No More Learning

His place was usurped by
Baburao Angria, the maternal uncle of Sindhia. The Company
suffered considerable annoyance from the piratical habits of both
Angria and the Sidi or Abyssinian chief of Janjira. On the death of
Sidi Abdul Rahim in 1784, a dispute for the succession arose between
his son Abdul Karim Khan alias Balu Mian and Sidi Johar. Lord
Cornwallis, to whom the matter was referred, was at first disposed
to leave the task of settling the dispute to the Peshwa, who had
already befriended Balu Mian; but a premature attempt on the part
of the Maratha Government to seize Janjira by stealth caused him
to reconsider the matter. A compromise was not reached until 1791,
when the Peshwa, in return for the grant to Balu Mian of a tract of
land near Surat-the modern Sachin state was recognised as superior
owner of the Janjira principality. His rights over the island, how-
ever, were never acknowledged by Sidi Johar, who, repelling all
efforts to oust him, was still master of the principality at the date of
the Peshwa's downfall. The third principal instigator of piracy was
Khem Savant of Wadi, who had married a niece of Mahadaji Sindhia
and was on that account created Raja Bahadur by the Moghul
emperor in 1763. His rule, which lasted till 1803, was a tale of
continuous piracies by his seafaring subjects in Vengurla and of
conflict with the British, the Peshwa, and the raja of Kolhapur.
Eventually in 1812 the Bombay Government forced his successor to
enter into a treaty and cede the port of Vengurla. They also in the
same year obtained the cession of the port of Malwan, an equally
notorious stronghold of pirates, from the raja of Kolhapur. Owing
3
1 Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, 1, 156-95.
2 Bombay Gazetteer, XI, 157.
Idem, pp. 418-9:
4 Idem, x, 442-3.
3
24


## p. 370 (#398) ############################################

370
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
to the constant losses inflicted on British vessels, the Company had
dispatched an expedition against the raja in 1792 and forced him to
pay compensation and to permit the establishment of factories at
Malwan and Kolhapur; and during the following decade internal
dissension and wars with neighbouring territorial chiefs so weakened
the Kolhapur state that in 1812 the raja was glad to sign a permanent
treaty with the British, under the terms of which his territory was
guaranteed against foreign attack, in return for the cession of several
strong places and an undertaking to refer all disputes with other
powers to the Company's arbitration 1
Mutual distrust and selfish intrigue effectually prevented the
leaders of the Maratha confederacy from offering a united front to
their opponents, though they were not averse from temporary com-
bination for any special object which offered a chance of gratifying
their personal avarice. In 1794 the renewal by the Peshwa of Maratha
claims upon the Nizam for arrears of chauth and sardesmukhi, in
which all the chiefs expected to share, offered them an occasion for
acting in concert with the Poona Government. The Nizam, alarmed
at the imminence of the combined Maratha attack, appealed to the
governor-general, Sir John Shore, for the military assistance which
he had been led to expect, and had certainly earned, by his cession of
Guntoor. But Sir John Shore, who dreaded a war with the Maratha
confederacy, sheltered himself behind the words of the act of parlia-
ment of 1784 and declared his neutrality, leaving the Nizam to bear
the whole brunt of the Maratha attack. The issue was not long in
doubt. In March, 1795, the Nizam's army, which had been trained by
the Frenchman Raymond, was overwhelmed by the Marathas and
their Pindari followers at Kharda, fifty-six miles south-east of Ahmad-
nagar, and the Nizam was forced to conclude a humiliating treaty,
which imposed upon him heavy pecuniary damages and deprived him
of considerable territory.
This victory, coupled with the spoils distributed among the
Maratha chiefs, restored for the moment the prestige of the Peshwa's
government and placed Nana Phadnavis at the height of his power.
It was, however, the last occasion on which "the chiefs of the Mahratta
nation assembled under the authority of their Peshwa", and the
inevitable domestic dissensions, which shortly followed, resulted in
the Marathas forfeiting much of the results of their victory. The
young Peshwa, Madhu Rao Narayan, tired of the control of Nana
Phadnavis and disheartened by the latter's refusal to countenance his
friendship with his cousin Baji Rao Raghunath, committed suicide
in October, 1795, by throwing himself from the terrace of the Sanivar
Wada at Poona. Baji Rao at once determined to secure for himself.
the vacant throne, and had no sooner overcome Nana's profound and
2
1 Bombay Gazetteer, XXIV, 236.
2 Malcolm, Political History of India, 1, 127-47.


## p. 371 (#399) ############################################

CONFUSION AT POONA
371
instinctive opposition by false professions of friendship and loyalty
than he was faced with the hostility of Daulat Rao Sindhia and
another faction, bent upon opposing. Nana's plans. This faction
contrived to place Chimnaji Appa, the brother of Baji Rao, on the
throne at the end of May, 1796, whereupon Nana took refuge in the
Konkan and there matured a counter-stroke, which ended in Baji
Rao's return as Peshwa and his own restoration as chief minister in
the following December. In preparing his plans, Nana secured the
goodwill of Sindhia, Holkar, the Bhonsle raja, and the raja of Kolha-
pur, and also obtained the approval of the Nizam by promising to
restore to him the districts ceded to the Peshwa after the battle of
Kharda and to remit the balance of the fine imposed by the Marathas.
The return of Baji Rao to Poona was the signal for grave disorder,
engendered by his determination to ruin Nana, to whom he owed his
position and to rid himself of the influence of Sindhia, who had
financial claims upon him. Nana was arrested, and his house plun-
dered, by a miscreant named Sarji Rao Ghatke, father-in-law of
Sindhia, who was also given carte blanche to extort from the citizens
of Poona by atrocious torture the money which Sindhia claimed from
the Peshwa. The confusion was aggravated by open hostilities carried
on in the Peshwa's territories between Sindhia and the widows of
Mahadaji Sindhia, by the growing inefficiency of the Peshwa's army,
whose pay was seriously in arrears, and by the continuous intrigues
and counter-plotting of Baji Rao and Sindhia. The confirmation by
Baji Rao of the arrangement made between Nana and the Nizam,
which the latter demanded as the price of his assistance against
Sindhia, was immediately followed by Sindhia's release of Nana
Phadnavis, who once again acquiesced in a hollow reconciliation
with his avowed enemy and resumed his old position at Poona. '
In 1798 Lord Wellesley arrived in Calcutta, determined to shatter
for ever all possibility of French competition in India. The political
outlook was far from favourable, for, largely in consequence of Sir
John Shore's invertebrate policy of non-interference in Indian politics,
Tipu Sultan had regained his strength; French influence, supported
by troops under French commanders, had become paramount at the
courts of Sindhia and the Nizam; the raja of Berar had indulged in
intrigues against British interests; and the Carnatic was in a condition
bordering on anarchy. Wellesley's first step was to persuade the
Nizam to accept a form of "subsidiary alliance"; and he then pro-
ceeded to deal with Tipu. The Peshwa was invited to send troops in
support of the British and promised to do so; but, true to his character,
he carried on secret intrigues with Tipu up to the last and gave the
English no appreciable help. Surprised by the rapid and complete
downfall of the ruler of Mysore, he endeavoured to excuse his inacti-
vity by putting the blame upon Nana Phadnavis. The state of his
1 Grant Duff, op. cit. chaps. xxxviii-xl.
2 Malcolm, Political History of India, I, 196-236.


