Now what is one with a thing, is that thing
itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself.
itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself.
Summa Theologica
Now it belongs to one
faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to
another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect
and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is
not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the
universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
Reply to Objection 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its
substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by
something additional, as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material
difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction,
which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the
diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the
difference of intellect from will.
Reply to Objection 3: Because the good and the true are really
convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect
as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something
good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for
diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
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Whether there is free-will in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.
For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with
the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking
counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in Ethic.
iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for
this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that
there is no free-will in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives.
But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such
indifference; because, as was observed already ([520]Q[58], A[5]),
their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally
intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appetitive
faculty can there be free-will.
Objection 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to
them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels
the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the
free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in
them.
On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels'
dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men,
with much more reason is it in the angels.
I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous
judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the
arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some
kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals;
for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it
esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one,
but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can
act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the
common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other
thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is
free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so
is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection
than in man.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is
in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an
angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other
does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in
the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but
by the sudden acceptance of truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As was observed already [521](A[2]), knowledge is
effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a
mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should
naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his
nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he
can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of
this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the
perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is
inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it
does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined
with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in
him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
Reply to Objection 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher
angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the
intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of
compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less
degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased
directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the
addition of some qualification.
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Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a
concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence. "
But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered
their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while
anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred
Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the
wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
Objection 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible
appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance
appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the
irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both
a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the
irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not
exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible
and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The
reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from
one another not according to the material but only by the formal
distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object
according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of
faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained
under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of
sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of sight
distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas
if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the
faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of
seeing black.
Now it is quite evident from what has been said [522](A[1]; [523]Q[16],
A[1]), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as
the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can
there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the
intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the
distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite
is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its
common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since
there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their
appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but
remains undivided; and it is called the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to
be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;---on account
of the resemblance in the effect.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are
in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple
act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to
love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to
repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these
things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei ix).
Reply to Objection 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible
appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible
appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine
goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind. For
the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the
irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is
something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of
hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine.
Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with the
desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible
faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside
in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a
human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the
irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in
them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to
be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated
of them according as in moderation they display their will in
conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed to
them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this
is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible
appetite.
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OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)
The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is
love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of
love.
Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?
(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?
(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of
choice?
(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves
himself?
(5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?
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Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection
in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from
intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an
angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.
Objection 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted
upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own
nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves;
because they possess free-will, as was shown above ([524]Q[59], A[3]).
Consequently there is no natural love in them.
Objection 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now
ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to
wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is
above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no
natural love in the angels.
On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved
except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But
there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also
natural love.
I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In
evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always
sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect,
because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently
whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects
as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to have some
inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination
is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each
according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there
is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the
sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature
devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to
something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there
must be a natural love in his will.
Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from
that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to
a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or
intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: All things in the world are moved to act by
something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that
He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will
are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to
act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the
Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not
act himself, because he has free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is
natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than
the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a
natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the
Author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from
the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects
the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and
the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.
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Whether there is love of choice in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the
angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice
follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now
rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to
angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice
in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides
such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to
acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to
everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first
principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as
has been already stated [525](A[1]; [526]Q[16], A[1]). Consequently,
besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels.
Therefore there is no love of choice in them.
On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But
by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of
choice in them.
I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of
choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice;
because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of
a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what
belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.
This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and
his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such
knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by
him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner,
the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the
intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will
tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills
happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire;
since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore
the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his
natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something
loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.
There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the
part of the will. Because, as was stated already ([527]Q[59], A[2]),
the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the
known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's
intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all
things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he
is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive
faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards
things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are
appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to
something else, and being appetible on account of something else.
Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for
him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from
choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual
nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive
knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both
natural love and love of choice.
In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which
are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof:
but we shall speak of them later on [528](Q[62]).
Reply to Objection 1: Not all love of choice is rational love,
according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For
rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as
was said above ([529]Q[59], A[3], ad 1), when treating of free-will,
every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only
human choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
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Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both
with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said [530](A[2]),
natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the
means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot
be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the
love of choice cannot have the same object.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a
uniting and a binding power. " But uniting and binding imply various
things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.
