No More Learning

[491]

HOURS.
Cæsar starts at four o’clock in the morning, and arrives at Randan
at one o’clock in the afternoon 9
Employs in negotiation from one o’clock to seven o’clock 6
Repose from seven o’clock to ten o’clock in the evening 3
Hurried return from Randan to Gergovia, from ten o’clock to
four o’clock in the morning 6
--
Duration of Cæsar’s absence 24


[492] _Plate 22_ shows the places which Cæsar’s eye could embrace from
the summit of the Roche-Blanche. He could see neither the plateau, nor
the country situated on the norther slopes of the mountains of Gergovia
and Rissoles. It was for this reason that he had to learn from the
deserters the form of the ground which lay on the other side. He thus
learnt that the ridge of this latter mountain (_dorsum ejus jugi_) was
not very uneven, and gave access to the western part of the town (_ad
alteram partem oppidi_) by a narrow wooded passage (the defile of the
Goules, which separates Rissoles from Gergovia). (_See Plate 21 in C. _)
This defile leads to the gate _P_ of the _oppidum_. The foundations, of
masonry, and the approaches to this gate, were uncovered in the month of
July, 1861. The wide road which led from this gate to the defile _C_ is
distinctly seen. The alarm of Vercingetorix may be imagined; he feared
lest the Romans might shut up from the Gauls this issue from the
_oppidum_. These latter would have been almost blockaded (_pœne
circumvallati_), without any way out, and in the impossibility of
producing forage from the valley of the Artières, since the northern
part of the town was difficult to access. Consequently, the words _si
alterum collem amisissent_ can only apply to the mountain mass of
Rissoles, and not, as several authors have pretended, to Montrognon or
to Puy-Giroux; for the possession of those two peaks, detached and
rather far from the mountain mass of Gergovia, offered no interest
either for the attack or for the defence.

The spot which it was important for the Gauls to fortify was the part _D
E_ of the heights of Rissoles which are opposite the village of Opme,
because troops could only scale the mass by the western slope. How can
any one suppose that, fearing for the defile of the Goules, the Gauls
would have abandoned their camp before the place to go and entrench
themselves on Montrognon, three kilomètres from Gergovia? How admit that
Cæsar, to threaten the defile, would have sent troops to make the
circuit of the mountain of Gergovia by the north? How could the legion,
which supported this movement, without advancing far, and which
concealed itself in the woods, have assisted in the stratagem, if the
false attack had been made to the east and to the north of Gergovia, at
two leagues from the camp? In passing by the south, that is, by the
defile of Opme, the legion was always in communication with the camps,
on which it could fall back, and the broken and wooded ground prevented
the Gauls from knowing accurately the importance of the attack. Besides,
two facts which result from the “Commentaries” prove that the Gauls were
not very far from the _oppidum_. Cæsar sees the southern front
abandoned, and he establishes his legions at a distance of 1,200 paces
from the place. The soldiers scale the heights at a rapid pace; but
scarcely have they reached the principal enclosure, when the Gauls, who
hear the cries of the women and of the small number of defenders left in
the place (_primo exaudito clamore_), have time to hurry to them, and
drive back the Romans. Consequently, the Gauls were at a distance where
the cries could be heard; and this distance may be measured by the time
which the attacking columns must have taken to climb the space of 1,200
paces, since they arrived almost simultaneously. We believe, therefore,
that they were at a distance of less than two kilomètres from the gate
_O_ of the town, engaged in fortifying the plateau of the heights of
Risolles.

[493] According to Polyænus (VIII. xxiii. 9), the soldiers marched with
their heads bent down, in order not to be seen.

[494] It is, in fact, 1780 mètres from the foot of the mountain, where
Cæsar must have assembled his troops, between the Roche-Blanche and the
Puy-de-Marmant, to the gate _O_ of the _oppidum_. This is the line which
passes by the ravine in which the village of Merdogne is situated; to
the left and to the right the ground is too rugged for the troops to
climb it.

[495] General Gœler believes, with apparent reason, that we ought to
read _regressus_ instead of _progressus_. The 10th legion, which acted
as reserve, must, in the presence of a combat, the issue of which was
uncertain, have taken up a position behind rather than towards the
front.