## p. 372 (#400) ############################################

372
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
1
own territories would have served as a more valid excuse. The
contest between Sindhia and the ladies of his family was still being
hotly pursued on both sides; the ruler of Kolhapur, a lineal descend-
ant of Sivaji, who had always been in more or less permanent
opposition to the Peshwa, was laying waste the southern Maratha
country, and was aided for a time by Chitur Singh, brother of the
raja of Satara; while, more dangerous and violent than the rest,
Jasvant Rao Holkar, who had escaped from confinement in Nagpur
during the feud of 1795 between the legitimate and natural sons of
Tukoji Rao Holkar, was carrying fire and sword through Sindhia's
territory in Malwa, with a large force composed of Indian and
Afghan freebooters,
Such was the state of affairs in March, 1800, when Nana Phadnavis
died. “With him", remarked the Resident, "has departed all the
wisdom and moderation of the Mahratta government. " He had
controlled Maratha politics for the long period of thirty-eight years,
and his demise may be said to mark the commencement of the final
débâcle. Nana being beyond his reach, Baji Rao, who was the per-
sonification of treachery and cowardice, sought revenge upon Nana's
friends and agreed to support Sindhia against Holkar, in return for
a promise by Davilat Rao to assist his policy of vengeance. While
Sindhia was absent from Poona. endeavouring to protect his lands
from Holkar's devastations, Baji Rao, giving free rein to his passions,
perpetrated a series of atrocious cruelties in Poona, which alienated
his subjects and brought upon his head the impiacable wrath of the
savage Jasvant Rao. Among those whom he barbarously murdered
in 1801 was Jasvant Rao's brother, Vithuji; and it was to avenge this
crime that Jasvant Rao invaded the Deccan in the following year.
The English endeavoured to set a limit to this internecine warfare by
offering terms and treaties to both parties. But their efforts were of
no avail.
In October, 1802, Holkar defeated the combined forces of Sindhia
and the Peshwa at Poona, placed on the throne Amrit Rao, brother
by adoption of Baji Rao, and then plundered the capital. Baji Rao,
as pusillanimous as he was perfidicus, fled to Mahad in the Konkan
and thence to Bassein, whence he besought the help of the English
and placed himself unreservedly in their hands. On the last day of
the year (1802) he signed the Treat of Bassein, which purported to
be a general defensive alliance for the reciprocal protection of the
possessions of the East India Company, the Peshwa, and their respec-
tive allies. The Peshwa bound himself to maintain a subsidiary
force of not less than six battalions, to be stationed within his do-
minions; to exclude from his service all Europeans of nations hostile
to the English; to relinquish all claims on Surat; to recognise the
engagements between the Gaekwad and the British; to abstain from
1 Malcolm, Central India, I, 107-225


## p. 373 (#401) ############################################

TREATY OF BASSEIN
373
hostilities or negotiations with other states, unless in consultation
with the English Government; and to accept the arbitration of the
British' in disputes with the Nizam or the Gaekwad. Having thus
persuaded Baji Rao to sacrifice his independence, the Company lost
no time in restoring him to the throne. By a series of rapid forced
marches, General Arthur Wellesley saved Poona from destruction,
obliged Holkar to retire to Malwa, and reinstalled the Peshwa in
May, 1803.
The Treaty of Bassein gave the Company the supremacy of the
Deccan. Although it was regarded askance by some authorities in
England and by the directors, as likely to involve the government in
the "endless and complicated distractions of the turbulent Maratha
empire", it entirely forestalled for the moment a combination of the
Maratha states against the Company, and by placing the Peshwa's
foreign policy under control, it made the governor-general really
responsible for every war in India in which the Poona Government
might be engaged. In short, "the Treaty by its direct and indirect
operations gave the Company the empire of India”, in contra-
distinction to the British Empire in India, which had hitherto existed.
On the other hand, while the support and protection of the English
power saved the Peshwa from becoming the puppet of one of the
other Maratha leaders, they'averted the fear of a popular rebellion,
which alone restrains an unprincipled despot from gratifying his evil
passions, and inevitably inclined his mind to substitute intrigue
against his foreign defenders for the military excursions which had
formed the principal activity of the Marathà state since the
seventeenth century. The period of fifteen years between Baji Rao's
restoration and his final surrender is a continuous story of oppressive
maladministration and of shameless plotting against the British
power in India.
The other Maratha leaders regarded Baji Rao's assent to the treaty
with open alarm and anger. Jasvant Rao Holkar declared that the
Peshwa had sold the Maratha power to the English; Sindhia and the
raja of Berar, who disliked particularly the provisions regarding
British arbitration in disputes between the Peshwa and other Indian
rulers, realised that at last they were face to face with the British
power, and that Wellesley's system of subsidiary alliances would
reduce them to impotence as surely as the Maratha claim to chauth
had ruined the Moghul power. With the secret approval of the
Peshwa, the leading Marathas, therefore, addressed themselves to the
problem of a joint plan of defence. But a general combination was
frustrated by the neutrality of the Gaekwad and the withdrawal of
Holkar to Malwa. Sindhia and the raja of Berar, who had crossed
the Narbada with obviously hostile intent, were requested by the
English to separate their forces and recross the river; and on their
refusal to comply, war was declared in August, 1803, with the avowed
object of conquering Sindhia's territory between the Ganges and


## p. 374 (#402) ############################################

374
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
Jumna, destroying the French force which protected Sindhia's frontier,
capturing Delhi and Agra, and acquiring Bundelkhand, Cuttack and
Broach. General Wellesley and General Lake commanded the two
major operations in the Deccan and Hindustan respectively, while
subsidiary campaigns were planned in Bundelkhand and Orissa, in
crder to secure the southern frontier of Hindustan and the districts
lying between the boundaries of Bengal and Madras.
The operations were speedily successful. Wellesley captured
Ahmadnagar in August, 1803, broke the combined armies of Sindhia
and the Bhonsle raja at Assaye in September, and then, after forcing
on Sindhia a temporary suspension of hostilities, defeated the raja
decisely at Argaon in November, stormed the strong fortress of
Gawilgarh, and thus forced the raja to sign the Treaty of Deogaon,
15 December, under the terms of which the latter ceded Cuttack to
his conquerors and accepted a position similar to that assigned to the
Peshwa by the Treaty of Bassein. Equally decisive were the results
achieved by Lake. Marching from Cawnpore, he captured Aligarh
at the end of August, causing Perron to retire in dejection from
Sindhia's service. He then defeated Perron's successor, Louis Bour-
quin, at Delhi in September; took possession of the old blind emperor,
Shah 'Alam; made a treaty with the raja of Bharatpur; and finally in
November vanquished Sindhia's remaining forces at Laswari in
Alwar state. Sindhia was thus rendered impotent; his regular troops,
commanded by French officers, were destroyed; and he was conse-
quently obliged to accept a "subsidiary alliance" and sign the Treaty
of Surji Arjungaon, 30 December, 1803. In the course of the subsi-
diary campaign, Broach was captured and all Sindhia's territories
annexed. Thus within five months the most powerful heads of the
"
Maratha confederacy had been reduced to comparative harmlessness.
Holkar alone remained unpacified. At the end of 1803 Lord Lake
opened negotiations with him without avail; and on his preferring
extravagant demands and plundering the territory of the raja of
Jaipur, war was declared against him in April, 1804. With Lake
operating in Hindustan, Wellesley advancing from the Deccan, and
Murray marching from Gujarat, it was hoped to hem in the Maratha
chief. But the plan miscarried, owing to the failure of Colonel Murray
and Colonel Monson, who was acting under Lord Lake, to carry out
their instructions. Monson, who according to Wellesley "advanced
without reason and retreated in the same manner", allowed himself
to be overwhelmed by Holkar in the Mukund Dara pass, thirty miles
south of Kotah, and beat a disorderly retreat to Agra at the end of
August. This disaster gave fresh courage to the Company's enemies.
Sindhia showed a disposition to fight again, and the Jat raja of
Bharatpur, renouncing his alliance with the English, joined with
Holkar in an attack on Delhi, which was successfully repulsed by
1 Fortescue, A History of the British Army, v, 1-69.


