No More Learning

If ? w%of onet00kavjewofourActions,Ipresumehewould
JSSfiy weareMenofCourage: butifheheard
tmsani ourWords;hewouldquicklychangehisSend- Wordsareo/mentS. ,- ,
Condi-
? ? Laches: Ot,ofValour. 207
Conditionwe arein? ,andhow impossibleitisfor
ustogetclearofit; Pray,rescueus,bygivingus toknowwhatValouris,andproving it.
Nic. 1thoughtallalongthatyoudefin'dthisVer- tueamiss. Howconiesittopass,Socrates,that you do not upon this Occasion make use of what I have heard you speak so often and so well ?
Soc. What'sthat,Nicias?
Nic. Ihaveoften heard youfay,thataManis dexterous at the Things, he knows, but very unhap pyatwhathedoesnotknow.
Soc. That's very true.
Nic. And by Consequence, ifavaliant Man be goodatanything,he'sgoodatwhatheknows.
Soc. DoyouhearhimLaches?
Lac. Yes, I hear him : But I do not well under stand what he means.
Soc. But,methinks,Iperceivehismeaning. AsI take it,he means that Valour isa Science.
Lac. What Science,Socrates? Soc. Whydonotyouaskhim?
Lac. I desire the lame Favour of him. Soc. Nicias, answerLachesalittle,andtellhim
w h a t S c i e n c e V a l o u r i s i n y o u r O p i n i o n ? , f o r ' t i s n e i ther the Science of playing upon the Flute, nor that of playing upon the Harp.
Nic. No, surely.
Soc. What isitthen? And whatistheSubject ofit?
Lac. You ask him very well Socrates $ let him tell us then what Science it is ?
Nic. I fay, Laches, that it is the * Science of
* Tildas himself knew not all the strength of this Definiti on, he understood only that Valour was the effect of Expe rienceandCustom. ForExample,Men whohaverunthro' manyDangers,arecommonlymoreValiantthanthosewho
had never seen any ; for as they have already escap'd those Dangers, they- believe that they may likewise overcome all others. ThisistheSentimentofTiiciat,butitisnotthatof Socrataiwho fromhisDefinitiondraws aPrinciple farmore Excellent, as will be seen by what follows.
things
? ? 2o8 ? Laches: Ot, ofValom.
^thiril Thingsthatareterrible,andofthosethatdonot DefinitionsurpassourStrength,andinwhichonemay shew ofvalour, a stedfastness, whether it be in War, or in the other whchaloneContingenciesofLife. .
'Z'SZ Lac- A stranSeDefinition,Socrates!
ideaofit. Soc. Whydoyouthinkitsostrange>
Seethegf- Lac. Why,becauseScienceandvalouraretwo
mark.
very different Things.
Soc. Nicias pretends they are not.
Lac. Yes, he pretends it, and therein he dotes. Soc. GoodGod,letus endeavourtoinstructhim;
Reproaches are not Reasons.
Nic. He has no design to abuse me, but he wishes
that what I have said may be of no weight, be cause he himself is deceived all along.
Lac. Itistheverytruth,and I(halldieofGrief, or make it appear that you have not spoke better thanI. Withoutgoinganyfurther,don'tthePhysici ansknow whatthereisthat'sdangerousinDiseases? Do the most valiant Men know it better? Or do you callthe Physicians valiant Men ?
Nic. No, surely.
Lac. Neither do you give that N a m e to Labour ers;yettheyknow whatitisthat'smostterrible, in their Labour. It is the fame with all other Tradesmen, they all know very well what it is that ismost terribleintheir Profession,and what itis thatmay givethemAssurance andConfidence;but theyarenotthemore valiantforthat.
Soc. What fay you, Nicias, of that Criticism ofLachesj1For my partIthinkthere'ssomething in it.
Nic. Itcertainlyhas somethinginit,but nothing oftruth.
Soc. Howso?
