According
to Vibhasd, TD 27, p.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
.
.
b. Samyutta v. 449: jdtisamvattanike'pi samkhdre abhisamkharonti / jardsamvattanike'pi. . . / maranasamvattanike'pi. . . / te jdtisamvattanike'pi samkhdre ahhisamkharitvd. . . jdtipapdtam pipapatanti J . . .
c. abhisamskaranalaksandh sarhskdrdh (Madhyamakavrtti 343. 9); cittdbhisamskdramanas- kdraksand cetand (ibid 137. 7, Mahdvastu, i. 26 and 391).
81. See ii. 34.
82. The Vydkhyd explains upalabdhi by the gloss vastumdtragrahana, and adds vedanddayas tu caitasikd visesagrahanarupdh (The text of the Biblotheca Buddhica has wrongly: caitasikavisesa-): "The consciousness {vijndna) or mind (citta) apprehends (grahana) only the thing itself (vastumdtra)\ the 'mental states' (caitasika) or dharmas associated with the consciousness (ii. 24), that is to say, sensation, etc. {vedand samjrid , . . ), apprehend particular characteristics, special conditions. " For example, the consciousness of touch (kdyavijndna) apprehends unevenness, softness, etc (i. l0d); it is associated with an agreeable sensation (vedand) which apprehends a certain characteristic of unevenness or softness, the characteristic of being the cause of an agreeable sensation (sukhavedaniyatd). The visual consciousness apprehends color (blue, etc. )
and shape; it is associated with a certain "mental state" called samjnd, an idea, which apprehends a certain characteristic of color and shape under consideration: "This is a man, this is a woman, etc. " (i. l4c-d).
This doctrine has been adopted by the School of Nagarjuna. Madhyamakavrtti, p. 65 cittam arthamMragrdhi caitta visesdvasthdgrdhinah sukhadayah; and by the School of Dignaga, Nydyabmdutikd, p. 12, Tibetan version, p. 25.
The Japanese editor of the Kofa here quotes the Koki (=the Chi of P'u-kuang, TD 41, p. 26a14) and the Vibhdsd which mentions four opinions on this problem.
See ii. 34b-d.
83. According to Samghabhadra: "Even though numerous material objects are present, visual consciousness solely grasps visible matter, not sound; it grasps the blue, etc. , but does not say that it is blue, etc. , or that it is agreeable, disagreeable, male, female, etc. , a stump, etc. . . . " (TD 29, p. 342al5).
84. The consciousnesses (vijndna) succeed one another; they can be visual . . . mental. The consciousness which disappears is the immediately antecedent cause (ii. 62a), the support (dsraya) of the consciousness which immediately follows. Under this aspect it receives the name of manas, mana-dyatana, manodhdtu, and mana-indriya (ii. l). It is to the consciousness which follows what the organ of sight is to the visual consciousness.
Footnotes 139
? 140 Chapter One
85. See i. 39a-b.
According to the Vydkhyd, the Yogacarins admit a manodhdtu, a manas or mental organ,
distinct from the six consciousnesses. The lamraparnlyas, the masters of Taprobane, imagine (kalpayanti) a material organ, the heart (hrdayavastu), a support of the mental consciousness. This heart also exists in Arupyadhato, the non-material sphere: these masters admit in faa the existence of matter in this sphere (viii. 3c); they explain the prefix a in the sense of "a little," as in dpingala, "a little red"
The Patthdna (quoted in Compendium of Philosophy, p. 276) assigns a material (rupa) support to the mental consciousness, without giving the name of "heart" to this support, whereas it terms "eye" the support of the visual consciousness. But the later Abhidhamma (Visuddhi- magga, Abhidhammasangaha) considers the heart as the organ of thought.
TheteachingoftheVibhanga,p. 88,islessclear:"Fromthevisual,auditoryconsciousness . . . tactile consciousness which has just perished there arises the mind, the manas, the mental organ (mdnasa = manas), the heart (=the mind), the manas, the manas organ . . . " {Atthasalini, 343).
86. Avijfiapti forms part of rupaskandha and dharmadhdtu.
87. The problem of inclusion (samgraha) is examined in the Dhdtukathdpakarana, Kathdvatthu,
vii. 1, Dhdtukdya, and Prakarana (see below i. 20, note 105).
88. Digha, iii. 232; Dharmasamgraha, 19; Mahdvyutpatti, 35, etc
89. Great ugliness results from the faa of having only one eye, one ear, or one nostril. But many animals, camels, cats, owls, etc. , are not beautiful for having two eyes! They are not beautiful in comparison with other species, but, among their species, individuals having only one eye, etc. , are ugly.
Sarhghabhadra explains fobhdrtham in the sense of ddhipatydrtham, "with a view to its predominating faaor" (see ii. 1). He who possesses predominance is beautiful, and shines in the world Individuals who only possess one eye do not possess "predominance," the capacity for clear vision; for sight is not as dear with one eye as with two eyes . . . (i. 43).
