58 Unfortunately,
domestic
politics in France now erupted and soon drove Europe over the brink.
Revolution and War_nodrm
The royal family's own search for foreign support was unsuccessful, despifre the close family connections between Louis and his queen and several rul- ing houses of Europe.
Although Marie Antoinette maintained an active cor- respondence and Louis dispatched a personal emissary to negotiate for foreign assistance, their efforts brought only words of encouragement and counsels of patience.
37
One reason for restraint was the favorable reaction that the revolution had produced among many European elites. If men such as Edmund Burke were suspicious, artists and intellectuals such as Kant, Fichte, Blake, and Beethoven all welcomed the apparent triumph of liberty in France. 38 This fa- vorable view was shared by prominent political leaders: Thomas Jefferson described events in France as "the first chapter of the history of European liberty," and the leader of the English Whigs, Charles James Fox, called the fall of the Bastille "the greatest and best event that has happened in the world. " Other Englishmen-including Prime Minister William Pitt-were
reminded of England's own revolution and were flattered that France seemed to be following a similar path. 39 Although elites in Russia, Sweden, and Spain tended to see the revolution as illegitimate and dangerous, liberali monarchs such as Joseph II and Leopold I were more sympathetic. 40
European statesmen also welcomed the revolution because it reduced French power, thereby decreasing the danger that prerevolutionary France had
37 The queen's efforts to enlist foreign support are chronicled in Alfred Ritter von Ameth, ed. , Marie Antoinette, joseph II, und Leopold II: Ihr Briefwechse/ (Leipzig: K. F. Kohler, 1866); and 0. G. de Heidenstam, The Letters ofMarie Antoinette, Fersen, and Barnave (New York: Frank Maurice, n. d. ).
38 On European reactions to the revolution, see Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:179-87; Albert Soboul, The French Revolution, 1 787-1799, trans. Alan Forrest and Colin Jones (New York: Vin? tage, 1975), 216-18; Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:16-27, 53; George Rude, Revolutionary Ew- rope, 1783-1815 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964}, 18o-82; G. P. Gooch, "Germany and the French Revolution," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, ser. 3, no. 10 (1916), esp. 55-56; Vovelle, Fallofthe French Monarchy, 137-41; Alfred Cobban, ed. , The Debate on the French Revolution (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1960); and Philip Anthony Brown, The French Revolution in English History (London: Crosby Lockwood and Son, 1918), 29-50.
39 Pitt told the House of Commons in February 1790 that "whenever the situation of France shall become restored, . . . France will enjoy just that kind of liberty which I venerate; . . . [I cannot] regard with envious eyes, an approximation in neighbouring states to those senti- ments which are the characteristic features of every British subject. " Quotations from Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U. S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 98; Brown, French Revolution in English History, 38-39; John Holland Rose, Life of William Pitt (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1924}, 1:551; Cobban, Debate on the French Revolution, 68-69.
40 In August 1790, for example, the Spanish foreign minister, Count Floridablanca, de- scribed the French democrats as "a wretched set. . . . If I had my way, I would put a cordon along the frontier, as if for a plague. " Quoted in Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 33-
? ? ? ? TheFrenchRevolution
posed and creating opportunities to profit at French expense. This attitude was nowhere more apparent than in England: to Pitt, France was "an object for compassion," while the duke of Leeds, then foreign secretary, remarked in 1789, "I defy the ablest heads in England to have planned, or its whole Wealth to have purchased, a Situation so fatal to its Rival, as that to which France is now reduced by her own Intestine commotions. " His successor, Lord Grenville, rejoiced that France would not "for many years be in a situation to molest the invaluable peace we now enjoy," and the English ambassador at the Hague, William Eden (later Lord Auckland), judged that France had "ceased
to be an object of alarm" and would be "of little importance with respect to its external politics. " Even Burke, whose worries focused on the spread of sub- versive ideas, referred to the French as "the ablest architects of ruin . . . in the world. "41 Thus, when the emigres offered them colonial concessions in ex- change for Briftish support, England's leaders chose the more immediate ben- efits of neutrality. As James Burges, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, wrote Auckland in December 1790: "We have felt too strongly the immense ad- vantages to be derived by this country from such a state of anarchy and weak- ness as France is at present plunged in to be so mad as to interfere in any measure that may . . . tend to [give] France . . . the power to injure us. "42
France's reduced power was equally apparent to the eastern monarchies.
Frederick William saw the revolution as a blow to the Franco-Austrian al- liance and began contemplating the acquisition of French territory once the Convention of Reichenbach ended his plans for war against Austria. 43 Simi- larly, Catherine II's hostility toward the revolution did not blind her to its strategic benefits: the revolutionary crisis had left France unable to come to the aid of Poland, Sweden, or Turkey, and Catherine's subsequent denunci- ations of the new regime were partly intended to draw Prussian and Aus- trian attention westwards so as to free Russia's hand in the east. 44 Some
41 See Rose, Life ofPitt, 1:542-43; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 79-Bo, 132; Rude, Rev- olutionary Europe, 181; and Harvey Mitchell, The Underground Waragainst Revolutionary France: The Missions ofWilliam Wickham, 1794-1Boo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 14. Such views were not confined to the English; one French agent reported in May 1790 that "England has nothing more to fear from France and can without qualms and without fear assume the su- premacy of the [New and Old] worlds. " Quoted in Albert Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution
Jranfaise (Paris: E. Pion, Nourrit, 1883-1912), 2:91.
42 QuotedinClapham,CausesoftheWarof1792,16. AucklandsharedBurges'sview,writing
Grenville, "I heartily detest . . . the whole system of the Democrates [sic] . . . but I am not sure that the continued course of their struggles . . . would not be beneficial to our political interests, and the best security to the permanence of our prosperity. " Quoted in Mitchell, Underground War, 19.
43 The court in Berlin reportedly believed that "the great popular revolution in France will prevent that country effectually from interfering in any shape in favour of the Imperial courts. " Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190.
44 In November 1791, Catherine reportedly told her secretary that she was "racking her brains to push the Courts of Vienna and Berlin into the French enterprise, so that she might have her own elbows free. " Quoted in Lord, Second Partition of Poland, 274; and see also Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190.
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Austrian officials were pleased to watch French power decline, and Leopold began exploring a renewed alliance with England. Thus, the initially mild reaction of the other great powers was partly due to the strategic benefits that each hoped to gain from the disarray in France.
The belief that the revolution posed little danger at first was reinforced by the caution and circumspection that characterized French diplomacy from 1789 to 1791. When the Spanish seizure of English fishing vess? ls in the Nootka Sound brought the two nations to the brink of war in 1790, for ex- ample, the Assembly's de facto refusal to honor the Family Compact left Spain isolated and forced Madrid to beat a hasty retreat. 45 Louis did order the arming of fourteen ships of the line as a precautionary measure in May, but this move led the Assembly to decree that any declaration of war was subject to their approval. In a further burst of idealism, the deputies also voted to renounce "the undertaking of any war with a view of making con-
quests" and declared that France would not use force "against the liberty of any people. "46 By limiting royal authority over the conduct of foreign policy, these measures appeared to reduce French influence even more. The As- sembly was equally unresponsive when Austria suppressed a revolt in the Netherlands later in the year, reinforcing the prevailing image of French im- potence.
In addition, despite having renounced feudalism in August 1789, the As- sembly treated the feudal rights of foreign powers cautiously. It offered to indemnify the Rhenish princes whose lands had been appropriated in Al- sace and refrained from annexing Avignon until the pope had openly de- clared his own opposition to the revolution. Nor was the threat to the existing order that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the renuncia- tion of feudalism embodied as novel or as far-reaching as it first appeared: the French monarchy had violated the rights of foreign princes on numer- ous occasions before the revolution, and other rulers had acted similarly in their own realms. The situation in Avignon was equally muddled, as the French claim to the territory rested on both the notion of popular sover- eignty and a number of traditional legal precedents. Given that annexation was common under the old regime, the Assembly's assertion of French sov- ereignty over a small enclave lying entirely within French borders hardly
45 The tepid French response may have been partly due to English bribes to the comte de Mirabeau, the dominant figure in the Assembly during this period. See John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, vol. 1: The Years ofAcclaim (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1969), 553? 8; Rose, Life of Pitt, 1:577-81; and Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 198-200.
46 The decree was incorporated in the Constitution of 1791, and the comte de Mirabeau de- clared that "the moment is not far off when liberty will acquit mankind of the crime of war. " Quoted in Gunther E. Rothenburg, "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," in The Origins and Prevention ofMajor Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 2o6; and see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 260.