[496] The part of the southern slope of Gergovia which was the scene of
the last battle is clearly indicated by the ground itself. This battle
took place on the whole space which extends in front of the gate _O_ of
the _oppidum_, the principal object of the attack. The ravine which,
according to the “Commentaries,” prevented the legions from hearing the
signal to retreat, is that which descends to the west of the Merdogne.
Hence it may be concluded that, at this moment, Cæsar and the 10th
legion were to the right of this ravine. Lastly, we understand on the
spot the movement of the Ædui. To the east of Merdogne there is a spur,
_H_, attached to the mountain of Gergovia, forty mètres below the
table-land, and presenting several successive terraces. So long as the
Ædui, who came from the east, had not arrived on the crest of this spur,
they could not be perceived by the Romans, who were fighting towards
Merdogne; but it may be imagined that, when they appeared all at once on
this crest, and at a distance of 600 mètres from the right flank of the
legions, the sight of them must have singularly surprised the troops,
who were expecting no re-enforcement from that side.

General de Gœler, without having seen the locality, has indicated nearly
the site of the Roman camp; but he does not place it sufficiently to the
west. He makes the Gaulish troops encamp on the four slopes of the
mountain of Gergovia. It is, no doubt, the expression _circum se_ (VII.
36) which led him into this error. It is, indeed, impossible to admit
that the Gauls could have encamped on the abrupt slopes of the northern
declivity. General de Gœler is also mistaken in directing the false
attack upon Montrognon. Lastly, he places the scene of the battle too
much towards the west.

[497] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 52.

[498] “In the war of the Gauls, Caius Julius Cæsar was surprised by an
enemy, who carried him off, armed as he was, on his horse, when another
Gaul, who recognized Cæsar, called out, intending to insult him, “Cæcos,
Cæsar! ” which in the Gaulish language signifies, _let him go, set him
loose_; and so he escaped. Cæsar says so himself, in his _Ephemerides_,
in the passage where he speaks of his good fortune. ” (Servius Maurus
Honoratus, a grammarian of the fifth century, in his commentary on the
11th book of the _Æneid_, line 743, II. p. 48, edit. Albert Lion. )

The manuscripts of Servius do not all present the same reading. The
following are some of the principal variations: _Cecos, Cæsar_; _Cæcos
ac Cæsar_; and _Cæsar, Cesar_.

[499] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 29.

[500] There has always been a ford at Bourbon-Lancy.

[501] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 56.

[502] A sling-ball of lead has been found at Sens, on which are stamped
in relief the words “T. Labienus. ” This ball forms part of the
collection of the Museum of Saint-Germain.

[503] MM. de Saulcy and J. Quicherat have already demonstrated in a
conclusive manner that Labienus must have followed the left bank of the
Yonne, after leaving Sens, and that he crossed over to the right bank of
the Seine at Melun. In fact, Labienus, on the right bank, found himself,
as Cæsar says, threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, on the other by
the army of Camulogenus (VII. 59). On the opposite bank, on the
contrary, Labienus would not have been placed between the two, since he
would have had Camulogenus in front, and, at a greater distance, the
Bellovaci coming from the north.

“A very large river kept the legions separated from their reserve and
their baggage. ” This very great river cannot be the Marne, which Cæsar
does not even mention in the whole course of this campaign: it was
evidently the Seine, which Labienus has crossed once only, at Melodunum
(_Melun_); by crossing over to the right bank, he was separated from his
base of operations, which was at Sens. On the contrary hypothesis, no
river would have separated Labienus from his line of retreat; unless we
admit, with Dulaure and several others, the identity of Agedincum with
Provius, which is no longer possible.

The Captain of the Staff Rouby has made investigations on the spot,
which prove that from Sens the most ancient ways leading to Paris passed
on the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine. Moreover, the
discoveries of M. Carré have made us acquainted with the exact direction
followed by the Roman road after quitting Sens towards Paris; it was
entirely on the left bank of the Yonne. If Cæsar’s lieutenant had
followed the right bank of the Yonne, he would, the day after his
departure, have been arrested by the course of the Seine, and would have
fallen in with the Gaulish town of Condate, built in the very angle of
the two streams, in the midst of perhaps impassable marshes. If only a
few thousand Gauls had occupied the heights which played so important a
part in the campaign of 1814, Labienus, compelled to seek for a place to
cross higher up the stream, would have been diverted considerably from
his aim.