90. Samyukta, TD 2, p. I4c4: yat kimcid rupam atitdndgatapratyutpannam ddhydtmikam vd bdhyamvdauddrikamvdsuksmamvdhinamvdpranitamvdduYamvdantikamvdtadekadhyam abhisamksipya ayam ucyate rupaskandhah.
Compare Vibhanga, p. 1.
The edition of the Vydkhyd has aikadhyam, but the Mahdvyutpatti 245, 243 has ekadhyam abhisamksipya. Wogihara mentions ekadhye in Divya, 5524,40. 22.
91. Anityatdniruddha: destroyed by impermanence which is one of the charaaeristics of conditioned things (ii. 45c-d).
There are five types of nirodha: (1) laksananirodha (ii. 45c-d) which is posed here, (2) samdpattinirodha (ii. 4lc), (3) upapattinirodha {^dsamjfiika, ii. 41b), (4) pratisamkhydnirodha (i. 6a-b), and (5) apratisamkhydnirodha (i. 6c-d).
If the texts were to say, "In the past, rupa is destroyed," one could understand that this refers to nirodhas two to five. Now nirodhas two and three are the destruaion of future mind and mental states; nirodha four is the destruaion of an impure mind and mental states; and nirodha five is the destruaion of future dharmas not destined to arise (anutpattidharman).
92. Aryadeva, Sataka, 258, shows that this definition contradicts the thesis of the existence of the future.
93. Hsiian-tsang translates: The Bhadanta Dharmatrata. But the Vydkhyd says: The Bhadanta is a Sautrantika Sthavira, or a Sautrantika Sthavira of this name. Bhagavadvisesa thinks that this refers to the Sthavira Dharmatrata.
? We object to this: Dharmatrata is a follower of the teaching of the existence of the past and future, thus a Sarvastivadin, and we are concerned here with a Sautrantika, this is, a Darstantika. But the Bhandanta Dharmatrata has a Sarvastivadin theory presented later (v. 25). The "Bhadanta" is a philosopher that the Vibhdsd quotes under the simple name of Bhadanta, a philosopher who adhers to the Sautrantika system (sautrdntika-darsanavalambin), whereas the Vibhdsd calls the Bhadanta Dharmatrata by his name. Thus we have here a certain Sautrantika Sthavira Bhiksu, who differs from Dharmatrata.
The Japanese editor refers to Vibhdsd TD 27, p. 383bl6, where it is said that Dharmatrata does not admit that the dharmdyatana is rupa (see iv. 4a-b).
94. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 379al2, presents twenty opinions on the meaning of the term dyatana. The definition of the Koia is reproduced in the Mahdvyutpatti, p. 552.
95. Vibhdsd, TD p. 367c21, has eleven etymologies. We have here the first one.
96. Dhatu signifies "mine" in the expression suvarnagotra, Asanga, Sutrdlamkdra, iii. 9 and note of
the translates
97. The Vaibhasikas believe that the skandhas, the dyatanas and the dhdtus really exist; the Sautrantikas hold that the dhdtus are real, the skandhas and the dyatanas only "nominally" so; Vasubandhu holds the skandhas to be "nominal," whereas the dyatanas and the dhdtus are real.
98. The doctrine of the pudgala is discussed in a supplement, Chapter DC, of the Koia, translated by Stcherbatsky, Academie de Petrograd, 1920.
99. Sarhghabhadra: "This objection does not hold Skandha does not signify 'mass,' but 'that which is susceptible of being collected together in a mass*. . . " (TD 29, p. 343c25).
100. In the way that, in the world, skandha signifies shoulder, ndmarupa are the two shoulders which bear the saddyatana (iii. 21).
101. That part which is rupa, that part which is sensation . . .
102. Paramartha: "I shall return to you three skandhas" Tibetan: dbul bar bya ba'iphun po gsum
dag tu dbul bar bya'o.
103. Utsutra: Mahdbhdsya, i. p. 12; Kielhorn, JRAS, 1908, p. 501.
104. The Abhidharmikas are not always clearly distinguished from the Vaibhasikas. See
Introduction.
105. Compare Prakaranapdda, Chapter VI (TD 26, p. 731cl9): The caksurdhdtu is embraced within one dhatu, one ayatana, and one skandha-, it is known (jfieya) by seven jUdnas (see Kola, vii) with the exception of paracittajfidna, nirodhajfidna, and mdrgajfldna: it is discerned by one vijfidna\ it exists in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu; it is affected by the anuiayas to be abandoned through Meditation (see Koia, v. ).
Dbdtukathdpakarana (PTS ed 1892) p. 6: cakkhudhdtu ekena khandhena ekendyatanena ekdya dhdtuya samgahitd
106. According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 366c26.
107. Teaching of the skandhas to persons of sharp faculties (prajtfendriya). Example: yad bhikso na tvarh sa te dharmah prahdtavyah /ajndtam bhagavan / katham asya bhikso samksiptenok- tdrtham djdndsi /ruparh bhadanta ndharh sa me dharmah prahdtavyah/
The three types of hearers--udghatitajna, aviparicitajfia, and padarhparama--correspond to the three types of faculties (PuggalapaHfiatti, p. 41; Sutrdlamkdra, trans, p. 145).
