"
Because the samjndkarana causes the nonmaterial skandhas to bend (namayatiti noma) towards their objea.
Because the samjndkarana causes the nonmaterial skandhas to bend (namayatiti noma) towards their objea.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
" Now one cannot
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196 imagine a dharma that, existing before having been produced, goes
first towards the pratyayas, and is then produced There is no action (going towards) without an agent. One can put this objection in verse: "Do you say that it goes towards the pratyayas before its production? This is inadmissible because it does not exist. Do you say that it goes and is produced at the same time? The gerundive is not justified, for the gerundive indicates priority. "
197 198
The objection of the Grammarians is without value. Let us ask
them if that which arises is present or future. "Do you say that a present thing arises? If it has not already arisen, how can it be present? If it has already arisen, how could it be reborn without being reborn indefinitely?
199
Do you say that a future thing arises? How can you attribute to that
which is future, and non-existent, the quality of agent in this action of arising? Or how can you admit an action without an agent? " Consequently we would answer the Grammarians that the dharma goes towards the pratyayas in the same condition in which, according to them, the dharma arises.
In what condition, ask the Grammarians, is the dharma to be found, in your opinion, that arises?
The dharma that arises is "the future dharma disposed to be born" 20
(utpadabhimukho'nagatah). ? So too the dharma that goes toward the pratyayas.
Yet the theory of the Grammarians and the manner in which they
oppose an agent and action, is not tenable. For them there is an agent
(kartar) which is "he who arises" (bhavitar), and an action (kriya) which
here is the action of arising (bhuti). Now one does not maintain that the
action of arising (bhuti) is distinct from the one who arises (bhavitar) (ii.
English trans, p. 247). There is thus nothing wrong in using, of course as
ft
conventional expressions, the words, it arises, it is produced after
having gone to the pratyayas! * The meaning of the expression 201
Pratityasamutpada is as indicated in the Sutra, "If that exists, then this exists; through the arising of that, there is the arising of this. " (See below,p. 4l5) Thefirstphrase("Ifthatexists. . . ");referstopratttya,and the second ("Through the arising of that. . . ") to samutpdda.
Thereupon one can say in verse, "If you admit that it arises at first nonexistent, nonexistent it also goes to the pratyayas. If you admit that it arises at first existent, arisen, it will continue to rearise; hence there is
? recession ad infinitum; or rather we shall say that, for us also, it is 202
preexistent to its arising. " As for the gerundive, it also indicates concomitance: "Darkness, having attained the lamp, perishes," or rather: "Having bathed, he lies down. " One does not speak in this
203 manner of anyone who bathes, closes his mouth and lies down.
***
Some other masters avoid the objection relative to the use of the
gerundive by giving a very different explanation of the word Pratitya-
samutpada: prati has a distributive meaning; sam signifies "coming
together"; itya signifies "good at leaving," "that which does not last;"
and the root pad preceeded by ut signifies "appearance," "arising. " We
then have Pratityasamutpada which signifies "arising together, by
reason of such and such a coming together of causes, of perishable
204 things. "
This explanation holds for the expression Pratityasamutpada', but it does not take into account texts such as: a visual consciousness arises "By
205 reason (pratitya) of the eye and visible things. "
###
Why does the Blessed One define Pratityasamutpada in two ways, "1. If that exists, then this exists;" and 2. "From the arising of that, this
206 arises? "
207
i. For many reasons: 1. to be more specific. In the first formula, it
results that the samskdras exist when ignorance exists; but it does not result that the samskdras come into existence through the sole existence of ignorance. The second formula specifies that it the arising of ignorance that precedes the arising of the samskdras\ 2. in order to indicate the succession of the parts of dependent orgination: if that (ignorance) exists, then they (the samskdras) exist; from the arising of that {samskdras)--and not from any other thing--this (consciousness) arises; 3. in order to indicate the succession of existences: if previous existence existed, then there is present existence; from the arising of present existence future existence arises; 4. in order to indicate the nature of causality which differs according to the case: the causality of the
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parts is either immediate: "if that exists, then this is," or not immediate: "from the arising of that, this arises. " For example, defiled sarhskdras can immediately succeed ignorance; or they can be separated from it by good sarhskdras (ii. 62a). But ignorance is the immediate cause of the sarhskdras, and a mediate cause of consciousness.
208
it According to another explanation, the Blessed One taught in
this manner in order to refute the theory of non-causality (ahetuvdda), the thesis that a thing exists in the absence of a cause, and the theory of
one non-arisen cause, such as Prakrti, Purusa, etc
This explanation is not good, for the second formula suffices to
refute these two theories.
til But certain non-Buddhist teachers imagine that "since the atman
exists as a support (of ignorance), then the sarhskdras, consciousness, etc, exist, being produced; that if ignorance is produced, then the sarhskdras are produced," and so o a In other words, they posit an atman which serves as a substrate to the successive causation of the dharmas. In order to refute this opinion, the Blessed One specified, "That which arises (the sarhskdras) through the arising of such a thing (ignorance) exists by reason of the existence of this one thing that arises, and not by reason of the existence of a certain substrate. " The first formula would permit us to say, "If the atman exists as a support and if ignorance, etc, exists, then the sarhskddras, etc. , exist. " This second formula permits us to say, "It is true that the sarhskdras, etc. , arise by reason of the arising of ignorance, etc. ; but this is on the condition that there exists a certain substrate. " The two formulas together make these explanations untenable: 'The sarhskdras have ignorance for their cause [that is: if ignorance alone exists . . . ] . . . thus the production of this large and autonomous mass of suffering takes place. "
209
iv. The Masters think that the first formula indicates non-
abandoning, non-cutting off: "If ignorance exists, not being abandoned, then the sarhskdras exist, are not abandoned;" whereas the second formula indicates arising: "Through the production of ignorance, the
210 sarhskdras are produced. "
211
v. According to another opinion, the first formula indicates
duration, and the second indicates arising: "As long as the flux of causes lasts, the flux of results exists; by the sole production of a cause, its result is produced"
? We observe that it is a question of arising: the Blessed One said in fact: "I shall teach you Pratityasamutpada*' Further, why would the Blessed One first teach duration and then arising?
212
Another explanation (of the same master): The formula: "If that
exists, then this exists," signifies: "If the result exists, then the destruction of its cause exists. " But let us not think that a result arises without a cause: "From the arising of that, this arises. "
But, in order to express this sense, the Blessed One should have said, "If that exists, then this does not exist;" and he should have first indicated the arising of the result. Once the result arose, he could say, "When the result has arisen, the cause is no more. " If the Sutra should be understood as this master understands it, how does it happen that, wishing to explain Pratityasamutpada, the Blessed One first explained the destruction of its cause?
*##
How do the samskaras exist by reason of ignorance? How does old 213
age and death exist by reason of birth? Let us briefly answer this question.
The fool or Prthagjana does not understand (aprajanari) that 214
Pratityasamutpada is merely the samskaras, that is, conditioned
(samskrta) dharmas--[this lack of prajnd is avidya aveniki, only non-
wisdom, not associated with desire]--and this produces a belief in an
atman (v. 7, 12), and egotism (v. lOa); it accomplishes the threefold
aaion,--bodily, vocal, mental,--with a view to agreeable sensation, and
to the sensation of indifference; non-meritorious action, with a view to
agreeable sensation in this life; meritorbus aaion, with a view to
agreeable sensation in a future life in Kamadhatu; and "immoveable" 215
(dninjya) aaion, with a view to agreeable sensation of the first three Dhyanas and the sensation of indifference of the higher stages (iv. 46a). These aaions are the samskaras that exist by reason of ignorance.
Given the force of the projeaion of aaion, the series of the consciousness, due to the series of the intermediary existence, goes into such and such a realm of rebirth, as long as it may be, in the manner in which a flame goes, that is, in a perpetual renewing. That is the consciousness which exists by reason of the samskaras: in thus
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understanding the consciousness, we are in agreement with the
definition that the Pratltyasamutpadasutra gives for the consciousness: 216
"What is the consciousness? The six groups of consciousnesses. " With the consciousness as an antecedent, ndmarupa arises in this
realm of rebirth. This is the five skandhas, conforming to the definition 211
of the Vibbanga: "What is ndman? The four nonmaterial skandhas. WhatisrupaiAllrupa. . . Thesetwo,--thendmanandtherupa,--are called ndmarupa! '
Then, through the development of namarupa, there arises in their times, the six organs: these are the six ayatanas.
Then, encountering their object, a consciousness arises, and, through the coming together of the three (consciousness, the six dyatanas and a visaya), there is contact, which is susceptible of being experienced agreeably, etc.
From that, the threefold sensation, agreeable, etc, arises.