It has been supposed wrongly that the Bièvre was the marsh where
Labienus, in his march on the left bank of the Seine, had been arrested
by the Gaulish army. Leaving out of consideration the fact that the
Bièvre, which flows through a calcareous soil, can at no epoch have
formed a marsh capable of arresting an army, how can we suppose that
Labienus, if he had arrived at this stream, that is, close to Lutetia,
would have retraced his steps as far back as Melun, to march from thence
towards the _oppidum_ of the Parisii by the right bank of the Seine,
which would have obliged him to make a journey of twenty-four leagues?
The manœuvre of Labienus can only be explained by his desire to turn the
strong position of Camulogenus, and arrive at Paris before him. The text
of the “Commentaries” says clearly that Labienus, stopped by the marsh
which shelves towards the Seine, stole away by night, surprised the
passage of the Seine at Melun, and marched upon Lutetia, where he
arrived before Camulogenus. To allow of the success of this manœuvre,
the marsh in question must necessarily not have been far from Melun. The
Essonne alone fulfils that condition. The ground on the banks of this
little river offers, even at present, by its nature, a very serious
obstacle to an army. It is cut up by innumerable peat mosses; and it was
behind this line of Essonne that, in 1814, the Emperor Napoleon I.
established his army, whilst the enemy occupied Paris.

[504] We have not translated these words, _fugam parare_, because this
passage has always appeared unintelligible to us. How, indeed, could the
Gauls, seeing that the Romans were ready to pass the Seine by force,
believe that this was a flight?

[505] Some manuscripts have Metiosedum, a version which, in our opinion,
is utterly incorrect.

[506] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 62.

[507] See _Appendix D_.

[508] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 65. --_Evocati_ was the name given to the
old soldiers who, after having served, returned voluntarily to the ranks
of the army.

[509] Let us here recapitulate the numbers of the legions employed
during the war in Gaul. Cæsar’s army, as we have seen, was composed in
696 of six legions, the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th. In 697, two
new legions were raised in Italy, the 13th and 14th. Probably, in the
winter between 699 and 700, Cæsar brought several cohorts composed of
soldiers and sailors who were to serve in the fleet; for, on his return
from the second expedition into England, notwithstanding the losses he
had sustained, he was at the head of eight legions and five cohorts (V.
24). He lost at Aduatuca one legion and a half, that is, the 14th
legion, besides five cohorts; but in 701 three new legions replaced the
cohorts lost, and even doubled their number. These legions were the 1st,
lent by Pompey (_De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 54, and Lucan, _Pharsalia_,
VII. , 1. 218); the 14th, which took the number of the legion destroyed
at Aduatuca (_De Bello Gallico_, VI. 32; VIII. 4); and the 15th; this
last legion was afterwards, with the 1st, given to Pompey for the war of
the Parthians; it figured in the Civil War, and took, in Pompey’s army,
the number 3. (Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, III. 88. )

The 6th legion, judging from its number, must have been one of the
oldest, for Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 47) informs us that the legions were
designated according to their order of inscription on the rolls of the
army; but, as it only appears for the first time in 702, it is probable
that it had remained in garrison among the Allobroges or in Italy. A
proof that this legion assisted in the siege of Alesia is found in the
fact that, after the surrender of the place, it was sent to winter
quarters on the Saône, where Cæsar found it a few months afterwards (_De
Bello Gallico_, VIII. 4). The distribution of the troops in their winter
quarters after the taking of Alesia confirms the number of legions given
above. The re-distribution after the siege of Uxellodunum gives also the
same result, for in book VII. c. 46 the “Commentaries” give the
positions of ten legions, without reckoning the 15th, which, according
to book VIII. c. 24, had been sent to Cisalpine Gaul. These facts are
repeated again, book VIII. c. 54.

[510] It is evident that an army could not remain in the wars for eight
years without receiving frequent re-enforcements in order to keep it up
to its effective number. Thus, when, after the murder of Clodius, all
the youth of Italy had been called to arms, Cæsar made new levies, which
were used probably to swell the ranks of his legions, for no new numbers
appear (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 1). --In the same manner, when he
arrived, in 702, in the south of Gaul, and crossed the Cévennes, he
placed himself at the head of the troops which had been recruited in the
Roman province and of the re-enforcements which he had brought from
Italy (_partem copiarum ex provincia supplementumque quod ex Italia
adduxerat in Helvois, qui fines Arvernorum contingunt, convenire
jubet_). (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 7. )--Labienus, on the other hand,
during his expedition to Paris, left his recruits in dépôt at Sens
(_Labienus eo supplemento quod nuper ex Italia venerat relicto_). (_De
Bello Gallico_, VII. 57. )

[511] Plutarch, _Cato_, 53.