Nic. How? because he thinks that Physicians know not any thing more of Diseases,than to lay that a Thing is healthful or unhealthful : 'Tis very cer
t a i n t h a t t h e y k n o w n o t h i n g m o r e o f it : F o r , i n g o o d earnest, Laches, do you imagine that the Physician v knows
? ? Laches : Or> of Valoar. '209
knows whether his Patienthas more reasontd be^<><<>-<< afraid of Health or of Sickness? And don't. youTMnTMfrht
thinkthatthereareabundanceofSicktowhom it^Jt^ would be more advantagious hot tobe cured than\mibuor to be cureii ? Dare you fay that it is always good notterrible, to live, and that there are not abundance os' Peo b? h"^? . ft
pie to whom it would be more Advantagious to/T/^""^
die? . greatTrin- L a c . I a m p e r s u a d e d t h a t t h e r e a r e s o m e P e o p l e c ? e '?
whowouldbemorehappyroadie: - \v''':". ''
Nic. And do you think that the Things that seem
terrible to those who wduld willingly live, appear
thesametothosewhohadratherdie. Lac:No,dbubtlels. r? ? '? )J-?
Nic. And who will ybu/ be'judged by on thele Occasions > The Physicians ? They don't in the least leeintoit. PeopleofotherProfessions,theyknow nothingoftheMatter. Itbelongsthenonlytothose
who areskilfulintheScienceofterribleThingst A n d 'tis thole w h o m I call ,Valiant.
Soc. Laches, do you fcnd,erstand what Nicidf fays? '<':'? '
Lac. Yes; I understand that according to' hisrec- J">we<<<<^ koning there is none Valiant but Prophets. Voi^s^ets>>
who elsebut a Prophet can know ifitbe more ad-forej-eetu vantagioustodiethantolive? AndIwouldask? ? </*to you Nicias, * Are you a Prophet ? If you be not, fare- c6w*
well to your Valour.
Nic. How then? Do you thinkthatitIsthebu
sinessofaProphettoknow himselfinThingsthat
are terrible, and in those wherein he can shew sted-
fastness?
Lac. Without doubt ? , and whose Business is it
else ?
Nic. Whose? His ofwhom Ispeak, the valiant
Man ; for the Business of a Prophet, is only to
*LachesjeersTildashereinobscureTermSj becauseofhis Respect to the Diviners j for as he was a very religious Man, he had a great Respect for all Diviners, and kept one always in His House. '
O o * know
? ? alo
W < :OhofVd<W*
? knowtheSignsofThingsthataretohappen,asof Deaths, Diseases, Losses, Defeats and Victories, w h i theritbeinWar orinotherCombats:And do you think,thatitismoreproperforhimthanforano therMantojudgewhichofallthoseAccidentsare moreorlessadvantagioustothisMan ortothat? Never had any Prophet the least thought of such a thing.
Lac. Truly, Socrates, I cannot comprehend his Meaning ; for, according to his Account, there is neither Prophet, nor Physician, nor any other ibrt of Men, to w h o m the N a m e of Valiant can be ap
plicable. ThisvaliantPerson,ofwhomhehasan T/;>>W;d>>tIdea,mustthenbeaGod. Bus,totellyou my Man itnotaThoughts, Nicias has not the Courage to confess, God, ? *tfethat he knows not what he lays* he only quibbles
""dTpporiand*&"? # concealhisConfusion. We couldhave "ed' b y G o d . " d o n e a s m u c h , y o u a n d I , i f w e h a d h a d n o t h i n g else in view but to hide the Contradictions w e fall into. IfwewerebeforeaJudge,thisConductmight perhapsbereasonable. TisaPieceofCunningto intangle a bad Cause } but in Conversation, like ours, to what purpose is it to endeavour to triumph by
c- . ^,
vain Discourse? .
Soc. Certainly that is a very ill thing : But let us
fee ifNicias does not pretend to lay something to the . purpose,andwhetheryoudon'tinjurehimbyaccu
singhimoftalkingmeerlyfortalkingsfake. Letus desire him to explain his thought to us more clear lyiand, ifwe findthathehasreasononhisside,we willbeofhismipd;ifnot,wewillendeavourto ipeak better.
Lac. Ask him your self, Socrates, if you please -, I have ask'd Questions enough of him.
Soc. I will do itj I will argue with him for you andmetoo.
Lac. If you please.
Soc. Tell me, I pray you, Nicias, or rather tell us,forIIpeakalsoforLaches,Do youmaintain, that Valour is the knowledge of things that are ter
rible
? ? Lion of 2{eibe<<,
Laches: Or, ofValom 211
ribleandofthingsinwhichonemay testinesome assurance and confidence ? - ?
