After this moment, when one notifies the new monk of the nisrayas,
306
when he makes known that he accepts them, and as long as the series
of the avijnapti created by the principal aaion continues--that is to say, as long as the monk does not lose the Pratimoksa discipline (iv.
306
when he makes known that he accepts them, and as long as the series
of the avijnapti created by the principal aaion continues--that is to say, as long as the monk does not lose the Pratimoksa discipline (iv.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
The volition of the ninth is the action which destroys black-white action.
The volition which corresponds to the ninth path of abandoning in the detachment of Kamadhatu is the pure action which causes the abandoning of black-white action and black action, for at this moment one abandons, in its entirety, good action of Kamadhatu (which is black-white) and the ninth and last category of bad action.
? 62c-d Volition which arises in the last paths of abandoning of the detachment of the dhyanas destroys good aaion
The volition of the ninth and last path of abandoning which produces detachment of Kamadhatu with regard to each dhydna is fourfold volition which destroys white aaion.
Objeaion: The first eight paths of abandoning in the detachment of Kamadhatu destroy black aaion. But you attribute the power to destroy white-black and white aaion (good and impure aaions: kusaksasrava) solely to the ninth path of abandoning. Why is this?
There is not, properly speaking, abandonment of any good
dharmas, for even if they are abandoned, the good dharmas can
reappear; but when the defilement which has this dharma for its objea
is destroyed this dharma is said to be abandoned. Therefore as long as
the last category of defilement which can grasp it as its objea is not
destroyed, this gooddharma is not considered abandoned. [Now it is the
ninth path of abandoning which breaks the prdpti of the ninth category
of defilement relative to each sphere (Kamadhatu, dhyanas) and, as a
consequence, allows one to obtain disconneaion (ii. 57d) from this
257 defilement).
63a-b. According to others, the first two aaions are retributed in hell and retributed moreover in Kamadhatu.
According to other masters (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 590al) aaion which should be experienced in hell is black aaion; aaion which should be experienced elsewhere in Kamadhatu, in addition to hell, is black- white aaion. Infernal retribution is produced exclusively through bad aaion: as a consequence, aaion which should be experienced in hell is black aaion. Retribution in Kamadhatu, with the exception of hell, is exclusively produced by good-bad aaion (that is, by good aaion mixed with bad aaion).
63c-d According to others, arisen in Kama, aaions are black
when they can be abandoned through Seeing the Truths; they
258 are black-white in the contrary case.
According to other masters (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 590c5) aaion which is abandoned through Seeing the Truths, not being mixed with the
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? 259
good, is black. All other actions of Kamadhatu, namely action which
is abandoned through Meditation, is black-white, that is, good mixed with bad.
***
The Sutra says, "There are three silences, silence of the body, voice,
260 and of the mind. "
64a-c. Asaiksa, that is, an Arhat's, actions of the body, voice and 261
mind, are, in this order, the three silences.
Silence of the body and silence of the voice is bodily and vocal action
262
which belongs to the Arhat. Silence of the mind is the mind or
thought which belongs to an Arhat: this is not mental action. Why is this?
Because the mind is the true Silent One, the true Muni.
The Vahasikas say that one knows through inference--by reason of the actions of the body and voice--that the mind is of oikfa.
But an Arhat's bodily and vocal action, is, in its nature, "abstention,"
whereas the action of the mind is not, by nature, "abstention," because 263
three is no avijnapti of the mind.
But "silence" is abstention, thus the mind itself "which abstains"
receives the name of silence.
Why does only the mind of the Arhat receive this name?
Because the Arhat is the true Silent One through the cessation of all
murmuring of his defilements.
***
The Sutra says, "There are three purifications, purification of the
264 body, purification of the voice, and purification of the mind. "
64c-d. The threefold good practice in its entirety is the threefold purification.
All the good practices of the body, pure or impure, are a purification of the body, because, either for a time or in a definitive manner, they efface the impurity of the defilements and bad practices.
? The same holds for the voice and mind
This teaching has for its goal the instruction of persons who take a
265 false silence for silence, and a false purification of purification.
***
266
The Sutra says that there are three bad practices.
65a-b. The bad actions of the body, speech and mind are regarded as being the three bad practices.
267 Bad actions of the body are the bad praaices of the body and so on.
65c-d Even though greed, wickedness, anger and false views are not actions, they constitute a threefold bad practice of the mind.
Further, there are three bad practices of the mind which, by their
268
nature, are not mental action: greed, wickedness or harm, and false
views.
The Darstantikas say that greed, wickedness and false views are,
269
in fact, mental actions, for the Samcetantyasutra considers them as 270
actions.
The Vaibhasikas: In this hypothesis, defilements and actions would
be the same thing.
The Darstantikas: What harm do you see in that?
The Vaibhasikas: To admit that defilement is action is to contradict
the Sutra and the definition that it gives of action (iv. lb). As for the Samcetantyasutra to which you allude, it is volition itself that it designates when it says "greed," because volition comes into play under the influence of greed
Because these produce a painful retribution, and because they are condemned by gpod persons, these praaices of the body, speech and mind are bad; they are thus termed bad praaices.
271 66a. Good praaice is the opposite.
The opposite of bad praaice is good praaice: good actions of the body, speech, and mind; further, non-greed, non-wickedness and right views.
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*#*
272 How can false views or right views by regarded as bad, or good?
In fact, the first does not contain an intention to do evil, and the second does not contain an intention to do good to another.
This is true, but they are the root of this twofold intentioa
66b-d By taking, among these practices, the most evident, one
273 defines the ten courses of action, good and bad respectively.
The Sutra defines ten courses of action: good courses of action, by taking the most important,--which are the easiest to see--from among the good practices; and bad courses of action, by taking the gravest from among the bad practices.
***
What practices, bad or good, are not included in the courses of action?
A part of the bad practices of the body, namely (1) preparatory and consecutive actions of bodily courses of action (prayoga, prsthabhiita, iv. 68c); and (2) certain defiled actions of the body, for example, drinking alcohol, hitting, binding, etc (Majjhbna, iii. 34), are not included among the courses of action, because these practices are not extremely grave. Among the bad practices of the body are courses of action which deprive another of his life, of his goods, or of his wife: one must absolutely abstain from them.
That which is very grave among bad practices of speech, is, for this same reason, declared to be a course of action, not preparatory, consecutive, or minor action.
One part of the bad praaice of the mind, volition, is also excluded
274 from the bad courses of actioa
The good courses of action do not include 1. either a part of the good
praaice of the body: preparatory or consecutive; abstention from
275
inebriating drinks, etc. ; alms, worship, etc. ; 2. or one part of the good
276
praaice of speech, affeaionate words, etc. ; 3. or one part of the good
praaice of the mind, good volition.
? Among the courses of action,
67a. Six bad courses of action can be exclusively avijnapti.
When one has six courses of action--murder, stealing, lying,
malicious speech, harmful speech, or inconsiderate speech--performed
by another, then these six courses of aaion are only avijnapti. He who
had these actions carried out is lacking the principle vijnapti, that is, the
278
act of killing itself, etc
67b. One bad course of aaion is always of two types.
Adulteryisalwaysvijnaptiandavijnapti,foritmustbeperpetrated in person. When one has it committed by another, he does not procure the same pleasure.
67b. Six, when one carries them out himself, are of two types
27 also. *
When one executes them himself, the six courses of aaion specified
above (67a) are at one and the same time vijnapti and avijnapti if death 280
takes place at the same moment as the vijnapti (that is, at the moment of the stroke by which one intends to kill): if death takes place later, there is only avijnapti.
***
Among the good courses of aaion,
67c Seven good courses of aaion are of two types.
Seven courses of material aaions, that is, of the body and the voice, are of two types, vijnapti and avijnapti. In faa the morality that one undertakes depends on one vijnapti.
61d. They are only avijnapti when they have arisen from absorption.
The courses of aaion which are included in dharmaiUa, that is, in the discipline of dhyana and in the pure discipline, are qualified as
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271
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"arisen from absorption/' These two disciplines depend on a single
21 thought: the courses of action are thus not vij&apti. *
Is this also the case for preparatory and consecutive actions as for the principle action or the course of aaion proper?
68a. The samantakas are vijnapti.
The samantakas or preliminary actions are actions which prepare forthecoursesofaaionofthesphereofKamadhatu Theyarealways vijnapti (iv. 2b, 3d).
68b. They may or may not be avijnapti.
When they are accomplished with a great violence of passion (paryavastbana, v. 47, dhfikya, 032, etc), or with an extreme strength of faith (prasddagbanarasena, iv. 22), they are avijnapti. If not, then no.