[512] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 36.

[513] See above, page 87.

[514] See above, page 108, note (2).

[515] We learn from the text that he formed three camps. This
disposition was necessitated by circumstances and the character of the
locality. The heights of Sacquenay form, in fact, three promontories,
_V_, _V_, _V_ (_see Plate 24_), advancing towards the north; the road to
Dijon passes over the one to the left, the road to Pontallier over the
one in the middle. By establishing three camps on these three
promontories, Vercingetorix occupied each of these roads with one-third
of his army, whilst he backed his right wing against the Vingeanne.

The Gaulish army had there a position of great natural strength, for, to
attack it, the enemy would have to climb high hills which were easy to
defend; it was, moreover, protected by two watercourses: one, the
Vingeanne, which covered its right; the other, the Badin, a small
tributary of the Vingeanne, which protected its front. In the space
comprised between these two watercourses and the road from Dijon to
Langres, a ground extends, measuring five kilomètres in every direction,
slightly broken in some parts, but almost flat everywhere else,
particularly between the Vingeanne and the hillock of Montsaugeon. Near
the road, and to the west, arise hills which command it, as well as the
whole country as far as Badin and the Vingeanne.

[516] The field of battle of the Vingeanne, which H. M. Defay, of
Langres, first pointed out, answers perfectly to all the requirements of
the Latin narrative, and, moreover, material proofs exist which are
undeniable evidences of the struggle. We allude to the tumuli which are
found, some at Prauthoy, others on the banks of the Vingeanne, at
Dardenay, and Cusey, and those which, at Pressant, Rivières-les-Fosses,
Chamberceau, and Vesvres, mark, as it were, the line of retreat of the
Gaulish army, to a distance of twelve kilomètres.

Two of these tumuli are situated near each other, between Prauthoy and
Montsaugeon (_see Plate 24_, where the tumuli are marked). There is one
near Dardenay, three to the west of Cusey, one at Rivières-les-Fosses,
another at Chamberceau. We will not mention those which have been
destroyed by agriculture, but which are still remembered by the
inhabitants.

Researches lately made in these tumuli have brought to light skeletons,
many of which had bronze bracelets round the arms and legs, calcined
bones of men and horses, thirty-six bracelets, several iron circles
which were worn around the neck, iron rings, fibulæ, fragments of metal
plates, pieces of Celtic pottery, an iron sword, &c.

It is a fact worthy of remark, that the objects found in the tumuli at
Rivières-les-Fosses and Chamberceau bear so close a resemblance to those
of the tumuli on the banks of the Vingeanne, that we might think they
had come from the hand of the same workman. Hence there can be no doubt
that all these tumuli refer to one and the same incident of war.
(Several of these objects are deposited in the Museum of Saint-Germain. )

We must add that the agricultural labourers of Montsaugeon, Isomes, and
Cusey have found during many years, when they make trenches for
drainage, horse-shoes buried a foot or two deep under the soil. In 1860,
at the dredging of the Vingeanne, hundreds of horse-shoes, the
inhabitants say, of excellent metal, were extracted from the gravel of
the river, at a depth of two or three feet. They are generally small,
and bear a groove all round, in which the heads of the nails were
lodged. A great number of these horse-shoes have preserved their nails,
which are flat, have a head in the form of a T, and still have their
rivet--that is, the point which is folded back over the hoof--which
proves that they are not shoes that have been lost, but shoes of dead
horses, the foot of which has rotted away in the soil or in the gravel.
Thirty-two of these horse-shoes have been collected. One of them is
stamped in the middle of the curve with a mark, sometimes found on
Celtic objects, and which has a certain analogy with the stamp on a
plate of copper found in one of the tumuli of Montsaugeon.

