Therefore
a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a
prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God,
according to 2 Cor.
a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a
prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God,
according to 2 Cor.
Summa Theologica
Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are subject to another's power are hindered from taking
vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's
power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed
by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a
lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God.
Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered
from taking vows.
Objection 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet
children may make religious profession even without the consent of
their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through
being subject to another's power.
Objection 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who
are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to
say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore
seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.
Objection 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But
subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this
forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
On the contrary, It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow any
thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age,"
she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is
said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in
like manner other persons that are subject to another's power cannot
bind themselves by vow.
I answer that, As stated above [3061](A[1]), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in
another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power.
Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is
subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it
depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent of
his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters
wherein he is subject to another.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject
of a promise made to God, as stated above [3062](A[2]). Now it is
contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to
another, as stated above (Q[86], A[3]). Hence the conditions necessary
for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's
power vows that which is in that other's power, except under the
condition that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.
Reply to Objection 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman
he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for
instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or
with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as
regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he
cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his
father.
A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his
personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since
this would withdraw him from his master's service.
Reply to Objection 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his
actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even
though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not
being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is
no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a
religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does
the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent;
nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to
another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom
he is subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood
to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his
superior approve or do not gainsay it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow
to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, it is
fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. But
this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore
just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow,
so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves by vow to enter
religion.
Objection 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be
annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or girl
before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian
(20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl cannot
validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.
Objection 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch.
58] and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to
those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation
of the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation,
for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.
On the contrary, That which is not done aright is invalid without being
annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even before
attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her
parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before
attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a
vow to enter religion.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said above
[3063](A[7]), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as
stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a
spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of
the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation.
Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind,
whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an
obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defect
of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by
vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or imbecility.
Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to another's power,
as stated above [3064](A[8]). Now these two circumstances concur in
children before the age of puberty, because in most instances they are
lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the care of their
parents, or guardians in place of their parents: wherefore in both
events their vows are without force. It happens, however, through a
natural disposition which is not subject to human laws, that the use of
reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said
to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, exempt
in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to
human law, which takes into account that which is of most frequent
occurrence.
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the
years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise
bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of
reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own
part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by their
parents, under whose care they are still subject.
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of
puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account of
the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt.
ad Relig. ] which considers the majority of cases. But after the years
of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious
vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in the case of children who
have not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are
invalid, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power
contain an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the
superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be
fulfilled, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows
which are taken in profession.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vows admit of dispensation?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation.
It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it.
But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9,10, "A beast that
may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and
cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a
better. " Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.
Objection 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters
concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those
of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which
is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a
matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as shown
above [3065](A[3]), and belongs to the precepts of the First Table
since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of
dispensation.
Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity
which a man owes to God, as stated above [3066](A[3]). But no man can
dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one
grant a dispensation from a vow.
On the contrary, That which proceeds from the common will of many has
apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the
individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force
from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it
seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same
sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, as
stated above ([3067]FS, Q[96], A[6]; [3068]FS, Q[97], A[4]), a law is
made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances.
But since, in certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone
to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be observed.
This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a dispensation
would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or application of some
common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a
person is said to dispense food to a household.
In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it
were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the
majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular
case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good:
and this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow,
as is clear from what has been said above [3069](A[2]). Therefore it is
necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is not to be
observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular vow is not
to be observed, this is called a "dispensation" from that vow; but if
some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was to have been
observed, the vow is said to be "commuted. " Hence it is less to commute
a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however, are in the power of
the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was
deemed holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow,
being, as it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason
it could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for
something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be already
consecrated, e. g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an animal
that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful matter of a
sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even
so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has intervened.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine
precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to
obey the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed
from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that
human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the Divine
command; but it amounts to this---that what was law is not law in this
particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that
which was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so
contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and such a
thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently when an
ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a vow, he does not
dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the Divine
law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to which a man had bound
himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every
circumstance.
Reply to Objection 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require that
we fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which
would be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation
from that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not
contrary to the fidelity due to God.
