An
objection
of the Vaisesikas.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
23c
Buddhadeva is perhaps the master named on the lion inscription of Mathura.
147. Thus (1) the organs are not primary matter, not being "solid," etc. ; (2) tangible things include primary matter, since a solid is perceived by touch; and (3) secondary matter perceived by the other organs is not perceived by touch.
148. See ii. 5. The first four dhdtus (earth . . . wind) are "radical substances," because the organs arise from these dhdtus; the vijndnadhatu or manodhdtu is a "root," because it gives rise to manahsparsayatana. Or rather the first four dhdtus are roots because they give rise to secondary matter; the vijfidnadhdtu is a root because it gives rise to mental states {caitta, caitasika).
149. Thus the first five "supports of contact," the five organs of sense consciousness, are "secondary matter:" otherwise, they would be included in the definition: "A person is made up of the six dhdtus. "
150. According to the Abhidhamma (Dhammasarigani, 647), derived rupa is not tangible. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 352cl) refutes this opinion which he attributes to the Sthavira. On this subject see the Introduction for a discussion of the authenticity of the Sutras.
151. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 391c6.
151. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 689c5 and foil
153. This is the etymology vipacyata iti vipdkah; the vipdka is what has become ripe. 154. This is the etymology vipdka = vipakti.
155. It appears that this is the opinion of Dharmatrata 145 (TD 28, number 1552).
156. Let us consider one moment or state of existence of this subtle matter which is the organ of sight. One part of this matter is retribution of a former action; another part proceeds from food: all this matter is the outflowing result of a previous moment or state in the existence of the eye. But this previous moment or state is not, in and of itself, capable of generating the present moment: in faa, at death, the organ of sight ceases producing itself through outflowing. Thus by
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definition the organ of sight is not an outflowing. But consider, on the contrary, the flesh that constitutes the body: it persists after death; it is thus an outflowing, the result, in each of the moments of its existence, of the previous moment.
The Kathavatthu, xii,4, xvi. 8, does not hold that matter is retribution.
157. Nine reason are enumerated in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 612c. Vasubandhu quotes the third
158. The Vatslputriyas and the Vibhajyavadins maintain that sound is retribution.
159. Compare Digha, iii. 173, quoted by the Mahasamghikas in the Kathdvatthu, xii. 3: saddo vipdko.
160. See Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 823a20, p. 449al6, and Dharmatrata, TD 29, p. 396c20. These passages are discussed by Fa-pao in his Shu, TD 41, p. 502al8 and following.
161. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 714a7 and foil. The difference between internal {ddhydtmika) dharmas and external {bdhya) dharmas is threefold: 1. difference from the point of view of the series (samtdna): the dharmas that are to be found in the person himself {svdtmabhdva) are internal; those that are to be found within another, and also those which are not integral to living beings (asattvdkhya, i. l0b), are external; 2. difference from the point of view of the dyatanas: the dyatanas which are the support (dsraya) of the mind and mental states are internal; those which are objects (dlambana) are external; 3. difference from the point of view of living beings: the dharmas integral to living beings are internal; the others are external.
162. See Uddnavarga, xxiii; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 354; Dhammapada, 160.
163. Prakarana, TD 26, p. 699a3-28.
164. Vibhdsd {TD 27, p. 368a21): The organ that has seen, now sees or shall see rupa, and its tatsabhaga (that is to say the organ which resembles this organ) is the caksurdhdtu. The organ which has seen is past caksurdhdtu; the organ which now sees is present caksurdhdtu; and the organ that shall see is future caksurdhdtu. As for tatsabhaga, the masters of this land say that it is of four types: the past, present, and future tatsabhaga eye is the caksurdhdtu which has perished, is now perishing, or shall perish without having seen the rupa; one should add, as a fourth, the caksurdhdtu which absolutely will not arise.
Foreign (bahirdesaka) masters say that it is of five types: past, present, future, as above. Further, future caksurdhdtu which absolutely will not arise, is of two types, accordingly as it is, or is not, associated with the consciousness.
165. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 368bl3. Three opinions. Can one see rupa by means of the eye of another? Who maintains such an opinion? If one cannot see by means of the eye of another, how can the eye of a certain being be called sabhdga through relationship with other beings? Because the activity of the eye is definite: this activity consists of seeing. When the eye, after having been active, has perished, it is called sabhdga: neither for the person himself, nor for another, does this name sabhdga change. In this same way . . .
166. By explaning bhdga in the passive, bhajyata iti bhdgah.
167. The eye that perishes without having seen is similar to the eye that sees, etc
The Madhyamikas (Vrtti, p. 32 and the note that should be corrected) make the best of this
theory: "In reality, the sabhdga eye does not see visible things, because it is an organ, exactly like tatsabhaga:" na paramdrthatah sabhdgam caksuh pasyati rilpdni, caksurinidriyatvat, tadyathdtatsabhdgam.
168. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 265cb. The same problem is examined in the Vibhanga, pp. 12, 16, 97, and the Dhammasangani, 1002, 1007,1008.
? 169. On the quality oiprthagjana, ii. 40c, vi. 26a, 28c-d In Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 231cl3-23, divergent explanations of Vasumitra, the Bhadanta, and Ghosaka.