When we consider that the action between the Roman and Gaulish armies
was merely a cavalry battle, in which were engaged from 20,000 to 25,000
horses, the facts just stated cannot but appear interesting, although
they may possibly belong to a battle of a later date.

[517] We have adopted the reading, _aciemque constitui jubebat_, which
alone gives a reasonable interpretation.

[518] He was not the same as the one mentioned in pp. 307, 321, 320.
(_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 67. )

[519] The three Gaulish camps having been established on the heights of
Sacquenay, four or five kilomètres behind the position occupied by the
infantry during the battle, and the line of retreat towards Alesia lying
to the left, in the direction of Pressant and Vesvres, if Vercingetorix
had returned to ascend the hills with his 80,000 men, to remove the
baggage, that operation would have taken two or three hours, during
which Cæsar might have cut off his retreat, or have inflicted a still
more serious defeat upon him. But, by immediately hastening his march on
Pressant, in order to follow from thence the road which, by
Rivières-les-Fosses and Vesvres, joined the great road from Langres to
Alise, near Aujeur, he got in advance of the Roman army, which, in the
disorder in which it was at that moment, was not able to pursue him at
once. And this is what he did.

The text says, also, that Vercingetorix gave orders that the baggage
should be taken out of the camps in all haste, to follow him. If the
baggage of an army of 100,000 men had accompanied Vercingetorix, on the
road followed by the infantry, we cannot understand how the Roman army,
which pursued the Gauls as long as daylight lasted, should not have
captured it all. But investigations made in the country situated between
the field of battle and the Alise, behind the heights of Sacquenay, have
brought to light vestiges of a Roman road which, starting from
Thil-Châtel, thirteen kilomètres behind Sacquenay, proceeded, by
Avelanges, towards the hamlet of Palus, where it branched from the road
from Langres to Alise. We may suppose, therefore, that Vercingetorix
caused his baggage to follow in his rear as far as Thil-Châtel, where it
took the road to Palus.

The Roman road from Langres to Alise, which, without any doubt, marks
the direction followed by the two armies, has been traced almost in its
whole extent by Commandant Stoffel. Even at the present day, on the
territories of Fraignot, Salives, Echalot, and Poiseul-la-Grange, the
inhabitants call it the _Road of the Romans_, or _Cæsar’s way_.

[520] We read (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 68) the words, _Altero die ad
Alesiam castra fecit_. We have before sought to prove that the words
_altero die_ must be translated by the _second day after_, and not by
the _next day_. [See page 279, note (1). ] It took Cæsar, therefore, two
days’ march to move from the field of battle to Alesia.

A study of the country fully confirms the interpretation we give to the
expression _altero die_. In fact, to the north and east of
Alise-Sainte-Reine (_Alesia_), to less than two days’ march, the ground
is so cut up and broken that no cavalry battle would be possible upon
it. It retains this character as far as fifty-five or sixty kilomètres
from Alise, to the east of the road from Pranthoy to Dijon, where it
becomes more easy and open. The battle-field of the Vingeanne, which we
consider as the true one, is at a distance of sixty-five kilomètres from
Alise. Supposing that, on the day of the victory, the Roman army had
pursued the Gauls over a space of fifteen kilomètres, it would have had
to traverse in the two following days, before arriving at Alesia, a
distance of fifty kilomètres, that is to say, twenty-five kilomètres a
day.

[521] We call the reader’s attention particularly to the numerous Roman
and Gaulish coins found in one of the fosses of the camp _D_, the list
of which will be found in _Appendix C_, at the end of this volume.

[522] Near the western summit of the mountain two abundant springs
arise; there is another on the eastern side. With these springs, as at
Gergovia, it was easy to form large watering-places for cattle. Besides,
manifest traces of a great number of wells are visible on the
table-land, so that it is evident the besieged can never have wanted
water, besides which, they could always descend to the two rivers.

[523] We believe that these _castella_ were palisaded redoubts having a
recess attached, similar to the wooden blockhouses represented on the
Trajan Column; often even these recesses alone composed the _castellum_.

[524] It was not, as will be remarked, the countervallation which was
11,000 feet in extent, but the line of investment.

[525] _Eadem altitudine_. See paragraph XIII. , Details on the
Excavations of Alesia, page 364.

[526] _Dolabratis_, diminished to a point, and not _delibratis_, peeled.

