The non-dogmatic education
regarding
truth in social relations means that education in Hegel is open to the truth of other forms of the relation between state and religion.
Education in Hegel
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
132 Education in Hegel
another 'each against all, in the multiplicity of allergic egoisms which are at war with one another' (1998: 4). Essence, says Levinas, is thus 'the extreme synchronism of war' (1998: 4). The remedy for such an allergy is not a 'rational peace' (1998: 4) for in reason interest becomes objectified as 'calculation, mediation [ ] politics [and] exchange and commerce' (1998: 4). As such, 'the mass remains permanent and interest remains. Transcendence is factitious and peace unstable. It does not resist interest' (1998: 5). It is in the disinterestedness of passivity that Levinas looks to find the peace that undoes all interest through substitution. Caygill observes that 'in the final sections of Otherwise than Being, Levinas searches for arguments that will link the ethical categories of proximity, substitution and responsibility with the order of ontology' (2002: 141). Thus Otherwise than Being ends as it and Totality and Infinity began: 'with war. But this is war - with all the ontological entailments that Levinas has taught us to see - now waged with a bad con- science. The otherwise than being is not otherwise than the war that Levinas has shown accompanies ontology' (2002: 143). These aporias reflate the contradictions of a totality that cannot avoid mediation by that which fails to exceed it.
Religion and the state
The relation of religion and the state in Otherwise than Being in a sense exceeds the relation of totality and infinity. In the earlier book, justice was the language of God, and was 'social' in the sense that the face-to-face is always a relation between egos and always an event of communication. But in Otherwise than Being this triadic relation can no longer be sustained against the problem posed by the third party.
The third party is other to the face-to-face or to proximity. In this case Levinas is clear that illeity has to recognize that its other in substitution is also other to another, that is, also in a relation of substitution to someone else. This recognition of the relation of substitution to a third party raises the question of how religion stands against the demands for calculated, rational and objectified universal justice? How, in other words, is prophetic justice to relate to state justice?
In addressing this Levinas distinguishes two violences. The first is the divine violence that defeats the ego in illeity. The ego is commanded here but not as a slave, for 'no one is a slave of the Good' (1998: 138). Divine violence accuses and redeems prior to any intentionality or will, just as the face in its destitution is both an accusation and an epiphany. The second violence is the interruption of substitution by the third man, the other to
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 133
my neighbour. Yet this violence is latent in the first violence. If proximity only concerned the-one-for-the-other then, says Levinas, it would not have been troubled into consciousness, self-consciousness or a question. Proxim- ity takes on a new meaning here. 'The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before the other until then went in one direction' (1998: 157). This contradiction arouses the question 'what has justice to do with me? ' a contradiction sustained in the relation of illeity and justice. It is here, however, that the possibility arises of judgements as to who is for or against those in proximity.
Caygill draws attention to the problems that are latent, and sometimes explicit in Levinas's construction of these two middles of illeity and justice. His concern, primarily, is that Levinas can be seen to defend a relation of responsibility between I and other while pitting this relation against the third party. This in effect means that the third party is not otherwise than being but otherwise than other. If justice is controlled by proximity there need be no rational order of justice. Additionally, proximity could wage 'just' war against a third party. This is what Caygill refers to when he talks of 'war waged with a bad conscience' (2002: 143).
There are times identified by Caygill when the antinomical relation of the two middles of illeity and justice is resolved against the third party, For example, he notes that in a 1968 interview Levinas chose silence - and, recall here, as we saw earlier, silence is not possible for sincerity - in response to a question about the State of Israel. Caygill remarks on the echoes of Heidegger's silence over the Holocaust in World War II. The point here is that when the state is seen as serving proximity against the third party Levinas is in danger of 'supporting injustice and forgetting the third for the sake of the Other - and thus indeed sacrificing Israel to the idol of the State of Israel' (2002: 166).
As we noted above, Levinas seeks to articulate the State of Israel as 'bear- ing witness to the promise of a new kind of state' (2002: 167). Now Caygill draws attention to the deeper antinomies of trying to do so, that is, of trying to discern a '"superposition" of messianic eschatology and political onto- logy' (2002: 170). This superposition forces terms such as 'particular universal' (2002: 170) which serve only to reflate mediation in Levinas. Caygill is critical of the way that Levinas, faced with the real antinomy of justice and the state of Israel, remains silent at the point of its greatest diffi- culty. Indeed, again from Levinas's Talmudic readings, Caygill argues that Levinas elides this difficulty of the (Hegelian) problem of universal and particular by giving priority to the prophetic - namely the Diaspora and the Talmud - over the concern for justice within the state and to its neighbours
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 134 Education in Hegel
who are excluded from proximity. Caygill concludes that 'Levinas's claim to a right of silence regarding the actions of the State of Israel reneges on his own political philosophy' (2002: 176). 7
Caygill's deeply worrying conclusion on the ambivalences of the political in Levinas is that at times Levinas does not hold the holy and the universal apart but, in fact, joins them in a collusion of ethics (religion) and 'human- ity' (the state) precisely against those third parties that interrupt the relation of I and other. The third, in this case, says Caygill, is Asia in general and 'the third Abrahamic religion - Islam' (2002: 183) in particular. As such there remains an ambivalence in Levinas as to whether 'Islam is indeed part of the holy history' (2002: 183), and rather less ambivalence in one essay in 1960, where Levinas refers to Asia as 'the yellow peril' (2002: 184). Caygill concludes that this essay at least reveals an 'aspect of Levinas's thought that arguably compromises many of his universalist ethical claims' (2002: 185).
