505 (#545) ############################################
CURZON'S POLICY
505
tion in the Indian states had come to outweigh the duty of observing
the letter of treaties framed in earlier days.
CURZON'S POLICY
505
tion in the Indian states had come to outweigh the duty of observing
the letter of treaties framed in earlier days.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
571, supra.
3 Tupper, Our Indian Protectorate, p. 295. * Aitchison, op. cit. iv, 7.
6 Parl. Papers, 1871, L, 441 599:
6 Aitchison, op. cit. mi, 241.
? Forrest, Administration of Lord Lansdowne, p. 51.
## p. 499 (#539) ############################################
MALHAR RAO GAEKWAR
499
protect the state against external attack, but that the resident would
endeavour to compose any disputes that might arise between the khan
and his sardars, and that in these matters the khan would abide by
the decision of the British Government. 1
But the outstanding example of interference by the Government of
India was certainly the deposition of Malhar Rao Gaekwar in 1875.
As the procedure adopted was unusual, and as the action of govern-
ment has since been stated to have aroused the distrust of many of the
princes, the matter evidently deserves statement and discussion.
British relations with this prince had been distinguished by a long
series of troubles, intensified by the fact that in more than one instance
the intellects of the rulers had been notably unstable. Malhar Rao
succeeded to the gaddi at Baroda in 1870. His character even then
stood low. He was believed to have been concerned in an attempted
outbreak in Gujarat in 1857. He had been imprisoned in 1863 by his
brother and predecessor for attempting to clear his way to the gaddi
by poison. After his accession he had pursued the chief agents of the
late ruler with singular vindictiveness, not by judicial process, but by
extermination. They had been cast into prison, where they had perished
mysteriously. After three years of his rule the inhabitants of the state
were exhibiting such unrest that the Government of India appointed
a commission to enquire into the nature of his administration. The
commission consisted of three British officials and the late chief
minister of the Jaipur state, in whom both his late master and the
Government of India placed great reliance. The commission found a
state of general maladministration calling urgently for remedy.
Malhar Rao was then required to remove the principal evils disclosed
within a period of eighteen months. Unluckily at this time the Baroda
resident was a man wanting in acuteness and in tact, who certainly
made matters much more difficult for the Gaekwar than he need have
done. The viceroy, Lord Northbrook, was requested by Malhar Rao
to remove the resident, and informed at almost the same moment by.
the resident that Malhar Rao had tried to poison him. The resident
was replaced by an abler man, who found that no material progress
had been made towards introducing the needed reforms; and investi-
gations disclosed a primâ facie case which the law-advisers considered
would have warranted prosecution had the accused been an ordinary
citizen. It was therefore determined to arrest the Gaekwar, to assume
the temporary administration of the state, and to enquire further into
the alleged attempt to poison the resident. : A new commission was
appointed for this purpose. It consisted of the Chief Justice of Bengal,
another judge, one high political official, two ruling princes—Sindhia
and Jaipur-and Sir Dinkar Rao. This was as independent a body as
>
1 Aitchison, op. cit. XI, 215.
The British Crown and the Indian Slates, p. 71.
3 Parl. Papers, 1875, C. 1252, pp. 3 599.
32-2
## p. 500 (#540) ############################################
500 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
1
the Government of India could well have selected. It would have
included three ruling princes instead of two, for Holkar was also
invited to serve; but that prince found himself unable to do so. He,
however, described the proposed commission as attesting "the for-
bearance and generosity of the British Government”, deserving
"universal applause”. ! These words were not, or at least should not
have been, insincere. The selection of judges on the one side, of Indian
princes on the other, marked in no uncertain way a desire that the
accusation against Malhar Rao should be fully and candidly con-
sidered. Years earlier the queen had expressed a desire that in disputes
with the Indian states some way should be found of acting so as to
“relieve the government agents from the fearful responsibility of being
sole advisers on steps implying judicial condemnation without trial”.
This view was now being put into action, and it is noteworthy that the
method adopted in 1875 is substantially the same as that laid down
for future use in 1921. All the commissioners, after hearing voluminous
evidence and the addresses of counsel, seem to have agreed that an
attempt had been made to poison the resident by two of the residency
servants who had been in communication with Malhar Rao. The
English half went farther and found the Gaekwar guilty; the Indian
half found the accusation not proven. In these circumstances the
Government of India decided to take no further action on the poisoning
charge; but it considered the presumptive evidence against Malhar
Rao so strong, when coupled with his gross mismanagement of the
administration, as to "make it impossible to replace him in power. . . .
In deference to the opinions and feelings of the native commissioners
we should do no more than depose him and his issue, and place him
under restraint in British territory”. 4 This was accordingly done.
A young member of the family was selected as Malhar Rao's successor,
and the administration of the state placed under a council of regency,
а
with a most distinguished Indian administrator, Sir Madhava Rao,
at its head. So far as the government's interference goes, the action
seems well within the provision of the treaties themselves. The engage-
ments of 1802, confirmed in 1805 and 1817, granted a right of inter-
vention "should I myself or my successors commit anything improper
or unjust”. It can scarcely be argued that the protected, not the
protecting, state was to be the judge of the occasion. Nor can the
provision of the treaty be deemed nullified by the language of the
Bombay governor in 1841 describing the Gaekwar as “sole sovereign"
in his territories. Such informal statements cannot be taken as signi-
fying more than the existing intention of the government not to
exercise its treaty rights to the full; nor did the state appear to under-
stand otherwise, for in 1856 the Gaekwar wrote to the resident, “This
.
· Parl. Papers, 1875, C. 1271, p. 90.
: The Queen to Sir Charles Wood, 23 July, 1859; Queen Victoria's Letters, m, 360.
• Parl. Papers, 1875, C. 1252, pp. 8 599.
Idem, p. 7.
## p. 501 (#541) ############################################
MANIPUR
501
government in every way is dependent on the governor-general”.
What is noticeable, here as elsewhere, is a deplorable laxity in regard
to treaties. Sometimes they were to be enforced up to the very limit of
constructive interpretation; sometimes (though rarely) government
chose not to exercise its full rights and allowed its agents to use
language quite at variance with the fundamental facts, thus greatly,
needlessly, unwisely increasing the ambiguous position of the princes
and multiplying the occasions of misunderstanding.
What seems in 1875 to have impressed the princes was, not the
authority claimed by the Government of India, but the moderation
with, which it was exercised. Holkar, in the letter cited above, dwells
on the satisfaction with which the decision to preserve, and not to
annex, the state was regarded by himself and his fellows. He had used
similar language to Daly, the resident, in 1874, saying, “The person
for the time being is little; the state with its rights is the point for
consideration”. In the Company's days, if precedents may be taken
as a guide, Baroda would have been annexed and the state ex-
tinguished. The same would have been the fate of the hill state of
Manipur. Thence in 1890 the raja was driven out. It had been the
custom to support the ruler's authority and definite promises had been
given to this effect. The home authorities had regarded this engage-
ment as of dubious propriety.
“The position, however,. . . imposes on you as a necessary consequence", the
Company wrote to the Government of India in 1852, "the obligation not only
of attempting to guide him by. your advice, but, if needful, of protecting his
subjects against oppression on his part, otherwise our guarantee of his rule may
be the cause of inflicting on them a continuance of reckless tyranny. "
The obligation had, in fact, proved onerous; and the expelled raja had
proved himself but an indifferent administrator. After a considerable
a
delay, government decided to recognise and confirm the new raja,
who was in fact the heir apparent, but to remove from the state the
turbulent and ferocious chief who had brought about the revolution.
But in attempting to effect this decision, the chief commissioner of
Assam, and four other officers were seized, one was speared, and the
rest were publicly beheaded. A strong British force was then sent;
the chief and the new raja were captured and executed for murder;
their acts were treated as acts of rebellion, not those of war; and the
state was continued in separate existence. Lee-Warner rightly em-
phasises the significance of the contrast between the annexation of
Coorg in 1834 and the naintenance of Manipur in 1891. 3 Neither
misgovernment nor attacks on the queen's forces and the murder of
her officers were considered now as warranting annexation.
