It is in this sense that
Augustine
speaks of perseverance as
denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
Summa Theologica
And works of virtue afford pleasure
in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues
are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is
a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned
a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from
being overcome by sorrow.
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Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For
in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience
hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of
the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the
soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written
(Lk. 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls. " Therefore
patience is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause
of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory
(Hom. xxxv in Evang. ) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the
virtues. " Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which
Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call
principal.
I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For
it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's
work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority
and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it
inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues
which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than
those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good:
and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that
which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity
/are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a
check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the
one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of
death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which
temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of
hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not
the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the
theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly
establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which
withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.
Reply to Objection 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in
bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is
moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by
meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to
unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the
principle is the most perfect.
Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,
that it is more perfect simply.
Reply to Objection 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership;
wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it
removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and
disturb the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of
all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly,
but merely because it removes their obstacles.
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Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?
Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without
grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it
possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more
reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of
evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and
without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that
"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love
sinfully. " Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the
help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be
truly patient.
Objection 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more
abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens
are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their
country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient.
Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the
help of grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much
trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health
of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like
manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the
health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i. e. from God,
"is my patience. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of
desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly
undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which
gives pleasure. " The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of
themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to
suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence
it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure
evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which
causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man
prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may
cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all
things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by
charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient. "
But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through
grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in
our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us. " Therefore it is
clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human
nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination
of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is
more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the
concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake
of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet
it is this that pertains to true patience.
Reply to Objection 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. [3402]FS,
Q[61], A[5]] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the
human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet
not without the help of God's grace [*Cf. [3403]FS, Q[109], A[2]]. On
the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot
tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man
bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man
naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between
this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether patience is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a
thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as
fortitude: because, as stated above ([3404]Q[123], A[6]), the proper
act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For
it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from
St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang. ] that "patience consists in enduring
evils inflicted by others. " Therefore patience is not a part of
fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated
above ([3405]Q[123], A[3]), and thus it is in the irascible. But
patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in
the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore
if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently,
but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience
is not a part of fortitude.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
fortitude.
I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because
it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs
to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by
others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang. ). Now of those
evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to
endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about
these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this
matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to
that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed
to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper
calls patience brave (Sent. 811).
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything
indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of
death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding
fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not
failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is
in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude
is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude
avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be
patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a
praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here
and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them.
Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the
concupiscible faculty.
Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because
the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the
matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part
of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because
temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of
touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex:
whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons.
Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides
their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man
forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however
great they be.
Reply to Objection 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain
respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a
man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it
is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it
inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up
against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v.
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says
on Mat. 4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient
under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most
wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii)
that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the
commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our
enemies. " But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is
annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
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Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is
necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with
magnanimity. ]
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For
Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, not
as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked,
that they may be converted. " Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4):
"The Most High is a patient rewarder. " Therefore it seems that patience
is the same as longanimity.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But
impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for
one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it
seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
Objection 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured,
so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of
place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time,
in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from
patience.
Objection 4: On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.
ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and
patience, and longsuffering? " says: "It seems that longanimity differs
from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of
set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take
a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently. "
I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great
things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long
way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good,
rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object,
so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with
magnanimity than with patience.
Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two
reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils
for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is
easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult.
Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a
nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul. " Hence there may be patience in bearing
this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity
and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the
delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil
which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which
regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous
evil.
For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says
that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and
difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit. " By saying "arduous"
he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to
the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and
by adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in
so far as it has something in common with patience.
This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though
distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that
which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails.
Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the
point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time
coming to us.
We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason
for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear
with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long
time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with
longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be
unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to
be borne with patience.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under
the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(3) Of its relation to constancy;
(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?
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Whether perseverance is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than
perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv,
9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority
(De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living,
unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should
persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic.
ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and continued
persistence in a well-considered purpose. " Therefore perseverance is
not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.
On the contrary, Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect. ] says that
"perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand,
and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are
indifferent. " Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to
omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue is
about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special kind
of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous
deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the
act's very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object
of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long
in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist
long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special
virtue.
Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of
itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in
connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in
itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in
enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as
necessity requires.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as
it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to
endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And
evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured
for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not
on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among
other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch,
because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the
lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now
it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who
grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as
in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not
violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly
affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that
moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this
sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus
of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long
persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who
has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to
persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like
perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from
the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same
name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe
without seeing. " Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without
performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence
without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the
habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for
instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it.
Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes
used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes
for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of
perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by
persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not
persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the
work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs
to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for
instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the
magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however,
some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such
as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the
entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal
virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of
life.
It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as
denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
Reply to Objection 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue
in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to
that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end,
belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as
its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to
its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every
virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change. "
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Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude.