Objection 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement
tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot
love himself with either natural or elective love.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for others
comes of love for oneself. "
I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and good is to be
found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6,
a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good;
and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a
subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that
which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good:
thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it
may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name
"concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship. "
Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything
naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to
mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own
good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man
naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what
is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the love of
choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will
benefit himself.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not under the same but under quite
different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and
with elective love, as was observed above.
Reply to Objection 2: As to be one is better than to be united, so
there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love
which unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and
"binding" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things
outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.
Reply to Objection 3: As love is an action which remains within the
agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does
not of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected
back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is
reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not love another with
natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an
angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows
himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as
was said above ([531]Q[56], AA[1],2). Therefore it seems that one angel
does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
Objection 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and
the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes
of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one
angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.
Objection 3: Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is
unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love
can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no
love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another with
natural love as he loves himself.
On the contrary, That seems to be a natural property which is found in
all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its
like," as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves
another as he loves himself.
I answer that, As was observed [532](A[3]), both angel and man
naturally love self.
Now what is one with a thing, is that thing
itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if
this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love;
but if it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with
non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social
love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far
as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.
Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with
another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves
another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in
so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things
devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate
its form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing's good; as
it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne
upwards.
So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural
affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an
angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from
him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.
Reply to Objection 1: The expression 'as himself' can in one way
qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and
loved: and thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows
the other to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the
expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the
knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself,
because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the
other's essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves
himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love
another by the other's will.
Reply to Objection 2: The expression "as" does not denote equality, but
likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the
angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he
loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one only
generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like
love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he loves self
in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing well to him.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of
that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one
wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to
oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels,
without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good
angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But they
hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness
and unrighteousness.
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Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural
love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated [533](A[4]),
natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far
above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the
angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.
Objection 2: Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet
more so. " But every one loves another with natural love for his own
sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the
angel does not love God more than self with natural love.
Objection 3: Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we
behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But
nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards
anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not
love God more than himself from natural love.
Objection 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than
self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it is
poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them,"
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not
love God more than themselves by natural love.
Objection 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the
love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who
sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two
cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the
earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the
heavenly city. " Therefore it is not natural to love God more than self.
On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of
nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept
of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from
natural love the angel loves God more than himself.
I answer that, There have been some who maintained that an angel loves
God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of
concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather
than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in
so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself;
because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he
wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the
natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he
naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.
The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider
whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because
the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the
natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature.
Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to
another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that other to
which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural tendency is
evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because
"according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude to
be thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that
the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as,
for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for
the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the
same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous
citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of
the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such
inclination would be natural to him.
Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both
man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every creature
in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that
from natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and
with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than
God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it
would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately
divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of
the other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it
does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with
the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and
goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self;
because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more
than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the
species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good
of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything
in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in
so far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far"
denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God
for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of love
on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature
of anyone to love God, except from this---that everything is dependent
on that good which is God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as
to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for
everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but
likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural
inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
Reply to Objection 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from
Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural
love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all
with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God's substance and universal goodness are
one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement
of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other
things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is
naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is
impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him.
But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular
effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they
are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal
good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR ARTICLES)
After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will,
it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the
first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence;
secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly,
how some of them became wicked.
Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?
(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?
(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?
(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
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Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their
existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by
God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not
created by God.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16)
that if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has
being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity. "
But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above ([534]Q[50],
A[2]). Therefore they have no cause of their being.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very
fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels
are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the
angels have no active cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:2): "Praise ye Him, all His
angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made. "
I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing,
except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while in
everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown
above ([535]Q[3], A[4]). From this it is clear that God alone exists of
His own essence: while all other things have their existence by
participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what
exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused by fire.
Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the
angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of
things, but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light. " And
they were either passed over, or else designated by the names of
corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as
yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had
been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal
nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which
they were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard
them.
Reply to Objection 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no
'formal' cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as
produces its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality
to actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire
substance.
From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.
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Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from
eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does
not act through something besides His essence. But His being is
eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at
another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid
down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time
existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's
incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as
truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual
nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but
likewise eternal.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten
Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He
made anything from the beginning. " But, as was shown above [536](A[1]),
the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.
I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity.
Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary
must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He
made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had not been.
Reply to Objection 1: God's being is His will. So the fact that God
produced the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude
that He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above
([537]Q[19], A[3]; [538]Q[46], A[1] ), God's will does not act by
necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He
willed, and when He willed.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure
of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a
corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the
measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and
which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations.