170. See ii. 13, iv. lla-b.
171. We shall see that the first stage is dnantaryamdrga, "the path which destroys the defilements;" the second stage is vimuktimdrga, "the path of deliverence," the path in which the defilements are destroyed (vi. 28).
172. Dhi in place of prajftd, for prosodical reasons (ii. 57d).
173. See Nydyabindutikdfippani, p. 26; Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, p. 520; Atthasdlim, p. 400; Warren (Visuddhimagga), p. 207; Buddhist Psychology, p. 351, note; Spence Hardy, Manual, p. 419. Kathdvatthu, sviii. 9, where the thesis "the eye sees" is attributed to the Mahasarhghikas. Compare Samayabheda, Wassilief, p. 262. Wassilief summarizes the discussion of the Kofa, p. 308
(Read: "das Auge nichtdas Mass des Sichtbarensieht," and not "ist").
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 489bl4: According to another opinion, all the samskrtas are, by their
nature, view (drsti). View means the manifested characteristic of its manner of being (patupracdra). All the samskrtas possess this characteristic. Some others say that the conscious- ness of the supression of the defilements and of non-production (ksaydnutpddajndna, vii. l) is view. Vibhdsd,TD 27. p. 61c and foil. : Dharmatrata says that the visual consciousness {caksurvijfidna) sees visible things. Ghosaka says that the prajnd associated with visual consciousness sees visible things. The Darstantikas say that the "complex" (sdmagrf) sees visible things. The Vatsiputriyas say that one eye alone sees visible things . . . If the visual consciousness sees visible things, then consciousness would have view for its characteristic; now this is not the case: thus this opinion is false. If the prajnd associated with visual consciousness sees visible things, then the prajnd associated with the consciousness of hearing would understand sounds; now prajnd does not have hearing for its characteristic: thus this opinion is false. If the "complex" sees visible things, then one would always see visible things, for the "complex" is always present. If one eye, not the two eyes, sees visible things, then parts of the body would not feel tangibles at one and the same time: in the same way that the two arms, however distant they may be from each other, can simultaneously feel tangible things and produce a single tactile consciousness, in this way what obstacle is there to the two eyes, however distant they may be from each other, simultaneously seeing and producing a single visual consciousness?
174. This is the thesis of the Bhadanta {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 63b23, cl2).
175. caksusd rupdni drstvd. . . quoted iii. 32d. Samyukta, TD 1, p. 87c26, p. 88a; Vibhanga, p. 381; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 137; Dhammasangani, 597. This is the argument of the Mahasamghikas, Kathdvatthu, xviii. 9-
176. Compare the formula: tasyaivam jdnata evam pasyatah.
111. Vydkhyd: vijndnam tu sdmnidhyamdtrenti nd/rayabhdvayogeneti dariayati / yathd suryo divasakara iti/yathd sdmnidhyamdtrena suryo divasam karotUy ucyate tathd vijndnam vijdnatity ucyate / kasmdt /loke tathd siddhatvdt.
178. Or rather: "One should not reject expressions in worldly use for the reason that they do not correspond to realities. " janapadaniruktim ndbhiniveseta samjnam, ca lokasya ndtidhavet. {Madhyama TD 1, p. 703a2, Samyukta, 13. 12). Compare Majjhima, iii. 230: janapadaniruttim ndbhiniveseyya samannam ndtidhdveyya; Samyutta, iv. 230: yam ca sdmam ndtam ca atidhdvanti,
yam ca loke saccasammatam tarn ca atidhdvanti. Itivuttaka, 49.
179. According to the Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 919c27; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 62bL Against the Vatslputrlyas. See above note 173, at the end.
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180. Argument of Vasubandhu, Paficavastuka, i. 10.
181. Compare Atthasdtint, 629.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 63bl4 and foil: One says that the object is attained (prdpta) in a twofold
sense: either because it is "grasped as object" or "perceived;" or because there is a juxtaposition (nirantaratva) of the object and the organ. In the first sense, the six organs attain the object. In the second sense, only three organs--the organs of smell, taste and touch,--attain the object; but on the contrary, three organs, the organs of sight and hearing and the mental organ, perceive without attaining.
The organ of sight preceives visible things by reason of light; when a visible thing is close to the organ, it hinders the light: the organ does not see. The organ of hearing perceives sound by reason of space or the void; when a sound is close to the organ, it does not hinder the void: the organ hears . . . The organ of smell perceives by reason of the wind; the organ of taste, by reason of water; the organ of touch, by reason of the earth; and the mental organ, by reason of the aa of attention (manaskdra).
Fa-pao (see TD 41, p. 508al9 and foil) observes that the rupa of the moon does not leave the moon in order to juxtapose itself on the eye.
Compare Aryadeva, Sataka, 288. 182.
An objection of the Vaisesikas.
183. This doctrine is refuted by Sarhghabhadra (TD 29, p. 370bl2 and foil); Shen-t'ai attributes it to the Sammitfyas; Fa-pao, to certain masters of the Vibhdsd (TD 41, p. 508bl7).
