No More Learning

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue
is a habit of choosing the mean. "

I answer that, As already explained ([1598]Q[55], A[3]), the nature of
virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is
properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to
some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive
movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good of
that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its
rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the rule of
art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance
from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by their
exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly
the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the
good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason.
Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality
or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the
mean.

Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of
reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If
therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that
which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz.
conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other
extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of
its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes
the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state," in so
far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is
an extreme in reference to the 'best' and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to
its conformity with reason.

Reply to Objection 2: In actions and passions the mean and the extremes
depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from
being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the
same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through being
in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and
magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the respective
objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and a maximum:
but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances,
then it has the character of a mean: since these virtues tend to this
maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i. e. "where" it is
right, "when" it is right, and for an "end" that is right. There will
be excess, if one tends to this maximum "when" it is not right, or
"where" it is not right, or for an undue "end"; and there will be
deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where" one ought, and "when"
one aught. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, but the
mean in the right mode of his action. "

Reply to Objection 3: The same is to be said of virginity and poverty
as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and
poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i. e.
according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this
be done in an undue manner, i. e. out of unlawful superstition, or again
for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it
ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by
deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or
poverty.
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Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the
rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists
in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8,
is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real
mean.

Objection 2: Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral
virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean
between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is
not the rational, but the real mean.

Objection 3: Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical
or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of
justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue
is not the rational, but the real mean.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue
observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason. "

I answer that, The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First,
according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as
though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this
sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act
of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational
mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that which the
reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every mean of
moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated [1599](A[1]),
moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right
reason.

But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean:
in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for instance,
in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the
real mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such is the mean in
all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is
about operations, which deal with external things, wherein the right
has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above
([1600]Q[60], A[2]): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same
as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his
due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with
interior passions wherein the right cannot be established in the same
way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions;
hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the passions,
with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the passions.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two
arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason,
while the third argues from the mean of justice.
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Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe
the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming to the
rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so
that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual
virtues do not observe the mean.

Objection 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an
intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue
observes the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint
it. " If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, this mean
will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there
would be an indefinite series of virtues.

Objection 3: Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries,
as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there seems
to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as
they are in the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, but
are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick.
Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.

On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean
in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes the
mean.

I answer that, The good of anything consists in its observing the mean,
by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may happen
to be excessive or deficient, as stated above [1601](A[1]). Now
intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as
stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue
consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a
measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true; in the case
of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi,
2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity with
a right appetite.

Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely,
is measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect,
as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we
think or say, according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the good
of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way
of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the intellect
expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are
not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be
excess if something false is affirmed, as though something were, which
in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is
falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is.

The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in
relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; so that both
in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists
in conformity with things. But if we consider it in relation to the
appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the
rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of
prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as
ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between
excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases.

Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as
stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that
measure.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no need for an indefinite series of
virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not
another kind of virtue, but things themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: The things themselves that are contrary have no
contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the
other: nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of
affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end of
Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary,
but in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as we consider
their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we have
"being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer
them to the act of the mind, there is something positive in both cases.
Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion
stating that "good is good" is contrary to the opinion stating that
"good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue
observes the mean.
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Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean.
For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. Now
the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much
more does theological virtue observe the mean.

Objection 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite
being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists
in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue
perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above ([1602]Q[62],
A[3]). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean.

Objection 3: Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean
between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course
between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii):
thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe
the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence
of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to
one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue observes the
mean.

On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to
sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by
excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is
written (Ecclus. 43:33): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you
can: for He is above all praise. " Therefore theological virtue does not
observe the mean.

I answer that, As stated above [1603](A[1]), the mean of virtue depends
on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may
exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological
virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and
thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because
our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to His
goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence and
loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never
can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope
in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in
such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a
mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit.

The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with
us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought,
yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving,
according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible
to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in
reference to us.

Reply to Objection 1: The good of intellectual and moral virtues
consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be
exceeded: whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue,
considered in itself, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our
intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule;
whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an
uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope observes the mean between presumption and
despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be
presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of
his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which
according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no
excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In
like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not
by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe
too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle position
between contrary opinions, as was explained above.
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OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there
are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?

(2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?

(3) Whether charity can be without them?

