No More Learning

Which of the merely scientitic has felt in himself an unconditioned comprehen- sion of all men and of all things, or even the capacity to verify any single thing in his mind and by his mind ? On
the contrary, has not the whole history of the science of the last thousand years been directed against this ? This is the reasonwhymenofsciencearenecessarilyone-sided. No man of science, unless he is also a philosopher, however eminent his achievements, has that continuous unforgetting life that the genius exhibits, and this is because of his want of universality.
finally, it is to be observed that the investigations of the scientific are always in definite relation to the knowledge of theirday. Thescientificmantakespossessionofadefinite store of experimental or observed knowledge, increases or altersitmoreorless,andthenhandsiton. Andmuchwill be taken away from his achievements, much will silently disappear ; his treatises may make a brave show in the libraries, but they cease to be actively alive. On the other
? TALENT AND MEMORY 141
hand, we can ascribe to the work of the great philosopher, as to that of the great artist, an imperishable, unchangeable presentation of the world, not disappearing with time, and which, because it was the expression of a great mind, will always find a school of men to adhere to it. There still exist disciples of Plato and Aristotle, of Spinoza and Berkeley and Bruno, but there are now none who denote them- selves as followers of Galileo or Helmholtz, of Ptolemy or Copernicus. It is a misuse of terms, due to erroneous ideas, to speak of the " classics " of science or of pedagogy in the sense that we speak of the classics of philosophy and art. ^
The great philosopher bears the name of genius deservedly and with honour. And if it will always be the greatest pain to the philosopher that he is not an artist, so the artist envies the philosopher his tenacious and controlled strength of systematic thought, and it is not surprising that the artist has taken pleasure in depicting Prometheus and Faust, Prospera and Cyprian, Paul the Apostle and II Penseroso. The philo- sopher and the artist are alternate sides of one another.
We must not be too lavish in attributing genius to those who are philosophers or we shall not escape the reproach of being merely partisans of philosophy against science. Such a partisanship is foreign to my purpose, and, I hope, to this book, ^t would only be absurd to discuss the claims to genius of such men as Anaxagoras, Geulincx, Baader, or
Emerson. I deny genius either to such unoriginally pro- found writers as Angelus Silesius, Philo and Jacobi, or to original yet superficial persons such as Comte Feuerbach, Hume,Herbart,Locke,andKarneades. Thehistoryofart is equally full of preposterous valuations, whilst, on the other hand, the history of science is extremely free from false estimations. / The history of science busies itself very little with the biographies of its protagonists ; its object is a system of objective, collective knowledge in which the individual is swept away. The service of science demands the greatest sacrifice, for in it the individual human being renounces all claim to eternity as such.
? CHAPTER VI
MEMORY, LOGIC, AND ETHICS
The title that I have given to this chapter at once opens the way to misinterpretation. It might appear as if the author supported the view that logical and ethical values were the objects exclusively of empirical psychology, psychical phenomena, like perception and sensation, and that logic and ethics, therefore, were subsections of psychology and
based upon psychology.
I declare at once that I call this view, the so-called psy-
chologismus, at once false and injurious. It is false because it can lead to nothing ; and injurious because, while it hardly touches logic and ethics, it overthrows psychology itself. The exclusion of logic and ethics from the foun- dations of psychology, and the insertion of them in an appendix, is one of the results of the overgrowth of the doctrine of empirical perception, of that strange heap of dead, fleshless bones which is known as empirical psycho- logy, and from which all real experience has been excluded. I have nothing to do with the empirical school, and in this matter lean towards the transcendentalism of Kant.
As the object of my work, however, is to discover the differences between different members of humanity, and not to discuss categories that would hold good for the angels in heaven, I shall not follow Kant closely, but remain more directly in psychological paths.
The justification of the title of this chapter must be reached along other Unes. The tedious, because entirely new, demonstration of the earlier part of my work has shown that the human memory stands in intimate relation
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with things hitherto supDOsed unconnected with it--such things as time, value, genius, immortality. I have attempted to show that memory stands in intimate connection with all these. There must be some strong reason for the complete absence of earlier allusions to this side of the subject. I believe the reason to be no more than the inadequacy and slovenliness which hitherto have spoiled theories of memory.
I must here call attention to a theory first propounded by Charles Bonnet in the middle of the eighteenth century and towards the end of the nineteenth century, specially insisted uponbyEwaldHeringandE. Mach. Thistheoryregarded the human memory as being only a special case of a pro- perty common to all organised matter, the property that makes the path of new stimuli rather easier if these resemble stimuli that have acted at some former time. The theory really makes the human memory an adaptation in the sense of Lamarck, the result on the living organism of repeated stimulation. It is true that there is a point in common between the human memory and the increase of sensitiveness caused by the repeated application of a stimu- lus ; that identical element consists in the permanence of the effect of the first stimulation. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the growth of a muscle
that is much used or the adaptation of the eater of arsenic or morphia to increased doses, and the recollection of past experiencesbyhumanbeings. Intheonecasethetraceof the old is just to be felt in the new stimulation ; in the other case, by means of the consciousness, the old situations are actuallyreproducedwithalltheirindividuation. Theiden- tification of the two is so superficial that it is a waste of time to dwell longer on it.
The doctrine of association as the theory of memory is linked with the foregoing physiological theory as a matter of history, through Hartley, and, as a matter of fact, becausetheideaofhabitissharedbythetwo. Theasso- ciation theory attributes memory to the mechanical play of the linking of presentations according to four laws. It
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overlooks the fact that memory (the continuous memory of man) is a function of the will. I can remember a thing if I really will. In the case of hypnosis, when the recollec- tion of all that has been forgotten is induced, an outside will replaces the will of the subject. It is will that sets in action the chains of association, and we have to deal here with something deeper than a mechanical principle.