[6o]
? ? The French Revolu tion
posed a radical threat to the existing order. Until 1791, in short, the revolu- tion in France simply did not appear that dangerous. 47
Foreign reactions were further muted by the unpopularity of the emigres and the obviously self-serving nature of their testimony. Although the emi- gres were greeted warmly by some rulers (and were subsidized by Cather- ine the Great), their extravagance and vanity won them few friends in foreign courts and made them something of a nuisance in their adopted places of residence. 48 Moreover, the French royal family usually opposed their efforts, fearing that a restoration conducted under the auspices of the emigres would weaken royal authority even more than the Assembly had. 49 Louis repeatedly rejected the emigres' suggestions that he flee, preferring to make his own arrangements, and Louis explicitly warned Leopold not to support the emigres (which the Austrian ruler was loath to do in any case). Contacts with emigre agents did reinforce Prussian revisionism (though Frederick William hardly needed encouragement), but England and Austria remained largely immune from their blandishments. 5? During the Nootka Sound dispute, for example, the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Gower, wrote that "the aristocratical party has little to hope from peace and shews evident signs of wishing to profit by the confusion which a war would cer- tainly occasion. " During the summer, the discovery that counterrevolution- ary groups were trying to provoke a war between England and France by blaming the revolution on English interference led Pitt to send two agents to
France to reassure the Assembly of England's pacific intentions and con- vince it not to support Spain. 51 Thus, the royalists' efforts to sound the alarm generally feB flat at this stage.
Last but by no means least, the revolution in France received modest at- tention because the great powers were preoccupied by more pressing prob- lems elsewhere. Russia was at war with Turkey and Sweden and faced a direct challenge from the Poles, while Prussia was backing the Polish rebels
47 See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:196--97; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 76-78; Clapham, Causes ofthe Warof1792, 19-21; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 7J.
48 On the activities of the emigres and foreign responses to them, see Blanning, French Rev- olution in Germany, 52-53, 6o-61; Biro, German Policy, 1:42-45; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:187-88; and Massimo Boffa, "Emigres," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 326-28.
49 Rivalry between the crown and the nobility predated the revolution. The comtes d'Ar- tois and Provence sought to limit royal authority and preserve noble and provincial privi- leges. See Albert Goodwin, "Calonne, the Assembly of French Notables of 1787 and the Origins of the Revolte Nobiliaire," English Historical Review 61, nos. 24o-41 (1946).
50 See Lord, Second Partition ofPoland, 159; and also J. Holland Rose, "The Comte d'Artois and Pitt in December 1789,'' English Historical Review 30, no. 118 (1915).
51 Pitt's instructions convey his desire to remain aloof: "In the present circumstances the ut- most care is necessary to use no language which can lead to an expectation of our taking mea- sures to forward the internal views of any political party. " Quoted in Mitchell, Underground War, 17-18.
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and concocting its own schemes for aggrandizement. Austria's army was bogged down against the Turks, unrest at home was spreading, the Nether- lands were in open revolt, and Prussia's restless revisionism remained a se- rious concern. England and Spain were at loggerheads for most of 1790, and Pitt was more concerned about the balance of power in the East than the col- lapse of England's rival across the Channel. Spain, Sweden, and the Rhen- ish princes were genuinely alarmed by the revolution but were too weak to act alone. Although events in France were of great interest, other problems still took precedence.
This analysis suggests that the wars between France and the rest of Eu- rope did not arise from irreconcilable ideological antipathies. Foreign pow- ers took note of the revolution, some with misgivings, but they did not regard it as an immediate threat on either military or ideological grounds. 52
By contrast, the revolutionary forces in France were already worried about a counterrevolutionary conspiracy between the emigres, the papacy, and various foreign monarchs. Their suspicions were partly justified, as both Louis and the emigres had been seeking foreign assistance since the end of 1790. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, however, and relations between the emigres and the king remained strained and suspicious. In short, genuine fears of an "aristocratic plot" helped drive the revolution in increasingly radical directions, but the alleged conspiracy was a chimera at this point. The stage was set for a spiral into war, partly intended and partly inadvertent.
The Causes ofthe War of1792
Relations between France and the rest of Europe deteriorated dramati- cally in 1791. An underlying cause was the end of the war with Turkey, which allowed Austria and Russia to shift their attention back to European affairs. Another contributing factor was the reform movement in Poland, which helped bring Austria and Prussia together and increased Catherine's desire to regain control in Warsaw. The three main causes of war in 1792, however, were the dynastic ambitions of the other great powers (especially Prussia}, the struggle for power within France, and a series of regrettable miscalculations on both sides. The ideology of the revolution intensified! mutual perceptions of threat and reinforced the belief that the enemy could! be defeated quickly and painlessly. As we shall see, these beliefs turned out to be either erroneous or self-defeating and led to nearly a quarter century of war.
First we turn to Prussia's territorial ambitions? Despite the favorable op- portunities created by the revolution in France, the revolt in Poland, and the
? ? 52 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 12o-23 and passim.
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? The French Revolution
outbreak of war in the East, Prussia had failed to gain a single inch of terri- tory. When his plans to attack Austria were thwarted, Frederick William re- versed course and sought an alliance with Leopold in order to pursue territorial gains at Russian, Polish, or French expense. In September 1 790, a Prussian envoy proposed that Austria and Prussia act together to restore Louis to the throne, in exchange for territorial compensations in Flanders, Alsace, and Germany. Leopold rejected Prussia's entreaties at this time, and Frederick William turned to other equally unsuccessful schemes. 53 Un- daunted by past failures, he repeated his offer for an alliance with Austria in June 1791, and Leopold was now more receptive. The Austrian monarch had become concerned about the fate of the royal family in France and wanted to convince the Assembly to halt its campaign against them. Leopold was also aware of the royal family's plans to escape, and he in- tended to organize an armed demonstration on the French border in order
to convince the Assembly to adopt a more moderate policy. This plan crum- bled when the royal escape miscarried, but Leopold still believed that for- eign threats would have a moderating effect on the Assembly. 54
Leopold's change of heart led to the signing of a formal convention be- tween Austria and Prussia in July 1791. The convention committed the two states to aid each other in the event of internal rebellion, to support a free constitution in Poland, and to promote a European concert to regulate in- ternal developments in France. But despite its outward appearance, the con- vention was not intended to be the first step toward a counterrevolutionary invasion. Instead, Leopold regarded it as a means of limiting Russian influ- ence in Poland and moderating great power rivalries, and his objectives in France were still quite limited. The emperor aimed neither to start a war nor to undermine the National Assembly; he merely sought to strengthen the moderates and protect the royal family. 55 Frederick William wanted land, not counterrevolution, and he was willing to intervene in France in order to obtain territorial compensations rather than to defend monarchical institu-
53 Frederick Willliam backed an Anglo-Dutch-Prussian effort to force Russia to both restore the status quo ante with the Ottoman Empire and give up its predominant position in Poland, but the ploy failed when Catherine stood firm and the English Parliament refused to support the policy. On this incident {known as the Ochakov affair), see John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, vol. 2: The Reluctant Transition {Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1g83), chap. 1.
54 Leopold and his sister corresponded regularly during this period. The queen's pleas heightened his concern over events in France but did not convince him to support a counter- revolutionary invasion. Von Amath, Marie Antoinette, Joseph II, and Leopold II, 143-47, 156-69, I81-82, 188-g3, 20D-203, 24Q-41.
5 5 Leopold supported the Constitution o f 1791, and the Austrian chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, told the Prussian ambassador, "If Louis XVI can come to an agreement with the National As- sembly about the constitution, there must be no war. " When Louis accepted the constitution in September, Leopold declared that the need for a European concert had evaporated. See Heinrich von Sybel, History ofthe French Revolution, trans. Walter C. Perry {London: J. Murray, 1867), 1:362, 368; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, go.
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tions. Although both monarchs used counterrevolutionary rhetoric to justify their actions, neither saw their rapprochement as the beginning of a coun- terrevolutionary crusade. 56
Given these reservations, Leopold's efforts to pressure the Assembly were quite circumspect. He had already invited the other European powers to form a union to defend the French monarchy in July, but despite some stem language, the so-called Padua Circular was a symbolic gesture that did not commit him in any way. Meeting in Pillnitz at the end of the month (with the emigre comte d'Artois in attendance as well), Leopold and Frederick William issued a declaration calling for a European concert against the rev- olution. Like the Padua Circular, the Declaration of Pillnitz was purely sym- bolic, and joint action remained conditional on unanimous participation by the other powers. England was firmly committed to neutrality, however, which rendered the threat to intervene meaningless. This subtlety was lost on the deputies in the Assembly, in part because the Declaration implied that the emigres and the foreign monarchs were in close collaboration. 57
Leopold's attempt to encourage moderation seemed to work perfectly afr first. The threat of foreign intervention strengthened the Feuillants' position in the Assembly and facilitated their efforts to preserve the king's position, while Louis' decision to accept the new constitution seemed to eliminate the need for intervention from abroad. With the Feuillants in control of the As- sembly and the key ministries, the risk of war appeared to be fading by the fall of 1791.