From this threefold sensation, there arises a threefold desire; desire for kdma or desire for agreeable sensation of the sphere of Kamadhatu, in a being tormented by suffering; desire for rupa, or desire for agreeable sensation of the three Dhyanas and the sensation of indifference of the Fourth; all desire for Ariipya.
Then, from the desire relating to sensation, there arises a fourfold
attachment (updddna): attachment to the object of sense pleasure
(kdmopdddna), attachment to views (drstyupddddna), attachment to
rules and rituals (silavratopdddna), and attachment to theories con- 218
cerning the soul {dtmavddopdddna). The kdmas are the five objects of
pleasure (kdmaguna, iii. 3, p. 368). The views, sixty-two in number, are
as explained in the Brahmajalasutra. $Ua is rejecting immorality {dauhsUya, 219
iv. l22a); vrata is the vow to act like a dog, a bull, etc. ; for example the
Nirgranthas and their nudity, the Brahmanas with their staffs and
antelope hides, the PaSupatas with their tuft of hair and their ashes, the
Parivrajakas with their three staffs and their nudity, and the rest: to tie
oneself down to the observation of these rules is iilavratopdddna (v. 7).
(dtmadrsti) and thoughts pertaining to a soul (asmimdna), for it is by reason of these two that one says atman, that one affirms the existence
Atmavdda is the person himself, and dtmabhava, is that relating to 22
which one says atman. ?
According to another opinion, atmavdda is both a view of soul
221
? of an atman {dtmavada)\ if Scripture uses the word vdda, "affirmation," it is because the atman does not exist. It is said in faa, "The fool, the ignorant, the Prthagjana, conforming to the manners of vulgar speech,
222 thinks 'me,' or 'mine;' but there is not any 'me* or 'mine. *"
Attachment to the kdmas, views, etc. , is chanda or desire, and raga or 2V>
craving, with regard to them. As the Blessed One said in the Sarva 224
'What is attachment? It is chandardga. "
Because of attachment, accumulated action produces a new existence:
this is bhava. The Sutra says, "Ananda, action that produces a new
225 existence is the nature of bhava! *
By reason of bhava, and by means of the descent of the con- 226
sciousness, future arising (janman) is birth, which is made up of the five skandhas, being namarupa in nature.
227 Because of birth, there is old age and death as defined in the Sutra.
It is in this manner that, sufficient unto itself (kevala)--that is, without any relation to an atman--there is produced this great mass of suffering, great because it has neither beginning nor end
##*
The theory that has just been taught--according to which the twelve parts of dependent origination are twelve states made up of the five skandhas--is a theory of the Vaibhasikas.
***
What is avidya (ignorance)?
The non-vidyd9 that which is not vidyd.
Impossible; for the eye is also non-vidyd.
It is an absence of vidyd, "ignorance. "
This is also impossible, for an absence is not a thing (dravya) (iv.
2b-3b) and avidya must be a thing, since it is a cause (pratyaya). Thus 28c-dAvidyaisaseparateentity{dharma),theoppositeofvidyd
228
The non-friend (amitra) is the opposite of a friend, not a non-friend, that is, anyone other than a friend, not the absence of the friend Ifra or
or knowledge, like a non-friend, the untrue, etc
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satya is truth; non-truth (anrta) is speech contrary to true speech; so too non-righteousness (adharma), non-useful (anattha) and the not-to-be-
229 done (akdrya) are the opposite of righteousness, useful, and duty.
Thus avidya--"non-knowledge"--is the opposite of vidyd, a real separate dharma. The Sutra defines it as the cause of the samskdras, from whence it results that it is not a mere negatioa Further,
230
The Sutra regards ignorance as a separate yoke (samyojana), a bond (bandhana), a latent defilement (anuSayd), a canker (dsrava), a torrent or flood (ogha), and a yoke (yoga). Thus ignorance cannot be a mere negation; it cannot be everything that is not vidyd, the eyes, etc
Yet the prefix nan--the privative a--has a pejorative sense. One terms a bad wife a "non-wife" (akalatra), and a bad son, a "non-son" (aputra). Should we not think then that avidya is bad vidyd, that is, bad prajtidl
231 29b. Avidydisnotbadprajnd,becausethisisseeing(dar/ana).
Bad prajfid (kuprajnd) or defiled prajfid would be a type of seeing
(drspi); one of the five bad views (v. 3). Now avidya or ignorance is
certainly not seeing, for ignorance and seeing are two distinct yokes
252 (samyojanas).
[TheSautrantikas:]Avidyawouldbethedefiledprajfidwhichisnot seeing by nature, [for example prajnd associated with rdga or craving].
This is impossible,
29c. Because views are associated with ignorance,
In fact moha (error or aberration), which is defined as avidya (ignorance) is among the mahdbhUmika kief as (defilements which are found in all defiled minds, ii. 26a); now all the mahdbhumika kief as are associated with them, thus avidya (under the name of moha) is associated with seeing (fivefold bad view) which is prajfid in nature; thus avidya is not prajfid, for two items of prajnd cannot be associated.
29d and because ignorance is defined as a defilement ofprajnd. The Sutra says, "The mind defiled by desire is not liberated; prajnd
233
defiled by ignorance is not purified. " Now prajnd cannot be defiled by
29a. Because it is declared to be bound (sarhyojana), etc
? prajnd: if desire is a defilement of the mind, then desire is not the mind; if ignorance is a defilement of prajnd, then ignorance is not prajOd.
[Reply of the Sautrantikas]. Good prajnd can be mixed with defiled prajnd, as when moments of good and defiled prajnd succeed one another. In the same way, when one says that a mind defiled by desire is not liberated, one is speaking of a mind that is not necessarily associated with aaving, but which is oppressed by craving [craving is not aaive,
samuddcaran\ but its traces remain and the mind is oppressed]. When an ascetic avoids aaving, [that is, by suppressing its traces and repairing the bad state, dausfhulya, of the mind], then the mind is liberated. In the same way prajnd, defiled by ignorance (bad prajnd), is not pure: it is oppressed, even when it is good, by ignorance.
234
What is capable of arresting the imaginations of a scholar?
Ignorance is not, in its nature, prajna-
The scholar who maintains that ignorance is all the defilements
236
(kiefas) is refuted at the same time. If ignorance is all the defilements,
it cannot be named separately among the yokes (samyojanas), etc; it is not associated with views and with the other defilements; Scripture should not say, "The mind, defiled by desire, is not liberated," but rather, "The mind defiled by ignorance . . . " Do you say that one expresses oneself in this manner in order to be more specific, and that the Sutra should say, "The mind, defiled by ignorance which consists of desire, is not liberated? " In this hypothesis, Scripture should specify what type of ignorance it is that hinders the purity of the prajnd: now it says, "Prajnd defiled by ignorance is not purified. "
If you hold that ignorance is a separate dharma, and not merely a certain type of prajnd, you should define it.
Ignorance is the non-samprakhydna of the Four Truths, the Three Jewels, of aaion and its result. [Samprakhydna is the same thing as
237 prajrid, discernment, orJnana, knowledge].
What is non-samprakhydna?
It is Tiot'Samprakhydna, nor absenceof->samprakhyana, in the same way that avidydis not non-vidyd or absence-of-f*/^. It is then a certain separate dharma, the opposite of samprakhydna.
Good enough; but as for ignorance, you have not told us the nature of asamprakhyana.
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Definitions are often thus, that is, not definitions through self lature or essence, but definitions through funaioa For example, the eye
s defined as "the pure rupa that serves as a support for the eye ronsciousness" because one does not know this invisible rupa except :hrough inference (Chap, ix, French trans, p. 231. ). [In the same way the inique nature oiavidyd is known through its aaion {karman) or aaivity [kdritra); this aaion is contrary to vidyddso it is thus a dharma contrary [vipaksa) to vidyd].
***
The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defines ignorance in the following
238 erms: asmUi sattvamayana.
Does this mayanddiffer from asmimdna (v. 10)? 239
The Bhadanta answers: As the Sutra says, "I know, I see--
hrough the perfe a abandoning and the perfea knowledge of desire, of
iews, mayands, attachments and latent defilements to the idea of self 240
a$magrdha)\ to the idea of mine (mamagrdha), to asmindna -- 241
without shade, Parinirvana. " [This Sutra shows that mayand--in the ingular since it is a genre--is distina from asmimdna].
So be it, there is mayand; but from whence do you hold that it is jnorance?
The Bhadanta answers: Because one cannot identify mayand with ny other defilement, since it is named separately from desire, views, nd asmimdna.
But could it not be a mdna other than asmimdna} [Mdna is in faa six r sevenfold, v. 10]. However we would have to say too much in order to smplete this examination. Let us stop here.