A yet more remarkable illustration of the same policy was afforded
by the rendition of Mysore to Indian rule. For fifty years the state
1. Tupper, op. cit. p. 117. 2 Pai. "apers, 1891, no. 258, p. 3. : Op. cit. p. 113.
## p. 502 (#542) ############################################
502 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
>
had been managed by British officials under the direct control of the
governor-general. The deposed raja had been refused permission to
adopt a son. At one time it was very generally assumed that the state
had passed permanently into British possession. Yet, when the old raja
died in 1868, it was resolved that his adopted son should succeed to
the government of the state if, when he came of age, he should be found
qualified for the position. Accordingly he was installed as raja in
1881. The Government of India seized this opportunity of determining
with precision what were the rights and duties of the state and of the
paramount power respectively, and the instrument of transfer, dated
i March, 1881, sums up what the government of the crown had come
to regard as the ideal relationship between it and the subordinate
Indian states. This modern document deserves comparison with the
1799 treaty which similarly sums up the views of policy held by
Wellesley, in this matter the most enlightened of all the Company's
governors-general. The present writer has discussed elsewhere the
change of outlook displayed by these documents. Financial stability
was the main object of the earlier, good government the main object
of the later. But in many ways the provisions 'touching the status of
the ruler of Mysore are perhaps the most interesting. The word
“sovereignty”, for instance, nowhere occurs in the instrument of trans-
fer except when referring to British sovereignty. The prince is to be
“placed in possession of the territories” which he is “to hold possession
of and administer". No succession is valid until recognised by the
governor-general in council. The prince must “remain faithful in
allegiance and subordination to Her Majesty". The separate Mysore
coinage, long discontinued, shall not be revived. The military forces
of the state "shall not exceed the strength which the governor-general
in council shall from time to time fix”. The laws and rules in force
ai the time of the transfer shall remain unchanged unless the governor-
general in council approves. It is noteworthy that these limitations
were imposed on one of the largest of the Indian states, covering
nearly 30,000 square miles, with a population of almost five million
persons, governed by a prince who was to be saluted with the maxi-
mum number of guns, and who therefore was reckoned, in spite of his
curtailed authority, on the same level of dignity as princes far less
restricted by treaty provisions. The rendition of Mysore is thus an
outstanding example of the manner in which the crown's disavowal
of any annexationist policy has been observed, even where territory
had been for nearly two generations under British control; but it also
affords the most strikirg instance on record of the contrast between
the views of the crown and those of the Company of what should be
the status of the Indian princes.
To this most important aspect of the present subject we must shortly
return. But it should be noted that other points of general policy are
1 Sketch of the History of India, 1858–1918, pp. 179 sqq.
## p. 503 (#543) ############################################
RENDITION OF MYSORE
503
well illustrated by the instrument of transfer. Of these telegraph and
railway development is one of the most important. Articles 14 and 15
provide for the free grant of all land needed by the Government of
India for these purposes, for the inclusion in the British telegraph
system of all telegraph lines that may be constructed, for their working
(in the absence of special agreement) by the British telegraph depart-
ment, for the exercise of plenary jurisdiction within all land made
over for railway construction. These provisions correspond with the
terms of special agreements made with a number of other states, and
represent the policy of developing these services throughout India as
a whole. In a like manner article 18 proscribes any action affecting
the salt and opium monopolies of the Government of India without its
assent. In the matter of salt Lytton concluded important agreements
with the Rajput states for the acquisition of the main sources of salt
in India, while the general policy of restricting exports of opium,
first accepted by the government of Lord Minto, has obviously affected
the revenues of the opium-producing states.
These points have a special interest of their own. They illustrate
the growth of a community of interests in India as a whole, reflected
in the field of policy by the appearance of that tendency which Lee-
Warner aptly described as “subordinate co-operation”. While com-
munications remained in their mediaeval condition, the resultant
limitation of trade and intercourse hindered the development of
common interests. It was possible still to regard the interests of in-
dividual states and of British India itself as little interdependent, and
consequently to adopt towards the states the former policy (again to
quote Lee-Warner) of “subordinate isolation". As time passed, and
the influence of developing communications became more evident,
this became more and more impracticable. A uniform railway and
telegraph system, for example, would manifestly be more beneficial,
not only to British India, but also to the states, than a variety of
gauges, rates, and regulations. Such ideas inevitably tended to carry
the conception of paramountcy beyond the political into the economic
sphere, and the uniformity achieved in the new economic relations
reacted upon the diversity of the old political relations.
Between 1858 and 1906 there were then numerous causes at work
tending (in defiance of all confirmations) to hasten the decay of the
Company's treaties. The establishment of personal relations with the
crown, the rising standards of administrative propriety, the growth of
common economic interests, multiplied points of contact, occasions
of influence, opportunities of interference, the scope of control; while
the guarantees against the old danger of annexation disposed the
princes to acquiesce in this development of policy and so to enlarge
the extra-diplomatic element in the paramountcy of the crown.
Hence arose the tendency (within limits which it is hardly possible at
1 Cf. Aitchison, op. cit. in, 189.
## p. 504 (#544) ############################################
504 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
present to define) to ignore treaty stipulations where important con-
siderations were deemed to be at stake. This operated, seldom by way
of any formal breach of treaty rights, but by assuming authority
nowhere granted by treaty, or by extending authority admitted by
treaty in one state to others which had not accepted such conditions.
A series of rules began to appear by which the Foreign Department
invariably determined certain questions. The absence of princes from
their states offers an illustration of this tendency. A custom had
sprung up for Indian princes, desirous of travelling beyond the limits
of their states, especially to Europe, to seek the approval of the govern-
inent. This had originated naturally enough in the clauses precluding
them from entering into any relations with another state save through
the agency of the Government of India. Some, however, began to form
a habit of residing for long periods of time in London and other
European capitals, where their occupations, if free from political
taint, were liable to criticism on other grounds. To Curzon, “who took
to government as other men take to pleasure”, this neglect of their
duty seemed an intolerable offence. He therefore issued a circular,
which found its way into the newspapers, laying down the views of
government.
“Repeated absences from India of Native Chiefs”, he observed, "should be
regarded as a dereliction and not as a discharge of public duty. . . the visits of
such princes and chiefs to Europe should only meet with encouragement in cases
where. . . benefit will result from the trip both to the chief and to his people. . .
where such permission is. . . granted,. . . it should be understood that so far from
constituting a ground for the early renewal of the request, it is a reason against
it; and. . . a suitable interval should elapse between the return from travel and
a fresh application for leave. ”
There had, in fact, been imported into the relations with the Indian
states a moral factor alongside of the old political considerations.
Curzon's speech at Gwalior in 1899 voices this in no uncertain manner.
"The native chief”, he said, "has become by our policy an integral factor in
the imperial organisation of India. He is concerned not less than the viceroy
or the lieutenant-governor in the administration of the country. I claim him as
my colleague and partner. He cannot remain vis d vis of the empire a loyal subject
of Her Majesty the Queen Empress, and vis à vis of his own people a frivolous
or irresponsible despot. He must justify and not abuse the authority committed
to him; he must be the servant as well as the master of his people. ”
It is significant that this declaration of administrative morality
should have coincided with a marked inclination to tighten the reins
of control. Much as seventy years earlier the Company's aversion to
annexation yielded before the reflection that the extension of British
rule would mean also the extension of educational and missionary
influences, so in 1899 the duty of securing an improved administra-
i The Times, 31 January, 1921.
2 Ronaldshay, Life of Curzon, 11, 91.
3 Raleigh, Curzon in India, p. 217.
"2
## p.
505 (#545) ############################################
CURZON'S POLICY
505
tion in the Indian states had come to outweigh the duty of observing
the letter of treaties framed in earlier days. A new attitude had indeed
come into vogue. The Foreign Department came to stress certain
provisions of certain treaties, to lay emphasis upon the conditions
imposed on certain states, to regard what had been done in one state
as a good precedent for what in like circumstances might be done in
any of the others. Nor did the practice invariably work to the dis-
advantage of the states. Down to the close of the nineteenth century,
for instance, there had lingered on queer survivals of oriental diplo-
matic custom. An agent sent publicly by one state to another had
cver been housed and clothed, fed and paid, at the expense of the state
which received him. The practice, perhaps, originated partly in the
oriental traditions of unlimited hospitality, partly in the universal
claims of Eastern kings who never willingly acknowledged any other
temporal dominion than their own and little liked the sight of those
whom they could not regard as their own servants. This tradition
been accepted by the Company's government when it first entered
into close relations with Indian princes; it had maintained the vakils
whom the Bonsla, or the nawab wazir, kept at Calcutta, and had
suffered the princes to pay allowances to the residents whom it sent
to them. This no doubt explains the immense popularity enjoyed by
the political service among the Company's servants of the period. The
revolution in the Company's position transformed this primitive
system of relations. Gradually the princes' vakils ceased to be received
at the headquarters of the government, and the Company's residents
depended on the salaries of the government that employed them. But
a number of advantages of various kinds and varying amounts—known
technically as “casements”-had continued; and just as Curzon laid
down rules regarding visits to Europe, so also in this matter of political
perquisites. In fact the relations with the princes were being regu-
larised, while the principle of “reading all Indian treaties together”,
1
so as to produce something like a coherent body of rules, strengthened
the process. This was definitely laid down by Curzon in his speech at
Bahawalpur in 1903. The ties between the Indian princes and the
British crown, he then said,
have no parallel in any other country of the world. The political system of India
is neither feudalism nor federation; it is embodied in no constitution; it does not
always rest upon a treaty; it bears no resemblance to a league. It represents a
series of relationships that have grown up between the crown and the Indian
princes under widely differing historical conditions, but which in process of time
have gradually conformed to a single type. ?