Caygill goes on to show how Levinas argues for and against Islam in holy history: how he both blamed and removed from blame the Arab world for Auschwitz; but how, at crucial times, for example in discussing the issue of the Palestinians - and in particular the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila - the ethical is left 'trailing behind the political' (2002: 189). The prophetic, by having justice as other, can only ever be the continuation of the political war by messianic means, a war clearly endorsed by Levinas who, when interviewed about the massacres, responded by argu- ing that the violent third party, the Palestinians, forces the hand in defence of the genuine face-to-face. Is this the same as saying that the Palestinian is not other in substitution but rather other to substitution? Is it to say that the third party is the enemy of alterity? Is it, in sum, to say that the prophetic and the political must work with God on their side? Caygill says here that Levinas's claim for the war against the third party to proximity is 'rigorously consistent with his philosophy, which we have argued recognizes the inevi- tability of war. To describe the other as enemy as this point is thus entirely consistent with such a reading of Levinas's ethics' (2002: 192-93).
Caygill's concerns here begin to reflate the Hegelian dialectic that Levi- nas has sought all along to avoid. This reflation is the return of mediation. It is not a return that is posited from outside of Levinas's thought but is a return that is immanent within Levinas's anti-Hegelian operation. Caygill hints at such a return when, in his discussion of the state as the middle in Totality and Infinity, he notes that 'the repetition of the opposition of theory and the concrete [up to and in Totality and Infinity] will prove increasingly disruptive in Levinas's later thought, producing a split between Israel as a "utopia of the human" and the violent internal and external politics of the State of Israel' (2002: 115). 8
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 135 PART C
Reflation as education
In this final section we will briefly discuss four aspects of education in Hegel as they pertain to the anti-Hegelianism of Levinas. The first three are in regard to the relation of religion and the state, alterity, and philosophical error. The final aspect concerns the educational imperative in Hegel.
State and religion
One of the most difficult propositions in Hegel is that 'religion and the foundation of the state are one and the same' (1984: 452). As such, the state and its laws 'are nothing else than religion manifesting itself in the relations of the actual world' (1956: 417). This statement requires to be compre- hended not as an abstract assertion of identity, but as subsisting in education in Hegel. We have seen in other chapters how recollection has its own edu- cational form and content in the learning of negation by that which is negated. Recollection here is the Aufhebung that knows its own nothingness. The implication of this is that consciousness already contains the actuality of the object that it seeks to comprehend. To know an enquiry structured in this way is to comprehend education in Hegel and, in particular, to compre- hend the illusions that rule in the absence of such education. In seeking to understand the relation of state and religion this education in Hegel teaches us that our object is already present or actual in the form of the enquiry.
More important than any hermeneutical significance here is that the enquiry appears to take the 'natural' form of a relation of thought to its object. It is as this natural appearance that the relation of state and religion hides its own determinative role. Its influence is veiled by making the rela- tion of thought to object appear completely transparent. But the transpar- ency is precisely the form of its political and religious intervention. Thus, the relation of state and religion is not waiting passively to be discovered. It is already active in determining the terms of the enquiry. It is the failure to see transparency in the relation of thought to its object as illusion that fails also to understand how the relation of state and religion determines how we perceive reality. Reality is the victory of political determination as trans- parent and unseen. Actuality knows reality as illusion, but knows too that it is also illusion. Actuality is by its very nature held by this recollection that knows illusion (negates it) and remains illusion (the Aufhebung). The truth of education in Hegel is here: that only as learning, as education, can it hold the truth of negation as its own actuality.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 136 Education in Hegel
This truth of education is easily avoided. When illusion contains truth as unknowable it hides itself within the critique of dogma, of the decideable and of the closure practised by the same. Equally, when illusion posits truth as objective and knowable it hides itself in the openness of non-founda- tional thought. It is the work of illusion, in this case the prior relation of state and religion, which is transparent and unseen, that defines truth and error as naturally incompatible. In Levinas, teaching, philosophy and study are responses to this natural opposition and even the claim made for them by Levinas as not oppositional but revelatory, is itself a claim grounded in the natural relation of totality and infinity. Education in Hegel exposes the natural here as political. It teaches that the relation of totality to infinity taken as one of closure and transcendence is a judgement grounded in and reproductive of the natural appearance in which the political hides. Illeity and justice repeat the same. This repetition of the illusions that constitute the relation of state and religion reflates the Hegelian in Levinas. The sig- nificance of this reflation and the ultimate difference between education in Levinas and education in Hegel is that God can be known in the illusions of the modern political state.
In recollection, then, we learn that what is actual is the modern form of the relation between religion and the state. The illusion of this relation as natural grounds our understanding of the nature of human transformative activity, of man and his object. Currently, this man is the sovereign property- owning bourgeois individual whose autonomy is complicit with the view of nature as object. This is the natural arena of modern life in which God and property, religion and the state are the one truth appearing separate from each other. This means that education in Hegel can find God in bourgeois social relations, but not in a religion that holds to an inwardness separate from modern law and freedom. God in (and as) education in Hegel is in actual social and political life, and includes the appearance of inwardness. To separate them, let us say, into the converted and the heathen, is to miss altogether how God is known in modernity.
