It
should, however, be observed that in another place Alciatus
allows this only under important reservations.
should, however, be observed that in another place Alciatus
allows this only under important reservations.
Thomas Carlyle
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? 296
[PABT III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
that the Law is the prince of princes, but he explained what
he meant by the Law when he said that it is not that law
which is written in books or on tables, but that living " reason"
which is within the prince. 1
It is obvious that Bude? was anxious, at least as a general
principle, to maintain the view that the king stood outside of,
and above, the legal order of society.
It is, however, also clear that in another place Bude? repre-
sents the actual constitutional practice of France in very
different terms. In discussing the position of the Senate in
Eome he compares it with "curia nostra suprema," and
maintains that this Court had all the powers which had been
in the Senate. The "Maiestas" and powers of the Roman
people had been transferred to the prince by the "Lex
Eegia," while the Senatorial Power had been granted to the
Curia--i. e. , the " Parlement. " It was this "Parlement" which
declared the princes' " acta," " rata irritave," by it he willed
that his Constitutions should be promulgated; and it was
to the judgment of this Court alone that the princes, though
"legibus soluti," submitted themselves ("a qua sibi jus dici,
principes leges soluti civili animo ferant "). 2
1 Id. id. id. : '' Verius autem quis
dixerit magistratus summos et prin-
cipes Dei ministros esse in procurations
bominum et salute, ut quae bona
goneri humano divinitus donantur, es
ipsi partim distribuant inter nominee,
partim asservent . . . tantorum porro
bonorum divinorum taliumque nullus
esset hominibus fructus ususque com-
modus et rectus, sine lege, sine justitia.
Bine principe. . . . Deinde haec sub-
dit; Justitia igitur finis est legis, lex
autem omcium est principis. At
princeps ipse imago est Dei, qui omnia
recte ordineque constituit. Convenit
hoc cum precepto apoitoli 'Ad
Romanos' Decimo Tortio (Rom. xiii.
1). Plutarchus tamen, alibi in
eodem tractatu ita inquit. . . . Quis
igitur principi princeps erit 1 Nempe
lex quae omnium regina est mortalium
atque immortalium, ut inquit Pindarus.
Quae verba esse consentanea cum
lege, 'Digna Vox' (Cod. i. 14, 4).
Sed quam legem Plutarchus principi
imperitantem dixerit, ex iis quae
sequuntur intelligemus. . . . Lex
inquit principi imperatrix erit: non
ilia quidem aut in libris extrinsecus
scripta, aut in tabulis, sed animata
intus in ipso ratio, semper cum eo
conversans, ejusdemque observatrix,
quaequo eius animam nunquam sinit
tutela sui esse vacuam. "
? Id. id. , Dig. i. 9, 12 (p. 96): "In
ea igitur curia in qua summa juris-
dictionis Gallicae atque etiam juridic-
tialis imperii sita est, omnia inesse
mihi videutur, quae et in senatu, et in
centumviratu, et . in aroopago erant,
dumtaxat quod ad jurisdic-tionem
imperiumque jurisdictiale attinet. . . .
Majestas vero populi apud Romanos
? ? dicebatur, et auotorit&a Senatus.
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
297
This is, indeed, a very different conception of the relation
of the prince to the Law from that expressed in the passages
already cited; it is possible that Bud6 looked upon this
relation of king and Parlement as arising from and depend-
ing npon the king's will and pleasure, but the discrepancy
remains, and we shall find something very like it in Bodin.
We may put beside the opinions of Bud6 some statements
of Jean Ferrault, in a work on the laws and privileges of the
kingdom of France, published in 1515. He contends that the
Kings of France have the same power of legislation as the
Eoman Emperor, and he seems, curiously enough, to hold
that the Salic Law was strictly analogous to the Lex Eegia
of Eome, and that by it all power had been transferred to the
King of France, who possessed all the rights of the Emperor. 1
And, in another place, as we understand him, he seems to
assert that the King of France can impose " novum vectigal,"
while other kings and lords can only exact the Eegalia. 2
Populus sciscere solebat et jubere,
Senatus censere et auctor esse. Ilia
1gitur popularia ad principem lege
regia delate sunt, haeo sanatoria ad
curiam translate esse creduntur. . . .
In hujus acta referri diplomata regiaque
boneficia solent, ut perpetua esse
possint, ac nunquam antiquabilia.
Hujus autoritate rata irritave principum
acta, ne ipsis quidem recusantibus,
fiont. Una haec curia est, a qua sibi
jus dici, principes legibus soluti civili
animo ferant: quam auctorem fieri
sacrandis promulgandisque eanctioni-
bus suis velint: cujus consilii cen-
surae, constitutionee suay eximi; edict-
aque sua nolint, imo cujus decretis
bujusmodi sua acta conservari eternitati
velint. "
1 Jesn Ferrault, 'Tractatus de
Juribus et Privilogiis Regni Francorum,'
zxxv. : "Duodecim lilium jus ali-
qualiter respiciens est quod Rex
iste solus facit constitutionee seu leges
in Regno Franciae. . . . Est enim
jure certissimum, quod populus regitur
solo rege, ille solus potest statuere,
condere et instituere. Constitutio vel
edictum est, quod tantum rex vel
imperator constituit, II. Dist. o.