For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is
about pains of touch. " But these belong to temperance. Therefore
perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain
passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the
more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.
Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,
but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can
lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal
virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part
of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a
part of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3406]FS, Q[61],
AA[3],4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed
something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it
practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most
difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated
(Q[123], A[2]) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it
observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand
firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity
that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of
something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to
principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in
accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor
is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore
perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues
depends not only on the matter [*Cf. [3407] Q[136], A[4], ad 2], but
also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than
matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have
more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it
has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm
against the difficulty arising from length of time.
Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks
(Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely
in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered
as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or
failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is
in the irascible.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as
denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the
end, according to Mat. 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he
shall be saved. " Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance
for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.
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Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?
Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q[137], A[5]): and
patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not
pertain to perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good. " Now
it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in
great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy
pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.
Objection 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would
seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of
unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i)
condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance,
as stated above (Q[128] , A[6]). Therefore constancy does not pertain
to perseverance.
On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a
thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as
appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy
belongs to perseverance.
I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it
belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to
those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the
virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good,
against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the
act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against
difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence
perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude,
because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more
intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external
obstacles.
Reply to Objection 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are
especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as
stated above ([3408]Q[136], A[1]). Hence constancy agrees with
perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those
things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account:
wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.
Reply to Objection 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds:
yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any
length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which
magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which
perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.
Reply to Objection 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as
it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the
point of their difference, as stated in the Article.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of
grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above [3409](A[1]). Now
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner
of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for
perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the
harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now
"before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what
he had received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more
therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ,
persevere without the help of a further grace.
Objection 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than
deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis.
5:7): "We . . . have walked through hard ways. " Now some persevere in
sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also
persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that
perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in
Christ. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2], ad 3), perseverance
has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of
perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of
habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be
taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in
this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous
help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated
above ([3410]FS, Q[109], A[10]), when we were treating of grace.
Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which
changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed
in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit
repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its
power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to
accomplish.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is
concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a
habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who
has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it
was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to
persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human
nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of
Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of
persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no
man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening
God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding
sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy,
have persevered in faith. "
Reply to Objection 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he
cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by
falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be
persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the other
hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good,
because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of
grace for that end.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which
head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Of effeminacy;
(2) Of pertinacity.
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Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally
'softness']
Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.
For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9,10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor
liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate---i. e.
obscene, given to unnatural vice. " But this is opposed to chastity.
Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that
"delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. " But to be delicate seems akin to
intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but
to temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
man who is fond of amusement is effeminate. " Now immoderate fondness of
amusement is opposed to {eutrapelia}, which is the virtue about
pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is
not opposed to perseverance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
persevering man is opposed to the effeminate. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3411]Q[137], AA[1],2), perseverance is
deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on
account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly
opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on
account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we
understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be "soft" if it
readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft
through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram.
Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy
blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no
wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or
sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them. " Now it
is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of
pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading "True
magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is
not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved
himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure. " Moreover, pleasure
itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of
pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure
privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7),
properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on
account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a
weak motion.
Reply to Objection 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one
way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is
more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by
natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering
through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared
to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who
are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish
themselves, as it were.
Reply to Objection 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it
is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the
delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that
diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Dt. 28:56): "The tender and
delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her
foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']. " Thus delicacy is a kind
of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of
pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for
instance toil or the like.
Reply to Objection 3: In play two things may be considered. In the
first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play
is opposed to {eutrapelia}. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or
rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to
effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs
thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.
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Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?
Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.
For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory.
But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as
stated above ([3412]Q[132], A[2]). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed
to perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so
either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess:
because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow,
since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when
they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected. " And if it
be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is
clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.
Objection 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good
against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against
pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But
pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is
not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is
to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is
opposed to religion, as stated above ([3413]Q[92], A[1]). Therefore
pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be
pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious. "
"Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man
"perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients
called 'vicia' what we call victory. " These the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is "head-strong," or
{idiognomones}, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their
opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less
than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear
that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while
pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for
falling short of it.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own
opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own
excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now
it has been stated above ([3414]Q[127], A[2], ad 1;[3415] Q[133],
A[2]), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause,
but on their species.
Reply to Objection 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting
inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a
certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man.
Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too
much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or
effeminate man.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the other virtues persist against the
onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the
same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise
seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is
directly opposed to perseverance.
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OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is
the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?
(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
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Whether fortitude is a gift?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues
differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should
not be reckoned a gift.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated
above ([3416]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of fortitude does not remain
in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the
fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from
heaven. " Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is
a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures
of the passing show. " Now noisome pleasures and delights are the
concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that
fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.
On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the
Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2).
I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]; [3417]FS, Q[61], A[3]): and this firmness of mind
is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with
regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his
proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these
respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties,
whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil.
