The
transformation
of the concept of speculation in Schelling prior to and after his encounter with Hegel in Jena is displayed most clearly by comparing the two editions of Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797 and 1803); one such comparison will be provided below in Section I.
Hegel_nodrm
1971.
"Der Einfluss Hamanns auf die Religionsphilosophie Jacobis" in Friederich Heinrich Jacobi: Philosoph und Literat der
Goethezeit. Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main), 85-113.
Pinkard, Terry. 2000. Hegel: A Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Parry, Milman. 1971. The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected
Papers of Milman Parry, ed. Adam Parry (Oxford).
Mitscherling. 1977.
Reinhold, Karl Leonard. 1791. Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen
Wissens.
--. 1792. Briefe u? ber die Kantische Philosophie, Zweyter Band.
--. 1794. Beytra? ge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missversta? ndnisse der
Philosophen, Zweyter Band.
Rosen, Michael. 1974. G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of
Wisdom (New Haven and London: Yale University Press)
--. 1982. Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism (Cambridge University
Press).
Schelling, F. W. J. 1797. Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature. Trans. by Errol
Harris and Peter Heath. Cambridge University Press. 1988.
--. 1800a. System des transcendentalen Idealismus, Sa? mmtliche Werke. Vol. 4. Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1858. System of Transcendental Idealism, P. Heath (tr. ) , M. Vater (ed. ). Charlotteville: University of
Virginia Press. 1978.
--. 1800b. "Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy, or Main
Propositions of the Philosophy of Art according to the Principles of Transcendental Idealism," trans. by Albert Hofstadter, in Philosophy of German Idealism (New York: Continuum Publishing Company).
--. 1802. Schelling (and Hegel). "On the Relationship of the Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy in General" in Between Kant and Hegel, 311- 362. Trans. by H. S. Harris. Albany: State University of New York, 1985.
--. 1803. Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature are provided by Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 1988.
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 145
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1799. On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Trans. and ed. by Richard Crouter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1800. "Review of Fichte's Bestimmung des Menschen. " Athaeneum, 3. 2, 283-97.
--. 1860. Aus Schleiermacher's Leben. In Briefen, I-IV. Ed. by Ludwig Jonas and Wilhelm Dilthey. 4 vols. Berlin: G. Reimer.
Schneider, Robert. 1938. Schellings und Hegels schwa? bische geistesahnen. Wu? rzburg-Aumu? hle: K. Triltsch.
Schulze, G. E. 1792. Aenesidemus, as translated in di Giovanni & Harris in Between Kant and Hegel, SUNY Press, 1985.
Seidel, G. 1998. "Fichte and German Idealism: The Heideggerian Reading," Idealistic Studies, 28 (1998) 63-69
Smith, John H. 1988. The Spirit and its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of Bildung. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
--. 1937. Grundprinzipen Hegel und Schleiermacher. Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt Verlag.
Snow, Dale Evarts. 1987. "F. H. Jacobi and the Development of German Idealism. " Journal of the History of Philosophy 23/3: 397-415.
Stoeffler, F. Ernest. 1973. German Pietism During the Eighteenth Century. Studies in the History of Religion 24, Leiden: Brill Press.
Vater, Michael. 1978. "Introduction," F. W. J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, tr. P. Heath. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia), xi-xxxvi.
Wisenman. 1786. An den Herr Professor Kant von den Resultate Williamson, Raymond Keith. 1984. Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of
Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).
Wo? lfflin, Heinrich. 1929. Principles of Art History: The Problem of
Development of Style in Later Art (New York: Dover Publications). Zirngiebl, E. 1867. F. H. Jacobis Leben, Dichten und Denken. Vienna:
Braumuller.