In the association psychology, which first splits up the psychic life, and then vainly imagines that it can weld the re-assorted pieces together again, there is another confusion, the confusion between memory and recollection, which has persisted in spite of the well-founded objections of Avenarius and von Ho? ffding. The recognition of a circum- stance does not necessarily involve the special reproduction of the former impression, even although there seems to be a tendency for the new impression, at least, partly to recall the old one. But there is another kind of recognition, perhaps as common, in which the new impression does not appear to be directly linked with an association, but in which it comes, so to speak, "coloured" (James would say "tinged") with that character that would be called by von Ho? ffding the "familiarity quality. " To him who returns to his native place the roads and streets seem familiar, even although he has forgotten the names, has to ask his way, and can think of no special occasion on which he went along them. A melodymayseem"familiar"andyetI maybeunableto say where I heard it. /The " character " (in the sense of Avenarius) of familiarity, of intimacy, hovers over the sense- impression itself, and analysis can detect no associations, none of the fusing of the old and new, which, according to the assertion of a presumptuous pseudo-psychology, produces the feeling ; these cases are quite easy to distinguish from cases in which there is a real although vague association with an older experience in henid formj
In individual psychology this distinction is of great importance. Inthehighesttypesofmankindtheconscious- ness of the continuous past is present in so active a form that the moment such a one sees a acquaintance in the
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street he is at once able to reproduce the last meeting as a complete experience, whereas in the case of the less gifted person, the feeling of familiarity that makes recognition possible, occurs when he is able to recall the past connection in all its details.
If we now, in conclusion, ask whether or no other animals than man possess a similar faculty for remembering and reviving their earlier lives in their entirety it is most probable that the answer must be in the negative. Animals could not, as they do, remain for hours at a time, motionless and peaceful on one spot, if they were capable of thinking of the future or of remembering the past. Animals have the feeling of familiarity and the sense of expectation (as we find from the recognition of his master by a dog after twenty years' absence); buttheypossessnomemoryandnohope. They are capable of recognition through the sense of familiarity, but they have no memory.
As memory has been shown to be a special character unconnected with the lower spheres of psychical life, and the exclusive property of human beings, it is not surprising that it is closely related to such higher things as the idea of value and of time, and the craving for immortality, which is absent in animals, and possible to men only in so far as they possess the quality of genius. If memory be an essen- tially human thing, part of the deepest being of humanity, finding expression in mankind's most peculiar qualities, then it will not be surprising if memory be also related to the phenomena of logic and ethics. I have now to explore this relationship.
I may set out from the old proverb that liars have bad memories. It is certain that the pathological liar has prac- tically no memory. About male liars I shall have more to say ; they are not common, however. But if we remember what was said as to the absence of memory amongst women we shall not be surprised at the existence of the numerous proverbs and common sayings about the untruthfulness of women. It is evident that a being whose memory is very, slight, and who can recall only in the most imperfect fashion
K
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\vhat it has said or done, or suffered, must lie easily if it has the gift of speech. The impulse to untruthfulness will be hard to resist if there is a practical object to be gained, and if the influence that comes from a full conscious reality of the past be not present. The impulse to lie is stronger in woman, because, unlike that of man, her memory is not continuous, whilst her life is discrete, unconnected, dis- continuous, swayed by the sensations and perceptions of themomentinsteadofdominatingthem. Unlikeman,her experiences float past without being referred, so to speak, to a definite, permanent centre ; she does not feel herself, past and present, to be one and the same throughout all her life. It happens almost to every man that sometimes he
"does not understand himself"; indeed, wilh very many men, it happens (leaving out of the question the facts of psychical periodicity) that if they think over their pasts in their minds they find it very difficult to refer all the events to a single conscious personality ; they do not grasp how it could have been that they, being what they feel themselves at the time to be, could ever have done or felt or thought this, that, or the other. And yet in spite of the difficulty, they know that they had gone through these experiences. The feeling of identity in all circumstances of life is quite wanting in the true woman, because her memory, even if exceptionallygood,isdevoidofcontinuity. Theconscious- ness of identity of the male, even although he may fail to understand his own past, manifests itself in the very desire to understand that past. Women, if they look back on their earlier lives, never understand themselves, and do not even wish to understand themselves, and this reveals itself in the scanty interest they give to the attempts of man to understand them, u he woman does not interest herself about herself, and hence there have been no female psychologists, no psychology of women written by a woman, and she is incapable of grasping the anxious desire of the man to understand the beginning, middle, and end of his individual
life in their relation to each other, and to interpret the whole as a continual, logical, necessary sequence. )
? MEMORY, LOGIC, AND ETHICS
At this point there is a natural transition to logic. A creature like woman, the absolute woman, who is not con- scious of her own identity at different stages of her life, has no evidence of the identity of the subject-matter of thought at different times. \If in her mind the two stages of a change cannot be present simultaneously by means of memory, it is impossible for her to make the comparison and note the change. ) A being whose memory is never sufficiently good as to make it psychologically possible to perceive identity through the lapse of time, so as to enable her, for instance, to pursue a quantity through a long mathematical reckoning
;
such a creature in the extreme case would be unable to control her memory for even the moment of time required to say that A will be still A in the next moment, to pronounce judgment on the identity A=A, or on the opposite propo- sition that A is not equal to A, for that proposition also requires a continuous memory of A to make the comparison possible.