58 Unfortunately, domestic politics in France now erupted and soon drove Europe over the brink.
The second major cause of war was the struggle for power in France and the Girondin campaign for war. The Feuillants' decision to preserve the
56 Leopold did tell the Prussian ambassador, "the Jacobins are stirring up revolts through- out the whole of Italy. It is necessary to root out the evil at once. " He offered no specific pro- posal for doing so, however, and warned, "We must proceed with extreme caution, and allow matters to come to such a pass that the nation itself will feel the necessity of a change in its condition. " Most importantly, he emphasized that intervention would have to be conducted by a general concert of all the European powers, which he knew to be a remote possibility. Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:351-52.
57 The declaration stated that the two monarchs "trust that the [European] powers . . . will (employ] the most effective means for enabling the King of France to consolidate . . . the foun- dations of a monarchical government. . . . In which case [alors et dans ce cas] their said Majesties . . . are resolved to act promptly . . . with the forces necessary. " And as Leopold as- sured his chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, "Alors et dans ce cas is for me the Law and the Prophets- if England fails us, the case I have put is nonexistent. " In referring to the monarchs having received "requests and representations of M. le Comte d'Artois," the declaration also con- tributed to French fears of an aristocratic conspiracy. See Stewart, Documentary Survey, 221-26; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 77-79; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 88; Ross, European Diplomatic History, 36-39; Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France," 693-96; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 89-90.
58 The Feuillants obtained 264 seats in the first elections, the Jacobins received 136, and over 350 were uncommitted. See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:213; and Sutherland, France, 132.
? ? The French Revolu tion
monarchy after the flight to Varennes and their suppression of popular forces at the Champs de Mars had further polarized internal politics in France, and the Austro-Prussian rapprochement, the exodus of emigres, the Padua Circular, and the Declaration of Pillnitz all combined to reinforce the fear that an aristocratic conspiracy was bent on crushing the revolution.
To counter these dangers and strengthen their own influence in the As- sembly, a faction of the Jacobin movement known as the Girondins began to advocate war in the fall of 1791. Led by a former journalist, Jean-Pierre Bris- sot de Warville, the Girondins believed that war would either expose the king's disloyalty or force him to break ranks with the emigres once and for all. In eithe1r case, the danger of counterrevolution would be reduced and the Girondins' own positions enhanced. The Girondins also feared the con- sequences of another popular uprising and thought a successful war would consolidate the nation and bring the revolutionary process to an end. 59
The Girondin recipe for war contained several volatile ingredients. Hs centerpiece was the familiar assertion that France faced a vast counterrevo- lutionary conspiracy linking the royal family, the emigres, the dissident clergy, and several foreign powers. 6? France's opponents were portrayed as irrevocably hostile, implying that war was inevitable and France must seize the initiative. As Brissot told the Assembly in October, "It is not merely nec- essary to think of defense, the [counterrevolutionary] attack must be antici- pated; you yourselves must attack. "61 The loyalty of the king was repeatedly questioned, and defenders of the monarchy now risked being labeled ene- mies of the revolution. The Girondins persuaded the Assembly to decree the death penalty for counterrevolutionaries and to issue an ultimatum de-
manding that several neighboring rulers expel the emigres from their terri- tories. These measures were intended to reduce the direct threat of counterrevolution and force the king to reveal his true loyalties. 62 Louis ve-
59 The Girondins (so named because many came from the department of Gironde) were known to contemporaries as "Brissotins," in reference to Brissot de Warville. See M. J. Syden- ham, The Girondins (London: Athlone Press, 1961 ); Alison Patrick, The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the French Convention of 1792 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press, 1972); and "Girondins" in Jones, Longman Companion, 176-18o.
60 Brissot's first speech on foreign affairs raised the specter of a vast conspiracy against the revolution, and he accused the king of "secret schemes" in December. See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; Clapham, Origins ofthe Warof1792, 135; Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1989), 592-93; and F. L. Kidner, "The Girondists and the 'Propaganda War' of 1792: A Reevaluation of French Revolutionary For- eign Policy from 1791 to 1793," (Ph. D diss. , Princeton University, 1971), 7<>-74?
61 Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 27, 115, 135. On the central place of "plots" in the mindset of the revolution, see Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 55-'JO.
62 As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791, "The accepted leader of the nation will be forced to rule in accordance with the Constitution. If he does his duty, we will support him wholeheartedly. If he betrays us-the people will be ready. " Quoted in Sydenham, Girondins, 104.
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toed the antiemigre decrees on November 12, but he also endorsed an ulti- matum demanding that the elector of Trier disperse the emigre armies the following month, and the Girondins' attempt to provoke a confrontation backfired when the elector promptly agreed to the French demands. The king's popularity soared, and the danger of war temporarily receded.
In addition, the Girondins argued that a successful war would rally pub- lic opinion behind the Assembly and undermine the counterrevolutionary forces within France. As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791: "A people which has just won its liberty after ten centuries of slavery needs a war in order te bring about its consolidation. " They also claimed that war would permit more active efforts to suppress internal opponents, because "in time of war, measures can be taken that would appear too stern in time of peace. "63
The Girondin orators also successfully stirred the emotions of the deputies by repeatedly invoking French glory and national honor. In his ini- tial speech, Brissot began by reciting a list of alleged offenses committed by foreign powers and told the delegates, "You must avenge your glory, or con- demn yourselves to eternal dishonor. " His associate Maximin Isnard pro- claimed, "The French people have become the foremost people of the universe. As slaves, they were bold and great; are they to be feeble and timid now that they are free? " Brissot addressed the same theme in a speech at the Jacobin Club in December: "Louis XIV could declare war on Spain be- cause his ambassador had been insulted . . . are we who are free, should we for a moment hesitate? " Another Girondin, Jean Baptiste Mailhe, pro- claimed that the French nation would "disappear from the face of the earth rather than violate her oath. " That oath, Brissot reminded the delegates, was a simple one: "The Constitution or death! "64
These invocations of patriotism and national pride led to a final theme: that the war would be easy and a glorious victory inevitable. Echoing the optimistic predictions of the foreign representatives in Paris, the Girondins claimed that foreign peoples would rise up to overthrow the despots who sought to suppress liberty. "In the face of our brave patriots," predicted one speaker, "the allied armies will fade away like the shades of night in the face of the rays of the sun. " The German exile Anacharsis Cloots told the As- sembly, "The German and Bohemian peasants will resume their war against their . . . seigneurs; the Dutch and the Germans, the Italians and the Scandi-
63 Brissotalsoargued,"Waratsuchatimeasthiswouldbeablessingtothenation,andthe only calamity that we should fear is that there will not be a war," and he maintained that "we need spectacular treason cases; the people are ready! " Another Girondin suggested that France "designate the place for traitors beforehand, and let it be the scaffold! " Quoted in Soboul,FrenchRevolution,236-37;Clapham, CausesoftheWarof1792,135-36;andLefebvre, French Revolution, 1:219.
64 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 100-101, 112.
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? The French Revolu tion
navians, will shake off and shatter their chains with fury. " Brissot described the war as "a crusade for universal liberty," and Isnard proclaimed, "If the cabinets try to raise up against France a war of kings, we shall raise up a war of peoples against kings. . . . At the moment that the enemy armies begin to fight with ours, the daylight of philosophy will open their eyes and the peo- ples will embrace each other in the face of their dethroned tyrants and an
approving heaven and earth. "65
If world revolution was imminent and lacked only the French spark to ig- nite it, then the war would be swift and would bring enormous benefits. As Mailhe reminded the Assembly: "Humanity will doubtless suffer, when one considers that in decreeing war you are also decreeing the death of several thousand men; but consider also that you are perhaps decreeing the liberty of the entire world. . . . Outside France despotism is in its death throes and a prompt attack will precipitate its final agony. "66
This extraordinary optimism also rested on an inflated sense of France's military capabilities and an unwarranted disregard for its opponents. Claiming that free peoples would fight more fiercely than the mercenary armies of the old regime, one of the deputies suggested that "Louis XIV with 40o,ooo slaves, knew how to defy all the powers of Europe; can we, with our millions of free men, fear them? " Another asked, "What is the [French] army? " and provided his own answer: "It is the entire population. " Yet another declared that "if the French people once draws the sword, it will fling the scabbard far away. Inflamed by the fire of freedom, it can . . . sin- glehanded change the whole face of the earth and make the tyrants tremble on their thrones of clay. " Brissot argued that "every advantage is now on our side, for every Frenchmen is a soldier, and a willing soldier at that! Where is the power on earth . . . who could hope to master six million free soldiers? " This confidence was reinforced by misleading reports from the minister of war, who believed that a short war would rally the nation around the constitution and presented the Assembly with an overly rosy picture of the nation's readiness for war. 67
The Girondins also argued that the diplomatic environment was unusu- ally favorable. They predicted that Sweden, Russia, and England would re-
65 The president of the Assembly, Henri Gregoire, declared that "if the princes of Germany continue to favor preparations against the French, the French will not carry fire and the sword to them, they will carry liberty. It is up to them to calculate the possible consequences of an awakening of nations. " Another Girondin predicted, "If the Revolution has already marked 1789 as the first year of French liberty, the date of the xst of January 1792 will mark this as the first year of universal liberty. " Quotations from Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 109-10; Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 77; and Schama, Citizens, 594, 597?