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Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a
solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a
dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But
a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle to a
greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the good of
an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to the good
of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if certain
persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of their
country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be
dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency.
Objection 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than
chastity. Now if a man vows an act of religion, e. g. to offer sacrifice
to God he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he
be dispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of
chastity.
Objection 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may
be a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a
vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be
dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body.
Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of
continency.
Objection 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the
religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the
vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed from
the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who are
appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems that it
is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of
a continent soul. "
Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach. ) at the end of the Decretal, Cum ad
Monasterium it is stated that the "renouncing of property, like the
keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that not
even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance. "
I answer that, Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of
continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency; secondly,
the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds himself by vow
to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the solemnity of the
vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III. vii. 1, qu.
5] say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter of dispensation, on
account of the continency itself for which no worthy price can be
found, as is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for this
is assigned by some to the fact that by continency man overcomes a foe
within himself, or to the fact that by continency man is perfectly
conformed to Christ in respect of purity of both body and soul. But
this reason does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the soul,
such as contemplation and prayer, far surpass the goods of the body and
still more conform us to God, and yet one may be dispensed from a vow
of prayer or contemplation. Therefore, continency itself absolutely
considered seems no reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a
matter of dispensation; especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor.
7:34) exhorts us to be continent on account of contemplation, when he
says that the unmarried woman . . . "thinketh on the things of God
[Vulg. : 'the Lord']," and since the end is of more account than the
means.
Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the reason
for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For they
assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by something
altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any vow. But this
is evidently false, because just as the practice of carnal intercourse
is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary
to abstinence from such things, and yet these latter vows may be a
matter for dispensation.
For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain
that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for the
sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the example
given above (OBJ[1]), of a country being restored to peace through a
certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal quoted says
explicitly that "not even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a monk
from keeping chastity," it follows seemingly, that we must maintain
that, as stated above (A[10], ad 1; cf. Lev. 27:9, 10, 28), whatsoever
has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to any other use.
For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose
its consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, for
instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated, so long as it
remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate make a man that is
consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so long as he lives. Now
the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of consecration or blessing
of the person who takes the vow, as stated above [3070](A[7]). Hence no
prelate of the Church can make a man, who has pronounced a solemn vow,
to be quit of that to which he was consecrated, e. g. one who is a
priest, to be a priest no more, although a prelate may, for some
particular reason, inhibit him from exercising his order. In like
manner the Pope cannot make a man who has made his religious profession
cease to be a religious, although certain jurists have ignorantly held
the contrary.
We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up
with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. because if not, the
solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of
continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that for
which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing continency
is connected with Holy orders, not essentially but by the institution
of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can grant a
dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the reception of
Holy Orders. on the other hand the obligation of observing; continency
is an essential condition of the religious state, whereby a man
renounces the world and binds himself wholly to God's service, for this
is incompatible with matrimony, in which state a man is under the
obligation of taking to himself a wife, of begetting children, of
looking after his household, and of procuring whatever is necessary for
these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:33) that "he that
is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may
please his wife; and he is divided. " Hence the "monk" takes his name
from "unity" [*The Greek {monos}] in contrast with this division. For
this reason the Church cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the
religious profession; and the reason assigned by the Decretal is
because "chastity is bound up with the monastic rule. "
Reply to Objection 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be
obviated by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use.
Now a professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so
he must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any
human contingency.
Reply to Objection 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of
dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal
abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a vow
of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being an act
of chastity, but because through the religious profession it is already
an act of religion.
Reply to Objection 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the
person, therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger
to the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of
dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly ordered
to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to
abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the
person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the
person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance
by abstinence, or other corporal remedies.
Reply to Objection 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more
absolved from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since
he must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the
dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither is
he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he is
not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a
monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of obedience.
The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary
sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of
the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency, which
is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares (De
Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a continent
soul," not "of a continent body. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the
dispensation of a vow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not
required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may
enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by
entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world,
even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap.
Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt. ]. Therefore the commutation or
dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior
prelate.