APPENDIX
SPECULATION AND REFLECTION: SCHELLING AND HEGEL'S COLLABORATIVE ENTERPRISE IN JENA
Translator's Preface
The problem of how the philosophy of Hegel is systematically and historically related to that of Schelling, i. e. the so-called "Schelling problem," as Pippen calls it in Hegel's Idealism, has been a "confusing and much debated issue. " According to Heine's Die romantische Schule (1835), the elder Schelling was convinced that Hegel stole all his ideas. But even if Schelling's characterization of Hegel as a concept-monger is wildly exaggerated, it is indisputable that Hegel entered the philosophical frenzy at Jena as a partial supporter and perceived disciple of Schelling's system. Nonetheless, even the earliest collaborative efforts during the Jenaer Zeit are - as Harris puts it - "so nearly explicit [in their critique of the Schellingean system] that one wonders how any of Hegel's readers, let alone Schelling himself, could have regarded him a mere disciple. " Indeed, Harris seems to credit Du? sing with having established what might be considered the moderate thesis of the following article when he claims that "careful study of Schelling's writings in this period does show that he learned some things from Hegel. " Indeed, current consensus tends not only to vindicate Hegel of conceptual thievery, it also credits Hegel with a more durable speculative edifice built from materials which Schelling considered unworthy of the philosophical enterprise (namely, common consciousness or reflection). This current consensus is in no small part due to the article translated below, originally published in Hegel-Studien, entitled "Spekulation und Reflexion: Zur Zusammenarbeit Schellings und Hegel in Jena. " Professor Du? sing's 1969 article not only documents the most salient points of systematic disagreement between the Schelling and Hegel's respective systems, whether before or during and after the Jena collaboration, it also sheds light on the problematic that gave rise to the distinctively Hegelian version of dialectic. Although the central theses of
148 Appendix
the following argument were thickened substantially in several of Du? sing's subsequent works (e. g. , "Tranzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation: Der Streit um die Gestalt einer Ersten Philosophie"), the decisive premises of the argument are essentially all here. Whether one agrees with the conclusions that Professor Du? sing draws toward the end of this essay, his sensitive if not also now iconic analysis of the "Schelling problem" is too important to remain untranslated. When possible, in those places where Du? sing cites passages from Schelling's Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, I have used Harris and Heath's excellent translation (1988). And while I concede that this translation is by no means perfect, and that it errs on the side of the literal, I trust that it does provide a serviceable translation of an important if not seminal essay within the secondary literature on Hegel in English.
The Identita? tsphilosophie and, within the scope of this systematic approach, the novel concept of nature occupy a place of central importance in Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise in Jena (1801-03). The design of the Naturphilosophie can be traced back, obviously, at least in general, to Schelling. This has been assumed to be the case, by and large, with the formulation of the Identita? tssystem as well. It would appear that at this stage of his thought Hegel essentially adopted, reorganized, and - above all else - presented systematically the philosophical suggestions made by Schelling. 1 And while an adoption and adaptation of this sort might possibly account for the realm of Naturphilosophie, though certainly not without essential modifications, such a relationship between Schelling and Hegel with regard to the design of the Identita? tsphilosophie is dubious.
It has already been suggested in various ways, or at least hinted at, in the literature that Hegel's critique of Fichte in the Differenz essay was the last nudge or even the decisive ground for Schelling's disassociation from Fichte. 2 Hegel's critique of Fichte, however, presupposes a systematic
1 See, e. g. , Zeltner: Schelling, Stuttgart, 1954, 53 and 46; Fuhrmans: Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter, Duesseldorf, 1954, 43, 165; also see Dilthey (Gesammelte Werke, Bd 4. Hrsg. v. H. Nohl. 198 ff. , 206 ff. ), which is nonetheless a restrained expression. Perhaps Schelling's later critique of Hegel also contributed to this perception of Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise.
2 See, possibly, Michelet: Einleitung in Hegel's philosophische Abhandlungen in Hegel's Werke. Bd 1. Berlin 1832; Haym: Hegel und seine Zeit, Berlin, 1832, VI,
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 149
position developed - at least in its essential features - on his own, i. e. separate from Schelling. It should be shown in what follows how Schelling took up and reinterpreted Hegel's systematic suggestions regarding the conceptual pair: speculation and reflection. This conceptual pair proves to be meaningful for Schelling's own development of a system of absolute identity as well as for his critique of the contemporary philosophy, in particular the philosophy of Fichte; and it is of particular importance to Schelling's revision of the concept of speculation in this phase of his thought.
The transformation of the concept of speculation in Schelling prior to and after his encounter with Hegel in Jena is displayed most clearly by comparing the two editions of Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797 and 1803); one such comparison will be provided below in Section I. These changes alone, however, do not sufficiently prove Schelling's adoption of the Hegelian concept of speculation and, its correlate, reflection. Already in the early formulations of the Identita? tssystem, from his Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801) forward, Schelling spoke of speculation in a manner very similar to that of Hegel. As such, it is particularly important to distinguish in detail what was borrowed and modified in order to characterize properly the meaning of this concept for Schelling's system and critique. This discussion of the relationship between speculation and reflection will ultimately lead to the problem of dialectic; this theme is developed in the Section II below.
I.
In the K. F. A. Schelling edition of Schelling's Werke, the differences between the two editions of the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur is in numerous places not easy to recognize. With regard to the theme of speculation and reflection, one merely finds a global statement: namely, "Here and in the following pages, like those still later in the first edition, 'speculation' replaces 'reflection' and 'to speculate' replaces 'to reflect. '"3 But Schelling made use of several other formulations of his early concept of speculation which were neither evident from that edition nor from the further revisions which he undertook - revisions which were not, at least
145 ff. ; Kroner: Von Kant bis Hegel, 2nd edition, Tu? bingen, 1961, Bd. 2, 111, 124, 142; especially, Braun: Differenzen in Hegel-Studien, 4 (1967), 291ff. , 299.
