What is the form of
mountains?
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
?
?
?
?
?
?
.
All who want to distinguish matter and consider it in itself, without form, resort to the analogy of art.
So it is with the Pythagoreans, the Platonists and the Peripatetics.
Take, for example, the art of carpentry: it has wood as substratum for all its forms and all its work, as iron is for the blacksmith and cloth for the tailor.
All these arts produce various images, compositions and figures in their own particular material, none of which is natural or proper to that material.
Nature is similar to art in that it needs material for its operations, since it is impossible for any agent who wishes to make something to create out of nothing, or to work on nothing.
There is, then, a sort of substratum from which, with which, and in which nature effects her operations or her work, and which she endows with the mani- fold forms that result in such a great variety of species being presented to the eyes of reason.
And just as wood does not possess, by itself, any artifi- cial form, but may have them all as a result of the carpenter's activity, in a similar way the matter of which we speak, because of its nature, has no nat- ural form by itself, but may take on all forms through the operation of the active agent which is the principle of nature.
This natural matter is not per- ceptible, as is artificial matter, because nature's matter has absolutely no form, while the matter of art is something already formed by nature.
Art can operate only on the surface of things already formed, like wood, iron,
? ?
Third dialogue
? stone, wool and the like, but nature works, so to speak, from the centre of its substratum, or matter, which is totally formless. Furthermore, the substrata of art are many, and that of nature one, because the former, formed by nature in different ways, are diverse and various, while the lat- ter, in no way formed, is undifferentiated throughout, since all difference or diversity proceeds from form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sothatthethingsformedbynatureserveasart'smaterial, while a single, formless thing serves as nature's material.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Can we know the substratum of nature, just as we can clearly see and know the substrata of the arts?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doubtless, but with different cognitive principles, for just as we do not know colours and sounds through the same senses, we cannot see the substrata of the arts and of nature with the same eye.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You mean we see the first with the eyes of sense and the second with the eye of reason.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Pleaseelaborate.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Gladly. Therelationthattheformofarthaswithitsmaterial
is the same (allowing for proportions) as that of nature with its material. Just as in art, then, while the forms vary to infinity (if this were possible), under those forms there always persists one and the same matter - the form of the tree, for example, being followed by the form of the trunk, then of a board, then of a table, a stool, a chest, a comb and so on, while the wood remains the same - and it is no different in nature, where forms vary infinitely, one after the other, and the matter always remains the same.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Howcanthisanalogybeconfirmed?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Do you not see that what was seed becomes stalk, what was stalk becomes an ear of wheat, what was an ear becomes bread, what was bread turns to chyle, from chyle to blood, from blood to seed, from seed to embryo, and then to man, corpse, earth, stone or something else, in suc- cession, involving all natural forms?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iseethiseasily.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,theremustexistonesamethingwhich,initself,isnei- ther stone, nor earth, nor corpse, nor man, nor embryo, nor blood, nor any- thing else, but which, after having been blood, turns to an embryo by receiving the being of the embryo, and which, after having been an embryo, receives the being of man to become human, just as the matter formed by
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? nature, which is the substratum of art, is a board and receives the being of board from what was a tree, and from the matter which was a board it receives the being of a door and is door.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . NowIunderstanditwell. Butitseemstomethatthissub- stratum of nature cannot be a body, nor have a definite quality. For, passing sometimes into such and such a form and natural being, sometimes into another form and being, it does not manifest itself corporally, like wood or stone, which always show through as they are, even if considered as material or substratum, no matter what the form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Wellsaid.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What shall I do, then, when I happen to be discussing this thought with some stubborn person who refuses to believe that there is only one matter underneath all nature's forms, just as there is only one beneath all the forms of each art? For we cannot deny what we see with our own eyes, but what we see solely through reason may be denied.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sendhimawayordonotanswer.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But what if this stubborn individual demands evidence of this matter and is a respectable person, more liable to send me away than I am him, and takes my refusal to answer as an insult?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Whatwouldyoudoifablinddemigod,worthyofeveryhon- our and respect, were so insistent, importunate and stubborn as to demand knowledge of and evidence for colours, or even for the external shapes of natural things? What if he asked, for example: What is the form of a tree?