***
242
As for ndmarupa rupa has already been explained (19).
245 30a. Ndman are the skandhas that are not rupa.
The four nonmaterial skandhas,--sensation, ideas, samskdras, and >nsciousness, are called ndman, for ndman signifies "that which bends, elds," (namatiti ndma).
? The nonmaterial skandhas bend, [that is, "are active," pravartante, "arise," utpadyante], towards the objea (artha) by reason of name
244 (ndman), the organs, and the object.
In this phrase, "by reason of name," one takes the word "name" in its popular sense, (samjndkarana, ii. 47a, English trans, p. 250), as a "designation," which designates and causes to be understood either a collection, "cattle," "horses," etc. ,ora single thing, "rupa" "taste," etc.
Why is samjndkarana termed "name?
"
Because the samjndkarana causes the nonmaterial skandhas to bend (namayatiti noma) towards their objea.
According to another explanation, the nonmaterial skandhas are termed ndman, because, then the body dissolves, these skandhas bend,
245 that is, go towards another existence.
***
We have already explained the six dyatanas (i. 9). *#*
246 30b. There are six contaas. They arise from encounter.
The first is the contaa of the eye, and the sixth is contaa of the manas or mind (Digha, iii. 243, etc. )
They arise from the coming together of three things, an organ, its objea, and a consciousness.
One can see indeed that there can be a coming together of the five material organs, with their objeas and their corresponding con- sciousnesses, for the three are simultaneous. But the mental organ or manas (manodhdtu) is destroyed when a mental consciousness (mano- vijnana) arises (i. 172); and the objea (i. e. , dharmas) of this con- sciousness can be future: how can there be a coming together of the three?
There is a coming together because the organ (the manas) and the objea (the dharmas) are the causal conditions of the mental con- sciousness; or rather because the organ, the objea and the consciousness produce the same single effea, namely the contaa.
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***
What is the nature of contact?
The masters are not in agreement.
Some--[the Sautrantikas]--say: Contact is merely the coming
together itself. According to the Sutra, 'The coming together, the 247
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact. "
Others--[the Sarvastivadins]--say: Contact is a dharma associated
with the mind (ii. 24, English trans, p. 190), distina from any coming 248 249
together. According to the Smra of the Six Hexades, "The six internal sources of consciousness (ayatanas, eye, etc. ), the six external sources of consciousness (visible things, etc), the six consciousness, the six contacts, the six sensations, and the six desires. " The Sutra thus knows of the six contacts, together with the six categories of internal ayatanas, external ayatanas, and the consciousnesses: [thus the contacts are separate dharmas; for the Sutra does not contain any repetition or double usages].
[The Sautrantikas explain this Sutra:] If the Sutra does not contain any repetition, it follows that sensations and desires exist apart from the dharmayatana which is the sixth internal source of consciousness (the object of the manas), since you can hold only that the first two categories (six organs and six objects) refer to the organs and their objects without any relation to the consciousness.
[Reply of the Sautrantika, the Bhadanta Srllabha:] Every eye and
visible thing is not the cause of a visual consciousness, as all visual
25 consciousness is not the result of the eye and a visible thing. ? Thus
what is defined as contact in the Sutra, "Six collections of contacts," is the eye, a visible thing and the consciousnesses which are cause and effect. (See p. 428, line 13a).
But how do the Sarvastivadins, who maintain that contact exists
apart from the coming together of any eye, a visible thing and a
consciousness, explain the Sutra, 'The coming together (samgati), the
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact? " 251
They do not read the Sutra in this form; or rather they say that the
252
expression is metaphorical: when the text says "the coming
together," it means "the result of the coming together. "
253 But this discussion is taking us too far afield
? ***
The Abhidharmikas think that contact is a dharma, a separate entity.
30c-d Five are contact through (actual) contact; the sixth is
254 so-called through denomination.
The contact of the eye, the ear, etc. , have sapratigha organs (i. 29b) for their support (dfraya); thus they are termed pratigha spar $ a taking
255 their name from their support.
The sixth, the contact of the mental organ, is called adhivaca- 256
nasamsparfa.
What is the meaning of the term adhivacanam
257 Adhivacana is a name.
Now name is the object (alambana) par excellence of contact
associated with the mental consciousness. In fact it is said, "Through the
visual consciousness, he knows blue; but he does not know, 'It is blue;'
through the mental consciousness, he knows blue and he knows, It is
258 blue/"
Thus the contact of the mental organ takes its name--a contact of
denomination--from its characteristic object.
259
According to another opinion, one takes into account the fact that
only the mental consciousness is activated (pravartate) with regard to its objeas (color, etc. ), or applies itself to its object, by reason of expression
260
or speech (adhikrtya vacanam = vacanam avadhatya): mental
consciousness is thus adhivacana. The contact (sparfa) that is associated with it is thus called adhivacanasamsparia.
#*#
The sixth contact is of three types:
31a-b. Contact of knowledge, non-knowledge, other: which are
261 respectively pure, defiled, other.
These are the contacts associated with vidya, that is, with pure prajna-, with avidya, that is, with defiled non-knowledge; and with naivavidya-navidyd, that is, with good, but impure prajnd.
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? 262 with all the defilements and which is always active,
the two:
31c. Contacts of antipathy and sympathy
which are associated with hatred and with desire.
one distinguishes
***
In considering the contact of non-knowledge which is associated
Contact in its totality, is threefold.
3Id. Three contacts, leading to pleasure (sukhavedya), etc.
These are contacts that lead to the acquisition of pleasure, of suffering, and of neither pleasure nor suffering. These contacts are so called because they are beneficial to pleasure, to suffering, and to neither pleasure nor suffering [that is: propitious to the sensation of pleasure, etc. , = sukhavedamya, etc. ] (Pdnini, 5,1. 1); or rather because "that" is felt or can be felt (vedyate tadvedayiturh vasakyam) (Panini, 3,1. 169).
"That" is sensation, vedana. The contact where a pleasure should be felt (sukham vedyam), is a contact that is called sukhavedya. There is in fact an agreeable (sukha) sensation there.
*##
We have defined the sixfold contact, contact of the eye, etc.
264 32a. Six sensations arise from contact.
That is: sensation arisen from contact with the eye, etc. 32a-b. Five are bodily sensations and one is mental.
The five sensations that arise from the contact of the eye and from the other bodily organs, having for support (asraya) the bodily organs, are bodily. The sixth sensation arises from contact with the manas: its support is the mind (manas) so it is mental or caitasi.
263
? [The Sautrantikas] ask if the sensation is later than, or simultaneous to contact.
The Vaibhasikas maintain that sensation and contact are simul- taneous, being sahabhilhetu, "reciprocal causes" (ii. 50a).
[The Sautrantikas:] How can two things arisen together be "that which produces" (janaka) and "that which is produced" (janya)?
[The Vaibhasikas:] Why would they not be?
[The Sautrantikas:] When two things arise together, how could the dharma "which produces" have any efficacy with regard to the dharma "to be produced," which has already arisen?
[The Vaibhasikas:] This argument (sddhana) only repeats the thesis (pratijna) that two things arisen together cannot be "that which produces" and "that which is produced. "
[The Sautrantikas:] We would say then that, in your hypothesis, there would be reciprocal causality of two dharmas arisen together.
[The Vaibhasikas:] But this is not a fault, for we admit this consequence. We define sahabhilhetu as ye mithahphalah, "The dharmas that are results of one other are a sahabhu cause" (ii. 50c).
[The Sautrantikas:] So be it, that is your system. But the Sutra condemns this system. It says, "By reason of the contact of the eye, there arises a sensation which arises from the contact of the eye;" it does not say, "By reason of the sensation which arises from the contact of the eye, the contact of the eye arises. " And again the thesis that "Two things arisen together can be cause and result" is in contradiction to the characteristics of a cause. It is taken for granted that the dharma which produces another dharma is not simultaneous to this other dharma', a seed precedes its shoot; milk precedes dadhi\ a blow precedes the noise; and the manas (the mental organ) precedes the mental consciousness (manovijndna) (i. 17).
[The Vaibhasikas:] We do not deny that a cause is sometimes earlier than its result; but we affirm that a cause and its result can be simultaneous: for example, the visual organ and color, and the visual consciousness; or the primary elements {mahahhutas) and "secondary (bhautika) matter. "
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[The Sautrantikas:] We do not admit your examples: the visual organ and color precede the visual consciousness; but the primary elements and derived matter, which are simultaneous, arise together from a complex of earlier causes.
The Vaibhasikas: Contact and sensation are simultaneous, like the
265 shoot and its shade.