66 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolution in Germany, 63.
67 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, xoB-109; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:385. For evidenceofFrance'slackofreadiness,seeLefebvre, FrenchRevolution, 1:229;butseealsoScott, Response ofthe Royal Army, esp. 161? 2; and Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution, 49-74?
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main neutral, while Prussia would abandon Austria and ally with France. Here was logic at its most contradictory: on the one hand, war was neces- sary because France was threatened by a vast aristocratic conspiracy; on the other harid, victory was certain because a key member of the opposing coalition was actually a French ally!
In short, the Girondins' campaign for war was inspired primarily by their desire to undermine the Feuillants and the king and to stave off the coun- terrevolution they believed was imminent. Brissot and company may not have believed all of their own arguments, of course, and their position was neither internally consistent nor supported by a careful survey of the avail- able evidence. 68 The key point, however, is that these arguments touched a sympathetic chord within the Assembly and helped convince the deputies to take an increasingly bellicose position toward the emigres, the Austrians, and the king. By portraying France's foes as implacably hostile, by linking them with the king, emigres, and internal opposition, and by persuading the Assembly that the campaign would be short, cheap, and glorious, the Girondins cast war as an ideal solution to the present turmoil.
Momentum for war increased after the Girondins' opponents also con- cluded that it would advance their own political fortunes. By the fall of 1791, for example, Lafayette was convinced that a short, victorious war would rally popular support behind the new constitution and establish the king's authority. Hence, his followers supported the Girondin campaign for war, but for their own reasons. 69 Ironically, Louis XVI also decided to sup- port a war at this point, because he believed that France was unprepared and a rapid defeat would undermine the Assembly's authority and permit him to negotiate his own restoration? 0 By January, therefore, a number of the contenders for power were in favor of war, each convinced that it would strengthen his own position and weaken his internal rivals.
The Girondins' efforts were aided by the fact that some of their arguments were partly true. The king's acceptance of the constitution was insincere, and although there existed no antirevolutionary "aristocratic plot," the royal fam-
68 The contradictions in the Girondins' position are noted by Kidner, who concludes that they did not seriously expect to spread revolution. See "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 84, 91-<)2 and passim.
69 SeeAlbertMathiez,TheFrenchRevolution,trans. CatherineAlisonPhillips(NewYork:Al- fred A. Knopf, 1928), 139-40; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:217-18.
70 Louis told an advisor, "The physical and moral state of France is such that it is impossi- ble for her to carry on [this war] for half a campaign, but it is necessary that I should appear to enter upon it whole-heartedly . . . . My course of action should be such that the nation may find its only resource in its troubles in throwing itself in to my arms. " The queen shared this view, arguing that "the fools" in the Assembly "do not see that [threatening the Electors] is a service to us, for if we begin [to fight them], it will be necessary . . . for all the powers to in- tervene. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 14o-42.
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? ? The French Revolution
ily had been in contact with various counterrevolutionary groups and did hope to reverse the revolution at an opportune moment. 71 The hostility of the emigres was not a fabrication either, even if the actual threat they posed was minimal. And, while there was no European concert against the revolution, Prussia and AustJria had made hostile gestures at Pillnitz, and Sweden, Rus- sia, and Spain had expressed even greater antipathy to the new order in France. Finally, the ease with which the revolts in Holland and Belgium had been suppressed in 1787 and 1790 gave the deputies in the Assembly a rea- sonable basis for fearing that they might suffer a similar fate. Although the Girondins tailored their arguments to suit their political goals, their assertions gained credibility because there was considerable evidence to support them.
In addition to the roles of Prussian ambition and internal French devel- opments, the decision for war was encouraged by a series of misperceptions and miscalculations between France and its main adversaries that intensi- fied perceptions of hostility and strengthened the prowar factions on both sides. The first error arose from Leopold's belief that the Padua Circular and the Declaration of Pillnitz had strengthened the Feuillants and convinced the Assembly to moderate its policies. Unaware that the Feuillants' earlier ascendancy had had little to do with his threats or that conditions within France were changing rapidly, Leopold failed to recognize that further at- tempts to intimidate the the Assembly would have very different effects.
As we have seen, the Girondins' first attempt to provoke a confrontation in November 1791 had backfired when Louis demanded the dispersal of the emigre armies and the German electors complied. Unfortunately, Leopold now chose this moment to try to repeat his actions of the previous August. As head of the Holy Roman Empire, he sent a formal protest regarding the usurping of the imperial princes' feudal rights in Alsace on December 3 and approved the Imperial Diet's resolution on this issue. On December 21, the Austrian chancellor, Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz, informed the As- sembly that Austria would defend the elector of Trier if he were threatened, bluntly warning that armed action by France would lead to "inevitable con- sequences not only from the head and members of the Holy Roman Empire but also from the other sovereigns who have united in a concert for the main- tenance of public order and for the security and honour of monarchs. "72
Despite the insulting tone of the Austrian demarche, Leopold and Kau- nitz did not want war, and the emperor advised the electors to accept the French demands. 73 Instead, their threats were intended to strengthen the
71 See Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 119-22.
72 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 102; and see also Clapham, Causes of the Warof1792, 132-33.
73 See Alfred von Vivenot and H. Zeissberg, eds. , Quellen zur Geschichte derDeutschen Kaiser- politik Osterreichs wiihrend der Franzosichen Revolutionskriege, 179D-1801 (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumiiller, 1873-<)0), 1:304, 316.
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moderates and to force the Assembly to tum to the king. The Austrians did not know that the Feuillants were no longer in control, however, and Kau- nitz's note merely aroused French suspicions and further undermined the moderates. On January 25, 1792, the Assembly voted to issue a counterulti- matum demanding that Leopold renounce any agreements or treaties di- rected against France. Louis promptly vetoed the motion, reminding the deputies tlhat the Constitution of 1791 gave him primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy and pointing out that he had already re- quested assurances of Leopold's peaceful intentions? 4
Louis's opposition stymied the Girondins temporarily, but momentum for war was restored when Austria tried yet again to intimidate the Assem- bly. The Austrian Council of State had already decided on January 17 to re- activate the "European concert" and demand that France disband its forces on the border, restore the German princes' feudal rights, renew Louis's tra- ditional privileges and freedoms, return Avignon to the papacy, and confirm its adherence to all existing treaties. Still convinced that their campaign of intimidation was working (an illusion sustained by a conciliatory message from French foreign minister Antoine Delessart), Austria now sought to transform the convention with Prussia into a formal military alliance, and! Kaunitz dispatched another caustic note to Paris on February 17. 75 Yet even these steps were not intended to lead to war, as Leopold and Kaunitz still believed an armed demonstration with Prussia would be sufficient to strengthen the forces of moderation and restore the position of the king. 76
Frederick William and his ministers welcomed the proposal for an ali? Hance, and a formal treaty was signed on February 7? The Austrians stm hoped to avoid war (although acquisitive ambitions were beginning to emerge in Vienna as well), but Prussia's leaders saw the situation primarily as an opportunity to expand. Their zeal was further increased by thei. r awareness of Russia's designs on Poland, which created the alluring possi- bility that Prussia might receive several Polish territories it had long coveted as compensation for its efforts in France. 77
74 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 105; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 145-48; Kidner, "Girondins and the 'Propaganda War,' " 95-102.
75 Delessart had tried to satisfy the Assembly's demands without provoking Austria to war, but his measured reply unwittingly reinforced the Austrians' faith in their minatory diplo- macy. See Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 1 54-55, 164-66; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:426-27; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, u6; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224.
76 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 89, 95--97; and also Vivenot and Zeiss? berg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiserpolitik, 1:323-41, esp. 327-30.
77 According to Robert Lord, "From the first moment when the enterprise against France appeared possible, Frederick William's dominant aim-the first and last word of his policy- was territorial aggrandizement. " Second Partition ofPoland, 2JD-3J See also Blanning, French R e v o l u t i o n a r y Wa r s , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; V o n S y b e l , F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , 2 : 6 - 1 1 , 2 2 ; a n d C l a p h a m , C a u s e s of t h e W a r of 1 7 9 2 , 1 5 6 , 1 7 1 - 7 2 .