What is the form of mountains? of stars? Or again: What is the form of a statue, of a robe, or other artificial things, which are so plain to our eyes?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iwouldtellhimthatifhehadeyes,hewouldnotaskforevi- dence of these things, since he could see them for himself, but since he is blind, it is impossible for others to show them to him.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Likewise, you could say to your other people that if they had an intellect, they would not demand evidence of that natural matter, but could see it for themselves.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Some would be humiliated by that answer, and others would see it as too cynical.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,youcanspeakinlessopenfashion,asfollowing:'Most illustrious sir,' or 'Sacred Majesty, just as some things cannot be evident but for the hands and by the sense of touch, others only through hearing, others by taste, so this matter of natural things cannot be brought to light except through the intellect. '
? ?
13 The pseudo-Timaeus of Locri, in his De anima mundi et natura, ? ? , A.
14 The Franciscans of the school of Duns Scotus.
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . He may perhaps construe the shaft, which after all is neither very obscure nor very veiled, and answer, 'It is you who have no intellect: I have more than all your sort. '
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You will, then, credit him no more than you would a blind man who retorted that it is you who are blind, and that he sees much better than all those who believe they see like you.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You have said enough to demonstrate in more detail than I have ever heard what the word 'matter' means and what must be understood by 'matter' in natural things. In the same way Timaeus the Pythagorean13 teaches us to find, through the metamorphosis of one element into another, the matter that is hidden and that can be known only in analogical terms. 'Where the form of the earth was', he says, 'there afterwards appeared the form of the water', and here we cannot say that one form receives the other, because a contrary thing does not accept or receive another. That is, the dry does not receive the wet, or rather the dryness does not receive the wetness, but there is a third thing from which the dryness is expelled and into which wetness is introduced, and this third thing is the substratum of both con- traries, not being itself contrary to any. It follows that, since we cannot think of the earth as reduced to nothing, we must conjecture that something which was in the earth has subsisted and is found in the water. For the same reason, that same thing will subsist and will be found in the air, when the water is transmuted into air (under the effect of the heat which reduces it to fumes or vapour).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Fromthiswemayconclude(inspiteofouradversaries)that nothing is ever annihilated and loses its being, except for the external and material accidental form. That is why both the matter and the substantial form of any natural thing whatever (that is, its soul) can be neither destroyed nor annihilated, losing their being completely. Certainly this cannot be true of all the substantial forms of the Peripatetics and others like them, which consist of nothing but a certain complexion and a certain set of accidents; all that they are able to designate outside of their primary matter is nothing but accident, complexion, disposition of qualities, a prin- ciple of definition, quiddity. Hence, some cowled and subtle metaphysi- cians among them14, wishing to excuse rather than accuse their idol Aristotle, have come up with humanity, bovinity, oliveness as specific sub- stantial forms. This humanity - for example, Socratiety - this bovinity, this
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? horseness, are individual substances. They have come up with all that in order to provide a substantial form which merits the name of substance, just as matter has the name of substance, and the being of substance. They have never derived any gain from this, for if you ask them, point by point, 'In what does the the substantial being of Socrates consist? ', they will answer, 'In Socrateity'; if you then ask, 'What do you mean by Socrateity? ', they will answer, 'The substantial form and proper matter of Socrates. ' But let us leave aside this substance which is matter, and ask, 'What is the substance as form? ' Some of them will reply, 'It is its soul'. Ask them, 'What is this soul? ' If they say it is the entelechy and perfection of a body possessing potential life, remark that this is an accident. If they say it is a principle of life, sense, vegetation and intellect, remark that, although that principle is a substance if one considers it fundamentally, as we do, they present it as only an accident. For the fact of being a principle of such and such a thing does not express an absolute and substantial nature, but a nature that is accidental and relative to that which is principled: just as whoever says what I do or can do is not expressing my being and substance; that would be expressed by who says what I am, insofar as I am myself, con- sidered absolutely. You see, then, how they consider this substantial form which is the soul: even if they have chanced to recognize it as substance, they have never, however, designated or considered it as such. You can make this conclusion out more plainly if you ask them in what consists the substantial form of an inanimate thing, for example, that of wood: the most subtle will imagine that it consists in woodness. Now take away that mate- rial common to iron, to wood, to stone, and ask, 'What substantial form of iron remains? ' They will never point out anything but accidents. And these are among the principles of individuation, and provide particularity, because the material cannot be contained within the particular except through some form, and because this form is the constituent principle of some substance, they hold that it is substantial, but then they cannot show it physically except as something accidental. When they have finally done all they can, they are left with a substantial form which exists only logically and not in nature. Thus, a logical construction comes to be posited as the principle of natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Aristotle does not realize this?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe he fully realized it but could do nothing about it. This is why he says that the ultimate differences are unknown and cannot be expressed.