282
Consecutive actions are, on the contrary, necessarily avijnapti. They are vijfiapti when, having accomplished a course of aaion, one continues to commit aaions analogous to the course of aaioa
***
What is it that constitutes preparatory aaion, the course of aaion
283 proper, and consecutive aaion?
A man, desiring to kill an animal, rises from his bed, takes some silver, goes to the market, feels the animal, buys the animal, leads it, pulls it, makes it enter, mistreats it, takes a sword, strikes the head once or twice: as long as he does not kill it, the aaion preparatory to killing lasts.
At the stroke by which he deprives the animal of its life--that is, at the moment when the animal dies--the vijnapti of this moment and the avijnapti which is simultaneous to this vijnapti, are the course of aaion proper. For it is by reason of two causes that one is touched by the transgression of murder: by reason of the preparatory aaion and by
284
reason of the achievement of the result [of the preparatory aaion]. The moments that follow, the moments of avijnapti created by the killing, are the consecutive aaion; the series of the moments of vijnapti
68c The opposite concerning consecutive aaioa
? are also consecutive action: moments that constitute pulling the hide off the animal, washing it, weighing it, selling it, cooking it, eating it, and congratulating oneself on it.
In the same way one can explain, with the necessary changes, the
285 other six courses of bodily and vocal aaion.
There is no reason to distinguish preparatory and consecutive aaion for greed, wickedness and false views: at the moment when they manifest themselves, by the sole fact of their presence, they are courses of action proper.
Objection: A question is raised. Is the course of action made up of
vijnapti and avijnapti at the moment when the animal is in marana- 286
bhava, that is, at the moment when the animal dies? Or is the vijnapti and the avijnapti of the moment when the animal is in mrtabhava, that is, when it is dead?
If you accept the first hypothesis, a person would be guilty of the transgression of killing when he kills at the very moment when the killed animal dies: but your system (siddhanta, iv. 72a-b) does not admit this. And in the second hypothesis, you have rightly said that, "at the stroke by which he deprives the animal of its life, the vijnapti of this moment and the avijnapti simultaneous to this vijnapti, are the course of action proper," [You should have said, mrte prdniniyd vijnaptih. . . "The vijnapti which took place when the animal dies. . . "]
Further, if you accept the second hypothesis, you contradict the
explanation that the Vaibhasikas give to the phrase, "while the prayoga
has not yet disappeared," that one reads in the Mulafastra (Jnana-
prasthma, TD 26, p. 975a8). This Sastra says, "Can it be the case that a
living being has already been killed but that murder has not yet
287
occured? Yes, when the living being has already been deprived of life,
288
but when the prayoga [of the murder] has not yet disappeared" The
Vaibhasikas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 6l7a3) explain this text by saying that the word prayoga ("conjoined with")--which normally signifies preparation--here has the meaning of consecutive aaion. Now you contradia this explanation since, placing the course of principle aaion at the moment when the animal dies, it is indeed the course of principal
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aaion which, according to you, has not disappeared at the moment when the animal dies. You interpret the word prayoga of the Sastra in the sense of the principal aaion
The Vaibhasikas: One must explain the Sastra in such a manner that it does not lend itself to criticism. And how is that? In the text in question, prayoga signifies principal course of aaion: [at least when one envisions the moment which immediately follows the death of the animal; when one envisions the moments which follow this moment,
prayoga signifies, as the Vibhasa says, the consecutive aaion]
But how could the vijnapti of the moment when the animal is
already dead be the principal course of aaion?
The Vaibhasikas: Why would it not be?
Because it is ineffeaive [The animal is dead: one does not cause it to
die again]
The Vaibhasikas: But how is avijnapti, which is always ineffecive, a
course of aaion? It is not their efficacy which makes a vijnapti and an avijnapti courses of aaion; it is the faa that they are produced at the
289
Gin it be the case that one course of aaion is either a preparatory aaion or a consecutive action of another course of aaion?
Yes. For example the ten courses of aaion can be a preparatory aaion for murder. A man desires to kill his enemy; in order to assure the success of this enterprise, he takes the goods of another and offers an animal in sacrifice; as a means to this same end, he committs adultery with the wife of his enemy in order to make her an accomplice; through lying, malicious, injurious, and frivolous words, he causes a falling out
between his enemy and his friends who would be able to defend him; he covets the goods of his enemy; he wishes to do evil to his enemy; he nourishes false views with regard to the murder that he wants to commit.
In this same way the ten courses of aaion can be the consecutive aaion of murder. And the same for the other courses of aaion, stealing,
290
But, greed, wickedness and false views are never preparatory
moment of the achievement of the result of the preparatory aaion.
etc
? actions, for they are not the beginning of an aaion; nor are they
291
The Sutra says, "There are, Oh Bhiksus, three types of killing: killing arisen from desire, killing arisen from hatred, and killing arisen from ignorance," and thus following to, "There are, Oh Bhiksus, three types of false views. " What are these different killings, etc?
All the courses of aaion are not indifferently achieved by desire, hatred, or ignorance; but
292 68d Preparatory aaion arises from three roots.
The preparatory aaion of all of the courses of aaion can indifferently arise from the three roots. The Blessed One, by expressing himself as we have seen, refers to the first cause, the cause which gives rise (samidtbapaka, iv. lOa-b) to the course of aaion.
293
1. Killing (iv. 73) arisen from desire: killing in order to seize a
certain part of an animal; killing in order to seize some goods; killing for pleasure; killing in order to defend oneself, or one's friends.
Killing arisen from hatred, in order to satiate hostility.
Killing arisen through ignorance. To consider the sacrifice as a
294
pious aaion and so to kill; when a king, according to the authority of
the legalists kills through duty, "The first of the meritorious aaions of
the king is to punish evil-doers"; when the Persians say, "One should
295
kill one's aged and sick parents"; when one says, "One should kill
preparatory actions, for they are solely a production of the mind
*##
serpents, scorpions, and tryambuka flies (Mahavyutpatti, 213,91), etc. , 296
because these creatures are poisonous; one must kill game, cattle,
297 birds, and buffalos in order to nourish oneself. "
And finally killing which is provoked by false views: murder committed by a person who denys a future life and whom nothing can stop.
2. Stealing (iv. 73c-d) arisen from desire. Either one steals the objea
desired, or one steals in order to then gain possession of another objea,
298
to acquire honor and respea, or in order to defend oneself and one's
friends.
Stealing arisen from hatred, in order to satiate hostility.
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Stealing arisen from ignorance. A king, upon the authority of the legalists, seizes the goods of evil-doers. The Brahmins say, "All things have been given to the Brahmins by Brahma; and it is through the weakness of the Brahmins that the Vr? alas enjoy it. Consequently, when a Brahmin steals, he takes that which belongs to him; he eats what is his,
299
wears what is his, and gives what is his. " And yet, when Brahmins
take, they indeed have the notion of the goods of another.
Stealing provoked through false views is also stealing from
ignorance.
3. Illicit sexuality (iv. 74a-b) arisen from desire. Sexual intercourse
with the wife of another, either through love, or in order to obtain honor and respect, or in order to defend oneself and one's friends.
Illicit sexuality arisen through hatred, in order to satiate hostility.
Illicit sexuality arisen from ignorance. The Persians, etc, have
30 intercourse with their mothers and other forbidden womea ? In the
301
gosava sacrifice, a Brahmin drinks water in the manner of an animal,
grazes through the grass, has intercourse with his mother, his sister, or a woman of his gotta; he must copulate with them wherever he finds them: in this manner this bull will triumph over the world And such
,r
too are those that say, Women are like rice mortars, flowers, fruits,
302 cooked food, ladders, roads, and ferryboats: they are there to be used"
4-7. Lying (iv. 74c-d) and other vocal transgressions arisen from ignorance and from hatred, as above.
Lying arisen from ignorance. "Oh King, playful lying, lying to
women, in marriage, or in danger of death, does not hurt: one says that
303
these five lies are not transgressions. " This is lying provoked by false
views.
Malicious words and other vocal transgressions arisen from
ignorance. These are provoked through false views. Further, the false discourses of the Vedas, etc, are frivolous words arisen from ignorance. 8-10. How do greed, wickedness and false views (iv. 77-78) arise out
of desire, etc? Since they are not preparatory action, this creates a difficulty:
69a-b. Greed and the other two mental courses arise from the three roots because they appear subsequent to these roots.
When they appear immediately after desire, they arise from desire;
? the same for the other two roots. ***
We have explained the bad courses of aaion in their relationship with the roots. As for the good courses of aaion,
69c-d Good actions, with their preparatory and consecutive aaions, arise fron non-desire, non-hatred, and non-ignorance.
Good courses of aaion, with their preparatory and consecutive aaions, have a good mind for their originating (pravartaka, iv. 10) cause. This good mind, being necessarily associated with the three roots, arises from the three roots.