I have been making no mere joke, no facetious sophism or paradoxical proposition. I assert that the judgment of identity depends on conceptions, never on mere perceptions and complexes of perceptions, and the conceptions, as logical conceptions, are independent of time, retaining their constancy, whether I, as a psychological entity, think them constant or not. But man never has a conception in the purely logical form, for he is a psychological being, affected by the condition of sensations ; he is able only to form a general idea (a typical, connotative, representative concep- tion) out of his individual experiences by a reciprocal effacing of the differences and strengthening of the simi- larities, thus, however, very closely approximating to an abstract conception, and in a most wonderful fashion using it as such. He must also be able to preserve this idea which he thinks clear, although in reality it is confused, and it is memory alone that brings about the possibility of that Were he deprived of memory he would lose the possibility of thinking logically, for this possibility is incarnated, so to speak, only in a psychological medium.
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Memory, then, is a necessary part of the logical faculty. The propositions of logic are not conditioned by the exist- ence of memory, but only the power to use them. The proposition A=A must have a psychological relation to time, otherwise it would be Ati = At2. Of course this is not the case in pure logic, but man has no special faculty of pure logic, and must act as a psychological being.
I have already shown that the continuous memory is the vanquisher of time, and, indeed, is necessary even for the ideaoftimetobeformed. Andsothecontinuousmemory is the psychological expression of the logical proposition of identity. The absolute woman, in whom memory is absent, cannot take the proposition of identity, or its contradictory, or the exclusion of the alternative, as axiomatic.
Besides these three conditions of logical thought, the fourth condition, the containing of the conclusion in the major premiss, is possible only through memory. That proposition is the groundwork of the syllogism. The pre- misses psychologically precede the conclusion, and must be retained by the thinking person whilst the minor premiss appliesthelawofidentityorofnon-identity. Thegrounds for the conclusion must lie in the past. And for this reason continuity which dominates the mental processes of man is bound up with causality. Every psychological application of the relation of a conclusion to its premisses implies the continuity of memory to guarantee the identity of the propo- sitions. As woman has no continuous memory she can have no principium rationis sufficientis.
And so it appears that woman is without logic.
George Simmel has held this familiar statement to be erroneous, inasmuch as women have been known to draw conclusionswiththestrongestconsistency. Thatawoman in a concrete case can unrelentingly pursue a given course at the stimulation of some object is no more a proof that she understands the syllogism, than is her habit of perpetually recurring to disproved arguments a proof that the law of identity is an axiom for her. ^he point at issue is whether or no they recognise the logical axioms as the criteria of
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the validity of their thoughts, as the directors of their process of thinking, whether they make or do not make these the rule of conduct and the principle of judgment. A woman cannot grasp that one must act from principle ; as she has no continuity she does not experience the necessity for logical support of her mental processes. Hence the ease withwhichwomenassumeopinions. Ifawomangivesvent to an opinion, or statement, and a man is so foolish as to take it seriously and to ask her for the proof of it, she regards the request as unkind and offensive, and as impugninghercharacter. Amanfeelsashamedofhimself, feels himself guilty if he has neglected to verify a thought, whether or no that thought has been uttered by him ; he feels the obligation to keep to the logical standard which he has set up for himself. Woman resents any attempt to require from her that her thoughts should be logical. <^he may be regarded as " logically insane. "/
The most common defect which one could discover in the conversation of a woman, if one really wished to apply to it the standard of logic (a feat that man habitually shuns, so showing his contempt for a woman's logic) is the quaternio terminorum, that form of equivocation which is the result of an incapacity to retain definite presentations; in other words, the result of a failure to grasp the law of identity. Woman is unaware of this ; she does not realise the law nor make it a criterionofthought. <^Manfeelshimselfboundtologic; the woman is without this feeling. It is only this feeling of guilt that guarantees man's efforts to think logically. Probably the most profound saying of Descartes, and yet one that has been widely misunderstood, is that all errors are crimes)
(The source of all error in life is failure of memory. Thus logic and ethics, both of which deal with the furtherance of truth and join in its highest service, are dependent on memory. The conception dawns on us that Plato was not so far wrong when he connected discernment with memory. Memory, it is true, is not a logical and ethical act, but it is a
logical and ethical phenomenon) <^A man who has had a vivid and deep perception regards it as a fault, if some half-
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hour afterwards he is thinking of something different, even ifexternalinfluenceshaveintervened. Amanthinkshim- self unconscientious and blameworthy if he notices that he has not thought of a particular portion of his life for a long time. Memory, moreover, is linked with morality, because itisonlythroughmemorythatrepentanceispossible. All forgetfulness is in itself immoral. And so reverence ps a moral exercise ; it is a duty to forget nothing, and for this reason we should reverence the dead. ) Equally from logical and ethical motives, man tries to carry logic into his past, in
order that past and present may become one.
\It is with something of a shock that we realise here*that we approach the deep connection between logic and ethics, long ago suggested by Socrates and Plato, discovered anew
by Kant and Fichte, but lost sight of by living workers.
A creature that cannot grasp the mutual exclusiveness of A and not A has no difficulty in lying ; more than that, such a creature has not even any consciousness of lying, being without a standard of truth. Such a creature if endowed with speech will lie without knowing it, without the possibility of knowing it; Veritas norma sui et falsa est. There is nothing more upsetting to a man than to find, when he has discovered a woman in a lie, and has asked her, " Why did you lie about it ? " that she simply does not understand the question, but simply looks at him and
laughingly tries to soothe him, or bursts into tearsi
The subject does not end with the part played by memory. Lyingiscommonenoughamongstmen. Andliescanbe told in spite of a full remembrance of the subject which for some purpose some one wishes to be informed about. Indeed, it might almost be said that the only persons who can lie are those who misrepresent facts in spite of a
superior knowledge and consciousness of them.