(4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?

(5) Whether charity can be without them?
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Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected
with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the
exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise
himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the
acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral
virtue without another.

Objection 2: Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues.
Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or
magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man
cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other virtues; and (Ethic.
iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth,
is modest, but not magnanimous. " Therefore the moral virtues are not
connected with one another.

Objection 3: Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part
of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective
part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we
may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, are
the moral virtues connected with one another.

Objection 4: Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this
can only be because they are united together in prudence. But this does
not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one
may be prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue,
without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one
may have the art of making certain things, without the art of making
certain others. Now prudence is right reason about things to be done.
Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one
another.

On the contrary, Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20: "The virtues are connected
and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several":
and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in
the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory
says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of
no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc.
ii): "If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs
be that you have none at all. "

I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as
imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or
fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good
deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If
we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we
find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt
in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of
chastity.

But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good
deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that
they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two
reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning the
distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above
([1604]Q[61], AA[3],4), some distinguish them according to certain
general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that
discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to
temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we
consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the
connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as
virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and
so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by
Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as
a virtue, "if isolated from the others: for there can be no true
prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues
to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. [1605] Q[61], A[4],
OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).

Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their
matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for
their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above
([1606]Q[58], A[4]), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it
is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective
habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end,
which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also
correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by
prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that are
directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one
has the moral virtues: since prudence is "right reason about things to
be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to
be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence,
just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the
understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence
without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the
moral virtues are connected with one another.

Reply to Objection 1: Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his
general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have
to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise
himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he
exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire
the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good
deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for
instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of
concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining
his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the
absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In
the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character
of virtue, if prudence be lacking.

But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some
eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does
not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such
virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues,
without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak
of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those
other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because
when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and
expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would
acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a
geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge
about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind
before. Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of
having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text.
56): "That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all. "

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual virtues are about divers matters
having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the
various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the
connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about
passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For
all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions, viz. love
and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure and sorrow.
In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue
are related to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole matter
of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.

Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles.
And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the
understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral
virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles which
are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not
depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other
intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence,
because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason
the appetite, as stated above ([1607]Q[9], A[1];[1608] Q[58], A[5], ad
1).

Reply to Objection 4: Those things to which the moral virtues incline,
are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not
the principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though
reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet
in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any
principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, "A
whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the science of
geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his
conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related to one another, but not
things "made," as stated above (ad 3).
Consequently the lack of
prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a
deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not
occur in things to be made.
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Whether moral virtues can be without charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity.
For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every virtue
save charity may be common to the good and bad. " But "charity can be in
none except the good," as stated in the same book. Therefore the other
virtues can be had without charity.

Objection 2: Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human
acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had
otherwise than by infusion, according to Rom. 5:5: "The charity of God
is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us. "
Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity.

Objection 3: Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through
depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed,
it surpasses prudence, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ,
which surpasseth all knowledge. " Therefore the moral virtues are not
connected with charity, and can be without it.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:14): "He that loveth not,
abideth in death. " Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues,
since it is "by them" that "we lead a good life," as Augustine states
(De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of
charity.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means
of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good
works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of
man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even
as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce
good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the
character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by
human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be
without charity. For it has been stated above [1609](A[1]; Q[58],
AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and
that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because these latter
make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of
the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is
much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end,
which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in
respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in
speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first
indemonstrable principle, that "contradictories cannot both be true at
the same time. " It is therefore evident that neither can infused
prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral
virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused
virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since
they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those,
namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not
simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some
particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply.
Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi. ] on the
words, "All that is not of faith is sin" (Rom. 14:23), says: "He that
fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct
be good. "

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect
virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes
its possessor good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds good of virtue in the sense
of acquired virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Though charity surpasses science and prudence,
yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all
the infused moral virtues.
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Whether charity can be without moral virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem possible to have charity without the moral
virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is
superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the
fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. 13:4,
seqq. : "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if
one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.

Objection 2: Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the
works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own
sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii,
3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they
find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing
to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore
many have charity without the other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet
there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says
(on Lk. 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not
having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have.
Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that
he has all the moral virtues.

On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is
written (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the
Law. " Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having
all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts
of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity,
has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis.
clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp. ] that charity contains all
the cardinal virtues.

