No More Learning

In your cutting away from me
these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will
injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my
weakness is injurious for your government. ""
The Durand Agreement of 1893 resulted in the delimitation of a
boundary, afterwards known as the Durand line, across which neither
the amir nor the Government of India was to interfere in any way.
The importance of this agreement has been somewhat overrated. It
is true that by putting an end to the existing uncertainty the demarca-
tion of this boundary should have considerably facilitated frontier
administration, but frontier history, since 1893, shows that this agree-
ment has not only increased the responsibilities of the Government of
India, but has also increased the chances of collision with the tribes
and of war with the amir. The new boundary line was not based upon
sound topographical data, for, during the process of demarcation, it
was discovered that certain places, marked on the Durand map, did
not exist on the actual ground. Many ethnic absurdities were per-
petrated, such as the handing over to the amir of the Birmal tract of
Waziristan, peopled by Darwesh Khel Waziris, the majority of whom
were included within the British sphere of influence. The worst
blunder of all was the arrangement by which the boundary cut the
Mohmand tribal area into two separate parts. It seems certain that
i Abd-ur-rahman, Autobiography, II, 158.


## p. 463 (#503) ############################################

CHITRAL
463
this could not have been a tripartite agreement, for there is no evidence
that the tribesmen were consulted before 1893. To give but one
example: it was not until the year 1896 that the Halimzai, Kamali,
Dawezai, Utmanzai, and Tarakzai Mohmands, afterwards known as
the eastern or “assured” clans, accepted the political control of the
Government of India. " In all probability the political issues at stake
occasioned this sacrifice of ethnological requirements. If the amir had
not been promised the Birmal tract, it is quite likely that he would
have refused his consent to the inclusion of Wana within the British
sphere of influence. In the light of subsequent events it is difficult to
understand the reasons which prompted the amir to sign this agree-
ment. It may have been that the increase of his subsidy to eighteen
lakhs of rupees, and the recognition of his right to import munitions
of war, bribed him into acquiescence.
While these negotiations were taking place Chitral became the
scene of fratricidal conflicts. On his death, in 1892, . Aman-ul-mulk,
the Mehtar of Chitral, had been succeeded by one of his sons, Afzal-
ul-mulk, who, after a short reign of two months and seven days, was
slain by his uncle, Sher Afzal, who had been allowed to escape from
Kabul where he had been living as a pensioner of the amir. Sher
Afzal held the reins of government until he was ousted from his
position by his nephew, Nizam-ul-mulk, who was recognised by the
Government of India. It is significant that Sher Afzal fled to the camp
of the Afghan commander-in-chief at Asmar. In answer to the new
Mehtar's request, a mission under Dr Robertson was dispatched to
Chitral. Although Robertson advocated the retention of British
troops in Chitral and Yassin, Lord Lansdowne, towards the end of
1893, issued instructions for the withdrawal of the political officer
from Chitral, if no further complications occurred. Two factors were
instrumental in reversing this decision. It was considered inexpedient
to withdraw so long as the Pamir boundary dispute with Russia
afforded an excuse for aggressive action from that direction. It was
further feared that, owing to the hostile attitude of Umra Khan of
Jandol, on the southern borders of Chitral, withdrawal would be
followed by a period of anarchy. In January, 1895, the Mehtar was
murdered, and Sher Afzal once more appeared on the scene. To make
matters worse, Umra Khan proclaimed a jehad throughout Dir, Swat,
and Bajaur, and Robertson found himself besieged in Fort Chitral by
a combined force of Chitralis and Pathans. 3 This necessitated the
immediate dispatch of a relief column. The memorable siege from
4 March to. 19 April, 1895; the heroic efforts of the defenders; Kelly's
marvellous march of 350 miles in 35 days from Gilgit; and the advance
of Sir Robert Low by way of the Malakand are well known to students
of the frontier problem.
1 Parl. Papers, 1908, LXXIV (Cd. 4201), 125-6.
* Idem, 1895, LXXI (C. 7864), 27-9.
3 Idem, pp. 35-42.


## p. 464 (#504) ############################################

464 THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
Prior to Low's march over the Malakand, the only communication
with Chitral was by way of Kashmir and the isolated position of
Gilgit. Not only was this route circuitous and the roads bad, but
Gilgit for many months in the year was cut off by snow from both
India and Chitral. The question of the retention of a garrison in
Chitral therefore hinged on the proposal to construct a more direct
road over the Malakand. As soon as it had been decided to move
troops over the Malakand and Lowarai to Chitral, a proclamation
had been issued on 14 March, 1895, to the people of Swat and Bajaur,
to the effect that if they granted British forces an unmolested passage
through their territories, their country would not be occupied. On
8 May, 1895, the Government of India decided to retain a garrison in
Chitral; and, to ensure its safety, proposed the construction of a road
a
from Peshawar through Swat. This decision did not meet with the
approval of Lord Rosebery's cabinet and the liberal government at
home. Once more, however, was an important imperial problem to
become the sport of English party politics, for this decision was reversed
by Lord Salisbury's government in August of the same year. The
liberal contention, that the construction of the new road was a de-
liberate breach of faith with the tribes and contrary to the spirit of the
proclamation, was merely a party cry, for the tribes, with one excep-
tion, had paid no heed to the proclamation and had resisted the
British advance. 2
Is the retention of a garrison in Chitral a strategic necessity for the
protection of that part of the frontier? It was pointed out at the time
that, by the Durand Agreement, the amir had pledged himself not to
interfere in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral: consequently all danger from
Afghanistan had passed away. On the other hand, it should have
been remembered that Afghan intrigues had played no small part in
the recent struggles in Chitral. On 10 September, 1895, the Pamir
boundary dispute came to an end, and the spheres of influence of
Great Britain and Russia were definitely mapped out in that region.
Some authorities were therefore of opinion that the danger of Russian
aggression had passed away. The answer to this was that the Pamir
Agreement had brought Russia a great extension of military and
political prestige, because she had been allowed to advance her
frontiers to the Hindu Kush. Military experts were at loggerheads.
Lord Roberts lent his support to the advocates of retention. Arrayed
against him were formidable antagonists, such as Sir Donald Stewart,
Sir Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Adye, Sir Charles Gough, and
Lord Chelmsford. It is, however, difficult to see how any effective
movement could be made by Russia from the Chitral side, unless she
were in complete military occupation of Afghanistan, or in friendly
alliance with the amir. In 1895 the danger of an attack upon India
from the direction of Chitral was infinitesimal.
i Parl. Papers, 1895, LXXI (C. 7864), p. 39. · Idem, 1896, lx (C. 8037), 9-10.