## p. 375 (#403) ############################################

WELLESLEY RECALLED
376
1
Ochterlony. In November one of Holkar's armies was defeated at
Dig, and another, led by Holkar himself, was routed by Lake a few
days later at Farrukhabad. The most serious reverse suffered by the
English was Lake's failure to capture Bharatpur early in 1805. He
was eventually obliged to make peace with the raja in April of that
year, leaving him in possession of the fortress, which had repulsed
four violent assaults by the Company's troops.
Monson's disaster and Lake's failure before Bharatpur caused
grave apprehension to the authorities in England, who had watched
the Company's debt increase rapidly under the strain of Wellesley's
forward policy, and were disposed to think that England's conquests
were becoming too large for profitable management. As a necessary
preliminary to a change of policy, they determined to recall the
governor-general and to entrust the task of making peace with the
arid Indian powers to Lord Cornwallis, now in his sixty-seventh
year and physically infirm. They failed to realise that, despite the
misfortune of Monson, Wellesley's operations had actually broken
Holkar's power and had left no single Maratha chief strong enough
to withstand the English. Moreover, as the resentment felt by every
Maratha chief towards the English at this juncture was too deep to
be assuaged by a policy of concession and forbearance, the abandon-
ment of Wellesley's programme merely amcunted to a postponement
of the final hour of reckoning. The peace concluded with the Marathas
in 1805 was unfortunately marked by a spirit of weak conciliation,
which caused future embarrassment to the Company's government
in India, handed over weak states like Jaipur, which relied on British
support, to the mercy of their rapacious neighbours, and ultimately
forced the Marquess of Hastings thirteen years later to consummate
the task which Wellesley was forbidden by the timidity of the ruling
party at the India House to bring to a successful conclusion. The
arrangements made by Lord Cornwallis and his successor, Sir George
Barlow, amounted practically to a renunciation of most of the Com-
pany's gains for the sake of a hollow peace and to the abandonment
of the Rajput states to the cruelty of the Maratha hordes and their
Pindari allies. Sindhia recovered Gohad, Gwalior, and other territory,
while to Holkar were restored the districts of Rajputana, which had
been taken from him by the Treaty of Rajpurghat. In two instances
only did Sir G. Barlow refuse to traverse Wellesley's policy. He
declined to allow the Nizam freedom to indulge in anti-English
intrigue, and he rejected a suggestion from England to modify the
position of the Peshwa under the Treaty of Bassein.
The Gaekwad of Baroda had taken no part in the struggle outlined
above. On the death of Govind Rao in 1800, the inevitable feud
about the succession broke out between Anand Rao, his legal suc-
cessor, who was of weak mind, and his illegitimate brother Kanhoji,
1 Fortescue, op. cit. V, 70-137.


## p. 376 (#404) ############################################

376
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
who was supported by the restless Malhar Rao. In 1802 the Company
sent a force from Cambay to support. Anand Rao, and in return
secured the cession of a good deal of territory and an acknowledgment
of their right to supervise the political affairs of the state. A little
later they frustrated an attempt by Sindhia and Holkar to meddle
with the Gaekwad's rights in Gujarat, and in April, 1805, concluded
a treaty whereby the Gaekwad undertook to maintain a subsidiary
force and to submit to British control his foreign policy and his
differences with the Peshwa. In 1804 the Peshwa renewed the lease
of Ahmadabad territory to Baroda for four and a half years at a rent
of ten lakhs per annum.
The decade following the hollow peace of 1805 was marked by
increasing disorder and anarchy throughout Central India and
Rajputana. Internal maladministration and constant internecine
warfare had produced the inevitable result, and the leading Maratha
states were forced to try and avert their impending bankruptcy by
means of contributions extorted from reluctant tributaries. In Holkar's
territories the peaceful progress, which had marked Ahalya Bai's wise
rule, had vanished beyond recall. In 1806 Jasvant Rao poisoned his
nephew Khande Rao and his brother Kashi Rao, who were suspected
of intriguing with his disaffected soldiery, and died a raving lunatic
at Bhanpura in 1811. His favourite concubine, Tulsi Bai, contrived
to place his illegitimate son, Malhar Rao, on the throne, with Amir
Khan, the leader of the Pathan banditti, as regent. Acute friction
between this Pathan element and the Maratha faction under Tulsi
Bai involved the state in chaos; revenue was collected at the sword's
point from the territory of Sindhia, the Ponwars, and Holkar himself
indiscriminately; the machinery of administration fell to pieces; and
a semblance of authority only remained with a vagrant and predatory
court, dominated by the profligate ex-concubine. The country had
no respite from disorder, until the murder of Tulsi Bai by a Pathan,
20 December, 1817, and the failure of British overtures for peace
obliged Sir Thomas Hislop to ford the Sipra river and extinguish at
Mahidpur the last embers of anarchy and hostility.
Sindhia's dominions were in no better plight. His troops, in default
of pay, were forced to subsist on the peasantry, who were already
impoverished by the mutual hostilities of their own ruler and Holkar.
The intermingled possessions of these two chiefs in Malwa became
the common hunting-ground of every band of marauders; Amir Khan
and his Pathan followers overran the raja of Berar's territory; the
Rajput states were swept by Sindhia, Holkar, the Pathans and the
Pindaris.
“Never”, in the words of a modern writer, "had there been such intense
and general suffering in India; the native states were disorganised, and society
on the verge of dissolution; the people crushed by despots and ruined by
1 Malcolm, Central India, I, 260-324.