The separation of state and religion is therefore not characterized as the feudal unhappy consciousness, although as we will see in the final chapter below this remains a constitutive moment of modern subjectivity. Rather, this separation is the freedom of subjectivity in universal property rights. It is education in Hegel, and in particular its learning of the truth of such illu- sions, that provides for a critique of universal property rights that remembers that this learning is the Aufhebung and not an overcoming. In this is the essential openness of philosophical critique to its being compromised by its own conditions of possibility. This is why it cannot be dogma.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 137
One final point here.
The non-dogmatic education regarding truth in social relations means that education in Hegel is open to the truth of other forms of the relation between state and religion. This pertains to the ques- tion of the third party, the other to the relation of state and religion. The state that is open to being other than itself, that knows itself in illusion, is also in relation to another state. Here, the state is already other to itself and the other state is not it. Here too is world spirit in education in Hegel, for it is the state that knows how to find itself in the other state because the other state is other to it. Nation can speak unto nation as it speaks unto itself. In the negation of the modern state by itself and in relation to its other it has a universal language, the language of the negation of the negation, that is, of their truth as relation in education. Vulnerability here is not weakness, but rather the strength gained in the truth of vulnerability. It is not so much that this truth can change the world, but rather that it changes it all the time, but only more or less recognized for what it is.
Alterity in education in Hegel
We have already seen in previous chapters that education in Hegel is a phi- losophy of self and other9. This can now be revisited in relation to the face-to-face in Levinas. The reflation of his anti-Hegelian operation means that the Hegelian notion of alterity is present in Levinas's thinking but it is eschewed from it within a natural appearance of the same opposed to the Other. As we noted above, this prejudgement in Levinas posits the relation of the same and Other even before the enquiry into them has begun. When God is cast beyond the same he is cast also beyond social relations. But this is an activity of social relations, themselves already a shape of the knowing or not knowing of God. The prior mediation of self and Other is not optional here. As such, one of the ways that education in Hegel differs from Levinas is in the recognition of a lack of mastery over mediation. Positing an absolute alterity is just such an act of mastery over mediation. The truth in proximity is therefore a truth un-re-formed in and by the mediation of this mastery over mediation. Positing a beyond of political totality is already the mediation by politics and religion of each other. This comes down, as so often in education in Hegel, to a question of complicity. The critique of totality is always a self-critique. This is why learning, and neither a notion of overcoming nor of a beyond, is the truth of this critique.
Complicity within the relation of state and religion educates us regarding Levinas's notion of the face-to-face. In education in Hegel there is no face- to-face as Levinas describes it. The face-to-face in education in Hegel is of
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 138 Education in Hegel
life and death. It is as death in life that life is lived learning of itself as abso- lute vulnerability. But the face-to-face of life and death is relieved in Levinas's notion of the face-to-face, relieved that is, in that the face already has death as other, as the other face. Levinas's face-to-face does not recognize its pre- determined political actuality. It does not, and this says the same thing, comprehend how the face-to-face is already a formation of state and religion which is itself already a formation of life and death. Against Levinas, then, education in Hegel teaches here that the il y a and the transcendent are not the trembling and the epiphany of the absolute that Levinas claims. In fact they relieve the face from having to recognize in itself the reproduction of prevailing social and political relations. The relief means that the natural appearance of the I as life that has death as other remains unchallenged. It is education in Hegel that retrieves death for the I as a critique of the natu- ral political relations of the face-to-face. This educates the face that the one face is already other to itself and that the other face, the face that faces it, is not it. We have seen what happens when Levinas exports the face-to-face of life and death into a totality of the same; the third party returns as the mediation carried by death, and can be accommodated or refused accord- ing to the whim of God in proximity.
Education in Hegel, then, offers a very different account of self, other and the third party than is found in illeity and justice in Levinas. Illeity is the Otherness of self and other, and justice is the otherness of self and other. We must ask of Levinas, what prejudgement of truth is it that can be sure that Otherness and otherness are not the one truth, or that they are other to each other? 10 Such a presupposition is grounded in the positing of truth as other to its being known or, as we will see in a moment, as error. This positing is, as we saw above, merely an unchallenged reproduction of the natural appearance of state and religion. Levinas's ethics is grounded in such an appearance. It is what leads him to judge that Otherness and other- ness are not the same. But education in Hegel teaches that this positing already carries within it a historically specific shape of the relation of state and religion. Taken as a neutral and obvious judgement that God and soci- ety cannot be the same, it is in fact the modern shape of their relation parading as if the relation were yet to be established. Seen in this way, the difference between Otherness and otherness is really a philosophical edu- cation regarding the politics of their appearance as different. This does not mean that suddenly they are reconciled. But it does mean that we learn the truth of their separation as our own political actuality.
Contrary to Levinas's misrecognition of self, other and third party, illeity and justice can be re-formed into education in Hegel as 'I am already other
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 139
and the other is not me'. I am already other means my relation to myself is one of absolute vulnerability. Equally, the other as not me means that my vulnerability is not returned to me as my own by my finding otherness in an other. There is no mutual recognition here. The opposite is the case. Even my vulnerability is other than the other. But nor is there justification for refusing my having vulnerability as the actual truth of myself, proved, as it were, precisely because it is not reconciled by finding the same in the other. This is the truth of otherness in the negation of the negation, that is, where otherness is absolutely unable to know itself. Levinas, ruling out the possi- bility that I can be other to myself and find that same otherness in the other who is not me, is forced to posit new violences that will try to mediate between the triad of man, God and state. The result, as we have seen, is to fail to do justice to the determination of infinity within social totality. I am already other and the other is not me - this is self-otherness, and self-otherness known as the other who is not me. This is the Aufhebung, the recollection of truth learning about its own misrecognition. It is the openness of the nega- tion of the negation because it is the truth of learning that it remains open to its own misrecognition rather than overcoming it or closing it down. Alterity in Hegel is a double negative, but only a single education.