[527] In the excavations at Alesia, five _stimuli_ have been found, the
form of which is represented in _Plate 27_. The new names which Cæsar’s
soldiers gave to these accessory defenses prove that they were used for
the first time.

[528] This appears from a passage in _De Bello Civili_, III. 47.

[529]

The Ædui and their clients, the Segusiavi, the Ambluareti, the MEN.
Aulerci-Brannovices, and the Blannovii 35,000

The Arverni, with the people in their dependence, as the
Cadurci-Eleutheri, the Gabali, the Vellavi 35,000

The Senones, the Sequani, the Bituriges, the Santones, the Ruteni,
the Carnutes (each 12,000) 72,000

The Bellovaci 10,000

The Lemovices 10,000

The Pictones, the Turones, the Parisii, the Helvii (each 8,000) 32,000

The Suessiones, the Ambiani, the Mediomatrice, the Petrocorii,
the Nervii, the Morini, the Nitiobriges (each 5,000) 35,000

The Aulerci-Cenomanni 5,000

The Atrebates 4,000

The Veliocasses, the Lexovii, the Aulerci-Eburovices (each 3,000) 9,000

The Rauraci and the Boii (each 3,000) 6,000

Lastly, the peoples who dwelt on the shores of the ocean, and
whom the Gauls called Armoricans, amongst whom were the
Curiosolites, the Redones, the Ambibari, the Caletes, the
Osismii, the Lemovices-Armoricani, the Veneti, and the Unelli,
had to furnish together 30,000
-------
Total 283,000


[530]: See note on page 143.

[531] This passage proves clearly that the army of succour attacked also
the circumvallation of the plain. In fact, how can we admit that, of
240,000 men, only 60,000 should have been employed?
It follows, from the
accounts given in the “Commentaries,” that among this multitude of
different peoples, the chiefs chose the most courageous men to form the
corps of 60,000 which operated the movement of turning the hills; and
that the others, unaccustomed to war, and less formidable, employed in
the assault of the retrenchments in the plain, were easily repulsed.

[532] According to Polyænus (VIII. xxiii. 11), Cæsar, during the night,
detached 3,000 legionaries and all his cavalry to take the enemy in the
rear.

[533] “Cæsar (at Alexandria) was greatly perplexed, being burdened with
his _purple_ vestments, which prevented him from swimming. ” (Xiphilinus,
_Julius Cæsar_, p. 26. )--“Crassus, instead of appearing before his
troops in a purple-coloured _paludamentum_, as is the custom of the
Roman generals. . . . ” (Plutarch, _Crassus_, 28. )

[534] “The inhabitants of Alesia despaired of their safety when they saw
the Roman soldiers bringing from all sides into their camp an immense
quantity of shields ornamented with gold and silver, cuirasses stained
with blood, plate, and Gaulish flags. ” (Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 30. )

[535] Florus, III. x. 26. --According to Plutarch (_Cæsar_, 30),
Vercingetorix, after having laid down his arms, seated himself in
silence at the foot of Cæsar’s tribunal.

[536] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 90. --By comparing the data of the VIIth
book with those of the VIIIth, we obtain the following results:

LEGIONS.

In Franche-Comté, Labienus with the 7th and 15th 2
In the country of the Remi, Fabius and Basilius with the 8th
and 9th 2
Between the Loire and the Allier, Reginus with the 11th 1
In Berrry, Sextius with the 13th 1
In Rouergue, Rebilus with the 1st 1
At Mâcon, Tullius Cicero with the 6th 1
At Chalon, Sulpicius with the 14th 1
At Bibracte, Mark Antony with the 10th and 12th 2
--
Total 11


[537] There have been found, on a length of 200 mètres, in the bottom of
the upper fosse, ten Gaulish coins, twenty arrow-heads, fragments of
shields, four balls of stone of different diameters, two millstones of
granite, skulls and bones, earthenware, and fragments of amphoras in
such quantity, that it would lead us to suppose that the Romans threw
upon the assailants everything that came to hand. In the lower fosse,
near which the struggle was hotter after the sally of Labienus, the
result has surpassed all hopes. This fosse has been opened for a space
of 500 mètres in length from _X_ to _X_ (_see Plate 25_): it contained,
besides 600 coins (_see Appendix C_), fragments of pottery, and numerous
bones, the following objects: ten Gaulish swords and nine scabbards of
iron, thirty-nine pieces which belonged to arms of the description of
the Roman _pilum_, thirty heads of javelins, which, on account of their
lightness, are supposed to have been the points of the _hasta amentata_;
seventeen more heavy heads may also have served for javelins thrown by
the _amentum_, or simply by the hand, or even for lances; sixty-two
blades, of various form, which present such finished workmanship that
they may be ranged among the spears.