***
According to another opinion, [the Bhadanta Srllabha]: Sensation is later than contact. There is first the organ and the object (first moment), then the consciousness (second moment); contact is the "coming together," that is, the quality of cause and result of these three: organ and object, and consciousness; finally (third moment) there arises sensation which has contact for its cause.
The Vaibhasikas: In this theory, there is no sensation wherever there is consciousness: for there is consciousness in the second and third moment, but sensation only in the third And all consciousness is not contact, for there is contact only in the first two moments.
[Srilabha:] No. One sensation, having for its cause an earlier contact, exists at the moment of a later contact: thus all contact is accompanied by sensation.
[The Vaibhasikas:] According to you, there would thus be simul- taneous contact and a sensation of different objects: a sensation produced by earlier contact of color would exist at the moment of a second contact of sound. Now a sensation produced by a contact of color should have this color for its object, for a sensation cannot have an object different from the object of the consciousness with which it is associated [and this consciousness, produced by color, should have color for its object]. Thus you are forced to an inadmissible conclusion.
[Srllabha:] Let us say then that consciousness is not always contact, and that it is not always accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of color, contemporaneous with the contact of sound, is not contact, but is accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of the sound is contact, but it is not accompaned by sensation.
[The Vaibhasikas:] This theory is incompatible with the rule of the universal (sarvatraga) or mahabhumika dharmas (ii. 23c-d). This rule
? establishes that ten dharmas,--sensation, contaa, idea, etc. --are associated with every mental state.
[Srilabha:] Upon what authority does this rule rest?
266 [The Vaibhasikas:] On the Sastra or Abhidharma.
[Srllabha:] We recognize Sutra and not Sastra as authority. For the
267
Blessed One said that recourse is to the Sutra. Or rather we propose
for the doctrine of the mahabhumikas an interpretation different from yours.
[The Vaibhasikas:] What then is the meaning of the expression
26s mahdbhumika"i
[The Sautrantikas:] There are three bhumis or spheres, 1. savitarka-
savicdra: Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, 2. avitarka-savicdra: the
intermediate dhyana, and 3. avitarka-avicdra: the Second Dhyana, etc.
(viii. 23c); three other bhumis, good, bad, and neutral [that is, the good,
bad, and neutral dharmas]', and three other bhumis, of Saiksas, Asaiksas,
and neither-Saiksa-nor-Asaiksa [that is, the pure dharmas of the Saiksa 269
and ASaiksa, and the impure dharmas, ii. 70c]. The mental dharmas 210
which are found in all these bhumis are called mahdbhumika [these are sensation, volition, as ii. 24]; those which are found only in a good bhumi are called kusalamahdbhumika [these are faith, etc. , as ii. 25]; those which are found only in a defiled bhumi are called klesamahd- bhumika [these are ignorance, etc. , as ii. 26]. But all these dharmas are called mahdbhumika, kusalamahdbhumika, and klesamahdbhumika because they can be found in the bhumi proper to them: but it is false that they are necessarily found all at once. Sensation, for example, exists
in all the bhumis, as too ideas, volition, etc. : but this does not mean that 271
every mental state includes all these dharmas, sensation, etc.
Certain masters observe that the category of the akusalamaha-
272
bhumikas, at first unknown, has been added later; and the Sutras
273 would suggest this idea.
[The Vaibhasikas:] If sensation is later than contact, you have to take into account the Sutra, "By reason of the eye and visible things there arises visual consciousness; the coming together of the three is contact;
274 together there arises (sahajdbd) sensation, ideas, volition. "
[The Sautrantikas:] This Sutra say that sensation, ideas and volition
arise together; it does not say that they arise together with contact: we
275
say that they arise together among themselves. Let us observe also
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that the word "together" (saha) is used, not only to indicate simultaneity,
but also to indicate immediate succession. The Sutra, for example, says,
with compassion. " Now compassion, which is always "worldly," evidently cannot be simultaneous to a part of Bodhi: for the parts of Bodhi are always transworldly. Thus the Sutra not only does not prove that sensation is simultaneous to contact; it does not even prove that sensation, ideas and volition are associated with, and simultaneous to consciousness (visual consciousness, etc).
[The Sarvastivadins:] But the Sutra says, "The dharmas of sensation, ideas, volition, and consciousness are mixed; they are not
277
separate. " "Mixed" signifies "arisen together. " From this Sutra we
conclude that there are no consciousnesses, sensations, ideas or volitions which are not simultaneous.
"He cultivates the part of Bodhi called mindfulness together (sahagata) 276
[The Sautrantikas:] But what is the meaning of the word "mixed", 278
samsrspa! We read in the Sutra that you have just quoted, "That which
he feels (vedayata), he thinks of (cetayate)\ that about which he thinks,
he discerns (vijandti)" In other words, the same thing is the object (alambana) of sensation, volition, and consciousness. The question is thus posed whether sensation, volition and ideas are called mixed because they have the same object--which is our opinion--or because they are simultaneous, as you say.
28
[The Vaibhasikas: ? ] The word samsrspa refers to simultaneous
samsrspa. They cannot be samsrspa except through simultaneity, not by the fact that they would have a common object, since they do not have any object. Furthermore the Sutra says, "The coming together of the three is contact. " How could there be a consciousness without there being a coming together of the three? How could there be encounter of the three without there being contact? Thus all consciousness is accompanied by contact and all contact is accompanied by sensation, etc.
But this discussion is carrying us too far afield. Let us return to our subject.
he grasps an idea of (samjandti)\ that about which he grasps an idea of, 219
things. It is said in fact that life (ayus) and warmth (usmaka) are 281
***
? We have explained, in summary, mental (caitast) sensation. 32c-d. This same sensation is of eighteen types by reason of the
22 objects of the mind (manopavicdras). *
Mental sensation is made up of eighteen types, because there are six upavicdras of satisfaaion (samanasya), six of dissatisfaaion {daurma- nasya), and six of indifference (upeksa) (ii. 7): these are the upavicdras of satisfaaion relating to visible things, sounds, color, tastes, tangible things, and the dharmas; the same for the upavicdras of dissatisfaaion and indifference.
How does one distinguish these eighteen?
In considering their nature, their quality of being sensation, the
upavicdras are three: of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference;
considering their quality of associates, they are one, all being associated
with the mental consciousness; and considering their objeas, they are
six: having visible things, sounds, etc. , for their objeas. We answer then
that one must take into account, at one and the same time, these three
283 qualities.
There is no variety in the object of the first fifteen upavicdras: the
objea of manopavicdra relating to visible things is only these visible
things. . . But, as for the three dharmopavkdras--the three upavicdras
(satisfaaion, etc. ) relating to the dharmas--one would distinguish: they
can arise relating to the distina dharmas of the five sense objects; in this
case, their objea presents no variety, and is not mixed; they can bear on
one, two, three,. . . six categories of dharmas (visible things, sounds,. . .
284
dharmas); in this case, their objea is mixed
What is the meaning of the expression manopavicdra?
Why are the different types of mental sensation (satisfaaion, etc. )
called manopavicdra}
The Vaibhasikas say wrongly, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference are supported by the manas in order to grasp visible 2
things, etc. , as an objea (upavicaranti = dlambante). " *^
According to another opinion, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference cause the manas to reconsider {upavicdrayanti) visible 286
things, etc. " For it is by reason of sensation (sensation of satisfaction, etc. ) that the manas repeatedly considers visible things, etc.
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***
Objections or difficulties. 1. Why not define bodily (kdyikt) sensation as manopavicdra.
Without doubt bodily sensation has the manas for its support, but it also has the material organs (eye, etc) for its support. It is free from vikalpa (like the visual consciousness, etc, to which it is associated, i. 33,
trans, p. 97); and it is no longer upavicarikd, [that is9 susceptible of 27
"consideration," samthikd]. *
2. But why is the sukha of the Third Dhyana (viii. 9b), which is of the
[The Vaibhasikas say (wrongly), ] "Because, initially, that is, in Kamadhatu, there is no sukha which is of the sphere of the manas, [In Kamadhatu, sukha is solely bodily sensation]; and because there does not exist any duhkha-upavicdra which would oppose the sukha- upavicdra that you imagine. "
3. But, if the upavicdras are only of the sphere of the manas, you have
to take into account the Sutra which says, "Having seen visible things
through the eye, he considers (upavicdrati) the visible things which 289
satisfy {saumanasyasthdntya). " The relationship is characterized, in the Sutra, by the visual organ and by upavicdra.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] 1. The Blessed One expresses himself in this manner because he takes into consideration the fact that the upavicdras can be produced by the five sense consciousnesses. The upavicdras are no less that the sphere of the single manas: in the same way, for example, that the aiubhds (meditation on a cadaver turning blue, etc, vi.