## p. 465 (#505) ############################################

THE MAIZAR OUTRAGE
465
The echoes of the Chitral expedition had no sooner died away than
the frontier was abnormally disturbed by the conflagration of 1897.
The first outbreak occurred in the Tochi valley, which had been taken
over, at the request of its Dawari inhabitants, in 1895. Here, on
10 June, 1897, the political officer and his escort were treacherously
attacked in the village of Maizar. Thence the revolt spread into Swat,
where the tribesmen rose under Sadullah Khan, the Mad Mullah,
and attacked the Malakand and Chakdarra. The next to rebel were
the Mohmands, who, under Najm-ud-din, the Adda Mullah, attacked
the village of Shankargarh in the Peshawar district. Finally, the
Orakzais and Afridis, instigated by Mullah Sayyid Akbar, an Aka
Khel Afridi, captured the Khyber forts and laid siege to the Samana
posts. The result was that troops had to be marched to Datta Khel in
the Tochi; to Swat, Bajaur, Chamla, the Utman Khel country, and
Buner, The Mohmands were punished by a force operating from
Peshawar; and lastly, a well-organised expeditionary force penetrated
into the heart of Orakzai and Afridi Tirah.
Many frontier officials believed that each rising had its own par-
ticular local cause; that, in the beginning, there was not the slightest
connection between the Malakand, Afridi, and Maizar disturbances. 1
The relative importance of fanaticism, Afghan and other intrigues,
and the feeling of unrest engendered by discontent at tribal allowances,
as causes of the Maizar outrage, will perhaps never be definitely
determined, but it seems certain that the exaggerated reports of this
affair, disseminated by anti-British mullahs, did tend to affect the rest
of the border-to some extent Maizar heralded the approaching storm.
The main factors underlying the 1897 risings were the active
forward policy pursued in the 'nineties and the influence of fanaticism.
There can be no doubt that this policy of intervention in tribal affairs
had thoroughly alarmed and annoyed the amir. The charges brought
against Abd-ur-rahman were that he had received deputations from
the British tribal zone; that he had failed to prevent his regular troops
and subjects from joining tribal lashkars; and that he had granted an
asylum to the enemies of the Government of India. It is a well-known
fact that he addressed an assembly of mullahs from all parts of
Afghanistan and the frontier, and impressed upon them that it was
the duty of all true believers to wipe out the infidel. It is significant,
too, that at the same time he assumed the title of Zia-ul-Millat wa-
ud-Din, the “Light of the Nation and Religion". The publication of
the amir’s book entitled Taqwim-ud-din, “Catechism” or “Almanac
of Religion”, which dealt with the question of a jehad, was, to say the
least, inopportune. A correct interpretation of this book may have
been perfectly harmless; the construction placed upon it by frontier
mullahs and its distribution within the British tribal zone were not
calculated to promote peaceful relations.
i Bruce, Forward Policy and its Results, p. 141.
CHI VI
30


## p. 466 (#506) ############################################

466
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
.
In 1897 a spirit of fanaticism was in the air. Wholesale massacres of
Christians had taken place; the Turks had been victorious over the
infidel Greeks; the Arabs of the Sudan had broken British squares;
and behind it all was the sinister figure of Sultan Abdul Hamid II.
British prestige was very low indeed until that crushing blow at
Omdurman. It would be difficult to state how far these happenings
affected the Indian frontier, but certain letters discovered in Mullah
Sayyid Akbar's house in the Waran valley of Tirah show clearly the
wild rumours that were prevalent. 1 Contemporary opinion, especially
that of officers and officials in the war zone, favoured fanaticism as
the chief cause of the outbreak, but they have ever been ready to
confuse fanaticism with the natural desire of the tribesmen for inde-
pendence.
If the risings were the outcome of a more forward policy, why did
the movement not spread to Baluchistan and Kurram? A detailed
answer to this question would revive one of the greatest of frontier
controversies, the respective merits and demerits of the Sandeman and
Panjab systems. The answer lies in the difference between the Baluch
and Pathan, in tribal constitution and in racial characteristics, and
in the fact that Baluchistan had long enjoyed an ordered administra-
tion. Although minor disturbances did take place among the Sarawan
Brahui chiefs and in Makran, it would be difficult to connect them
with the northern Pathan upheaval. As for the Turis of Kurram, they
were Shiahs and at deadly enmity with their Sunni neighbours.
Thus, when Lord Curzon arrived in India, in January, 1899, the
Government of India had successfully brought to a conclusion a series
of punitive expeditions against widespread and violent tribal risings.
The new viceroy found more than 10,000 troops cantoned across the
administrative border, in the Khyber, on the Samana range, in
Waziristan, and in the Malakand area. Not only were these advanced
positions many miles from a base, but they were also entirely uncon-
nected by lateral communications, and were consequently in constant
danger of being overpowered before supports could be rushed to their
assistance. The lesson of 1897 seemed to have had no effect upon the
authorities in India, for, not only were they still persisting in a policy
of dispersion instead of concentration of forces, but proposals were
also being brought forward for the construction of fresh and costly
fortifications in tribal territory. 2 Fortunately, wiser counsels prevailed
under Lord Curzon, whose policy can be described as one of with-
drawal and concentration. In other words, the policy pursued in the
’nineties was to be replaced by one of non-interference resembling in
many respects the old “close border” system. What Lord Curzon
accomplished can be best summed up in his own words:
Withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions, employment of tribal
forces in defence of tribal country, concentration of British forces in British
1 Parl. Papers, 1898 (C. 8714), Appendix G, p. 39 C. 3 Idem, 1901 (Cd. 496), p. 116.