This certainly represents the practice of the Forcign Department
under Curzon's vigorous, if unwise, control. The objections on the
part of the Indian states are evident enough, for the policy casts doubt
upon the validity of individual treaties. Yet in the circumstances of
1 Lee-Warner, op. cit. p. 256.
? Raleigh, op. cil. p. 226.
## p. 506 (#546) ############################################
506 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
the case it would have been singularly difficult to avoid. Almost all
the treaties belonged to a world which had completely passed away,
and in which the Company's predominance had been new, uncertain,
questioned. They no longer corresponded with the political facts, and
some general rules of conduct towards the Indian states were indis-
pensable. Even Sir Leslie Scott found himself unable to avoid general
formulas for which assuredly no universal treaty obligations can be
found. “The rights and duties arising from paramountcy”, he says,
“are uniform throughout India. "1 He elsewhere defines paramountcy
as arising “out of the agreed cession of. . . attributes of sovereignty”. 2
Yet there are numerous small states that have never formally made
any such cession. They are, it seems, bound by the cessions that other
states have made. And yet, if for instance the little state of Janjira is
bound by the cessions made by Hyderabad, why is Hyderabad not
bound by the cessions made by Mysore? The fact seems to be that
constructive interpretations and practice based on use and sufferance
could not be excluded from a consideration of the princes' rights and
duties, nor could any real limit be set to their application beyond the
line drawn at any moment by political expediency, failing that general
revision of the treaties which is still awaited.
Certainly no one considering the general course of events within
the period covered by this chapter can deny that political expediency
has materially affected the attitude of both parties, of the Government
of India on the one side and of the states on the other, towards the
question of treaty rights. In general down to 1906 the governors-
general were steadily inclining more and more towards basing their
policy on the maxims of general philanthropy, while their unquestioned
power disposed them in the name of duty constantly to raise the limits
of the expedient. At the same time through most of the period the
princes were equally inclined to acquiesce. They had gained too much
by the abandonment of annexation to oppose the accompanying
growth of paramountcy. It was not until the close of the century that
regulations such as Curzon's rules about visits to Europe excited their
active opposition. Then, indeed, they began to question the validity of
much that had been done, and to consider how much of it might be
reversed. At almost the same moment the attitude of the Government
of India began to change. The explanation lies less in any belated
recognition of the princes' rights than in the fact that political move-
ments within British India itself were beginning to dispute the right
and authority by which India was governed. Assailed by the intelli-
gentsia, the government looked round naturally for allies and helpers.
In 1857 the princes had in general aided to resist the tide of the Mutiny.
In 1907 they might aid to slacken the onslaught of political unrest.
They were therefore to be cultivated rather than coerced. Seeing
their rising value, the princes raised their demands, but not too much,
1 Butler Committee Report, p. 79.
· Idem, p. 64.
## p. 507 (#547) ############################################
IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS
507
for they also were threatened by the same forces that the Government
of India was seeking to dam back into constitutional channels. A new
tendency had come into operation.
It is illustrated by two very remarkable developments, both of which
may be traced back into the pre-Curzonian period. One is represented
by the imperial service troops, the other by the abandonment of the
century-old policy of the isolation of individual states. The distrust or
dislike with which the state forces had been regarded has already been
pointed out. Save for a brief period during the Mutiny, few governors-
general had regarded the states, in their military aspect, save as
potential, if unlikely, enemies. Even at the beginning of the twentieth
century Kitchener's internal defence scheme took them into account
as a source of possible danger. " This, however, was more the survival
of tradition than the policy advocated by the Foreign Department.
The Panjdeh war scare in 1885 had elicited a number of offers from
the Indian states, especially from those near the North-West Frontier,
of troops for service against Russia if need should arise. General
military opinion was averse to anything of the kind. But the secretary
of the Foreign Department, Mortimer Durand, strongly favoured the
idea of utilising the state forces. He discussed it with the lieutenant-
governor of the Panjab, with the governor-general, Lord Dufferin,
with the commander-in-chief, Lord (then Sir Frederick) Roberts. 2
The upshot was the formation of the imperial service troops. These
were bodics of men entirely under the control of the states which
maintained them, trained under British officers specially lent for the
purpose, and never under the orders of the commander-in-chief except
when on active service. The first occasion of their employment was
the Hunza campaign of 1893. They were differentiated from the
contingents of earlier days by the voluntary nature of their main-
tenance, by their being entirely under Indian control and commanded
by Indian officers, and by their recognition depending on their
being kept up to an effective standard, always ready for service
whenever called for. In 1914 they were 22,000 strong, maintained by
twenty-nine of the states. In 1923 they had risen to 27,000. 3 This
represents, as Lee-Warner points out, the complete antithesis of
Wellesley's policy of holding the Indian states in check by the bit and
bridle of subsidiary forces. It even affords a notable contrast with
the policy which had warned Sindhia in 1867 to disperse his favourite
"toy”.
The other development was at least equally significant. The com-
monest clause in the treaties had been that which forbade the states
to enter into relations with each other or with any external power save
i Irthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, 11, 135.
* Sykes, Lifi of Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 172.
3 The Army in India and its evolution, pp. 156–7.
• Lee-Warner, op. cit. p. 185.
## p. 508 (#548) ############################################
508 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
through the medium of the Company's government. The constant
repetition of the clause had marked the importance which was attached
to it. It had been the corner-stone of the Company's policy, and for
many years it remained equally important in the eyes of the repre-
sentatives of the crown. It was deemed essential to keep the states
isolated one from another. Lytton was the first governor-general to
propose the abandonment of these views. It is noteworthy that he was
also the first governor-general to attempt to regulate the vernacular
press. In one of those moments of true insight which from time to
time visited him, he wrote to Lord Salisbury,
I am convinced that the fundamental political mistake of able and experienced
Indian officials is a belief that we can hold India securely by what they call good
government. . . . Look at the mistake which Austria made in the government of
her Italian provinces. They were the best governed portions of Italy; she studied
and protected the interests of the native peasantry; but, fcaring the native noblesse,
she snubbed and repressed it. . . . !
He was exceedingly anxious, therefore, to transform the relations
between the states and the Government of India. With this end in view
he pressed for leave to announce, at the durbar in which the queen
was to be proclaimed the Queen Empress, the establishment of an
Indian privy council. This was to be limited, at first at all events, to
the great chiefs, who were to consult with and advise the governor-
general on matters of common interest. But the opposition of the
home authorities proved too strong, and the proposal was cut down
to the bestowal of an empty title, “Councillors of the Empress”, on
some of the leading princes. The effect of Lytton's proposals, had
they been carried into effect, would have been the establishment of
co-operation, not only between the Government of India and the
states individually, but also between the states collectively. This novel
idea, as yet unsupported by the evident development of danger from
within, would, it was still feared, give rise to common understandings
and united pressure such as mightembarrass the Government of India.
In fact it was regarded with the same doleful apprehension as that
with which forty years later distinguished publicists regarded the
creation of the chamber of princes. *
No further step in this direction was taken till the government of
Lord Minto. By then the Indian situation was much more favourable
to a move, for political unrest had reached the point at which it could
not be mistaken. The governor-general consulted the leading states
concerning the spread of anarchist conspiracies; and his reform pro-
posals included the revival of something like Lytton's earlier scheme.