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196 imagine a dharma that, existing before having been produced, goes
first towards the pratyayas, and is then produced There is no action (going towards) without an agent. One can put this objection in verse: "Do you say that it goes towards the pratyayas before its production? This is inadmissible because it does not exist. Do you say that it goes and is produced at the same time? The gerundive is not justified, for the gerundive indicates priority. "
197 198
The objection of the Grammarians is without value. Let us ask
them if that which arises is present or future. "Do you say that a present thing arises? If it has not already arisen, how can it be present? If it has already arisen, how could it be reborn without being reborn indefinitely?
199
Do you say that a future thing arises? How can you attribute to that
which is future, and non-existent, the quality of agent in this action of arising? Or how can you admit an action without an agent? " Consequently we would answer the Grammarians that the dharma goes towards the pratyayas in the same condition in which, according to them, the dharma arises.
In what condition, ask the Grammarians, is the dharma to be found, in your opinion, that arises?
The dharma that arises is "the future dharma disposed to be born" 20
(utpadabhimukho'nagatah). ? So too the dharma that goes toward the pratyayas.
Yet the theory of the Grammarians and the manner in which they
oppose an agent and action, is not tenable. For them there is an agent
(kartar) which is "he who arises" (bhavitar), and an action (kriya) which
here is the action of arising (bhuti). Now one does not maintain that the
action of arising (bhuti) is distinct from the one who arises (bhavitar) (ii.
English trans, p. 247). There is thus nothing wrong in using, of course as
ft
conventional expressions, the words, it arises, it is produced after
having gone to the pratyayas! * The meaning of the expression 201
Pratityasamutpada is as indicated in the Sutra, "If that exists, then this exists; through the arising of that, there is the arising of this. " (See below,p. 4l5) Thefirstphrase("Ifthatexists. . . ");referstopratttya,and the second ("Through the arising of that. . . ") to samutpdda.
Thereupon one can say in verse, "If you admit that it arises at first nonexistent, nonexistent it also goes to the pratyayas. If you admit that it arises at first existent, arisen, it will continue to rearise; hence there is
? recession ad infinitum; or rather we shall say that, for us also, it is 202
preexistent to its arising. " As for the gerundive, it also indicates concomitance: "Darkness, having attained the lamp, perishes," or rather: "Having bathed, he lies down. " One does not speak in this
203 manner of anyone who bathes, closes his mouth and lies down.
***
Some other masters avoid the objection relative to the use of the
gerundive by giving a very different explanation of the word Pratitya-
samutpada: prati has a distributive meaning; sam signifies "coming
together"; itya signifies "good at leaving," "that which does not last;"
and the root pad preceeded by ut signifies "appearance," "arising. " We
then have Pratityasamutpada which signifies "arising together, by
reason of such and such a coming together of causes, of perishable
204 things. "
This explanation holds for the expression Pratityasamutpada', but it does not take into account texts such as: a visual consciousness arises "By
205 reason (pratitya) of the eye and visible things. "
###
Why does the Blessed One define Pratityasamutpada in two ways, "1. If that exists, then this exists;" and 2. "From the arising of that, this
206 arises? "
207
i. For many reasons: 1. to be more specific. In the first formula, it
results that the samskdras exist when ignorance exists; but it does not result that the samskdras come into existence through the sole existence of ignorance. The second formula specifies that it the arising of ignorance that precedes the arising of the samskdras\ 2. in order to indicate the succession of the parts of dependent orgination: if that (ignorance) exists, then they (the samskdras) exist; from the arising of that {samskdras)--and not from any other thing--this (consciousness) arises; 3. in order to indicate the succession of existences: if previous existence existed, then there is present existence; from the arising of present existence future existence arises; 4. in order to indicate the nature of causality which differs according to the case: the causality of the
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parts is either immediate: "if that exists, then this is," or not immediate: "from the arising of that, this arises. " For example, defiled sarhskdras can immediately succeed ignorance; or they can be separated from it by good sarhskdras (ii. 62a). But ignorance is the immediate cause of the sarhskdras, and a mediate cause of consciousness.
208
it According to another explanation, the Blessed One taught in
this manner in order to refute the theory of non-causality (ahetuvdda), the thesis that a thing exists in the absence of a cause, and the theory of
one non-arisen cause, such as Prakrti, Purusa, etc
This explanation is not good, for the second formula suffices to
refute these two theories.
til But certain non-Buddhist teachers imagine that "since the atman
exists as a support (of ignorance), then the sarhskdras, consciousness, etc, exist, being produced; that if ignorance is produced, then the sarhskdras are produced," and so o a In other words, they posit an atman which serves as a substrate to the successive causation of the dharmas. In order to refute this opinion, the Blessed One specified, "That which arises (the sarhskdras) through the arising of such a thing (ignorance) exists by reason of the existence of this one thing that arises, and not by reason of the existence of a certain substrate. " The first formula would permit us to say, "If the atman exists as a support and if ignorance, etc, exists, then the sarhskddras, etc. , exist. " This second formula permits us to say, "It is true that the sarhskdras, etc. , arise by reason of the arising of ignorance, etc. ; but this is on the condition that there exists a certain substrate. " The two formulas together make these explanations untenable: 'The sarhskdras have ignorance for their cause [that is: if ignorance alone exists . . . ] . . . thus the production of this large and autonomous mass of suffering takes place. "
209
iv. The Masters think that the first formula indicates non-
abandoning, non-cutting off: "If ignorance exists, not being abandoned, then the sarhskdras exist, are not abandoned;" whereas the second formula indicates arising: "Through the production of ignorance, the
210 sarhskdras are produced. "
211
v. According to another opinion, the first formula indicates
duration, and the second indicates arising: "As long as the flux of causes lasts, the flux of results exists; by the sole production of a cause, its result is produced"
? We observe that it is a question of arising: the Blessed One said in fact: "I shall teach you Pratityasamutpada*' Further, why would the Blessed One first teach duration and then arising?
212
Another explanation (of the same master): The formula: "If that
exists, then this exists," signifies: "If the result exists, then the destruction of its cause exists. " But let us not think that a result arises without a cause: "From the arising of that, this arises. "
But, in order to express this sense, the Blessed One should have said, "If that exists, then this does not exist;" and he should have first indicated the arising of the result. Once the result arose, he could say, "When the result has arisen, the cause is no more. " If the Sutra should be understood as this master understands it, how does it happen that, wishing to explain Pratityasamutpada, the Blessed One first explained the destruction of its cause?
*##
How do the samskaras exist by reason of ignorance? How does old 213
age and death exist by reason of birth? Let us briefly answer this question.
The fool or Prthagjana does not understand (aprajanari) that 214
Pratityasamutpada is merely the samskaras, that is, conditioned
(samskrta) dharmas--[this lack of prajnd is avidya aveniki, only non-
wisdom, not associated with desire]--and this produces a belief in an
atman (v. 7, 12), and egotism (v. lOa); it accomplishes the threefold
aaion,--bodily, vocal, mental,--with a view to agreeable sensation, and
to the sensation of indifference; non-meritorious action, with a view to
agreeable sensation in this life; meritorbus aaion, with a view to
agreeable sensation in a future life in Kamadhatu; and "immoveable" 215
(dninjya) aaion, with a view to agreeable sensation of the first three Dhyanas and the sensation of indifference of the higher stages (iv. 46a). These aaions are the samskaras that exist by reason of ignorance.
Given the force of the projeaion of aaion, the series of the consciousness, due to the series of the intermediary existence, goes into such and such a realm of rebirth, as long as it may be, in the manner in which a flame goes, that is, in a perpetual renewing. That is the consciousness which exists by reason of the samskaras: in thus
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understanding the consciousness, we are in agreement with the
definition that the Pratltyasamutpadasutra gives for the consciousness: 216
"What is the consciousness? The six groups of consciousnesses. " With the consciousness as an antecedent, ndmarupa arises in this
realm of rebirth. This is the five skandhas, conforming to the definition 211
of the Vibbanga: "What is ndman? The four nonmaterial skandhas. WhatisrupaiAllrupa. . . Thesetwo,--thendmanandtherupa,--are called ndmarupa! '
Then, through the development of namarupa, there arises in their times, the six organs: these are the six ayatanas.
Then, encountering their object, a consciousness arises, and, through the coming together of the three (consciousness, the six dyatanas and a visaya), there is contact, which is susceptible of being experienced agreeably, etc.
From that, the threefold sensation, agreeable, etc, arises.
