-- Thb
Antinomy
of Pure Reason
Sect.
Sect.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
The digital images and OCR of this work were produced by Google, Inc.
(indicated by a watermark on each page in the PageTurner).
Google requests that the images and OCR not be re-hosted, redistributed or used commercially.
The images are provided for educational, scholarly, non-commercial purposes.
? ? ? UNIVERSITY/OF VIRGINIA CHARLOTTESVILLE LIBRARIES
? ? ? ? DO__NQI
R BOOKS, REQUIRE
INC. 6962
T LAMINATE
ALKALINE PRESERVATION
PAPER PHOTOCOPY
? 1 12-
3NAL =B
' L
UNDER 12- FLAT
SADDLE PAM
JOBNO COVER NO
? ? ? ? BOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY
KANT'S
OF PURE REASON
CRITIQUE
? ? ? ? GEORGE BELL & SONS
LONDON : YORK ST. , COVENT GARDEN NKW YORK : 66 FIFTH AVENUE, AND BOMBAY: 53 ESPLANADE ROAD CAMBRIDGE : DEIGHTON BELL & CO.
? ? ? CRITIQUE OF
PURE
TRANSLATED rROM THE GERMAN OF
I M MANUEL KANT
BY
J. M. D. MEIKLEJOHN
REASON
? LONDON
GEORGE BELL AND SONS
1901
? ? ? 160006
KACO DK VERULAMIO. IN8TAURATI0 M AONA-PR1EF. VTIO.
? )e NOBIS IPSIfl SILEMUS: DB KB AUTEM, QVX AGITUR, PETIMUII OT HOMINES EAM NON OPINION KM, sED OPUS E98B COGlTENr; AC PBO CBBTO HABBANT, NON SbCTX N08 ALICUJCs, AUT PLAC- ITI, 8XD UTILITATIS BT AMPLITUDINI8 HUMAN*: FUNDAMBKTA MOLIBI. DeINDE UT 8UIS C0MM0DI8 XQVl--IN COMMUNB CON- sULANT--XT IF8I IN PARTEM VENIANT. PbJETBBRA UT BENB 8PERBNT, NEQUE InsTAUBATIONBM NOSTBAM UT QUIDDAM INFI NITUM BT ULTBA MOBTALB FINGANT, ET ANIMO CONCIPIANT:
QUUM BBVBBA BIT INFINITI BBBOBIB FINIS BT TRBMINU8 LE- SITIltUS.
? ? ? ? CONTENTS.
Translator's Preface
Preface to the First Edition- of tub CniTians Prrfacb to the Second Edition
INTRODUCTION.
I. --Of thr Difference between Pure and Empirical Know ledge
II. --Thb Human Intellect, e\ in an cnfnilosophical statb. is dx possession of certain cognitions A PRIORI HI. --Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall
Put* xi
! 2
. >> 7 9
12 16
? IV. -- Of V. -- In
thb Diffbrbncb cal Judgments
between
Analytical
and
Syntheti
DETERMINE THR POSSIBILITY. PRINCIPLES, AND EXTENT OF
Human Knowlbdob A PRIORI
all Theoretical
of Reason, Synthetical Judgments A PRIORI are contained as Principles . .
Sciences
VI. --Tub General Prorlem of Pure Reason
VII. --Idea and DrroioN of a Particular Science, under tub
Name of a Critique of Pure Heason
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS,
PART FIR8T. --TRANSCENDENTAL -ESTHETIC.
$ 1. Introductory 21
Sect. I. --Of Space.
Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 23 Transcendental Exposition of the conception of Space 2-5
4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions 25 Sect. II. --Of Timb.
5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 28 6. Transcendenta. Exposition of the Conception of Time 29 " Conclusions from the above Conceptions 30 Elucidation 32
General Remarks on Transcendental . Esthetic 36
xii xx;>
? ? Ii
7. 12. 3.
? TI
CONTENT*.
PAST SECOND. --TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. Introduction. --Idea of a Transcendental Loqio.