Footnotes 141
? 142 Chapter One
108. Dharmaskandha, TD 26, p. 501a7; Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 385a29. 109. Six vivddamulas in Digha, iii. 246, etc
110. Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 385bl5.
111.
According to Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 384H-6.
112. The Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 399c4-7, enumerates eleven reason which justify the terms riipdyatana and dharmdyatana.
113. This is the opinion of Dharmatrata (see his Samyukta Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, p. 873a28-b2). i. 17.
114. (1) According to the Sautrantikas, the word of the Buddha {buddhavacana) is vdgvijnapti (iv. 3d); according to another school (nikaydntartya) it is ndman. The Vydkhyd quotes, on this point, the jndnaprasthdna (See Cosmologie bouddhique, p. vii, note).
(2) In another canon, the Sutra says that there are eighty-four thousand dharmaskandhas.
The Sutra has Ananda saying, "I have learned from the Buddha more than eighty-four thousand dharmaskandhas: sdtirekdni me'sJtir dharmaskandhasahasrdni bhagavato'ntikdt sammukham udgfhitdni (See Burnouf, Introduction, p. 34; Sumangalavildsini, p. 24; Theragdthd, 1024; Prajndpdramitd in the Akutobhaya of NagSrjuna, i. 8; Avaddnafataka, ii. 155).
115. Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 385cl8: the Dharmaskandhaidstra contains six thousand goathas. See Takakusu's analysis, JPTS, 1905, p. 112.
116. Eighty thousand dharmaskandhas have perished; a single dharmaskandha has been preserved (Vydkhyd).
111. This is the explanation of Buddhaghosa, Sumangalavildsini, i. 24.
118. The Vydkhyd quotes a Sutra, a more developed form of Digha, iii. 241 and Anguttara, iii. 21.
Vimuktydyatana = vimukter dyadvaram.
119. These are opposed to the sixty-two drstis {Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 376c6 and foil. ). The Bahudhdtuka (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 723cl3 , Dharmaskandha, Chapter XX) is closely related to Majjhima, iii. 6l (41 dhdtus). Compare Asanga, Sutrdlamkdra, iii. 2.
120. This refers to the Sutra which explains the constituent elements of a person: saddhdtur ayam bhikso purusah. Vasubandhu quotes it (i. 35) under the name of Garbhdvakrdntisutra (Vinayasamyuktakavastu,Sec. 11,TD24,p. 253a21;andintheRatnakuta,Chap. 14,TD 11,p. 326b). In the Majjhima, this Sutra is called the Dhdtuvibhangasutta (iii. 239); it constitutes one of the sources of the Pitdputrasamdgama extracts of which are preserved in the Siksadsamuccaya, p. 244, Bodhicarydvatara, ix. 88, Madhyamakdvatdra, p. 269.
See note 62, and note 143 and Prakaranapada quoted in the note ad ii. 23c-d.
On the six dhdtus, Anguttara, i. 176, Vibhanga, p. 82-85, Abhidharmahrdaya, viii. 7.
121. Dharmaskandha, Chapter XX, Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 388a29. Same definition in Vibhanga, p. 84: katamd ajjhattikd dkdsadhdtuPyam ajjhattam paccattam dkdso dkdsagatam agham aghagatam vivaro vivaragatam . . . kannacchiddam ndsacchiddam . . .
122. P'u-kuang says (TD41, p. 32c28): "One says that dkdsadhdtu is light and darkness in order to show that it is a type of color (varna) and a real thing. The author does not believe that dkdsadhdtu is a real thing, and this is why he adds the word kHa" For Vasubandhu and the Sautrantikas, dkd? adhdtu is solely the absence of a resistent body (sapratighadravydbhdvamdtra). See ii. 55c-d
Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 388M9: What difference is there between dkdsa and dkafadhatu? The first
I
? is non-material (arupin), invisible (anidariana), non-resistent (apratigha), pure (anasrava), unconditioned (asamskrta); the second is material. . .
123. One edition of the Vydkhyd reads dgba: dgharh kila citastham rUpam iti citastham samghdtastham /atyartham hanti hanyate cety dgham / . . . atyarthasabdasya dkdrddesah krto hantes ca ghddesah. But the Burnouf MSS reads agham . . . akdrddesab; we have, ad iii. 72, agba
= citastharupa; Mabdvyutpatti, 245. 162.
124. See above p. 70 and following.
125. The dharmadhdtu is apart from cause: it includes avijnapti which is material and non- susceptible to being struck.
126. See Karanaprajnaptisdstra, analyzed in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 339.
127. Compare Samyutta, iv. 201: puthujjano cakkhusmim hanh^i mandpdmandpehi rupehi.
128. This means that the consciousness which arises having blue for its object (visaya) and the eye for its support (dsraya), can be hindered from arising through the interposition of a foreign body between the eye and the blue object: the eye and the blue are thus sapratigha. But neither the manodhdtu, which functions as the organ of the mental consciousness (manovijndna), nor the dharmadhdtu, which is the object proper of the mental consciousness (for example sensation), are not sapratigha: nothing can hinder, by making an "obstacle" or a "screen" (avarana), the mental consciousness from arising from the mental organ (manodhdtu) with respect to the dharmadhdtu.