In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]).
in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues
are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is
a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned
a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from
being overcome by sorrow.
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Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For
in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience
hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of
the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the
soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written
(Lk. 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls. " Therefore
patience is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause
of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory
(Hom. xxxv in Evang. ) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the
virtues. " Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which
Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call
principal.
I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For
it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's
work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority
and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it
inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues
which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than
those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good:
and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that
which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity
/are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a
check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the
one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of
death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which
temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of
hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not
the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the
theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly
establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which
withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.
Reply to Objection 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in
bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is
moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by
meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to
unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the
principle is the most perfect.
Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,
that it is more perfect simply.
Reply to Objection 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership;
wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it
removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and
disturb the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of
all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly,
but merely because it removes their obstacles.
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Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?
Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without
grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it
possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more
reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of
evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and
without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that
"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love
sinfully. " Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the
help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be
truly patient.
Objection 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more
abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens
are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their
country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient.
Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the
help of grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much
trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health
of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like
manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the
health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i. e. from God,
"is my patience. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of
desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly
undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which
gives pleasure. " The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of
themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to
suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence
it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure
evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which
causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man
prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may
cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all
things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by
charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient. "
But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through
grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in
our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us. " Therefore it is
clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human
nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination
of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is
more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the
concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake
of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet
it is this that pertains to true patience.
Reply to Objection 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. [3402]FS,
Q[61], A[5]] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the
human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet
not without the help of God's grace [*Cf. [3403]FS, Q[109], A[2]]. On
the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot
tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man
bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man
naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between
this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether patience is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a
thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as
fortitude: because, as stated above ([3404]Q[123], A[6]), the proper
act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For
it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from
St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang. ] that "patience consists in enduring
evils inflicted by others. " Therefore patience is not a part of
fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated
above ([3405]Q[123], A[3]), and thus it is in the irascible. But
patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in
the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore
if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently,
but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience
is not a part of fortitude.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
fortitude.
I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because
it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs
to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by
others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang. ). Now of those
evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to
endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about
these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this
matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to
that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed
to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper
calls patience brave (Sent. 811).
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything
indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of
death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding
fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not
failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is
in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude
is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude
avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be
patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a
praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here
and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them.
Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the
concupiscible faculty.
Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because
the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the
matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part
of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because
temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of
touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex:
whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons.
Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides
their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man
forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however
great they be.
Reply to Objection 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain
respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a
man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it
is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it
inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up
against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v.
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says
on Mat. 4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient
under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most
wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii)
that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the
commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our
enemies. " But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is
annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
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Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is
necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with
magnanimity. ]
Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For
Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, not
as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked,
that they may be converted. " Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4):
"The Most High is a patient rewarder. " Therefore it seems that patience
is the same as longanimity.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But
impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for
one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it
seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
Objection 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured,
so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of
place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time,
in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from
patience.
Objection 4: On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.
ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and
patience, and longsuffering? " says: "It seems that longanimity differs
from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of
set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take
a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently. "
I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great
things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long
way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good,
rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object,
so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with
magnanimity than with patience.
Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two
reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils
for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is
easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult.
Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a
nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul. " Hence there may be patience in bearing
this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity
and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the
delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil
which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which
regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous
evil.
For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says
that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and
difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit. " By saying "arduous"
he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to
the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and
by adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in
so far as it has something in common with patience.
This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though
distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that
which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails.
Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the
point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time
coming to us.
We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason
for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear
with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long
time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with
longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be
unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to
be borne with patience.
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OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under
the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
(3) Of its relation to constancy;
(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?
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Whether perseverance is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than
perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv,
9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority
(De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living,
unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should
persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic.
ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and continued
persistence in a well-considered purpose. " Therefore perseverance is
not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.
On the contrary, Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect. ] says that
"perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand,
and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are
indifferent. " Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to
omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue is
about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special kind
of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous
deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the
act's very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object
of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long
in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist
long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special
virtue.
Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of
itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in
connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in
itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in
enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as
necessity requires.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as
it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to
endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And
evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured
for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not
on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among
other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch,
because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the
lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now
it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who
grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as
in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not
violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly
affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that
moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this
sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus
of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long
persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who
has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to
persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like
perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from
the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same
name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe
without seeing. " Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without
performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence
without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the
habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for
instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it.
Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes
used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes
for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of
perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by
persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not
persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the
work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs
to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for
instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the
magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however,
some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such
as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the
entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal
virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of
life.
It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as
denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
Reply to Objection 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue
in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to
that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end,
belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as
its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to
its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every
virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change. "
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Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude.
For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is
about pains of touch. " But these belong to temperance. Therefore
perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain
passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the
more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.
Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,
but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can
lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal
virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part
of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a
part of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3406]FS, Q[61],
AA[3],4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed
something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it
practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most
difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated
(Q[123], A[2]) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it
observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand
firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity
that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of
something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to
principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in
accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor
is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore
perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues
depends not only on the matter [*Cf. [3407] Q[136], A[4], ad 2], but
also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than
matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have
more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it
has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm
against the difficulty arising from length of time.
Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks
(Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely
in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered
as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or
failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is
in the irascible.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as
denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the
end, according to Mat. 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he
shall be saved. " Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance
for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.
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Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?
Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q[137], A[5]): and
patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not
pertain to perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good. " Now
it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in
great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy
pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.
Objection 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would
seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of
unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i)
condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance,
as stated above (Q[128] , A[6]). Therefore constancy does not pertain
to perseverance.
On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a
thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as
appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy
belongs to perseverance.
I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it
belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to
those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the
virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good,
against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the
act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against
difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence
perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude,
because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more
intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external
obstacles.
Reply to Objection 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are
especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as
stated above ([3408]Q[136], A[1]). Hence constancy agrees with
perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those
things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account:
wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.
Reply to Objection 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds:
yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any
length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which
magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which
perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.
Reply to Objection 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as
it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the
point of their difference, as stated in the Article.
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Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of
grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above [3409](A[1]). Now
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner
of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for
perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the
harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now
"before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what
he had received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more
therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ,
persevere without the help of a further grace.
Objection 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than
deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis.
5:7): "We . . . have walked through hard ways. " Now some persevere in
sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also
persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that
perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in
Christ. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2], ad 3), perseverance
has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of
perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of
habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be
taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in
this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous
help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated
above ([3410]FS, Q[109], A[10]), when we were treating of grace.
Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which
changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed
in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit
repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its
power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to
accomplish.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is
concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a
habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who
has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it
was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to
persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human
nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of
Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of
persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no
man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening
God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding
sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy,
have persevered in faith. "
Reply to Objection 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he
cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by
falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be
persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the other
hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good,
because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of
grace for that end.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which
head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Of effeminacy;
(2) Of pertinacity.
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Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally
'softness']
Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.
For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9,10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor
liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate---i. e.
obscene, given to unnatural vice. " But this is opposed to chastity.
Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that
"delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. " But to be delicate seems akin to
intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but
to temperance.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
man who is fond of amusement is effeminate. " Now immoderate fondness of
amusement is opposed to {eutrapelia}, which is the virtue about
pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is
not opposed to perseverance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
persevering man is opposed to the effeminate. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3411]Q[137], AA[1],2), perseverance is
deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on
account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly
opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on
account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we
understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be "soft" if it
readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft
through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram.
Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy
blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no
wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or
sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them. " Now it
is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of
pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading "True
magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is
not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved
himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure. " Moreover, pleasure
itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of
pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure
privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7),
properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on
account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a
weak motion.
Reply to Objection 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one
way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is
more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by
natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering
through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared
to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who
are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish
themselves, as it were.
Reply to Objection 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it
is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the
delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that
diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Dt. 28:56): "The tender and
delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her
foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']. " Thus delicacy is a kind
of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of
pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for
instance toil or the like.
Reply to Objection 3: In play two things may be considered. In the
first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play
is opposed to {eutrapelia}. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or
rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to
effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs
thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.
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Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?
Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.
For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory.
But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as
stated above ([3412]Q[132], A[2]). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed
to perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so
either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess:
because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow,
since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when
they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected. " And if it
be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is
clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.
Objection 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good
against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against
pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But
pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is
not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is
to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is
opposed to religion, as stated above ([3413]Q[92], A[1]). Therefore
pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be
pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious. "
"Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man
"perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients
called 'vicia' what we call victory. " These the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is "head-strong," or
{idiognomones}, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their
opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less
than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear
that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while
pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for
falling short of it.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own
opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own
excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now
it has been stated above ([3414]Q[127], A[2], ad 1;[3415] Q[133],
A[2]), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause,
but on their species.
Reply to Objection 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting
inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a
certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man.
Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too
much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or
effeminate man.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the other virtues persist against the
onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the
same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise
seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is
directly opposed to perseverance.
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OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is
the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?
(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
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Whether fortitude is a gift?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues
differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should
not be reckoned a gift.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated
above ([3416]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of fortitude does not remain
in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the
fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from
heaven. " Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is
a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures
of the passing show. " Now noisome pleasures and delights are the
concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that
fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.
On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the
Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2).
I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]; [3417]FS, Q[61], A[3]): and this firmness of mind
is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with
regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his
proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these
respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties,
whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil.
In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]).