## p. 467 (#507) ############################################

CURZON'S POLICY
467
territory behind them as a safeguard and a support, improvement of communica-
tions in the rear. '
1
1
The important point to remember about his militia scheme is that he
recognised that a tribal militia would break down, if called upon to
perform the duties of regulars. Consequently, he arranged for their
protection and support by movable columns and light railways. By
1904 the new system was in operation along the whole frontier from
Chitral to Baluchistan. All regular troops had been withdrawn from
Gilgit, and the protection of that isolated position left in the hands of
the Kashmir Imperial Service troops. In Chitral alone were regular
forces to be found. These were concentrated at Kila Drosh in the
extreme south, at a discreet distance from the Mehtar's capital.
Mastuj was the headquarters of the Chitrali irregulars. In 1902 the
Khar Movable Column was withdrawn and regulars stationed at
Chakdarra, Malakand and Dargai. Chakdarra was of great im-
portance owing to the fact that the Swat river had been bridged at
that spot, and because it was the starting-point of the famous road to
Chitral. All the outlying posts were held by the Dir and Swat levies,
who were responsible for the safety of the road. To support the
Malakand garrisons, a light railway was constructed from Naushahra
to Dargai. Similarly, regular troops were withdrawn from the Khyber,
which was guarded by the reorganised Khyber Rifles, consisting of
two battalions under British officers. For their support a flying
column was kept in constant readiness at Peshawar, which was con-
nected with Jamrud by an extension of the broad gauge railway, with
Landi Kotal by a road running through the Mullagori country, and
with Kohat by a cart-road running through the Kohat pass. The
Mullagori road was an alternative route to the Khyber, and its con-
struction had been previously advocated by Sir Robert Warburton.
The bridge over the Indus at Kushalgarh and the extension of the
railway from Kohat to Thal were not completed during Lord Curzon's
term of office. In the Orakzai country, the Samana Rifles were raised,
and were supported by British troops at Kohat. British garrisons were
recalled from Kurram and were replaced by two battalions of the
Kurram Militia, equipped and officered on the same lines as the
Khyber Rifles. In the Waziri country, the Northern and Southern
Waziristan Militia were raised for the protection of the Tochi and
Gumal passes respectively, and were supported by movable columns
stationed at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. In Baluchistan the
Quetta-Nushki railway was commenced, but it was not completed
until 1905. This line played an important part in the later develop-
ment of the Nushki-Seistan caravan route.
The creation of the North-West Frontier Province was the consum-
mation of all Curzon's frontier policy. For at least a quarter of a century
1 Budget Speech, 30 March, 1904.
30-2


## p. 468 (#508) ############################################

468
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
viceroys and frontier administrators had put forward proposals for the
formation of a new administrative unit. In 1843, six years before the
Panjab was wrested from its Sikh owners, Sind had been placed under
the government of Bombay. Had the Panjab been annexed first, in
all probability Sind would have been incorporated with it, for these
two areas are connected by the strongest of all natural links, a large
river. During the governor-generalship of Lord Dalhousie a proposal
had been made to unite them, but, for financial reasons, it was not
sanctioned by the court of directors. After the Mutiny the question
was reconsidered, but, owing to the backward state of communications
along the Indus, Lord Canning refused to give his consent. Moreover,
Sind was prospering under the excellent administration of Sir Bartle
Frere. The status quo was, therefore, maintained, and, even to-day, in
spite of distance, Sind remains under the government of Bombay
Lord Lytton sought to solve the problem by the creation of an
enormous trans-Indus province, consisting of the six frontier districts
of the Panjab and of the trans-Indus districts of Sind, with the ex-
ception of Karachi. ? To compensate Bombay for the loss of trans-
Indus Sind, Lytton proposed that it should receive the whole, or part,
of the Central Provinces. It was this proposal which contributed
largely to the non-acceptance of his scheme. During the viceroyalty
of Lord Lansdowne the proposal was revived in its original form, but,
owing to the formation of the Baluchistan Agency, Sind had ceased
to be a frontier district. Nothing had been done when Lord Curzon
assumed office, although the secretary of state, in his dispatch of
5 August, 1898, had pointed out the desirability of placing tribal
policy more directly under the control and supervision of the Govern-
ment of India. After carefully considering all previous proposals,
Lord Curzon determined to carve out a new frontier province across
the Indus. The reasons which led him to take this step are clearly laid
down in his minute of 27 August, 1900. The most important reason
for the change was that between the frontier system and the authority
of the viceroy there was placed a subordinate government, through
whose hands all frontier questions had to pass before they reached the
Government of India. He pointed out that under this system,
with its
long official chain of reference, rapidity of action and swiftness of
decision, both of which were essential on an exposed frontier, were
well-nigh impossible.
Politically, the new province was divided into two parts: the settled
districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan;
and the trans-border tracts which lay between the administrative and
Durand boundaries. It should be remembered that the trans-border
area, in addition to the five political agencies of the Malakand, Khyber,
Kurram, Tochi, and Wana, also contained tribal tracts under the
i Parl. Papers, 1878, lvi (Cd. 1898), 5.
2 Idem, pp. 136-43.
• Idem, 1901 (Cd. 496), p. 71.