Nic. Yes,Idomaintainit*
Soc. You maintain also, that this Knowledge isit << >><<
n o t g i v e n t o a l l f o r t s o f P e o p l e , s e e i n g i t i s n o t k n o w n * >> << w >> *<* neither to the Physicians nor to the Prophets, and Thfi-^f
thatyetnobodycanbevaliantwithoutthisKnow-ZfzZZt ledge. Isnotthiswhatyousaid? ,. itTrophta Nic. Yes, doubtless. *ss>>d>.
Soc. ThenwemayapplytheProverbinthisCase: That itis not thefame of every wild Sowi every wild Spw is not valiant and couragious.
'Nic. No, surely.
Soc. Itisevidentby this, Nicias, thatyouareful
lyperlwaded,thatthewild*SowofCrommionwas not couragious, whatever the Ancients have said of her. Idonottellyouthisinjest,butingoodear nest 5 he, w h o speaks as you, must not of necessity admit of any Courage in Beasts, or grant, that the Lions^eopatds,Boars,know many things which most Men areignorantof,becauseoftheirbeingtoo diffi cult. Besides,hewho maintains,thatValouriswhat
you lay it is, must also maintain, that Lions, Bulls*
Harts, Foxes, are born equally valiant one with ano ther. ? ;j;?
Lac. By allthat'ssacred, Socrates, you speak to admiration. Tellusthentruly,Nicias,doyoube lieve,thatBeasts,whicharegenerallyretkon'dfjjlt of Courage , are more understanding than we, or dare you go against the common Opinion}and main tain, that they have not Courage? ? . '
Nic. I tell you in a word , Laches , that I don't callneitherBeastnorMan, noranythingwhatever, that, through imprudence and ignorauce, fears not
. , * T h e A i n i o f S o c r a t e s i s t o t r y 2 { W << i a r t d t o f l t a k e h i m i n his Opiriion by making him tear that his Principle would hurttheirReligion;forifthewildSow oiCrommionhadnot been valiant and couragious, Theseus is not so great a Hero for having overcome her , nor Hercules for having defeated the
'
Do J* the
,
? ? led.
* Wisdom and-Prudence were the true Character of 2\Ji'-
cias, w h o undertook nothing but where he saw at least an ap
parent Safety, and who, by Waiting for Opportunities to act
safely, did often let them flip j which begot him the Chara
cter of a cowardly Man: however, he undertook things well
and executed 'em better, performing his part always well. ? f L a c b e > s p e a k s l i k e o n e t h a t ' s a l i t t l e t o u c h ' d , f o r h e w o u l d
fay, that he could answer THjciasthat he isnot valiant, because he is too prudent and too wife : As indeed the Poets them selvestaxedhisPrudencewithCowardice. . .
|TheGreekCopyfays,testyoushouldtakemeforaManof the Tribe of Aixionidts : For the People of that Tribe were much cry'Jdown fortheirrailingTemper and illNature.
312
Laches: Or, 0s Valotir.
the things that are terrible, valiant and couragious j butIcallthen? fearlessandsensless! Alas! Do you think, thatIcallallChildren, Who, throughimpru dence,fearnodanger,valiantandcouragious?
In
my Opinion, to be wkhout fear,,and to be valiant, aretwovery differentthings:There isnothing more rare than Valour accompanied with Prudence, and nothing more common than Boldness, Audaciousness
-and Intrepidity accompanied with Imprudence: for itisthepropertyofmostMenandWomen, ofall BeastsandChildren. Inaword,thosewhomyou
*and most People call Valiant, I call Rash and Fool
hardy, and I give the N a m e of Valiant only to those
who arePrudentandWise;theseonly are thePer
sons I mean. ForNicias:? ac. j)0voufg^Socrates,*how he offersIn-
pmthfxandcense t0 himself, as if he were the only valiant yerywije. Man;forhestrivestoroballthole,whopassfoi
Seethe Re-such, of that Gloty.
mark ? ? JV/f. That is none of m y design, Laches, do not
Lamachus F011 *Kt y0Ur * ^ * know tliat y0U anC* ^amac^us whorvasGe-Mzprudentandwiseifyoubevaliant. Ifaythe
nerdofdefame ofmany ofour'-Athenians.
Athenians L3CtfTho51couldansweryouinyourownCoin, W Alci-SyetlwiUnot>lesty? QfoTM1*accuseme 1ofbeing
biades<<>> ill-natur'dandfoul-mouth'd.
theExpedi- ? Soc. Don't fay so. Laches, I see plainly1 you do
tionofski-not perceive that Nicias hath learned these fine iy, where s *
i things
? ? Laches: Or, of Valour. 3:13
thingsofourFriendDamon,andthatDamonisthe intimate Friend oSHrodicus the ablest of all the So phists for that kind of Distinctions.