I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity.
The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of
grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find
that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has
also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are
provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls
empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it
directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works
that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues
must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them
that man performs each different kind of good work.

It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not
only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that
whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused
moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: In order that the act of a lower power be
perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in
the lower power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect
action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed.
Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the
end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also
those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the
end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving
principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end.
Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with
charity.

Reply to Objection 2: It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit,
finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and
consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account
of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit
of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or
unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience
difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions
remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect
of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are
acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain saints are said not to have certain
virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those
virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all
the virtues.
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Whether faith and hope can be without charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without
charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be
more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused
moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith
and hope be without charity.

Objection 2: Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says
(Tract. xxvi in Joan. ). But charity is in the will as a perfection
thereof, as stated above ([1610]Q[62], A[3]). Therefore faith cannot be
without charity.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can
be no hope without love. " But love is charity: for it is of this love
that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.

On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 1:2 says that "faith begets hope, and
hope, charity. " Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be
without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without
charity.

I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be
considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as
complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good
works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a
perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good,
but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well
done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit
that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of
virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good:
but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well,
i. e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which
reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.

Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without
charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without
charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to
believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will not as
one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is
the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right
movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a
perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without
prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in
looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on
the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to
expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one
proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and
this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be
without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly
so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should
not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic.
ii, 6).

Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even
infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for
this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the
ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend
either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity,
although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of faith considered as a
perfect virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby
we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and
this is not without charity.
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Whether charity can be without faith and hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope.
For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God
naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss.
Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.

Objection 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according
to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity. " Now the root is
sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without
faith and hope, and the other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He
had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as
we shall explain further on ([1611]TP, Q[7], AA[3],4). Therefore
charity can be without faith and hope.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity,
according to Prov. 8:17: "I love them that love me. " Again, it is by
hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above ([1612]Q[62],
A[4]). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and
hope.

I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a
certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain
mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in
Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 Jn.
4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and
from 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are
called unto the fellowship of His Son. " Now this fellowship of man with
God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun
here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life,
by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore
just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one
disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or
familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is
impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and
colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore
charity is quite impossible without faith and hope.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that
love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which
object we are directed by faith and hope.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far
as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such
are the precursors of charity, as stated above ([1613]Q[62], A[4]), and
so charity is impossible without them.

Reply to Objection 3: In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on
account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had
manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See
above[1614], Q[4], A[3]]: so that in Him was perfect charity.
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OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there
are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?

(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?

(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;

(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;

(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;

(6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.
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Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less
than another. For it is written (Apoc. 21:16) that the sides of the
city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the
virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot
be greater than another.

Objection 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a
maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a
maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states
(De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that
"virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil
purpose. " Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less
than another.

Objection 3: Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the
power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God
Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue
cannot be greater than another.

On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance,
there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and
increase: for it is written (Mat. 5:20): "Unless your justice abound
more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into
the kingdom of heaven": and (Prov. 15:5): "In abundant justice there is
the greatest strength [virtus]. " Therefore it seems that a virtue can
be greater or less than another.

I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than
another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to
virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue
is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than
its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most
excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said ([1615]Q[18],
A[5];[1616] Q[61], A[2]) that the cause and root of human good is the
reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness
the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far
as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better than another,
according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice,
which is in the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and
fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance,
which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6.

The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of
the same species. In this way, according to what was said above
([1617]Q[52], A[1] ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits,
virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself;
secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider
it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, according to the
things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, e. g.
temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But
this does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not
know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said
rightly, as Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Predicaments,
that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the
nature of virtue consists in a maximum.

If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then
be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in
different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to
attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and
this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural
disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a
greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the
measure of the giving of Christ," as stated in Eph. 4:9. And here the
Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous,
unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the
nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of
right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics
thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated
in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more
nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when
several arches aim at a fixed target.

Reply to Objection 1: This equality is not one of absolute quantity,
but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately,
as we shall see further on [1618](A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have
the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained
above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.

Reply to Objection 3: God does not work by necessity of nature, but
according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various
measures of virtue, according to Eph. 4:7: "To every one of you [Vulg. :
'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ. "
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Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all
equally intense. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:7): "Everyone hath his
proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that.