Among objects of defensive armour there have been found one iron helmet
and seven cheek-pieces, the forms of which are analogous to those which
we see represented on Roman sculptures; umbos of Roman and Gaulish
shields; an iron belt of a legionary; and numerous collars, rings and
fibulæ.

[538] In the fosses of the plain of Laumes have been found a fine sword,
several nails, and some bones; on the left bank of the Oserain, two
coins, three arrow-heads, and other fragments of arms; in the fosse
which descends towards the Ose, on the northern slopes of Mont
Penneville, a prodigious quantity of bones of animals. A spot planted
with vines, close by, on the southern slope of Mont Penneville, is still
at the present day called, on the register of lands, _Cæsar’s Kitchen_
(_la Cuisine de César_).

[539] In the fosses of the circumvallation in the plain of Laumes have
been found stone balls, some fragments of arms, pottery, and a
magnificent silver vase, of good Greek art. This last was found at _z_
(_see Plate 25_), near the imperial road from Paris to Dijon, at the
very bottom of the fosse, at a depth of 1·40m. Bronze arms, consisting
of ten spears, two axes, and two swords, have been found previously at
_y_ near the Oserain.

[540] This book, as is known, was written by Hirtius.

[541] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 5.

[542] Viz. , the Aulerci-Eburovices.

[543] It has been objected that Mont Saint-Pierre was not sufficiently
large to contain seven legions; but, since Cæsar for a long while had
only four legions with him, the camp was made for that number.
Afterwards, instead of remaining on the defensive, he determined, as at
Alesia, to invest the Gaulish camp, and it was then only that he sent
for three more legions. The appearance of the different camps which have
been found is, on the contrary, very rational, and in conformity with
the number of troops mentioned in the “Commentaries. ” Thus, the camp of
Berry-au-Bac, which contained eight legions, had forty-one hectares of
superfices; that of Gergovia, for six legions, had thirty-three
hectares; and that of Mont Saint-Pierre, for four legions, twenty-four
hectares.

[544] “Non solum vallo et sudibus, sed etiam turriculis instruunt. . . .
quod opus loriculam vocant. ” (Vegetius, IV. 28. )

[545] It may be seen, by the profiles of the fosses which have been
brought to light, that they could not have had vertical sides; the
expression used by Hirtius leads us to believe that, by _lateribus
directis_, he meant fosses not triangular, but with a square bottom.

[546] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 17.

[547] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 23.

[548] Rebilus had at first only one legion; we believe, with Rustow,
that the 10th, which was quartered at Bibracte, had come to join him. It
is said (VII. 90) that Rebilus had been sent to the Ruteni; but it
appears, from a passage of Orosius (VI. 11), “that he was stopped on his
way by a multitude of enemies, and ran the greatest dangers. ” He
remained, therefore, in the country of the Pictones, where Fabius came
to his succour.

[549] Some manuscripts read erroneously the 13th legion.

[550] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 25.

[551] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 31.

[552] See his biography in _Appendix D_.

[553] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 44.

[554] It is due to the persevering research of M. J. B. Cessac, assisted
subsquently by the departmental commission of the Lot.

[555] List of the objects found at Puy-d’Issolu: one blade of a
_dolabrum_, thirty-six arrow-heads, six heads of darts for throwing by
catapults, fragments of bracelets, bear’s tooth (an amulet), necklace
beads, rings, a blade of a knife, and nails.

[556] According to Frontinus (_Stratag. _, II. 11), Commius sought an
asylum in Great Britain.

[557] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 48.

[558] Plutarch, _Marius_, 19.

[559] _Mémoires de Napoléon I. _, Revolt of Pavia, VII. 4.

[560] For the clearer intelligence of the recapitulation, we have
adopted the modern names of the different people of Gaul, although these
names are far from answering to their ancient boundaries.