184. Samghabhadra discusses this thesis (TD 29, p. 370b23 and folL).
185. Here and below (the definition of Bhadanta, p. 106), our Tibetan version translates nirantara by 'dab chags pa. But the Tibetan Siddhantas analyzed by Wassilief (p. 307) oppose the nirantara of the Bhadanta (bar medpa) to the nirantara of the other masters ('dab chags pa).
According to the Bodhicaiyavatara, p. 516, the organ and its object cannot be either separated (savyavadhdna, santara) or contiguous (nirantara).
186. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 371c7): What is the meaning of "to attain? " When an object arises in proximity to an organ, this latter grasps it. Thus one can say that smell, taste, and touch grasp the objects that they attain; in the same way one says that the organ of sight does not see eyelids, eye-lashes and the other visible matter that it attains. The eyelid does not touch the organ of sight: one says nevertheless that the organ attains it. From the fact that the eyelid arises in proximity to the organ, one says that this latter attains it. As the organ of sight does not see the visible matter thus attained, one says that the organ of sight grasps without attaining, not by attaining; moreover it does not grasp a very distant object. In this same way, even though smell grasps the object that it attains, it does not grasp what is very close.
187. Compare the Vimsaka of Vasubandhu, 12-14; Bodhicaiyavatara, p. 503; Prafastapdday p. 43, etc.
188. According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 683c24: Do the atoms touch one another? They do not touch one another; if they touch one another, they touch one another in either their totality or partially. If they touch one another in their totality, they form but one single thing; if they partially touch one another they would thus have parts. And atoms do not have parts.
How is it that agglomerations, striking against one another, do not fall to pieces? They do not fall to pieces because vdyudhdtu holds them together.
But does not vayudhdtu fall to pieces? Sometimes it falls to pieces, for example at the end of the cosmic period. Sometimes it holds together, for example at the beginning of the cosmic period.
? If atoms do not touch one another, how can striking produce sound? Sound is produced for this very reason. For, if the atoms were to touch one another, how could there be the production of sound? If atoms touch one another, the hand and the body that it strikes would mix with one another, and there would be not free space, and how could sound arise? Vasumitra says: "Atoms do not touch one another: if they touch one another, they would thus last for a second moment. " The Bhadanta says: There is no real contact; it is through acquiescense to popular truth that one say that there is contaa when atoms arise in a union without interval (nirantara).
Does the thing in contact arise having for its case a thing in contaa . . .
189. They should have arisen (first moment) in order to touch one another (second moment).
190. Vasubandhu believes that the Bhadanta understands "juxtaposition without interval" in the sense that atoms do not allow any intermediate space bewteen them. Samghabhadra is of a different opinion.
191. For Vasubandhu, atoms are immediately juxtaposed; nevertheless they do not mix one with another, for being impenetrable, they remain distinct in spite of their contiguity. See p. 70.
Here are the essentials of Samghadra's explanations.
Nyayanusara, (TD 29, p. 372bl2): The Bhadanta nevertheless says: "Atoms do not touch one another; but one says, by metaphor, that they touch one another, because they are juxtaposed without interval" (nirantara). The Sautrantika (that is, Vasubandhu), indicating that that is the best theory, says: "This doarine is the best; otherwise, the atoms would present some intermediate space (sdntara) between them; since' these intermediate spaces are empty, what would hinder the atoms from going (one towards the other)? One admits that they are impenetrable (sapratigha). " This theory of the Bhadanta can neither be approved nor aiticized; one should solely examine how there can be any absence of an intermediate space without there being contaa: since this is not explicit, this theory is difficult to understand. If one says that atoms absolutely are without any intermediate space between them, and yet are not mixed one with another, they must have parts: a false opinion. Otherwise, if nirantara signifies "without interval" (anantara), how is it that the atoms do not touch one another? Consequently, the word nirantara signifies "close. " The prefix nis signifies "certitude. " As there is certainly an interval, the atoms are nirantara, "possessing intervals:" the same way as nirdahati, "he burns. " Or rather the prefix nis signifies "absence. " The atoms are called "without interposition" (nirantara), because there is not any rupa of contaa (sprspa) of the dimension of a atom between them. When the atoms of the primary elements arise close to one another, without "interposition," they are said, by metaphor, to touch one another. We approve the understanding of the Bhadanta thusly . . .
192. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 372c5) reproduces this paragraph (The Sautrantika says: 'If you admit. . . ), and following: "This is not correa. 'To have parts' and 'to be spatially divided' are two expressions of the same idea. When one says that 'an atom does not have any parts,' one says in faa that it is foreign to all spatial division. How can you be in doubt with respea to this point and still say: 'If you admit spatial division . . . ? ' Since the atoms are foreign to this division, how can they touch one another? We have explained that contaa can only be total or partial; thus the atom, foreign to any spatial division, cannot enter into contaa. How can you thus say 'If you deny spatial division, there will be no difficulty in the atoms touching one another. ' Thus the atoms are called nirantara, 'not separated,' because there is not any rupa of contaa of the dimension of an atom between them. "
See ii. 22 and the Introduction.
193. According to Vibhdsa TD 27, p. 63cl2.
194. The first opinion is that of the Sarvastivadins.
195. mdldvad avasthita = mandalena samapanktydvasthita.
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196. The text has kila. As a general rule, Vasubandhu uses the word kila when the opinion in question is a wrong opinion of the Vaibhasikas; but here the Vyakhya says: dgamasucandrthah kilasabdah.