I. --Of Logic in general
tfi 49
II. --Of Transcendental III. -- Of the Division -- Dialectic
Logic
of General
Logic into
Analytio
and
60 scendental Analytic and Dialectic 63
IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Tran
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC-- FIRST
Transcendental Analytic. ? 1 Analytic op Conceptions. ? 2
D1YI8ION.
? CHAP. I. --Of the Transcendental Cine to the DiacoTeiy of all Pore Conceptions cf the Understanding.
Introductory. 6 3 56 Sect. I. --Of the Logical use of the Understanding in gene
ral. ? 4 56 Sect. II. --Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
Judgments. ? 6
Sect. III. --Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or
Categories. ? 6
CHAP. II. --Of thb Deduction of thb Pure Conceptions op the Understanding.
Sect. I. -- Of the Principles of Transcendental Deduction in ge neral. ? 9
5*. 62
71
Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Catego
ries. ? 10 77
8bot II. --Transcendental Deduction op the Pure Con ceptions OF THE UnDERSTANDOU}.
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre sentations given by Sense. 4 11 80 Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. {12 81
The Principle of the Synthetical Ulity of Apperception is
the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understand
ing. ? 13 84
What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. 6 14 86 The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained
therein. ? 16 86 All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold contents of
them can be united in one Consciousness. ? 16 88 Observations. ? 17 88 In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is
the only legitimate use of the Category, f 18 90
64 66
? ? ? CONTESTS.
yjj
Of the Application of the Categories to Object! of the Senses hfi
in general. I 20
Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible em
ployment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the
Understanding. $ 23 97 Besult of this Deduction -of the Conceptions of the Under
standing. (23
Short view of the above Deduction
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC-- BOOK 1L
Analytic or Principles
Introduction. -- Of the Transcendental Faculty of
ment in general
Judg
101 103
101 104
BS
? Transcendental. Doctrine of the Faculty of Judg ment, ob Analytic or Princifles.
CH AP. I. --Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Un
derstanding 107
CHAP. IL--System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding. . . . US System or tub Principles or the Pure Understanding.
Sect. I. -- Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical -- Judgments
115
Sect. II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgments 117
Sect.
III. -- Systematic Representations of all Synthetical
-- Priiomles of the Pure Understanding 120
I.
II. --Anticipations of Perception III. -- Analogies of Experience
A. First Analogy. -- Principle
Axioms of Intuition
123 124 132
134
of Substance -- B. Second Analogy.
of Time -- C. Third Analogy.
Principle of the Succession
141
Principle of Co-existence . . 166 IV. --The Postulates of Empirical Thought 161
Refutation of Idealism
General Remark on the System of Principles 174
0HAP. III. --Of the Ground of the division of all objects into Phss- nomena and Noumena ITS
Appendix Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly, the Conceptions of Reflection from the Confusion of
the Traiucendental with the Empirical use of
the Understanding 190
Remark on the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection 194
of
the
Permanence
166
? ? ? COITTENTS.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC-- SECOND DIVISION. Transcendent ax Dialectic. -- Introduction.
I. --Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance
If. -- Of Pure Reaaon as the Seat of Transcendental
pearance
A. Op Reason in General
B. Of the Logical Usb of Reason C. Of the Poeb Ube of Reason
209
212 214 21 S
219 221 225 23?
237 237
245
251 General Remark on the Transition from Rational Psy
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC-- BOOK I.
Illuiory
Ap
? Or the Conceptions of Pure Reason Sect. J. --Of Ideas in General
Sect. II. -- Of Transcendental Ideas Sbct. III. -- System of Transcendental
Book II. -- Or the Dia'. ecticai, Reason
Idens Procedure
op
Pcee
CHAP I. -- Of the Pabalooisms op Pure Reason
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub
stantiality or Permanence of the Soul
Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralo
gism
chology to Cosmology
CITAP. II.