The renouncing of a preparation of a bad course of aaion is a preparation of a good course of aaion; the renouncing of the aaion proper which constitutes a bad course of aaion is itself a good course of aaion; the renouncing of a consecutive aaion of a bad course of aaion is a consecutive aaion of a good course of aaion.
Let us give as an example: the ordination of a novice. From the
m
moment when the novice enters into the nandvasa, salutes the
Sangha, addresses his request to the Upadhyaya, until the first or second
305
karmavdcana, this is the preparatory aaion.
At the achievement of
the third karmavdcana there takes place a vijnapti, and an avijnapti
simultaneous to this vijnapti, which constitute the course of aaion itself.
After this moment, when one notifies the new monk of the nisrayas,
306
when he makes known that he accepts them, and as long as the series
of the avijnapti created by the principal aaion continues--that is to say, as long as the monk does not lose the Pratimoksa discipline (iv. 38)-- this is the consecutive aaion.
##*
We have seen that bad courses of aaion were not indifferently "achieved" by the three roots.
70a-b. Killing, wickedness, and injurious words are achieved through hate.
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307 Solely by hate. They are achieved when one thought of murder, or
one thought of violence (concerning wickedness and injurious words) manifests itself.
70b-d Adultery, greed, and stealing are achieved through desire. "Adultery" is illicit sexuality.
71a. False views, through ignorance. Through an extreme ignorance.
71b. The others, by the three.
The other courses of action,--lying, malicious words, and in- considerate words,--are achieved either through desire, hatred, or ignorance.
The courses of action, which have just been divided into four sections, three (70a-b), three, one and three, have respectively for their
71c-d Object: living beings, objeas of enjoyment, namarupa,
308 and ndman.
Living beings are the objects of killing, wickedness and injurious
speech; the objeas of enjoyment are the objeas of adultery, greed and
stealing; namarupa, that is, the five skandhas, are the objea of false
views; ndman, that is, the ndmakdya (ii. 47) is the objea of lying and the 309
other two transgressions of the voice.
#*#
When one has decided to kill someone, and if the murderer dies either before the intended victim, or if he dies at precisely the same
moment as the viaim, is there a principal course of action for the author of the murder?
72a-b. If one dies before or at the same time, there is no principal
310 course of aaion.
This is why the Vibhdsd says, "Question: When a person has made the preparation for killing, can it be that, at the moment when the result of this preparation is achieved, this person is not touched by the
? 311
transgression of killing? Answer: Yes, when the murderer dies
before or at the same time [as the viaim]. " The reason is clear: as long as the viaim is living, the murderer is not touched by the transgression of murder; and when the viaim dies, he (=the murderer) no longer exists if he died at the same time or before.
72b. Because a new body has come into existence.
The body--the personality--by whom the preparation had been accomplished, the body of the murderer, is destroyed; the murderer takes up a new body which belongs to another nikayasabhaga (ii. 41a): this body did not make the preparation, is not prayoktar and, as a consequence, cannot be touched by the transgression of murder.
*##
When many persons are united with the intention to kill, either in war, or in the hunt, or in banditry, who is guilty of murder, if only one of them kills?
72c-d As soldiers, etc. , concur in the realization of the same effea, all are as guilty as the one who kills.
Having a common goal, all are guilty exaaly as he who among them kills, for all mutually incite one another, not through speech, but by the very faa that they are united together in order to kill
But is the person who has been constrained through force to join the army also guilty?
Evidently so, unless he has formed the resolution, "Even in order to save my life, I shall not kill a living being. "
***
What does he do in order that he who kills should commit the course of aaion? Same question for the other transgressions up to and including false views.
73a-b. Murder is to kill another, consciously, without making an error.
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When a person kills by thinking, "I am killing such a one," and kills
this same person, and not another through error, then there is
312 murder.
But is there murder when a person kills, doubting if he hits a living being or a thing, or if he hits another?
This person possesses the certitude, "This is certainly him"; he hits
515 him; and as a consequence, there is the thought of paritydga.
***
How can there be murder, or destruction of the prdna (prdndtipdta), 314
since the skandhas are momentary?
Prdna, the "vital breath", is a wind whose existence depends on the
315
body and the mind. This prdna is annihilated by a murderer in the
same way in which one annihilates a flame or a sound of a bell, that is to
say, by obstructing the continuation of its reproducing itself. 316
Or rather, prdna is the vital organ (fivitendriya, ii. 45a): when a person creates an obstacle to the arising of a new moment of the vital organ, he annihilates it, and is touched by the transgression of killing.
But to whom do you attribute the vital organ? Who do you say is
317 dead when life is absent?
The true value of the pronoun "to whom" or "of whom" will be examined in the chapter on the Refutation of the Pudgala (Chapter
318
IX).
Let us observe that the Blessed One said, "When life, heat and
consciousness leave the body, it lies abandoned, like a piece of wood,
319
deprived of feeling. " One says that the body lives when it is endowed
with the organs; and that the body is dead when it is devoid of them.
**#
32
AccordingtotheNirgranthas, ? atransgression(adharma)results
for the doer from killing, even committed without knowing it, or without desiring it, in the way that contact with fire results in burning. But if this is the case, then one is guilty when one sees, or touches, without wanting to, the wife of another; he who trims the hair of the
Nigranthas is guilty; the master of the Nirgranthas is guilty since he preaches terrible austerities; he who gives the Nirgranthas food which
? provokes cholera and death is also guilty. The mother and the embryo
which are both the cause of suffering, are guilty; guilty also is the person
killed, for he is bound to the action of killing as the object killed: and fire
burns its own support. But on the other hand, he who has murder
committed by another is not guilty, for one is not himself burned when
one has another person touch the fire. Since you do not take intention
into consideration, wood and other materials, even though lacking
consciousness, are guilty of murder when a house collapses and living
321
beings perish. If you would avoid these consequences, recognize that
but one example--the example of the fire--and it alone, not accompanied by any argument, cannot prove your thesis.
#*#
73c-& Stealing--taking what is not given--is to appropriate to
322 oneself the goods of another through force or in secret.
The reservation above holds: "with the condition that there has
323 been no error. "
To appropriate to oneself, through force or in secret, that which is possessed by another, when one does not confuse the person from whom one wants to steal with another person, constitutes stealing.
The plunder of a Stupa is to take a thing that has not been given by
the Buddha: for, at the moment of Nirvana, the Blessed One accepted,
324
appropriated to himself all the gifts made to Stupas. According to
others, this is to take a thing which has not been given by the guardians
325 of the Stupa.
To take a thing that does not have an owner is to take what is not given by the ruler of the country.
326
To take the goods, the robes, etc, of an deceased monk, is to take
327
what is not given by the Sangha of the parish, in the case when an
ecclesiastical action has not been done; in the opposite case, this is to take what is not given by all the disciples of the Buddha.
74a-b. Illicit sexuality, fourfold, is intercourse with a woman
328 with whom one should not have intercourse.
1. Intercourse with a forbidden woman, that is, the wife of another,
Karma 651
? 329 one's mother, one's daughter, or one's paternal or maternal relations;
33
2. Intercourse with one's own wife through a forbidden way; ? 3. in an
m unsuitable place: an uncovered spot, a caitya, an aranya; 4. at an
332 unsuitable time: when the wife is pregnant, when she is nursing, or
333
when she has taken a vow. Some say: when she has taken a vow only
with the consent of her husband
The reservation relative to killing, "with the condition that there
has been no error," also extends to illicit sexuality, and there is no course
of aaion when one has intercourse with the wife of another if one
334 thought that he was with his own wife.
Opinions differ on whether there is a course of action when one takes the wife of a certain one for the wife of another one. For some, yes, for it is the wife of another who was the object of the preparatory action; it is also the wife of another that one enjoys. For others, no, as in the case of killing with an error of person: the object of the preparatory aaion is
335 not the objea of the enjoyment.
With regard to whom is intercourse with Bhiksunis illicit sexuality?
With regard to the master of the land, who is not disposed to tolerate it. As for the master of the country himself, if his spouse, when she has undertaken a vow, is forbidden to him, all the more reason are nuns so forbidden.
Intercourse with a young girl is illicit with regard to the man to whom she is engaged, and, if she is not engaged, with regard to her guardian; if she has no guardian, then with regard to the king. (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 585a20)
74c-d. Lying is discourse held, with differing thoughts, with a
336 person who understands the meaning.
1. Lying is discourse held, with thoughts different from the sense expressed, with a person who understands the meaning. When the person addressed does not understand, such discourse is only frivolous
words.
2. Discourse (ii. 47a-b) is sometimes made up of numerous syllables.
Which will be the course of aaion? Which will be lies?