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that "God moves the
spiritual creature according to time. "
Reply to Objection 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by
the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of
truth. But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was
bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not
follow that the angels existed from eternity.
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Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the
corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand
years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the
time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones,
Dominations, and the other orders served God? " Damascene also says (De
Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels were begotten before all
creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all devised
the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making
thereof. "
Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the
Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from
eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic
nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.
Objection 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the
corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one
corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the
production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much
more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal
nature.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. " Now, this would not be true if anything had been
created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before
corporeal nature.
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in
the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the
angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the
angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of
themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting
one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature
to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the
good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the
whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose "works are
perfect," as it is said Dt. 32:4, should have created the angelic
creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not
to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory
Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight
that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the
case with the doctrine of Athanasius," as Jerome says.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of
the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have
taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.
Reply to Objection 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole
universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the
universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe.
Hence the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while
the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation
of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the
creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve
creation of the universe.
If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn. 1, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning,"
must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning of time": but
not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say
"Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures. "
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Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the
empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a
substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its
existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation.
Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that
the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the
empyrean heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest
heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it
would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is
contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the
sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (Is. 14:13).
On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the
visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual
firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor;
and which was filled with angels directly it was made. "
I answer that, As was observed [539](A[3]), the universe is made up of
corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures
were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature,
and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the
angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over
all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or
whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is
the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: "Behold
heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven. "
Reply to Objection 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not
as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their
being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal
creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal
place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that
they are by their power in touch with bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly
means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of
affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not
speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the
opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing
to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted
and universal power over all corporeal things, were created in the
highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as
having more restricted powers, were created among the inferior bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal
heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the
sinning angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some
manner to God, as will appear later on ([540]Q[63], A[3]).
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OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE
ARTICLES)
In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the
order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points
of inquiry:
(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?
(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?
(3) Were they created in grace?
(4) Did they merit their beatitude?
(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?
(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural
capacities?
(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?
(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?
(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?
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Whether the angels were created in beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude.
For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue in
the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess
the excellence they have. " Therefore the angels were created in
beatitude.
faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to
another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect
and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is
not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the
universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
Reply to Objection 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its
substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by
something additional, as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material
difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction,
which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the
diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the
difference of intellect from will.
Reply to Objection 3: Because the good and the true are really
convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect
as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something
good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for
diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
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Whether there is free-will in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.
For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with
the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking
counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in Ethic.
iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for
this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that
there is no free-will in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives.
But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such
indifference; because, as was observed already ([520]Q[58], A[5]),
their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally
intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appetitive
faculty can there be free-will.
Objection 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to
them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels
the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the
free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in
them.
On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels'
dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men,
with much more reason is it in the angels.
I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous
judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the
arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some
kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals;
for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it
esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one,
but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can
act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the
common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other
thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is
free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so
is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection
than in man.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is
in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an
angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other
does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in
the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but
by the sudden acceptance of truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As was observed already [521](A[2]), knowledge is
effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a
mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should
naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his
nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he
can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of
this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the
perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is
inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it
does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined
with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in
him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
Reply to Objection 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher
angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the
intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of
compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less
degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased
directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the
addition of some qualification.
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Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a
concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence. "
But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered
their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while
anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred
Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the
wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
Objection 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible
appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance
appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the
irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both
a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the
irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not
exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible
and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The
reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from
one another not according to the material but only by the formal
distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object
according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of
faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained
under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of
sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of sight
distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas
if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the
faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of
seeing black.
Now it is quite evident from what has been said [522](A[1]; [523]Q[16],
A[1]), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as
the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can
there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the
intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the
distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite
is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its
common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since
there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their
appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but
remains undivided; and it is called the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to
be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;---on account
of the resemblance in the effect.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are
in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple
act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to
love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to
repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these
things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei ix).
Reply to Objection 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible
appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible
appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine
goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind. For
the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the
irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is
something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of
hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine.
Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with the
desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible
faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside
in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a
human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the
irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in
them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to
be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated
of them according as in moderation they display their will in
conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed to
them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this
is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible
appetite.