197. According to Vibhdsd TD p. 369cl0 and foil.
198. Unconditioned things are eternal because they do not go from one time period to another time period (advasamcdrdbhavdta, v. 25). Asamskfta, nitya, dhruva, (iv. 9) and dravya (i. 38) are synonyms.
199- According to another reading (kecit pathanti): dharmdrdham . . . See Dhammasangani, 661.
200. The Vyakhya quotes the conversation of the Brahmin Jatisrona with the Blessed One: indriydmndriydni bho Gautama ucyante /kati bho Gautama indnydni /kryatd cendriyandm samgraho bhavati . . .
201. The order of the indriyas is justified ii. 6. We have the order of our Sutra in Vibhanga, p. 122, Kathdvatthu, trans, p. 16, Visuddhimaggay xvi; and also in the Indriyaskandhaka (TD 26, p. 991b24), sixth book of the Jndnaprasthana (Takakusu, "Abhidharma Literature," JPTS, 1905, p. 93).
The small treatise of Anuruddha (Compendium, p. 175) follows the same order as the Prakaranapdda.
The Mahavyutpatti (108) places the vital organ at the end.
202. The last three indriyas are made up of (1-3) three sense faculties; (4-8) the five moral faculties; and (9) the mental organ (ii. 4); 1-8 are dharmadhdtu.
? CHAPTER TWO
The Indriyas
v / m . Homage to the Buddha.
We have enumerated the organs or indriyas with regard to the
dhatus (i. 48). What is the meaning of the word indriya?
The root idi signifies paramaisvarya or supreme authority {Dha-
tupdfha, i. 64). Whatever exercises supreme power or authority is called x
an indriya. Thus, in general, indriya signifies adhipati or ruler.
What is the object of the predominating influence of each indriya? .
la. According to the School, five are predominate with regard to
2
things;
i. Each of the five indriyas of which the organ of sight is the first--the five organs of sense consciousness--is a predominating influence (1) with regard to the beauty of the person; (2) with regard to the protection of the person; (3) with regard to the production of a consciousness and the mental states associated with this consciousness; and (4) with regard to their special mode of activity (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 730a29).
The organs of seeing and hearing are predominating influences (1) with regard to beauty, for the body in which they are missing is not beautiful (i. 19); (2) with regard to proteaion, for by seeing and hearing, a person avoids that which would destroy him; (3) with regard to the production of the seeing and hearing consciousnesses, and of the mental states associated with them; and (4) with regard to their special activities, i. e. , seeing visible things and hearing sounds.
The organs of smell, taste, and sensation are predominating influences (1) with regard to beauty, as above; (2) with regard to protection, through the consumption of solid foods (kavadikarahara,
? 154 Chapter Two
iii. 39); (3) with regard to the production of their three conscious- nesses; and (4) with regard to their special aaivities, i. e. , perceiving smells, tasting tastes, and touching tangibles.
lb. Four predominate with regard to two things;
ii. Four indriyas, namely the two sexual organs, the vital organ, and the mental organ are each a predominating influence with regard to two things (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 731bl2; see also b23, b5).
1. The sexual organs are the predominating influence (1) with regard to the distribution of living beings: it is by reason of these two that living beings form the categories of male and female; and (2) with regard to the differentiation of living beings: by reason of these two organs, there are, among the sexes, differences of physical form, voice,
3 and manner of being.
4
Some other masters do not admit this explanation. In fact there
are sexual differences among the gods of Rupadhatu who, however, do not possess sexual organs (i. 30), and their distribution into sexes results from these differences. Thus, if the sexual organs are the predominating influences from two points of view, they are the predominating influences with regard to defilement and purification: in fact, the three types of eunuchs and bisexual beings are alien (1) to the dharmas of defilement, lack of discipline (iv. l3b), mortal transgression (iv. 103), the cutting off of the roots of good (iv. 80); and (2) to the dharmas of purification, discipline (iv. l3b), acquisition of the fruits (vi. 51), and detachment (vairagya, vi. 45c) (see ii. l9c-d).
2. The vital organ is the predominating influence (1) with regard to the "joining" of the nikayasabhaga (ii. 41a), i. e. , that which concerns the arising of an existing thing; and (2) with regard to "maintaining" this nikayasabhdga, i. e. , that which concerns the prolongation of an existing thing from its arising to its extinction.
3. The mental organ is predominate (1) with regard to rebirth, as the Sutra explains, "Then there is produced among the Gandharvas, beings in the intermediate existence, one or the other of two minds, a mind of desire or a mind of hatred . . . " (iii. 15); (2) with regard to domination: the world and the dharmas submit to the mind. As the
? stanza says: "The world is lead by the mind, conducted by the mind:
5
(all dharmas obey this one dharma, the mind. )"
iii. The five indriyas of sensation (i. e. , the five sensations of
pleasure, displeasure, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference; ii. 7,) and the eight indriyas of faith, (force, memory, absorption and discernment (ii. 24) and the three pure faculties, ii. 10)
lc. Five and eight with regard to defilement and to purification.
are, respectively, predominant with regard to defilement and to purification.