From this threefold sensation, there arises a threefold desire; desire for kdma or desire for agreeable sensation of the sphere of Kamadhatu, in a being tormented by suffering; desire for rupa, or desire for agreeable sensation of the three Dhyanas and the sensation of indifference of the Fourth; all desire for Ariipya.
Then, from the desire relating to sensation, there arises a fourfold
attachment (updddna): attachment to the object of sense pleasure
(kdmopdddna), attachment to views (drstyupddddna), attachment to
rules and rituals (silavratopdddna), and attachment to theories con- 218
cerning the soul {dtmavddopdddna). The kdmas are the five objects of
pleasure (kdmaguna, iii. 3, p. 368). The views, sixty-two in number, are
as explained in the Brahmajalasutra. $Ua is rejecting immorality {dauhsUya, 219
iv. l22a); vrata is the vow to act like a dog, a bull, etc. ; for example the
Nirgranthas and their nudity, the Brahmanas with their staffs and
antelope hides, the PaSupatas with their tuft of hair and their ashes, the
Parivrajakas with their three staffs and their nudity, and the rest: to tie
oneself down to the observation of these rules is iilavratopdddna (v. 7).
(dtmadrsti) and thoughts pertaining to a soul (asmimdna), for it is by reason of these two that one says atman, that one affirms the existence
Atmavdda is the person himself, and dtmabhava, is that relating to 22
which one says atman. ?
According to another opinion, atmavdda is both a view of soul
221
? of an atman {dtmavada)\ if Scripture uses the word vdda, "affirmation," it is because the atman does not exist. It is said in faa, "The fool, the ignorant, the Prthagjana, conforming to the manners of vulgar speech,
222 thinks 'me,' or 'mine;' but there is not any 'me* or 'mine. *"
Attachment to the kdmas, views, etc. , is chanda or desire, and raga or 2V>
craving, with regard to them. As the Blessed One said in the Sarva 224
'What is attachment? It is chandardga. "
Because of attachment, accumulated action produces a new existence:
this is bhava. The Sutra says, "Ananda, action that produces a new
225 existence is the nature of bhava! *
By reason of bhava, and by means of the descent of the con- 226
sciousness, future arising (janman) is birth, which is made up of the five skandhas, being namarupa in nature.
227 Because of birth, there is old age and death as defined in the Sutra.
It is in this manner that, sufficient unto itself (kevala)--that is, without any relation to an atman--there is produced this great mass of suffering, great because it has neither beginning nor end
##*
The theory that has just been taught--according to which the twelve parts of dependent origination are twelve states made up of the five skandhas--is a theory of the Vaibhasikas.
***
What is avidya (ignorance)?
The non-vidyd9 that which is not vidyd.
Impossible; for the eye is also non-vidyd.
It is an absence of vidyd, "ignorance. "
This is also impossible, for an absence is not a thing (dravya) (iv.
2b-3b) and avidya must be a thing, since it is a cause (pratyaya). Thus 28c-dAvidyaisaseparateentity{dharma),theoppositeofvidyd
228
The non-friend (amitra) is the opposite of a friend, not a non-friend, that is, anyone other than a friend, not the absence of the friend Ifra or
or knowledge, like a non-friend, the untrue, etc
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satya is truth; non-truth (anrta) is speech contrary to true speech; so too non-righteousness (adharma), non-useful (anattha) and the not-to-be-
229 done (akdrya) are the opposite of righteousness, useful, and duty.
Thus avidya--"non-knowledge"--is the opposite of vidyd, a real separate dharma. The Sutra defines it as the cause of the samskdras, from whence it results that it is not a mere negatioa Further,
230
The Sutra regards ignorance as a separate yoke (samyojana), a bond (bandhana), a latent defilement (anuSayd), a canker (dsrava), a torrent or flood (ogha), and a yoke (yoga). Thus ignorance cannot be a mere negation; it cannot be everything that is not vidyd, the eyes, etc
Yet the prefix nan--the privative a--has a pejorative sense. One terms a bad wife a "non-wife" (akalatra), and a bad son, a "non-son" (aputra). Should we not think then that avidya is bad vidyd, that is, bad prajtidl
231 29b. Avidydisnotbadprajnd,becausethisisseeing(dar/ana).
Bad prajfid (kuprajnd) or defiled prajfid would be a type of seeing
(drspi); one of the five bad views (v. 3). Now avidya or ignorance is
certainly not seeing, for ignorance and seeing are two distinct yokes
252 (samyojanas).
[TheSautrantikas:]Avidyawouldbethedefiledprajfidwhichisnot seeing by nature, [for example prajnd associated with rdga or craving].
This is impossible,
29c. Because views are associated with ignorance,
In fact moha (error or aberration), which is defined as avidya (ignorance) is among the mahdbhUmika kief as (defilements which are found in all defiled minds, ii. 26a); now all the mahdbhumika kief as are associated with them, thus avidya (under the name of moha) is associated with seeing (fivefold bad view) which is prajfid in nature; thus avidya is not prajfid, for two items of prajnd cannot be associated.
29d and because ignorance is defined as a defilement ofprajnd. The Sutra says, "The mind defiled by desire is not liberated; prajnd
233
defiled by ignorance is not purified. " Now prajnd cannot be defiled by
29a. Because it is declared to be bound (sarhyojana), etc
? prajnd: if desire is a defilement of the mind, then desire is not the mind; if ignorance is a defilement of prajnd, then ignorance is not prajOd.
[Reply of the Sautrantikas]. Good prajnd can be mixed with defiled prajnd, as when moments of good and defiled prajnd succeed one another. In the same way, when one says that a mind defiled by desire is not liberated, one is speaking of a mind that is not necessarily associated with aaving, but which is oppressed by craving [craving is not aaive,
samuddcaran\ but its traces remain and the mind is oppressed]. When an ascetic avoids aaving, [that is, by suppressing its traces and repairing the bad state, dausfhulya, of the mind], then the mind is liberated. In the same way prajnd, defiled by ignorance (bad prajnd), is not pure: it is oppressed, even when it is good, by ignorance.
234
What is capable of arresting the imaginations of a scholar?
Ignorance is not, in its nature, prajna-
The scholar who maintains that ignorance is all the defilements
236
(kiefas) is refuted at the same time. If ignorance is all the defilements,
it cannot be named separately among the yokes (samyojanas), etc; it is not associated with views and with the other defilements; Scripture should not say, "The mind, defiled by desire, is not liberated," but rather, "The mind defiled by ignorance . . . " Do you say that one expresses oneself in this manner in order to be more specific, and that the Sutra should say, "The mind, defiled by ignorance which consists of desire, is not liberated? " In this hypothesis, Scripture should specify what type of ignorance it is that hinders the purity of the prajnd: now it says, "Prajnd defiled by ignorance is not purified. "
If you hold that ignorance is a separate dharma, and not merely a certain type of prajnd, you should define it.
Ignorance is the non-samprakhydna of the Four Truths, the Three Jewels, of aaion and its result. [Samprakhydna is the same thing as
237 prajrid, discernment, orJnana, knowledge].
What is non-samprakhydna?
It is Tiot'Samprakhydna, nor absenceof->samprakhyana, in the same way that avidydis not non-vidyd or absence-of-f*/^. It is then a certain separate dharma, the opposite of samprakhydna.
Good enough; but as for ignorance, you have not told us the nature of asamprakhyana.
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Definitions are often thus, that is, not definitions through self lature or essence, but definitions through funaioa For example, the eye
s defined as "the pure rupa that serves as a support for the eye ronsciousness" because one does not know this invisible rupa except :hrough inference (Chap, ix, French trans, p. 231. ). [In the same way the inique nature oiavidyd is known through its aaion {karman) or aaivity [kdritra); this aaion is contrary to vidyddso it is thus a dharma contrary [vipaksa) to vidyd].
***
The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defines ignorance in the following
238 erms: asmUi sattvamayana.
Does this mayanddiffer from asmimdna (v. 10)? 239
The Bhadanta answers: As the Sutra says, "I know, I see--
hrough the perfe a abandoning and the perfea knowledge of desire, of
iews, mayands, attachments and latent defilements to the idea of self 240
a$magrdha)\ to the idea of mine (mamagrdha), to asmindna -- 241
without shade, Parinirvana. " [This Sutra shows that mayand--in the ingular since it is a genre--is distina from asmimdna].
So be it, there is mayand; but from whence do you hold that it is jnorance?
The Bhadanta answers: Because one cannot identify mayand with ny other defilement, since it is named separately from desire, views, nd asmimdna.
But could it not be a mdna other than asmimdna} [Mdna is in faa six r sevenfold, v. 10]. However we would have to say too much in order to smplete this examination. Let us stop here.
***
242
As for ndmarupa rupa has already been explained (19).