## p. 469 (#509) ############################################

THE FRONTIER PROVINCE
469
political control of the deputy-commissioners of the adjoining settled
districts. The cis-Indus tract of Hazara was not included in the scheme
as originally drafted by Lord Curzon. It is interesting to note that
between Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara there was only one trans-
Indus tract which was not taken away from the Panjab; the trans-
riverain tahsil of Isa Khel, the inhabitants of which were non-Pashtu-
speaking Pathans, remained within the limits of the Panjab. The head
of the new unit was to be a chief commissioner and agent to the
governor-general, to be appointed by and responsible to the Govern-
ment of India. In addition, there was to be both a revenue and a
judicial commissioner.
The first chief commissioner was Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane,
whose staff consisted of officers of the political department of the
Government of India, members of the provincial and subordinate
civil services, police officers, and officers specially recruited for the
militia, engineering, education, medicine, and forestry departments. 1
The civil and judicial administration of the settled districts approxi-
mated to that obtaining elsewhere in British India. Each of the five
districts was placed under a deputy-commissioner who was assisted
by the usual tahsildars, naib-tahsildars, kanungos, and patwaris. The
judicial commissioner, Mr C. E. Bunbury, was the controlling
authority in the judicial branch of the administration, his court being
the highest criminal and appellate tribunal in the province. Sub-
ordinate to him were the two divisional and sessions judges of Peshawar
and the Derajat. The revenue administration of the whole settled area
was likewise under the control of the revenue commissioner, Mr (after-
wards Sir) Michael O'Dwyer.
It was, however, found impossible to separate the administration of
the five settled districts from the political control of the adjoining
unadministered areas. This had always been the case. Nevertheless,
before the formation of the new province, a suggestion had been
brought forward to make the commissioner of Peshawar directly re-
sponsible to the Government of India as far as his external policy was
concerned, while for internal affairs he was still to remain answerable
to the Panjab authorities. Fortunately, Lord Curzon was well aware
that, for at least a quarter of a century, this suggestion had been
reprobated by all the greatest frontier administrators. Neither did
he fail to realise that the administrative boundary was an arbitrary
line drawn through the limits of a more or less homogeneous popula-
tion, that the people on either side were closely connected socially,
ethnically, and commercially.
Thousands of our subjects are constantly visiting independent territory, many
thousands of the hillmcn regularly migrate to our districts, whole clans live for half
1 A good account of the early administrative system will be found in O'Dwyer, India as
I knew il, chap. vii. For later changes in the staff of the chief commissioner see N. -W. F.
Province Administration Repori, 1921-2, p. 17.


## p. 470 (#510) ############################################

470
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
the year on this and for the other half of the year on that side of the border; where
the residents within and without the frontier are not men of the same clan or of the
same tribe, they are connected by the intimate ties of common race, of marriage,
neighbourhood and of an association, territorial and social, which has endured
for many generations. "
Before proceeding to describe how this close connection between the
plains and the hills affects the administration of justice in the settled
districts, some account of the state of affairs in the tribal tracts, where
no organised magistracy exists, is essential.
The Pathan code of honour, known as Pakhtunwali, imposes upon
the tribesman three obligations, the non-observance of which is re-
garded as the deadliest of sins, and is followed by lasting dishonour
and ostracism. He must grant to all fugitives the right of asylum
(nanawatai), he must proffer open-handed hospitality (melmastia), even
to his deadliest enemy, and he must wipe out insult with insult (badal).
This leads to blood-feuds, which, as a general rule, have their origin
in zar, zan, and zamin—gold, women, and land. Hence the tribes are
perpetually at feud, tribe with tribe, clan with clan, and family with
family. Feuds are of rare occurrence amongst the law-abiding
Marwats; they are almost domestic incidents in the Afridi country,
where it is not uncommon to find one half of a village at deadly feud
with the other. Indeed, the Afridis are so distracted by intestine
quarrels that they have little time for carrying on feuds with the
neighbouring tribes. According to the customary law of the Mahsud
and the Shirani, only the actual murderer should be punished, but
theory is one thing, practice another. As a general rule revenge
extends to the male relatives of the murderer. There is, however, a
growing tendency in some quarters to blot out the remembrance of
former wrongs by means of a payment known as blood-money.
A temporary cessation of tribal feuds may occur during harvest
operations, or in the face of a common danger, such as the advance of
a British punitive force. The Maidan Jagis had been for years at
deadly feud with the Turis of Kurram, but, in the spring of 1907, the
leading men of both factions concluded a two-years' truce, which was
faithfully kept on both sides. Again, Pathans who are hereditary
enemies may serve together for ; ears in the Indian Army, but, once
across the border, revenge is again uppermost in their minds.
Under
this system of bloody vengeance, murder begets murder, and the
greater the bloodshed the greater the probability of the duration of
the feud. Unfortunately, the unruly tribesmen fail to realise that,
under the disastrous influence of this barbarous custom, many of their
noblest families are being brought to the verge of extinction. Blood-
feuds are not the sole cause of internecine warfare, for the tribes are
also split up into several political and religious factions. The most
1 Parl. Papers, 1901 (Cd. 496), p. 75.
Kurram Agency Gazetteer, 1908, p. 13.