Buddhadeva is perhaps the master named on the lion inscription of Mathura.
147. Thus (1) the organs are not primary matter, not being "solid," etc. ; (2) tangible things include primary matter, since a solid is perceived by touch; and (3) secondary matter perceived by the other organs is not perceived by touch.
148. See ii. 5. The first four dhdtus (earth . . . wind) are "radical substances," because the organs arise from these dhdtus; the vijndnadhatu or manodhdtu is a "root," because it gives rise to manahsparsayatana. Or rather the first four dhdtus are roots because they give rise to secondary matter; the vijfidnadhdtu is a root because it gives rise to mental states {caitta, caitasika).
149. Thus the first five "supports of contact," the five organs of sense consciousness, are "secondary matter:" otherwise, they would be included in the definition: "A person is made up of the six dhdtus. "
150. According to the Abhidhamma (Dhammasarigani, 647), derived rupa is not tangible. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 352cl) refutes this opinion which he attributes to the Sthavira. On this subject see the Introduction for a discussion of the authenticity of the Sutras.
151. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 391c6.
151. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 689c5 and foil
153. This is the etymology vipacyata iti vipdkah; the vipdka is what has become ripe. 154. This is the etymology vipdka = vipakti.
155. It appears that this is the opinion of Dharmatrata 145 (TD 28, number 1552).
156. Let us consider one moment or state of existence of this subtle matter which is the organ of sight. One part of this matter is retribution of a former action; another part proceeds from food: all this matter is the outflowing result of a previous moment or state in the existence of the eye. But this previous moment or state is not, in and of itself, capable of generating the present moment: in faa, at death, the organ of sight ceases producing itself through outflowing. Thus by
Footnotes 145
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definition the organ of sight is not an outflowing. But consider, on the contrary, the flesh that constitutes the body: it persists after death; it is thus an outflowing, the result, in each of the moments of its existence, of the previous moment.
The Kathavatthu, xii,4, xvi. 8, does not hold that matter is retribution.
157. Nine reason are enumerated in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 612c. Vasubandhu quotes the third
158. The Vatslputriyas and the Vibhajyavadins maintain that sound is retribution.
159. Compare Digha, iii. 173, quoted by the Mahasamghikas in the Kathdvatthu, xii. 3: saddo vipdko.
160. See Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 823a20, p. 449al6, and Dharmatrata, TD 29, p. 396c20. These passages are discussed by Fa-pao in his Shu, TD 41, p. 502al8 and following.
161. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 714a7 and foil. The difference between internal {ddhydtmika) dharmas and external {bdhya) dharmas is threefold: 1. difference from the point of view of the series (samtdna): the dharmas that are to be found in the person himself {svdtmabhdva) are internal; those that are to be found within another, and also those which are not integral to living beings (asattvdkhya, i. l0b), are external; 2. difference from the point of view of the dyatanas: the dyatanas which are the support (dsraya) of the mind and mental states are internal; those which are objects (dlambana) are external; 3. difference from the point of view of living beings: the dharmas integral to living beings are internal; the others are external.
162. See Uddnavarga, xxiii; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 354; Dhammapada, 160.
163. Prakarana, TD 26, p. 699a3-28.
164. Vibhdsd {TD 27, p. 368a21): The organ that has seen, now sees or shall see rupa, and its tatsabhaga (that is to say the organ which resembles this organ) is the caksurdhdtu. The organ which has seen is past caksurdhdtu; the organ which now sees is present caksurdhdtu; and the organ that shall see is future caksurdhdtu. As for tatsabhaga, the masters of this land say that it is of four types: the past, present, and future tatsabhaga eye is the caksurdhdtu which has perished, is now perishing, or shall perish without having seen the rupa; one should add, as a fourth, the caksurdhdtu which absolutely will not arise.
Foreign (bahirdesaka) masters say that it is of five types: past, present, future, as above. Further, future caksurdhdtu which absolutely will not arise, is of two types, accordingly as it is, or is not, associated with the consciousness.
165. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 368bl3. Three opinions. Can one see rupa by means of the eye of another? Who maintains such an opinion? If one cannot see by means of the eye of another, how can the eye of a certain being be called sabhdga through relationship with other beings? Because the activity of the eye is definite: this activity consists of seeing. When the eye, after having been active, has perished, it is called sabhdga: neither for the person himself, nor for another, does this name sabhdga change. In this same way . . .
166. By explaning bhdga in the passive, bhajyata iti bhdgah.
167. The eye that perishes without having seen is similar to the eye that sees, etc
The Madhyamikas (Vrtti, p. 32 and the note that should be corrected) make the best of this
theory: "In reality, the sabhdga eye does not see visible things, because it is an organ, exactly like tatsabhaga:" na paramdrthatah sabhdgam caksuh pasyati rilpdni, caksurinidriyatvat, tadyathdtatsabhdgam.
168. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 265cb. The same problem is examined in the Vibhanga, pp. 12, 16, 97, and the Dhammasangani, 1002, 1007,1008.
? 169. On the quality oiprthagjana, ii. 40c, vi. 26a, 28c-d In Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 231cl3-23, divergent explanations of Vasumitra, the Bhadanta, and Ghosaka.