Error as actual vulnerability
The same point can now be made slightly differently in regard to education in Hegel as the actuality of error. Actuality is one of Hegel's most important educational concepts. It is well known, for example, that in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right he stated that 'what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational' (1967: 10). The conservative tone of this comment is seemingly backed up by others in the Preface, notably that philosophy always comes about too late to instruct the world on how it ought to be and that the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk, at the end of the day. Philosophy appears here to be the science only of hindsight. Yet it is the significance of the philosophical education that hindsight carries as recollection that requires to be comprehended.
There are two points here. First, recollection is not restricted to looking backwards. This is because a present recollection is also open to itself as a future recollection. In other words, we can know that this present will be recollected in the future. We will be known again, and truthfully, when our truth is negated, re-formed and re-learned. Our mastery over the past is nonesuch because we do not have mastery over the present. This is the groundlessness of recollection in and for itself. Recollection backwards is
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 140 Education in Hegel
also recollection forwards. 11 As such, its actuality includes but does not pri- oritize its being known as yet to be known. This is not undecideability. It is the knowing of the truth of undecideability.
Second, if the recollection of what was and the future recollection of what is are seen as error in the sense that they are only knowledge for us, and not knowledge in itself, then all knowing is error. But the judgement of this as error presupposes that the object of thought stands on one side and the thought of it on the other. In fact, Hegel's political education is based on the insight that error is itself the universality of all thought, because all thought is recollection. 12 If error contains universality then the truth of this requires to be known. One way to proceed here would be Socratic, and to say that this is the universality of ignorance, that we know only that we do not and cannot know anything. But Socrates, too, holds the universality of error still only as error. It is in the negation of the negation, and therefore in education in Hegel, that the universality of ignorance is comprehended, that is, that error itself is true. This, as we have been arguing, is the nature of education in Hegel. In several of the chapters above we have seen how, when the actuality of death in life - negation of negation - is eschewed, it defines otherness per se. The idea that negation in thought is only error - that error is 'other' than truth - is just such an exporting of death. If the truth of error is comprehended, as it is in education in Hegel, then death has become its own groundless absolute knowing, and, again, it is only learning that can hold the truth of such negation as its own actuality. Levi- nas, in casting truth beyond the error of totality, is in fact avoiding the truth of the vulnerability that is so central and yet at times so far from his work.
Educational imperative
Finally in this chapter to the question of education as a moral imperative. Does education in Hegel feed the other with bread from its own mouth? Levinas's political philosophy is so appealing because it appears to offer a transcendental, perhaps categorical, perhaps unconditional imperative that I am commanded by the Other to feed the stranger over and above my own needs. Does anything in Hegel come close to this? It does. The question for the master here is not, as in Levinas, am I commanded to give, for it is in the nature of mastery that one master can refuse another. The question really is how do I learn that the command is just? The answer is that one can only experience the command within the social relations that already shape the command and its reception, and that means experiencing the command, the imperative, as an autoimmunity. To help the other is to oppose myself. Accepted at face value, I can react to the command as being impossible or
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 141
unwelcome, and walk past the stranger who needs help; or I can help in bad conscience; or I can give food to the first stranger but not to the second. Each of these responses speaks from within the impossibility of the uncon- ditional command. But philosophically, I can learn of the significance of the truth of this impossibility, that it is in the impossibility that I am able to learn why and how giving bread is my own truth in relation to myself as well as to the other. It is when I learn that the command to love thy neighbour as thyself is within the experience where I am already other and the other is not me, that it offers an education different from that found in Levinas. I am commanded to give only because I know the other to be other to my otherness.
Thus, it is not that we are the same that commands my generosity. It is that I can recognize the difference of the other in myself, even though I can never have this as an abstract mutual recognition. This is perhaps the most fundamental difference between Levinas and Hegel regarding the relation of self and other. The imperative in education in Hegel is not just to feed the stranger but to know why to feed him, which means to know the truth of our relationship and thus also to know the stranger in my own otherness. That I should treat my neighbour as myself carries the imperative of double negation where I am already other and the other is not me. How else could I know to feed him unless his otherness to me and my otherness to myself learn of themselves within the impossibility of their being the same?