Constitutio. Nam salutem reipublicao
tueri nulli magis credidit, divus
Augusti (nus) convenire, nec aliquem
sufficere ei rei . . . quia autiqua lege
regia quae salica nuncupatur omne jus
omnisque potestas in regiam translate
est: et sicuti imperatori soli hoc
conveneret in subditis . . . ita regi;
cum rex Franciae omnia jura impera-
toris babeat, quia (ut dictum est)
non recognoscit in temporalibus
superiorem. "
>> Id. id. , 41: "Decimum septimum
jus regium est, quod ipse solus et
nullus alius potest imponere novum
vectigal . . . alii autem reges, et
domini temporales possunt oxigere; in
Tit. quae sunt regalia X Coll. Sed
nec imponere nec quocunque colore
aliam exactionem facere etiam pro
? ? utilitate patriae. " (We confoss that wo
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? 208
fPABT m.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
We may also put beside Ferrault the opinions of Charles
de Grassaille, in a work published in 1538. 1
When, however, we turn to other and more important
Civilians of the sixteenth century, we find judgments of a
very different kind. We begin with Alciatus of Milan and
Bourges, whose earlier years were spent in Milan, but who
later migrated to France and taught in the Law School of
Bourges in the earlier part of the century.
AlciatuB, as was natural, held that the authority of the
Emperor was derived from the Eoman people, but he de-
veloped this into the doctrine that all political authority
was and could only be derived from the people. The "Jus
imperii Koinani " belonged to the people until they transferred
it by law to Augustus. God gave men lordship over all
animals, but not over other men; kings were created, not by
the Divine command, but by the consent of the people.
Charles the Great was elected by the Eoman people, and this
authority is now exercised by the seven German Electors.
Thus, also in France, Chilperic was deposed and Pipin elected
king, and so with Hugh Capet; and thus also, in lesser
kingdoms. Alciatus concludes that " he is a just prince who
reigns with the consent of the people, and he is a tyrant who
reigns over unwilling subjects. " St Augustine rightly described
kingdoms created by violence, without the consent of the
subjects, as "magna latrocinia. " 2
1 Cf. J. W. Allen, 'A History of
Political Thought in the sixteenth
century,' p. 284.
* Alciatus, Opera, vol. ii. col. 1047,
'Comm. on Digest,' L. 16, I5:
"Jus Imperii Romani ad populum
pertinebat, donee per legem Rhemniam
populus in August um Caesarem
jus omne transtulit. . . . Nam
cum hominem creavit Deus, illi
in cetera quidem animantia jus et
dominium concessit, hominem autem
ut alteri alter serviret non indixit.
Undo prinoipio rerum non divina
ju&siono, sed ex populi consensu reges
assumpti sunt; quod et, post Romani
imperii occasum, servatum fuit, cum
Carolus Magnus a populo Romano
Augustus electus est, et a pontifice
Leone sacro oleo iniunctus; quod jus
populi hodie Gregoriana lege in septem
Germaniae principes translatum est.
Sio et Franci, Chilperico ejecto qui
regno idoneus non esset, Pipinum
varitcATiir^i consilio substituerunt. Et
cum Pipini proles a majoribus degener-
asset, rursus Odonem, mox eius {rat rem
Robertum et deinde Robert! nepotom
Hugonem ad summum fastigium
evexerunt. . . . Et quod de maxim is
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 299
This is an interesting expansion of the tradition of the
Eoman Law, that all authority in Eome was derived from
the people, for Alciatus enlarges this into the general principle,
that without the consent of the community there is no legiti-
mate authority.
He is almost equally definite in his repudiation of the
conception that the authority which the people had granted
to the prince was absolutely unlimited. He refers contemptu-
ously in one place to the " hallucinations " of the theologians
and the " adulation" of the jurists who maintained that the
power of the prince was supreme and free, and that he could
do whatever he pleased. This, he says, is certainly not true
in Italy; it is absurd to say that bishops, dukes, or marquises
have an authority over Italians which the Emperor himself
does not possess. 1
In another work he insists again upon the limited nature
of the authority of princes. He has, he says, dealt at some
length with this, in order that princes, whether they had
reached the highest rank (he means the Empire) or are kings,
dukes, or counts, might learn that they had not so great an
authority as their flatterers tell them; and also in order that
the doctrine of Martin (i. e. , that there was nothing that the
Emperor could not do) should once again be refuted. 2
hisce regibus, nimirum Romano et
Franco, dictum est, idem in inferioribus
observatum fuisse, qui historicos legerit,
deprebendet; utmeritocenseamDivina
lege eum justum principem esse, qui
ex populi consensu regnet, quod et
Aristot. tradit; qui vero invitis
dominetur, eum tyrannum esse, etiamsi
Caesar sit, a Septemviris electus, vel
quaqua alia ratione civili jure potentiam
suam tueatur. Unde cum magna
regna non ex subditorum consensu,
sed per violentiam primo constitute
sunt, merito Augustinus libro de
Civitate Dei IIII. magna latrocinia
esse dicit. "
1 Id. id. , vol. ii. col. 1162, 'Comm. on
Digest,' L. 16, 111: "Hallucinantibus
theologis, adulantibus jurisconsultis,
persuadentibusque omnia principi licere,
summamque et liberam esse potestatom.
Quod certe in Italia verum non est . . .
ut ridiculum sit affirmare pontificibus,
due i bus, ot quos Qermanica voce march -
iones vocant, absolutam in subditis
potestatem competere, quae nec ipsi
Imperatori in Italos competit. "
* Id. , 'De Formula Romani Im-
perii ' (ed. Basle 1554) p. 43: "Et haec
a nobis diffusius dicta sunt, tum ut inde
admonerentur principes, sive ipsi ad
summum imperii gradum pervenerint,
sive ab imperatoribus, reges, duces,
comites appellati sint: non tantum
illis in populos licero quantum adula.
tores eorum auribus melle diluto
veneno infundunt; tum etiam ut
Martini, qui Bononiae jus civile pro-
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? 300
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [part III.