But again the project fell through, largely because in Morley's doc-
trinaire view the only effective remedy for the situation lay in political
concessions.
Lady Betty Balfour, Lytton's Indian Administration, p. 109.
2 Idem, p. 111.
3 Sir Valentine Chirol, ap. The Times, 10 February, 1921.
## p. 509 (#549) ############################################
MINTO'S POLICY
509
The outbreak of war with Germany, however, displayed so strongly
the decision with which the princes held to their position in the British
Empire, that the adoption of the new policy was at last assured.
Lord Hardinge "initiated conferences with the ruling princes on
matters of imperial interest and on matters affecting the states as a
whole". 1 The joint report of Mr Edwin Montagu and Lord Chelms-
ford recommended the establishment of a Chamber of Princes, and
the formation of machinery for joint consultation between the governor-
general and the Indian states on matters of common interest. In 1921
the chamber was inaugurated, bringing to an end a prolonged and
most important phase of the relations between the states and the
Government of India.
The best exposition of the attitude of the governors-general within
the later and formative part of the period is contained in the speech
which Lord Minto delivered at Udaipur in 1909. He fully renounced
the tendency which the practice of the Foreign Department had
exhibited down to the government of Lord Curzon.
“I have. . . made it a rule", he declared, "to avoid as far as possible the issue
of general instructions, and have endeavoured to deal with questions as they
arose with reference to existing treaties, the merits of each case, local conditions,
antecedent circumstances, and the particular stage of development, feudal and
constitutional, of individual principalities. "
This "more sympathetic and therefore more elastic policy" ad-
mitted the existence of more than one type of relationship. Yet Lord
Minto, too, recognised and declared the suzerainty of the crown as
existent quite apart from treaty obligation. “The imperial govern-
ment”, he said, "has assumed a certain degree of responsibility for
the general soundness of [the princes') administration and would not
consent to incur the reproach of being an indirect instrument of mis-
rule. ” He maintained the need of interpreting the treaties in the light
of actual fact, of established usage, and indeed of political expediency,
but he drew the line of political expediency far below the level to
which it had been forced by his predecessors. His attitude closely
agrees with that of Lord Reading in 1922. 3
Throughout the whole period, then, neither the claims of the crown
nor the claims of the princes have really depended on the exact
wording of the treaties. Both have fluctuated with the circumstances
of the time. The crown, in two most important points, has receded from
claims which it might have exercised. It has renounced annexation;
it has forgone its right to deal in no other way than individually with
the states. But, as against this, the states have become what they never
were by treaty, parts of an empire. The problem has become con-
stitutional rather than diplomatic. The suzerainty of the crown has
1 Butler Committee Report, p. 20.
* Buchan, Life of Lord Minto, p. 298.
• Parl. Papers, 1926, C. 2621, p. 19
## p. 510 (#550) ############################################
510 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
become by the weight of its power greater than the Company's para-
mountcy ever was. But this process has gone on unsupported by
any formal recognition. The contrast between the political facts and
any theory which both parties would agree to draw from the docu-
ments has become more pronounced. Under the pressure of this
suzerainty the administration of the states has been improved and the
position of the princes in a world of change been greatly strengthened.
But this has been achieved by an illogical expansion of political right
by that sense of moral duty which has been at once the strength and
weakness, the inspiration and obsession, of modern British rule in
India.
## p. 511 (#551) ############################################
CHAPTER XXVIII
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
The story of local self-government in British India reveals a long-
drawn-out effort to retain what was good in existing institutions and
to reinforce these wherever necessary by ideas which
had been proved
to be useful in England. As India was and is essentially a country of
villages, places where, thanks to the space and air available and the
cleansing power of the Indian sun and rains, disease in normal circum-
stances remained within reasonable bounds, the indigenous village
customs were left undisturbed, but for congested areas like towns it
was soon necessary to bring in the system of the West. Local self-
government was imported from England and bestowed as a gift, first
on the three presidency towns and later on the district towns, while
the villages were allowed to retain their ancient customs. Yet it is in
these villages, where the great mass of the people live, that there has
existed for centuries a simple system of local self-government on which
all real advance must be based. As the Decentralisation Commission
has said in its report:
The foundation of any stable edifice which shall associate the people with the
administration, must be the village, as being an area of much greater antiquity
than the administrative creations such as tahsils, and one in which people are
known to one another and have interests which converge on well-recognised
objects.
Unfortunately, owing to the general political unsettlement which
preceded the establishment of British rule in India, there had been
a great decay in the life of the village community so that often it was
hard to discern and call to life the various members of what had been
an organic whole. The following pages will show the efforts to utilise
what was left, for it was the business and policy of the government
“to leave as much as possible of the business of the country to be done
by the people themselves". 2
The conditions of life in the towns, however, called for the early
application of English methods of administration, and many attempts
were made to transplant English municipal life into India. But, since
this system was not an indigenous growth but a forced plant of foreign
importation, it developed in India not like the English local govern-
ment but somewhat like that in France, with local authorities looking
rather to the wishes of the central authority than to what was desired
by the local people and with the conduct of local affairs in the hands
a
i Report, p. 239.
2 Resolution of Lord Lawrence, 14 September, 1864.
## p. 512 (#552) ############################################
512
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
of officials criticised and advised by local inhabitants rather than in
the hands of elected representatives of the locality advised and helped
by permanent officials who were their servants. Such a development
was naturally disliked by the British government in England and by
British officials in India, who often attempted to breed a munici-
pal system like that known in England. These did not meet with any
great success, partly because the English system was not suited to the
situation in the country and partly because officials in India did not
realise the real nature of government control in England.
The subject of local self-government in India naturally divides
itself into two main sections, rural and urban. Each section, again, has
two divisions which demand separate treatment. In the rural area
the administration of the villages with their indigenous local self-
government stands apart from that of the rural district, while among
the towns the presidency towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras
have a history quite distinct from that of the others.
VILLAGES
The following description of an Indian village taken from the
Imperial Gazetteer gives a picture which is true for large parts of India. 1
The typical Indian village has its central residential site, with an open space
for a pond or cattle stand. Stretching around this nucleus lie the village lands,
consisting of a cultivated area and (very often) grounds for grazing and wood
cutting. The arable lands have their several boundary marks and their little sub-
divisions of earth ridges made for retaining rain or irrigation water. The in-
habitants of such a village pass their life in the midst of these simple surroundings,
welded together in a little community with its own organisation and government,
which differ in character in the various types of villages, its body of customary
rules, and its little staff of functionaries, artisans and traders.
Such a description is not true of certain parts of India such as Bengal
and Assam, and, even where it may be generally true, there is such
an infinite variety of exceptions that the general application of a
statement must be made and received with the greatest caution.
The chief functionaries were the headman, the accountant, the
watchman, the priest and the schoolmaster, while the artisans included
among others the smith, the potter and the washerman. The final
word in the internal affairs of the village lay with the village council
or panchayat, which settled matters by discussion carried on until
general agreement was reached. The idea that the will of the majority
should prevail or that votes should be taken does not appear to have
existed. Formerly the village officers and artisans were paid by
grants of land or a share of the produce, but during Muhammadan
rule, especially in its later phases, the village community greatly
decayed and the remuneration of both officers and artisans, where
1 Imperial Gazetteer, IV, 279.
· Matthai, Village Government in British India, p. 30.
## p. 513 (#553) ############################################
VILLAGES
513
these remained, largely took the form of cash payments. Sometimes
the village council had disappeared, and in many places little trace of it
could be found. Not that the rulers interfered with village life directly,
for the relation between ruler and village was purely fiscal. So long
as the revenue was paid to the proper official the villages were left to
themselves. There was, however, in the exaction of all the revenue
and perquisites that could be taken from the country, a tremendous
pressure on the peasants which led to the decadence of village life. 1
Accordingly the British administrators had not to deal with a network
of flourishing villages each with a healthy local life, but only with the
remnants of the former system. Such as they were these remnants
were utilised as the foundation of the new rule. Under settled and
peaceful conditions, village life assumed a more normal course, and,
as knowledge was gained with experience, many efforts were made to
revive what was useful in the old village life with reference to educa-
tion, sanitation, watch and ward, administration of justice and poor
relief. In 1814 the court of directors of the East India Company
wrote:
We refer with particular satisfaction upon this occasion to that distinguished
feature of internal polity which prevails in some parts of India, and by which the
instruction of the people is provided for by a certain charge upon the produce
of the soil and by other endowments in favour of the village teachers, who are
thereby rendered public servants of the community.