## p. 471 (#511) ############################################

THE JIRGA SYSTEM
471
important of the former are the Gar and Samil, which appear to have
originated in the Bangash country whence they spread to the Afridis,
Orakzais, and Mohmands. Whatever their origin may have been,
their existence has undoubtedly complicated the frontier problem and
produced a chronic state of internal warfare. West of the Gar and
Samil, the Spin (White) and Tor (Black) political factions prevail.
With the exception of the Turis of Kurram and certain Bangash and
Orakzai clans who are Shiahs, the border tribesmen are orthodox
Muhammadans of the Sunni sect. The important point to remember is
that the religious creed of the Pathans does not affect their political
convictions, for a tribe or clan may be Samil and Sunni, or Samil and
a
Shiah: the combination varies.
No description of these tribes would be complete without some
account of their internal administration and of their method of
negotiating with the British raj. Even the most lawless community
is compelled to recognise the necessity for some sort of government;
even the rudest form of customary law needs enforcing. From Chitral
to the Kabul River the British are able to deal with important chiefs
and rulers, such as the Mehtar of Chitral and the hereditary chiefs of
the numerous khanates into which Dir and Bajaur are divided.
Farther south, between the Kabul and the Gumal, this is not the case.
Here the controlling power is a council of elders or tribal maliks,
known as the jirga, through which agency all negotiations between the
tribesmen and British frontier officials are carried out. The more
democratic a tribe the larger the jirga. For this reason a full jirga
often means nothing less than a gathering of every adult male.
Rarely, if ever, does any jirga represent the whole tribe, for there are
always unruly members who refuse to recognise any control save their
own interests and desires. The tribal council is usually composed of
a certain number of influential maliks and mullahs wilo attempt to
enforce their decrees by meting out punishment in the form of out-
lawry, heavy fines, or the destruction of property. For the enforce-
ment of jirga decrees, the Mahsuds have an institution known as the
chalweshtis, or tribal police. No blood-feud can arise because of any
death caused by them in the execution of their duties. In ordinary
times the jirga deals with questions of inter-tribal politics, and, since
its functions are political rather than social, it cannot be compared
to a caste panchayat.
Because of the close connection between the semi-independent hills
and the settled districts, a modified form of the jirga system has been
introduced into the administered area. This system is in accordance
with the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901, which superseded the
Panjab Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1887. This regulation empowers
the deputy-commissioner to make both civil and criminal references
to councils of elders, that is, to jirgas of three or more persons convened
according to tribal custom. Where the deputy-commissioner is con-


## p. 472 (#512) ############################################

472
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
vinced that a civil dispute is likely to lead to a blood-feud or to a
breach of the peace, especially where a frontier tribesman is a party
to the dispute, he is at liberty to refer the case, for investigation and
report, to a council of elders of his own nomination. When the decision
of the jirga is received, he may remand the case for further investiga-
tion, refer the enquiry to another jirga, or pass a decree in accordance
with the finding, provided that not less than three-quarters of the
members of the jirga have agreed to this decision. Similarly, criminal
references may be made to a council of elders, if it is inexperient that
the question of the guilt or innocence of an accused person suvuld be
tried in the ordinary criminal courts. Here the deputy-commissioner's
power to nominate the jirga is limited by the accused person's right
to object to any member. The maximum punishment for an offence
investigated in this manner is fourteen years' rigorous imprisonment.
Under this regulation members of hostile tribes may be debarred from
entering British India. Again, where a blood-feud is likely to arise
between two families or factions in British territory, the deputy-
commissioner may, on the recommendation of a jirga, order the
parties concerned to execute a bond for their good behaviour, for a
period not exceeding three years.
An attempt was made in certain parts of the province to modify
this system of trial by jirga, and to assimilate it to that in use in the
Baluchistan Agency. Instead of appointing small jirgas for each case,
periodical "jirga sessions” were held to which all cases awaiting trial
were referred. It was hoped that this arrangement would do away
with the corruption inherent in small councils and avoid constant
summonses to the members of the jirga. But even this system had its
drawbacks, for, on account of its size and the large number of cases
which came before this jirga, the members were precluded from
proceeding to the scene of each offence for the purpose of supple-
menting by their own investigations the facts which had already been
brought to their notice. 1
It was not only in the administration of justice that difficulties were
experienced. To-day the land tenures of the settled areas resemble
those of the adjoining Panjab districts, but this generalisation was not
true of the early days of Panjab rule. When the Pathans overran the
frontier zone, between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, they
divided the land amongst their various tribes, clans, and septs. Their
intensely democratic constitution resulted, with rare exceptions, in a
periodical redistribution of lands, known as vesh or khasanne. The land
of each tribal sept was termed a tappa, and there was a time when
redistribution even of these tappas took place. When this ceased, vesh
still continued within the tappa, and involved the transfer of whole
villages, not merely of individual holdings within the village itself.
i See also N. -W. F. Province Administration Report, 1921-2, p. 40.
* For Pathan invasions see Kalid-i-Afghani, Selections from the Tarikh-i-Murass'a (ed.
Plowden), chaps. i-v.