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Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, he seems to me to have openly confessed his igno- rance; therefore, I would be of the opinion that it is better to embrace those philosophical principles which, in this important question, do not plead ignorance, such as those of Pythagoras, Empedocles and your Nolan, whose opinions we touched on yesterday.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This is what the Nolan holds: there is an intellect that gives being to everything, which the Pythagoreans and the Timaeus call the 'giver of forms'; a soul and a formal principle which becomes and informs everything, that they call 'fountain of forms'; there is matter, out of which everything is produced and formed, and which is called by everyone the 'receptacle of forms'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This doctrine, from which it seems nothing is lacking, pleases me much. And, indeed, it is necessary that, just as we can posit a constant and eternal material principle, we similarly posit a formal princi- ple. We see that all natural forms cease in matter, then appear again in mat- ter; therefore, nothing, if not matter, seems in reality to be constant, firm, eternal and worthy to be considered as principle. Besides, forms do not exist without matter, in which they are generated and corrupted, and out of whose bosom they spring and into which they are taken back. Hence, matter, which always remains fecund and the same, must have the funda- mental prerogative of being recognized as the only substantial principle; as that which is, and forever remains, and all the forms together are to be taken merely as varied dispositions of matter, which come and go, cease and renew themselves, so that none have value as principle. This is why we find philosophers who, having pondered thoroughly the essence of natural forms, such as one may see in Aristotle and his kind, have finally concluded that they are only accidents and particularities of matter, so that, accord- ing to them, it is to matter that we must accord the privilege of being act and perfection, and not to the things of which we can truly say that they are neither substance nor nature, but relative to the substance and nature - that is to say, in their opinion, matter, which for them is a necessary, eter- nal and divine principle, as it is to Avicebron, the Moor, who calls it 'God who is in everything'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Those who have not recognized any other form outside of accidental form have been led to this error, and this Moor, although he had accepted the substantial form from the Peripatetic doctrine in which he was nurtured, judged it corruptible and not merely susceptible to material mutations. Since he despised that which is produced and does not produce,
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? is constituted and does not constitute, is remade but does not remake, he held it worthless compared to matter, which is stable, eternal, progenitor and mother. And this happens, inevitably, to those who do not know what wedo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thepointhasbeenverywellexamined. Butitistimetoturn from this digression back to our problem. We now know how to distinguish matter from form, as much from the accidental form (whatever it may be) as from the substantial form. We must still look into its nature and its real- ity. But first, I would like to know whether, in view of the great union that this world soul and universal form has with matter, one could not admit that other mode of philosophizing, belonging to those who do not separate the act from the essence of matter, and who understand matter as a divine thing, and not as something so pure and formless that it cannot form and clothe itself.
? ? ? ? ?
? ?
Third dialogue
? stone, wool and the like, but nature works, so to speak, from the centre of its substratum, or matter, which is totally formless. Furthermore, the substrata of art are many, and that of nature one, because the former, formed by nature in different ways, are diverse and various, while the lat- ter, in no way formed, is undifferentiated throughout, since all difference or diversity proceeds from form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sothatthethingsformedbynatureserveasart'smaterial, while a single, formless thing serves as nature's material.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Can we know the substratum of nature, just as we can clearly see and know the substrata of the arts?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doubtless, but with different cognitive principles, for just as we do not know colours and sounds through the same senses, we cannot see the substrata of the arts and of nature with the same eye.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You mean we see the first with the eyes of sense and the second with the eye of reason.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Pleaseelaborate.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Gladly. Therelationthattheformofarthaswithitsmaterial
is the same (allowing for proportions) as that of nature with its material. Just as in art, then, while the forms vary to infinity (if this were possible), under those forms there always persists one and the same matter - the form of the tree, for example, being followed by the form of the trunk, then of a board, then of a table, a stool, a chest, a comb and so on, while the wood remains the same - and it is no different in nature, where forms vary infinitely, one after the other, and the matter always remains the same.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Howcanthisanalogybeconfirmed?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Do you not see that what was seed becomes stalk, what was stalk becomes an ear of wheat, what was an ear becomes bread, what was bread turns to chyle, from chyle to blood, from blood to seed, from seed to embryo, and then to man, corpse, earth, stone or something else, in suc- cession, involving all natural forms?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iseethiseasily.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,theremustexistonesamethingwhich,initself,isnei- ther stone, nor earth, nor corpse, nor man, nor embryo, nor blood, nor any- thing else, but which, after having been blood, turns to an embryo by receiving the being of the embryo, and which, after having been an embryo, receives the being of man to become human, just as the matter formed by