They urged the government to protect and support these teachers.
3 Tupper, Our Indian Protectorate, p. 295. * Aitchison, op. cit. iv, 7.
6 Parl. Papers, 1871, L, 441 599:
6 Aitchison, op. cit. mi, 241.
? Forrest, Administration of Lord Lansdowne, p. 51.
## p. 499 (#539) ############################################
MALHAR RAO GAEKWAR
499
protect the state against external attack, but that the resident would
endeavour to compose any disputes that might arise between the khan
and his sardars, and that in these matters the khan would abide by
the decision of the British Government. 1
But the outstanding example of interference by the Government of
India was certainly the deposition of Malhar Rao Gaekwar in 1875.
As the procedure adopted was unusual, and as the action of govern-
ment has since been stated to have aroused the distrust of many of the
princes, the matter evidently deserves statement and discussion.
British relations with this prince had been distinguished by a long
series of troubles, intensified by the fact that in more than one instance
the intellects of the rulers had been notably unstable. Malhar Rao
succeeded to the gaddi at Baroda in 1870. His character even then
stood low. He was believed to have been concerned in an attempted
outbreak in Gujarat in 1857. He had been imprisoned in 1863 by his
brother and predecessor for attempting to clear his way to the gaddi
by poison. After his accession he had pursued the chief agents of the
late ruler with singular vindictiveness, not by judicial process, but by
extermination. They had been cast into prison, where they had perished
mysteriously. After three years of his rule the inhabitants of the state
were exhibiting such unrest that the Government of India appointed
a commission to enquire into the nature of his administration. The
commission consisted of three British officials and the late chief
minister of the Jaipur state, in whom both his late master and the
Government of India placed great reliance. The commission found a
state of general maladministration calling urgently for remedy.
Malhar Rao was then required to remove the principal evils disclosed
within a period of eighteen months. Unluckily at this time the Baroda
resident was a man wanting in acuteness and in tact, who certainly
made matters much more difficult for the Gaekwar than he need have
done. The viceroy, Lord Northbrook, was requested by Malhar Rao
to remove the resident, and informed at almost the same moment by.
the resident that Malhar Rao had tried to poison him. The resident
was replaced by an abler man, who found that no material progress
had been made towards introducing the needed reforms; and investi-
gations disclosed a primâ facie case which the law-advisers considered
would have warranted prosecution had the accused been an ordinary
citizen. It was therefore determined to arrest the Gaekwar, to assume
the temporary administration of the state, and to enquire further into
the alleged attempt to poison the resident. : A new commission was
appointed for this purpose. It consisted of the Chief Justice of Bengal,
another judge, one high political official, two ruling princes—Sindhia
and Jaipur-and Sir Dinkar Rao. This was as independent a body as
>
1 Aitchison, op. cit. XI, 215.
The British Crown and the Indian Slates, p. 71.
3 Parl. Papers, 1875, C. 1252, pp. 3 599.
32-2
## p. 500 (#540) ############################################
500 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
1
the Government of India could well have selected. It would have
included three ruling princes instead of two, for Holkar was also
invited to serve; but that prince found himself unable to do so. He,
however, described the proposed commission as attesting "the for-
bearance and generosity of the British Government”, deserving
"universal applause”. ! These words were not, or at least should not
have been, insincere. The selection of judges on the one side, of Indian
princes on the other, marked in no uncertain way a desire that the
accusation against Malhar Rao should be fully and candidly con-
sidered. Years earlier the queen had expressed a desire that in disputes
with the Indian states some way should be found of acting so as to
“relieve the government agents from the fearful responsibility of being
sole advisers on steps implying judicial condemnation without trial”.
This view was now being put into action, and it is noteworthy that the
method adopted in 1875 is substantially the same as that laid down
for future use in 1921. All the commissioners, after hearing voluminous
evidence and the addresses of counsel, seem to have agreed that an
attempt had been made to poison the resident by two of the residency
servants who had been in communication with Malhar Rao. The
English half went farther and found the Gaekwar guilty; the Indian
half found the accusation not proven. In these circumstances the
Government of India decided to take no further action on the poisoning
charge; but it considered the presumptive evidence against Malhar
Rao so strong, when coupled with his gross mismanagement of the
administration, as to "make it impossible to replace him in power. . . .
In deference to the opinions and feelings of the native commissioners
we should do no more than depose him and his issue, and place him
under restraint in British territory”. 4 This was accordingly done.
A young member of the family was selected as Malhar Rao's successor,
and the administration of the state placed under a council of regency,
а
with a most distinguished Indian administrator, Sir Madhava Rao,
at its head. So far as the government's interference goes, the action
seems well within the provision of the treaties themselves. The engage-
ments of 1802, confirmed in 1805 and 1817, granted a right of inter-
vention "should I myself or my successors commit anything improper
or unjust”. It can scarcely be argued that the protected, not the
protecting, state was to be the judge of the occasion. Nor can the
provision of the treaty be deemed nullified by the language of the
Bombay governor in 1841 describing the Gaekwar as “sole sovereign"
in his territories. Such informal statements cannot be taken as signi-
fying more than the existing intention of the government not to
exercise its treaty rights to the full; nor did the state appear to under-
stand otherwise, for in 1856 the Gaekwar wrote to the resident, “This
.
· Parl. Papers, 1875, C. 1271, p. 90.
: The Queen to Sir Charles Wood, 23 July, 1859; Queen Victoria's Letters, m, 360.
• Parl. Papers, 1875, C. 1252, pp. 8 599.
Idem, p. 7.
## p. 501 (#541) ############################################
MANIPUR
501
government in every way is dependent on the governor-general”.
What is noticeable, here as elsewhere, is a deplorable laxity in regard
to treaties. Sometimes they were to be enforced up to the very limit of
constructive interpretation; sometimes (though rarely) government
chose not to exercise its full rights and allowed its agents to use
language quite at variance with the fundamental facts, thus greatly,
needlessly, unwisely increasing the ambiguous position of the princes
and multiplying the occasions of misunderstanding.
What seems in 1875 to have impressed the princes was, not the
authority claimed by the Government of India, but the moderation
with, which it was exercised. Holkar, in the letter cited above, dwells
on the satisfaction with which the decision to preserve, and not to
annex, the state was regarded by himself and his fellows. He had used
similar language to Daly, the resident, in 1874, saying, “The person
for the time being is little; the state with its rights is the point for
consideration”. In the Company's days, if precedents may be taken
as a guide, Baroda would have been annexed and the state ex-
tinguished. The same would have been the fate of the hill state of
Manipur. Thence in 1890 the raja was driven out. It had been the
custom to support the ruler's authority and definite promises had been
given to this effect. The home authorities had regarded this engage-
ment as of dubious propriety.
“The position, however,. . . imposes on you as a necessary consequence", the
Company wrote to the Government of India in 1852, "the obligation not only
of attempting to guide him by. your advice, but, if needful, of protecting his
subjects against oppression on his part, otherwise our guarantee of his rule may
be the cause of inflicting on them a continuance of reckless tyranny. "
The obligation had, in fact, proved onerous; and the expelled raja had
proved himself but an indifferent administrator. After a considerable
a
delay, government decided to recognise and confirm the new raja,
who was in fact the heir apparent, but to remove from the state the
turbulent and ferocious chief who had brought about the revolution.
But in attempting to effect this decision, the chief commissioner of
Assam, and four other officers were seized, one was speared, and the
rest were publicly beheaded. A strong British force was then sent;
the chief and the new raja were captured and executed for murder;
their acts were treated as acts of rebellion, not those of war; and the
state was continued in separate existence. Lee-Warner rightly em-
phasises the significance of the contrast between the annexation of
Coorg in 1834 and the naintenance of Manipur in 1891. 3 Neither
misgovernment nor attacks on the queen's forces and the murder of
her officers were considered now as warranting annexation.