-(Truth must first be regarded as the real value of logic and ethics before it is correct to speak of deviations from truth for special motives as lies from the moral point of view. Those who have not this high conception should be adjudged as guilty rather of vagueness and exaggeration
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than of lying : they are not immoral but non-moral. And in this sense the woman is non-moral. )
The root of such an absolute misconception of truth must lie deep. The continuous memory against which alone a man can be false, is not the real source of the effort for truth, the desire for truth, the basal ethical-logical phenomenon, but only stands in intimate relation with it,
(That which enables man to have a real relation to truth and which removes his temptation to lie, must be some- thing independent of all time, something absolutely unchangeable, which as faithfully reproduces the old as if it were new, because it is permanent itself ; it can only be that source in which all discrete experiences unite and which creates from the first a continuous existence. It is what produces the feehng of responsibility which oppresses all men, young and old, as to their actions, which makes them know that they are responsible, which leads to the phenomena of repentance and consciousness of sin, which calls to account before an eternal and ever present self things that are long past, its judgment being subtler and more comprehensive than that of any court of law or of the laws of society, and which is exerted by the individual him- self quite independently of all social codes (so condemning the moral psychology which would derive morality from the social life of man). Society recognises the idea of illegality, but not of sin ; it presses for punishment without wishing to produce repentance ; lying is punished by the law only in its ceremonious form of perjury, and error has never been placed under its ban. ) Social ethics with its conception of duty to our neighbour and to society, and
practical exclusion from consideration of the other fifteen
hundred million human beings, cannot extend the realm of morality, when it begins by limiting it in this arbitrary fashion.
What is this " centre of apperception " that is superior to time and change ?
It can be nothing less than what raises man above himself (as a part of the world of sense) which joins him to an
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order of things that only the reason can grasp, and that puts the whole world of sense at his feet. It is nothing else than personality.
The most sublime book in the world, the " Criticism of Practical Reason," has referred morality to an intelli. ^ent ego,distinctfromallempiricalconsciousness. Imustnow turn to that side of my subject.
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(PAVID Hume is well known to have abolished the concep- tion of the ego by seeing in it only a bundle of different perceptionsincontinualebbandflow. Howevercompletely Hume thought himself to have compromised the ego, at least he explained his view relatively moderately. He proposed to say nothing about a few metaphysicians who appeared to rejoice in another kind of ego ; for himself he was quite certain that he had none, and he dared to suppose that the majority of mankind, leaving the few peculiar metaphysicians out of the question, were, like himself, mere bundles. So the polite man expressed himself. In the next chapter I shall show how his irony recoils on himself. That his view became so famous depends partly on the over-estimation in which Hume is held and which is largely
due to Kant. Hume was a most distinguished empirical psychologist, but he cannot be regarded as a genius, the popular view notwithstanding. ) It is not very much to be the first of English philosophers, but Hume has not even a claim to that position. I do not think that Kant would have given so much praise to Hume if he had been fully acquainted with all Hume's work and not merely with the " Enquiry," as he certainly rejected the position of Spinoza, according to which men were not " substances," but merely accidents.
-Lichtenberg, who took the field against the ego later than Hume, was still bolder. He is the philosopher of imperson- ality, and calmly corrects the conversational " I think" mto
an actual " it thinks "
;
he regards the ego as a creation of
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the grammarian. In this Hume had anticipated him, inas- much as he also had declared, at the end of his analysis, all disputes as to the identity of the person to be merely a battle of words. )
E. Mach has recently represented the universe as a coherent mass, and the egos as points in which the coherent mass has greater consistency. The only realities are the perceptions, which are connected in one individual strongly, but which are weaker in another individual who is thus differentiated from the first.
The contents of the perceptions are the realities, and they persist externally to the worthless personal recollections. The ego is not a real but only a practical entity and cannot be isolated, and, therefore, the idea of individual immortality must be rejected. None the less the idea of an ego is not wholly to be rejected ; here and there, as, for instance, in Darwin's struggle for existence, it appears to have some validity.
It is extraordinary how an investigator who has accom- plished so much, not only as a historian of his special branch and as a critic of ideas, but who is also fully equipped with knowledge of biology, should have paid no heed to the fact that every organic being is indivisible from the first, and is not composed of anything like atoms, monads, &c. The first distinctive mark of the living as opposed to inorganic matter is that the former is always differentiated into dissimilar, mutually dependent parts, and is not homogeneous like a crystal. And so it should have been borne in mind that it was at least possible that individuation>> the fact that organic beings are not united, like Siamese twins, would prove to have importance in psychical matters, and the ego, therefore, was more than Mach's idea of it as a mere waiting-hall of perceptions.
It may be that there exists a psychical correlation even amongst animals. Everythmg that an animal feels and perceives has a different " note " or " colour " in every individual. Thisindividualqualityisnotonlycharacteristic of the class, genus, species, race, and family, but also is
? LOGIC, ETHICS AND THE EGO
different in every individual of the same family, &c. The idioplasm is the physiological equivalent of this specific individual quality of the sensations and perceptions, and there are reasons analogous with those in favour of the supposition of an idioplasm for the supposition of an individual character amongst animals. The sportsman who has to do with dogs, the trainer with horses, and the keeper with animals will readily admit the existence of this individualityasaconstantelement. Itisclearthatwehave to do here with something more than a mere rendezvous of perceptions.