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? nature, which is the substratum of art, is a board and receives the being of board from what was a tree, and from the matter which was a board it receives the being of a door and is door.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . NowIunderstanditwell. Butitseemstomethatthissub- stratum of nature cannot be a body, nor have a definite quality. For, passing sometimes into such and such a form and natural being, sometimes into another form and being, it does not manifest itself corporally, like wood or stone, which always show through as they are, even if considered as material or substratum, no matter what the form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Wellsaid.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What shall I do, then, when I happen to be discussing this thought with some stubborn person who refuses to believe that there is only one matter underneath all nature's forms, just as there is only one beneath all the forms of each art? For we cannot deny what we see with our own eyes, but what we see solely through reason may be denied.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sendhimawayordonotanswer.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But what if this stubborn individual demands evidence of this matter and is a respectable person, more liable to send me away than I am him, and takes my refusal to answer as an insult?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Whatwouldyoudoifablinddemigod,worthyofeveryhon- our and respect, were so insistent, importunate and stubborn as to demand knowledge of and evidence for colours, or even for the external shapes of natural things? What if he asked, for example: What is the form of a tree?
What is the form of mountains? of stars? Or again: What is the form of a statue, of a robe, or other artificial things, which are so plain to our eyes?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iwouldtellhimthatifhehadeyes,hewouldnotaskforevi- dence of these things, since he could see them for himself, but since he is blind, it is impossible for others to show them to him.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Likewise, you could say to your other people that if they had an intellect, they would not demand evidence of that natural matter, but could see it for themselves.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Some would be humiliated by that answer, and others would see it as too cynical.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,youcanspeakinlessopenfashion,asfollowing:'Most illustrious sir,' or 'Sacred Majesty, just as some things cannot be evident but for the hands and by the sense of touch, others only through hearing, others by taste, so this matter of natural things cannot be brought to light except through the intellect. '
? ?
13 The pseudo-Timaeus of Locri, in his De anima mundi et natura, ? ? , A.
14 The Franciscans of the school of Duns Scotus.
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . He may perhaps construe the shaft, which after all is neither very obscure nor very veiled, and answer, 'It is you who have no intellect: I have more than all your sort. '
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You will, then, credit him no more than you would a blind man who retorted that it is you who are blind, and that he sees much better than all those who believe they see like you.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You have said enough to demonstrate in more detail than I have ever heard what the word 'matter' means and what must be understood by 'matter' in natural things. In the same way Timaeus the Pythagorean13 teaches us to find, through the metamorphosis of one element into another, the matter that is hidden and that can be known only in analogical terms. 'Where the form of the earth was', he says, 'there afterwards appeared the form of the water', and here we cannot say that one form receives the other, because a contrary thing does not accept or receive another. That is, the dry does not receive the wet, or rather the dryness does not receive the wetness, but there is a third thing from which the dryness is expelled and into which wetness is introduced, and this third thing is the substratum of both con- traries, not being itself contrary to any. It follows that, since we cannot think of the earth as reduced to nothing, we must conjecture that something which was in the earth has subsisted and is found in the water. For the same reason, that same thing will subsist and will be found in the air, when the water is transmuted into air (under the effect of the heat which reduces it to fumes or vapour).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Fromthiswemayconclude(inspiteofouradversaries)that nothing is ever annihilated and loses its being, except for the external and material accidental form. That is why both the matter and the substantial form of any natural thing whatever (that is, its soul) can be neither destroyed nor annihilated, losing their being completely. Certainly this cannot be true of all the substantial forms of the Peripatetics and others like them, which consist of nothing but a certain complexion and a certain set of accidents; all that they are able to designate outside of their primary matter is nothing but accident, complexion, disposition of qualities, a prin- ciple of definition, quiddity. Hence, some cowled and subtle metaphysi- cians among them14, wishing to excuse rather than accuse their idol Aristotle, have come up with humanity, bovinity, oliveness as specific sub- stantial forms. This humanity - for example, Socratiety - this bovinity, this