The last syllable, which is vijnapti and which is accompanied by
avijnaptiOr rather, the syllable whose hearing causes the meaning to be understood. The preceeding syllables are a preparation for the lie.
? 3. How should one interpret the expression arthabhijna, "a person who understands the meaning? " Does this refer to the moment when the person addressed understands the meaning? Does it refer to a person addressed capable of understanding the meaning? In the first hypothesis, you admit that the course of action takes place when the person addressed has understood the meaning; it follows then that the course of action is solely avijnapti: for the person addressed understood the meaning through mental consciousness, which is consecutive to auditory consciousness; and the vijnapti, or vocal action, perishes at the same time as the auditory consciousness. There is no longer any vijOapti at the moment when the person addressed understands. In the second hypothesis, this difficulty is not present. But what must one do in order that the person addressed is "capable of understanding the mean- ing? "^
The person who knows the language and in whom auditory consciousness has arisen is "capable of understanding the meaning. "
One must interpret the text in a manner in which it will not give rise to criticism.
***
338
The Sutra teaches that there are sixteen "vocal actions," eight of
which are bad: to say that one has seen what one has not seen, to say that one has heard, cognized, or known what one has not heard, cognized, or known; to say that one has not seen when one has seen; and to say that one has not heard, cognized, or known when one has heard, cognized, or known; and eight are good: to say that one has not seen when one has not seen. . .
What is the meaning of the words seen (drsfa), heard (fruta), cognized (vijnata), and known (mata)?
75. What is perceived through the visual consciousness, through the auditory consciousness, through the mental consciousness, and through three consciousnesses, is called, in order, seen, heard, cognized, and known.
What is perceived through the visual consciousness receives the name of seen,. . . what is perceived through the consciousness of smell,
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taste, and touch, receives the name of knowa
How do you justify this last interpretation?
The Vaibhasikas say that odors, tastes and tangible things, being
morally neutral, are as dead (mrtakalpa); this is why they are called mata.
The Sautrantikas: According to what authority do you maintain that the expression mata refers to what is smelled, tasted, and touched?
The Vaibhasikas: According to the Sutra, and by virtue of reasoning.
339
The Sutra says, "What do you think, Oh Malakimatar, the visible
objeas that you have not seen, that you have not seen formerly, that you do not see, about which you do not think Would that I could see them,' do you have, by reason of them, any longing, lust, desire, affection,
340
attachment, appetite, or searching out? No, Lord Oh Malakimatar,
with regard to the subject seen, you will only think, 'it is seen,' with regard to the subject heard, cognized, and known, you will only think, 'it is heard, cognized, known (matamdtram bhavisyati). '"
The words "seen," "heard," and "cognized," certainly refer to visible things, to sounds, and to the dharmas: hence the word mata refers to smells, tastes, and tangible things (opinion of Buddhaghosa, Visuddhi- magga, 451). If it were otherwise, the experience relative to smells, tastes and tangible things would not be refered to in this teaching of the Blessed One.
The Sautrantikas: This Sutra does not have the meaning that you believe it does, and is does not confirm your interpretation of the word mata. The Blessed One does not aim to define the characteristics of the four experiences, having seen, having heard, having cognized, having mata. His mind is evidently, "In the fourfold experience, seeing, etc,-- each of which bears on the sixfold objects, visible things, sounds, smells,
tastes, tangible things and dharmas,--you maintain only that this experience takes place, that you see, etc, without attributing (adhya- ropa) to the object the characteristic of disagreeable or agreeable. "
Then what should one thus understand by seen, heard, mata (known) and cognized?
According to the Sautrantikas, that which is immediately perceived by the five material organs, is seen, drsta; that the consciousness of which is transmitted to us by another, is heard, iruta; what is admitted
? by reason of correct reasoning, is mata, known; and what is perceived by 541
the mental organ is cognized, vijndta. Thus five categories of objects--visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible things--are seen, heard, known, and cognized; the sixth category--dharmas--is not seen: such is the fourfold experience that the Sutra refers to. It is thus false that, in the hypothesis where mata does not designate odors, tastes, and tangible matter, the experience relative to these objects would be omitted in the Sutra: thus the argument of the Vaibhasikas does not hold
342
According to former masters, "seen" is what is perceived by the
organ of seeing; "heard" is what is perceivedby the organ of hearing and
what one learns from another: "known" is what is personally accepted
343
or experienced; and "cognized" is what one feels in and of oneself
(Le. , agreeable sensation, etc, or an intuition that one has in an absorption).
344
who, by means of his body and not by means of speech,
Does he
causes to be understood what is not in his mind, commit lying?
Yes. The Sastra says in fact, "Question: Can one be touched by the
transgression of killing, without acting, without attacking bodily?
345
Answer: Yes, when one acts vocally. Question: Gin one be touched by
the transgression of lying without vocal action? Answer: Yes, when one
acts bodily. Question: Qui one be touched by the transgression of
murder, by the transgression of lying, without either bodily or vocal
action? Answer: Yes, for example the R? is, guilty of murder through
346
their anger, and a Bhiksu, guilty of lying through his silence in the
347
confession ceremony. " (Vibhdfd, TD 27, p. 6l7c25).
But, we would say, how could one admit that R? is and a Bhiksu
accomplish a course of action which is at one and the same time vijnapti
and avijriapti! Neither the Rsis nor a Bhiksu have bodily or vocal action:
hence there is no vijnapti; and avijnapti of the sphere of Kamadhatu
cannot exist where vijnapti is absent (iv. 2a). This is a difficulty that 348
must be resolved.
76a-b. Malicious or slanderous speech is the discourse of a
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349 person with a defiled mind with a view to dividing.
The discourse that one has, with a defiled mind, with a view to dividing others and creating enmity, is malicious speech.
The restrictions formulated above, "when the person addressed understands, when there is no confusion of persons," applies here.
76c Injurious words are abusive discourse.
Discourse pronounced with a defiled mind, outraging, understood
by him whom one addresses, addressed to him whom one wants to
35 address, is injurious speech. ?
351 76c-d All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech.
The Karika has "all defiled . . . "; but it refers here to discourse.
All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech; one who utters it is 1
thus an"inconsiderate speaker" ; but the Karika has bhinnapralapita in place of sambhinnapraldpa.
11&. According to others, inconsiderate speech is the defiled discourse which differs from the others.
Lying, malicious and injurious speech and defiled discourse: the name "inconsiderate speech" is reserved for the defiled speech which is neither lying, nor malicious, nor injurious.
77b-c For example, boasting, singing, declamations; for example, bad commentaries.
For example, a monk boasts about himself in order to obtain alms,
etc;
352 353
through frivolity some others sing; in the course of plays or
dances, the dancers, in order to entertain the public, hold inconsiderate
discourse; adopting the doctrines of bad philosophers, non-Buddhists
read bad commentaries. And in addition, there are lamentations and
354
loquaciousness, carried out with a defiled mind but which differ from
lying, malicious speech and injurious speech.
But is it not true that, in the period of a Cakravartin King, there are
songs that do not have inconsiderate words?
In this period, songs are inspired by a spirit of detachment, not by
355
sensuality. Or, according to another opinion, there is, in this period,
? Karma 657 356
inconsiderate words, since one speaks of dvdha, of vivdha, etc. ; but this inconsiderate speech does not constitute the course of action of this name.
77c-d Greed is the desire to appropriate to oneself, by illigitimate means, the goods of another.
To desire to appropriate to oneself the goods of another in an
illegitimate manner, in an unjust manner, by force or secretly--"Would
357
that the goods of another were mine! " --is the course of action called
greed, abhidhyd.
According to another opinion, abhidhyd means all desire of the
358
sphere of Kamadhatu, for the Sutra of the Five Ntvaranas, on the
subjea of kdmacchanda, expresses itself thusly, "Having abandoned abhidhyd. . . "
But, say other masters, Cakravartin Kings and the Uttarakurus are not guilty of the course of abhidhyd aaion, and yet they are not delivered from desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu.
Let us admit that all desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu is abhidhyd: but all abhidhyd is not a course of aaion. Only the most notable among the bad praaices are included among the courses of aaion (iv. 66b).
359 78a. Wickedness is a hatred of living beings.
It is a hatred of living beings, by which one desires to harm the
360 person of another.
78b-c False view is the opinion that there is neither good nor
361 bad.
As it is said in the Sutra, "There is no gift, no sacrifice, no oblation, no good aaion, no bad aaion. . . there are no Arhats in the world. " False view, as this Sutra shows, consists of negating aaion, its results, and the existence of Aryans. The Karika only indicates the beginning.
Such is the definition of the ten bad courses of aaion.