Generosity, here, is autoimmune, and difficult, because as master I have to accept generosity as an antagonistic self-education. Giving reveals me as the face-to-face of life and death. As life I am already death in life, I am already other to myself. But death is not me and therefore I am not the other. Giving plays out this crisis of identity, and is an education that carries its own imperative. Learning generosity is hard because generosity is never enough, it is never a blank cheque. This aporia of giving educates us regard- ing self and other. When I give I have to suffer this education, namely that I am already other and yet the other is not me. I am not fulfilled in my giv- ing and this lack of fulfilment is exactly the truth of giving, the truth of death in life. The imperative of education in Hegel is not simply to give or to be generous; it is to risk the learning that it offers us. To do justice to the other here is the imperative of education in Hegel. Or, of course, one could sell all one has and give it to the poor - but the man (and, indeed, the nation) were sorrowful on hearing this, for he was very rich. 13
Notes
1 Levinas's view that such a criticism is facile will be returned to below.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
another 'each against all, in the multiplicity of allergic egoisms which are at war with one another' (1998: 4). Essence, says Levinas, is thus 'the extreme synchronism of war' (1998: 4). The remedy for such an allergy is not a 'rational peace' (1998: 4) for in reason interest becomes objectified as 'calculation, mediation [ ] politics [and] exchange and commerce' (1998: 4). As such, 'the mass remains permanent and interest remains. Transcendence is factitious and peace unstable. It does not resist interest' (1998: 5). It is in the disinterestedness of passivity that Levinas looks to find the peace that undoes all interest through substitution. Caygill observes that 'in the final sections of Otherwise than Being, Levinas searches for arguments that will link the ethical categories of proximity, substitution and responsibility with the order of ontology' (2002: 141). Thus Otherwise than Being ends as it and Totality and Infinity began: 'with war. But this is war - with all the ontological entailments that Levinas has taught us to see - now waged with a bad con- science. The otherwise than being is not otherwise than the war that Levinas has shown accompanies ontology' (2002: 143). These aporias reflate the contradictions of a totality that cannot avoid mediation by that which fails to exceed it.
Religion and the state
The relation of religion and the state in Otherwise than Being in a sense exceeds the relation of totality and infinity. In the earlier book, justice was the language of God, and was 'social' in the sense that the face-to-face is always a relation between egos and always an event of communication. But in Otherwise than Being this triadic relation can no longer be sustained against the problem posed by the third party.
The third party is other to the face-to-face or to proximity. In this case Levinas is clear that illeity has to recognize that its other in substitution is also other to another, that is, also in a relation of substitution to someone else. This recognition of the relation of substitution to a third party raises the question of how religion stands against the demands for calculated, rational and objectified universal justice? How, in other words, is prophetic justice to relate to state justice?
In addressing this Levinas distinguishes two violences. The first is the divine violence that defeats the ego in illeity. The ego is commanded here but not as a slave, for 'no one is a slave of the Good' (1998: 138). Divine violence accuses and redeems prior to any intentionality or will, just as the face in its destitution is both an accusation and an epiphany. The second violence is the interruption of substitution by the third man, the other to
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 133
my neighbour. Yet this violence is latent in the first violence. If proximity only concerned the-one-for-the-other then, says Levinas, it would not have been troubled into consciousness, self-consciousness or a question. Proxim- ity takes on a new meaning here. 'The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before the other until then went in one direction' (1998: 157). This contradiction arouses the question 'what has justice to do with me? ' a contradiction sustained in the relation of illeity and justice. It is here, however, that the possibility arises of judgements as to who is for or against those in proximity.
Caygill draws attention to the problems that are latent, and sometimes explicit in Levinas's construction of these two middles of illeity and justice. His concern, primarily, is that Levinas can be seen to defend a relation of responsibility between I and other while pitting this relation against the third party. This in effect means that the third party is not otherwise than being but otherwise than other. If justice is controlled by proximity there need be no rational order of justice. Additionally, proximity could wage 'just' war against a third party. This is what Caygill refers to when he talks of 'war waged with a bad conscience' (2002: 143).
There are times identified by Caygill when the antinomical relation of the two middles of illeity and justice is resolved against the third party, For example, he notes that in a 1968 interview Levinas chose silence - and, recall here, as we saw earlier, silence is not possible for sincerity - in response to a question about the State of Israel. Caygill remarks on the echoes of Heidegger's silence over the Holocaust in World War II. The point here is that when the state is seen as serving proximity against the third party Levinas is in danger of 'supporting injustice and forgetting the third for the sake of the Other - and thus indeed sacrificing Israel to the idol of the State of Israel' (2002: 166).
As we noted above, Levinas seeks to articulate the State of Israel as 'bear- ing witness to the promise of a new kind of state' (2002: 167). Now Caygill draws attention to the deeper antinomies of trying to do so, that is, of trying to discern a '"superposition" of messianic eschatology and political onto- logy' (2002: 170). This superposition forces terms such as 'particular universal' (2002: 170) which serve only to reflate mediation in Levinas. Caygill is critical of the way that Levinas, faced with the real antinomy of justice and the state of Israel, remains silent at the point of its greatest diffi- culty. Indeed, again from Levinas's Talmudic readings, Caygill argues that Levinas elides this difficulty of the (Hegelian) problem of universal and particular by giving priority to the prophetic - namely the Diaspora and the Talmud - over the concern for justice within the state and to its neighbours
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 134 Education in Hegel
who are excluded from proximity. Caygill concludes that 'Levinas's claim to a right of silence regarding the actions of the State of Israel reneges on his own political philosophy' (2002: 176). 7
Caygill's deeply worrying conclusion on the ambivalences of the political in Levinas is that at times Levinas does not hold the holy and the universal apart but, in fact, joins them in a collusion of ethics (religion) and 'human- ity' (the state) precisely against those third parties that interrupt the relation of I and other. The third, in this case, says Caygill, is Asia in general and 'the third Abrahamic religion - Islam' (2002: 183) in particular. As such there remains an ambivalence in Levinas as to whether 'Islam is indeed part of the holy history' (2002: 183), and rather less ambivalence in one essay in 1960, where Levinas refers to Asia as 'the yellow peril' (2002: 184). Caygill concludes that this essay at least reveals an 'aspect of Levinas's thought that arguably compromises many of his universalist ethical claims' (2002: 185).