-- Thb Antinomy of Pure Reason
Sect. I. -- System of Cosmological Ideas Sror. II. --Antithetic of Pure Reason
253
255
256
263
266
271
278
284
290
298 303
307 310
318 321
First Antinomy Second Antinomy
Third Antinomy! Fourth Antinomy
8ect. III. -- Of the Interest of dictions
Reason in
these
Sel'-Contra-
Sect. TV. -- Of the Necessity Imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental
Problems
Sect. V. -- Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems -- presented in the four Transcendental Ideas . . . 8ect. VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution
-- of Pure Cosmological Dialectic
Sect VTT. Critical Solution of the Cosmoloficai Problems . . 8bct. VIII. -- Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation
to the Cosmolosical Ideas
8bot. IX. -- Of the Empirical Use of the R-;rulative Principle
of Reason, with regard to the Cosmoloeicol Ideas
? ? ? CONTENTS. 13
L-- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe 322
II. -- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a 'Whole given in Intuition
Causes 33(
Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Uni versal Law of Natural Necessity 333
Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the universal Law of Natural
-- Necessity 335 IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality
Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcen dental Mathematical Ideas -- and Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas
325
328
III. -- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their
? of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences . . . . 346
Concluding Reason
Sect. IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the
-- Existence of God 364
CHAP, ITL-- The Ideal
Sect. I. -- Of the Ideal in General
Sect. II. -- Of the Transcendental Ideal Sect. III. -- Of the Arguments Employed
349
350 352
Remarks
on the
Antinomy
of
Pure
op Pure
Reason.
Reason
-- in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being 359
Set. V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God
Di tection and Explanation of the Dialectical Elu sion in all Transcendental Arguments for the
370
-- Existence of a Necessary Being 377 Sect. VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological
Proof
8ect. VII. -- Critique :f all Theology
based upon
Speculative
381
387
of Reason
Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure
Principles
Reason 894 Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of
Human Reason 41C
Til VNSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
431
CIl AP. I. --The Discipline op Pcbe Reason 432 Skct. I. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dog
matism 439 Sect. II. --The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics 449 Sect. III. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason iu Hypothesis 467
8ect. IV. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs
47 S
by
Speculative
? ? ? CONTENT*.
CHAP. n. --The Canon of Pure Reason 482 Sect. I. --Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason 483 Sect. II. --Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter
mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure
-- Reason 487 Sect. III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 498
CHAP. III. --The Architectonic of Pure Reason 503 CHAP. IV. --Tub History of Pure Reason 616
? ? ? ? TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
The following translation has been undertaken with the hope of rendering Kant's Kritik der reinen Vermmft intelligible to the English student.
The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his own system. But the Horatian rule of
Verba pravisam rem non invita sequentur,
will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a few. The main statement in his sentences is often over laid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses ; and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course
of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve
? ? ? ? tkanslatob' a freface.
years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Kcmigs- berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso phy, and to enounce ideas th. -. t were entirely to revolutionise European thought . On the other hand, there are many excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often as precise and forcible as his thought ; and, in some of his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy
of comprehension.
A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it
been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint ance with the German language, and still less with his subject. A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary.
? Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent, -- it has been his lot to be either
hended, or entirely neglected. Duguld Stewart did not understand his system of philosophy -- as he had no proper opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Kitsch* and Willichf undertook to introduce him to the English philosophical public; Richardson and Haywood " traduced"
? A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles. By F. A. Nitsch. London, 1706.
Willich's Elements af Kant's Philosophy, Svo. 1708.
unappreciated, misappre
? ? ? TBANSLATOTl'B PREPACK.
xiU
him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr. Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely of a selection of sentences from his own translation : -- a mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there
is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserves to be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics. " All are written by men who either took no pains to understand Kant, or were incapahle of understanding him. *
The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS.
translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by
Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise as he had
perceived to be incorrect. After having laboured through
about eighty pages, found, from the numerous errors and
inaccuracies pervading that hardly one-fifth of the original
? MS. remained. therefore,
laid entirely aside, and com menced df novo. These eighty pages did not cancel, be
cause the careful examination
made them, as believed, not an unworthy representation of the author.