245 30a. Ndman are the skandhas that are not rupa.
The four nonmaterial skandhas,--sensation, ideas, samskdras, and >nsciousness, are called ndman, for ndman signifies "that which bends, elds," (namatiti ndma).
? The nonmaterial skandhas bend, [that is, "are active," pravartante, "arise," utpadyante], towards the objea (artha) by reason of name
244 (ndman), the organs, and the object.
In this phrase, "by reason of name," one takes the word "name" in its popular sense, (samjndkarana, ii. 47a, English trans, p. 250), as a "designation," which designates and causes to be understood either a collection, "cattle," "horses," etc. ,ora single thing, "rupa" "taste," etc.
Why is samjndkarana termed "name?
"
Because the samjndkarana causes the nonmaterial skandhas to bend (namayatiti noma) towards their objea.
According to another explanation, the nonmaterial skandhas are termed ndman, because, then the body dissolves, these skandhas bend,
245 that is, go towards another existence.
***
We have already explained the six dyatanas (i. 9). *#*
246 30b. There are six contaas. They arise from encounter.
The first is the contaa of the eye, and the sixth is contaa of the manas or mind (Digha, iii. 243, etc. )
They arise from the coming together of three things, an organ, its objea, and a consciousness.
One can see indeed that there can be a coming together of the five material organs, with their objeas and their corresponding con- sciousnesses, for the three are simultaneous. But the mental organ or manas (manodhdtu) is destroyed when a mental consciousness (mano- vijnana) arises (i. 172); and the objea (i. e. , dharmas) of this con- sciousness can be future: how can there be a coming together of the three?
There is a coming together because the organ (the manas) and the objea (the dharmas) are the causal conditions of the mental con- sciousness; or rather because the organ, the objea and the consciousness produce the same single effea, namely the contaa.
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***
What is the nature of contact?
The masters are not in agreement.
Some--[the Sautrantikas]--say: Contact is merely the coming
together itself. According to the Sutra, 'The coming together, the 247
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact. "
Others--[the Sarvastivadins]--say: Contact is a dharma associated
with the mind (ii. 24, English trans, p. 190), distina from any coming 248 249
together. According to the Smra of the Six Hexades, "The six internal sources of consciousness (ayatanas, eye, etc. ), the six external sources of consciousness (visible things, etc), the six consciousness, the six contacts, the six sensations, and the six desires. " The Sutra thus knows of the six contacts, together with the six categories of internal ayatanas, external ayatanas, and the consciousnesses: [thus the contacts are separate dharmas; for the Sutra does not contain any repetition or double usages].
[The Sautrantikas explain this Sutra:] If the Sutra does not contain any repetition, it follows that sensations and desires exist apart from the dharmayatana which is the sixth internal source of consciousness (the object of the manas), since you can hold only that the first two categories (six organs and six objects) refer to the organs and their objects without any relation to the consciousness.
[Reply of the Sautrantika, the Bhadanta Srllabha:] Every eye and
visible thing is not the cause of a visual consciousness, as all visual
25 consciousness is not the result of the eye and a visible thing. ? Thus
what is defined as contact in the Sutra, "Six collections of contacts," is the eye, a visible thing and the consciousnesses which are cause and effect. (See p. 428, line 13a).
But how do the Sarvastivadins, who maintain that contact exists
apart from the coming together of any eye, a visible thing and a
consciousness, explain the Sutra, 'The coming together (samgati), the
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact? " 251
They do not read the Sutra in this form; or rather they say that the
252
expression is metaphorical: when the text says "the coming
together," it means "the result of the coming together. "
253 But this discussion is taking us too far afield
? ***
The Abhidharmikas think that contact is a dharma, a separate entity.
30c-d Five are contact through (actual) contact; the sixth is
254 so-called through denomination.
The contact of the eye, the ear, etc. , have sapratigha organs (i. 29b) for their support (dfraya); thus they are termed pratigha spar $ a taking
255 their name from their support.
The sixth, the contact of the mental organ, is called adhivaca- 256
nasamsparfa.
What is the meaning of the term adhivacanam
257 Adhivacana is a name.
Now name is the object (alambana) par excellence of contact
associated with the mental consciousness. In fact it is said, "Through the
visual consciousness, he knows blue; but he does not know, 'It is blue;'
through the mental consciousness, he knows blue and he knows, It is
258 blue/"
Thus the contact of the mental organ takes its name--a contact of
denomination--from its characteristic object.
259
According to another opinion, one takes into account the fact that
only the mental consciousness is activated (pravartate) with regard to its objeas (color, etc. ), or applies itself to its object, by reason of expression
260
or speech (adhikrtya vacanam = vacanam avadhatya): mental
consciousness is thus adhivacana. The contact (sparfa) that is associated with it is thus called adhivacanasamsparia.
#*#
The sixth contact is of three types:
31a-b. Contact of knowledge, non-knowledge, other: which are
261 respectively pure, defiled, other.
These are the contacts associated with vidya, that is, with pure prajna-, with avidya, that is, with defiled non-knowledge; and with naivavidya-navidyd, that is, with good, but impure prajnd.
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? 262 with all the defilements and which is always active,
the two:
31c. Contacts of antipathy and sympathy
which are associated with hatred and with desire.
one distinguishes
***
In considering the contact of non-knowledge which is associated
Contact in its totality, is threefold.
3Id. Three contacts, leading to pleasure (sukhavedya), etc.
These are contacts that lead to the acquisition of pleasure, of suffering, and of neither pleasure nor suffering. These contacts are so called because they are beneficial to pleasure, to suffering, and to neither pleasure nor suffering [that is: propitious to the sensation of pleasure, etc. , = sukhavedamya, etc. ] (Pdnini, 5,1. 1); or rather because "that" is felt or can be felt (vedyate tadvedayiturh vasakyam) (Panini, 3,1. 169).
"That" is sensation, vedana. The contact where a pleasure should be felt (sukham vedyam), is a contact that is called sukhavedya. There is in fact an agreeable (sukha) sensation there.
*##
We have defined the sixfold contact, contact of the eye, etc.
264 32a. Six sensations arise from contact.
That is: sensation arisen from contact with the eye, etc. 32a-b. Five are bodily sensations and one is mental.
The five sensations that arise from the contact of the eye and from the other bodily organs, having for support (asraya) the bodily organs, are bodily. The sixth sensation arises from contact with the manas: its support is the mind (manas) so it is mental or caitasi.
263
? [The Sautrantikas] ask if the sensation is later than, or simultaneous to contact.
The Vaibhasikas maintain that sensation and contact are simul- taneous, being sahabhilhetu, "reciprocal causes" (ii. 50a).
[The Sautrantikas:] How can two things arisen together be "that which produces" (janaka) and "that which is produced" (janya)?
[The Vaibhasikas:] Why would they not be?
[The Sautrantikas:] When two things arise together, how could the dharma "which produces" have any efficacy with regard to the dharma "to be produced," which has already arisen?
[The Vaibhasikas:] This argument (sddhana) only repeats the thesis (pratijna) that two things arisen together cannot be "that which produces" and "that which is produced. "
[The Sautrantikas:] We would say then that, in your hypothesis, there would be reciprocal causality of two dharmas arisen together.
[The Vaibhasikas:] But this is not a fault, for we admit this consequence. We define sahabhilhetu as ye mithahphalah, "The dharmas that are results of one other are a sahabhu cause" (ii. 50c).
[The Sautrantikas:] So be it, that is your system. But the Sutra condemns this system. It says, "By reason of the contact of the eye, there arises a sensation which arises from the contact of the eye;" it does not say, "By reason of the sensation which arises from the contact of the eye, the contact of the eye arises. " And again the thesis that "Two things arisen together can be cause and result" is in contradiction to the characteristics of a cause. It is taken for granted that the dharma which produces another dharma is not simultaneous to this other dharma', a seed precedes its shoot; milk precedes dadhi\ a blow precedes the noise; and the manas (the mental organ) precedes the mental consciousness (manovijndna) (i. 17).
[The Vaibhasikas:] We do not deny that a cause is sometimes earlier than its result; but we affirm that a cause and its result can be simultaneous: for example, the visual organ and color, and the visual consciousness; or the primary elements {mahahhutas) and "secondary (bhautika) matter. "
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[The Sautrantikas:] We do not admit your examples: the visual organ and color precede the visual consciousness; but the primary elements and derived matter, which are simultaneous, arise together from a complex of earlier causes.
The Vaibhasikas: Contact and sensation are simultaneous, like the
265 shoot and its shade.
***
According to another opinion, [the Bhadanta Srllabha]: Sensation is later than contact. There is first the organ and the object (first moment), then the consciousness (second moment); contact is the "coming together," that is, the quality of cause and result of these three: organ and object, and consciousness; finally (third moment) there arises sensation which has contact for its cause.