***
What is the meaning of the expression "course or pathway of aaion" (karmapatha)P
? 362 78c-d Three are courses of aaion; seven are also actioa
Greed, wickedness and false views are courses of action--courses of aaion that one terms volition (cetana, iv. lb).
The volition which corresponds to the ninth path of abandoning in the detachment of Kamadhatu is the pure action which causes the abandoning of black-white action and black action, for at this moment one abandons, in its entirety, good action of Kamadhatu (which is black-white) and the ninth and last category of bad action.
? 62c-d Volition which arises in the last paths of abandoning of the detachment of the dhyanas destroys good aaion
The volition of the ninth and last path of abandoning which produces detachment of Kamadhatu with regard to each dhydna is fourfold volition which destroys white aaion.
Objeaion: The first eight paths of abandoning in the detachment of Kamadhatu destroy black aaion. But you attribute the power to destroy white-black and white aaion (good and impure aaions: kusaksasrava) solely to the ninth path of abandoning. Why is this?
There is not, properly speaking, abandonment of any good
dharmas, for even if they are abandoned, the good dharmas can
reappear; but when the defilement which has this dharma for its objea
is destroyed this dharma is said to be abandoned. Therefore as long as
the last category of defilement which can grasp it as its objea is not
destroyed, this gooddharma is not considered abandoned. [Now it is the
ninth path of abandoning which breaks the prdpti of the ninth category
of defilement relative to each sphere (Kamadhatu, dhyanas) and, as a
consequence, allows one to obtain disconneaion (ii. 57d) from this
257 defilement).
63a-b. According to others, the first two aaions are retributed in hell and retributed moreover in Kamadhatu.
According to other masters (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 590al) aaion which should be experienced in hell is black aaion; aaion which should be experienced elsewhere in Kamadhatu, in addition to hell, is black- white aaion. Infernal retribution is produced exclusively through bad aaion: as a consequence, aaion which should be experienced in hell is black aaion. Retribution in Kamadhatu, with the exception of hell, is exclusively produced by good-bad aaion (that is, by good aaion mixed with bad aaion).
63c-d According to others, arisen in Kama, aaions are black
when they can be abandoned through Seeing the Truths; they
258 are black-white in the contrary case.
According to other masters (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 590c5) aaion which is abandoned through Seeing the Truths, not being mixed with the
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good, is black. All other actions of Kamadhatu, namely action which
is abandoned through Meditation, is black-white, that is, good mixed with bad.
***
The Sutra says, "There are three silences, silence of the body, voice,
260 and of the mind. "
64a-c. Asaiksa, that is, an Arhat's, actions of the body, voice and 261
mind, are, in this order, the three silences.
Silence of the body and silence of the voice is bodily and vocal action
262
which belongs to the Arhat. Silence of the mind is the mind or
thought which belongs to an Arhat: this is not mental action. Why is this?
Because the mind is the true Silent One, the true Muni.
The Vahasikas say that one knows through inference--by reason of the actions of the body and voice--that the mind is of oikfa.
But an Arhat's bodily and vocal action, is, in its nature, "abstention,"
whereas the action of the mind is not, by nature, "abstention," because 263
three is no avijnapti of the mind.
But "silence" is abstention, thus the mind itself "which abstains"
receives the name of silence.
Why does only the mind of the Arhat receive this name?
Because the Arhat is the true Silent One through the cessation of all
murmuring of his defilements.
***
The Sutra says, "There are three purifications, purification of the
264 body, purification of the voice, and purification of the mind. "
64c-d. The threefold good practice in its entirety is the threefold purification.
All the good practices of the body, pure or impure, are a purification of the body, because, either for a time or in a definitive manner, they efface the impurity of the defilements and bad practices.
? The same holds for the voice and mind
This teaching has for its goal the instruction of persons who take a
265 false silence for silence, and a false purification of purification.
***
266
The Sutra says that there are three bad practices.
65a-b. The bad actions of the body, speech and mind are regarded as being the three bad practices.
267 Bad actions of the body are the bad praaices of the body and so on.
65c-d Even though greed, wickedness, anger and false views are not actions, they constitute a threefold bad practice of the mind.
Further, there are three bad practices of the mind which, by their
268
nature, are not mental action: greed, wickedness or harm, and false
views.
The Darstantikas say that greed, wickedness and false views are,
269
in fact, mental actions, for the Samcetantyasutra considers them as 270
actions.
The Vaibhasikas: In this hypothesis, defilements and actions would
be the same thing.
The Darstantikas: What harm do you see in that?
The Vaibhasikas: To admit that defilement is action is to contradict
the Sutra and the definition that it gives of action (iv. lb). As for the Samcetantyasutra to which you allude, it is volition itself that it designates when it says "greed," because volition comes into play under the influence of greed
Because these produce a painful retribution, and because they are condemned by gpod persons, these praaices of the body, speech and mind are bad; they are thus termed bad praaices.
271 66a. Good praaice is the opposite.
The opposite of bad praaice is good praaice: good actions of the body, speech, and mind; further, non-greed, non-wickedness and right views.
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*#*
272 How can false views or right views by regarded as bad, or good?
In fact, the first does not contain an intention to do evil, and the second does not contain an intention to do good to another.
This is true, but they are the root of this twofold intentioa
66b-d By taking, among these practices, the most evident, one
273 defines the ten courses of action, good and bad respectively.
The Sutra defines ten courses of action: good courses of action, by taking the most important,--which are the easiest to see--from among the good practices; and bad courses of action, by taking the gravest from among the bad practices.
***
What practices, bad or good, are not included in the courses of action?
A part of the bad practices of the body, namely (1) preparatory and consecutive actions of bodily courses of action (prayoga, prsthabhiita, iv. 68c); and (2) certain defiled actions of the body, for example, drinking alcohol, hitting, binding, etc (Majjhbna, iii. 34), are not included among the courses of action, because these practices are not extremely grave. Among the bad practices of the body are courses of action which deprive another of his life, of his goods, or of his wife: one must absolutely abstain from them.
That which is very grave among bad practices of speech, is, for this same reason, declared to be a course of action, not preparatory, consecutive, or minor action.
One part of the bad praaice of the mind, volition, is also excluded
274 from the bad courses of actioa
The good courses of action do not include 1. either a part of the good
praaice of the body: preparatory or consecutive; abstention from
275
inebriating drinks, etc. ; alms, worship, etc. ; 2. or one part of the good
276
praaice of speech, affeaionate words, etc. ; 3. or one part of the good
praaice of the mind, good volition.
? Among the courses of action,
67a. Six bad courses of action can be exclusively avijnapti.
When one has six courses of action--murder, stealing, lying,
malicious speech, harmful speech, or inconsiderate speech--performed
by another, then these six courses of aaion are only avijnapti. He who
had these actions carried out is lacking the principle vijnapti, that is, the
278
act of killing itself, etc
67b. One bad course of aaion is always of two types.
Adulteryisalwaysvijnaptiandavijnapti,foritmustbeperpetrated in person. When one has it committed by another, he does not procure the same pleasure.
67b. Six, when one carries them out himself, are of two types
27 also. *
When one executes them himself, the six courses of aaion specified
above (67a) are at one and the same time vijnapti and avijnapti if death 280
takes place at the same moment as the vijnapti (that is, at the moment of the stroke by which one intends to kill): if death takes place later, there is only avijnapti.
***
Among the good courses of aaion,
67c Seven good courses of aaion are of two types.
Seven courses of material aaions, that is, of the body and the voice, are of two types, vijnapti and avijnapti. In faa the morality that one undertakes depends on one vijnapti.
61d. They are only avijnapti when they have arisen from absorption.
The courses of aaion which are included in dharmaiUa, that is, in the discipline of dhyana and in the pure discipline, are qualified as
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"arisen from absorption/' These two disciplines depend on a single
21 thought: the courses of action are thus not vij&apti. *
Is this also the case for preparatory and consecutive actions as for the principle action or the course of aaion proper?
68a. The samantakas are vijnapti.
The samantakas or preliminary actions are actions which prepare forthecoursesofaaionofthesphereofKamadhatu Theyarealways vijnapti (iv. 2b, 3d).
68b. They may or may not be avijnapti.
When they are accomplished with a great violence of passion (paryavastbana, v. 47, dhfikya, 032, etc), or with an extreme strength of faith (prasddagbanarasena, iv. 22), they are avijnapti. If not, then no.
282
Consecutive actions are, on the contrary, necessarily avijnapti. They are vijfiapti when, having accomplished a course of aaion, one continues to commit aaions analogous to the course of aaioa
***
What is it that constitutes preparatory aaion, the course of aaion
283 proper, and consecutive aaion?