170. See ii. 13, iv. lla-b.
171. We shall see that the first stage is dnantaryamdrga, "the path which destroys the defilements;" the second stage is vimuktimdrga, "the path of deliverence," the path in which the defilements are destroyed (vi. 28).
172. Dhi in place of prajftd, for prosodical reasons (ii. 57d).
173. See Nydyabindutikdfippani, p. 26; Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, p. 520; Atthasdlim, p. 400; Warren (Visuddhimagga), p. 207; Buddhist Psychology, p. 351, note; Spence Hardy, Manual, p. 419. Kathdvatthu, sviii. 9, where the thesis "the eye sees" is attributed to the Mahasarhghikas. Compare Samayabheda, Wassilief, p. 262. Wassilief summarizes the discussion of the Kofa, p. 308
(Read: "das Auge nichtdas Mass des Sichtbarensieht," and not "ist").
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 489bl4: According to another opinion, all the samskrtas are, by their
nature, view (drsti). View means the manifested characteristic of its manner of being (patupracdra). All the samskrtas possess this characteristic. Some others say that the conscious- ness of the supression of the defilements and of non-production (ksaydnutpddajndna, vii. l) is view. Vibhdsd,TD 27. p. 61c and foil. : Dharmatrata says that the visual consciousness {caksurvijfidna) sees visible things. Ghosaka says that the prajnd associated with visual consciousness sees visible things. The Darstantikas say that the "complex" (sdmagrf) sees visible things. The Vatsiputriyas say that one eye alone sees visible things . . . If the visual consciousness sees visible things, then consciousness would have view for its characteristic; now this is not the case: thus this opinion is false. If the prajnd associated with visual consciousness sees visible things, then the prajnd associated with the consciousness of hearing would understand sounds; now prajnd does not have hearing for its characteristic: thus this opinion is false. If the "complex" sees visible things, then one would always see visible things, for the "complex" is always present. If one eye, not the two eyes, sees visible things, then parts of the body would not feel tangibles at one and the same time: in the same way that the two arms, however distant they may be from each other, can simultaneously feel tangible things and produce a single tactile consciousness, in this way what obstacle is there to the two eyes, however distant they may be from each other, simultaneously seeing and producing a single visual consciousness?
174. This is the thesis of the Bhadanta {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 63b23, cl2).
175. caksusd rupdni drstvd. . . quoted iii. 32d. Samyukta, TD 1, p. 87c26, p. 88a; Vibhanga, p. 381; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 137; Dhammasangani, 597. This is the argument of the Mahasamghikas, Kathdvatthu, xviii. 9-
176. Compare the formula: tasyaivam jdnata evam pasyatah.
111. Vydkhyd: vijndnam tu sdmnidhyamdtrenti nd/rayabhdvayogeneti dariayati / yathd suryo divasakara iti/yathd sdmnidhyamdtrena suryo divasam karotUy ucyate tathd vijndnam vijdnatity ucyate / kasmdt /loke tathd siddhatvdt.
178. Or rather: "One should not reject expressions in worldly use for the reason that they do not correspond to realities. " janapadaniruktim ndbhiniveseta samjnam, ca lokasya ndtidhavet. {Madhyama TD 1, p. 703a2, Samyukta, 13. 12). Compare Majjhima, iii. 230: janapadaniruttim ndbhiniveseyya samannam ndtidhdveyya; Samyutta, iv. 230: yam ca sdmam ndtam ca atidhdvanti,
yam ca loke saccasammatam tarn ca atidhdvanti. Itivuttaka, 49.
179. According to the Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 919c27; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 62bL Against the Vatslputrlyas. See above note 173, at the end.
Footnotes 147
? 148 Chapter One
180. Argument of Vasubandhu, Paficavastuka, i. 10.
181. Compare Atthasdtint, 629.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 63bl4 and foil: One says that the object is attained (prdpta) in a twofold
sense: either because it is "grasped as object" or "perceived;" or because there is a juxtaposition (nirantaratva) of the object and the organ. In the first sense, the six organs attain the object. In the second sense, only three organs--the organs of smell, taste and touch,--attain the object; but on the contrary, three organs, the organs of sight and hearing and the mental organ, perceive without attaining.
The organ of sight preceives visible things by reason of light; when a visible thing is close to the organ, it hinders the light: the organ does not see. The organ of hearing perceives sound by reason of space or the void; when a sound is close to the organ, it does not hinder the void: the organ hears . . . The organ of smell perceives by reason of the wind; the organ of taste, by reason of water; the organ of touch, by reason of the earth; and the mental organ, by reason of the aa of attention (manaskdra).
Fa-pao (see TD 41, p. 508al9 and foil) observes that the rupa of the moon does not leave the moon in order to juxtapose itself on the eye.
Compare Aryadeva, Sataka, 288. 182.
An objection of the Vaisesikas.
183. This doctrine is refuted by Sarhghabhadra (TD 29, p. 370bl2 and foil); Shen-t'ai attributes it to the Sammitfyas; Fa-pao, to certain masters of the Vibhdsd (TD 41, p. 508bl7).