It curiam to observe, in all the English works written spe cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering, in his own words. Nitsch and Willich, who professed to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators "Haywood, even in his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of Beck's Principle* of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his " Translator** Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated bis Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The snne
case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises,"
London, 1798. ) This person has written preface to each of the volumes, and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant's works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in there at his own few being then able to detect the plagiarism.
which they had undergone,
the vols. 8vo.
? ? ;
it
a
it I
(2
is
it,
;
i
* is
I
I,
I it,
? tbanslatob'b fbefacb.
The second edition of the Kritik, from which all tha sub sequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, main tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the second a Verschlbrvnbesserung of the first; and that the changes made by Kant, " in the weakness of old age," have rendered it a " self-contradictory and mutilated work. " I am not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet, and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition,--
whether fear could have induced a man of his character to retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455-- 460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would surrender what he believed to be truth, at the"outcry of preju diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the sacred doctrines of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains, less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, however learned and profound.
No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But the common editions, as well those printed during, as after Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the " third edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791," swarms with errors, at once misleading and annoying. -- Rosenkranz hu
* Of the preient translation.
? ? ? ? preface.
suae a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the accuracy of which cannot be doubted.
It may be necessary to mention that it has been found
requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im possible to translate the Eritik with the aid of the philoso phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim -- parch detorta. Such is the verb intuite for anschauen ; the manifold in intuition has also been employed for dot Mannig- faltige der Amchauung, by which Kant designates the varied contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology has the merit of being precise and consistent.
Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to the possibility of metaphysics --whatever his estimate of the utility of such discussions, --the value of Kant's work, as an instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If the present translation contribute in the least to the ad vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and long-protracted labour.
J. M. D. M.
translator's
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TI0N. -O781. )
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, aa they transcend every faculty of the mind.
It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphyric.
Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences ; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now. it is the fashion of the time to heap con tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba,
" Modo maxima rerura, Tot generis, natisque poteni . . .
Nunc trahor exul, inopa. "*
At first, her government, under the administration of the
? Ovid, Metamorphoses.
? ? ? ? rviii
PREFAOK TO TM FtRST EDITION.
? ? ? UNIVERSITY/OF VIRGINIA CHARLOTTESVILLE LIBRARIES
? ? ? ? DO__NQI
R BOOKS, REQUIRE
INC. 6962
T LAMINATE
ALKALINE PRESERVATION
PAPER PHOTOCOPY
? 1 12-
3NAL =B
' L
UNDER 12- FLAT
SADDLE PAM
JOBNO COVER NO
? ? ? ? BOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY
KANT'S
OF PURE REASON
CRITIQUE
? ? ? ? GEORGE BELL & SONS
LONDON : YORK ST. , COVENT GARDEN NKW YORK : 66 FIFTH AVENUE, AND BOMBAY: 53 ESPLANADE ROAD CAMBRIDGE : DEIGHTON BELL & CO.
? ? ? CRITIQUE OF
PURE
TRANSLATED rROM THE GERMAN OF
I M MANUEL KANT
BY
J. M. D. MEIKLEJOHN
REASON
? LONDON
GEORGE BELL AND SONS
1901
? ? ? 160006
KACO DK VERULAMIO. IN8TAURATI0 M AONA-PR1EF. VTIO.
? )e NOBIS IPSIfl SILEMUS: DB KB AUTEM, QVX AGITUR, PETIMUII OT HOMINES EAM NON OPINION KM, sED OPUS E98B COGlTENr; AC PBO CBBTO HABBANT, NON SbCTX N08 ALICUJCs, AUT PLAC- ITI, 8XD UTILITATIS BT AMPLITUDINI8 HUMAN*: FUNDAMBKTA MOLIBI. DeINDE UT 8UIS C0MM0DI8 XQVl--IN COMMUNB CON- sULANT--XT IF8I IN PARTEM VENIANT. PbJETBBRA UT BENB 8PERBNT, NEQUE InsTAUBATIONBM NOSTBAM UT QUIDDAM INFI NITUM BT ULTBA MOBTALB FINGANT, ET ANIMO CONCIPIANT:
QUUM BBVBBA BIT INFINITI BBBOBIB FINIS BT TRBMINU8 LE- SITIltUS.