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OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)
The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is
love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of
love.
Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?
(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?
(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of
choice?
(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves
himself?
(5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?
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Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection
in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from
intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an
angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.
Objection 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted
upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own
nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves;
because they possess free-will, as was shown above ([524]Q[59], A[3]).
Consequently there is no natural love in them.
Objection 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now
ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to
wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is
above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no
natural love in the angels.
On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved
except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But
there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also
natural love.
I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In
evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always
sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect,
because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently
whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects
as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to have some
inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination
is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each
according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there
is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the
sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature
devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to
something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there
must be a natural love in his will.
Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from
that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to
a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or
intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: All things in the world are moved to act by
something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that
He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will
are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to
act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the
Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not
act himself, because he has free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is
natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than
the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a
natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the
Author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from
the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects
the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and
the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.
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Whether there is love of choice in the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the
angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice
follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now
rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to
angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice
in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides
such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to
acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to
everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first
principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as
has been already stated [525](A[1]; [526]Q[16], A[1]). Consequently,
besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels.
Therefore there is no love of choice in them.
On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But
by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of
choice in them.
I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of
choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice;
because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of
a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what
belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.
This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and
his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such
knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by
him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner,
the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the
intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will
tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills
happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire;
since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore
the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his
natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something
loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.
There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the
part of the will. Because, as was stated already ([527]Q[59], A[2]),
the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the
known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's
intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all
things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he
is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive
faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards
things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are
appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to
something else, and being appetible on account of something else.
Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for
him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from
choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual
nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive
knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both
natural love and love of choice.
In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which
are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof:
but we shall speak of them later on [528](Q[62]).
Reply to Objection 1: Not all love of choice is rational love,
according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For
rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as
was said above ([529]Q[59], A[3], ad 1), when treating of free-will,
every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only
human choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both
with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said [530](A[2]),
natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the
means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot
be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the
love of choice cannot have the same object.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a
uniting and a binding power. " But uniting and binding imply various
things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.
Objection 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement
tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot
love himself with either natural or elective love.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for others
comes of love for oneself. "
I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and good is to be
found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6,
a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good;
and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a
subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that
which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good:
thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it
may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name
"concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship. "
Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything
naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to
mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own
good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man
naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what
is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the love of
choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will
benefit himself.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not under the same but under quite
different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and
with elective love, as was observed above.
Reply to Objection 2: As to be one is better than to be united, so
there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love
which unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and
"binding" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things
outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.
Reply to Objection 3: As love is an action which remains within the
agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does
not of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected
back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is
reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.
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Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not love another with
natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an
angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows
himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as
was said above ([531]Q[56], AA[1],2). Therefore it seems that one angel
does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
Objection 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and
the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes
of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one
angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.
Objection 3: Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is
unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love
can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no
love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another with
natural love as he loves himself.
On the contrary, That seems to be a natural property which is found in
all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its
like," as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves
another as he loves himself.
I answer that, As was observed [532](A[3]), both angel and man
naturally love self.
Now what is one with a thing, is that thing
itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if
this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love;
but if it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with
non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social
love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far
as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.
Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with
another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves
another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in
so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things
devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate
its form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing's good; as
it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne
upwards.
So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural
affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an
angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from
him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.
Reply to Objection 1: The expression 'as himself' can in one way
qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and
loved: and thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows
the other to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the
expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the
knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself,
because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the
other's essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves
himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love
another by the other's will.
Reply to Objection 2: The expression "as" does not denote equality, but
likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the
angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he
loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one only
generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like
love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he loves self
in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing well to him.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of
that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one
wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to
oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels,
without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good
angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But they
hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness
and unrighteousness.
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Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural
love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated [533](A[4]),
natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far
above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the
angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.
Objection 2: Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet
more so. " But every one loves another with natural love for his own
sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the
angel does not love God more than self with natural love.
Objection 3: Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we
behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But
nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards
anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not
love God more than himself from natural love.
Objection 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than
self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it is
poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them,"
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not
love God more than themselves by natural love.
Objection 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the
love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who
sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two
cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the
earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the
heavenly city. " Therefore it is not natural to love God more than self.
On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of
nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept
of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from
natural love the angel loves God more than himself.