Lac. Oh, Socrates, itbecomesaSophistverywell to make Ostentation of his vain Subtilties; but for a ManlikeNicias,whomtheAthenianshavechosen f0 fitattheHelm of theRepublick
Soc. MydearLaches,itwellbecomesaManwho hathsogreatAffairsupon hisHands,tostudytobe more learned and more wife than others; wherefore I-thinkthatNiciasdeservestobeheard, and thatwe ought at least to enquire into his Reasons why he defines Valour thus.
Lac. Enquire then as much as you please, So crates.
Soc. 'TiswhatIamgoingtodo;butdon'tthink that I acquit you of it, and that you sliall not assist meinsomethings:Listenalittlethen,andtake heedto'WhatIamgoingtofay.
Lac. I stiall do so, since it pleases you.
Soc. That issofarwell:Now come on, Nicias-, Eray you tell us, in resuming the Matter from the eginning ; Is it not true, that at first w e considered
Valour * as a part of Virtue?
Nic 'Tistrue.
Sac. Did not you answer, that Valour was certain
ly but one part, and that there were other parts, whichalltogetherwerecalledbytheName ofVir tue ?
Nic. How couldIfayotherwise?
Soc. You say then as I do: for, besides Valour, I acknowledge there are other parts of Virtue, as Temperance, Justice, and many others? , don't you
also acknowledge them ?
Nic. DoubtlessIdo.
Soc. That's good, we are agreed upon this Point:
* Socrates would prove, that Virtue being one, he, w h o has
not all the parts that compose it, cannot brag of being vir tuous. m T
003 Let
? ? ai$
Ladies: Or, of Vahw.
Let us go then to thoie things which you call ter
rible? ,andwhereinyoufayaManmayshewsome
A s s u r a n c e a n d C o n f i d e n c e ; let u s e x a m i n e t h e m w e l l ,
lest it happen that you understand them one w a y a n d w e a n o t h e r ? , w e a r e g o i n g t o t e l l y o u w h a t w e
thinkofthem. Ifyoudon'tagreewithusyouwill correctus. We believethethingswhichyou call
terrible are iuch as inspire People with Terror and Fear? ,andthatthosewhereinyousaywemay shew
some Assurance are such as do not inspire us with thatFear: Now thosethatcauseFear,areneither things that have already happened, nor things that actuallyhappen,butsuchaswe expectj forFear
isonlytheExpectationofanEviltocome. Are notyouofthisOpinion,Laches? >>-:<<? ? ? -> *? -
Lac. Yes,yesperfectly.
Soc. ThisthenisourSentiment,Nicks. Bythose things that are terrible, we understand the Evils to come j and by the things wherein one may shew some assurance, we understand those things which arealsotocome, and which appear good, or,at least,don'tappeartobeil* Do youadmitourDe> finition or not? > ,;. . . :. -.
Nic. Yes, yes, I admit it.
Soc. Then it is the Knowledge ofthose things whichyoucallValour? . ? . -. . <? ? ;<?
Nic. Yes, it is.
Soc. Let us go to a third Point, and see if w e can agreeuponthattoo. . ? . ;,. ? . ? . . ? ,;?
,Nic, What isthat?
Soc Youshallhearitpresently. We fay,thatis,
Laches and I, that in all things * Science never dis-. fers from it self3 it is not one thing, as to things past,
* Socrates would make tycias understand, that in defining Valour to be the Knowledge of things^ that are terrible, that is to fay, of Evils to come, he has not been large enough in his Pefinition; for Knowledge extending itselfto what ispast, whatispresent,andwhatisto,come,Valourmusthaveall thatextentifitbetrulyaScience. ThenWe mustfay,that itistheKnowledgeofalltheEvilandofalltheGoodthat
. . . . . . . ha*
? ? Laches : Or> of Pahar.
a 15
? ? past,toknowhowtheypassed? ,another,astothe
thingspresent,toknowhowtheyareandhowthey happen -, and another upon the things to come, to knowhowtheywillbeandhowtheywillfallout; but it is always the lame : For example as to Health, Let the Time be what itwill,Phisick never differs from it self, it is always the fame Art of Phi- lick that judges of it* and that fees what has been, what is and what will be healthfei-etunhealthful.