? ? ? ? CONTENTS.
Translator's Preface
Preface to the First Edition- of tub CniTians Prrfacb to the Second Edition
INTRODUCTION.
I. --Of thr Difference between Pure and Empirical Know ledge
II. --Thb Human Intellect, e\ in an cnfnilosophical statb. is dx possession of certain cognitions A PRIORI HI. --Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall
Put* xi
! 2
. >> 7 9
12 16
? IV. -- Of V. -- In
thb Diffbrbncb cal Judgments
between
Analytical
and
Syntheti
DETERMINE THR POSSIBILITY. PRINCIPLES, AND EXTENT OF
Human Knowlbdob A PRIORI
all Theoretical
of Reason, Synthetical Judgments A PRIORI are contained as Principles . .
Sciences
VI. --Tub General Prorlem of Pure Reason
VII. --Idea and DrroioN of a Particular Science, under tub
Name of a Critique of Pure Heason
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS,
PART FIR8T. --TRANSCENDENTAL -ESTHETIC.
$ 1. Introductory 21
Sect. I. --Of Space.
Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 23 Transcendental Exposition of the conception of Space 2-5
4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions 25 Sect. II. --Of Timb.
5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 28 6. Transcendenta. Exposition of the Conception of Time 29 " Conclusions from the above Conceptions 30 Elucidation 32
General Remarks on Transcendental . Esthetic 36
xii xx;>
? ? Ii
7. 12. 3.
? TI
CONTENT*.
PAST SECOND. --TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. Introduction. --Idea of a Transcendental Loqio.
I. --Of Logic in general
tfi 49
II. --Of Transcendental III. -- Of the Division -- Dialectic
Logic
of General
Logic into
Analytio
and
60 scendental Analytic and Dialectic 63
IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Tran
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC-- FIRST
Transcendental Analytic. ? 1 Analytic op Conceptions. ? 2
D1YI8ION.
? CHAP. I. --Of the Transcendental Cine to the DiacoTeiy of all Pore Conceptions cf the Understanding.
Introductory. 6 3 56 Sect. I. --Of the Logical use of the Understanding in gene
ral. ? 4 56 Sect. II. --Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
Judgments. ? 6
Sect. III. --Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or
Categories. ? 6
CHAP. II. --Of thb Deduction of thb Pure Conceptions op the Understanding.
Sect. I. -- Of the Principles of Transcendental Deduction in ge neral. ? 9
5*. 62
71
Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Catego
ries. ? 10 77
8bot II. --Transcendental Deduction op the Pure Con ceptions OF THE UnDERSTANDOU}.
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre sentations given by Sense. 4 11 80 Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. {12 81
The Principle of the Synthetical Ulity of Apperception is
the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understand
ing. ? 13 84
What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. 6 14 86 The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained
therein. ? 16 86 All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold contents of
them can be united in one Consciousness. ? 16 88 Observations. ? 17 88 In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is
the only legitimate use of the Category, f 18 90
64 66
? ? ? CONTESTS.
yjj
Of the Application of the Categories to Object! of the Senses hfi
in general. I 20
Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible em
ployment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the
Understanding. $ 23 97 Besult of this Deduction -of the Conceptions of the Under
standing. (23
Short view of the above Deduction
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC-- BOOK 1L
Analytic or Principles
Introduction. -- Of the Transcendental Faculty of
ment in general
Judg
101 103
101 104
BS
? Transcendental. Doctrine of the Faculty of Judg ment, ob Analytic or Princifles.
CH AP. I. --Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Un
derstanding 107
CHAP. IL--System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding. . . . US System or tub Principles or the Pure Understanding.
Sect. I. -- Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical -- Judgments
115
Sect. II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgments 117
Sect.