## p. 473 (#513) ############################################

THE ARMS TRAFFIC
473
This was the state of affairs when the British took over the frontier
tracts from the Sikhs, and vesh was recognised in the early settlements.
This system gradually disappeared in the settled districts, because it
was opposed to the spirit of British revenue procedure, and because
the Pathan began to realise the advantages of fixity of tenure. When
the Frontier Province was formed, vesh, with a few exceptions, was to
be found only across the administrative border. The most important
exception was the system of khulla (mouth) vesh, which prevailed, as
late as 1904, in certain unirrigated tracts of the Marwat tahsil of
Bannu. 1 Under khulla vesh fresh shares were allotted to every man,
woman, and child. The custom of vesh is now obsolete, except in the
independent hills of Buner, Dir, Swat, Bajaur, and Utman Khel.
There is, however, one important difference between frontier ad-
ministrations, like British Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier
Province, and an ordinary province in the heart of British India.
Geographical and strategical considerations make the marches of
Hindustan a military area, and render the defence of these provinces a
matter of vital importance to the Government of India. On the Indian
frontier there is necessarily a large excess of expenditure over income,
but critics often fail to realise that expenditure on frontier defence is
not merely for the protection of the inhabitants of the settled districts
from the marauding incursions of the turbulent tribesmen, but is also
for the defence of India as a whole.
Lord Curzon knew full well that finality could never be reached on
the Indian frontier, and did not claim that his solution of the problem
would last for ever. Although, by the Anglo-Russian Convention of
1907, Russia recognised Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence,
the refusal of the home government to consult the amir only served
to add more fuel to the smouldering fires of Habib-ullah's resentment,
and his displeasure was reflected, to a certain extent, in the wave
of unrest which swept over the Afridi and Mohmand valleys in the
year 1908. But, with the exception of short expeditions, no punitive
operations took place until the late war. It must not be imagined,
however, that this period was devoid of interest, for it was marked by
the growth of the arms traffic, which entirely revolutionised the nature
of border warfare; by the increase of raiding by well-organised gangs
of outlaws from Afghanistan; and by the development of the Mahsud
problem which still awaits solution.
The evil effects of gun-running in the Persian Gulf, which flooded
the tribal areas with arms of precision, first became apparent during
the Tirah campaign, 1897–8, but ten years were to elapse before
adequate attempts were made to suppress it. From 1906 onwards
there was an alarming increase in the number of rifles imported into
Afghanistan, the number increasing from 15,000 in 1907 to 40,000 in
1909. Some idea of the volume of trade may be gained from the fact
i Kohat Settlement Report, 1907, p. 2.
• Gooch and Temperley, Origins of the War, 1898–1914, iv, 577.


## p. 474 (#514) ############################################

474
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
that whereas, in 1906, the price of a Martini rifle in Tirah was
approximately Rs. 500, in 1908 it had dropped to Rs. 130. 1 Although
the Chagai caravan route was effectively blocked in 1908, the real
result of this precautionary measure was to deflect the traffic to more
westerly routes through Persian territory. The necessity for immediate
repressive measures becomes apparent from the following report:
It is estimated that over 16,500 rifles, 352 revolvers and pistols and 1,079,100
rounds as well as 13; boxes of ammunition were landed between the 31st March
1909 and 1st April 1910. 3
It was not until 1910, when the British established a rigorous
blockade of the Gulf, that this pernicious traffic was in any way
checked. Unfortunately, these repressive measures came too late, for
the powers of resistance of the Pathan tribesmen had already been
increased. Indeed, it can be safely asserted that this arming of the
border tribes with more modern weapons in place of the old-fashioned
jezails has not only greatly aggravated the difficulty of dealing with
the frontier problem, but has also radically altered the whole situation.
It is always possible to coerce tribes within the British sphere of
influence: it is an entirely different matter when the subjects of a
neighbouring power make marauding incursions into the settled
districts of India. From 1908 onwards, the peace of the border was
seriously disturbed by large raiding gangs from Afghan territory. By
1910 the situation had become so critical that the viceroy was forced
to remonstrate with the amir, for it was in this year that the Hindustani
fanatics visited Kabul, where they were received with great honour
by the anti-British Nasr-ullah Khan. As a result of this remonstrance
steps were taken by the Afghan Government to root out the colonies
of outlaws living in Khost. The British attempted to solve the problem
by the formation of conciliation committees, of prominent persons
from the settled districts and chiefs and elders from adjacent tribal
terriiory, for the purpose of making recommendations for the repatria-
tion of outlaws residing in the independent hills. 4 British efforts were
remarkably successful, but, owing to the state of anarchy prevailing
in Khost, the same cannot be said of the attempts made by the Afghan
authorities. The British also introduced a special system of patrolling
for the protection of their subjects, but, unfortunately, British subjects
resembled sheep exposed to ravening wolves, for, against the almost
unanimous opinion of the greatest frontier administrators, they had
been disarmed in 1900. Far worse than this, the tribesmen were
better armed than either the Border Military Police or the militia,
the very forces maintained for the purpose of reprisals. In 1909 ihe
state of the police was so disgraceful that twenty-five out of every
hundred sepoys were either unfit or too old for frontier service. Both
native officers and the non-commissioned ranks were selected, not for
i Secret Border Report, 1908-9, p. 5.
: Secret Border Report, 1910-11, p. 1.
2 Baluchistan Agency Report, 1909-10, p. 2.
• Idem, pp. 2–3.
5 Idem, 1908-9, p. 17.