?
One reason for restraint was the favorable reaction that the revolution had produced among many European elites. If men such as Edmund Burke were suspicious, artists and intellectuals such as Kant, Fichte, Blake, and Beethoven all welcomed the apparent triumph of liberty in France. 38 This fa- vorable view was shared by prominent political leaders: Thomas Jefferson described events in France as "the first chapter of the history of European liberty," and the leader of the English Whigs, Charles James Fox, called the fall of the Bastille "the greatest and best event that has happened in the world. " Other Englishmen-including Prime Minister William Pitt-were
reminded of England's own revolution and were flattered that France seemed to be following a similar path. 39 Although elites in Russia, Sweden, and Spain tended to see the revolution as illegitimate and dangerous, liberali monarchs such as Joseph II and Leopold I were more sympathetic. 40
European statesmen also welcomed the revolution because it reduced French power, thereby decreasing the danger that prerevolutionary France had
37 The queen's efforts to enlist foreign support are chronicled in Alfred Ritter von Ameth, ed. , Marie Antoinette, joseph II, und Leopold II: Ihr Briefwechse/ (Leipzig: K. F. Kohler, 1866); and 0. G. de Heidenstam, The Letters ofMarie Antoinette, Fersen, and Barnave (New York: Frank Maurice, n. d. ).
38 On European reactions to the revolution, see Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:179-87; Albert Soboul, The French Revolution, 1 787-1799, trans. Alan Forrest and Colin Jones (New York: Vin? tage, 1975), 216-18; Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:16-27, 53; George Rude, Revolutionary Ew- rope, 1783-1815 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964}, 18o-82; G. P. Gooch, "Germany and the French Revolution," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, ser. 3, no. 10 (1916), esp. 55-56; Vovelle, Fallofthe French Monarchy, 137-41; Alfred Cobban, ed. , The Debate on the French Revolution (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1960); and Philip Anthony Brown, The French Revolution in English History (London: Crosby Lockwood and Son, 1918), 29-50.
39 Pitt told the House of Commons in February 1790 that "whenever the situation of France shall become restored, . . . France will enjoy just that kind of liberty which I venerate; . . . [I cannot] regard with envious eyes, an approximation in neighbouring states to those senti- ments which are the characteristic features of every British subject. " Quotations from Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U. S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 98; Brown, French Revolution in English History, 38-39; John Holland Rose, Life of William Pitt (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1924}, 1:551; Cobban, Debate on the French Revolution, 68-69.
40 In August 1790, for example, the Spanish foreign minister, Count Floridablanca, de- scribed the French democrats as "a wretched set. . . . If I had my way, I would put a cordon along the frontier, as if for a plague. " Quoted in Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 33-
? ? ? ? TheFrenchRevolution
posed and creating opportunities to profit at French expense. This attitude was nowhere more apparent than in England: to Pitt, France was "an object for compassion," while the duke of Leeds, then foreign secretary, remarked in 1789, "I defy the ablest heads in England to have planned, or its whole Wealth to have purchased, a Situation so fatal to its Rival, as that to which France is now reduced by her own Intestine commotions. " His successor, Lord Grenville, rejoiced that France would not "for many years be in a situation to molest the invaluable peace we now enjoy," and the English ambassador at the Hague, William Eden (later Lord Auckland), judged that France had "ceased
to be an object of alarm" and would be "of little importance with respect to its external politics. " Even Burke, whose worries focused on the spread of sub- versive ideas, referred to the French as "the ablest architects of ruin . . . in the world. "41 Thus, when the emigres offered them colonial concessions in ex- change for Briftish support, England's leaders chose the more immediate ben- efits of neutrality. As James Burges, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, wrote Auckland in December 1790: "We have felt too strongly the immense ad- vantages to be derived by this country from such a state of anarchy and weak- ness as France is at present plunged in to be so mad as to interfere in any measure that may . . . tend to [give] France . . . the power to injure us. "42
France's reduced power was equally apparent to the eastern monarchies.
Frederick William saw the revolution as a blow to the Franco-Austrian al- liance and began contemplating the acquisition of French territory once the Convention of Reichenbach ended his plans for war against Austria. 43 Simi- larly, Catherine II's hostility toward the revolution did not blind her to its strategic benefits: the revolutionary crisis had left France unable to come to the aid of Poland, Sweden, or Turkey, and Catherine's subsequent denunci- ations of the new regime were partly intended to draw Prussian and Aus- trian attention westwards so as to free Russia's hand in the east. 44 Some
41 See Rose, Life ofPitt, 1:542-43; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 79-Bo, 132; Rude, Rev- olutionary Europe, 181; and Harvey Mitchell, The Underground Waragainst Revolutionary France: The Missions ofWilliam Wickham, 1794-1Boo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 14. Such views were not confined to the English; one French agent reported in May 1790 that "England has nothing more to fear from France and can without qualms and without fear assume the su- premacy of the [New and Old] worlds. " Quoted in Albert Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution
Jranfaise (Paris: E. Pion, Nourrit, 1883-1912), 2:91.
42 QuotedinClapham,CausesoftheWarof1792,16. AucklandsharedBurges'sview,writing
Grenville, "I heartily detest . . . the whole system of the Democrates [sic] . . . but I am not sure that the continued course of their struggles . . . would not be beneficial to our political interests, and the best security to the permanence of our prosperity. " Quoted in Mitchell, Underground War, 19.
43 The court in Berlin reportedly believed that "the great popular revolution in France will prevent that country effectually from interfering in any shape in favour of the Imperial courts. " Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190.
44 In November 1791, Catherine reportedly told her secretary that she was "racking her brains to push the Courts of Vienna and Berlin into the French enterprise, so that she might have her own elbows free. " Quoted in Lord, Second Partition of Poland, 274; and see also Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190.
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Austrian officials were pleased to watch French power decline, and Leopold began exploring a renewed alliance with England. Thus, the initially mild reaction of the other great powers was partly due to the strategic benefits that each hoped to gain from the disarray in France.
The belief that the revolution posed little danger at first was reinforced by the caution and circumspection that characterized French diplomacy from 1789 to 1791. When the Spanish seizure of English fishing vess? ls in the Nootka Sound brought the two nations to the brink of war in 1790, for ex- ample, the Assembly's de facto refusal to honor the Family Compact left Spain isolated and forced Madrid to beat a hasty retreat. 45 Louis did order the arming of fourteen ships of the line as a precautionary measure in May, but this move led the Assembly to decree that any declaration of war was subject to their approval. In a further burst of idealism, the deputies also voted to renounce "the undertaking of any war with a view of making con-
quests" and declared that France would not use force "against the liberty of any people. "46 By limiting royal authority over the conduct of foreign policy, these measures appeared to reduce French influence even more. The As- sembly was equally unresponsive when Austria suppressed a revolt in the Netherlands later in the year, reinforcing the prevailing image of French im- potence.
In addition, despite having renounced feudalism in August 1789, the As- sembly treated the feudal rights of foreign powers cautiously. It offered to indemnify the Rhenish princes whose lands had been appropriated in Al- sace and refrained from annexing Avignon until the pope had openly de- clared his own opposition to the revolution. Nor was the threat to the existing order that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the renuncia- tion of feudalism embodied as novel or as far-reaching as it first appeared: the French monarchy had violated the rights of foreign princes on numer- ous occasions before the revolution, and other rulers had acted similarly in their own realms. The situation in Avignon was equally muddled, as the French claim to the territory rested on both the notion of popular sover- eignty and a number of traditional legal precedents. Given that annexation was common under the old regime, the Assembly's assertion of French sov- ereignty over a small enclave lying entirely within French borders hardly
45 The tepid French response may have been partly due to English bribes to the comte de Mirabeau, the dominant figure in the Assembly during this period. See John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, vol. 1: The Years ofAcclaim (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1969), 553? 8; Rose, Life of Pitt, 1:577-81; and Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 198-200.
46 The decree was incorporated in the Constitution of 1791, and the comte de Mirabeau de- clared that "the moment is not far off when liberty will acquit mankind of the crime of war. " Quoted in Gunther E. Rothenburg, "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," in The Origins and Prevention ofMajor Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 2o6; and see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 260.