Alciatus did not, we think, doubt that the prince had the
legislative power, which he had received from the people,
but in one passage he indicates that he was of opinion that
the prince should not make laws without the advice of the
"Periti," the men of experience. It appears very possible that
this is a reminiscence of the provisions of' Code,' i. 14,8, though
he is not here commenting on that passage. 1 He is also clear
that the prince is bound by his contracts, that he has no
power to revoke or annul them. We have already observed
the importance of this conception in the Civilians of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; indeed, he refers directly
to some of them, and he also refers to the important parallel
principle of the Feudal Law, that the lord could not deprive
the vassal of his fief without just cause. 2
He also discusses the question whether the prince can insert,
in his briefs, clauses which derogate from the law; he says in
one place that no one can do this except the prince, and such
persons as have received authority from him. 3 That is, he
would seem to maintain the dispensing power of the prince.
It
should, however, be observed that in another place Alciatus
allows this only under important reservations. The prince,
he says, has power to remit all punishments for offences
against himself, but he cannot deal in this way with "our"
rights anymore than the peopledid who gave him this authority;
fitebatur, nihil non Imperatori run-
cedentis, sententiam confutaretur. "
For the story about Martin, cf.
Savigny, 'Geschichte des Romischen
Rechts,' vol. iv. p. 180.
1 Id. , Opera, vol. iii. col. 26,' Comm.
on Cod. ,' i. , 2, 5: "Rationabilis Consilii.
Non enim debent principes ex se ipsis,
leges promulgate, sed adhibito peri-
torum consilio. "
* Id. id. , vol. iv. ,eol. 816, "Traotatus
de Praesumptionibus,' 'Regula Tertia
Praescriptionum ': "Et probatur ista
opinio, quao videtur communior . . .
ubi non presumitur causa in principe
volente rescindere proprium con-
tract um: imo iatud non potest etiam
de plenitudine potestatis, secundum
Paulus de Castro in L. Digna Vox
C. De Legibus. (Cod. i. xiv. 4. )
Et Baldus in Cap. I. Ad haec de pace
jur. firm, Et Lud. Rom. . . .
Queritur primo, dicens, quod princeps
non potest revocare contractum a ee
factum. . . . Item est in feudo. "
>> Id. id. , vol. i. col. 1108, 'Comm. on
Dig. ,' xxx. i. 55: "Adnotavit in primis
Doct. non posse testatorem ad versus
leges quicquam inducere. Et ideo neo
ipsum, nec quemquam alium, excepto
principe, posse clausula derogatoria
legum uti. Principibus quidem id
permit 1 itur, qui legibus soluti sunt;
aliis vero minime, nisi quatenus ex
principisindulgentiahocconsequantur. "
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 301
there is, therefore, in ' jure nostro ' no mention of "plenitudo
potestatis," or of "non obstante" clauses. Much less can
marquises, dukes, or counts take away another man's rights. 1
Alciatus seems clearly to interpret the doctrine that the
prince is "legibus solutus " as meaning little more than that
he can remit penalties that he has himself imposed, and
not as meaning that he can suspend any law at his pleasure.
The conception of political authority which we find in
Alciatus is obviously very important, even if it stood alone,
but its importance is greatly increased when we bring it into
comparison with that of some other important Civilians of
the sixteenth century.
How far it may be thought that some of the conceptions of
other important French Civilians of the sixteenth century
are due to the influence of Alciatus, and his teaching at
Bourges, we cannot positively say, but it is certainly remark-
able that several of them set out conceptions which are more
nearly akin to his than to those of the Italian Civilians of the
fifteenth century with which we have dealt in the second part
of this volume.
Francois Connon, who died in 1551, is said to have studied
law at Bourges under Alciatus,2 and his Commentaries on
the Eoman Law contain some very important observations
on the nature of law and its relation to the king. The primitive
world, he says in one place, was ruled by kings who were
chosen for their capacity and virtue, and they ruled without
any fixed system of law. When, however, they began to abuse
their power, and men saw how dangerous it was to entrust
the wellbeing of all to the goodwill of one, they either thrust
1 Id. id. , vol iii. col. 113, 'Comm.
on Cod. ,' U. , 2, 2: "Dubinin tamen non
ost. quinsupremi principes,si volunt. has
poenas, libers, quam sibi vendicant,
potestate romittere possiunt. De jure
autem nostro non pes sunt, cum enim
omne jus et imperium ex translationo
populi habeant, non aliter eo debent
uti, quam ipsi qui transtulerunt
uterentur: qua propter in jure nostro,
nullus est mentio plenitudinis potes-
tatis, item clausula? non obstante,
Ac, ut Baldus ait. Sed quid in Mar.
chionibus, Ducibus, Comitibusquo ab
his constituti? Et multo minus posse,
dicendum est, nec in ejus dignitatis con.