A yet more remarkable illustration of the same policy was afforded
by the rendition of Mysore to Indian rule. For fifty years the state
1. Tupper, op. cit. p. 117. 2 Pai. "apers, 1891, no. 258, p. 3. : Op. cit. p. 113.
## p. 502 (#542) ############################################
502 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
>
had been managed by British officials under the direct control of the
governor-general. The deposed raja had been refused permission to
adopt a son. At one time it was very generally assumed that the state
had passed permanently into British possession. Yet, when the old raja
died in 1868, it was resolved that his adopted son should succeed to
the government of the state if, when he came of age, he should be found
qualified for the position. Accordingly he was installed as raja in
1881. The Government of India seized this opportunity of determining
with precision what were the rights and duties of the state and of the
paramount power respectively, and the instrument of transfer, dated
i March, 1881, sums up what the government of the crown had come
to regard as the ideal relationship between it and the subordinate
Indian states. This modern document deserves comparison with the
1799 treaty which similarly sums up the views of policy held by
Wellesley, in this matter the most enlightened of all the Company's
governors-general. The present writer has discussed elsewhere the
change of outlook displayed by these documents. Financial stability
was the main object of the earlier, good government the main object
of the later. But in many ways the provisions 'touching the status of
the ruler of Mysore are perhaps the most interesting. The word
“sovereignty”, for instance, nowhere occurs in the instrument of trans-
fer except when referring to British sovereignty. The prince is to be
“placed in possession of the territories” which he is “to hold possession
of and administer". No succession is valid until recognised by the
governor-general in council. The prince must “remain faithful in
allegiance and subordination to Her Majesty". The separate Mysore
coinage, long discontinued, shall not be revived. The military forces
of the state "shall not exceed the strength which the governor-general
in council shall from time to time fix”. The laws and rules in force
ai the time of the transfer shall remain unchanged unless the governor-
general in council approves. It is noteworthy that these limitations
were imposed on one of the largest of the Indian states, covering
nearly 30,000 square miles, with a population of almost five million
persons, governed by a prince who was to be saluted with the maxi-
mum number of guns, and who therefore was reckoned, in spite of his
curtailed authority, on the same level of dignity as princes far less
restricted by treaty provisions. The rendition of Mysore is thus an
outstanding example of the manner in which the crown's disavowal
of any annexationist policy has been observed, even where territory
had been for nearly two generations under British control; but it also
affords the most strikirg instance on record of the contrast between
the views of the crown and those of the Company of what should be
the status of the Indian princes.
To this most important aspect of the present subject we must shortly
return. But it should be noted that other points of general policy are
1 Sketch of the History of India, 1858–1918, pp. 179 sqq.
## p. 503 (#543) ############################################
RENDITION OF MYSORE
503
well illustrated by the instrument of transfer. Of these telegraph and
railway development is one of the most important. Articles 14 and 15
provide for the free grant of all land needed by the Government of
India for these purposes, for the inclusion in the British telegraph
system of all telegraph lines that may be constructed, for their working
(in the absence of special agreement) by the British telegraph depart-
ment, for the exercise of plenary jurisdiction within all land made
over for railway construction. These provisions correspond with the
terms of special agreements made with a number of other states, and
represent the policy of developing these services throughout India as
a whole. In a like manner article 18 proscribes any action affecting
the salt and opium monopolies of the Government of India without its
assent. In the matter of salt Lytton concluded important agreements
with the Rajput states for the acquisition of the main sources of salt
in India, while the general policy of restricting exports of opium,
first accepted by the government of Lord Minto, has obviously affected
the revenues of the opium-producing states.
These points have a special interest of their own. They illustrate
the growth of a community of interests in India as a whole, reflected
in the field of policy by the appearance of that tendency which Lee-
Warner aptly described as “subordinate co-operation”. While com-
munications remained in their mediaeval condition, the resultant
limitation of trade and intercourse hindered the development of
common interests. It was possible still to regard the interests of in-
dividual states and of British India itself as little interdependent, and
consequently to adopt towards the states the former policy (again to
quote Lee-Warner) of “subordinate isolation". As time passed, and
the influence of developing communications became more evident,
this became more and more impracticable. A uniform railway and
telegraph system, for example, would manifestly be more beneficial,
not only to British India, but also to the states, than a variety of
gauges, rates, and regulations. Such ideas inevitably tended to carry
the conception of paramountcy beyond the political into the economic
sphere, and the uniformity achieved in the new economic relations
reacted upon the diversity of the old political relations.
Between 1858 and 1906 there were then numerous causes at work
tending (in defiance of all confirmations) to hasten the decay of the
Company's treaties. The establishment of personal relations with the
crown, the rising standards of administrative propriety, the growth of
common economic interests, multiplied points of contact, occasions
of influence, opportunities of interference, the scope of control; while
the guarantees against the old danger of annexation disposed the
princes to acquiesce in this development of policy and so to enlarge
the extra-diplomatic element in the paramountcy of the crown.
Hence arose the tendency (within limits which it is hardly possible at
1 Cf. Aitchison, op. cit. in, 189.
## p. 504 (#544) ############################################
504 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
present to define) to ignore treaty stipulations where important con-
siderations were deemed to be at stake. This operated, seldom by way
of any formal breach of treaty rights, but by assuming authority
nowhere granted by treaty, or by extending authority admitted by
treaty in one state to others which had not accepted such conditions.
A series of rules began to appear by which the Foreign Department
invariably determined certain questions. The absence of princes from
their states offers an illustration of this tendency. A custom had
sprung up for Indian princes, desirous of travelling beyond the limits
of their states, especially to Europe, to seek the approval of the govern-
inent. This had originated naturally enough in the clauses precluding
them from entering into any relations with another state save through
the agency of the Government of India. Some, however, began to form
a habit of residing for long periods of time in London and other
European capitals, where their occupations, if free from political
taint, were liable to criticism on other grounds. To Curzon, “who took
to government as other men take to pleasure”, this neglect of their
duty seemed an intolerable offence. He therefore issued a circular,
which found its way into the newspapers, laying down the views of
government.
“Repeated absences from India of Native Chiefs”, he observed, "should be
regarded as a dereliction and not as a discharge of public duty. . . the visits of
such princes and chiefs to Europe should only meet with encouragement in cases
where. . . benefit will result from the trip both to the chief and to his people. . .
where such permission is. . . granted,. . . it should be understood that so far from
constituting a ground for the early renewal of the request, it is a reason against
it; and. . . a suitable interval should elapse between the return from travel and
a fresh application for leave. ”
There had, in fact, been imported into the relations with the Indian
states a moral factor alongside of the old political considerations.
Curzon's speech at Gwalior in 1899 voices this in no uncertain manner.
"The native chief”, he said, "has become by our policy an integral factor in
the imperial organisation of India. He is concerned not less than the viceroy
or the lieutenant-governor in the administration of the country. I claim him as
my colleague and partner. He cannot remain vis d vis of the empire a loyal subject
of Her Majesty the Queen Empress, and vis à vis of his own people a frivolous
or irresponsible despot. He must justify and not abuse the authority committed
to him; he must be the servant as well as the master of his people. ”
It is significant that this declaration of administrative morality
should have coincided with a marked inclination to tighten the reins
of control. Much as seventy years earlier the Company's aversion to
annexation yielded before the reflection that the extension of British
rule would mean also the extension of educational and missionary
influences, so in 1899 the duty of securing an improved administra-
i The Times, 31 January, 1921.
2 Ronaldshay, Life of Curzon, 11, 91.
3 Raleigh, Curzon in India, p. 217.
"2
## p.
505 (#545) ############################################
CURZON'S POLICY
505
tion in the Indian states had come to outweigh the duty of observing
the letter of treaties framed in earlier days. A new attitude had indeed
come into vogue. The Foreign Department came to stress certain
provisions of certain treaties, to lay emphasis upon the conditions
imposed on certain states, to regard what had been done in one state
as a good precedent for what in like circumstances might be done in
any of the others. Nor did the practice invariably work to the dis-
advantage of the states. Down to the close of the nineteenth century,
for instance, there had lingered on queer survivals of oriental diplo-
matic custom. An agent sent publicly by one state to another had
cver been housed and clothed, fed and paid, at the expense of the state
which received him. The practice, perhaps, originated partly in the
oriental traditions of unlimited hospitality, partly in the universal
claims of Eastern kings who never willingly acknowledged any other
temporal dominion than their own and little liked the sight of those
whom they could not regard as their own servants. This tradition
been accepted by the Company's government when it first entered
into close relations with Indian princes; it had maintained the vakils
whom the Bonsla, or the nawab wazir, kept at Calcutta, and had
suffered the princes to pay allowances to the residents whom it sent
to them. This no doubt explains the immense popularity enjoyed by
the political service among the Company's servants of the period. The
revolution in the Company's position transformed this primitive
system of relations. Gradually the princes' vakils ceased to be received
at the headquarters of the government, and the Company's residents
depended on the salaries of the government that employed them. But
a number of advantages of various kinds and varying amounts—known
technically as “casements”-had continued; and just as Curzon laid
down rules regarding visits to Europe, so also in this matter of political
perquisites. In fact the relations with the princes were being regu-
larised, while the principle of “reading all Indian treaties together”,
1
so as to produce something like a coherent body of rules, strengthened
the process. This was definitely laid down by Curzon in his speech at
Bahawalpur in 1903. The ties between the Indian princes and the
British crown, he then said,
have no parallel in any other country of the world. The political system of India
is neither feudalism nor federation; it is embodied in no constitution; it does not
always rest upon a treaty; it bears no resemblance to a league. It represents a
series of relationships that have grown up between the crown and the Indian
princes under widely differing historical conditions, but which in process of time
have gradually conformed to a single type. ?