But even if this psychical analogue of the idioplasm were proved to exist in the case of animals, it could not be ranked with the intelligible character, the existence of which in any living creature except man cannot be maintained. The intelligible character of men, their individuation, has the same relation to empirical character that memory has tothesimplepowerofrecognition. Andfinallywecome to identity, by which the structure, form, law, and cosmos persist even through the change of contents. \The conside- rations from which is drawn the proof of the existence in man of such a noumenal, trans-empirical subject must now be stated briefly. / They come from logic and ethics.
Logic deals with the true significance of the principle of identity (also with that of contradiction ; the exact relation of these two, and the various modes of stating it are con- troversialmattersoutsidethepresentsubject). Thepropo- sition A = A is axiomatic and self-evident. It is the primi- tive measure of truth for all other propositions ; however much we may think over it we must return to this funda- mental proposition. It is the principle of the distinction betweentruthanderror; andhewhoregardsitasmeaning- less tautology, as was the case with Hegel and many of the later empiricists (this being not the only surprising point of contact between two schools apparently so different) is right in a fashion, but has misunderstood the nature of the proposition. A=A,theprincipleofalltruth,cannotitself be a special truth. He who finds the proposition of identity
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or that of non-identity meaningless does so by his own fault. He must have expected to find in these propositions special ideas, a source of positive knowledge. ''^But they are not in themselves knowledge, separate acts of thought, but the common standard for all acts of thought^ And so they cannot be compared with other acts of thought. <(The rule of the process of thought must be outside thought. The proposition of identity does not add to our knowledge ;
it does not increase but rather founds a kingdom. The proposition of identity is either meaningless or means everything.
Upon what do the propositions of identity and of non-identity depend ? The common view is that theyarejudgments. Sigwart,forinstance,whohasrecently discussed the matter, puts it as follows : The two judgments A is B and A is not B cannot be true at the same time because the judgment "An unlearned man is learned" would involve a contradiction because the predicate "learned" is affirmed of a subject of which the judg- ment has been made implicitly that he is unlearned, so that in reality two judgments are made, X is learned and
Xisunlearned. The"psychologismus"ofthismethodof argument is plain. It has recourse to a temporary judg- ment preceding the formation of the conception "unlearned man. " Theproposition,however,AisnotAclaimsvalidity quite apart from the past, present, or future existence of other judgments. It depends on the conception " unlearned man. " It makes the conception more certain by excluding
contradictory instances.
^ This, then, gives us the true function of the principles of
identityandnon-identity. Theyarematerialsforconcep- tions^
This function concerns only logical conceptions, but not what have been called psychological conceptions. The conception is always represented psychologically by a generalisation ; and this presentation in a certain fashion is included in the conception. The generalisation represents the conception psychologically, but is not identical with it.
It can, so to speak, be richer (as when I think of a triangle)
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or it can be poorer (the conception of a lion contains more than my generaUsation of Hons). The logical conception is the plumb-line which the attention tries to follow ; it is the goal and pole-star of the psychological generalisation. \Pure logical thought cannot occur in the case of men
;
it would be an attribute of deity. A human being must always think partly psychologically because he possesses not only reason but also senses, and his thought cannot free itself from temporal experiences but must remain bound by them. Logic, however, is the supreme standard by which the individual can test his own psychological ideas and those of others. When two men are discussing anything it is the conception and not the varying individual pre- sentations of it that they aim at. ) The conception, then, is the standard of value for the individual presentations. The
mode in which the psychological generalisation comes into existence is quite independent of the conception and has no significance in respect to it. The logical character which invests the conception with dignity and power is not derived from experience, for experience can give only vague and wavering generalisations. Absolute constancy and absolute coherence which cannot come from ex-
perience are the essence of the conception of that power concealed in the depths of the human mind whose handi- work we try hard but in vain to see in nature. Concep- tions are the only true realities, and the conception is not in nature ; it is the rule of the essence not of the actual existence.
\When I enunciate the proposition A = A, the meaning of the proposition is not that a special individual A of experience or of thought is like itself. The judgment of identity does not depend on the existence of an A. It means only that if an A exists, or even if it does not exist, thenA=A. Somethingisposited,theexistenceofA=A whether or no A itself exists. It cannot be the result of experience, as Mill supposed, for it is independent of the
existence of A. But an existence has been posited ; it is not the existence of the object ; it must be the existence of
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the subject. "sThe reality of the existence is not in the first A or the second A, but in the simultaneous identity of the two. And so the proposition A = A is no other than the proposition " I am. "^
/From the psychological point of view, the real meaning oT^the proposition of identity is not so difficult to interpret. It is clear that to be able to say A = A, to establish the per- manence of the conception through the changes of ex- perience, there must be something unchangeable, and this can be only the subject. Were I part of the stream of change I could not verify that the A had remained unchanged, had remained itself. Were I part of the change, I could not recognise the change. Fichte was right when he stated that the existence of the ego was to be found concealed in pure logic, inasmuch as the ego is
the condition of intelligible existence.
/ The logical axioms are the principle of all truth. These I posit an existence towards which all cognition serves. ) Logic is a law which must be obeyed, and man realises / himself only in so far as he is logical. He finds himself
j
in cognition. ^
\ All error must be felt to be crime. And so man must
not err. He must find the truth, and so he can find it. The duty of cognition involves the possibility of cognition, the freedom of thought, and the hope of ascertaining truth. In the fact that logic is the condition of the mind lies the proof that thought is free and can reach its goal.