## p. 475 (#515) ############################################

1914-1918
475
military efficiency, but for political reasons, because they happened
to be the sons or relatives of influential border landowners. In addi-
tion, the rank and file were so badly paid that it was practically
impossible for them to make both ends meet, unless they were stationed
in close proximity to their native villages. Not only were the border
villagers disarmed, the tribesmen well armed, the police inefficient and
undisciplined, but the moral of the militia was being rapidly under-
mined by the knowledge that their obsolete weapons could be easily
outranged by those of their enemies across the border. Before 1914
these abuses had been remedied as far as possible by the arming of
the border villagers and by the creation of a more efficient and better
armed Frontier Constabulary to take the place of the Border Military
Police.
The outbreak of war, in August, 1914, aroused but little immediate
interest amongst the frontier population. Of course undercurrents of
disloyalty existed, and a certain lack of confidence was displayed by
a run on the savings banks in Peshawar. The entry of Turkey in
November created considerable excitement. One of the great dangers
on the frontier is the possible attitude of the Afridis, whose lead in war
the other tribes are usually prepared to follow. The danger of an
Afridi rising, however, was averted, when, on 1 February, 1915, the
government decided to double their allowances. Great pressure was
brought to bear upon the amir to persuade him to declare war. In
fact, all the leading mullahs of Afghanistan preached openly in favour
of war, but, fortunately for the peace of the Indian borderland,
Habib-ullah, the first years of whose reign had been marked by ex-
tensive intrigues on the Indian side of the Durand line, remained
faithful to the British alliance. Nevertheless, a wave of unrest necessi-
tated the dispatch of punitive expeditions against the Mohmands and
Mahsuds.
The history of British relations with the Mahsud tribes inhabiting
the heart of Waziristan has been a history of constant friction. Neither
punitive expedition nor stringent blockade has served to curb their
lawlessness. After the Mahsud blockade, 1900–2, that pestilential
priest, the mullah Powindah, became paramount in the Mahsud
council chamber, and several dastardly assassinations of British officers
were traced to his direct instigation. His death on the eve of the great
war did not make for peace, for, from 1914 to 1917, the history of the
Dera Ismail Khan district was one long tale of rapine and outrage,
so much so, that it was difficult to understand why British subjects on
the borders of Waziristan had not moved en masse across the Indus.
Eventually, in the hot season of 1917, troops marched into the Mahsud
country, but were able to effect only a temporary settlement. British
preoccupations elsewhere delayed the day of retribution; and, until
quite recently, the wind-swept raghzas of Waziristan have witnessed
the severest fighting in the blood-stained annals of the Indian frontier.
1 Secret Border Report, 1914-15, p. 11.


## p. 476 (#516) ############################################

CHAPTER XXVI
a
INDIA AND THE WAR
FOR India, the war possessed—nay, still possesses—a twofold
significance. It was, in the first place, a transient if exhausting crisis
in the history of the British Commonwealth: a crisis in which India
bore herself bravely: contributed substantially to the cause of victory,
and vindicated once and for all her attachment to the person of the
king. But it was also something far more significant. It was a wind
from the West, fanning to a blaze the embers of old Nationalist ambi-
tions, bearing with it the sparks of new fires which readily seized upon
combustible elements already heaped together. Strange enthusiasms
were kindled: unfamiliar ideals furnished fuel to the flames. A furnace
glowed, and into its fires the polity of India passed. That which will
at length emerge from the conflagration remains a matter of con-
jecture.
To describe what India did for the war is to tell a tale as simple as
it is inspiring. To estimate what the war did for India is a problem
that may perplex the wisest, since the issue is still unknown. Inevitably,
therefore, the pages which immediately follow will deal mainly with
the former and obvious aspect of war-time India: and will contain
only such references to the more fundamental matter as can escape
the charge of prophecy or speculation.
From one point of view the outbreak of hostilities saw India better
prepared than her sister members of the commonwealth: from another
she was far more severely handicapped than they in shouldering her
share of the common burden. This apparent contradiction arose from
the fact that the Army in India Committee, the majority report of
which was accepted by the Government of India in 1913, had specially
limited the part she would be called upon to play in any future struggle.
It was officially determined that
while India should provide for her own defence against local aggression, and, if
necessary, for an attack on the Indian Empire by a great Power until reinforce-
ments can come from home, she is not called upon to maintain troops for the
specific purpose of placing them at the disposal of the Home Government for wars
outside the Indian sphere. "
Accordingly, while August, 1914, found the Indian Army at war
strength, the magazines full, and the equipment complete, the whole
measure of this preparedness was based upon a principle of limitation
which the home government itself was the first to disregard. Instead
of India's task being restricted to the defence of her frontiers and the
1 India's Contribution to the Great War (official document), p. 73.


## p. 477 (#517) ############################################

THE INDIAN PRINCES
477
maintenance of internal order-responsibilities which, be it remem-
bered, had jointly or severally ruined alike the Moghul Empire and
its many predecessors-she found herself in no long time obliged to
fight for the commonwealth in half a dozen theatres of war. "As was
only to be expected, the overloaded military machine could not at
first cope with strains which its designers had specifically excluded
from their calculations.
But if the more prudent might well have harboured doubts as to
the capacity of India to undertake the task which fell to her lot, it
was impossible to question the spirit in which she assumed her obliga-
tions. The great princes of India, true to their martial traditions and
tested loyalty, rallied with one accord to the defence of the empire,
offering their personal services and the resources of their states for the
prosecution of the war. From among the many princes who volun-
teered for active service, the viceroy, Lord Hardinge, selected the
rulers of Bikaner, Jodhpur, Kishengarh, Patiala and Sachin. The
veteran Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, despite his seventy
years, would not be denied his right to serve the king: and insisted
upon accompanying his sixteen-year-old nephew and ward, the
Maharaja of Jodhpur, to the fighting line. The twenty-seven larger
states which maintain Imperial Service Troops immediately placed
every regiment at the disposal of the Government of India: and the
viceroy accepted from twelve states contingents of cavalry, infantry,
sappers and transport, besides the famous Camel Corps of Bikaner.
From the remoter parts of India, and even from beyond her borders,
loyal messages, coupled with generous offers of assistance, came pouring
in. The government of Nepal placed the whole of its formidable
resources at the disposal of the empire. Even the Dalai Lama of Tibet
offered a contingent of a thousand troops, while the innumerable
lamas who owed him allegiance chanted prayers for a British victory
at the behest of “The Lord of All the Beings in the Snowy Country”.
Throughout British India a similar spirit prevailed, even if its mani-
festations were more conventional. Hundreds of letters and telegrams
were received by the central and local governments expressing loyalty
and service. Private individuals and political associations, monied
magnates and poor pensioners, prominent politicians and private
citizens—all alike seemed animated by a single purpose--to demon-
strate in every possible manner their loyalty to the throne and their
attachment to the commonwealth. When the imperial legislative
council met on 8 September, 1914, there were witnessed remarkable
scenes of enthusiasm: the non-official members vying with one another
in expressing whole-hearted devotion to the British cause. Of their
own initiative, they expressed a desire that India should share in the
heavy financial burden which the war was already imposing upon
the United Kingdom.
It is no exaggeration to say that this immense and spontaneous
a