This certainly represents the practice of the Forcign Department
under Curzon's vigorous, if unwise, control. The objections on the
part of the Indian states are evident enough, for the policy casts doubt
upon the validity of individual treaties. Yet in the circumstances of
1 Lee-Warner, op. cit. p. 256.
? Raleigh, op. cil. p. 226.
## p. 506 (#546) ############################################
506 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
the case it would have been singularly difficult to avoid. Almost all
the treaties belonged to a world which had completely passed away,
and in which the Company's predominance had been new, uncertain,
questioned. They no longer corresponded with the political facts, and
some general rules of conduct towards the Indian states were indis-
pensable. Even Sir Leslie Scott found himself unable to avoid general
formulas for which assuredly no universal treaty obligations can be
found. “The rights and duties arising from paramountcy”, he says,
“are uniform throughout India. "1 He elsewhere defines paramountcy
as arising “out of the agreed cession of. . . attributes of sovereignty”. 2
Yet there are numerous small states that have never formally made
any such cession. They are, it seems, bound by the cessions that other
states have made. And yet, if for instance the little state of Janjira is
bound by the cessions made by Hyderabad, why is Hyderabad not
bound by the cessions made by Mysore? The fact seems to be that
constructive interpretations and practice based on use and sufferance
could not be excluded from a consideration of the princes' rights and
duties, nor could any real limit be set to their application beyond the
line drawn at any moment by political expediency, failing that general
revision of the treaties which is still awaited.
Certainly no one considering the general course of events within
the period covered by this chapter can deny that political expediency
has materially affected the attitude of both parties, of the Government
of India on the one side and of the states on the other, towards the
question of treaty rights. In general down to 1906 the governors-
general were steadily inclining more and more towards basing their
policy on the maxims of general philanthropy, while their unquestioned
power disposed them in the name of duty constantly to raise the limits
of the expedient. At the same time through most of the period the
princes were equally inclined to acquiesce. They had gained too much
by the abandonment of annexation to oppose the accompanying
growth of paramountcy. It was not until the close of the century that
regulations such as Curzon's rules about visits to Europe excited their
active opposition. Then, indeed, they began to question the validity of
much that had been done, and to consider how much of it might be
reversed. At almost the same moment the attitude of the Government
of India began to change. The explanation lies less in any belated
recognition of the princes' rights than in the fact that political move-
ments within British India itself were beginning to dispute the right
and authority by which India was governed. Assailed by the intelli-
gentsia, the government looked round naturally for allies and helpers.
In 1857 the princes had in general aided to resist the tide of the Mutiny.
In 1907 they might aid to slacken the onslaught of political unrest.
They were therefore to be cultivated rather than coerced. Seeing
their rising value, the princes raised their demands, but not too much,
1 Butler Committee Report, p. 79.
· Idem, p. 64.
## p. 507 (#547) ############################################
IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS
507
for they also were threatened by the same forces that the Government
of India was seeking to dam back into constitutional channels. A new
tendency had come into operation.
It is illustrated by two very remarkable developments, both of which
may be traced back into the pre-Curzonian period. One is represented
by the imperial service troops, the other by the abandonment of the
century-old policy of the isolation of individual states. The distrust or
dislike with which the state forces had been regarded has already been
pointed out. Save for a brief period during the Mutiny, few governors-
general had regarded the states, in their military aspect, save as
potential, if unlikely, enemies. Even at the beginning of the twentieth
century Kitchener's internal defence scheme took them into account
as a source of possible danger. " This, however, was more the survival
of tradition than the policy advocated by the Foreign Department.
The Panjdeh war scare in 1885 had elicited a number of offers from
the Indian states, especially from those near the North-West Frontier,
of troops for service against Russia if need should arise. General
military opinion was averse to anything of the kind. But the secretary
of the Foreign Department, Mortimer Durand, strongly favoured the
idea of utilising the state forces. He discussed it with the lieutenant-
governor of the Panjab, with the governor-general, Lord Dufferin,
with the commander-in-chief, Lord (then Sir Frederick) Roberts. 2
The upshot was the formation of the imperial service troops. These
were bodics of men entirely under the control of the states which
maintained them, trained under British officers specially lent for the
purpose, and never under the orders of the commander-in-chief except
when on active service. The first occasion of their employment was
the Hunza campaign of 1893. They were differentiated from the
contingents of earlier days by the voluntary nature of their main-
tenance, by their being entirely under Indian control and commanded
by Indian officers, and by their recognition depending on their
being kept up to an effective standard, always ready for service
whenever called for. In 1914 they were 22,000 strong, maintained by
twenty-nine of the states. In 1923 they had risen to 27,000. 3 This
represents, as Lee-Warner points out, the complete antithesis of
Wellesley's policy of holding the Indian states in check by the bit and
bridle of subsidiary forces. It even affords a notable contrast with
the policy which had warned Sindhia in 1867 to disperse his favourite
"toy”.
The other development was at least equally significant. The com-
monest clause in the treaties had been that which forbade the states
to enter into relations with each other or with any external power save
i Irthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, 11, 135.
* Sykes, Lifi of Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 172.
3 The Army in India and its evolution, pp. 156–7.
• Lee-Warner, op. cit. p. 185.
## p. 508 (#548) ############################################
508 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
through the medium of the Company's government. The constant
repetition of the clause had marked the importance which was attached
to it. It had been the corner-stone of the Company's policy, and for
many years it remained equally important in the eyes of the repre-
sentatives of the crown. It was deemed essential to keep the states
isolated one from another. Lytton was the first governor-general to
propose the abandonment of these views. It is noteworthy that he was
also the first governor-general to attempt to regulate the vernacular
press. In one of those moments of true insight which from time to
time visited him, he wrote to Lord Salisbury,
I am convinced that the fundamental political mistake of able and experienced
Indian officials is a belief that we can hold India securely by what they call good
government. . . . Look at the mistake which Austria made in the government of
her Italian provinces. They were the best governed portions of Italy; she studied
and protected the interests of the native peasantry; but, fcaring the native noblesse,
she snubbed and repressed it. . . . !
He was exceedingly anxious, therefore, to transform the relations
between the states and the Government of India. With this end in view
he pressed for leave to announce, at the durbar in which the queen
was to be proclaimed the Queen Empress, the establishment of an
Indian privy council. This was to be limited, at first at all events, to
the great chiefs, who were to consult with and advise the governor-
general on matters of common interest. But the opposition of the
home authorities proved too strong, and the proposal was cut down
to the bestowal of an empty title, “Councillors of the Empress”, on
some of the leading princes. The effect of Lytton's proposals, had
they been carried into effect, would have been the establishment of
co-operation, not only between the Government of India and the
states individually, but also between the states collectively. This novel
idea, as yet unsupported by the evident development of danger from
within, would, it was still feared, give rise to common understandings
and united pressure such as mightembarrass the Government of India.
In fact it was regarded with the same doleful apprehension as that
with which forty years later distinguished publicists regarded the
creation of the chamber of princes. *
No further step in this direction was taken till the government of
Lord Minto. By then the Indian situation was much more favourable
to a move, for political unrest had reached the point at which it could
not be mistaken. The governor-general consulted the leading states
concerning the spread of anarchist conspiracies; and his reform pro-
posals included the revival of something like Lytton's earlier scheme.
But again the project fell through, largely because in Morley's doc-
trinaire view the only effective remedy for the situation lay in political
concessions.
Lady Betty Balfour, Lytton's Indian Administration, p. 109.