## p. 377 (#405) ############################################

THE PINDARIS
377
Exactions; the country overrun by bandits and its resources wasted by enemies;
armed forces existed only to plunder, torture and mutiny; government had
ceased to exist; there remained only oppression and misery. "
The one sentiment uniting the warring units was hatred of the
English. All the Marathas, from the Peshwa downwards, realised
that if they were to regain their independence and make their preda-
tory power supreme in India, they must exterminate the foreign
government. It was to Baji Rao they all looked for support in this
desperate and ill-omened enterprise; and had the Peshwa shown any
spark of courage and statesmanship, the final struggle of the Company
for complete supremacy might conceivably have been more protracted.
But, while from 1803 the Peshwa never ceased to court disaster by
intriguing against his foreign supporters, he alienated the Maratha
feudal nobility by his tyrannous behaviour, as illustrated by the over-
throw and degradation of the Pant Pratinidhi. He also failed com-
pletely to protect his own territory from Pindari inroads and to check
the hostilities of the raja of Kolhapur and the Savant of Wadi. In the
case of the former, peace was not assured until 1811, when the English
forced the raja to sign the Treaty of Karvir.
The hesitation of the Company's government to assert its authority
as paramount power resulted between 1805 and 1814 in the rapid
growth of the destructive spirit of the Maratha hordes and Pathan
freebooters and a dangerous increase of the power of the Pindaris,
who were closely related to the two former organisations. The
Pindaris, consisting of lawless persons of all castes and classes,
originally attached loosely to the Maratha armies, developed, “like
masses of putrefaction in animal matter out of the corruption of weak
and expiring states", into a formidable menace to the whole of India.
Under their leaders, Chitu, Wasil Muhammad, and Karim Khan,
they made rapid raids across India, inflicting appalling devastation
upon the countryside and cominitting most atrocious outrages upon
all classes of the inhabitants. In 1812 they commenced to raid the
Company's territory by harrying Mirzapur and the southern districts
of Bihar; but it was not until 1816, when they attacked the Northern
Sarkars, plundering, torturing and killing the peaceful inhabitants,
that the directors in England, who still cherished an exaggerated
dread of Maratha power, became alive to the need for action and
authorised Lord Hastings in September of that year to extirpate the
cvil.
The Pindaris would have met their doom much earlier but that
the governor-general had been obliged to postpone his measures for a
while. A new power had been founded in the Himalayan regions by
the Gurkhas, a warlike race of hardy hillmen. The only serious effort
to check their progress had been made by the nawab of Bengal in
1762, but his army was severely defeated under the walls of Mak-
1 Prinsep, A Narrative of the Political and Military Transactions of British
India, pp. 21-32.


## p. 378 (#406) ############################################

378
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
wanpur. In the 1768 they conquered the Nepal valley and established
themselves at Kathmandu. The hill chiefs were subdued one after
another and the Gurkha kingdom expanded rapidly until it extended
from Sikkim on the east to the Satlej on the west. In 1814 the Gurkha
frontier was conterininous with that of the British over a distance of
seven hundred miles and the border districts suffered terribly from
their incessant inroads. The concessions of Barlow and the expostula-
lions of Minto proved equally futile and Lord Hastings found it
necessary to take strong measures. In April, 1814, he sent a small
force to occupy the disputed districts but the Gurkhas suddenly fell
upon the outlying stations and killed or captured the small garrisons.
War was therefore declared in November of that year.
The campaign was planned by the governor-general himself. The
main Gurkha army under Amar Singh Thapa was at that time
engaged in an expedition on the Satlej. It was decided that Major-
Generals Marley and Wood should advance upon the Gurkha capital
from Patna and Gorakhpur respectively, while Major-General
-
Gillespie from Saharanpur and Colonel Ochterlony from Ludhiana
were to close upon Amar Singh Thapa's main body. A speedy and
easy victory was expected. But the Gurkha country was yet unknown
to the British generals; there was no good road and the difficulties
of transport were exceptionally great. Most of the older generals,
moreover, were unfamiliar with hill fighting. .
In none of the Indian wars had British arms met with so many
reverses. Marley and Wood fell back after some feeble demonstra-
tions. Gillespie died in an assault on Kalanga, and his successor
suffered a defeat before the stronghold of Jaitak. The news of these
defeats spread widely in the country and offered no small encourage-
ment to the Peshwa and his partisans in their anti-British designs,
and the Gurkhas talked of invading the neighbouring provinces.
Fortunately the genius of Colonel Ochterlony soon restored the lost
prestige of his nation. By a series of masterly maneuvres he com-
pelled the Gurkha general to give up two strong positions and to
withdraw his army to his last retreat, the fort of Malaon. Here he
was closely besieged and the conquest of Kumaon in April, 1815, so
demoralised the Gurkhas that they deserted in large numbers. The
fall of Malaon on 15 May compelled the Gurkha Government to sue
for peace. Lord Hastings at first demanded the permanent cession
of the whole of the Tarai but afterwards reduced his demands and a
treaty was signed. The Nepal Government, however, refused to
ratify the treaty and prepared to renew the war. All the main passes
were secured and strongly defended by stockades but their plans were
again upset by Ochterlony who penetrated into the heart of Nepal
and inflicted a severe defeat upon the Gurkhas at Makwanpur on 28
February, 1816. - The English army was within easy reach of the
Gurkha capital and there was no more time for hesitation. The
Treaty of Sagauli was promptly ratified and a lasting peace was con-


## p. 379 (#407) ############################################

THE GURKHA WAR
379
cluded. The Gurkhas ceded Garhwal and Kumaon with the greater
portion of the Tarai. They withdrew permanently from Sikkim and
received a British resident at Kathmandu. The Gurkha country, it
is true, has not yet been thrown open to the English, but the Nepal
Government have faithfully adhered to their treaty obligations, and
the British districts have never since been disturbed by the dreaded
hillmen of the north. 1
Meanwhile British relations with the Peshwa were moving
towards the inevitable dénouement. When the old question of the
Peshwa's claims upon the Gaekwad was again raised in 1814, the
British Government, anxious to secure a final and peaceful settlement
of the dispute, arranged for the dispatch to Poona, under a safe con-
duct, of the Gaekwad's minister, Gangadhar Sastri. The Peshwa, who
had refused to renew the lease of Ahmadabad to the Gaekwad and
granted it to a vicious favourite, Trimbakji Danglia, connived at
the murder of the Baroda envoy by Trimbakji during the course of the
negotiations at Nasik. 2 After much prevarication, he was forced by
Mountstuart Elphinstone, the Resident, to deliver the murderer to
the British authorities in September, 1815. Trimbakji, however,
effected a romantic escape from custody a year later, probably with
the knowledge of Baji Rao, who was now engrossed in plans for a
Maratha combination against British supremacy. The governor-
general, confronted by the Pindari menace, the hostile intrigues of
the Peshwa, and dangerous unrest among other Maratha chiefs, was
glad to arrange a subsidiary alliance in May, 1816, with Appa Sahib
of Nagpur, who on the death of Raghuji Bhonsle became regent for
his imbecile successor, Parsaji. ? This agreement by which the Company
obtained security for three hundred miles of frontier, disconcerted for
the moment the secret plans of the Peshwa and Sindhia, and secured
a military position near the Narbada, whence it could, if need arose,
attack Sindhia and intercept Pindari raids. That done, Lord Hastings
turned his attention to the Peshwa, who with his usual perfidy openly
disowned Trimbakji, concluded an agreement with the Gaekwad,
and generally adopted conciliatory attitude. Proof of his treachery,
however, was shortly afterwards furnished to Elphinstone, who
forced him by a hostile military demonstration in June, 1817, to sign
a compact supplementary to the Treaty of Bassein. He thereby
explicitly renounced his headship of the Maratha confederacy and
ceded the Konkan and certain other lands and strongholds to the
British. He also recognised the independence of the Gaekwad, waived
all claims for arrears, and granted him a perpetual lease of Ahmada-
bad for an annual payment of four lakhs. To the British he ceded
the tribute of Kathiawad.
1 Fortescue, op. cit. XI, 118-62.
2 Forrest, Official Writings of Mountstuart Elphinstone, pp. 119-78.
3 Prinsep, op. cit. pp. 125-34.
4 Idem, pp. 186-203.