129. See ii. 9a; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 263cl2, p. 740b8.
130. The Mahisasakas believe that the first four consciousnesses are always neutral; the
consciousness of touch and the mental consciousness are of the three types.
131. The dharmas which do not belong to any sphere of existence, which are transcendent to
existence (adhdtupatita, adhdtvdpta, apariydpanna) are unconditioned things. 132. The examination of this problem is taken up again ii. 12.
Compare Kathdvatthu, viii. 7.
133. Compare Digba, i. 34, 186.
134. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 746a4: "Do the male and female organs exist in Rupadhatu? Neither of the sexual organs exist there. First opinion: it is because one desires to abandon these organs that one cultivates the dhyanas and is reborn in Rupadhatu. If beings in Rupadhatu were to possess these organs, they would not desire to be reborn in this sphere. Second opinion: these organs are created by gross food (iii. 39); the Sutra (iii. 98c) says in faa that human beings at the beginning of the cosmic age do not possess these organs, that they all have the same form; later, when they eat of the juice of the earth, the two organs arise, and the difference of male and female appear; in the absence of gross food, the two organs will be missing. Third opinion: the two organs have a use in Kamadhatu, but they do not have a use in Rupadhatu: thus they are missing in Rupadhatu . . .
On the gods of Kamadhatu, see iii. 70.
135. The Mahasamghikas and the Sautrantikas maintain that the body of the Buddha is pure (anasrava) (see iv. 4a-b, discussion of avijnapti) (Compare Kathdvatthu, iv. 3, xiv. 4). Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 229al7, p. 391c27: "Certain masters, the Mahasamghikas, maintain that the body of the Buddha is pure. They say, 'Scripture says that the Tathagata remains above the world, that he is not mundane, that he is not defiled; thus we know that the body of the Buddha is pure. ' In order
to refute this opinion, we show that the body of the Buddha is impure. To say that it is pure is to contradict the Sutra. "
The body of the Buddha is not pure (anasrava), because it can be the occasion of the
Footnotes 143
? 144 Chapter One
defilement of another. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 871cll: The body of the Buddha is the result of ignorance and thirst; it is thus not pure. The Sutra says that ten complete dyatanas (organ of sight. . . ,visibles . . . ), and two partial ayatanas (manadyatana dhannas) are impure . . . If the body of the Buddha were pure, women would not have affection for him; he would not produce, among others, any desire, hatred, confusion, or pride . . .
Compare Vydkhyd, p. 14; above p. 58.
136. Same question in Vibhaga, 97,435. Vitarka and vicdra are defined ii. 28, 33.
137. These are called avikalapaka by reason of the text: caksurvi/ndnasamanginilarh vijdndti no tu nilam iti (See above note 75).
138. Kila: this is an opinion of the Vaibhasikas without support in the Sutras.
The opinion of Vasubandhu is explained later, ii. 33. For him as for the Sautrantikas, vitarka
and vicdra are citta, manovijndna.
139. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 219b7: svabhdvavikalpa is vitarka-vicdra; anusmaranavikalpa is the memory associated with mental consciousness; nirupandvikalpa is non-absorbed prajnd of the sphere of the mental consciousness. In Kamadhatu, the five consciousnesses have only the first
type of vikalpa: they, include memory, but not anusmaranavikalpa, for they are not capable of recognition; they include prajnd, but not nirupandvikalpa, for they are not capable of examination.
Nyaydnusdra (TD 29, p. 350bll): The nature of svabhdvavikalpa is vitarka.
140. Sarhghabhadra: Prajnd and memory are associated with the five sense consciousnesses, but
their functions are reduced therein (TD 29, p. 350bl7).
141. Prajnd which is mental (mdnast), that is to say manasi bhavd, proceeds either from the hearing of Scripture or from reflection (irutacintdmayt), or is innate (upapattipratilambhikd)', is dispersed (vyagrd), that is, non-concentrated prajrid, having different objects (agra), or "dis- crowned" (vigatapradhdnd) by the fact that it successively grasps after different object.
Why give the name of abhinirupandvikalpa to this prajnd?
Because it applies to a certain object in respect to its name (ndmdpeksayd) and examines (abhinirupand): "this is rupa, vedand, anitya, duhkha," etc However, concentrated (samdhitd)
prajrid, proceeding from absorption (bhdvandmayt), is applied to an object without taking into consideration its name. Thus it is not abhinirupandvikalpa.