I answer that, There have been some who maintained that an angel loves
God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of
concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather
than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in
so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself;
because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he
wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the
natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he
naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.
The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider
whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because
the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the
natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature.
Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to
another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that other to
which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural tendency is
evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because
"according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude to
be thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that
the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as,
for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for
the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the
same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous
citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of
the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such
inclination would be natural to him.
Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both
man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every creature
in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that
from natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and
with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than
God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it
would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately
divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of
the other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it
does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with
the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and
goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self;
because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more
than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the
species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good
of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything
in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in
so far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far"
denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God
for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of love
on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature
of anyone to love God, except from this---that everything is dependent
on that good which is God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as
to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for
everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but
likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural
inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
Reply to Objection 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from
Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural
love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all
with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God's substance and universal goodness are
one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement
of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other
things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is
naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is
impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him.
But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular
effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they
are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal
good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR ARTICLES)
After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will,
it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the
first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence;
secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly,
how some of them became wicked.
Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?
(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?
(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?
(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
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Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their
existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by
God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not
created by God.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16)
that if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has
being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity. "
But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above ([534]Q[50],
A[2]). Therefore they have no cause of their being.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very
fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels
are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the
angels have no active cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:2): "Praise ye Him, all His
angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made. "
I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing,
except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while in
everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown
above ([535]Q[3], A[4]). From this it is clear that God alone exists of
His own essence: while all other things have their existence by
participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what
exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused by fire.
Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the
angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of
things, but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light. " And
they were either passed over, or else designated by the names of
corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as
yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had
been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal
nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which
they were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard
them.
Reply to Objection 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no
'formal' cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as
produces its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality
to actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire
substance.
From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from
eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does
not act through something besides His essence. But His being is
eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at
another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid
down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time
existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's
incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as
truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual
nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but
likewise eternal.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten
Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He
made anything from the beginning. " But, as was shown above [536](A[1]),
the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.
I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity.
Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary
must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He
made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had not been.
Reply to Objection 1: God's being is His will. So the fact that God
produced the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude
that He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above
([537]Q[19], A[3]; [538]Q[46], A[1] ), God's will does not act by
necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He
willed, and when He willed.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure
of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a
corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the
measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and
which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations.
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that "God moves the
spiritual creature according to time. "
Reply to Objection 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by
the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of
truth. But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was
bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not
follow that the angels existed from eternity.
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Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the
corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand
years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the
time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones,
Dominations, and the other orders served God? " Damascene also says (De
Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels were begotten before all
creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all devised
the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making
thereof. "
Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the
Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from
eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic
nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.
Objection 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the
corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one
corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the
production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much
more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal
nature.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. " Now, this would not be true if anything had been
created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before
corporeal nature.
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in
the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the
angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the
angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of
themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting
one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature
to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the
good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the
whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose "works are
perfect," as it is said Dt. 32:4, should have created the angelic
creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not
to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory
Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight
that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the
case with the doctrine of Athanasius," as Jerome says.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of
the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have
taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.
Reply to Objection 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole
universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the
universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe.
Hence the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while
the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation
of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the
creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve
creation of the universe.
If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn. 1, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning,"
must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning of time": but
not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say
"Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the
empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a
substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its
existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation.
Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that
the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the
empyrean heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest
heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it
would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is
contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the
sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (Is. 14:13).
On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the
visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual
firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor;
and which was filled with angels directly it was made. "
I answer that, As was observed [539](A[3]), the universe is made up of
corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures
were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature,
and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the
angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over
all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or
whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is
the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: "Behold
heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven. "
Reply to Objection 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not
as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their
being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal
creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal
place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that
they are by their power in touch with bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly
means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of
affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not
speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the
opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing
to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted
and universal power over all corporeal things, were created in the
highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as
having more restricted powers, were created among the inferior bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal
heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the
sinning angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some
manner to God, as will appear later on ([540]Q[63], A[3]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE
ARTICLES)
In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the
order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points
of inquiry:
(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?
(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?
(3) Were they created in grace?
(4) Did they merit their beatitude?
(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?
(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural
capacities?
(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?
(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?
(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels were created in beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude.
For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue in
the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess
the excellence they have. " Therefore the angels were created in
beatitude.