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posed a radical threat to the existing order. Until 1791, in short, the revolu- tion in France simply did not appear that dangerous. 47
Foreign reactions were further muted by the unpopularity of the emigres and the obviously self-serving nature of their testimony. Although the emi- gres were greeted warmly by some rulers (and were subsidized by Cather- ine the Great), their extravagance and vanity won them few friends in foreign courts and made them something of a nuisance in their adopted places of residence. 48 Moreover, the French royal family usually opposed their efforts, fearing that a restoration conducted under the auspices of the emigres would weaken royal authority even more than the Assembly had. 49 Louis repeatedly rejected the emigres' suggestions that he flee, preferring to make his own arrangements, and Louis explicitly warned Leopold not to support the emigres (which the Austrian ruler was loath to do in any case). Contacts with emigre agents did reinforce Prussian revisionism (though Frederick William hardly needed encouragement), but England and Austria remained largely immune from their blandishments. 5? During the Nootka Sound dispute, for example, the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Gower, wrote that "the aristocratical party has little to hope from peace and shews evident signs of wishing to profit by the confusion which a war would cer- tainly occasion. " During the summer, the discovery that counterrevolution- ary groups were trying to provoke a war between England and France by blaming the revolution on English interference led Pitt to send two agents to
France to reassure the Assembly of England's pacific intentions and con- vince it not to support Spain. 51 Thus, the royalists' efforts to sound the alarm generally feB flat at this stage.
Last but by no means least, the revolution in France received modest at- tention because the great powers were preoccupied by more pressing prob- lems elsewhere. Russia was at war with Turkey and Sweden and faced a direct challenge from the Poles, while Prussia was backing the Polish rebels
47 See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:196--97; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 76-78; Clapham, Causes ofthe Warof1792, 19-21; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 7J.
48 On the activities of the emigres and foreign responses to them, see Blanning, French Rev- olution in Germany, 52-53, 6o-61; Biro, German Policy, 1:42-45; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:187-88; and Massimo Boffa, "Emigres," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 326-28.
49 Rivalry between the crown and the nobility predated the revolution. The comtes d'Ar- tois and Provence sought to limit royal authority and preserve noble and provincial privi- leges. See Albert Goodwin, "Calonne, the Assembly of French Notables of 1787 and the Origins of the Revolte Nobiliaire," English Historical Review 61, nos. 24o-41 (1946).
50 See Lord, Second Partition ofPoland, 159; and also J. Holland Rose, "The Comte d'Artois and Pitt in December 1789,'' English Historical Review 30, no. 118 (1915).
51 Pitt's instructions convey his desire to remain aloof: "In the present circumstances the ut- most care is necessary to use no language which can lead to an expectation of our taking mea- sures to forward the internal views of any political party. " Quoted in Mitchell, Underground War, 17-18.
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and concocting its own schemes for aggrandizement. Austria's army was bogged down against the Turks, unrest at home was spreading, the Nether- lands were in open revolt, and Prussia's restless revisionism remained a se- rious concern. England and Spain were at loggerheads for most of 1790, and Pitt was more concerned about the balance of power in the East than the col- lapse of England's rival across the Channel. Spain, Sweden, and the Rhen- ish princes were genuinely alarmed by the revolution but were too weak to act alone. Although events in France were of great interest, other problems still took precedence.
This analysis suggests that the wars between France and the rest of Eu- rope did not arise from irreconcilable ideological antipathies. Foreign pow- ers took note of the revolution, some with misgivings, but they did not regard it as an immediate threat on either military or ideological grounds. 52
By contrast, the revolutionary forces in France were already worried about a counterrevolutionary conspiracy between the emigres, the papacy, and various foreign monarchs. Their suspicions were partly justified, as both Louis and the emigres had been seeking foreign assistance since the end of 1790. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, however, and relations between the emigres and the king remained strained and suspicious. In short, genuine fears of an "aristocratic plot" helped drive the revolution in increasingly radical directions, but the alleged conspiracy was a chimera at this point. The stage was set for a spiral into war, partly intended and partly inadvertent.
The Causes ofthe War of1792
Relations between France and the rest of Europe deteriorated dramati- cally in 1791. An underlying cause was the end of the war with Turkey, which allowed Austria and Russia to shift their attention back to European affairs. Another contributing factor was the reform movement in Poland, which helped bring Austria and Prussia together and increased Catherine's desire to regain control in Warsaw. The three main causes of war in 1792, however, were the dynastic ambitions of the other great powers (especially Prussia}, the struggle for power within France, and a series of regrettable miscalculations on both sides. The ideology of the revolution intensified! mutual perceptions of threat and reinforced the belief that the enemy could! be defeated quickly and painlessly. As we shall see, these beliefs turned out to be either erroneous or self-defeating and led to nearly a quarter century of war.
First we turn to Prussia's territorial ambitions? Despite the favorable op- portunities created by the revolution in France, the revolt in Poland, and the
? ? 52 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 12o-23 and passim.
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outbreak of war in the East, Prussia had failed to gain a single inch of terri- tory. When his plans to attack Austria were thwarted, Frederick William re- versed course and sought an alliance with Leopold in order to pursue territorial gains at Russian, Polish, or French expense. In September 1 790, a Prussian envoy proposed that Austria and Prussia act together to restore Louis to the throne, in exchange for territorial compensations in Flanders, Alsace, and Germany. Leopold rejected Prussia's entreaties at this time, and Frederick William turned to other equally unsuccessful schemes. 53 Un- daunted by past failures, he repeated his offer for an alliance with Austria in June 1791, and Leopold was now more receptive. The Austrian monarch had become concerned about the fate of the royal family in France and wanted to convince the Assembly to halt its campaign against them. Leopold was also aware of the royal family's plans to escape, and he in- tended to organize an armed demonstration on the French border in order
to convince the Assembly to adopt a more moderate policy. This plan crum- bled when the royal escape miscarried, but Leopold still believed that for- eign threats would have a moderating effect on the Assembly. 54
Leopold's change of heart led to the signing of a formal convention be- tween Austria and Prussia in July 1791. The convention committed the two states to aid each other in the event of internal rebellion, to support a free constitution in Poland, and to promote a European concert to regulate in- ternal developments in France. But despite its outward appearance, the con- vention was not intended to be the first step toward a counterrevolutionary invasion. Instead, Leopold regarded it as a means of limiting Russian influ- ence in Poland and moderating great power rivalries, and his objectives in France were still quite limited. The emperor aimed neither to start a war nor to undermine the National Assembly; he merely sought to strengthen the moderates and protect the royal family. 55 Frederick William wanted land, not counterrevolution, and he was willing to intervene in France in order to obtain territorial compensations rather than to defend monarchical institu-
53 Frederick Willliam backed an Anglo-Dutch-Prussian effort to force Russia to both restore the status quo ante with the Ottoman Empire and give up its predominant position in Poland, but the ploy failed when Catherine stood firm and the English Parliament refused to support the policy. On this incident {known as the Ochakov affair), see John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, vol. 2: The Reluctant Transition {Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1g83), chap. 1.
54 Leopold and his sister corresponded regularly during this period. The queen's pleas heightened his concern over events in France but did not convince him to support a counter- revolutionary invasion. Von Amath, Marie Antoinette, Joseph II, and Leopold II, 143-47, 156-69, I81-82, 188-g3, 20D-203, 24Q-41.
5 5 Leopold supported the Constitution o f 1791, and the Austrian chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, told the Prussian ambassador, "If Louis XVI can come to an agreement with the National As- sembly about the constitution, there must be no war. " When Louis accepted the constitution in September, Leopold declared that the need for a European concert had evaporated. See Heinrich von Sybel, History ofthe French Revolution, trans. Walter C. Perry {London: J. Murray, 1867), 1:362, 368; and Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, go.
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tions. Although both monarchs used counterrevolutionary rhetoric to justify their actions, neither saw their rapprochement as the beginning of a coun- terrevolutionary crusade. 56
Given these reservations, Leopold's efforts to pressure the Assembly were quite circumspect. He had already invited the other European powers to form a union to defend the French monarchy in July, but despite some stem language, the so-called Padua Circular was a symbolic gesture that did not commit him in any way. Meeting in Pillnitz at the end of the month (with the emigre comte d'Artois in attendance as well), Leopold and Frederick William issued a declaration calling for a European concert against the rev- olution. Like the Padua Circular, the Declaration of Pillnitz was purely sym- bolic, and joint action remained conditional on unanimous participation by the other powers. England was firmly committed to neutrality, however, which rendered the threat to intervene meaningless. This subtlety was lost on the deputies in the Assembly, in part because the Declaration implied that the emigres and the foreign monarchs were in close collaboration. 57
Leopold's attempt to encourage moderation seemed to work perfectly afr first. The threat of foreign intervention strengthened the Feuillants' position in the Assembly and facilitated their efforts to preserve the king's position, while Louis' decision to accept the new constitution seemed to eliminate the need for intervention from abroad. With the Feuillants in control of the As- sembly and the key ministries, the risk of war appeared to be fading by the fall of 1791.