## p.
380 (#408) ############################################

380
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
Sindhia, who had been invited to assist in suppressing the Pindaris,
was naturally disposed to side with the ruffianly hordes who were
partly under his protection. Lord Hastings, therefore, crossed the
Jumna, marched on Gwalior, and taking advantage of the internal
dissension and military disorganisation which had reduced Sindhia's
offensive capacity, secured his signature in November, 1817, to the
Treaty of Gwalior, which bound him to co-operate against the Pindaris
and rescinded the clause in the Treaty of Surji Arjungaon restricting
the British from negotiation with the Rajput and other chiefs. As a
result, treaties were concluded at Delhi with Udaipur (Mewar),
Jodhpur (Marwar), Bhopal, Kotah, Jaipur, Bundi and thirteen other
Rajput states. Negotiations were also opened with the Pathan leader,
Amir Khan, who was subsequently granted the principality of Tonk
as the price of his neutrality and the disarmament of his followers.
Such was the position towards the close of 1817 when the process
of exterminating the Pindaris commenced. Though outwardly friend-
ly, every Maratha leader, including even Appa Sahib of Nagpur was a
potential enemy, prepared to take advantage of any reverse sustained
by the British during the campaign. Thus it happened that "the
hunt of the Pindaris became merged in the third Maratha war" and
struck the final death-knell of the Maratha power. Lord Hastings's
plan of campaign was to surround the Pindaris in Malwa by a large
army of 113,000 men and 300 guns, divided into a northern force of
four divisions, commanded by himself, and a Deccan army of five
divisions under Sir Thomas Hislop, operating from a central position
at Handia in Allahabad district. In order to divide the Deccan states
from those of Hindustan and prevent the Marathas from assisting
the Pindaris, a portion of the army was interposed as a cordon between
Poona and Nagpur. The operations were completely successful. By
the close of 1817 the Pindaris had been driven across the Chambal;
by the end of January, 1818, their organised bands had been anni-
hilated. Of the leaders, one was given land at Gorakhpur, another
committed suicide in captivity, while the third and most dangerous
of them all, Chitu, fled into the jungles around Asirgarh and was there
devoured by a tiger.
The Maratha danger alone remained and was finally precipitated
by the folly of the Peshwa and Appa Sahib Bhonsle. On the day
(5 November, 1817) that Sindhia signed the supplementary Treaty of
Gwalior, the Peshwa rose in revolt, sacked and burnt the British
Residency at Poona, and then attacked with an army of about 26,000
a small British force of 2800, which was drawn up under Colonel
Burr at Kirkee (Khadki). He was heavily defeated and fled south-
wards from Poona, seizing as he went the titular raja of Satara. The
British followed in hot pursuit, intending to prevent his escape into
Berar, fought two brilliant and victorious engagements against heavy
1 Fortescue, op. cit. XI, 177-250.


## p. 381 (#409) ############################################

THE MARATHA WAR
381
odds at Koregaon and Ashti, in the latter of which the Peshwa's
general, Bapu Gokhale, was slain, and finally forced the hunted fugi-
tive to surrender himself to Sir John Malcolm, 18 June, 1818. TO
the annoyance of the governor-general, Malcolm, whose political
judgment was temporarily obscured by feelings of compassion for
fallen greatness, pledged the Company to grant-Baji Rao an excessive
annuity of eight lakhs of rupees; and, the office of Peshwa having
been declared extinct, Baji Rao was permitted to reside at Bithur on
the Ganges, where he doubtless instilled into the mind of his adopted
son, known later as Nana Sahib, that hatred of the English which
bore such evil fruit in 1857,1
Meanwhile, Appa Sahib, emulating the example of the Peshwa,
attacked the British Resident at Nagpur, who had at his command a
small force of native infantry and cavalry and four guns. Taking up
its position on the ridge of Sitabaldi, the British force won a brilliant
victory on 27 November, and with the aid of reinforcements which
arrived a few days later, it forced the Bhonsle to surrender and finally
defeated a few days later, it forced the Bhonsle to surrender and
finally defeated his troops at Nagpur on 16 December, 1818. Appa
Sahib, who fled to the Panjab and eventually died in Rajputana, was
formally deposed in favour of a minor grandson of Raghuji Bhonsle;
his army was disbanded; and the portion of his dominions which lay
to the north of the Narbada was annexed to British territory under
the style of the Sagar (Saugor) and Narbada Territories. 2
The tactical arrangements of Lord Hastings, which prevented the
Maratha states from combining at the moment when mutual assistance
was vital to their plans, ensured the defeat of Holkar. The Indore
Darbar openly sympathised with the Peshwa's bid for freedom and
rejected all offers of negotiation; but deprived of external aid and
handicapped by internal dissension, the state forces could not with-
stand Sir Thomas Hislop's advance. Holkar's defeat at Mahidpur
was followed by the Treaty of Mandasor, signed on 6 January, 1818,
under the terms of which the chief relinquished his possessions south
of the Narbada, abandoned his claims upon the Rajput chiefs, recog-
nised the independence of Amir Khan, reduced the state army and
agreed to maintain a contingent to co-operate with the British, and
acquiesced in the appointment of a British Resident to his court.
Sindhia, who failed to fulfil his promise of active help in the
Pindari campaign and, in contravention of the Treaty of Gwalior, had
connived at the retention of the great fortress of Asirgarh by his
killadar, Jasvant Rao Lad, now saw that further opposition would be
fruitless, and, therefore, agreed in 1818 to a fresh treaty with the
Company. This agreement provided, inter alia, for the cession to the
English of Ajmir, the strategical key to Rajputana, and for a readjust-
ment of boundaries. The Gaekwad, Fateh Singh, who acted as:regent
1 Fortesque, op. cit. XI, 180-247.
? Idem, pp. 189-97:246-9.
.