Objection 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in
deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the
prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does
not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a
dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows,
as stated above (A[10], ad 2; A[11]). Likewise, when anyone rightly
determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be
kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it
have an evil result (A[2], ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a prelate
is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.
Objection 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant
dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all
prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow.
Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense from
vows.
On the contrary, A vow binds one to do something, even as a law does.
Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation from a
precept of the law, as stated above ([3071]FS, Q[96], A[6]; [3072]FS,
Q[97], A[4]). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from
a vow.
I answer that, As stated above ([3073]AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made
to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise something
to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what you
promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place.
Therefore
a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a
prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God,
according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For . . . have pardoned . . . for your sakes
. . . in the person of Christ. " And he says significantly "for your
sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a dispensation we should do
so to honor Christ in Whose person he dispenses, or to promote the
interests of the Church which is His Body.
Reply to Objection 1: All other vows are about some particular works,
whereas by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's
service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a
Decretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt. ] says that "a man
is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the
perpetual service of religion. " And yet a man who enters religion is
not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the
like, which he made when in the world, because by entering religion he
dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life
that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden
of religion is onerous enough without requiring the addition of other
burdens.
Reply to Objection 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from
vows at their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a
condition that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated
above [3074](A[8]) that the vow of a subject, e. g. of a slave or a son,
supposes this condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does
not dissent. " And thus a subject might break his vow without any
remorse of conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.
But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual
prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given "unto
edification, not for destruction" (2 Cor. 10:8), and consequently, just
as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to God,
namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleasing to
God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking man can vow
them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide what is the more
virtuous and the more acceptable to God. Consequently in matters
presenting no difficulty, the prelate's dispensation would not excuse
one from sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense a person from
a vow to enter the religious life, without any apparent cause to
prevent him from fulfilling his vow. But if some cause were to appear,
giving rise, at least, to doubt, he could hold to the prelate's
decision whether of commutation or of dispensation. He could not,
however, follow his own judgment in the matter, because he does not
stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case when the thing he
has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse to the
prelate.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of
Christ throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of
dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and
inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those vows
that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in order
that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows of
pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin. , de Voto et Voti redempt. ), fasting and
the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the
Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa].
__________________________________________________________________
OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something
Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or the Name of
God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the
Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name we shall treat
now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of
oath in order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly, by way of
adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of invocation
for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of
oaths: and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is an oath?
(2) Whether it is lawful?
(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?
(4) Of what virtue is it an act?
(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as
something useful and good?
(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?
(7) Whether an oath is binding?
(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?
(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?
(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?
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Whether to swear is to call God to witness?
Objection 1: It would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness.
Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to witness, since
it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to
call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would
swear. But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false also.
Objection 2: Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling
him to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it
is written (Mat. 5:33): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to
the Lord"; and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear [jurare] is
"to pay the right [jus reddere] of truth to God. " Therefore to swear is
not to call God to witness.
Objection 3: Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a
witness, as shown above (QQ[67],70). Now sometimes a man, by swearing,
implores the Divine judgment, according to Ps. 7:5, "If I have rendered
to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my
enemies. " Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm. clxxx):
"When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that God is his
witness? "
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths are taken for the
purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive
confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known
naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts
regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore
propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by
witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such matters
for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, for many
give way to lying, according to Ps. 16:10, "Their mouth hath spoken
lies [Vulg. : 'proudly']. " Secondly, on account of this lack of
knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret thoughts,
nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things, and our
everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about them.
Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither can
God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is
named "jurare" [to swear] because it is established as though it were a
principle of law [jure] that what a man asserts under the invocation of
God as His witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is
called to witness when we assert present or past events, and this is
termed a "declaratory oath"; while sometimes God is called to witness
in confirmation of something future, and this is termed a "promissory
oath. " But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary
matters, and such as come under the investigation of reason; for it
would seem absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's
point by an oath.
Reply to Objection 1: It is one thing to employ a Divine witness
already given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and
another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he
performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he
calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal
knowledge and unerring truth.