All mental memory (smrti), that is to say, the mental memory, is or is not concentrated. For, according to the School, the mental memory uniquely has for its object the thing previously experienced and does not take into consideration its name, according to the definition: "What is memory? Expression of the mind (cetaso'bhildpah). " The mode of existence of memory connected to the five consciousnesses is not an expression {abhilapa) of a thing previously experienced.
b. Samyutta v. 449: jdtisamvattanike'pi samkhdre abhisamkharonti / jardsamvattanike'pi. . . / maranasamvattanike'pi. . . / te jdtisamvattanike'pi samkhdre ahhisamkharitvd. . . jdtipapdtam pipapatanti J . . .
c. abhisamskaranalaksandh sarhskdrdh (Madhyamakavrtti 343. 9); cittdbhisamskdramanas- kdraksand cetand (ibid 137. 7, Mahdvastu, i. 26 and 391).
81. See ii. 34.
82. The Vydkhyd explains upalabdhi by the gloss vastumdtragrahana, and adds vedanddayas tu caitasikd visesagrahanarupdh (The text of the Biblotheca Buddhica has wrongly: caitasikavisesa-): "The consciousness {vijndna) or mind (citta) apprehends (grahana) only the thing itself (vastumdtra)\ the 'mental states' (caitasika) or dharmas associated with the consciousness (ii. 24), that is to say, sensation, etc. {vedand samjrid , . . ), apprehend particular characteristics, special conditions. " For example, the consciousness of touch (kdyavijndna) apprehends unevenness, softness, etc (i. l0d); it is associated with an agreeable sensation (vedand) which apprehends a certain characteristic of unevenness or softness, the characteristic of being the cause of an agreeable sensation (sukhavedaniyatd). The visual consciousness apprehends color (blue, etc. )
and shape; it is associated with a certain "mental state" called samjnd, an idea, which apprehends a certain characteristic of color and shape under consideration: "This is a man, this is a woman, etc. " (i. l4c-d).
This doctrine has been adopted by the School of Nagarjuna. Madhyamakavrtti, p. 65 cittam arthamMragrdhi caitta visesdvasthdgrdhinah sukhadayah; and by the School of Dignaga, Nydyabmdutikd, p. 12, Tibetan version, p. 25.
The Japanese editor of the Kofa here quotes the Koki (=the Chi of P'u-kuang, TD 41, p. 26a14) and the Vibhdsd which mentions four opinions on this problem.
See ii. 34b-d.
83. According to Samghabhadra: "Even though numerous material objects are present, visual consciousness solely grasps visible matter, not sound; it grasps the blue, etc. , but does not say that it is blue, etc. , or that it is agreeable, disagreeable, male, female, etc. , a stump, etc. . . . " (TD 29, p. 342al5).
84. The consciousnesses (vijndna) succeed one another; they can be visual . . . mental. The consciousness which disappears is the immediately antecedent cause (ii. 62a), the support (dsraya) of the consciousness which immediately follows. Under this aspect it receives the name of manas, mana-dyatana, manodhdtu, and mana-indriya (ii. l). It is to the consciousness which follows what the organ of sight is to the visual consciousness.
Footnotes 139
? 140 Chapter One
85. See i. 39a-b.
According to the Vydkhyd, the Yogacarins admit a manodhdtu, a manas or mental organ,
distinct from the six consciousnesses. The lamraparnlyas, the masters of Taprobane, imagine (kalpayanti) a material organ, the heart (hrdayavastu), a support of the mental consciousness. This heart also exists in Arupyadhato, the non-material sphere: these masters admit in faa the existence of matter in this sphere (viii. 3c); they explain the prefix a in the sense of "a little," as in dpingala, "a little red"
The Patthdna (quoted in Compendium of Philosophy, p. 276) assigns a material (rupa) support to the mental consciousness, without giving the name of "heart" to this support, whereas it terms "eye" the support of the visual consciousness. But the later Abhidhamma (Visuddhi- magga, Abhidhammasangaha) considers the heart as the organ of thought.
TheteachingoftheVibhanga,p. 88,islessclear:"Fromthevisual,auditoryconsciousness . . . tactile consciousness which has just perished there arises the mind, the manas, the mental organ (mdnasa = manas), the heart (=the mind), the manas, the manas organ . . . " {Atthasalini, 343).
86. Avijfiapti forms part of rupaskandha and dharmadhdtu.
87. The problem of inclusion (samgraha) is examined in the Dhdtukathdpakarana, Kathdvatthu,
vii. 1, Dhdtukdya, and Prakarana (see below i. 20, note 105).
88. Digha, iii. 232; Dharmasamgraha, 19; Mahdvyutpatti, 35, etc
89. Great ugliness results from the faa of having only one eye, one ear, or one nostril. But many animals, camels, cats, owls, etc. , are not beautiful for having two eyes! They are not beautiful in comparison with other species, but, among their species, individuals having only one eye, etc. , are ugly.
Sarhghabhadra explains fobhdrtham in the sense of ddhipatydrtham, "with a view to its predominating faaor" (see ii. 1). He who possesses predominance is beautiful, and shines in the world Individuals who only possess one eye do not possess "predominance," the capacity for clear vision; for sight is not as dear with one eye as with two eyes . . . (i. 43).