[561] Cicero, when proconsul in Cilicia, obtained the sum of twelve
millions of sesterii (2,280,000 francs) from the sale of prisoners made
at the siege of Pindenissus. (Cicero, _Epistolæ ad Atticum_, V. 20. )

[562] Julian (_Cæsares_, p. 72, edit. Lasius) makes Cæsar say that he
had treated the Helvetii _like a philanthropist_, and rebuilt their
burnt towns.

[563] It was probably at this time that the chiefs of Auvergne, and
perhaps Vercingetorix himself, as Dio Cassius tells us, came to render
homage to the Roman proconsul. (See above, p. 80. )

[564] Mommsen, _Römische Geschichte_, III. , p. 291. Berlin, 1861.

[565] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 51, 52.

[566] “He soon allowed himself to be enervated by his love for his young
wife. Entirely occupied in pleasing her, he passed whole days with her
in his country house or in his gardens, and ceased to think of public
affairs. Thus even Clodius, then tribune of the people, regarding him no
longer with anything but contempt, dared to embark in the rashest
enterprises. ” (Plutarch, _Pompey_, 50. )

[567] Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 13.

[568] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 51, 52.

[569] Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 30.

[570] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 48 and 50.

[571] “Pompey is going at last to labour on my recall: he only waited
for a letter from Cæsar to cause the proposal to be made by one of his
partisans. ” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, III. 18. )--“If Cæsar has
abandoned me, if he has joined my enemies, he has been unfaithful to his
friendship, and has done me an injury; I ought to have been his enemy, I
deny it not; but if Cæsar has interested himself in my restoration, if
it be true that you thought it important for me that Cæsar should not be
opposed,” &c. . . . (_Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 18. )

[572] “It was then that P. Sextius, the tribune nominate, repaired to
Cæsar to interest him in my recall. I say only that if Cæsar were well
intentioned towards me, and I believe he was, these proceedings added
nothing to his good intentions. He (Sextius) thought that, if they
wished to restore concord among the citizens and decide on my recall,
they must secure the consent of Cæsar. ” (Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 33)

[573] “Pompey took my brother as witness that all he had done for me he
had done by the will of Cæsar. ” (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar. _, I. 9. )

[574] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 31, _et seq. _

[575] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 31.

[576] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 51. --Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 32; _De Responsu
Haruspic. _, 23: _Pro Milone_, 7. --Asconius, _Comment. in Orat. pro
Milone_, p. 47, edit. Orelli.

[577] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 51. --Cicero, _Pro Milone_, 7. --Asconius,
_Comment. in Orat. pro Milone_, p. 47, edit. Orelli.

[578] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, III. 23. --Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 6.

[579] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 33.

[580] Cicero, _Orat. pro Domo sua_, 27; _Pro Sextio_, 34.

[581] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 34; _De Legibus_, III. 19.

[582] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 34.

[583] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 35. --Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 7. --Plutarch,
_Pompey_, 51.

[584] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 35; _Orat. prima post Reditum_, 5, 6.

[585] Cicero, _De Officiis_, II. 17; _Orat. pro Sextio_, 39. --Dio
Cassius XXXIX. 8.

[586] Cicero, _Orat. secunda post Reditum ad Senatum_, 10; _Orat. pro
Domo sua_, 28; _Orat. in Pisonem_, 15.

[587] We thus see that the power of observing the sky continued to exist
in spite of the law Clodia.

[588] Cicero, in the passages cited.

[589] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV, 1.

[590] Asconius, _Comment in Orat. Ciceronis pro Milone_, p. 48, edit.
Orelli.

[591] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 9. --Plutarch, _Pompey_, 52.

[592] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV. 1. --Cicero’s proposal was further
amplified by C. Messius, tribune of the people, who demanded for Pompey
a fleet, an army, and the authority to dispose of the finances.

[593] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 52. --Cicero, _Orat. pro Domo sua_, 10.

[594] _Epist. ad Attic. _, IV. 2.

[595] “I will add that, in the opinion of the public, Clodius is
regarded as a victim reserved for Milo. ” (Cicero, _De Respons. Harusp. _,
3. )--This oration on the reply of the Aruspices is of May, June, or
July, 698. See, also, what he says in his letter to Atticus, of
November, 697. (_Epist. ad Attic. _ IV. 3. )

[596] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 23. --_De Bello Gallico_, II. 35.