Reply to Objection 3: A person is called to give witness, in order that
he may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two
ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or
not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward
inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what
was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness, and
then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar He
makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple
contestation of God, as when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I
speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as
Augustine states [*See argument On the contrary]; the other is by
cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to
punishment if what is alleged be not true.
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Whether it is lawful to swear?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing
forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden (Mat.
5:34), "But I say to you not to swear at all"; and (James 5:12), "Above
all things, my brethren, swear not. " Therefore swearing is unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful,
because according to Mat. 7:18, "neither can an evil tree bring forth
good fruit. " Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Mat.
5:37): "But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which is
over and above these is of evil. " Therefore swearing is apparently
unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt
God, and this is altogether unlawful, according to Dt. 6:16, "Thou
shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. " Now he that swears seems to seek a
sign of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this
must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is
altogether unlawful.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord
thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name. "
I answer that, Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet
becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly:
thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it
"unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" (1 Cor. 11:29).
Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that
an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is proved from its
origin and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes its
introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses
unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and
from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to
put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16).
Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it,
that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if a man
calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would seemingly
prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he would not
treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of
committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, according to
James 3:2, "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man. "
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:9): "Let not thy mouth be
accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls. "
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome, commenting on Mat. 5:34, says: "Observe
that our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and
earth. For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of
swearing by the elements. " Yet this answer does not suffice, because
James adds, "nor by any other oath. " Wherefore we must reply that, as
Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath in
his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say to
you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear
easily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from
swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swore
only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids hasty
words. "
Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i.
17): "If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the
infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an
evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is
evil,' but 'is of evil. ' For you do no evil; since you make good use of
swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes of
the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to swear. "
Reply to Objection 3: He who swears tempts not God, because it is not
without usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine
assistance. Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be
unwilling to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear
witness at some future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden
things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts" (1
Cor. 4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither
for nor against him.
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Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned,
namely, justice, judgment, and truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are
unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things
should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other.
Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a part of
justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment is
an act of justice, as stated above ([3075]Q[60], A[1]). Therefore the
three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably assigned.
Objection 2: Further, many other things are required for an oath,
namely, devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all
things and cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath
are insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed:
since he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without
judgment, according to 1 Tim. 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice,"
i. e. without previous judgment [*Vulg. : 'Observe these things without
prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side. ']. Therefore
these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with
other human actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As the
Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which words
Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be accompanied by
these conditions, truth, judgment and justice. "
I answer that, As stated above [3076](A[2]), an oath is not good except
for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for
the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous, but
for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires judgment or
discretion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards
the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor
unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that one employ an oath in
order to confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm what is
lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a
wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.
Reply to Objection 1: Judgment does not signify here the execution of
justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is truth
here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of
speech.
Reply to Objection 2: Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for
the right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two
regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that
justice regards the reason for swearing.
Reply to Objection 3: There is great danger in swearing, both on
account of the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and
on account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are
confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an
oath than for other human actions.
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Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria?
Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or
latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths
are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers nothing
to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an
act of religion or latria.
Objection 3: Further, the end of religion or latria is to show
reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the
confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of
religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord
thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His name. "
Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is
an act of religion.
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above [3077](A[1]),
he that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says.
Now nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more
powerful. Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he
acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth
and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to
God. For this reason the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16) that "men swear by
one greater than themselves," and Jerome commenting on Mat. 5:34, says
that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he
swears. " The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that "to swear is
to give very great honor. " Now to show reverence to God belongs to
religion or latria. wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of
religion or latria.
Reply to Objection 1: Two things may be observed in an oath. The
witness adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or
that which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human.
Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and
not of the latter.
Reply to Objection 2: In the very fact that a man takes God as witness
by way of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains
to the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God,
namely, reverence and honor.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of
God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man,
we show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in
God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God
also works for His own glory and for our good.
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Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful
and good?
Objection 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used
frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of
religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to
do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above
([3078]Q[88], A[5]). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a
thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are
desirable as being good essentially.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat. 5:34, says that "he
who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears.