90. Samyukta, TD 2, p. I4c4: yat kimcid rupam atitdndgatapratyutpannam ddhydtmikam vd bdhyamvdauddrikamvdsuksmamvdhinamvdpranitamvdduYamvdantikamvdtadekadhyam abhisamksipya ayam ucyate rupaskandhah.
Compare Vibhanga, p. 1.
The edition of the Vydkhyd has aikadhyam, but the Mahdvyutpatti 245, 243 has ekadhyam abhisamksipya. Wogihara mentions ekadhye in Divya, 5524,40. 22.
91. Anityatdniruddha: destroyed by impermanence which is one of the charaaeristics of conditioned things (ii. 45c-d).
There are five types of nirodha: (1) laksananirodha (ii. 45c-d) which is posed here, (2) samdpattinirodha (ii. 4lc), (3) upapattinirodha {^dsamjfiika, ii. 41b), (4) pratisamkhydnirodha (i. 6a-b), and (5) apratisamkhydnirodha (i. 6c-d).
If the texts were to say, "In the past, rupa is destroyed," one could understand that this refers to nirodhas two to five. Now nirodhas two and three are the destruaion of future mind and mental states; nirodha four is the destruaion of an impure mind and mental states; and nirodha five is the destruaion of future dharmas not destined to arise (anutpattidharman).
92. Aryadeva, Sataka, 258, shows that this definition contradicts the thesis of the existence of the future.
93. Hsiian-tsang translates: The Bhadanta Dharmatrata. But the Vydkhyd says: The Bhadanta is a Sautrantika Sthavira, or a Sautrantika Sthavira of this name. Bhagavadvisesa thinks that this refers to the Sthavira Dharmatrata.
? We object to this: Dharmatrata is a follower of the teaching of the existence of the past and future, thus a Sarvastivadin, and we are concerned here with a Sautrantika, this is, a Darstantika. But the Bhandanta Dharmatrata has a Sarvastivadin theory presented later (v. 25). The "Bhadanta" is a philosopher that the Vibhdsd quotes under the simple name of Bhadanta, a philosopher who adhers to the Sautrantika system (sautrdntika-darsanavalambin), whereas the Vibhdsd calls the Bhadanta Dharmatrata by his name. Thus we have here a certain Sautrantika Sthavira Bhiksu, who differs from Dharmatrata.
The Japanese editor refers to Vibhdsd TD 27, p. 383bl6, where it is said that Dharmatrata does not admit that the dharmdyatana is rupa (see iv. 4a-b).
94. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 379al2, presents twenty opinions on the meaning of the term dyatana. The definition of the Koia is reproduced in the Mahdvyutpatti, p. 552.
95. Vibhdsd, TD p. 367c21, has eleven etymologies. We have here the first one.
96. Dhatu signifies "mine" in the expression suvarnagotra, Asanga, Sutrdlamkdra, iii. 9 and note of
the translates
97. The Vaibhasikas believe that the skandhas, the dyatanas and the dhdtus really exist; the Sautrantikas hold that the dhdtus are real, the skandhas and the dyatanas only "nominally" so; Vasubandhu holds the skandhas to be "nominal," whereas the dyatanas and the dhdtus are real.
98. The doctrine of the pudgala is discussed in a supplement, Chapter DC, of the Koia, translated by Stcherbatsky, Academie de Petrograd, 1920.
99. Sarhghabhadra: "This objection does not hold Skandha does not signify 'mass,' but 'that which is susceptible of being collected together in a mass*. . . " (TD 29, p. 343c25).
100. In the way that, in the world, skandha signifies shoulder, ndmarupa are the two shoulders which bear the saddyatana (iii. 21).
101. That part which is rupa, that part which is sensation . . .
102. Paramartha: "I shall return to you three skandhas" Tibetan: dbul bar bya ba'iphun po gsum
dag tu dbul bar bya'o.
103. Utsutra: Mahdbhdsya, i. p. 12; Kielhorn, JRAS, 1908, p. 501.
104. The Abhidharmikas are not always clearly distinguished from the Vaibhasikas. See
Introduction.
105. Compare Prakaranapdda, Chapter VI (TD 26, p. 731cl9): The caksurdhdtu is embraced within one dhatu, one ayatana, and one skandha-, it is known (jfieya) by seven jUdnas (see Kola, vii) with the exception of paracittajfidna, nirodhajfidna, and mdrgajfldna: it is discerned by one vijfidna\ it exists in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu; it is affected by the anuiayas to be abandoned through Meditation (see Koia, v. ).
Dbdtukathdpakarana (PTS ed 1892) p. 6: cakkhudhdtu ekena khandhena ekendyatanena ekdya dhdtuya samgahitd
106. According to Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 366c26.
107. Teaching of the skandhas to persons of sharp faculties (prajtfendriya). Example: yad bhikso na tvarh sa te dharmah prahdtavyah /ajndtam bhagavan / katham asya bhikso samksiptenok- tdrtham djdndsi /ruparh bhadanta ndharh sa me dharmah prahdtavyah/
The three types of hearers--udghatitajna, aviparicitajfia, and padarhparama--correspond to the three types of faculties (PuggalapaHfiatti, p. 41; Sutrdlamkdra, trans, p. 145).