O can treat ethics briefly and in another fashion, inas- much as what I have to say is founded on Kant's moral philosophy. Thedeepest,theintelligible,partofthenature of man is that part which does not take refuge in causality, but which chooses in freedom the good or the bad. ^ This is manifest in consciousness of sin and in repentance. No one has attempted to explain these facts otherwise ; and no one allows himself to be persuaded that he must commit this or that act. In the shall there lies the possibility of the can. The causal determining factors, the lower motives that act upon him, he is fully
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? LOGIC, ETHICS AND THE EGO
159 aware of, but he remains conscious of an intelligible ego
free to act in a different way from other egos.
Truth, purity, faithfulness, uprightness, with reference to oneself ; these give the only conceivable ethics. Duty is only duty to oneself, duty of the empirical ego to the intelligible ego. These appear in the form of two impera- tives that will always put to shame every kind of psycho- logismus--the logical law and the moral law. The internal direction, the categorical imperatives of logic and morality which dominate all the codes of social util'tarianism are factors that no empiricism can explain. All empiricism and scepticism, positivism and relativism, instinctively feel that their principal difficulties lie in logic and ethics. And so perpetually renewed and fruitless efforts are made to explain this inward discipline empirically and psychologi-
cally.
Logic and ethics are fundamentally the same, they are
no more than duty to oneself. They celebrate their union by the highest service of truth, which is overshadowed in the one case by error, in the other by untruth. <A11 ethics are possible only by the laws of logic, and logic is no more than the ethical side of law. Not only virtue, but also insight, not only sanctity but also wisdom, are the duties and tasks of mankind. Through the union of these alone comes perfection. \
Ethics, however, the laws of which are postulates, cannot bemadethebasisofalogicalproofofexistence. Ethicsare not logical in the same sense that logic is ethical. Logic proves the absolute actual existence of the ego ; ethics con- troltheformwhichtheactualityassumes. Ethicsdominate logic and make logic part of their contents.
In thinking of the famous passage in the "Critique of Practical Reason," where Kant introduces man as a part of the intelligible cosmos, it may be asked how Kant assured himself that the moral law was inherent in personality. The answer Kant gave was simply that no other and no nobler origin could be found for it. He goes no further than to say that the categorical imperative is the law of
? i6o SEX AND CHARACTER
the noumenon, belonging to it and inherent in it from the beginning. That, however, is the nature of ethics. / Ethics make it possible for the intelligible ego to act free from the shackles of empiricism, and so through ethics, the existence of whose possibilities logic assures us, is able to become actual in all its purit3^|
There remains a most important point in which the Kantian system is often misunderstood. It reveals itself plainly in every case of wrong-doing.
Duty is only towards oneself ; Kant must have realised this in his earlier days when first he felt an impulse to lie. Except for a few indications in Nietzsche, and in Stirner, and a few others, Ibsen alone seems to have grasped the principle of the Kantian ethics (notably in " Brand " and " Peer Gvnt "). The following two quotations also give the Kantian view in a general way :
First Nebbel's epigram, " Lies and Truth. "
" Which do you pay dearer for, lies or the truth ? The former costs you yourself, the latter at most your happiness. " )
Next, the well-known words of Sleika from the "Wes- to? stlichen Diwan " :
(All sorts go to make a world,
The crowd and the rogue and the hero; But the highest fortune of earth's children Is always in their own personality.
It matters little how a man lives
If only he is true to himself;
It matters nothing what a man may lose If he remains what he really is. )
It is certainly true that most men need some kind of a God. A few, and they are the men of genius, do not bow to an alien law. The rest try to justify their doings and misdoings, their thinking and existence (at least the mental side of it), to some one else, whether it be the personal God of the Jews, or a beloved, respected, and revered human being. Itisonlyinthiswaythattheycanbringtheirlives under the social law.
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? LOGIC, ETHICS AND THE EGO i6i
Kant was permeated with his conviction, as is con- spicuous in the minutest details of his chosen Hfe-work, that man was responsible only to himself, to such an extent that he regarded this side of his theory as self- evidentandleastlikelytobedisputed. ThissilenceofKant has brought about a misunderstanding of his ethics--the only ethics tenable from the psychologically introspective standpoint, the only system according to which the insistent strong inner voice of the one is to be heard through the noise of the many.