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Whether those who are subject to another's power are hindered from taking
vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's
power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed
by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a
lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God.
Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered
from taking vows.
Objection 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet
children may make religious profession even without the consent of
their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through
being subject to another's power.
Objection 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who
are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to
say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore
seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.
Objection 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But
subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this
forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
On the contrary, It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow any
thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age,"
she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is
said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in
like manner other persons that are subject to another's power cannot
bind themselves by vow.
I answer that, As stated above [3061](A[1]), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in
another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power.
Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is
subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it
depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent of
his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters
wherein he is subject to another.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject
of a promise made to God, as stated above [3062](A[2]). Now it is
contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to
another, as stated above (Q[86], A[3]). Hence the conditions necessary
for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's
power vows that which is in that other's power, except under the
condition that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.
Reply to Objection 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman
he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for
instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or
with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as
regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he
cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his
father.
A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his
personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since
this would withdraw him from his master's service.
Reply to Objection 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his
actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even
though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not
being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is
no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a
religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does
the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent;
nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to
another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom
he is subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood
to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his
superior approve or do not gainsay it.
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Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow
to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, it is
fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. But
this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore
just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow,
so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves by vow to enter
religion.
Objection 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be
annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or girl
before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian
(20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl cannot
validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.
Objection 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch.
58] and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to
those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation
of the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation,
for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.
On the contrary, That which is not done aright is invalid without being
annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even before
attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her
parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before
attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a
vow to enter religion.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said above
[3063](A[7]), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as
stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a
spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of
the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation.
Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind,
whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an
obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defect
of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by
vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or imbecility.
Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to another's power,
as stated above [3064](A[8]). Now these two circumstances concur in
children before the age of puberty, because in most instances they are
lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the care of their
parents, or guardians in place of their parents: wherefore in both
events their vows are without force. It happens, however, through a
natural disposition which is not subject to human laws, that the use of
reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said
to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, exempt
in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to
human law, which takes into account that which is of most frequent
occurrence.
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the
years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise
bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of
reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own
part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by their
parents, under whose care they are still subject.
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of
puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account of
the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt.
ad Relig. ] which considers the majority of cases. But after the years
of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious
vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in the case of children who
have not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are
invalid, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power
contain an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the
superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be
fulfilled, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows
which are taken in profession.
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Whether vows admit of dispensation?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation.
It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it.
But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9,10, "A beast that
may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and
cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a
better. " Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.
Objection 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters
concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those
of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which
is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a
matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as shown
above [3065](A[3]), and belongs to the precepts of the First Table
since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of
dispensation.
Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity
which a man owes to God, as stated above [3066](A[3]). But no man can
dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one
grant a dispensation from a vow.
On the contrary, That which proceeds from the common will of many has
apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the
individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force
from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it
seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same
sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, as
stated above ([3067]FS, Q[96], A[6]; [3068]FS, Q[97], A[4]), a law is
made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances.
But since, in certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone
to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be observed.
This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a dispensation
would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or application of some
common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a
person is said to dispense food to a household.
In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it
were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the
majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular
case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good:
and this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow,
as is clear from what has been said above [3069](A[2]). Therefore it is
necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is not to be
observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular vow is not
to be observed, this is called a "dispensation" from that vow; but if
some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was to have been
observed, the vow is said to be "commuted. " Hence it is less to commute
a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however, are in the power of
the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was
deemed holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow,
being, as it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason
it could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for
something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be already
consecrated, e. g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an animal
that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful matter of a
sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even
so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has intervened.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine
precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to
obey the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed
from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that
human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the Divine
command; but it amounts to this---that what was law is not law in this
particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that
which was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so
contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and such a
thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently when an
ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a vow, he does not
dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the Divine
law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to which a man had bound
himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every
circumstance.