Footnotes 141
? 142 Chapter One
108. Dharmaskandha, TD 26, p. 501a7; Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 385a29. 109. Six vivddamulas in Digha, iii. 246, etc
110. Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 385bl5.
111.
According to Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 384H-6.
112. The Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 399c4-7, enumerates eleven reason which justify the terms riipdyatana and dharmdyatana.
113. This is the opinion of Dharmatrata (see his Samyukta Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, p. 873a28-b2). i. 17.
114. (1) According to the Sautrantikas, the word of the Buddha {buddhavacana) is vdgvijnapti (iv. 3d); according to another school (nikaydntartya) it is ndman. The Vydkhyd quotes, on this point, the jndnaprasthdna (See Cosmologie bouddhique, p. vii, note).
(2) In another canon, the Sutra says that there are eighty-four thousand dharmaskandhas.
The Sutra has Ananda saying, "I have learned from the Buddha more than eighty-four thousand dharmaskandhas: sdtirekdni me'sJtir dharmaskandhasahasrdni bhagavato'ntikdt sammukham udgfhitdni (See Burnouf, Introduction, p. 34; Sumangalavildsini, p. 24; Theragdthd, 1024; Prajndpdramitd in the Akutobhaya of NagSrjuna, i. 8; Avaddnafataka, ii. 155).
115. Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 385cl8: the Dharmaskandhaidstra contains six thousand goathas. See Takakusu's analysis, JPTS, 1905, p. 112.
116. Eighty thousand dharmaskandhas have perished; a single dharmaskandha has been preserved (Vydkhyd).
111. This is the explanation of Buddhaghosa, Sumangalavildsini, i. 24.
118. The Vydkhyd quotes a Sutra, a more developed form of Digha, iii. 241 and Anguttara, iii. 21.
Vimuktydyatana = vimukter dyadvaram.
119. These are opposed to the sixty-two drstis {Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 376c6 and foil. ). The Bahudhdtuka (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 723cl3 , Dharmaskandha, Chapter XX) is closely related to Majjhima, iii. 6l (41 dhdtus). Compare Asanga, Sutrdlamkdra, iii. 2.
120. This refers to the Sutra which explains the constituent elements of a person: saddhdtur ayam bhikso purusah. Vasubandhu quotes it (i. 35) under the name of Garbhdvakrdntisutra (Vinayasamyuktakavastu,Sec. 11,TD24,p. 253a21;andintheRatnakuta,Chap. 14,TD 11,p. 326b). In the Majjhima, this Sutra is called the Dhdtuvibhangasutta (iii. 239); it constitutes one of the sources of the Pitdputrasamdgama extracts of which are preserved in the Siksadsamuccaya, p. 244, Bodhicarydvatara, ix. 88, Madhyamakdvatdra, p. 269.
See note 62, and note 143 and Prakaranapada quoted in the note ad ii. 23c-d.
On the six dhdtus, Anguttara, i. 176, Vibhanga, p. 82-85, Abhidharmahrdaya, viii. 7.
121. Dharmaskandha, Chapter XX, Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 388a29. Same definition in Vibhanga, p. 84: katamd ajjhattikd dkdsadhdtuPyam ajjhattam paccattam dkdso dkdsagatam agham aghagatam vivaro vivaragatam . . . kannacchiddam ndsacchiddam . . .
122. P'u-kuang says (TD41, p. 32c28): "One says that dkdsadhdtu is light and darkness in order to show that it is a type of color (varna) and a real thing. The author does not believe that dkdsadhdtu is a real thing, and this is why he adds the word kHa" For Vasubandhu and the Sautrantikas, dkd? adhdtu is solely the absence of a resistent body (sapratighadravydbhdvamdtra). See ii. 55c-d
Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 388M9: What difference is there between dkdsa and dkafadhatu? The first
I
? is non-material (arupin), invisible (anidariana), non-resistent (apratigha), pure (anasrava), unconditioned (asamskrta); the second is material. . .
123. One edition of the Vydkhyd reads dgba: dgharh kila citastham rUpam iti citastham samghdtastham /atyartham hanti hanyate cety dgham / . . . atyarthasabdasya dkdrddesah krto hantes ca ghddesah. But the Burnouf MSS reads agham . . . akdrddesab; we have, ad iii. 72, agba
= citastharupa; Mabdvyutpatti, 245. 162.
124. See above p. 70 and following.
125. The dharmadhdtu is apart from cause: it includes avijnapti which is material and non- susceptible to being struck.
126. See Karanaprajnaptisdstra, analyzed in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 339.
127. Compare Samyutta, iv. 201: puthujjano cakkhusmim hanh^i mandpdmandpehi rupehi.
128. This means that the consciousness which arises having blue for its object (visaya) and the eye for its support (dsraya), can be hindered from arising through the interposition of a foreign body between the eye and the blue object: the eye and the blue are thus sapratigha. But neither the manodhdtu, which functions as the organ of the mental consciousness (manovijndna), nor the dharmadhdtu, which is the object proper of the mental consciousness (for example sensation), are not sapratigha: nothing can hinder, by making an "obstacle" or a "screen" (avarana), the mental consciousness from arising from the mental organ (manodhdtu) with respect to the dharmadhdtu.