Caygill goes on to show how Levinas argues for and against Islam in holy history: how he both blamed and removed from blame the Arab world for Auschwitz; but how, at crucial times, for example in discussing the issue of the Palestinians - and in particular the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila - the ethical is left 'trailing behind the political' (2002: 189). The prophetic, by having justice as other, can only ever be the continuation of the political war by messianic means, a war clearly endorsed by Levinas who, when interviewed about the massacres, responded by argu- ing that the violent third party, the Palestinians, forces the hand in defence of the genuine face-to-face. Is this the same as saying that the Palestinian is not other in substitution but rather other to substitution? Is it to say that the third party is the enemy of alterity? Is it, in sum, to say that the prophetic and the political must work with God on their side? Caygill says here that Levinas's claim for the war against the third party to proximity is 'rigorously consistent with his philosophy, which we have argued recognizes the inevi- tability of war. To describe the other as enemy as this point is thus entirely consistent with such a reading of Levinas's ethics' (2002: 192-93).
Caygill's concerns here begin to reflate the Hegelian dialectic that Levi- nas has sought all along to avoid. This reflation is the return of mediation. It is not a return that is posited from outside of Levinas's thought but is a return that is immanent within Levinas's anti-Hegelian operation. Caygill hints at such a return when, in his discussion of the state as the middle in Totality and Infinity, he notes that 'the repetition of the opposition of theory and the concrete [up to and in Totality and Infinity] will prove increasingly disruptive in Levinas's later thought, producing a split between Israel as a "utopia of the human" and the violent internal and external politics of the State of Israel' (2002: 115). 8
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 135 PART C
Reflation as education
In this final section we will briefly discuss four aspects of education in Hegel as they pertain to the anti-Hegelianism of Levinas. The first three are in regard to the relation of religion and the state, alterity, and philosophical error. The final aspect concerns the educational imperative in Hegel.
State and religion
One of the most difficult propositions in Hegel is that 'religion and the foundation of the state are one and the same' (1984: 452). As such, the state and its laws 'are nothing else than religion manifesting itself in the relations of the actual world' (1956: 417). This statement requires to be compre- hended not as an abstract assertion of identity, but as subsisting in education in Hegel. We have seen in other chapters how recollection has its own edu- cational form and content in the learning of negation by that which is negated. Recollection here is the Aufhebung that knows its own nothingness. The implication of this is that consciousness already contains the actuality of the object that it seeks to comprehend. To know an enquiry structured in this way is to comprehend education in Hegel and, in particular, to compre- hend the illusions that rule in the absence of such education. In seeking to understand the relation of state and religion this education in Hegel teaches us that our object is already present or actual in the form of the enquiry.
More important than any hermeneutical significance here is that the enquiry appears to take the 'natural' form of a relation of thought to its object. It is as this natural appearance that the relation of state and religion hides its own determinative role. Its influence is veiled by making the rela- tion of thought to object appear completely transparent. But the transpar- ency is precisely the form of its political and religious intervention. Thus, the relation of state and religion is not waiting passively to be discovered. It is already active in determining the terms of the enquiry. It is the failure to see transparency in the relation of thought to its object as illusion that fails also to understand how the relation of state and religion determines how we perceive reality. Reality is the victory of political determination as trans- parent and unseen. Actuality knows reality as illusion, but knows too that it is also illusion. Actuality is by its very nature held by this recollection that knows illusion (negates it) and remains illusion (the Aufhebung). The truth of education in Hegel is here: that only as learning, as education, can it hold the truth of negation as its own actuality.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 136 Education in Hegel
This truth of education is easily avoided. When illusion contains truth as unknowable it hides itself within the critique of dogma, of the decideable and of the closure practised by the same. Equally, when illusion posits truth as objective and knowable it hides itself in the openness of non-founda- tional thought. It is the work of illusion, in this case the prior relation of state and religion, which is transparent and unseen, that defines truth and error as naturally incompatible. In Levinas, teaching, philosophy and study are responses to this natural opposition and even the claim made for them by Levinas as not oppositional but revelatory, is itself a claim grounded in the natural relation of totality and infinity. Education in Hegel exposes the natural here as political. It teaches that the relation of totality to infinity taken as one of closure and transcendence is a judgement grounded in and reproductive of the natural appearance in which the political hides. Illeity and justice repeat the same. This repetition of the illusions that constitute the relation of state and religion reflates the Hegelian in Levinas. The sig- nificance of this reflation and the ultimate difference between education in Levinas and education in Hegel is that God can be known in the illusions of the modern political state.
In recollection, then, we learn that what is actual is the modern form of the relation between religion and the state. The illusion of this relation as natural grounds our understanding of the nature of human transformative activity, of man and his object. Currently, this man is the sovereign property- owning bourgeois individual whose autonomy is complicit with the view of nature as object. This is the natural arena of modern life in which God and property, religion and the state are the one truth appearing separate from each other. This means that education in Hegel can find God in bourgeois social relations, but not in a religion that holds to an inwardness separate from modern law and freedom. God in (and as) education in Hegel is in actual social and political life, and includes the appearance of inwardness. To separate them, let us say, into the converted and the heathen, is to miss altogether how God is known in modernity.