III. -- Systematic Representations of all Synthetical
-- Priiomles of the Pure Understanding 120
I.
II. --Anticipations of Perception III. -- Analogies of Experience
A. First Analogy. -- Principle
Axioms of Intuition
123 124 132
134
of Substance -- B. Second Analogy.
of Time -- C. Third Analogy.
Principle of the Succession
141
Principle of Co-existence . . 166 IV. --The Postulates of Empirical Thought 161
Refutation of Idealism
General Remark on the System of Principles 174
0HAP. III. --Of the Ground of the division of all objects into Phss- nomena and Noumena ITS
Appendix Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly, the Conceptions of Reflection from the Confusion of
the Traiucendental with the Empirical use of
the Understanding 190
Remark on the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection 194
of
the
Permanence
166
? ? ? COITTENTS.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC-- SECOND DIVISION. Transcendent ax Dialectic. -- Introduction.
I. --Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance
If. -- Of Pure Reaaon as the Seat of Transcendental
pearance
A. Op Reason in General
B. Of the Logical Usb of Reason C. Of the Poeb Ube of Reason
209
212 214 21 S
219 221 225 23?
237 237
245
251 General Remark on the Transition from Rational Psy
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC-- BOOK I.
Illuiory
Ap
? Or the Conceptions of Pure Reason Sect. J. --Of Ideas in General
Sect. II. -- Of Transcendental Ideas Sbct. III. -- System of Transcendental
Book II. -- Or the Dia'. ecticai, Reason
Idens Procedure
op
Pcee
CHAP I. -- Of the Pabalooisms op Pure Reason
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub
stantiality or Permanence of the Soul
Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralo
gism
chology to Cosmology
CITAP. II.
-- Thb Antinomy of Pure Reason
Sect. I. -- System of Cosmological Ideas Sror. II. --Antithetic of Pure Reason
253
255
256
263
266
271
278
284
290
298 303
307 310
318 321
First Antinomy Second Antinomy
Third Antinomy! Fourth Antinomy
8ect. III. -- Of the Interest of dictions
Reason in
these
Sel'-Contra-
Sect. TV. -- Of the Necessity Imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental
Problems
Sect. V. -- Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems -- presented in the four Transcendental Ideas . . . 8ect. VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution
-- of Pure Cosmological Dialectic
Sect VTT. Critical Solution of the Cosmoloficai Problems . . 8bct. VIII. -- Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation
to the Cosmolosical Ideas
8bot. IX. -- Of the Empirical Use of the R-;rulative Principle
of Reason, with regard to the Cosmoloeicol Ideas
? ? ? CONTENTS. 13
L-- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe 322
II. -- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a 'Whole given in Intuition
Causes 33(
Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Uni versal Law of Natural Necessity 333
Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the universal Law of Natural
-- Necessity 335 IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality
Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcen dental Mathematical Ideas -- and Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas
325
328
III. -- Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their
? of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences . . . . 346
Concluding Reason
Sect. IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the
-- Existence of God 364
CHAP, ITL-- The Ideal
Sect. I. -- Of the Ideal in General
Sect. II. -- Of the Transcendental Ideal Sect. III. -- Of the Arguments Employed
349
350 352
Remarks
on the
Antinomy
of
Pure
op Pure
Reason.
Reason
-- in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being 359
Set. V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God
Di tection and Explanation of the Dialectical Elu sion in all Transcendental Arguments for the
370
-- Existence of a Necessary Being 377 Sect. VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological
Proof
8ect. VII. -- Critique :f all Theology
based upon
Speculative
381
387
of Reason
Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure
Principles
Reason 894 Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of
Human Reason 41C
Til VNSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
431
CIl AP. I. --The Discipline op Pcbe Reason 432 Skct. I. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dog
matism 439 Sect. II. --The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics 449 Sect. III. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason iu Hypothesis 467
8ect. IV. -- The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs
47 S
by
Speculative
? ? ? CONTENT*.