58 Unfortunately, domestic politics in France now erupted and soon drove Europe over the brink.
The second major cause of war was the struggle for power in France and the Girondin campaign for war. The Feuillants' decision to preserve the
56 Leopold did tell the Prussian ambassador, "the Jacobins are stirring up revolts through- out the whole of Italy. It is necessary to root out the evil at once. " He offered no specific pro- posal for doing so, however, and warned, "We must proceed with extreme caution, and allow matters to come to such a pass that the nation itself will feel the necessity of a change in its condition. " Most importantly, he emphasized that intervention would have to be conducted by a general concert of all the European powers, which he knew to be a remote possibility. Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:351-52.
57 The declaration stated that the two monarchs "trust that the [European] powers . . . will (employ] the most effective means for enabling the King of France to consolidate . . . the foun- dations of a monarchical government. . . . In which case [alors et dans ce cas] their said Majesties . . . are resolved to act promptly . . . with the forces necessary. " And as Leopold as- sured his chancellor, Prince Kaunitz, "Alors et dans ce cas is for me the Law and the Prophets- if England fails us, the case I have put is nonexistent. " In referring to the monarchs having received "requests and representations of M. le Comte d'Artois," the declaration also con- tributed to French fears of an aristocratic conspiracy. See Stewart, Documentary Survey, 221-26; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 77-79; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 88; Ross, European Diplomatic History, 36-39; Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France," 693-96; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 89-90.
58 The Feuillants obtained 264 seats in the first elections, the Jacobins received 136, and over 350 were uncommitted. See Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:213; and Sutherland, France, 132.
? ? The French Revolu tion
monarchy after the flight to Varennes and their suppression of popular forces at the Champs de Mars had further polarized internal politics in France, and the Austro-Prussian rapprochement, the exodus of emigres, the Padua Circular, and the Declaration of Pillnitz all combined to reinforce the fear that an aristocratic conspiracy was bent on crushing the revolution.
To counter these dangers and strengthen their own influence in the As- sembly, a faction of the Jacobin movement known as the Girondins began to advocate war in the fall of 1791. Led by a former journalist, Jean-Pierre Bris- sot de Warville, the Girondins believed that war would either expose the king's disloyalty or force him to break ranks with the emigres once and for all. In eithe1r case, the danger of counterrevolution would be reduced and the Girondins' own positions enhanced. The Girondins also feared the con- sequences of another popular uprising and thought a successful war would consolidate the nation and bring the revolutionary process to an end. 59
The Girondin recipe for war contained several volatile ingredients. Hs centerpiece was the familiar assertion that France faced a vast counterrevo- lutionary conspiracy linking the royal family, the emigres, the dissident clergy, and several foreign powers. 6? France's opponents were portrayed as irrevocably hostile, implying that war was inevitable and France must seize the initiative. As Brissot told the Assembly in October, "It is not merely nec- essary to think of defense, the [counterrevolutionary] attack must be antici- pated; you yourselves must attack. "61 The loyalty of the king was repeatedly questioned, and defenders of the monarchy now risked being labeled ene- mies of the revolution. The Girondins persuaded the Assembly to decree the death penalty for counterrevolutionaries and to issue an ultimatum de-
manding that several neighboring rulers expel the emigres from their terri- tories. These measures were intended to reduce the direct threat of counterrevolution and force the king to reveal his true loyalties. 62 Louis ve-
59 The Girondins (so named because many came from the department of Gironde) were known to contemporaries as "Brissotins," in reference to Brissot de Warville. See M. J. Syden- ham, The Girondins (London: Athlone Press, 1961 ); Alison Patrick, The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the French Convention of 1792 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press, 1972); and "Girondins" in Jones, Longman Companion, 176-18o.
60 Brissot's first speech on foreign affairs raised the specter of a vast conspiracy against the revolution, and he accused the king of "secret schemes" in December. See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; Clapham, Origins ofthe Warof1792, 135; Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1989), 592-93; and F. L. Kidner, "The Girondists and the 'Propaganda War' of 1792: A Reevaluation of French Revolutionary For- eign Policy from 1791 to 1793," (Ph. D diss. , Princeton University, 1971), 7<>-74?
61 Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 27, 115, 135. On the central place of "plots" in the mindset of the revolution, see Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 55-'JO.
62 As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791, "The accepted leader of the nation will be forced to rule in accordance with the Constitution. If he does his duty, we will support him wholeheartedly. If he betrays us-the people will be ready. " Quoted in Sydenham, Girondins, 104.
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toed the antiemigre decrees on November 12, but he also endorsed an ulti- matum demanding that the elector of Trier disperse the emigre armies the following month, and the Girondins' attempt to provoke a confrontation backfired when the elector promptly agreed to the French demands. The king's popularity soared, and the danger of war temporarily receded.
In addition, the Girondins argued that a successful war would rally pub- lic opinion behind the Assembly and undermine the counterrevolutionary forces within France. As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791: "A people which has just won its liberty after ten centuries of slavery needs a war in order te bring about its consolidation. " They also claimed that war would permit more active efforts to suppress internal opponents, because "in time of war, measures can be taken that would appear too stern in time of peace. "63
The Girondin orators also successfully stirred the emotions of the deputies by repeatedly invoking French glory and national honor. In his ini- tial speech, Brissot began by reciting a list of alleged offenses committed by foreign powers and told the delegates, "You must avenge your glory, or con- demn yourselves to eternal dishonor. " His associate Maximin Isnard pro- claimed, "The French people have become the foremost people of the universe. As slaves, they were bold and great; are they to be feeble and timid now that they are free? " Brissot addressed the same theme in a speech at the Jacobin Club in December: "Louis XIV could declare war on Spain be- cause his ambassador had been insulted . . . are we who are free, should we for a moment hesitate? " Another Girondin, Jean Baptiste Mailhe, pro- claimed that the French nation would "disappear from the face of the earth rather than violate her oath. " That oath, Brissot reminded the delegates, was a simple one: "The Constitution or death! "64
These invocations of patriotism and national pride led to a final theme: that the war would be easy and a glorious victory inevitable. Echoing the optimistic predictions of the foreign representatives in Paris, the Girondins claimed that foreign peoples would rise up to overthrow the despots who sought to suppress liberty. "In the face of our brave patriots," predicted one speaker, "the allied armies will fade away like the shades of night in the face of the rays of the sun. " The German exile Anacharsis Cloots told the As- sembly, "The German and Bohemian peasants will resume their war against their . . . seigneurs; the Dutch and the Germans, the Italians and the Scandi-
63 Brissotalsoargued,"Waratsuchatimeasthiswouldbeablessingtothenation,andthe only calamity that we should fear is that there will not be a war," and he maintained that "we need spectacular treason cases; the people are ready! " Another Girondin suggested that France "designate the place for traitors beforehand, and let it be the scaffold! " Quoted in Soboul,FrenchRevolution,236-37;Clapham, CausesoftheWarof1792,135-36;andLefebvre, French Revolution, 1:219.
64 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 100-101, 112.
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navians, will shake off and shatter their chains with fury. " Brissot described the war as "a crusade for universal liberty," and Isnard proclaimed, "If the cabinets try to raise up against France a war of kings, we shall raise up a war of peoples against kings. . . . At the moment that the enemy armies begin to fight with ours, the daylight of philosophy will open their eyes and the peo- ples will embrace each other in the face of their dethroned tyrants and an
approving heaven and earth. "65
If world revolution was imminent and lacked only the French spark to ig- nite it, then the war would be swift and would bring enormous benefits. As Mailhe reminded the Assembly: "Humanity will doubtless suffer, when one considers that in decreeing war you are also decreeing the death of several thousand men; but consider also that you are perhaps decreeing the liberty of the entire world. . . . Outside France despotism is in its death throes and a prompt attack will precipitate its final agony. "66
This extraordinary optimism also rested on an inflated sense of France's military capabilities and an unwarranted disregard for its opponents. Claiming that free peoples would fight more fiercely than the mercenary armies of the old regime, one of the deputies suggested that "Louis XIV with 40o,ooo slaves, knew how to defy all the powers of Europe; can we, with our millions of free men, fear them? " Another asked, "What is the [French] army? " and provided his own answer: "It is the entire population. " Yet another declared that "if the French people once draws the sword, it will fling the scabbard far away. Inflamed by the fire of freedom, it can . . . sin- glehanded change the whole face of the earth and make the tyrants tremble on their thrones of clay. " Brissot argued that "every advantage is now on our side, for every Frenchmen is a soldier, and a willing soldier at that! Where is the power on earth . . . who could hope to master six million free soldiers? " This confidence was reinforced by misleading reports from the minister of war, who believed that a short war would rally the nation around the constitution and presented the Assembly with an overly rosy picture of the nation's readiness for war. 67
The Girondins also argued that the diplomatic environment was unusu- ally favorable. They predicted that Sweden, Russia, and England would re-
65 The president of the Assembly, Henri Gregoire, declared that "if the princes of Germany continue to favor preparations against the French, the French will not carry fire and the sword to them, they will carry liberty. It is up to them to calculate the possible consequences of an awakening of nations. " Another Girondin predicted, "If the Revolution has already marked 1789 as the first year of French liberty, the date of the xst of January 1792 will mark this as the first year of universal liberty. " Quotations from Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 109-10; Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 77; and Schama, Citizens, 594, 597?