The separation of state and religion is therefore not characterized as the feudal unhappy consciousness, although as we will see in the final chapter below this remains a constitutive moment of modern subjectivity. Rather, this separation is the freedom of subjectivity in universal property rights. It is education in Hegel, and in particular its learning of the truth of such illu- sions, that provides for a critique of universal property rights that remembers that this learning is the Aufhebung and not an overcoming. In this is the essential openness of philosophical critique to its being compromised by its own conditions of possibility. This is why it cannot be dogma.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 137
One final point here.
The non-dogmatic education regarding truth in social relations means that education in Hegel is open to the truth of other forms of the relation between state and religion. This pertains to the ques- tion of the third party, the other to the relation of state and religion. The state that is open to being other than itself, that knows itself in illusion, is also in relation to another state. Here, the state is already other to itself and the other state is not it. Here too is world spirit in education in Hegel, for it is the state that knows how to find itself in the other state because the other state is other to it. Nation can speak unto nation as it speaks unto itself. In the negation of the modern state by itself and in relation to its other it has a universal language, the language of the negation of the negation, that is, of their truth as relation in education. Vulnerability here is not weakness, but rather the strength gained in the truth of vulnerability. It is not so much that this truth can change the world, but rather that it changes it all the time, but only more or less recognized for what it is.
Alterity in education in Hegel
We have already seen in previous chapters that education in Hegel is a phi- losophy of self and other9. This can now be revisited in relation to the face-to-face in Levinas. The reflation of his anti-Hegelian operation means that the Hegelian notion of alterity is present in Levinas's thinking but it is eschewed from it within a natural appearance of the same opposed to the Other. As we noted above, this prejudgement in Levinas posits the relation of the same and Other even before the enquiry into them has begun. When God is cast beyond the same he is cast also beyond social relations. But this is an activity of social relations, themselves already a shape of the knowing or not knowing of God. The prior mediation of self and Other is not optional here. As such, one of the ways that education in Hegel differs from Levinas is in the recognition of a lack of mastery over mediation. Positing an absolute alterity is just such an act of mastery over mediation. The truth in proximity is therefore a truth un-re-formed in and by the mediation of this mastery over mediation. Positing a beyond of political totality is already the mediation by politics and religion of each other. This comes down, as so often in education in Hegel, to a question of complicity. The critique of totality is always a self-critique. This is why learning, and neither a notion of overcoming nor of a beyond, is the truth of this critique.
Complicity within the relation of state and religion educates us regarding Levinas's notion of the face-to-face. In education in Hegel there is no face- to-face as Levinas describes it. The face-to-face in education in Hegel is of
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 138 Education in Hegel
life and death. It is as death in life that life is lived learning of itself as abso- lute vulnerability. But the face-to-face of life and death is relieved in Levinas's notion of the face-to-face, relieved that is, in that the face already has death as other, as the other face. Levinas's face-to-face does not recognize its pre- determined political actuality. It does not, and this says the same thing, comprehend how the face-to-face is already a formation of state and religion which is itself already a formation of life and death. Against Levinas, then, education in Hegel teaches here that the il y a and the transcendent are not the trembling and the epiphany of the absolute that Levinas claims. In fact they relieve the face from having to recognize in itself the reproduction of prevailing social and political relations. The relief means that the natural appearance of the I as life that has death as other remains unchallenged. It is education in Hegel that retrieves death for the I as a critique of the natu- ral political relations of the face-to-face. This educates the face that the one face is already other to itself and that the other face, the face that faces it, is not it. We have seen what happens when Levinas exports the face-to-face of life and death into a totality of the same; the third party returns as the mediation carried by death, and can be accommodated or refused accord- ing to the whim of God in proximity.
Education in Hegel, then, offers a very different account of self, other and the third party than is found in illeity and justice in Levinas. Illeity is the Otherness of self and other, and justice is the otherness of self and other. We must ask of Levinas, what prejudgement of truth is it that can be sure that Otherness and otherness are not the one truth, or that they are other to each other? 10 Such a presupposition is grounded in the positing of truth as other to its being known or, as we will see in a moment, as error. This positing is, as we saw above, merely an unchallenged reproduction of the natural appearance of state and religion. Levinas's ethics is grounded in such an appearance. It is what leads him to judge that Otherness and other- ness are not the same. But education in Hegel teaches that this positing already carries within it a historically specific shape of the relation of state and religion. Taken as a neutral and obvious judgement that God and soci- ety cannot be the same, it is in fact the modern shape of their relation parading as if the relation were yet to be established. Seen in this way, the difference between Otherness and otherness is really a philosophical edu- cation regarding the politics of their appearance as different. This does not mean that suddenly they are reconciled. But it does mean that we learn the truth of their separation as our own political actuality.
Contrary to Levinas's misrecognition of self, other and third party, illeity and justice can be re-formed into education in Hegel as 'I am already other
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 139
and the other is not me'. I am already other means my relation to myself is one of absolute vulnerability. Equally, the other as not me means that my vulnerability is not returned to me as my own by my finding otherness in an other. There is no mutual recognition here. The opposite is the case. Even my vulnerability is other than the other. But nor is there justification for refusing my having vulnerability as the actual truth of myself, proved, as it were, precisely because it is not reconciled by finding the same in the other. This is the truth of otherness in the negation of the negation, that is, where otherness is absolutely unable to know itself. Levinas, ruling out the possi- bility that I can be other to myself and find that same otherness in the other who is not me, is forced to posit new violences that will try to mediate between the triad of man, God and state. The result, as we have seen, is to fail to do justice to the determination of infinity within social totality. I am already other and the other is not me - this is self-otherness, and self-otherness known as the other who is not me. This is the Aufhebung, the recollection of truth learning about its own misrecognition. It is the openness of the nega- tion of the negation because it is the truth of learning that it remains open to its own misrecognition rather than overcoming it or closing it down. Alterity in Hegel is a double negative, but only a single education.