cessione id actum videri potest, ut jus
alterius auferant. "
* Cf. 'Biographic Universelle. '
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? 302
[PABT EH.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
out the kings and made laws, or retained the kings and im-
posed upon them the restraints of law. 1 He goes on to cite
a judgment which he attributes to Aristotle, that to obey
the Law is to obey God and the Law, while to obey a man
is to obey a wild beast, for the greed and anger which
turns the magistrate from virtue is like that of a wild
beast. 2
These are general conceptions, and when he turns to the
actual conditions of his time, his statements are different
but significant. In discussing the source of Law he first
mentions with approval the saying of Demosthenes that law
is the agreement of the whole "Civitas" and the similar
doctrine of Papinian (' Digest,' i. 3, 1), but he admits that
in France it is the authority of the king which binds men by
laws. Even here, however, Connon maintains that it was
from the consent of the people that this authority was drawn,
and thus no law is made without the will of the people,
either by their own decree, or by that of the person to
whom they have given authority to make it. 3
1 F. Connanus, 'Libri Commen-
tariorum Juris Civilis,' vol. i. Bk. i. 7
(p. 25): "Hoc est quod dicitur,
priscis illis seculis omnia fuisse guber-
nata manu regia. . . . Erat enim
regibus sola naturae ratio et juris et
injuriae regula. . . . Itaque non
quilibet creabatur rex, sod inter ipsos
esset ad res gerendas maxime idoneus,
qui virtute, consilio, prudentia, ac
animi magnitudine et robore maxime
praestaret. . . . Qui non amore aut
odio, non cupiditate aut iracundia
duceretur ad judicandum, sed quod jus,
quod equitas et veritas postularet,
id omnibus in rebus constitueret, id
sequeretur et tueretur.
Postquam vero coepissent ii, quibus
ad hunc modum fuerat data rerum
omnium potestas, contra rationis prae-
sumptionem, multa pro animi libidine
facere, et periculosum videretur, unius
arbitrio fortunas et vitam omnium
committi; quidam, eiectis regibus,
leges posuerunt, alii, retentis regibus,
tamquam frenos legum iniecerunt, ut
eos nimia potentia ferocientos duritia
juris cohiberent. "
* Id. id. id. , "Bene Aristoteles:
Qui legem praeesse vult, is videtur
Deum et leges imperare: qui autem
vult hominem, adiungit et beluam:
nam belue similis est cupiditas et
iracundia, quae magiatratus et opti-
mum quemque a virtute detorquent. "
? Id. id. , i. 8 (p. 28): "Quod voro
lex dicitur esse convontum quoddam
totius civitatis, bene a Domosthene
dicitur quod Atheniensibus lex nulla
nisi de ipsorum consensu imponi
potuerit. Bene et Papinianus, 'lex
est commune preceptum . . . com-
munis reipublicae sponsio. ' (Dig. i.
3, 1. ) Nam et Romanis legis sciscendi
potestas fuit penes populum.
Nos qui regibus paremus, non
communis sponsio, sed principis auth-
? ? oritas alligat legibus: nisi jam tum
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 303
Connon is, however, clear that the legislative authority
of the prince (at least, of the Eoman Emperor) was unfettered
by the necessity of taking counsel; he cites the opinion of
Papinian that the Law is "consultum virorum prudentum,"
but adds that this does not imply that the prince must consult
the jurists; it is customary to do so, and it is right and
honourable, as the Code says " Humanum est," &c. (' Code,' i.
14, 8), but as Bartolus says, this is a counsel of " Humanitas,"
not a legal necessity. Connon holds clearly and emphatically
that the legislative power of the prince was as complete as
that of the whole Eoman people. 1
On the other hand, he contemptuously repudiates the notion
that law is superior to custom; their authority is equal, and
the later prevails over the earlier2; and he is equally dogmatic
in repudiating the doctrine that the prince is " legibus solutus. "
The prince is, indeed, over the people, but he is still one
of the people, and he wishes that all princes should re-
member the " Digna Vox " (' Code,' i. 121, 4), and should suffer
their authority to be controlled by the law and by equity. 3
A little later he lays down dogmatically the principle that an
unjust law is not a law at all, and should be corrected or
annulled; and that, if a king by hereditary right becomes a
tyrant and violates the divine and human laws, he should
be deposed. The law and the king are sacred, and not to be
violated, but evil law is to be abrogated and the tyrant to be
expelled. Until this has been done, they must be obeyed;
cum et illi regnandi pot est os data est,
et nobis imposita necessitas parendi.
Sic fit ut nulla lex non de populi
volunt ate constituatur, et sit tanquam
pactum quod dam consentientium inter
se civium, ut dicebat Lycophron
sophistes; quod eam aut sciscunt ipsi,
aut is cui eius sciscendae ferendaequo
dederunt potestatem. Ergo vel utilitas
ipsa justi prope mater et equi, ut
scribit Horatius, vel conventio ipsa
nostra, nos obligat legibus, iis ut
omnes pexere debeamus. "
1 Id. id. , 8 (p. 29).
>> Id. id. , 10 (p. ii).
? Id. id. , 8 (p. 28): "Quod si ita
est, ne prince ps quidem ipse legibus
solutus est, quoniam ita praeest
populo, ut unus tamen sit de populo,
'Digna vox est majestate Regnantis
. . . et re vera majus imperii est
submittere legibus principatum. Et
oraculo praesentis edioti quod nobis
licere non patimur, aliis indicamus. '
Quod utinam sibi oditum puterint
omnes principes omnium qui unius
imperio subsunt populorum: et poten-
tiain suam jure, lege, equitate prae-
ponderari sinant. "
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? 304 THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT III.
but when it is done, men are free from them. 1 We cannot
say that these conceptions of Connon are derived from those
of Alciatus, but there are obviously important parallels
between them.
Francois Duaren was also a pupil of Alciatus and a con-
temporary of Connon, dying in 1559, and in his Commentaries
on the 'Digest' we find some important observations on the
sources of law and the authority of the prince.
There is no doubt, he says in one place, that the prince
can make law, but he raises the question how far the people
also have the right to do this, and he contends that they
clearly possessed this right in the time of Julianus, that is, in
the second century; he also cites Dion and Suetonius as showing
that Augustus and Caligula were in the habit of submitting
legislative proposals to the people, and in a later passage he
suggests that it is at least possible that the people shared
their power of legislation with the prince, and did not re-
nounce it entirely, and he cites the words of Julianus as
illustrating this. 2
1 Id.
? 296
[PABT III.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
that the Law is the prince of princes, but he explained what
he meant by the Law when he said that it is not that law
which is written in books or on tables, but that living " reason"
which is within the prince. 1
It is obvious that Bude? was anxious, at least as a general
principle, to maintain the view that the king stood outside of,
and above, the legal order of society.