184. Samghabhadra discusses this thesis (TD 29, p. 370b23 and folL).
185. Here and below (the definition of Bhadanta, p. 106), our Tibetan version translates nirantara by 'dab chags pa. But the Tibetan Siddhantas analyzed by Wassilief (p. 307) oppose the nirantara of the Bhadanta (bar medpa) to the nirantara of the other masters ('dab chags pa).
According to the Bodhicaiyavatara, p. 516, the organ and its object cannot be either separated (savyavadhdna, santara) or contiguous (nirantara).
186. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 371c7): What is the meaning of "to attain? " When an object arises in proximity to an organ, this latter grasps it. Thus one can say that smell, taste, and touch grasp the objects that they attain; in the same way one says that the organ of sight does not see eyelids, eye-lashes and the other visible matter that it attains. The eyelid does not touch the organ of sight: one says nevertheless that the organ attains it. From the fact that the eyelid arises in proximity to the organ, one says that this latter attains it. As the organ of sight does not see the visible matter thus attained, one says that the organ of sight grasps without attaining, not by attaining; moreover it does not grasp a very distant object. In this same way, even though smell grasps the object that it attains, it does not grasp what is very close.
187. Compare the Vimsaka of Vasubandhu, 12-14; Bodhicaiyavatara, p. 503; Prafastapdday p. 43, etc.
188. According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 683c24: Do the atoms touch one another? They do not touch one another; if they touch one another, they touch one another in either their totality or partially. If they touch one another in their totality, they form but one single thing; if they partially touch one another they would thus have parts. And atoms do not have parts.
How is it that agglomerations, striking against one another, do not fall to pieces? They do not fall to pieces because vdyudhdtu holds them together.
But does not vayudhdtu fall to pieces? Sometimes it falls to pieces, for example at the end of the cosmic period. Sometimes it holds together, for example at the beginning of the cosmic period.
? If atoms do not touch one another, how can striking produce sound? Sound is produced for this very reason. For, if the atoms were to touch one another, how could there be the production of sound? If atoms touch one another, the hand and the body that it strikes would mix with one another, and there would be not free space, and how could sound arise? Vasumitra says: "Atoms do not touch one another: if they touch one another, they would thus last for a second moment. " The Bhadanta says: There is no real contact; it is through acquiescense to popular truth that one say that there is contaa when atoms arise in a union without interval (nirantara).
Does the thing in contact arise having for its case a thing in contaa . . .
189. They should have arisen (first moment) in order to touch one another (second moment).
190. Vasubandhu believes that the Bhadanta understands "juxtaposition without interval" in the sense that atoms do not allow any intermediate space bewteen them. Samghabhadra is of a different opinion.
191. For Vasubandhu, atoms are immediately juxtaposed; nevertheless they do not mix one with another, for being impenetrable, they remain distinct in spite of their contiguity. See p. 70.
Here are the essentials of Samghadra's explanations.
Nyayanusara, (TD 29, p. 372bl2): The Bhadanta nevertheless says: "Atoms do not touch one another; but one says, by metaphor, that they touch one another, because they are juxtaposed without interval" (nirantara). The Sautrantika (that is, Vasubandhu), indicating that that is the best theory, says: "This doarine is the best; otherwise, the atoms would present some intermediate space (sdntara) between them; since' these intermediate spaces are empty, what would hinder the atoms from going (one towards the other)? One admits that they are impenetrable (sapratigha). " This theory of the Bhadanta can neither be approved nor aiticized; one should solely examine how there can be any absence of an intermediate space without there being contaa: since this is not explicit, this theory is difficult to understand. If one says that atoms absolutely are without any intermediate space between them, and yet are not mixed one with another, they must have parts: a false opinion. Otherwise, if nirantara signifies "without interval" (anantara), how is it that the atoms do not touch one another? Consequently, the word nirantara signifies "close. " The prefix nis signifies "certitude. " As there is certainly an interval, the atoms are nirantara, "possessing intervals:" the same way as nirdahati, "he burns. " Or rather the prefix nis signifies "absence. " The atoms are called "without interposition" (nirantara), because there is not any rupa of contaa (sprspa) of the dimension of a atom between them. When the atoms of the primary elements arise close to one another, without "interposition," they are said, by metaphor, to touch one another. We approve the understanding of the Bhadanta thusly . . .
192. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 372c5) reproduces this paragraph (The Sautrantika says: 'If you admit. . . ), and following: "This is not correa. 'To have parts' and 'to be spatially divided' are two expressions of the same idea. When one says that 'an atom does not have any parts,' one says in faa that it is foreign to all spatial division. How can you be in doubt with respea to this point and still say: 'If you admit spatial division . . . ? ' Since the atoms are foreign to this division, how can they touch one another? We have explained that contaa can only be total or partial; thus the atom, foreign to any spatial division, cannot enter into contaa. How can you thus say 'If you deny spatial division, there will be no difficulty in the atoms touching one another. ' Thus the atoms are called nirantara, 'not separated,' because there is not any rupa of contaa of the dimension of an atom between them. "
See ii. 22 and the Introduction.
193. According to Vibhdsa TD 27, p. 63cl2.
194. The first opinion is that of the Sarvastivadins.
195. mdldvad avasthita = mandalena samapanktydvasthita.
Footnotes 149
? 150 Chapter One
196. The text has kila. As a general rule, Vasubandhu uses the word kila when the opinion in question is a wrong opinion of the Vaibhasikas; but here the Vyakhya says: dgamasucandrthah kilasabdah.