Reply to Objection 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require that
we fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which
would be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation
from that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not
contrary to the fidelity due to God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a
solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a
dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But
a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle to a
greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the good of
an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to the good
of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if certain
persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of their
country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be
dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency.
Objection 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than
chastity. Now if a man vows an act of religion, e. g. to offer sacrifice
to God he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he
be dispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of
chastity.
Objection 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may
be a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a
vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be
dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body.
Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of
continency.
Objection 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the
religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the
vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed from
the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who are
appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems that it
is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of
a continent soul. "
Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach. ) at the end of the Decretal, Cum ad
Monasterium it is stated that the "renouncing of property, like the
keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that not
even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance. "
I answer that, Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of
continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency; secondly,
the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds himself by vow
to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the solemnity of the
vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III. vii. 1, qu.
5] say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter of dispensation, on
account of the continency itself for which no worthy price can be
found, as is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for this
is assigned by some to the fact that by continency man overcomes a foe
within himself, or to the fact that by continency man is perfectly
conformed to Christ in respect of purity of both body and soul. But
this reason does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the soul,
such as contemplation and prayer, far surpass the goods of the body and
still more conform us to God, and yet one may be dispensed from a vow
of prayer or contemplation. Therefore, continency itself absolutely
considered seems no reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a
matter of dispensation; especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor.
7:34) exhorts us to be continent on account of contemplation, when he
says that the unmarried woman . . . "thinketh on the things of God
[Vulg. : 'the Lord']," and since the end is of more account than the
means.
Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the reason
for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For they
assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by something
altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any vow. But this
is evidently false, because just as the practice of carnal intercourse
is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary
to abstinence from such things, and yet these latter vows may be a
matter for dispensation.
For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain
that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for the
sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the example
given above (OBJ[1]), of a country being restored to peace through a
certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal quoted says
explicitly that "not even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a monk
from keeping chastity," it follows seemingly, that we must maintain
that, as stated above (A[10], ad 1; cf. Lev. 27:9, 10, 28), whatsoever
has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to any other use.
For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose
its consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, for
instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated, so long as it
remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate make a man that is
consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so long as he lives. Now
the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of consecration or blessing
of the person who takes the vow, as stated above [3070](A[7]). Hence no
prelate of the Church can make a man, who has pronounced a solemn vow,
to be quit of that to which he was consecrated, e. g. one who is a
priest, to be a priest no more, although a prelate may, for some
particular reason, inhibit him from exercising his order. In like
manner the Pope cannot make a man who has made his religious profession
cease to be a religious, although certain jurists have ignorantly held
the contrary.
We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up
with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. because if not, the
solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of
continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that for
which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing continency
is connected with Holy orders, not essentially but by the institution
of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can grant a
dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the reception of
Holy Orders. on the other hand the obligation of observing; continency
is an essential condition of the religious state, whereby a man
renounces the world and binds himself wholly to God's service, for this
is incompatible with matrimony, in which state a man is under the
obligation of taking to himself a wife, of begetting children, of
looking after his household, and of procuring whatever is necessary for
these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:33) that "he that
is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may
please his wife; and he is divided. " Hence the "monk" takes his name
from "unity" [*The Greek {monos}] in contrast with this division. For
this reason the Church cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the
religious profession; and the reason assigned by the Decretal is
because "chastity is bound up with the monastic rule. "
Reply to Objection 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be
obviated by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use.
Now a professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so
he must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any
human contingency.
Reply to Objection 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of
dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal
abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a vow
of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being an act
of chastity, but because through the religious profession it is already
an act of religion.
Reply to Objection 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the
person, therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger
to the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of
dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly ordered
to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to
abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the
person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the
person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance
by abstinence, or other corporal remedies.
Reply to Objection 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more
absolved from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since
he must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the
dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither is
he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he is
not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a
monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of obedience.
The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary
sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of
the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency, which
is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares (De
Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a continent
soul," not "of a continent body. "
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Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the
dispensation of a vow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not
required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may
enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by
entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world,
even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap.
Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt. ]. Therefore the commutation or
dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior
prelate.