## p. 382 (#410) ############################################

382
FINAL STRUGGLE WITH THE MARATHAS
for Anand Rao, signed a supplementary treaty in November, 1817,
whereby he agreed to augment his subsidiary force, ceded his share
of Ahmadabad for a cash payment representing its estimated value,
and received in exchange the district of Okhamandal, the island of
Bet, and other territory. Fateh Singh, who died in 1818 a few months
before the titular ruler Anand Rao, adhered scrupulously to his
alliance with the British during the operations against the Pindaris
and the Maratha states. In return he was granted full remission of
the tribute annually payable to the Peshwa for the revenues of
Ahmadabad. 1
In accordance with the precedent set by Wellesley in the case of
Mysore, the raja of Satara, who had been delivered from the clutches
of Baji Rao by Colonel Smith's victory at Ashti, was provided with
a small semi-independent principality around Satara, and was en-
throned on 11 April, 1818. With a view to a pacific settlement of the
Peshwa's conquered dominions, arrangements satisfactory to both
parties were made by the Company with the Pant Pratinidhi, the Pant
Sachiv, the raja of Akalkot, the Patvardhans, and the other Maratha
nobles and jagirdars; while the piratical chiefs of the western littoral,
who had been incompletely chastised in 1812, were completely
reduced in 1820 and forced to cede the remainder of the coast
between Kolhapur and Goa.
“The struggle which has thus ended”, wrote Prinsep in his Political Review,
published in 1825, “in the universal establishment of the British influence is
particularly important and worthy of attention, as it promises to be the last
we shall ever have to maintain with the native powers of India. Hencefor-
ward this epoch will be referred to as that whence each of the existing states
will date the commencement of its peaceable settlement and the consolidation
of its relations with the controlling power. The dark age of trouble and
violence, which so long spread its malign influence over the fertile regions of
Central India, has thus ceased from this time; and a new era has commenced,
we trust, with brighter prospects,-an era of peace, prosperity and wealth at
least, if not of political liberty and high moral improvement. ”
There can be no doubt that the English and Maratha Governments
could not co-exist in India; for the practical working of the Maratha
system, which was inspired more deeply than has hitherto been
recognised by the doctrines of the ancient Hindu text-books of auto-
cracy, was oppressive to the general mass of the people, destitute of
moral ideas, and directly antagonistic to the fundamental principles
of the Company's rule. Lord Hastings fully realised that, if India
was ever to prosper, orderly government must be substituted for the
lawless and predatory rule of his chief antagonists, and he brought
to the achievement of his complex task a singular combination of
firmness and moderation. Every chance was offered to the treacherous
Peshwa and the raja of Berar of reforming their corrupt adminis-
tration and living in amity with the English; consideration was shown
1 Prinsep, op. cit. pp. 418-68.


## p. 383 (#411) ############################################

THE SETTLEMENT
383
to avowed freebooters like Amir Khan and even to the ruffians who
led the Pindari raids across India; Sindhia's duplicity was treated
with undeserved forbearance. And when the doom of Maratha rule
had been sealed, the governor-general's prudence and knowledge
framed the measures which converted hostile princes like Sindhia and
Holkar into staunch allies of the British Government, caused new
villages and townships to germinate amid the ashes of rapine and
desolation, created new and permanent sources of revenue, and
diffused from Cape Comorin to the banks of the Satlej a spirit of
tranquillity and order which India had never known since the spacious
days of Akbar.


## p. 384 (#412) ############################################

CHAPTER XXIII
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
THE Maratha administrative system, in the eighteenth century and
the opening years of the nineteenth, may be described as a compound
of the principles embodied in ancient works on Hindu polity, such as
the Arthasastra of Kautilya, of the arrangements institutea by Sivaji
and followed to some extent by his immediate successors, Sambhaji,
Raja Rama, and Shahu, and of the modifications introduced by the
Peshwas from the year 1727. In the various branches of the state's
activities, the main differences between the system originally pei.
fected by Sivaji and that which obtained under the Peshwas resulted
naturally from the change in the position of Sivaji's lineal descendant,
the raja of Satara, whose powers and prestige rapidly declined from
the moment when the appointment of Peshwa became hereditary
in the family of Balaji Visvanath (1714-20). Although the raja
continued after that date to be regarded as the head of the Maratha
state, and in theory retained the right to appoint the Peshwa and
other high officials, his powers gradually became little more than
nominal, and he was subsequently deprived even of the right of
appointing and dismissing his own retainers. His personal expenses,
moreover, were closely scrutinised by the Peshwa's secretariat, and he
was obliged to obtain sanction from Poona for all expenditure con-
nected with public works, private charities, and the maintenance of
his household. Originally one of Sivaji's Ashta Pradhan and holding,
like the other seven ministers, a non-hereditary appointment, the
Peshwa gradually assumed a position superior to that of the other
ministers, including even the pratinidhi who had originally been
appointed by Raja Rama as his vice-regent at Jinji and continued to
occupy the senior position on the board until the genius of Balaji
Visvanath made the Peshwa's office both hereditary and supreme.
The gradual transformation of "the mayor of the palace" of the raja
of Satara into the virtual ruler of the Maratha state and the Maratha
confederacy, thus initiated by Balaji Visvanath, was aided by Tara
Bai's imprisonment of Raja Rama in the Satara fort and was com-
pieted by Raja Shahu's grant of plenary powers to the Peshwa Balaji
Baji Rao on his deathbed. ?
Thus from the first quarter of the eighteenth century until the final
débâcle of the Maratha power, the Peshwa, though acting nominally
as the vice-regent of the raja of Satara and showing him on public
occasions the attentions due to the ruler, actually controlled the whole
1 Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, pp. 186-96.
? Idem, pp. 196-202.


## p. 385 (#413) ############################################

THE PESHWA
385
administration and even usurped the raja's powers and prerogatives
as ecclesiastical head of the state. This latter function was not con-
sequent upon the Peshwa's social position as a Brahman, for the
Chitpavan sect, to which the Peshwas belonged, was not accounted
of much importance by other Brahmanic sects and by some, indeed,
was considered ineligible for inclusion in the Brahmanic category.
As was the case with Sivaji, the Peshwa's supremacy in the socio-
religious sphere was the natural corollary of his position as head
executive power or chief magistrate, and in that capacity he gave
decisions in a large variety of matters, including the appointment of
officiating priests for non-Hindu congregations, the remarriage of
widows, the sale of unmarried girls, and arrangements for dowry and
adoption.
The Peshwa's predominant position was also recognised by the
Maratha feudal nobility, composed of estate-holders and chiefs, who
were expected to provide troops and render military service, as
occasion demanded, in return for their saranjams or fiefs, and were
practically independent autocrats within the boundaries of their own
lands and villages. As the Peshwa himself was originally one of these
feudal landholders, subject to the general control of the raja of
Satara, he was not slow to realise that his assumption of supremacy
might evoke combinations of the others against himself. This possi-
bility was largely discounted by dividing the revenues of any one
district between several Maratha chiefs, who generally considered it
beneath their dignity as fighting men to learn the art of reading and
writing their mother-tongue and were at the same time exceedingly
resentful of any supposed infringement of their financial proprietary
rights. This system of sub-division of revenues gave rise to great
complications in the state accounts, of which the Peshwa and his
Brahman secretariat were not slow to take advantage : and it also
engendered among the Maratha chiefs perpetual feuds and jealousies.
which prevented their combining whole-heartedly against a common
enemy and were ultimately responsible in large measure for the
downfall of the Maratha power. The Maratha respect for the maxim
that "it is well to have a finger in every pie”, and their constant
search for opportunities of extortion and pillage, are well illustrated
by the refusal of Sindhia, as recorded in the private journal of the
Marquess of Hastings, to relinquish his share in certain lands included
in the possessions of the chief of Bundi, although he was offered in
exchange more valuable territory, contiguous to his own dominions.
The focus of the Maratha administration was the Peshwa's secre-
tariat in Poona, styled the Huzur Daftar, which was composed of
several departments and bureaux. It dealt, broadly speaking, with
the revenues and expenditure of all districts, with the accounts
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 202-4, 397-417.
25