It is, however, also clear that in another place Bude? repre-
sents the actual constitutional practice of France in very
different terms. In discussing the position of the Senate in
Eome he compares it with "curia nostra suprema," and
maintains that this Court had all the powers which had been
in the Senate. The "Maiestas" and powers of the Roman
people had been transferred to the prince by the "Lex
Eegia," while the Senatorial Power had been granted to the
Curia--i. e. , the " Parlement. " It was this "Parlement" which
declared the princes' " acta," " rata irritave," by it he willed
that his Constitutions should be promulgated; and it was
to the judgment of this Court alone that the princes, though
"legibus soluti," submitted themselves ("a qua sibi jus dici,
principes leges soluti civili animo ferant "). 2
1 Id. id. id. : '' Verius autem quis
dixerit magistratus summos et prin-
cipes Dei ministros esse in procurations
bominum et salute, ut quae bona
goneri humano divinitus donantur, es
ipsi partim distribuant inter nominee,
partim asservent . . . tantorum porro
bonorum divinorum taliumque nullus
esset hominibus fructus ususque com-
modus et rectus, sine lege, sine justitia.
Bine principe. . . . Deinde haec sub-
dit; Justitia igitur finis est legis, lex
autem omcium est principis. At
princeps ipse imago est Dei, qui omnia
recte ordineque constituit. Convenit
hoc cum precepto apoitoli 'Ad
Romanos' Decimo Tortio (Rom. xiii.
1). Plutarchus tamen, alibi in
eodem tractatu ita inquit. . . . Quis
igitur principi princeps erit 1 Nempe
lex quae omnium regina est mortalium
atque immortalium, ut inquit Pindarus.
Quae verba esse consentanea cum
lege, 'Digna Vox' (Cod. i. 14, 4).
Sed quam legem Plutarchus principi
imperitantem dixerit, ex iis quae
sequuntur intelligemus. . . . Lex
inquit principi imperatrix erit: non
ilia quidem aut in libris extrinsecus
scripta, aut in tabulis, sed animata
intus in ipso ratio, semper cum eo
conversans, ejusdemque observatrix,
quaequo eius animam nunquam sinit
tutela sui esse vacuam. "
? Id. id. , Dig. i. 9, 12 (p. 96): "In
ea igitur curia in qua summa juris-
dictionis Gallicae atque etiam juridic-
tialis imperii sita est, omnia inesse
mihi videutur, quae et in senatu, et in
centumviratu, et . in aroopago erant,
dumtaxat quod ad jurisdic-tionem
imperiumque jurisdictiale attinet. . . .
Majestas vero populi apud Romanos
? ? dicebatur, et auotorit&a Senatus.
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
297
This is, indeed, a very different conception of the relation
of the prince to the Law from that expressed in the passages
already cited; it is possible that Bud6 looked upon this
relation of king and Parlement as arising from and depend-
ing npon the king's will and pleasure, but the discrepancy
remains, and we shall find something very like it in Bodin.
We may put beside the opinions of Bud6 some statements
of Jean Ferrault, in a work on the laws and privileges of the
kingdom of France, published in 1515. He contends that the
Kings of France have the same power of legislation as the
Eoman Emperor, and he seems, curiously enough, to hold
that the Salic Law was strictly analogous to the Lex Eegia
of Eome, and that by it all power had been transferred to the
King of France, who possessed all the rights of the Emperor. 1
And, in another place, as we understand him, he seems to
assert that the King of France can impose " novum vectigal,"
while other kings and lords can only exact the Eegalia. 2
Populus sciscere solebat et jubere,
Senatus censere et auctor esse. Ilia
1gitur popularia ad principem lege
regia delate sunt, haeo sanatoria ad
curiam translate esse creduntur. . . .
In hujus acta referri diplomata regiaque
boneficia solent, ut perpetua esse
possint, ac nunquam antiquabilia.
Hujus autoritate rata irritave principum
acta, ne ipsis quidem recusantibus,
fiont. Una haec curia est, a qua sibi
jus dici, principes legibus soluti civili
animo ferant: quam auctorem fieri
sacrandis promulgandisque eanctioni-
bus suis velint: cujus consilii cen-
surae, constitutionee suay eximi; edict-
aque sua nolint, imo cujus decretis
bujusmodi sua acta conservari eternitati
velint. "
1 Jesn Ferrault, 'Tractatus de
Juribus et Privilogiis Regni Francorum,'
zxxv. : "Duodecim lilium jus ali-
qualiter respiciens est quod Rex
iste solus facit constitutionee seu leges
in Regno Franciae. . . . Est enim
jure certissimum, quod populus regitur
solo rege, ille solus potest statuere,
condere et instituere. Constitutio vel
edictum est, quod tantum rex vel
imperator constituit, II. Dist. o.