2 Idem, p. 111.
3 Sir Valentine Chirol, ap. The Times, 10 February, 1921.
## p. 509 (#549) ############################################
MINTO'S POLICY
509
The outbreak of war with Germany, however, displayed so strongly
the decision with which the princes held to their position in the British
Empire, that the adoption of the new policy was at last assured.
Lord Hardinge "initiated conferences with the ruling princes on
matters of imperial interest and on matters affecting the states as a
whole". 1 The joint report of Mr Edwin Montagu and Lord Chelms-
ford recommended the establishment of a Chamber of Princes, and
the formation of machinery for joint consultation between the governor-
general and the Indian states on matters of common interest. In 1921
the chamber was inaugurated, bringing to an end a prolonged and
most important phase of the relations between the states and the
Government of India.
The best exposition of the attitude of the governors-general within
the later and formative part of the period is contained in the speech
which Lord Minto delivered at Udaipur in 1909. He fully renounced
the tendency which the practice of the Foreign Department had
exhibited down to the government of Lord Curzon.
“I have. . . made it a rule", he declared, "to avoid as far as possible the issue
of general instructions, and have endeavoured to deal with questions as they
arose with reference to existing treaties, the merits of each case, local conditions,
antecedent circumstances, and the particular stage of development, feudal and
constitutional, of individual principalities. "
This "more sympathetic and therefore more elastic policy" ad-
mitted the existence of more than one type of relationship. Yet Lord
Minto, too, recognised and declared the suzerainty of the crown as
existent quite apart from treaty obligation. “The imperial govern-
ment”, he said, "has assumed a certain degree of responsibility for
the general soundness of [the princes') administration and would not
consent to incur the reproach of being an indirect instrument of mis-
rule. ” He maintained the need of interpreting the treaties in the light
of actual fact, of established usage, and indeed of political expediency,
but he drew the line of political expediency far below the level to
which it had been forced by his predecessors. His attitude closely
agrees with that of Lord Reading in 1922. 3
Throughout the whole period, then, neither the claims of the crown
nor the claims of the princes have really depended on the exact
wording of the treaties. Both have fluctuated with the circumstances
of the time. The crown, in two most important points, has receded from
claims which it might have exercised. It has renounced annexation;
it has forgone its right to deal in no other way than individually with
the states. But, as against this, the states have become what they never
were by treaty, parts of an empire. The problem has become con-
stitutional rather than diplomatic. The suzerainty of the crown has
1 Butler Committee Report, p. 20.
* Buchan, Life of Lord Minto, p. 298.
• Parl. Papers, 1926, C. 2621, p. 19
## p. 510 (#550) ############################################
510 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
become by the weight of its power greater than the Company's para-
mountcy ever was. But this process has gone on unsupported by
any formal recognition. The contrast between the political facts and
any theory which both parties would agree to draw from the docu-
ments has become more pronounced. Under the pressure of this
suzerainty the administration of the states has been improved and the
position of the princes in a world of change been greatly strengthened.
But this has been achieved by an illogical expansion of political right
by that sense of moral duty which has been at once the strength and
weakness, the inspiration and obsession, of modern British rule in
India.
## p. 511 (#551) ############################################
CHAPTER XXVIII
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
The story of local self-government in British India reveals a long-
drawn-out effort to retain what was good in existing institutions and
to reinforce these wherever necessary by ideas which
had been proved
to be useful in England. As India was and is essentially a country of
villages, places where, thanks to the space and air available and the
cleansing power of the Indian sun and rains, disease in normal circum-
stances remained within reasonable bounds, the indigenous village
customs were left undisturbed, but for congested areas like towns it
was soon necessary to bring in the system of the West. Local self-
government was imported from England and bestowed as a gift, first
on the three presidency towns and later on the district towns, while
the villages were allowed to retain their ancient customs. Yet it is in
these villages, where the great mass of the people live, that there has
existed for centuries a simple system of local self-government on which
all real advance must be based. As the Decentralisation Commission
has said in its report:
The foundation of any stable edifice which shall associate the people with the
administration, must be the village, as being an area of much greater antiquity
than the administrative creations such as tahsils, and one in which people are
known to one another and have interests which converge on well-recognised
objects.
Unfortunately, owing to the general political unsettlement which
preceded the establishment of British rule in India, there had been
a great decay in the life of the village community so that often it was
hard to discern and call to life the various members of what had been
an organic whole. The following pages will show the efforts to utilise
what was left, for it was the business and policy of the government
“to leave as much as possible of the business of the country to be done
by the people themselves". 2
The conditions of life in the towns, however, called for the early
application of English methods of administration, and many attempts
were made to transplant English municipal life into India. But, since
this system was not an indigenous growth but a forced plant of foreign
importation, it developed in India not like the English local govern-
ment but somewhat like that in France, with local authorities looking
rather to the wishes of the central authority than to what was desired
by the local people and with the conduct of local affairs in the hands
a
i Report, p. 239.
2 Resolution of Lord Lawrence, 14 September, 1864.
## p. 512 (#552) ############################################
512
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
of officials criticised and advised by local inhabitants rather than in
the hands of elected representatives of the locality advised and helped
by permanent officials who were their servants. Such a development
was naturally disliked by the British government in England and by
British officials in India, who often attempted to breed a munici-
pal system like that known in England. These did not meet with any
great success, partly because the English system was not suited to the
situation in the country and partly because officials in India did not
realise the real nature of government control in England.
The subject of local self-government in India naturally divides
itself into two main sections, rural and urban. Each section, again, has
two divisions which demand separate treatment. In the rural area
the administration of the villages with their indigenous local self-
government stands apart from that of the rural district, while among
the towns the presidency towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras
have a history quite distinct from that of the others.
VILLAGES
The following description of an Indian village taken from the
Imperial Gazetteer gives a picture which is true for large parts of India. 1
The typical Indian village has its central residential site, with an open space
for a pond or cattle stand. Stretching around this nucleus lie the village lands,
consisting of a cultivated area and (very often) grounds for grazing and wood
cutting. The arable lands have their several boundary marks and their little sub-
divisions of earth ridges made for retaining rain or irrigation water. The in-
habitants of such a village pass their life in the midst of these simple surroundings,
welded together in a little community with its own organisation and government,
which differ in character in the various types of villages, its body of customary
rules, and its little staff of functionaries, artisans and traders.
Such a description is not true of certain parts of India such as Bengal
and Assam, and, even where it may be generally true, there is such
an infinite variety of exceptions that the general application of a
statement must be made and received with the greatest caution.
The chief functionaries were the headman, the accountant, the
watchman, the priest and the schoolmaster, while the artisans included
among others the smith, the potter and the washerman. The final
word in the internal affairs of the village lay with the village council
or panchayat, which settled matters by discussion carried on until
general agreement was reached. The idea that the will of the majority
should prevail or that votes should be taken does not appear to have
existed. Formerly the village officers and artisans were paid by
grants of land or a share of the produce, but during Muhammadan
rule, especially in its later phases, the village community greatly
decayed and the remuneration of both officers and artisans, where
1 Imperial Gazetteer, IV, 279.
· Matthai, Village Government in British India, p. 30.
## p. 513 (#553) ############################################
VILLAGES
513
these remained, largely took the form of cash payments. Sometimes
the village council had disappeared, and in many places little trace of it
could be found. Not that the rulers interfered with village life directly,
for the relation between ruler and village was purely fiscal. So long
as the revenue was paid to the proper official the villages were left to
themselves. There was, however, in the exaction of all the revenue
and perquisites that could be taken from the country, a tremendous
pressure on the peasants which led to the decadence of village life. 1
Accordingly the British administrators had not to deal with a network
of flourishing villages each with a healthy local life, but only with the
remnants of the former system. Such as they were these remnants
were utilised as the foundation of the new rule. Under settled and
peaceful conditions, village life assumed a more normal course, and,
as knowledge was gained with experience, many efforts were made to
revive what was useful in the old village life with reference to educa-
tion, sanitation, watch and ward, administration of justice and poor
relief. In 1814 the court of directors of the East India Company
wrote:
We refer with particular satisfaction upon this occasion to that distinguished
feature of internal polity which prevails in some parts of India, and by which the
instruction of the people is provided for by a certain charge upon the produce
of the soil and by other endowments in favour of the village teachers, who are
thereby rendered public servants of the community.
They urged the government to protect and support these teachers.