I gather from a passage in his " Anthropology " that even in the case of Kant some incident in his actual earthly life precededthe"formationofhischaracter. " Thebirthof the Kantian ethics, the noblest event in the history of the world, was the moment when for the first time the dazzling awful conception came to him, " I am responsible only to myself ; I must follow none other ; I must not forget myselfevenin mywork; I amalone; I amfree; I amlord of myself. " ;
" Two things fill my mind with ever renewed wonder and awe the more often and the deeper I dwell on them thestarryvaultabovemeandthemorallawwithinme. I must not look on them both as veiled in mystery or think that their majesty places them beyond me. I see them before me, and they are part of the consciousness of my existence. The first arises from my position in the outer world of the senses, and links me with the immeasurable space in which worlds and worlds and systems and systems, although in immeasurable time, have their ebbs and flows, their beginnings and ends. The second arises from my invisible self, my personality, and places me in a world that has true infinity, but which is evident only to the reason and with which I recognise myself as being bound, not accidentally as in the other case but in a universal and necessary union. On the one hand, the consciousness of an endless series of worlds destroys my sense of importance, making me only one of the animal creatures which must
return its substance again to the planet (that, too, being nc L
\rhus he becomes one and all ; he has the law in him, and so he himself is the law, and no mere changing caprice. The desire is in him to be only the law, to be the law that is ihimself, without afterthought or forethought. This is the awful conclusion, he has no longer the sense that there can be duty for him. Nothing is superior to him, to the isolated absolute unity. But there are no alternatives for him ; he must respond to his own categorical imperatives, absolutely, impartially. " Freedom," he cries (for instance, Wagner, or Schopenhauer), " rest, peace from the enemy peace,notthisendlessstriving ;
" and he is terrified. Even in this wish for freedom there is cowardice ; in the igno- minious lament there is desertion as if he were too small for the fight. What is the use of it all, he cries to the
universe ; and is at once ashamed, for he is demanding happiness, and that his own burden should rest on other shoulders. Kant's lonely man does not dance or laugh he neither brawls nor makes merry ; he feels no need to make a noise, because the universe is so silent around him. To acquiesce in his loneliness is the splendid supremacy of the Kantian. )
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? i62 SEX AND CHARACTER
more than a point in space) from whence it came, after having been in some unknown way endowed with life for a brief space. The second point of view enhances my im- portance, makes me an intelHgence, infinite and uncon- ditioned through my personaHty, the moral law in which separates me from the animals and from the world of sense, removes me from the limits of time and space, and links me with infinity. "
The secret of the critique of practical reason is that man is alone in the world, in tremendous eternal isolation.
He has no object outside himself ; lives for nothing else ;
he is far removed from being the slave of his wishes, of his abilities, of his necessities ; he stands far above social ethics ; he is alone.
? CHAPTER VIII
THE "I" PROBLEM AND GENIUS
? ' In the beginning the world was nothing but the Atman, in the form of a man. It looked around and saw nothing different to itself. Then it cried out once,
Itis L' Thatis howtheword' I' cameto be. That is why even at the present day, if any one is called, he answers, 'It is I,' and then recalls his other name, the one he bears. "--(Brihadaranyata-Upanishad. )
Many disputations about principles in psychology arise from individual characterological differences in the dis- putants. Thus, in the mode that I have already suggested, charactero)ogy might play an important part. When one person thinks to have discovered this, the other that, by introspection, characterology would have to show why the results in the one case should differ from those in the other, or, at least, to point out in what other respects the persons in question were unlike. I see no other possible way of clear- ingupthedisputedpointsofpsychology. Psychologyisa scienceofexperiences,and,therefore,it mustproceedfrom
the individual to the general, and not, as in the supra-indi- vidualistic laws of logic and ethics, proceed from the uni- versal to the individual case. There is no such thing as an empirical general psychology ; and it would be a mistake to approach such without having fully reckoned with differential psychology.
It is a great pity that psychology has been placed between philosophyandtheanalysisofperceptions. Fromwhich- ever side psychologists approached the subject, they have always been assured of the general validity of their results.
? SEX AND CHARACTER
164
Perhaps even so fundamental a question as to whether or no perception itself implies an actual and spontaneous act of consciousness cannot be solved without a consideration of characterological differences.
The purpose of this work is to apply characterology to the solution of a few of these doubtful matters, with special referencetothedistinctionsbetweenthesexes. Thedifferent conceptions of the I-problem, however, depend not so much ondifferencesofsexasondifferencesingiftedness. The dispute between Hume and Kant receives its characterolo- gical explanation much in the same way as if 1 were to dis- tinguish two men in so far as the one held in the highest esteem the works of Makart and Gounod, the other those ofRembrandtandBeethoven. Iwouldsimplydistinguish the two by their giftedness. So also the judgments about the " I " must be very different in the cases of differently giftedmen. Therehavebeennotrulygreatmenwhowere not persuaded of the existence of the " I " ; a man who denies it cannot be a great man.
In the course of the following pages this proposition will be taken as absolutely binding, and will be used really as a means of valuing genius.
There has been no famous man who, at least some time in the course of his life, and generally earlier in proportion to his greatness, has not had a moment in which he was absolutely convinced of the possession of an ego in the highest sense.
Let us compare the following utterances of three very great geniuses.
Jean Paul relates in his autobiographical sketch, " Truths from my own Life " :
** I can never forget a circumstance which, so far, has been related by no one--the birth of my own self-conscious- ness, the time and place of which I can tell. One morning I was standing, as a very young child, at the front door, and looking towards the wood-shed I suddenly saw, all at once, my inner likeness. ' I ' am ' I' flashed like lightning from the skies across me, and since then has remained. I saw
:
? THE "I" PROBLEM AND GENIUS 165
myself then for the first time and for ever. This cannot be explained as a confusion of memory, for no alien narrative could have blended itself with this sacred event, preserved permanently in my memory by its vividness and novelty. "
Novalis, in his " Miscellaneous Fragments," refers to an identical experience :
"This factor every one must experience for himself. It is a factor of the higher order, and reveals itself only to higher men ; but men should strive to induce it in them- selves. Philosophy is the exercise of this factor, it is a true self-revelation, the stimulation of the real ego by the ideal ego. It is the foundation of all other revelations
;
the resolution to philosophise is a challenge to the actual ego, to become conscious of itself, to grow and to become a soul. "
^Schelling discusses the same phenomenon in his "Philoso- phical Letters upon Dogmatism and Criticism," a little known early work, in which occurs the following beautiful words
" In all of us there dwells a secret marvellous power of freeing ourselves from the changes of time, of withdrawing to our secret selves away from external things, and of so discover- ing to ourselves the eternal in us in the form of unchange- ability. Thispresentationofourselvestoourselvesisthemost truly personal experience upon which depends everything that we know of the supra-sensual world. This presenta- tion shows us for the first time what real existence is, whilst all else only appears to be. It differs from every presenta- tion of the sense in its perfect freedom, whilst all other presentations are bound, being overweighted by the burden of the object. Still there exists for those who have not this perfect freedom of the inner sense some approach to it, experiences approaching it from which they may gain some faint idea of it. . . . )This intellectual presentation occurs when we cease to be our own object, when, with- drawing into ourselves, the perceiving self merges in the self-perceived. At that moment we annihilate time and duration of time; we are no longer in time, but time, or
? i66 SEX AND CHARACTER
rather eternity itself, is in us. The external world is no longer an object for us, but is lost in us. "
The positivist will perhaps only laugh at the self-deceived deceiver, the philosopher who asserts that he has had such experiences. Well, it is not easy to prevent it. It is also unnecessary. ButI ambynomeansoftheopinionthat this " factor of a higher order " plays the same part in all men of genius of a mystical identity of subject and object as Schelling describes it.