Constitutio. Nam salutem reipublicao
tueri nulli magis credidit, divus
Augusti (nus) convenire, nec aliquem
sufficere ei rei . . . quia autiqua lege
regia quae salica nuncupatur omne jus
omnisque potestas in regiam translate
est: et sicuti imperatori soli hoc
conveneret in subditis . . . ita regi;
cum rex Franciae omnia jura impera-
toris babeat, quia (ut dictum est)
non recognoscit in temporalibus
superiorem. "
>> Id. id. , 41: "Decimum septimum
jus regium est, quod ipse solus et
nullus alius potest imponere novum
vectigal . . . alii autem reges, et
domini temporales possunt oxigere; in
Tit. quae sunt regalia X Coll. Sed
nec imponere nec quocunque colore
aliam exactionem facere etiam pro
? ? utilitate patriae. " (We confoss that wo
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? 208
fPABT m.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
We may also put beside Ferrault the opinions of Charles
de Grassaille, in a work published in 1538. 1
When, however, we turn to other and more important
Civilians of the sixteenth century, we find judgments of a
very different kind. We begin with Alciatus of Milan and
Bourges, whose earlier years were spent in Milan, but who
later migrated to France and taught in the Law School of
Bourges in the earlier part of the century.
AlciatuB, as was natural, held that the authority of the
Emperor was derived from the Eoman people, but he de-
veloped this into the doctrine that all political authority
was and could only be derived from the people. The "Jus
imperii Koinani " belonged to the people until they transferred
it by law to Augustus. God gave men lordship over all
animals, but not over other men; kings were created, not by
the Divine command, but by the consent of the people.
Charles the Great was elected by the Eoman people, and this
authority is now exercised by the seven German Electors.
Thus, also in France, Chilperic was deposed and Pipin elected
king, and so with Hugh Capet; and thus also, in lesser
kingdoms. Alciatus concludes that " he is a just prince who
reigns with the consent of the people, and he is a tyrant who
reigns over unwilling subjects. " St Augustine rightly described
kingdoms created by violence, without the consent of the
subjects, as "magna latrocinia. " 2
1 Cf. J. W. Allen, 'A History of
Political Thought in the sixteenth
century,' p. 284.
* Alciatus, Opera, vol. ii. col. 1047,
'Comm. on Digest,' L. 16, I5:
"Jus Imperii Romani ad populum
pertinebat, donee per legem Rhemniam
populus in August um Caesarem
jus omne transtulit. . . . Nam
cum hominem creavit Deus, illi
in cetera quidem animantia jus et
dominium concessit, hominem autem
ut alteri alter serviret non indixit.
Undo prinoipio rerum non divina
ju&siono, sed ex populi consensu reges
assumpti sunt; quod et, post Romani
imperii occasum, servatum fuit, cum
Carolus Magnus a populo Romano
Augustus electus est, et a pontifice
Leone sacro oleo iniunctus; quod jus
populi hodie Gregoriana lege in septem
Germaniae principes translatum est.
Sio et Franci, Chilperico ejecto qui
regno idoneus non esset, Pipinum
varitcATiir^i consilio substituerunt. Et
cum Pipini proles a majoribus degener-
asset, rursus Odonem, mox eius {rat rem
Robertum et deinde Robert! nepotom
Hugonem ad summum fastigium
evexerunt. . . . Et quod de maxim is
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 299
This is an interesting expansion of the tradition of the
Eoman Law, that all authority in Eome was derived from
the people, for Alciatus enlarges this into the general principle,
that without the consent of the community there is no legiti-
mate authority.
He is almost equally definite in his repudiation of the
conception that the authority which the people had granted
to the prince was absolutely unlimited. He refers contemptu-
ously in one place to the " hallucinations " of the theologians
and the " adulation" of the jurists who maintained that the
power of the prince was supreme and free, and that he could
do whatever he pleased. This, he says, is certainly not true
in Italy; it is absurd to say that bishops, dukes, or marquises
have an authority over Italians which the Emperor himself
does not possess. 1
In another work he insists again upon the limited nature
of the authority of princes. He has, he says, dealt at some
length with this, in order that princes, whether they had
reached the highest rank (he means the Empire) or are kings,
dukes, or counts, might learn that they had not so great an
authority as their flatterers tell them; and also in order that
the doctrine of Martin (i. e. , that there was nothing that the
Emperor could not do) should once again be refuted. 2
hisce regibus, nimirum Romano et
Franco, dictum est, idem in inferioribus
observatum fuisse, qui historicos legerit,
deprebendet; utmeritocenseamDivina
lege eum justum principem esse, qui
ex populi consensu regnet, quod et
Aristot. tradit; qui vero invitis
dominetur, eum tyrannum esse, etiamsi
Caesar sit, a Septemviris electus, vel
quaqua alia ratione civili jure potentiam
suam tueatur. Unde cum magna
regna non ex subditorum consensu,
sed per violentiam primo constitute
sunt, merito Augustinus libro de
Civitate Dei IIII. magna latrocinia
esse dicit. "
1 Id. id. , vol. ii. col. 1162, 'Comm. on
Digest,' L. 16, 111: "Hallucinantibus
theologis, adulantibus jurisconsultis,
persuadentibusque omnia principi licere,
summamque et liberam esse potestatom.
Quod certe in Italia verum non est . . .
ut ridiculum sit affirmare pontificibus,
due i bus, ot quos Qermanica voce march -
iones vocant, absolutam in subditis
potestatem competere, quae nec ipsi
Imperatori in Italos competit. "
* Id. , 'De Formula Romani Im-
perii ' (ed. Basle 1554) p. 43: "Et haec
a nobis diffusius dicta sunt, tum ut inde
admonerentur principes, sive ipsi ad
summum imperii gradum pervenerint,
sive ab imperatoribus, reges, duces,
comites appellati sint: non tantum
illis in populos licero quantum adula.
tores eorum auribus melle diluto
veneno infundunt; tum etiam ut
Martini, qui Bononiae jus civile pro-
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? 300
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [part III.