A man, desiring to kill an animal, rises from his bed, takes some silver, goes to the market, feels the animal, buys the animal, leads it, pulls it, makes it enter, mistreats it, takes a sword, strikes the head once or twice: as long as he does not kill it, the aaion preparatory to killing lasts.
At the stroke by which he deprives the animal of its life--that is, at the moment when the animal dies--the vijnapti of this moment and the avijnapti which is simultaneous to this vijnapti, are the course of aaion proper. For it is by reason of two causes that one is touched by the transgression of murder: by reason of the preparatory aaion and by
284
reason of the achievement of the result [of the preparatory aaion]. The moments that follow, the moments of avijnapti created by the killing, are the consecutive aaion; the series of the moments of vijnapti
68c The opposite concerning consecutive aaioa
? are also consecutive action: moments that constitute pulling the hide off the animal, washing it, weighing it, selling it, cooking it, eating it, and congratulating oneself on it.
In the same way one can explain, with the necessary changes, the
285 other six courses of bodily and vocal aaion.
There is no reason to distinguish preparatory and consecutive aaion for greed, wickedness and false views: at the moment when they manifest themselves, by the sole fact of their presence, they are courses of action proper.
Objection: A question is raised. Is the course of action made up of
vijnapti and avijnapti at the moment when the animal is in marana- 286
bhava, that is, at the moment when the animal dies? Or is the vijnapti and the avijnapti of the moment when the animal is in mrtabhava, that is, when it is dead?
If you accept the first hypothesis, a person would be guilty of the transgression of killing when he kills at the very moment when the killed animal dies: but your system (siddhanta, iv. 72a-b) does not admit this. And in the second hypothesis, you have rightly said that, "at the stroke by which he deprives the animal of its life, the vijnapti of this moment and the avijnapti simultaneous to this vijnapti, are the course of action proper," [You should have said, mrte prdniniyd vijnaptih. . . "The vijnapti which took place when the animal dies. . . "]
Further, if you accept the second hypothesis, you contradict the
explanation that the Vaibhasikas give to the phrase, "while the prayoga
has not yet disappeared," that one reads in the Mulafastra (Jnana-
prasthma, TD 26, p. 975a8). This Sastra says, "Can it be the case that a
living being has already been killed but that murder has not yet
287
occured? Yes, when the living being has already been deprived of life,
288
but when the prayoga [of the murder] has not yet disappeared" The
Vaibhasikas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 6l7a3) explain this text by saying that the word prayoga ("conjoined with")--which normally signifies preparation--here has the meaning of consecutive aaion. Now you contradia this explanation since, placing the course of principle aaion at the moment when the animal dies, it is indeed the course of principal
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aaion which, according to you, has not disappeared at the moment when the animal dies. You interpret the word prayoga of the Sastra in the sense of the principal aaion
The Vaibhasikas: One must explain the Sastra in such a manner that it does not lend itself to criticism. And how is that? In the text in question, prayoga signifies principal course of aaion: [at least when one envisions the moment which immediately follows the death of the animal; when one envisions the moments which follow this moment,
prayoga signifies, as the Vibhasa says, the consecutive aaion]
But how could the vijnapti of the moment when the animal is
already dead be the principal course of aaion?
The Vaibhasikas: Why would it not be?
Because it is ineffeaive [The animal is dead: one does not cause it to
die again]
The Vaibhasikas: But how is avijnapti, which is always ineffecive, a
course of aaion? It is not their efficacy which makes a vijnapti and an avijnapti courses of aaion; it is the faa that they are produced at the
289
Gin it be the case that one course of aaion is either a preparatory aaion or a consecutive action of another course of aaion?
Yes. For example the ten courses of aaion can be a preparatory aaion for murder. A man desires to kill his enemy; in order to assure the success of this enterprise, he takes the goods of another and offers an animal in sacrifice; as a means to this same end, he committs adultery with the wife of his enemy in order to make her an accomplice; through lying, malicious, injurious, and frivolous words, he causes a falling out
between his enemy and his friends who would be able to defend him; he covets the goods of his enemy; he wishes to do evil to his enemy; he nourishes false views with regard to the murder that he wants to commit.
In this same way the ten courses of aaion can be the consecutive aaion of murder. And the same for the other courses of aaion, stealing,
290
But, greed, wickedness and false views are never preparatory
moment of the achievement of the result of the preparatory aaion.
etc
? actions, for they are not the beginning of an aaion; nor are they
291
The Sutra says, "There are, Oh Bhiksus, three types of killing: killing arisen from desire, killing arisen from hatred, and killing arisen from ignorance," and thus following to, "There are, Oh Bhiksus, three types of false views. " What are these different killings, etc?
All the courses of aaion are not indifferently achieved by desire, hatred, or ignorance; but
292 68d Preparatory aaion arises from three roots.
The preparatory aaion of all of the courses of aaion can indifferently arise from the three roots. The Blessed One, by expressing himself as we have seen, refers to the first cause, the cause which gives rise (samidtbapaka, iv. lOa-b) to the course of aaion.
293
1. Killing (iv. 73) arisen from desire: killing in order to seize a
certain part of an animal; killing in order to seize some goods; killing for pleasure; killing in order to defend oneself, or one's friends.
Killing arisen from hatred, in order to satiate hostility.
Killing arisen through ignorance. To consider the sacrifice as a
294
pious aaion and so to kill; when a king, according to the authority of
the legalists kills through duty, "The first of the meritorious aaions of
the king is to punish evil-doers"; when the Persians say, "One should
295
kill one's aged and sick parents"; when one says, "One should kill
preparatory actions, for they are solely a production of the mind
*##
serpents, scorpions, and tryambuka flies (Mahavyutpatti, 213,91), etc. , 296
because these creatures are poisonous; one must kill game, cattle,
297 birds, and buffalos in order to nourish oneself. "
And finally killing which is provoked by false views: murder committed by a person who denys a future life and whom nothing can stop.
2. Stealing (iv. 73c-d) arisen from desire. Either one steals the objea
desired, or one steals in order to then gain possession of another objea,
298
to acquire honor and respea, or in order to defend oneself and one's
friends.
Stealing arisen from hatred, in order to satiate hostility.
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Stealing arisen from ignorance. A king, upon the authority of the legalists, seizes the goods of evil-doers. The Brahmins say, "All things have been given to the Brahmins by Brahma; and it is through the weakness of the Brahmins that the Vr? alas enjoy it. Consequently, when a Brahmin steals, he takes that which belongs to him; he eats what is his,
299
wears what is his, and gives what is his. " And yet, when Brahmins
take, they indeed have the notion of the goods of another.
Stealing provoked through false views is also stealing from
ignorance.
3. Illicit sexuality (iv. 74a-b) arisen from desire. Sexual intercourse
with the wife of another, either through love, or in order to obtain honor and respect, or in order to defend oneself and one's friends.
Illicit sexuality arisen through hatred, in order to satiate hostility.
Illicit sexuality arisen from ignorance. The Persians, etc, have
30 intercourse with their mothers and other forbidden womea ? In the
301
gosava sacrifice, a Brahmin drinks water in the manner of an animal,
grazes through the grass, has intercourse with his mother, his sister, or a woman of his gotta; he must copulate with them wherever he finds them: in this manner this bull will triumph over the world And such
,r
too are those that say, Women are like rice mortars, flowers, fruits,
302 cooked food, ladders, roads, and ferryboats: they are there to be used"
4-7. Lying (iv. 74c-d) and other vocal transgressions arisen from ignorance and from hatred, as above.
Lying arisen from ignorance. "Oh King, playful lying, lying to
women, in marriage, or in danger of death, does not hurt: one says that
303
these five lies are not transgressions. " This is lying provoked by false
views.
Malicious words and other vocal transgressions arisen from
ignorance. These are provoked through false views. Further, the false discourses of the Vedas, etc, are frivolous words arisen from ignorance. 8-10. How do greed, wickedness and false views (iv. 77-78) arise out
of desire, etc? Since they are not preparatory action, this creates a difficulty:
69a-b. Greed and the other two mental courses arise from the three roots because they appear subsequent to these roots.
When they appear immediately after desire, they arise from desire;
? the same for the other two roots. ***
We have explained the bad courses of aaion in their relationship with the roots. As for the good courses of aaion,
69c-d Good actions, with their preparatory and consecutive aaions, arise fron non-desire, non-hatred, and non-ignorance.
Good courses of aaion, with their preparatory and consecutive aaions, have a good mind for their originating (pravartaka, iv. 10) cause. This good mind, being necessarily associated with the three roots, arises from the three roots.
The renouncing of a preparation of a bad course of aaion is a preparation of a good course of aaion; the renouncing of the aaion proper which constitutes a bad course of aaion is itself a good course of aaion; the renouncing of a consecutive aaion of a bad course of aaion is a consecutive aaion of a good course of aaion.