Whether there are undivided experiences in which the dualism of actual life is overcome, as is indicated by Plotin and the Indian Mahatmas, or whether this is only the highest intensification of experience, but in principle similar to all others--does not signify here, the coincidence of sub- ject and object, of time and eternity, the representing of God through living men, will neither be demonstrated as possible nor denied as impossible. The experiencing of one's own " I " is not to be begun by theoretical knowledge, and no one has ever, so far, tried to put it in the position of a systematic philosophy. I shall, therefore, not call this factor of a higher order, which manifests itself in some men in one way and in other men in another way, an essential manifestation of the true ego, but only a phase of it.
'(^Every great man knows this phase of the ego. He may become conscious of it first through the love of a woman, for the great man loves more intensely than the ordinary man ; or it may be from the contrast given by a sense of guilt or the knowledge of having failed ; these, too, the great man feels more intensely than smaller-minded people. It may lead him to a sense of unity with the all, to the seeing of all things in God, or, and this is more likely, it may reveal to him the frightful dualism of nature and spirit in the universe, and produce in him the need, the craving, for a solution of it, for the secret inner wonder) But always it leads the great man to the beginning of a presentation of the world for himself and by himself, without the help of the thought of others.
This intuitive vision of the world is not a great synthesis
? THE "I" PROBLEM AND GENIUS 167
elaborated at his writing-table in his library from all the booksthathavebeenwritten; itissomethingthathasbeen experienced, and as a whole it is clear and intelligible, although details may still be obscure and contradictory. The excitation of the ego is the only source of this intuitive vision of the world as a whole in the case of the artist as in thatofthephilosopher. And,howeverdifferenttheymay be, if they are really intuitive visions of the cosmos, they have this in common, something that comes only from the excitation of the ego, the faith that every great man pos-> sesses, the conviction of his possession of an " I " or soul, which is solitary in the universe, which faces the universe and comprehends it. -
From the time of this first excitation of his ego, the great man, in spite of lapses due to the most terrible feeling, the feeling of mortality, will live in and by his soul.
,(And it is for this reason, as well as from the sense of his creative powers, that the great man has so intense a self- consciousness. Nothingcanbemoreunintelligentthanto talk of the modesty of great men, of their inability to recog- nisewhatiswithinthem. Thereisnogreatmanwhodoes not well know how far he differs from others (except during these periodical fits of depression to which I have already alluded). Every great man feels himself to be great as soon as he has created something ; his vanity and ambition are, in fact, always so great that he over-estimates himself. Schopenhauer believed himself to be greater than Kant. Nietzsche declared that " Thus spake Zarathustra " was the
greatest book in the world.
There is, however, a side of truth in the assertion that
great men are m^,dest. They are never arrogant. Arro- gance and self-realisation are contradictories, and should neverbeconfui^edalthoughthisisoftendone. Amanhas just as much arrogance as he lacks of self-realisation, and uses it to increase his own self-consciousness by artificially lowering his estimation of others. Of course the fore- going holds true only of what may be called physiological, unconscious arrogance ; the great man must occasionally
? 1 68 SEX AND CHARACTER
comport himself with what seems rudeness to contemptible persons.
^All great men, then, have a conviction, really independent of external proof, that they have a soul. The absurd fear must be laid aside that the soul is a hyperempirical reality and that belief in it leads us to the position of the the- ologists. Belief in a soul is anything rather than a supersti- tionandisnomerehandmaidofreligioussystems. Artists speak of their souls although they have not studied philosophy or theology ; atheists like Shelley use the ex- pression and know very well what they mean by it)-
Others have suggested that the " soul " is only a beautiful empty word, which people ascribe to others without having felt its need for themselves. This is like saying that great artists use symbols to express the highest form of reality without being assured as to the existence of that reality. The mere empiricist and the pure physiologist no doubt will consider that ail this is nonsense, and that Lucretius is theonlygreatpoet. Nodoubttherehasbeenmuchmisuse of the word, but if great artists speak of their soul they knowwhattheyareabout. Artists,likephilosophers,know well when they approach the greatest possible reality, but
Hume had no sense of this.
^The scientific man ranks, as 1 have already said, and as I
shall presently prove, below the artist and the philosopher. The two latter may earn the title of genius which must always be denied to the scientific man^ Without any good reason having been assigned for it, it has usually been the case that the voice of genius on any particular problem is listened to before the voice of science. Is there justice in this preference ? Can the genius explain things as to which the man of science, as such, can say nothing ? Can he peer into depths where the man of science is blind ?