Alciatus did not, we think, doubt that the prince had the
legislative power, which he had received from the people,
but in one passage he indicates that he was of opinion that
the prince should not make laws without the advice of the
"Periti," the men of experience. It appears very possible that
this is a reminiscence of the provisions of' Code,' i. 14,8, though
he is not here commenting on that passage. 1 He is also clear
that the prince is bound by his contracts, that he has no
power to revoke or annul them. We have already observed
the importance of this conception in the Civilians of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; indeed, he refers directly
to some of them, and he also refers to the important parallel
principle of the Feudal Law, that the lord could not deprive
the vassal of his fief without just cause. 2
He also discusses the question whether the prince can insert,
in his briefs, clauses which derogate from the law; he says in
one place that no one can do this except the prince, and such
persons as have received authority from him. 3 That is, he
would seem to maintain the dispensing power of the prince.
It
should, however, be observed that in another place Alciatus
allows this only under important reservations. The prince,
he says, has power to remit all punishments for offences
against himself, but he cannot deal in this way with "our"
rights anymore than the peopledid who gave him this authority;
fitebatur, nihil non Imperatori run-
cedentis, sententiam confutaretur. "
For the story about Martin, cf.
Savigny, 'Geschichte des Romischen
Rechts,' vol. iv. p. 180.
1 Id. , Opera, vol. iii. col. 26,' Comm.
on Cod. ,' i. , 2, 5: "Rationabilis Consilii.
Non enim debent principes ex se ipsis,
leges promulgate, sed adhibito peri-
torum consilio. "
* Id. id. , vol. iv. ,eol. 816, "Traotatus
de Praesumptionibus,' 'Regula Tertia
Praescriptionum ': "Et probatur ista
opinio, quao videtur communior . . .
ubi non presumitur causa in principe
volente rescindere proprium con-
tract um: imo iatud non potest etiam
de plenitudine potestatis, secundum
Paulus de Castro in L. Digna Vox
C. De Legibus. (Cod. i. xiv. 4. )
Et Baldus in Cap. I. Ad haec de pace
jur. firm, Et Lud. Rom. . . .
Queritur primo, dicens, quod princeps
non potest revocare contractum a ee
factum. . . . Item est in feudo. "
>> Id. id. , vol. i. col. 1108, 'Comm. on
Dig. ,' xxx. i. 55: "Adnotavit in primis
Doct. non posse testatorem ad versus
leges quicquam inducere. Et ideo neo
ipsum, nec quemquam alium, excepto
principe, posse clausula derogatoria
legum uti. Principibus quidem id
permit 1 itur, qui legibus soluti sunt;
aliis vero minime, nisi quatenus ex
principisindulgentiahocconsequantur. "
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 301
there is, therefore, in ' jure nostro ' no mention of "plenitudo
potestatis," or of "non obstante" clauses. Much less can
marquises, dukes, or counts take away another man's rights. 1
Alciatus seems clearly to interpret the doctrine that the
prince is "legibus solutus " as meaning little more than that
he can remit penalties that he has himself imposed, and
not as meaning that he can suspend any law at his pleasure.
The conception of political authority which we find in
Alciatus is obviously very important, even if it stood alone,
but its importance is greatly increased when we bring it into
comparison with that of some other important Civilians of
the sixteenth century.
How far it may be thought that some of the conceptions of
other important French Civilians of the sixteenth century
are due to the influence of Alciatus, and his teaching at
Bourges, we cannot positively say, but it is certainly remark-
able that several of them set out conceptions which are more
nearly akin to his than to those of the Italian Civilians of the
fifteenth century with which we have dealt in the second part
of this volume.
Francois Connon, who died in 1551, is said to have studied
law at Bourges under Alciatus,2 and his Commentaries on
the Eoman Law contain some very important observations
on the nature of law and its relation to the king. The primitive
world, he says in one place, was ruled by kings who were
chosen for their capacity and virtue, and they ruled without
any fixed system of law. When, however, they began to abuse
their power, and men saw how dangerous it was to entrust
the wellbeing of all to the goodwill of one, they either thrust
1 Id. id. , vol iii. col. 113, 'Comm.
on Cod. ,' U. , 2, 2: "Dubinin tamen non
ost. quinsupremi principes,si volunt. has
poenas, libers, quam sibi vendicant,
potestate romittere possiunt. De jure
autem nostro non pes sunt, cum enim
omne jus et imperium ex translationo
populi habeant, non aliter eo debent
uti, quam ipsi qui transtulerunt
uterentur: qua propter in jure nostro,
nullus est mentio plenitudinis potes-
tatis, item clausula? non obstante,
Ac, ut Baldus ait. Sed quid in Mar.
chionibus, Ducibus, Comitibusquo ab
his constituti? Et multo minus posse,
dicendum est, nec in ejus dignitatis con.
cessione id actum videri potest, ut jus
alterius auferant. "
* Cf. 'Biographic Universelle. '
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? 302
[PABT EH.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
out the kings and made laws, or retained the kings and im-
posed upon them the restraints of law. 1 He goes on to cite
a judgment which he attributes to Aristotle, that to obey
the Law is to obey God and the Law, while to obey a man
is to obey a wild beast, for the greed and anger which
turns the magistrate from virtue is like that of a wild
beast. 2
These are general conceptions, and when he turns to the
actual conditions of his time, his statements are different
but significant. In discussing the source of Law he first
mentions with approval the saying of Demosthenes that law
is the agreement of the whole "Civitas" and the similar
doctrine of Papinian (' Digest,' i. 3, 1), but he admits that
in France it is the authority of the king which binds men by
laws. Even here, however, Connon maintains that it was
from the consent of the people that this authority was drawn,
and thus no law is made without the will of the people,
either by their own decree, or by that of the person to
whom they have given authority to make it. 3
1 F. Connanus, 'Libri Commen-
tariorum Juris Civilis,' vol. i. Bk. i. 7
(p. 25): "Hoc est quod dicitur,
priscis illis seculis omnia fuisse guber-
nata manu regia. . . . Erat enim
regibus sola naturae ratio et juris et
injuriae regula. . . . Itaque non
quilibet creabatur rex, sod inter ipsos
esset ad res gerendas maxime idoneus,
qui virtute, consilio, prudentia, ac
animi magnitudine et robore maxime
praestaret. . . . Qui non amore aut
odio, non cupiditate aut iracundia
duceretur ad judicandum, sed quod jus,
quod equitas et veritas postularet,
id omnibus in rebus constitueret, id
sequeretur et tueretur.