Error as actual vulnerability
The same point can now be made slightly differently in regard to education in Hegel as the actuality of error. Actuality is one of Hegel's most important educational concepts. It is well known, for example, that in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right he stated that 'what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational' (1967: 10). The conservative tone of this comment is seemingly backed up by others in the Preface, notably that philosophy always comes about too late to instruct the world on how it ought to be and that the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk, at the end of the day. Philosophy appears here to be the science only of hindsight. Yet it is the significance of the philosophical education that hindsight carries as recollection that requires to be comprehended.
There are two points here. First, recollection is not restricted to looking backwards. This is because a present recollection is also open to itself as a future recollection. In other words, we can know that this present will be recollected in the future. We will be known again, and truthfully, when our truth is negated, re-formed and re-learned. Our mastery over the past is nonesuch because we do not have mastery over the present. This is the groundlessness of recollection in and for itself. Recollection backwards is
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 140 Education in Hegel
also recollection forwards. 11 As such, its actuality includes but does not pri- oritize its being known as yet to be known. This is not undecideability. It is the knowing of the truth of undecideability.
Second, if the recollection of what was and the future recollection of what is are seen as error in the sense that they are only knowledge for us, and not knowledge in itself, then all knowing is error. But the judgement of this as error presupposes that the object of thought stands on one side and the thought of it on the other. In fact, Hegel's political education is based on the insight that error is itself the universality of all thought, because all thought is recollection. 12 If error contains universality then the truth of this requires to be known. One way to proceed here would be Socratic, and to say that this is the universality of ignorance, that we know only that we do not and cannot know anything. But Socrates, too, holds the universality of error still only as error. It is in the negation of the negation, and therefore in education in Hegel, that the universality of ignorance is comprehended, that is, that error itself is true. This, as we have been arguing, is the nature of education in Hegel. In several of the chapters above we have seen how, when the actuality of death in life - negation of negation - is eschewed, it defines otherness per se. The idea that negation in thought is only error - that error is 'other' than truth - is just such an exporting of death. If the truth of error is comprehended, as it is in education in Hegel, then death has become its own groundless absolute knowing, and, again, it is only learning that can hold the truth of such negation as its own actuality. Levi- nas, in casting truth beyond the error of totality, is in fact avoiding the truth of the vulnerability that is so central and yet at times so far from his work.
Educational imperative
Finally in this chapter to the question of education as a moral imperative. Does education in Hegel feed the other with bread from its own mouth? Levinas's political philosophy is so appealing because it appears to offer a transcendental, perhaps categorical, perhaps unconditional imperative that I am commanded by the Other to feed the stranger over and above my own needs. Does anything in Hegel come close to this? It does. The question for the master here is not, as in Levinas, am I commanded to give, for it is in the nature of mastery that one master can refuse another. The question really is how do I learn that the command is just? The answer is that one can only experience the command within the social relations that already shape the command and its reception, and that means experiencing the command, the imperative, as an autoimmunity. To help the other is to oppose myself. Accepted at face value, I can react to the command as being impossible or
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Education in Hegel in Levinas 141
unwelcome, and walk past the stranger who needs help; or I can help in bad conscience; or I can give food to the first stranger but not to the second. Each of these responses speaks from within the impossibility of the uncon- ditional command. But philosophically, I can learn of the significance of the truth of this impossibility, that it is in the impossibility that I am able to learn why and how giving bread is my own truth in relation to myself as well as to the other. It is when I learn that the command to love thy neighbour as thyself is within the experience where I am already other and the other is not me, that it offers an education different from that found in Levinas. I am commanded to give only because I know the other to be other to my otherness.
Thus, it is not that we are the same that commands my generosity. It is that I can recognize the difference of the other in myself, even though I can never have this as an abstract mutual recognition. This is perhaps the most fundamental difference between Levinas and Hegel regarding the relation of self and other. The imperative in education in Hegel is not just to feed the stranger but to know why to feed him, which means to know the truth of our relationship and thus also to know the stranger in my own otherness. That I should treat my neighbour as myself carries the imperative of double negation where I am already other and the other is not me. How else could I know to feed him unless his otherness to me and my otherness to myself learn of themselves within the impossibility of their being the same?
Generosity, here, is autoimmune, and difficult, because as master I have to accept generosity as an antagonistic self-education. Giving reveals me as the face-to-face of life and death. As life I am already death in life, I am already other to myself. But death is not me and therefore I am not the other. Giving plays out this crisis of identity, and is an education that carries its own imperative. Learning generosity is hard because generosity is never enough, it is never a blank cheque. This aporia of giving educates us regard- ing self and other. When I give I have to suffer this education, namely that I am already other and yet the other is not me. I am not fulfilled in my giv- ing and this lack of fulfilment is exactly the truth of giving, the truth of death in life. The imperative of education in Hegel is not simply to give or to be generous; it is to risk the learning that it offers us. To do justice to the other here is the imperative of education in Hegel. Or, of course, one could sell all one has and give it to the poor - but the man (and, indeed, the nation) were sorrowful on hearing this, for he was very rich. 13
Notes
1 Levinas's view that such a criticism is facile will be returned to below.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