## p. 386 (#414) ############################################

386
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
submitted by the district and village officials, with all alienations of
public revenue in the form of inams, saranjams, etc. , with the pay and
privileges of all grades of the public service, and with the budgets of
the civil, military and religious establishments. The daily registers
.
(roz kird) of the various departments recorded all revenue transac-
tions, all grants and payments, and all contributions and exactions
levied on foreign territory. These records, which included state
transactions of every kind, were maintained with great care and
efficiency until the rule of Baji Rao II (1796-1818), when they
became practically valueless by reason of the maladministration and
political disorder of that period.
The foundation of the Peshwa's administrative system was the
self-contained and self-supporting village community, which had its
roots in an almost prehistoric past. Each village had a headman,
the patel (the pattakila of ancient lithic and copperplate records), who
combined the functions of revenue officer, magistrate and judge, and
acted as intermediary between the villagers and the Peshwa's officials.
His office was hereditary and might form the subject of sale and
purchase, and his emoluments, which varied slightly from village to
village, consisted chiefly in the receipt from every yillager of a fixed
share of his produce. These receipts ranged from a daily supply of
betel-leaves, provided by the dealers in pan-supari, to a tax on the
remarriage of a widow; and in return for these emoluments and for
his recognition as the social leader of the village community, the patel
was expected to shoulder the responsibility for the village's welfare
and good conduct. The kulkarni, or village clerk and record-keeper,
who was always a Brahman, was second in importance to the patel,
and like the latter was remunerated by a variety of perquisites. He
was often expected to share the patel's responsibility for the good
behaviour of the village community, and ran an equal risk of oppres-
sion and imprisonment by casual' invaders or tyrannous officials.
Excluding the chaugula who had custody of the kuikarni's bundles of
correspondence, assisted the patel, and was frequently an illegitimate
scion of the patel's family, the communal duties and wants of the
village were performed and supplied by the bara balute or twelve
hereditary village servants, who received a recognised share of the
crops and other perquisites in return for their services to the com-
munity. The personnel of the bara balute was not invariably the same
in all parts of the Deccan, and in some places they were associated
with an additional body of twelve village servants, styled bara alute.
Up to the period of the rule of the Peshwa Madhu Rao I (1761-72),
certain classes of village mechanics and artisans, like the carpenter
and blacksmith, were liable to forced labour (begar) on behalf of the
state-an exaction which had the express sanction of the most ancient
* Sen, op. cit. pp. 267-71.
2 Idem, pp. 211-37, 503-21.


## p. 387 (#415) ############################################

THE MAMLATDAR
387
Hindu law codes and was certainly practised by previous governments
in India. 1
The backbone of the Maratha district administration, which
perhaps drew its origina) inspiration from the principles laid down
in Kautilya's Arthasastra, was supplied by the mamlatdar, who was in
charge of a division styled sarkar, subha, or prant, and by the kamu-
visdar, his subordinate or deputy, who administered a smaller terri-
torial area of the same kind, usually termed a pargana. This territorial
nomenclature had, however, lost its significance by the beginning of
the nineteenth century, and the revenue divisions—the sarkar, the
pargana, and the smaller areas styled mahal and tarf, had been largely
broken up as a result of internal changes and confusion. The mam-
latdar, who corresponded roughly to the subhedar or mukhya desha-
dhikari of Sivaji's day, and the kamavisdar were directly subordinate
to the Peshwa's secretariat in: Poona, except in the case of Khandesh,
Gujarat and the Karnatak, where a superior official, styled sarsubhe-
ddr, was interposed between them and the government. Originally the
mamlatdar and the kamavisdar were appointed for short terms only,
but in practice they managed frequently to secure renewals of their
term of office in a district. As the direct representative of the Peshwa
they were responsible for every branch of the district administration,
including agriculture, industries, civil and criminal justice, the control
of the sihbandis (militia) and the police, and the investigation of
social and religious questions. They also fixed the revenue assessment
of each village in consultation with the patel, heard and decided
complaints against the village officers, and were responsible for the
collection of the state revenue, which in cases of recalcitrance they
were accustomed to recover through the medium of the sihbandis. 2
It will be obvious that under this system there were many oppor-
tunities for peculation and maladministration on the part of the dist-
rict officials, while the only checks upon the action of the mamlatdar
were of a theoretical rather than a practical character. The first of
these restraints was provided by the desmukh and despande, who had
long ceased to hold any official status and had been relegated to a
more or less ornamental position since the days of Sivaji. 3 In theory
the mamlatdar's accounts were not passed by the secretariat at Poona,
unless corroborated by corresponding accounts from these local
anachronisms, and in all disputes regarding land the deshmukh was
expected to produce his ancient records, containing the history of all
watans, inams and grants, and the register of transfer of properties,
which he maintained in return for the annual fee or perquisites
received from the villagers. The safeguards not infrequently proved
illusory, for there was nothing to prevent the mamiatdar obtaining
official approval of his returns by methods of his own, while the
.
2 Idem; -pp. 252-8.
1. Sen, op. cit. pp. 532-4.
3 Idem, pp. 243-51.