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? horseness, are individual substances. They have come up with all that in order to provide a substantial form which merits the name of substance, just as matter has the name of substance, and the being of substance. They have never derived any gain from this, for if you ask them, point by point, 'In what does the the substantial being of Socrates consist? ', they will answer, 'In Socrateity'; if you then ask, 'What do you mean by Socrateity? ', they will answer, 'The substantial form and proper matter of Socrates. ' But let us leave aside this substance which is matter, and ask, 'What is the substance as form? ' Some of them will reply, 'It is its soul'. Ask them, 'What is this soul? ' If they say it is the entelechy and perfection of a body possessing potential life, remark that this is an accident. If they say it is a principle of life, sense, vegetation and intellect, remark that, although that principle is a substance if one considers it fundamentally, as we do, they present it as only an accident. For the fact of being a principle of such and such a thing does not express an absolute and substantial nature, but a nature that is accidental and relative to that which is principled: just as whoever says what I do or can do is not expressing my being and substance; that would be expressed by who says what I am, insofar as I am myself, con- sidered absolutely. You see, then, how they consider this substantial form which is the soul: even if they have chanced to recognize it as substance, they have never, however, designated or considered it as such. You can make this conclusion out more plainly if you ask them in what consists the substantial form of an inanimate thing, for example, that of wood: the most subtle will imagine that it consists in woodness. Now take away that mate- rial common to iron, to wood, to stone, and ask, 'What substantial form of iron remains? ' They will never point out anything but accidents. And these are among the principles of individuation, and provide particularity, because the material cannot be contained within the particular except through some form, and because this form is the constituent principle of some substance, they hold that it is substantial, but then they cannot show it physically except as something accidental. When they have finally done all they can, they are left with a substantial form which exists only logically and not in nature. Thus, a logical construction comes to be posited as the principle of natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Aristotle does not realize this?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe he fully realized it but could do nothing about it. This is why he says that the ultimate differences are unknown and cannot be expressed.
? ?
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, he seems to me to have openly confessed his igno- rance; therefore, I would be of the opinion that it is better to embrace those philosophical principles which, in this important question, do not plead ignorance, such as those of Pythagoras, Empedocles and your Nolan, whose opinions we touched on yesterday.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This is what the Nolan holds: there is an intellect that gives being to everything, which the Pythagoreans and the Timaeus call the 'giver of forms'; a soul and a formal principle which becomes and informs everything, that they call 'fountain of forms'; there is matter, out of which everything is produced and formed, and which is called by everyone the 'receptacle of forms'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This doctrine, from which it seems nothing is lacking, pleases me much. And, indeed, it is necessary that, just as we can posit a constant and eternal material principle, we similarly posit a formal princi- ple. We see that all natural forms cease in matter, then appear again in mat- ter; therefore, nothing, if not matter, seems in reality to be constant, firm, eternal and worthy to be considered as principle. Besides, forms do not exist without matter, in which they are generated and corrupted, and out of whose bosom they spring and into which they are taken back. Hence, matter, which always remains fecund and the same, must have the funda- mental prerogative of being recognized as the only substantial principle; as that which is, and forever remains, and all the forms together are to be taken merely as varied dispositions of matter, which come and go, cease and renew themselves, so that none have value as principle. This is why we find philosophers who, having pondered thoroughly the essence of natural forms, such as one may see in Aristotle and his kind, have finally concluded that they are only accidents and particularities of matter, so that, accord- ing to them, it is to matter that we must accord the privilege of being act and perfection, and not to the things of which we can truly say that they are neither substance nor nature, but relative to the substance and nature - that is to say, in their opinion, matter, which for them is a necessary, eter- nal and divine principle, as it is to Avicebron, the Moor, who calls it 'God who is in everything'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Those who have not recognized any other form outside of accidental form have been led to this error, and this Moor, although he had accepted the substantial form from the Peripatetic doctrine in which he was nurtured, judged it corruptible and not merely susceptible to material mutations. Since he despised that which is produced and does not produce,
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? is constituted and does not constitute, is remade but does not remake, he held it worthless compared to matter, which is stable, eternal, progenitor and mother. And this happens, inevitably, to those who do not know what wedo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thepointhasbeenverywellexamined. Butitistimetoturn from this digression back to our problem. We now know how to distinguish matter from form, as much from the accidental form (whatever it may be) as from the substantial form. We must still look into its nature and its real- ity. But first, I would like to know whether, in view of the great union that this world soul and universal form has with matter, one could not admit that other mode of philosophizing, belonging to those who do not separate the act from the essence of matter, and who understand matter as a divine thing, and not as something so pure and formless that it cannot form and clothe itself.
? ? ? ? ?