129. See ii. 9a; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 263cl2, p. 740b8.
130. The Mahisasakas believe that the first four consciousnesses are always neutral; the
consciousness of touch and the mental consciousness are of the three types.
131. The dharmas which do not belong to any sphere of existence, which are transcendent to
existence (adhdtupatita, adhdtvdpta, apariydpanna) are unconditioned things. 132. The examination of this problem is taken up again ii. 12.
Compare Kathdvatthu, viii. 7.
133. Compare Digba, i. 34, 186.
134. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 746a4: "Do the male and female organs exist in Rupadhatu? Neither of the sexual organs exist there. First opinion: it is because one desires to abandon these organs that one cultivates the dhyanas and is reborn in Rupadhatu. If beings in Rupadhatu were to possess these organs, they would not desire to be reborn in this sphere. Second opinion: these organs are created by gross food (iii. 39); the Sutra (iii. 98c) says in faa that human beings at the beginning of the cosmic age do not possess these organs, that they all have the same form; later, when they eat of the juice of the earth, the two organs arise, and the difference of male and female appear; in the absence of gross food, the two organs will be missing. Third opinion: the two organs have a use in Kamadhatu, but they do not have a use in Rupadhatu: thus they are missing in Rupadhatu . . .
On the gods of Kamadhatu, see iii. 70.
135. The Mahasamghikas and the Sautrantikas maintain that the body of the Buddha is pure (anasrava) (see iv. 4a-b, discussion of avijnapti) (Compare Kathdvatthu, iv. 3, xiv. 4). Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 229al7, p. 391c27: "Certain masters, the Mahasamghikas, maintain that the body of the Buddha is pure. They say, 'Scripture says that the Tathagata remains above the world, that he is not mundane, that he is not defiled; thus we know that the body of the Buddha is pure. ' In order
to refute this opinion, we show that the body of the Buddha is impure. To say that it is pure is to contradict the Sutra. "
The body of the Buddha is not pure (anasrava), because it can be the occasion of the
Footnotes 143
? 144 Chapter One
defilement of another. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 871cll: The body of the Buddha is the result of ignorance and thirst; it is thus not pure. The Sutra says that ten complete dyatanas (organ of sight. . . ,visibles . . . ), and two partial ayatanas (manadyatana dhannas) are impure . . . If the body of the Buddha were pure, women would not have affection for him; he would not produce, among others, any desire, hatred, confusion, or pride . . .
Compare Vydkhyd, p. 14; above p. 58.
136. Same question in Vibhaga, 97,435. Vitarka and vicdra are defined ii. 28, 33.
137. These are called avikalapaka by reason of the text: caksurvi/ndnasamanginilarh vijdndti no tu nilam iti (See above note 75).
138. Kila: this is an opinion of the Vaibhasikas without support in the Sutras.
The opinion of Vasubandhu is explained later, ii. 33. For him as for the Sautrantikas, vitarka
and vicdra are citta, manovijndna.
139. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 219b7: svabhdvavikalpa is vitarka-vicdra; anusmaranavikalpa is the memory associated with mental consciousness; nirupandvikalpa is non-absorbed prajnd of the sphere of the mental consciousness. In Kamadhatu, the five consciousnesses have only the first
type of vikalpa: they, include memory, but not anusmaranavikalpa, for they are not capable of recognition; they include prajnd, but not nirupandvikalpa, for they are not capable of examination.
Nyaydnusdra (TD 29, p. 350bll): The nature of svabhdvavikalpa is vitarka.
140. Sarhghabhadra: Prajnd and memory are associated with the five sense consciousnesses, but
their functions are reduced therein (TD 29, p. 350bl7).
141. Prajnd which is mental (mdnast), that is to say manasi bhavd, proceeds either from the hearing of Scripture or from reflection (irutacintdmayt), or is innate (upapattipratilambhikd)', is dispersed (vyagrd), that is, non-concentrated prajrid, having different objects (agra), or "dis- crowned" (vigatapradhdnd) by the fact that it successively grasps after different object.
Why give the name of abhinirupandvikalpa to this prajnd?
Because it applies to a certain object in respect to its name (ndmdpeksayd) and examines (abhinirupand): "this is rupa, vedand, anitya, duhkha," etc However, concentrated (samdhitd)
prajrid, proceeding from absorption (bhdvandmayt), is applied to an object without taking into consideration its name. Thus it is not abhinirupandvikalpa.
All mental memory (smrti), that is to say, the mental memory, is or is not concentrated. For, according to the School, the mental memory uniquely has for its object the thing previously experienced and does not take into consideration its name, according to the definition: "What is memory? Expression of the mind (cetaso'bhildpah). " The mode of existence of memory connected to the five consciousnesses is not an expression {abhilapa) of a thing previously experienced.