Let us give as an example: the ordination of a novice. From the
m
moment when the novice enters into the nandvasa, salutes the
Sangha, addresses his request to the Upadhyaya, until the first or second
305
karmavdcana, this is the preparatory aaion.
At the achievement of
the third karmavdcana there takes place a vijnapti, and an avijnapti
simultaneous to this vijnapti, which constitute the course of aaion itself.
After this moment, when one notifies the new monk of the nisrayas,
306
when he makes known that he accepts them, and as long as the series
of the avijnapti created by the principal aaion continues--that is to say, as long as the monk does not lose the Pratimoksa discipline (iv. 38)-- this is the consecutive aaion.
##*
We have seen that bad courses of aaion were not indifferently "achieved" by the three roots.
70a-b. Killing, wickedness, and injurious words are achieved through hate.
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307 Solely by hate. They are achieved when one thought of murder, or
one thought of violence (concerning wickedness and injurious words) manifests itself.
70b-d Adultery, greed, and stealing are achieved through desire. "Adultery" is illicit sexuality.
71a. False views, through ignorance. Through an extreme ignorance.
71b. The others, by the three.
The other courses of action,--lying, malicious words, and in- considerate words,--are achieved either through desire, hatred, or ignorance.
The courses of action, which have just been divided into four sections, three (70a-b), three, one and three, have respectively for their
71c-d Object: living beings, objeas of enjoyment, namarupa,
308 and ndman.
Living beings are the objects of killing, wickedness and injurious
speech; the objeas of enjoyment are the objeas of adultery, greed and
stealing; namarupa, that is, the five skandhas, are the objea of false
views; ndman, that is, the ndmakdya (ii. 47) is the objea of lying and the 309
other two transgressions of the voice.
#*#
When one has decided to kill someone, and if the murderer dies either before the intended victim, or if he dies at precisely the same
moment as the viaim, is there a principal course of action for the author of the murder?
72a-b. If one dies before or at the same time, there is no principal
310 course of aaion.
This is why the Vibhdsd says, "Question: When a person has made the preparation for killing, can it be that, at the moment when the result of this preparation is achieved, this person is not touched by the
? 311
transgression of killing? Answer: Yes, when the murderer dies
before or at the same time [as the viaim]. " The reason is clear: as long as the viaim is living, the murderer is not touched by the transgression of murder; and when the viaim dies, he (=the murderer) no longer exists if he died at the same time or before.
72b. Because a new body has come into existence.
The body--the personality--by whom the preparation had been accomplished, the body of the murderer, is destroyed; the murderer takes up a new body which belongs to another nikayasabhaga (ii. 41a): this body did not make the preparation, is not prayoktar and, as a consequence, cannot be touched by the transgression of murder.
*##
When many persons are united with the intention to kill, either in war, or in the hunt, or in banditry, who is guilty of murder, if only one of them kills?
72c-d As soldiers, etc. , concur in the realization of the same effea, all are as guilty as the one who kills.
Having a common goal, all are guilty exaaly as he who among them kills, for all mutually incite one another, not through speech, but by the very faa that they are united together in order to kill
But is the person who has been constrained through force to join the army also guilty?
Evidently so, unless he has formed the resolution, "Even in order to save my life, I shall not kill a living being. "
***
What does he do in order that he who kills should commit the course of aaion? Same question for the other transgressions up to and including false views.
73a-b. Murder is to kill another, consciously, without making an error.
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When a person kills by thinking, "I am killing such a one," and kills
this same person, and not another through error, then there is
312 murder.
But is there murder when a person kills, doubting if he hits a living being or a thing, or if he hits another?
This person possesses the certitude, "This is certainly him"; he hits
515 him; and as a consequence, there is the thought of paritydga.
***
How can there be murder, or destruction of the prdna (prdndtipdta), 314
since the skandhas are momentary?
Prdna, the "vital breath", is a wind whose existence depends on the
315
body and the mind. This prdna is annihilated by a murderer in the
same way in which one annihilates a flame or a sound of a bell, that is to
say, by obstructing the continuation of its reproducing itself. 316
Or rather, prdna is the vital organ (fivitendriya, ii. 45a): when a person creates an obstacle to the arising of a new moment of the vital organ, he annihilates it, and is touched by the transgression of killing.
But to whom do you attribute the vital organ? Who do you say is
317 dead when life is absent?
The true value of the pronoun "to whom" or "of whom" will be examined in the chapter on the Refutation of the Pudgala (Chapter
318
IX).
Let us observe that the Blessed One said, "When life, heat and
consciousness leave the body, it lies abandoned, like a piece of wood,
319
deprived of feeling. " One says that the body lives when it is endowed
with the organs; and that the body is dead when it is devoid of them.
**#
32
AccordingtotheNirgranthas, ? atransgression(adharma)results
for the doer from killing, even committed without knowing it, or without desiring it, in the way that contact with fire results in burning. But if this is the case, then one is guilty when one sees, or touches, without wanting to, the wife of another; he who trims the hair of the
Nigranthas is guilty; the master of the Nirgranthas is guilty since he preaches terrible austerities; he who gives the Nirgranthas food which
? provokes cholera and death is also guilty. The mother and the embryo
which are both the cause of suffering, are guilty; guilty also is the person
killed, for he is bound to the action of killing as the object killed: and fire
burns its own support. But on the other hand, he who has murder
committed by another is not guilty, for one is not himself burned when
one has another person touch the fire. Since you do not take intention
into consideration, wood and other materials, even though lacking
consciousness, are guilty of murder when a house collapses and living
321
beings perish. If you would avoid these consequences, recognize that
but one example--the example of the fire--and it alone, not accompanied by any argument, cannot prove your thesis.
#*#
73c-& Stealing--taking what is not given--is to appropriate to
322 oneself the goods of another through force or in secret.
The reservation above holds: "with the condition that there has
323 been no error. "
To appropriate to oneself, through force or in secret, that which is possessed by another, when one does not confuse the person from whom one wants to steal with another person, constitutes stealing.
The plunder of a Stupa is to take a thing that has not been given by
the Buddha: for, at the moment of Nirvana, the Blessed One accepted,
324
appropriated to himself all the gifts made to Stupas. According to
others, this is to take a thing which has not been given by the guardians
325 of the Stupa.
To take a thing that does not have an owner is to take what is not given by the ruler of the country.
326
To take the goods, the robes, etc, of an deceased monk, is to take
327
what is not given by the Sangha of the parish, in the case when an
ecclesiastical action has not been done; in the opposite case, this is to take what is not given by all the disciples of the Buddha.
74a-b. Illicit sexuality, fourfold, is intercourse with a woman
328 with whom one should not have intercourse.
1. Intercourse with a forbidden woman, that is, the wife of another,
Karma 651
? 329 one's mother, one's daughter, or one's paternal or maternal relations;
33
2. Intercourse with one's own wife through a forbidden way; ? 3. in an
m unsuitable place: an uncovered spot, a caitya, an aranya; 4. at an
332 unsuitable time: when the wife is pregnant, when she is nursing, or
333
when she has taken a vow. Some say: when she has taken a vow only
with the consent of her husband
The reservation relative to killing, "with the condition that there
has been no error," also extends to illicit sexuality, and there is no course
of aaion when one has intercourse with the wife of another if one
334 thought that he was with his own wife.
Opinions differ on whether there is a course of action when one takes the wife of a certain one for the wife of another one. For some, yes, for it is the wife of another who was the object of the preparatory action; it is also the wife of another that one enjoys. For others, no, as in the case of killing with an error of person: the object of the preparatory aaion is
335 not the objea of the enjoyment.
With regard to whom is intercourse with Bhiksunis illicit sexuality?
With regard to the master of the land, who is not disposed to tolerate it. As for the master of the country himself, if his spouse, when she has undertaken a vow, is forbidden to him, all the more reason are nuns so forbidden.
Intercourse with a young girl is illicit with regard to the man to whom she is engaged, and, if she is not engaged, with regard to her guardian; if she has no guardian, then with regard to the king. (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 585a20)
74c-d. Lying is discourse held, with differing thoughts, with a
336 person who understands the meaning.
1. Lying is discourse held, with thoughts different from the sense expressed, with a person who understands the meaning. When the person addressed does not understand, such discourse is only frivolous
words.
2. Discourse (ii. 47a-b) is sometimes made up of numerous syllables.
Which will be the course of aaion? Which will be lies?
The last syllable, which is vijnapti and which is accompanied by
avijnaptiOr rather, the syllable whose hearing causes the meaning to be understood. The preceeding syllables are a preparation for the lie.