Objection 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in
deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the
prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does
not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a
dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows,
as stated above (A[10], ad 2; A[11]). Likewise, when anyone rightly
determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be
kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it
have an evil result (A[2], ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a prelate
is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.
Objection 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant
dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all
prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow.
Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense from
vows.
On the contrary, A vow binds one to do something, even as a law does.
Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation from a
precept of the law, as stated above ([3071]FS, Q[96], A[6]; [3072]FS,
Q[97], A[4]). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from
a vow.
I answer that, As stated above ([3073]AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made
to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise something
to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what you
promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place.
Therefore
a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a
prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God,
according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For . . . have pardoned . . . for your sakes
. . . in the person of Christ. " And he says significantly "for your
sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a dispensation we should do
so to honor Christ in Whose person he dispenses, or to promote the
interests of the Church which is His Body.
Reply to Objection 1: All other vows are about some particular works,
whereas by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's
service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a
Decretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt. ] says that "a man
is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the
perpetual service of religion. " And yet a man who enters religion is
not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the
like, which he made when in the world, because by entering religion he
dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life
that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden
of religion is onerous enough without requiring the addition of other
burdens.
Reply to Objection 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from
vows at their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a
condition that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated
above [3074](A[8]) that the vow of a subject, e. g. of a slave or a son,
supposes this condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does
not dissent. " And thus a subject might break his vow without any
remorse of conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.
But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual
prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given "unto
edification, not for destruction" (2 Cor. 10:8), and consequently, just
as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to God,
namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleasing to
God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking man can vow
them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide what is the more
virtuous and the more acceptable to God. Consequently in matters
presenting no difficulty, the prelate's dispensation would not excuse
one from sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense a person from
a vow to enter the religious life, without any apparent cause to
prevent him from fulfilling his vow. But if some cause were to appear,
giving rise, at least, to doubt, he could hold to the prelate's
decision whether of commutation or of dispensation. He could not,
however, follow his own judgment in the matter, because he does not
stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case when the thing he
has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse to the
prelate.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of
Christ throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of
dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and
inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those vows
that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in order
that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows of
pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin. , de Voto et Voti redempt. ), fasting and
the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the
Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa].
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OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something
Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or the Name of
God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the
Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name we shall treat
now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of
oath in order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly, by way of
adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of invocation
for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of
oaths: and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is an oath?
(2) Whether it is lawful?
(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?
(4) Of what virtue is it an act?
(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as
something useful and good?
(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?
(7) Whether an oath is binding?
(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?
(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?
(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?
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Whether to swear is to call God to witness?
Objection 1: It would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness.
Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to witness, since
it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to
call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would
swear. But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false also.
Objection 2: Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling
him to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it
is written (Mat. 5:33): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to
the Lord"; and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear [jurare] is
"to pay the right [jus reddere] of truth to God. " Therefore to swear is
not to call God to witness.
Objection 3: Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a
witness, as shown above (QQ[67],70). Now sometimes a man, by swearing,
implores the Divine judgment, according to Ps. 7:5, "If I have rendered
to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my
enemies. " Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm. clxxx):
"When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that God is his
witness? "
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths are taken for the
purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive
confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known
naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts
regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore
propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by
witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such matters
for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, for many
give way to lying, according to Ps. 16:10, "Their mouth hath spoken
lies [Vulg. : 'proudly']. " Secondly, on account of this lack of
knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret thoughts,
nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things, and our
everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about them.
Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither can
God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is
named "jurare" [to swear] because it is established as though it were a
principle of law [jure] that what a man asserts under the invocation of
God as His witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is
called to witness when we assert present or past events, and this is
termed a "declaratory oath"; while sometimes God is called to witness
in confirmation of something future, and this is termed a "promissory
oath. " But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary
matters, and such as come under the investigation of reason; for it
would seem absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's
point by an oath.
Reply to Objection 1: It is one thing to employ a Divine witness
already given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and
another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he
performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he
calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal
knowledge and unerring truth.