The Vaibhasikas: In this theory, there is no sensation wherever there is consciousness: for there is consciousness in the second and third moment, but sensation only in the third And all consciousness is not contact, for there is contact only in the first two moments.
[Srilabha:] No. One sensation, having for its cause an earlier contact, exists at the moment of a later contact: thus all contact is accompanied by sensation.
[The Vaibhasikas:] According to you, there would thus be simul- taneous contact and a sensation of different objects: a sensation produced by earlier contact of color would exist at the moment of a second contact of sound. Now a sensation produced by a contact of color should have this color for its object, for a sensation cannot have an object different from the object of the consciousness with which it is associated [and this consciousness, produced by color, should have color for its object]. Thus you are forced to an inadmissible conclusion.
[Srllabha:] Let us say then that consciousness is not always contact, and that it is not always accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of color, contemporaneous with the contact of sound, is not contact, but is accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of the sound is contact, but it is not accompaned by sensation.
[The Vaibhasikas:] This theory is incompatible with the rule of the universal (sarvatraga) or mahabhumika dharmas (ii. 23c-d). This rule
? establishes that ten dharmas,--sensation, contaa, idea, etc. --are associated with every mental state.
[Srilabha:] Upon what authority does this rule rest?
266 [The Vaibhasikas:] On the Sastra or Abhidharma.
[Srllabha:] We recognize Sutra and not Sastra as authority. For the
267
Blessed One said that recourse is to the Sutra. Or rather we propose
for the doctrine of the mahabhumikas an interpretation different from yours.
[The Vaibhasikas:] What then is the meaning of the expression
26s mahdbhumika"i
[The Sautrantikas:] There are three bhumis or spheres, 1. savitarka-
savicdra: Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, 2. avitarka-savicdra: the
intermediate dhyana, and 3. avitarka-avicdra: the Second Dhyana, etc.
(viii. 23c); three other bhumis, good, bad, and neutral [that is, the good,
bad, and neutral dharmas]', and three other bhumis, of Saiksas, Asaiksas,
and neither-Saiksa-nor-Asaiksa [that is, the pure dharmas of the Saiksa 269
and ASaiksa, and the impure dharmas, ii. 70c]. The mental dharmas 210
which are found in all these bhumis are called mahdbhumika [these are sensation, volition, as ii. 24]; those which are found only in a good bhumi are called kusalamahdbhumika [these are faith, etc. , as ii. 25]; those which are found only in a defiled bhumi are called klesamahd- bhumika [these are ignorance, etc. , as ii. 26]. But all these dharmas are called mahdbhumika, kusalamahdbhumika, and klesamahdbhumika because they can be found in the bhumi proper to them: but it is false that they are necessarily found all at once. Sensation, for example, exists
in all the bhumis, as too ideas, volition, etc. : but this does not mean that 271
every mental state includes all these dharmas, sensation, etc.
Certain masters observe that the category of the akusalamaha-
272
bhumikas, at first unknown, has been added later; and the Sutras
273 would suggest this idea.
[The Vaibhasikas:] If sensation is later than contact, you have to take into account the Sutra, "By reason of the eye and visible things there arises visual consciousness; the coming together of the three is contact;
274 together there arises (sahajdbd) sensation, ideas, volition. "
[The Sautrantikas:] This Sutra say that sensation, ideas and volition
arise together; it does not say that they arise together with contact: we
275
say that they arise together among themselves. Let us observe also
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that the word "together" (saha) is used, not only to indicate simultaneity,
but also to indicate immediate succession. The Sutra, for example, says,
with compassion. " Now compassion, which is always "worldly," evidently cannot be simultaneous to a part of Bodhi: for the parts of Bodhi are always transworldly. Thus the Sutra not only does not prove that sensation is simultaneous to contact; it does not even prove that sensation, ideas and volition are associated with, and simultaneous to consciousness (visual consciousness, etc).
[The Sarvastivadins:] But the Sutra says, "The dharmas of sensation, ideas, volition, and consciousness are mixed; they are not
277
separate. " "Mixed" signifies "arisen together. " From this Sutra we
conclude that there are no consciousnesses, sensations, ideas or volitions which are not simultaneous.
"He cultivates the part of Bodhi called mindfulness together (sahagata) 276
[The Sautrantikas:] But what is the meaning of the word "mixed", 278
samsrspa! We read in the Sutra that you have just quoted, "That which
he feels (vedayata), he thinks of (cetayate)\ that about which he thinks,
he discerns (vijandti)" In other words, the same thing is the object (alambana) of sensation, volition, and consciousness. The question is thus posed whether sensation, volition and ideas are called mixed because they have the same object--which is our opinion--or because they are simultaneous, as you say.
28
[The Vaibhasikas: ? ] The word samsrspa refers to simultaneous
samsrspa. They cannot be samsrspa except through simultaneity, not by the fact that they would have a common object, since they do not have any object. Furthermore the Sutra says, "The coming together of the three is contact. " How could there be a consciousness without there being a coming together of the three? How could there be encounter of the three without there being contact? Thus all consciousness is accompanied by contact and all contact is accompanied by sensation, etc.
But this discussion is carrying us too far afield. Let us return to our subject.
he grasps an idea of (samjandti)\ that about which he grasps an idea of, 219
things. It is said in fact that life (ayus) and warmth (usmaka) are 281
***
? We have explained, in summary, mental (caitast) sensation. 32c-d. This same sensation is of eighteen types by reason of the
22 objects of the mind (manopavicdras). *
Mental sensation is made up of eighteen types, because there are six upavicdras of satisfaaion (samanasya), six of dissatisfaaion {daurma- nasya), and six of indifference (upeksa) (ii. 7): these are the upavicdras of satisfaaion relating to visible things, sounds, color, tastes, tangible things, and the dharmas; the same for the upavicdras of dissatisfaaion and indifference.
How does one distinguish these eighteen?
In considering their nature, their quality of being sensation, the
upavicdras are three: of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference;
considering their quality of associates, they are one, all being associated
with the mental consciousness; and considering their objeas, they are
six: having visible things, sounds, etc. , for their objeas. We answer then
that one must take into account, at one and the same time, these three
283 qualities.
There is no variety in the object of the first fifteen upavicdras: the
objea of manopavicdra relating to visible things is only these visible
things. . . But, as for the three dharmopavkdras--the three upavicdras
(satisfaaion, etc. ) relating to the dharmas--one would distinguish: they
can arise relating to the distina dharmas of the five sense objects; in this
case, their objea presents no variety, and is not mixed; they can bear on
one, two, three,. . . six categories of dharmas (visible things, sounds,. . .
284
dharmas); in this case, their objea is mixed
What is the meaning of the expression manopavicdra?
Why are the different types of mental sensation (satisfaaion, etc. )
called manopavicdra}
The Vaibhasikas say wrongly, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference are supported by the manas in order to grasp visible 2
things, etc. , as an objea (upavicaranti = dlambante). " *^
According to another opinion, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference cause the manas to reconsider {upavicdrayanti) visible 286
things, etc. " For it is by reason of sensation (sensation of satisfaction, etc. ) that the manas repeatedly considers visible things, etc.
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? sphere of a single manas, not placed among the manopavicara} 288
***
Objections or difficulties. 1. Why not define bodily (kdyikt) sensation as manopavicdra.
Without doubt bodily sensation has the manas for its support, but it also has the material organs (eye, etc) for its support. It is free from vikalpa (like the visual consciousness, etc, to which it is associated, i. 33,
trans, p. 97); and it is no longer upavicarikd, [that is9 susceptible of 27
"consideration," samthikd]. *
2. But why is the sukha of the Third Dhyana (viii. 9b), which is of the
[The Vaibhasikas say (wrongly), ] "Because, initially, that is, in Kamadhatu, there is no sukha which is of the sphere of the manas, [In Kamadhatu, sukha is solely bodily sensation]; and because there does not exist any duhkha-upavicdra which would oppose the sukha- upavicdra that you imagine. "
3. But, if the upavicdras are only of the sphere of the manas, you have
to take into account the Sutra which says, "Having seen visible things
through the eye, he considers (upavicdrati) the visible things which 289
satisfy {saumanasyasthdntya). " The relationship is characterized, in the Sutra, by the visual organ and by upavicdra.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] 1. The Blessed One expresses himself in this manner because he takes into consideration the fact that the upavicdras can be produced by the five sense consciousnesses. The upavicdras are no less that the sphere of the single manas: in the same way, for example, that the aiubhds (meditation on a cadaver turning blue, etc, vi.