CHAP. n. --The Canon of Pure Reason 482 Sect. I. --Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason 483 Sect. II. --Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter
mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure
-- Reason 487 Sect. III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 498
CHAP. III. --The Architectonic of Pure Reason 503 CHAP. IV. --Tub History of Pure Reason 616
? ? ? ? TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
The following translation has been undertaken with the hope of rendering Kant's Kritik der reinen Vermmft intelligible to the English student.
The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his own system. But the Horatian rule of
Verba pravisam rem non invita sequentur,
will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a few. The main statement in his sentences is often over laid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses ; and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course
of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve
? ? ? ? tkanslatob' a freface.
years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Kcmigs- berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso phy, and to enounce ideas th. -. t were entirely to revolutionise European thought . On the other hand, there are many excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often as precise and forcible as his thought ; and, in some of his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy
of comprehension.
A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it
been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint ance with the German language, and still less with his subject. A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary.
? Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent, -- it has been his lot to be either
hended, or entirely neglected. Duguld Stewart did not understand his system of philosophy -- as he had no proper opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Kitsch* and Willichf undertook to introduce him to the English philosophical public; Richardson and Haywood " traduced"
? A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles. By F. A. Nitsch. London, 1706.
Willich's Elements af Kant's Philosophy, Svo. 1708.
unappreciated, misappre
? ? ? TBANSLATOTl'B PREPACK.
xiU
him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr. Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely of a selection of sentences from his own translation : -- a mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there
is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserves to be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics. " All are written by men who either took no pains to understand Kant, or were incapahle of understanding him. *
The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS.
translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by
Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise as he had
perceived to be incorrect. After having laboured through
about eighty pages, found, from the numerous errors and
inaccuracies pervading that hardly one-fifth of the original
? MS. remained. therefore,
laid entirely aside, and com menced df novo. These eighty pages did not cancel, be
cause the careful examination
made them, as believed, not an unworthy representation of the author.
It curiam to observe, in all the English works written spe cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering, in his own words. Nitsch and Willich, who professed to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators "Haywood, even in his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of Beck's Principle* of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his " Translator** Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated bis Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The snne
case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises,"
London, 1798. ) This person has written preface to each of the volumes, and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant's works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in there at his own few being then able to detect the plagiarism.
which they had undergone,
the vols. 8vo.
? ? ;
it
a
it I
(2
is
it,
;
i
* is
I
I,
I it,
? tbanslatob'b fbefacb.
The second edition of the Kritik, from which all tha sub sequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, main tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the second a Verschlbrvnbesserung of the first; and that the changes made by Kant, " in the weakness of old age," have rendered it a " self-contradictory and mutilated work. " I am not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet, and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition,--
whether fear could have induced a man of his character to retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455-- 460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would surrender what he believed to be truth, at the"outcry of preju diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the sacred doctrines of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains, less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, however learned and profound.
No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But the common editions, as well those printed during, as after Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the " third edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791," swarms with errors, at once misleading and annoying. -- Rosenkranz hu
* Of the preient translation.
? ? ? ? preface.
suae a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the accuracy of which cannot be doubted.
It may be necessary to mention that it has been found
requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im possible to translate the Eritik with the aid of the philoso phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim -- parch detorta. Such is the verb intuite for anschauen ; the manifold in intuition has also been employed for dot Mannig- faltige der Amchauung, by which Kant designates the varied contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology has the merit of being precise and consistent.
Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to the possibility of metaphysics --whatever his estimate of the utility of such discussions, --the value of Kant's work, as an instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If the present translation contribute in the least to the ad vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and long-protracted labour.
J. M. D. M.
translator's
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TI0N. -O781. )
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, aa they transcend every faculty of the mind.
It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphyric.
Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences ; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now. it is the fashion of the time to heap con tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba,
" Modo maxima rerura, Tot generis, natisque poteni . . .
Nunc trahor exul, inopa. "*
At first, her government, under the administration of the
? Ovid, Metamorphoses.
? ? ? ? rviii
PREFAOK TO TM FtRST EDITION.