Reply to Objection 3: A person is called to give witness, in order that
he may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two
ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or
not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward
inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what
was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness, and
then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar He
makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple
contestation of God, as when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I
speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as
Augustine states [*See argument On the contrary]; the other is by
cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to
punishment if what is alleged be not true.
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Whether it is lawful to swear?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing
forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden (Mat.
5:34), "But I say to you not to swear at all"; and (James 5:12), "Above
all things, my brethren, swear not. " Therefore swearing is unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful,
because according to Mat. 7:18, "neither can an evil tree bring forth
good fruit. " Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Mat.
5:37): "But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which is
over and above these is of evil. " Therefore swearing is apparently
unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt
God, and this is altogether unlawful, according to Dt. 6:16, "Thou
shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. " Now he that swears seems to seek a
sign of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this
must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is
altogether unlawful.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord
thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name. "
I answer that, Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet
becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly:
thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it
"unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" (1 Cor. 11:29).
Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that
an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is proved from its
origin and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes its
introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses
unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and
from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to
put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16).
Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it,
that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if a man
calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would seemingly
prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he would not
treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of
committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, according to
James 3:2, "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man. "
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:9): "Let not thy mouth be
accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls. "
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome, commenting on Mat. 5:34, says: "Observe
that our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and
earth. For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of
swearing by the elements. " Yet this answer does not suffice, because
James adds, "nor by any other oath. " Wherefore we must reply that, as
Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath in
his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say to
you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear
easily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from
swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swore
only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids hasty
words. "
Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i.
17): "If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the
infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an
evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is
evil,' but 'is of evil. ' For you do no evil; since you make good use of
swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes of
the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to swear. "
Reply to Objection 3: He who swears tempts not God, because it is not
without usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine
assistance. Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be
unwilling to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear
witness at some future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden
things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts" (1
Cor. 4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither
for nor against him.
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Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned,
namely, justice, judgment, and truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are
unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things
should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other.
Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a part of
justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment is
an act of justice, as stated above ([3075]Q[60], A[1]). Therefore the
three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably assigned.
Objection 2: Further, many other things are required for an oath,
namely, devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all
things and cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath
are insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed:
since he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without
judgment, according to 1 Tim. 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice,"
i. e. without previous judgment [*Vulg. : 'Observe these things without
prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side. ']. Therefore
these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with
other human actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As the
Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which words
Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be accompanied by
these conditions, truth, judgment and justice. "
I answer that, As stated above [3076](A[2]), an oath is not good except
for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for
the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous, but
for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires judgment or
discretion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards
the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor
unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that one employ an oath in
order to confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm what is
lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a
wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.
Reply to Objection 1: Judgment does not signify here the execution of
justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is truth
here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of
speech.
Reply to Objection 2: Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for
the right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two
regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that
justice regards the reason for swearing.
Reply to Objection 3: There is great danger in swearing, both on
account of the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and
on account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are
confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an
oath than for other human actions.
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Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria?
Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or
latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths
are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers nothing
to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an
act of religion or latria.
Objection 3: Further, the end of religion or latria is to show
reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the
confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of
religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord
thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His name. "
Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is
an act of religion.
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above [3077](A[1]),
he that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says.
Now nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more
powerful. Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he
acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth
and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to
God. For this reason the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16) that "men swear by
one greater than themselves," and Jerome commenting on Mat. 5:34, says
that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he
swears. " The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that "to swear is
to give very great honor. " Now to show reverence to God belongs to
religion or latria. wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of
religion or latria.
Reply to Objection 1: Two things may be observed in an oath. The
witness adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or
that which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human.
Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and
not of the latter.
Reply to Objection 2: In the very fact that a man takes God as witness
by way of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains
to the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God,
namely, reverence and honor.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of
God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man,
we show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in
God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God
also works for His own glory and for our good.
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Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful
and good?
Objection 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used
frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of
religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to
do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above
([3078]Q[88], A[5]). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a
thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are
desirable as being good essentially.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat. 5:34, says that "he
who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears.