## p. 478 (#518) ############################################

478
INDIA AND THE WAR
manifestation of loyal enthusiasm took the Government of India some-
what unawares. No one who knew the country at first hand had
attached importance to the confident prophecies of such writers as
Count von Reventlow, who preached, for the edification of the
German public, that India would flame into formidable revolt when-
ever trouble overtook Britain. Government was well aware of the
fine-spun net of German intrigue so sedulously woven in the years
preceding the war: and also knew what its authors failed to realise-
the essential futility of the fabric upon which German secret service
agents had expended so much money and toil. There were, indeed,
terrorist conspiracies: some childish, others formidable. But they
were confined to a mere handful of persons, whose worst efforts were
powerless to distract government from its task. All this had been
foreseen. What took the authorities by surprise was the whole-hearted
rally of the country to their side. The history of India, it must be
admitted, provided no precedent for the remarkable spectacle now
unfolding itself before the eyes of observers. Since the beginning of
the connection between India and England, the empire had been at
war on many occasions. But with the exception of offers of help from
the great princes, the country as a whole had on each occasion given
,
no sign of any deep feeling. In these circumstances, the government
cannot fairly be blamed for failing to anticipate the manner in which
Britain's entry into the struggle would arouse all the most generous
instincts of the Indian people. Here was no war of aggrandisement:
no project of imperialist expansion: but a solemn fulfilment of treaty
obligations to defend a small nation. The whole of India was filled
with enthusiasm. Unfortunately, the Government of India was in-
capable of turning this enthusiasm to the best account. Imagination
is not a prominent characteristic of bureaucratic administrations: and
the authorities in India had been accustomed for so long to rule the
country with the passive acquiescence of the population, while en-
during in the process the pin-prick criticism of an educated class
anxious for the privileges and responsibilities of office, that the uni-
versal desire to assist and to co-operate became almost a source of
embarrassment. To a lesser extent, it may be argued, the governments
of all the belligerents experienced a similar difficulty. But elsewhere
the enthusiasm of the people, after a period in which it was suffered
to run to waste, was canalised into voluntary organisations and sub-
sidiary services, which provided at once an outlet for patriotic energy
and a stimulus to further efforts. In India very little was done to this
end: the government desired rather to be left alone, and only valued
such enthusiasm as could be turned to immediate and direct account
for official purposes. The small British community, both men and
women, played their part nobly, and devoted themselves whole-
heartedly to war work where they could not be spared for active
service. Indians, however, were left without much guidance. In


## p. 479 (#519) ############################################

THE MILITARY EFFORT
479
consequence, the astonishing outburst of popular emotion was allowed
to exhaust itself almost fruitlessly in proportion to its magnitude: until,
at a later date, it had to be artificially revived to meet a domestic
danger and to sustain the unprecedented war effort of 1918. The
authorities seemed to rest content with the knowledge that India was
safe from revolution: it appeared scarcely to occur to them to enlist
in the cause of the commonwealth even a proportion of the energy
and devotion so freely proffered. Offers of service were courteously
acknowledged: some few were accepted, others were pigeon-holed.
But no attempt was made to set up any organisation which might be
capable of co-ordinating them, encouraging them, and turning them
to the best account.
Only in one single respect, it would seem, did the Government of
India take full advantage of the remarkable position in which circum-
stances had placed it. The country was denuded of troops to such an
extent that the British garrison for the space of some weeks stood at
a figure of 15,000 men. Of the British cavalry establishment in India,
seven regiments out of nine were sent overseas: of infantry battalions,
only eight were left out of fifty-two: of artillery, forty-three batteries
out of fifty-six were dispatched abroad. Instead of the two divisions
and one cavalry brigade, which the government had indicated its
willingness to send overseas in certain circumstances, India proceeded
to provide at once for France two infantry and two cavalry divisions,
accompanied by four field artillery brigades in excess of the normal
allotment. It is to the abiding glory of the Indian corps that it reached
France in the first great crisis of the war. The only trained reinforce-
ments immediately available in any part of the empire arrived in time
to stem the German thrust towards Ypres and the Channel ports
during the autumn of 1914. They consecrated with their blood the
unity of India with the empire: and few indeed are the survivors of
that gallant force. But, even in the first few months of the war, the
Indian Army was to distinguish itself upon many fronts. In September,
1914, personnel, transport and equipment accompanied the mixed
division of troops to East Africa. In October and November, two
divisions of Indian infantry and one brigade of cavalry were sent to
Egypt. Only when eight divisions had already been mobilised and sent
either abroad or to the frontier, was action undertaken in Mesopotamia
with the remainder of the forces. On 31 October an Indian brigade
seized the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab: and in three months' time, this
force was increased to an army corps of two divisions. Further, a
battalion of Indian infantry was sent to Mauritius: another to the
Cameroons: while two were dispatched to the Persian Gulf for the
protection of the Abadan pipe-line. In all, approximately 80,000
British officers and men and 210,000 Indian officers and men were
dispatched overseas in the first few months of the war. To replace
* Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, quoted in India's Contribution to the Great War, pp. 99–102.


## p. 480 (#520) ############################################

480
INDIA AND THE WAR
them twenty-nine territorial field batteries and thirty-five territorial
battalions were sent from England.