## p. 388 (#416) ############################################

388
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
desmukh's registers were irregularly written up and often very
incomplete. The second check upon the mamlatdar was provided by
a staff of hereditary darakhdars or office-holders, who were appointed
to the various provinces or major divisions of the Maratha dominions,
were directly subordinate to the Peshwa, and reported direct to the
government in Poona. These officials were eight in number, viz. the
dewan or mamlatdar's deputy, mazumdar, phadnavis, daftardar,
potnis, potdar, sabhasad, and chitnis; and they were expected to act
as a check, not only upon one another but also on the mamlatdar, who
was not empowered to dismiss any one of them. A ninth official of
this class, the jamenis, who apparently concerned himself with the
land revenue of the villages, is mentioned in the reign of the Peshwa
Madhu Rao 1. 1
With the object, doubtless, of preventing the wholesale malversa-
tion of public money, the Maratha Government was accustomed to
demand from the mamlatdar and other officials the payment of a
heavy sum (rasad) on their first appointment to a district, and careful
estimates of probable income and expenditure were drawn up for
their guidance by the Huzur Daftar. These precautions were of even
less value than those mentioned above. The mamlatdar was at pains
to recover his advance with interest and frequently made considerable
illicit profits by concealment of receipts, non-payment of pensions,
and the preparation of false bills and muster-rolls. A fruitful source
of gain was the sadąr warid pattiman extra tax intended to cover
miscellaneous district expenditure not provided for by the govern-
ment; and one of the chief items of this additional expenditure was
the darbar kharch or fee to ministers and auditors, which, originally
a secret bribe, developed eventually into a recognised scale of pay.
ments, audited like other items of account. These illicit claims showeci
a constant tendency to increase, and as it was obviously impolitic to
recover more than a certain amount from the peasantry, who pro-
vided in one way or another a very large proportion of the public
revenues, the mamlatdar did not scruple to pay himself and his
superiors out of funds that should have been credited wholly to the
government. ? Under the rule. of the last Peshwa, Baji Rao II, the
peasantry were deprived of even this modified protection from extor-
ti:in by the system of farming the district appointments, which had
been in vogue under the preceding Muhammadan governments of the
Deccan.
“The office of mamlatdar"; according to Mountstuart Elphinstone, “was put
up to auction among the Peshwa's attendants, who were encouraged to bid
high and were sometimes disgraced, if they showed a reluctance to enter on
this sort of speculation. ”
The mamlatdar, who had secured a district at these auctions, promptly
a
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 238-63.
2 Idem, pp. 263-5; Forrest, official Writings of Mountstuart Elphinstone,
pp. 287-9.


## p. 389 (#417) ############################################

THE KAMAVISDAR
389
rented it at a profit to under-farmers, who repeated the process until
it reached the village officers. Under such a system the scale on.
which each peasant was assessed was based upon his ability to pay,
not upon the area and quality of the land which he occupied; and
as the demand was usually immoderate and constant resort was had
to fictitious accounts, the villagers were steadily exhausted by the
shameless exactions of the official hierarchy. 1
The kamavisdar, whose official emoluments were often fixed at
4 per cent. of the revenues of the district in his charge together with
certain allowances, e. g. for the upkeep of a palanquin, was provided,
like the mamlatdar, with a staff of clerks and menials, who were
generally paid ten or eleven months' salary in return for a full year's
work. The reason for this short payment, which was also adopted in
the military department, is not clear. Possibly it amounted to a tacit
acknowledgment that an aggregate period of at least one or two
months in every twelve would be spent on leave or otherwise wasted,
or that petty illicit perquisites, which it would be fruitless to trace
or expose, would probably total to the amount of a month's salary.
The small territorial divisions, known as mahal or tarf, were adminis-
tered on the same lines as the mamlatdar's and kamavisdar's charges
by a non-hereditary official styled havaldar, assisted and checked by
a hereditary mazumdar (accountant) and phadnis (auditor). In each
mahal, as a rule, were stationed four additional officials of militia,
viz. the hashamnavis, who maintained a muster-roll of the villagers,
their arms, and their pay; the hasham phadnis and hasham daftardar,
who kept the accounts and wrote up the ledger of the militia, and
the hazirinavis, who maintained a muster-roll of those actually
serving in the militia. 2
The Maratha judicial system has been described as very imper-
fect, there being no rules of procedure, no regular administration of
justice, and no codified law. In both civil and criminal matters
decisions were based upon custom and upon rules or formulae
err. bodied in ancient Sanskrit compilations, like those of Manu and
Yajnavalkya. In civil cases the main object aimed at was amicable
settlement, and arbitration was therefore the first step in the disposal
of a suit. If arbitration failed, the case was transferred for decision
to a panchayat, appointed by the patel in the village and by the shete
mahajan, or leading merchant, in urban areas. An appeal lay from
the decision of a panchayat to the mamlatdar, who usually upheld the
verdict, unless the parties concerned were able to prove that the
panchayat was prejudiced or corrupt. In serious or important suits,
however, it was the duty of the mamlatdar to appoint an arbitrator
or a panchayat, the members of which were chosen by him with the
approval, and often at the suggestion, of the parties to the suit. In
1 Forrest, op. cit. pp. 294-6.
2 Sen, op. cit. p. 266.


## p. 390 (#418) ############################################

390
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
such cases the panchayat's decision was subject to an appeal to the
Peshwa or his legal minister, the nyayadhish. The system of pancha-
yats left a good deal to be desired from the standpoint of modern legal
administration. These bodies were slow in action and uncertain in
their decisions: the attendance of the members was usually irregular,
depending as it did entirely upon the individual's sense of duty or
fear of public opinion. The powers of the panchayat were strictly
limited; it was exposed to constant obstruction; and it possessed no
authority to enforce its decisions, which were left to the mamlatdar
to carry out or neglect, as he pleased. It had likewise no power to
compel the attendance of parties and their witnesses, and depended
upon the mamlatdar or other local official to supply a petty officer for
this purpose. In cases where the members of a panchayat were nomi-
nated by the parties to a suit, they functioned rather as advocates
than as judges; and, speaking generally, the system offered consider-
able scope for partiality and corruption, which became very marked
under the rule of Baji Rao II. Yet, despite its primitive character
and its liability to be improperly influenced, the panchayat was a
popular institution, and the absence of a decision by a panchayat in
any suit was almost always regarded as complete justification for a
retrial of the issues. The fact must be admitted that among themselves,
within the confines of the self-contained ancestral village, the
peasantry did obtain a fair modicum of rude justice from the village
panchayat. What they failed to obtain either from the panchayats or
from the government was any measure of redress against the merciless
oppression of their superiors. 1
In criminal cases much the same procedure was adopted, though
a punchayat was less frequently appointed than in civil disputes. The
chief authorities were the patel in the village, the mamlatdar in the
district, the sarsubhedar in the province, and the Peshwa and his
nyayadhish at headquarters; and they administered a law which was
merely popular custom tempered by the trying officer's own ideas of
expediency. Ancient Hindu law in its criminal application had
become practically obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century,
and Mountstuart Elphinstone's opinion that "the criminal system of
the Mahrattas was in the last stage of disorder and corruption" was
fully justified by the state of the criminal law and procedure imme-
diately prior to the downfall of the last Peshwa. No regular form of
trial of accused persons was prescribed; flogging was frequently
inflicted with the object of extorting confessions of guilt; and in the
case of crimes against the state torture was usually employed. The
punishment for serious offences against the person was originally fine,
or confiscation of property, or imprisonment, the fine being propor-
tioned to the means of the offender; ? but after 1761 capital punisi-
2
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 347-79.
2 Idem, pp. 381-3.


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JUDICIAL SYSTEM
391
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ment and mutilation were inflicted upon persons convicted of grievous
hurt, dacoity and theft, as well as upon those found guilty of murder
or treason. The usual methods of execution were hanging, decapi-
tation, cutting to pieces with swords, or crushing the skull with a
mallet, exception being made in the case of Brahmans, who were
poisoned or starved to death. Powers of life and death were originally
vested in the ruler only, and in the principal feudal chiefs within the
limits of their respective jagirs. In later times, however, these powers
were delegated to the sarsubhedar of a province; while throughout the
second half of the eighteenth century the mamlatdar, as head of a
district, considered himself justified in hanging a Ramosi, Bhil, or
Mang robber, without reference to higher authority.