66 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolution in Germany, 63.
67 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, xoB-109; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:385. For evidenceofFrance'slackofreadiness,seeLefebvre, FrenchRevolution, 1:229;butseealsoScott, Response ofthe Royal Army, esp. 161? 2; and Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution, 49-74?
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main neutral, while Prussia would abandon Austria and ally with France. Here was logic at its most contradictory: on the one hand, war was neces- sary because France was threatened by a vast aristocratic conspiracy; on the other harid, victory was certain because a key member of the opposing coalition was actually a French ally!
In short, the Girondins' campaign for war was inspired primarily by their desire to undermine the Feuillants and the king and to stave off the coun- terrevolution they believed was imminent. Brissot and company may not have believed all of their own arguments, of course, and their position was neither internally consistent nor supported by a careful survey of the avail- able evidence. 68 The key point, however, is that these arguments touched a sympathetic chord within the Assembly and helped convince the deputies to take an increasingly bellicose position toward the emigres, the Austrians, and the king. By portraying France's foes as implacably hostile, by linking them with the king, emigres, and internal opposition, and by persuading the Assembly that the campaign would be short, cheap, and glorious, the Girondins cast war as an ideal solution to the present turmoil.
Momentum for war increased after the Girondins' opponents also con- cluded that it would advance their own political fortunes. By the fall of 1791, for example, Lafayette was convinced that a short, victorious war would rally popular support behind the new constitution and establish the king's authority. Hence, his followers supported the Girondin campaign for war, but for their own reasons. 69 Ironically, Louis XVI also decided to sup- port a war at this point, because he believed that France was unprepared and a rapid defeat would undermine the Assembly's authority and permit him to negotiate his own restoration? 0 By January, therefore, a number of the contenders for power were in favor of war, each convinced that it would strengthen his own position and weaken his internal rivals.
The Girondins' efforts were aided by the fact that some of their arguments were partly true. The king's acceptance of the constitution was insincere, and although there existed no antirevolutionary "aristocratic plot," the royal fam-
68 The contradictions in the Girondins' position are noted by Kidner, who concludes that they did not seriously expect to spread revolution. See "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 84, 91-<)2 and passim.
69 SeeAlbertMathiez,TheFrenchRevolution,trans. CatherineAlisonPhillips(NewYork:Al- fred A. Knopf, 1928), 139-40; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:217-18.
70 Louis told an advisor, "The physical and moral state of France is such that it is impossi- ble for her to carry on [this war] for half a campaign, but it is necessary that I should appear to enter upon it whole-heartedly . . . . My course of action should be such that the nation may find its only resource in its troubles in throwing itself in to my arms. " The queen shared this view, arguing that "the fools" in the Assembly "do not see that [threatening the Electors] is a service to us, for if we begin [to fight them], it will be necessary . . . for all the powers to in- tervene. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 14o-42.
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ily had been in contact with various counterrevolutionary groups and did hope to reverse the revolution at an opportune moment. 71 The hostility of the emigres was not a fabrication either, even if the actual threat they posed was minimal. And, while there was no European concert against the revolution, Prussia and AustJria had made hostile gestures at Pillnitz, and Sweden, Rus- sia, and Spain had expressed even greater antipathy to the new order in France. Finally, the ease with which the revolts in Holland and Belgium had been suppressed in 1787 and 1790 gave the deputies in the Assembly a rea- sonable basis for fearing that they might suffer a similar fate. Although the Girondins tailored their arguments to suit their political goals, their assertions gained credibility because there was considerable evidence to support them.
In addition to the roles of Prussian ambition and internal French devel- opments, the decision for war was encouraged by a series of misperceptions and miscalculations between France and its main adversaries that intensi- fied perceptions of hostility and strengthened the prowar factions on both sides. The first error arose from Leopold's belief that the Padua Circular and the Declaration of Pillnitz had strengthened the Feuillants and convinced the Assembly to moderate its policies. Unaware that the Feuillants' earlier ascendancy had had little to do with his threats or that conditions within France were changing rapidly, Leopold failed to recognize that further at- tempts to intimidate the the Assembly would have very different effects.
As we have seen, the Girondins' first attempt to provoke a confrontation in November 1791 had backfired when Louis demanded the dispersal of the emigre armies and the German electors complied. Unfortunately, Leopold now chose this moment to try to repeat his actions of the previous August. As head of the Holy Roman Empire, he sent a formal protest regarding the usurping of the imperial princes' feudal rights in Alsace on December 3 and approved the Imperial Diet's resolution on this issue. On December 21, the Austrian chancellor, Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz, informed the As- sembly that Austria would defend the elector of Trier if he were threatened, bluntly warning that armed action by France would lead to "inevitable con- sequences not only from the head and members of the Holy Roman Empire but also from the other sovereigns who have united in a concert for the main- tenance of public order and for the security and honour of monarchs. "72
Despite the insulting tone of the Austrian demarche, Leopold and Kau- nitz did not want war, and the emperor advised the electors to accept the French demands. 73 Instead, their threats were intended to strengthen the
71 See Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 119-22.
72 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 102; and see also Clapham, Causes of the Warof1792, 132-33.
73 See Alfred von Vivenot and H. Zeissberg, eds. , Quellen zur Geschichte derDeutschen Kaiser- politik Osterreichs wiihrend der Franzosichen Revolutionskriege, 179D-1801 (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumiiller, 1873-<)0), 1:304, 316.
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moderates and to force the Assembly to tum to the king. The Austrians did not know that the Feuillants were no longer in control, however, and Kau- nitz's note merely aroused French suspicions and further undermined the moderates. On January 25, 1792, the Assembly voted to issue a counterulti- matum demanding that Leopold renounce any agreements or treaties di- rected against France. Louis promptly vetoed the motion, reminding the deputies tlhat the Constitution of 1791 gave him primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy and pointing out that he had already re- quested assurances of Leopold's peaceful intentions? 4
Louis's opposition stymied the Girondins temporarily, but momentum for war was restored when Austria tried yet again to intimidate the Assem- bly. The Austrian Council of State had already decided on January 17 to re- activate the "European concert" and demand that France disband its forces on the border, restore the German princes' feudal rights, renew Louis's tra- ditional privileges and freedoms, return Avignon to the papacy, and confirm its adherence to all existing treaties. Still convinced that their campaign of intimidation was working (an illusion sustained by a conciliatory message from French foreign minister Antoine Delessart), Austria now sought to transform the convention with Prussia into a formal military alliance, and! Kaunitz dispatched another caustic note to Paris on February 17. 75 Yet even these steps were not intended to lead to war, as Leopold and Kaunitz still believed an armed demonstration with Prussia would be sufficient to strengthen the forces of moderation and restore the position of the king. 76
Frederick William and his ministers welcomed the proposal for an ali? Hance, and a formal treaty was signed on February 7? The Austrians stm hoped to avoid war (although acquisitive ambitions were beginning to emerge in Vienna as well), but Prussia's leaders saw the situation primarily as an opportunity to expand. Their zeal was further increased by thei. r awareness of Russia's designs on Poland, which created the alluring possi- bility that Prussia might receive several Polish territories it had long coveted as compensation for its efforts in France. 77
74 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 105; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 145-48; Kidner, "Girondins and the 'Propaganda War,' " 95-102.
75 Delessart had tried to satisfy the Assembly's demands without provoking Austria to war, but his measured reply unwittingly reinforced the Austrians' faith in their minatory diplo- macy. See Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 1 54-55, 164-66; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:426-27; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, u6; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224.
76 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 89, 95--97; and also Vivenot and Zeiss? berg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiserpolitik, 1:323-41, esp. 327-30.
77 According to Robert Lord, "From the first moment when the enterprise against France appeared possible, Frederick William's dominant aim-the first and last word of his policy- was territorial aggrandizement. " Second Partition ofPoland, 2JD-3J See also Blanning, French R e v o l u t i o n a r y Wa r s , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; V o n S y b e l , F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , 2 : 6 - 1 1 , 2 2 ; a n d C l a p h a m , C a u s e s of t h e W a r of 1 7 9 2 , 1 5 6 , 1 7 1 - 7 2 .
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