Husbandry in the lame manner judges of what has come,ofwhatisnowcomeandofwhatwi^come. And, as to War, you can very well testifie, and will
bebelieved, thattheArtofaGeneralextendst,self
to all, to what is past, what is present and to what istocome*thathehasnooccasionfortheArtof Divination, and that on the contrary he has it at command, asknowingbetterthanit,whathappens? ''Jj>> andwhat oughttohappen. IsnottheLaw it:selftmmtmUL expressinthat? ForitcommandsnotthattheDivi-tbeGmtrd,
nershallcommand theGeneral, but that theGene-hewoM
ralshallcommandtheDiviner. Isnotthiswhat'? ? ? ?
w e fay, Laches ? pis. Lac. Yes certainly, Socrates.
Soc. And you, Mcia*, do you also say as we do,
and do you agree, that Knowledge, being always the fame, judges equally of what ispast, what ispre
sent,andwhattocome? Me. Yes,Ifayasyoufay? ,forIthinkitcannot
be otherwise. ? __. . , Soc. You say then, most excellent Nicias, that
Valour is the Knowledge of things that are terrible,
andofthosethatarenotso? Isnotthatwhatyou
fey> . '-: . ?
Nic. Yes. ?
Soc. Havenotweagreed,thatthoset|pgsthat areterribleareEvilstocome-, andthosethingsthat Oo4 ? are
hath been, that is, and that shallbe ; forValour ought no less tojudgeofwhathasbeen,apdofwhatis,thanofwhatwill b e . B m ;o f w h a t u s e is it? T h a t S << rat a w i l l n a i f g p l a i n b y a n d
by.
? ? a16 Laches:Or,ofValour.
arenotterrible,andinwhichwecanshewsomeas
surance^ issome Good thatwe expect? <,jV/s. We areagreeduponit.
Son. And that Knowledge does not extend itse^f onlytowhat isto. come, butalsotothingspresent andtowhatispast;. . ', . i,
JV? V. Iagreeinthat. ,', . ? '. ,
i&? A Then it,isnot true, that Valour is only the Knowledge of 'things that are terrible, and of those thatarenotterribler,foritdoesnotonlyknow the GoodandtheEvilthatistocome,butitsJurisdi ction,extends as far as that of other Sciences, and it also judges of what ispast an4 of what ispresent, and,inaword, ofallthingswhethertheybenearat hand, or at a distance.
? A7v. That seems to be true.
Soc. Then you have only defined to us the third
part of Valopr, but w e desir'd you to give us a full definitionofit:Atpresentitseemstome, that,ac cording to,your Principles, 'tis the Knowledge not only of things that are terrible and not terrible, * but alsoofalmostalltheGood and alltheEvilatwhat distancesoevertheybefromusbeforeorafter. Have you then changed your Sentiment, Niciaf ? what do youfay? '. ',. , . . .
. ? Njc. _Itappearstome, thatValourhasalltheex tent you fay.
Sac. That being so, do you think that a valiant M a n wants any part of Virtue, if it be true, that he knows alltheGood andalltheEvilsthathavebeen, that aje, and that may be? and do you believe, that such a M a n can want Temperance, Justice, and
^//f/<</;eSa;. ctiry>hetowhom aloneitbelongstousea vouUmt piiidentPrecautionagainstalltheEvilsthatmay
* focrates will have ys understand that Valour puts us in 4 condition to attract the Good and to avoid the Evil that may happentousonthepartofManandonthepartofGod; foritmay servetocorrectwhatispair,todisposewellof what ispresent, and to use wise Precautions against what ii tocome. ItissosolidaPrinciplethatnothingcanshakeit. "
"? hap. :
? ? Laches:Qr, ofValour. 217
happentohimonthepartofManand vdow consiststhenin m thepastofGod, andtoputhimself P>>>nnins. **<<**K <<*
inaconditiontodrawfromthenceall S ^ l ^ t theGoodthatcanbeexpected, seeing w,mtonlyonthepartof heknowshowheoughttobehavehim- -m>>i>malsoo>>thefart
selfbothtawardsManandtowardsGcd. ? fGod-
Nic,Whatyoulaynow, Socrates-seemstohave somethinginit. '? '? * ?
Sot. Valour then is not a part of Virtue , but is Virtueinallitsparts? 'T ', :
Mr.