? 3. How should one interpret the expression arthabhijna, "a person who understands the meaning? " Does this refer to the moment when the person addressed understands the meaning? Does it refer to a person addressed capable of understanding the meaning? In the first hypothesis, you admit that the course of action takes place when the person addressed has understood the meaning; it follows then that the course of action is solely avijnapti: for the person addressed understood the meaning through mental consciousness, which is consecutive to auditory consciousness; and the vijnapti, or vocal action, perishes at the same time as the auditory consciousness. There is no longer any vijOapti at the moment when the person addressed understands. In the second hypothesis, this difficulty is not present. But what must one do in order that the person addressed is "capable of understanding the mean- ing? "^
The person who knows the language and in whom auditory consciousness has arisen is "capable of understanding the meaning. "
One must interpret the text in a manner in which it will not give rise to criticism.
***
338
The Sutra teaches that there are sixteen "vocal actions," eight of
which are bad: to say that one has seen what one has not seen, to say that one has heard, cognized, or known what one has not heard, cognized, or known; to say that one has not seen when one has seen; and to say that one has not heard, cognized, or known when one has heard, cognized, or known; and eight are good: to say that one has not seen when one has not seen. . .
What is the meaning of the words seen (drsfa), heard (fruta), cognized (vijnata), and known (mata)?
75. What is perceived through the visual consciousness, through the auditory consciousness, through the mental consciousness, and through three consciousnesses, is called, in order, seen, heard, cognized, and known.
What is perceived through the visual consciousness receives the name of seen,. . . what is perceived through the consciousness of smell,
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taste, and touch, receives the name of knowa
How do you justify this last interpretation?
The Vaibhasikas say that odors, tastes and tangible things, being
morally neutral, are as dead (mrtakalpa); this is why they are called mata.
The Sautrantikas: According to what authority do you maintain that the expression mata refers to what is smelled, tasted, and touched?
The Vaibhasikas: According to the Sutra, and by virtue of reasoning.
339
The Sutra says, "What do you think, Oh Malakimatar, the visible
objeas that you have not seen, that you have not seen formerly, that you do not see, about which you do not think Would that I could see them,' do you have, by reason of them, any longing, lust, desire, affection,
340
attachment, appetite, or searching out? No, Lord Oh Malakimatar,
with regard to the subject seen, you will only think, 'it is seen,' with regard to the subject heard, cognized, and known, you will only think, 'it is heard, cognized, known (matamdtram bhavisyati). '"
The words "seen," "heard," and "cognized," certainly refer to visible things, to sounds, and to the dharmas: hence the word mata refers to smells, tastes, and tangible things (opinion of Buddhaghosa, Visuddhi- magga, 451). If it were otherwise, the experience relative to smells, tastes and tangible things would not be refered to in this teaching of the Blessed One.
The Sautrantikas: This Sutra does not have the meaning that you believe it does, and is does not confirm your interpretation of the word mata. The Blessed One does not aim to define the characteristics of the four experiences, having seen, having heard, having cognized, having mata. His mind is evidently, "In the fourfold experience, seeing, etc,-- each of which bears on the sixfold objects, visible things, sounds, smells,
tastes, tangible things and dharmas,--you maintain only that this experience takes place, that you see, etc, without attributing (adhya- ropa) to the object the characteristic of disagreeable or agreeable. "
Then what should one thus understand by seen, heard, mata (known) and cognized?
According to the Sautrantikas, that which is immediately perceived by the five material organs, is seen, drsta; that the consciousness of which is transmitted to us by another, is heard, iruta; what is admitted
? by reason of correct reasoning, is mata, known; and what is perceived by 541
the mental organ is cognized, vijndta. Thus five categories of objects--visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible things--are seen, heard, known, and cognized; the sixth category--dharmas--is not seen: such is the fourfold experience that the Sutra refers to. It is thus false that, in the hypothesis where mata does not designate odors, tastes, and tangible matter, the experience relative to these objects would be omitted in the Sutra: thus the argument of the Vaibhasikas does not hold
342
According to former masters, "seen" is what is perceived by the
organ of seeing; "heard" is what is perceivedby the organ of hearing and
what one learns from another: "known" is what is personally accepted
343
or experienced; and "cognized" is what one feels in and of oneself
(Le. , agreeable sensation, etc, or an intuition that one has in an absorption).
344
who, by means of his body and not by means of speech,
Does he
causes to be understood what is not in his mind, commit lying?
Yes. The Sastra says in fact, "Question: Can one be touched by the
transgression of killing, without acting, without attacking bodily?
345
Answer: Yes, when one acts vocally. Question: Gin one be touched by
the transgression of lying without vocal action? Answer: Yes, when one
acts bodily. Question: Qui one be touched by the transgression of
murder, by the transgression of lying, without either bodily or vocal
action? Answer: Yes, for example the R? is, guilty of murder through
346
their anger, and a Bhiksu, guilty of lying through his silence in the
347
confession ceremony. " (Vibhdfd, TD 27, p. 6l7c25).
But, we would say, how could one admit that R? is and a Bhiksu
accomplish a course of action which is at one and the same time vijnapti
and avijriapti! Neither the Rsis nor a Bhiksu have bodily or vocal action:
hence there is no vijnapti; and avijnapti of the sphere of Kamadhatu
cannot exist where vijnapti is absent (iv. 2a). This is a difficulty that 348
must be resolved.
76a-b. Malicious or slanderous speech is the discourse of a
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349 person with a defiled mind with a view to dividing.
The discourse that one has, with a defiled mind, with a view to dividing others and creating enmity, is malicious speech.
The restrictions formulated above, "when the person addressed understands, when there is no confusion of persons," applies here.
76c Injurious words are abusive discourse.
Discourse pronounced with a defiled mind, outraging, understood
by him whom one addresses, addressed to him whom one wants to
35 address, is injurious speech. ?
351 76c-d All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech.
The Karika has "all defiled . . . "; but it refers here to discourse.
All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech; one who utters it is 1
thus an"inconsiderate speaker" ; but the Karika has bhinnapralapita in place of sambhinnapraldpa.
11&. According to others, inconsiderate speech is the defiled discourse which differs from the others.
Lying, malicious and injurious speech and defiled discourse: the name "inconsiderate speech" is reserved for the defiled speech which is neither lying, nor malicious, nor injurious.
77b-c For example, boasting, singing, declamations; for example, bad commentaries.
For example, a monk boasts about himself in order to obtain alms,
etc;
352 353
through frivolity some others sing; in the course of plays or
dances, the dancers, in order to entertain the public, hold inconsiderate
discourse; adopting the doctrines of bad philosophers, non-Buddhists
read bad commentaries. And in addition, there are lamentations and
354
loquaciousness, carried out with a defiled mind but which differ from
lying, malicious speech and injurious speech.
But is it not true that, in the period of a Cakravartin King, there are
songs that do not have inconsiderate words?
In this period, songs are inspired by a spirit of detachment, not by
355
sensuality. Or, according to another opinion, there is, in this period,
? Karma 657 356
inconsiderate words, since one speaks of dvdha, of vivdha, etc. ; but this inconsiderate speech does not constitute the course of action of this name.
77c-d Greed is the desire to appropriate to oneself, by illigitimate means, the goods of another.
To desire to appropriate to oneself the goods of another in an
illegitimate manner, in an unjust manner, by force or secretly--"Would
357
that the goods of another were mine! " --is the course of action called
greed, abhidhyd.
According to another opinion, abhidhyd means all desire of the
358
sphere of Kamadhatu, for the Sutra of the Five Ntvaranas, on the
subjea of kdmacchanda, expresses itself thusly, "Having abandoned abhidhyd. . . "
But, say other masters, Cakravartin Kings and the Uttarakurus are not guilty of the course of abhidhyd aaion, and yet they are not delivered from desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu.
Let us admit that all desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu is abhidhyd: but all abhidhyd is not a course of aaion. Only the most notable among the bad praaices are included among the courses of aaion (iv. 66b).
359 78a. Wickedness is a hatred of living beings.
It is a hatred of living beings, by which one desires to harm the
360 person of another.
78b-c False view is the opinion that there is neither good nor
361 bad.
As it is said in the Sutra, "There is no gift, no sacrifice, no oblation, no good aaion, no bad aaion. . . there are no Arhats in the world. " False view, as this Sutra shows, consists of negating aaion, its results, and the existence of Aryans. The Karika only indicates the beginning.
Such is the definition of the ten bad courses of aaion.
***
What is the meaning of the expression "course or pathway of aaion" (karmapatha)P
? 362 78c-d Three are courses of aaion; seven are also actioa
Greed, wickedness and false views are courses of action--courses of aaion that one terms volition (cetana, iv. lb).