Postquam vero coepissent ii, quibus
ad hunc modum fuerat data rerum
omnium potestas, contra rationis prae-
sumptionem, multa pro animi libidine
facere, et periculosum videretur, unius
arbitrio fortunas et vitam omnium
committi; quidam, eiectis regibus,
leges posuerunt, alii, retentis regibus,
tamquam frenos legum iniecerunt, ut
eos nimia potentia ferocientos duritia
juris cohiberent. "
* Id. id. id. , "Bene Aristoteles:
Qui legem praeesse vult, is videtur
Deum et leges imperare: qui autem
vult hominem, adiungit et beluam:
nam belue similis est cupiditas et
iracundia, quae magiatratus et opti-
mum quemque a virtute detorquent. "
? Id. id. , i. 8 (p. 28): "Quod voro
lex dicitur esse convontum quoddam
totius civitatis, bene a Domosthene
dicitur quod Atheniensibus lex nulla
nisi de ipsorum consensu imponi
potuerit. Bene et Papinianus, 'lex
est commune preceptum . . . com-
munis reipublicae sponsio. ' (Dig. i.
3, 1. ) Nam et Romanis legis sciscendi
potestas fuit penes populum.
Nos qui regibus paremus, non
communis sponsio, sed principis auth-
? ? oritas alligat legibus: nisi jam tum
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 303
Connon is, however, clear that the legislative authority
of the prince (at least, of the Eoman Emperor) was unfettered
by the necessity of taking counsel; he cites the opinion of
Papinian that the Law is "consultum virorum prudentum,"
but adds that this does not imply that the prince must consult
the jurists; it is customary to do so, and it is right and
honourable, as the Code says " Humanum est," &c. (' Code,' i.
14, 8), but as Bartolus says, this is a counsel of " Humanitas,"
not a legal necessity. Connon holds clearly and emphatically
that the legislative power of the prince was as complete as
that of the whole Eoman people. 1
On the other hand, he contemptuously repudiates the notion
that law is superior to custom; their authority is equal, and
the later prevails over the earlier2; and he is equally dogmatic
in repudiating the doctrine that the prince is " legibus solutus. "
The prince is, indeed, over the people, but he is still one
of the people, and he wishes that all princes should re-
member the " Digna Vox " (' Code,' i. 121, 4), and should suffer
their authority to be controlled by the law and by equity. 3
A little later he lays down dogmatically the principle that an
unjust law is not a law at all, and should be corrected or
annulled; and that, if a king by hereditary right becomes a
tyrant and violates the divine and human laws, he should
be deposed. The law and the king are sacred, and not to be
violated, but evil law is to be abrogated and the tyrant to be
expelled. Until this has been done, they must be obeyed;
cum et illi regnandi pot est os data est,
et nobis imposita necessitas parendi.
Sic fit ut nulla lex non de populi
volunt ate constituatur, et sit tanquam
pactum quod dam consentientium inter
se civium, ut dicebat Lycophron
sophistes; quod eam aut sciscunt ipsi,
aut is cui eius sciscendae ferendaequo
dederunt potestatem. Ergo vel utilitas
ipsa justi prope mater et equi, ut
scribit Horatius, vel conventio ipsa
nostra, nos obligat legibus, iis ut
omnes pexere debeamus. "
1 Id. id. , 8 (p. 29).
>> Id. id. , 10 (p. ii).
? Id. id. , 8 (p. 28): "Quod si ita
est, ne prince ps quidem ipse legibus
solutus est, quoniam ita praeest
populo, ut unus tamen sit de populo,
'Digna vox est majestate Regnantis
. . . et re vera majus imperii est
submittere legibus principatum. Et
oraculo praesentis edioti quod nobis
licere non patimur, aliis indicamus. '
Quod utinam sibi oditum puterint
omnes principes omnium qui unius
imperio subsunt populorum: et poten-
tiain suam jure, lege, equitate prae-
ponderari sinant. "
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? 304 THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT III.
but when it is done, men are free from them. 1 We cannot
say that these conceptions of Connon are derived from those
of Alciatus, but there are obviously important parallels
between them.
Francois Duaren was also a pupil of Alciatus and a con-
temporary of Connon, dying in 1559, and in his Commentaries
on the 'Digest' we find some important observations on the
sources of law and the authority of the prince.
There is no doubt, he says in one place, that the prince
can make law, but he raises the question how far the people
also have the right to do this, and he contends that they
clearly possessed this right in the time of Julianus, that is, in
the second century; he also cites Dion and Suetonius as showing
that Augustus and Caligula were in the habit of submitting
legislative proposals to the people, and in a later passage he
suggests that it is at least possible that the people shared
their power of legislation with the prince, and did not re-
nounce it entirely, and he cites the words of Julianus as
illustrating this. 2
1 Id.