197. According to Vibhdsd TD p. 369cl0 and foil.
198. Unconditioned things are eternal because they do not go from one time period to another time period (advasamcdrdbhavdta, v. 25). Asamskfta, nitya, dhruva, (iv. 9) and dravya (i. 38) are synonyms.
199- According to another reading (kecit pathanti): dharmdrdham . . . See Dhammasangani, 661.
200. The Vyakhya quotes the conversation of the Brahmin Jatisrona with the Blessed One: indriydmndriydni bho Gautama ucyante /kati bho Gautama indnydni /kryatd cendriyandm samgraho bhavati . . .
201. The order of the indriyas is justified ii. 6. We have the order of our Sutra in Vibhanga, p. 122, Kathdvatthu, trans, p. 16, Visuddhimaggay xvi; and also in the Indriyaskandhaka (TD 26, p. 991b24), sixth book of the Jndnaprasthana (Takakusu, "Abhidharma Literature," JPTS, 1905, p. 93).
The small treatise of Anuruddha (Compendium, p. 175) follows the same order as the Prakaranapdda.
The Mahavyutpatti (108) places the vital organ at the end.
202. The last three indriyas are made up of (1-3) three sense faculties; (4-8) the five moral faculties; and (9) the mental organ (ii. 4); 1-8 are dharmadhdtu.
? CHAPTER TWO
The Indriyas
v / m . Homage to the Buddha.
We have enumerated the organs or indriyas with regard to the
dhatus (i. 48). What is the meaning of the word indriya?
The root idi signifies paramaisvarya or supreme authority {Dha-
tupdfha, i. 64). Whatever exercises supreme power or authority is called x
an indriya. Thus, in general, indriya signifies adhipati or ruler.
What is the object of the predominating influence of each indriya? .
la. According to the School, five are predominate with regard to
2
things;
i. Each of the five indriyas of which the organ of sight is the first--the five organs of sense consciousness--is a predominating influence (1) with regard to the beauty of the person; (2) with regard to the protection of the person; (3) with regard to the production of a consciousness and the mental states associated with this consciousness; and (4) with regard to their special mode of activity (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 730a29).
The organs of seeing and hearing are predominating influences (1) with regard to beauty, for the body in which they are missing is not beautiful (i. 19); (2) with regard to proteaion, for by seeing and hearing, a person avoids that which would destroy him; (3) with regard to the production of the seeing and hearing consciousnesses, and of the mental states associated with them; and (4) with regard to their special activities, i. e. , seeing visible things and hearing sounds.
The organs of smell, taste, and sensation are predominating influences (1) with regard to beauty, as above; (2) with regard to protection, through the consumption of solid foods (kavadikarahara,
? 154 Chapter Two
iii. 39); (3) with regard to the production of their three conscious- nesses; and (4) with regard to their special aaivities, i. e. , perceiving smells, tasting tastes, and touching tangibles.
lb. Four predominate with regard to two things;
ii. Four indriyas, namely the two sexual organs, the vital organ, and the mental organ are each a predominating influence with regard to two things (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 731bl2; see also b23, b5).
1. The sexual organs are the predominating influence (1) with regard to the distribution of living beings: it is by reason of these two that living beings form the categories of male and female; and (2) with regard to the differentiation of living beings: by reason of these two organs, there are, among the sexes, differences of physical form, voice,
3 and manner of being.
4
Some other masters do not admit this explanation. In fact there
are sexual differences among the gods of Rupadhatu who, however, do not possess sexual organs (i. 30), and their distribution into sexes results from these differences. Thus, if the sexual organs are the predominating influences from two points of view, they are the predominating influences with regard to defilement and purification: in fact, the three types of eunuchs and bisexual beings are alien (1) to the dharmas of defilement, lack of discipline (iv. l3b), mortal transgression (iv. 103), the cutting off of the roots of good (iv. 80); and (2) to the dharmas of purification, discipline (iv. l3b), acquisition of the fruits (vi. 51), and detachment (vairagya, vi. 45c) (see ii. l9c-d).
2. The vital organ is the predominating influence (1) with regard to the "joining" of the nikayasabhaga (ii. 41a), i. e. , that which concerns the arising of an existing thing; and (2) with regard to "maintaining" this nikayasabhdga, i. e. , that which concerns the prolongation of an existing thing from its arising to its extinction.
3. The mental organ is predominate (1) with regard to rebirth, as the Sutra explains, "Then there is produced among the Gandharvas, beings in the intermediate existence, one or the other of two minds, a mind of desire or a mind of hatred . . . " (iii. 15); (2) with regard to domination: the world and the dharmas submit to the mind. As the
? stanza says: "The world is lead by the mind, conducted by the mind:
5
(all dharmas obey this one dharma, the mind. )"
iii. The five indriyas of sensation (i. e. , the five sensations of
pleasure, displeasure, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference; ii. 7,) and the eight indriyas of faith, (force, memory, absorption and discernment (ii. 24) and the three pure faculties, ii. 10)
lc. Five and eight with regard to defilement and to purification.
are, respectively, predominant with regard to defilement and to purification.