3 II, 13 ftn. Here and in the following, we display the Roman and Arabic numbers as volume and page respectively.
? 150 Appendix
in part, indicated. The aforementioned modifications are understood most precisely and judged most accurately only when one surveys the second edition alterations alongside the original - paying close attention, of course, to the theme of speculation and reflection. We have also listed here a text within which Schelling most likely adopted, within this systematic context, one of Hegel's quotations from the Timaios. 4
Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. 1. Aufl. Leipzig 1797.
Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. Als Einleitung in das Studium dieser W issenschaft. 2. Aufl. Landshut 1803.
XII. In this connection two objects have been kept in view, first to set forth for the friends of philosophy, in the supplement to the Introduction and scattered intermittently elsewhere, the position reached through progressive development of the Philosophy of Nature in its relation to speculation in general . . . (7). 5
XVI. The greatest philosophers we always the first to return to it, and Socrates (as Plato relates), after he stood throughout the night sunk in contemplation [Spekulation], prayed in the early morning to the rising sun (10).
XVII. With that separation, reflection first begins . . . (10).
5: With that separation, speculation first begins . . .
XVIII. Mere speculation, therefore, is a spiritual sickness of mankind, and moreover the most dangerous of all, which kills the germ of man's existence and uproots his being. It is a tribulation, which, where it has once become dominant, cannot be dispelled - not by the stimulation of Nature (for what can that do to a dead soul? ), nor by the bustle of life.
4 The publisher of the fourth volume of the new Hegel-edition had already hinted at the Hegelian influence on the changes to Schelling's second edition in their editorial comments and, indeed, with regard to the conceptual pair: reflection and speculation. They see in this a proof that not only did Hegel learn and adopt a great deal from Schelling, but also Schelling from Hegel.
5 Translations of the following passages in Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature are provided by Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 1988.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 151
Scandit aeratas vitiosa naves
Cura nec turmas equitum relinquit.
Every weapon is justifiable against a philosophy which makes speculation no a means but an end. For it torments human reason with chimeras . . .
6: Mere reflection, therefore, is a spiritual sickness in mankind, the more so where it imposes itself in domination over the whole man, and kills at the root what in germ is his highest being, his spiritual life, which issues only from Identity. It is an evil which accompanies man into life itself, and distorts all his intuition even for the more familiar objects of consideration. But its preoccupation with dissection does not extend only to the phenomenal world; so far as it separates the spiritual principle from this, it fills the intellectual world with chimeras . . . (11).
XVIII: In contrast to this stands the true philosophy, which regards speculation as such merely as a means.
7: In contrast to this stands the true philosophy, which regards reflection as such merely as a means (11).
XVIII: Therefore it assigns to speculation only negative value.
7: Therefore it assigns to reflection only negative value (11).
XIX. The philosopher who spends his life, or part of it, pursuing speculative philosophy into its bottomless abysses, in order there to dig out its deepest foundation, brings to humanity an offering which, because it is the sacrifice of the noblest that he has, may perhaps be respected as much as most others. It is fortunate enough if he brings philosophy to the point at which even the ultimate necessity for it as a special science, and therewith his own name, vanishes forever from the memory of mankind.
7: The philosopher who might employ his life, or a part of it, in pursuing the philosophy of reflection in its endless dichotomizing, in order to eliminate it in its ultimate ramifications, would earn for himself the most worthy place by this service, which, although it remains negative, may be respected equally with the highest, even if he were not himself to have the satisfaction of seeing philosophy in its absolute form resurrect itself self- consciously out of the dismembering activities of reflection (11-12).
152 Appendix
LV. Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the philosophy of mere speculation, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us more intelligibly the less we think of her in a merely speculative way.
52: Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the philosophy of mere reflection, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us more intelligibly the less we think of her in a merely reflective way (1988: 35).
83: From the side of the speculative cognition of nature as such, or considered as a speculative physics, there is nothing comparable to the philosophy of nature. . .
86: Fichte's philosophy was the first to restore validity to the universal form of subject-objectivity, as the one and all of philosophy; but the more it developed, the more it seemed to restrict that very identity, again as a special feature, to the subjective consciousness; yet as absolute and in itself, to make it the object of an endless task, an absolute demand, and in this way after extracting all substance from speculation, to abandon it as just empty froth, which proceeding, on the other hand, like the Kantian theory, to reconnect absoluteness with the deepest subjectivity, through action and faith (1988: 54).
86 Note: It is not even necessary to invoke the Bestimmung des Menschen, the Sonnenklaren Berichte, etc. , on behalf of this total rejection of all speculation from pure knowing and the integration of the latter in its vacuity through faith (1988: 54).
97: We posit, however, a third mass (similar, again, to the first two), but what follows?
Let us suppose that the combined powers of attraction and repulsion were directed against those which originally empowered A and B, the power of each exercising its influence in tandem on the remaining two, handicapping the other in such a way that the remaining two draw their original power from the third.
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 153
247f. . . . but if we posit a third mass (similar, again, to the first two), this will be the purest, the fairest and the most fundamental relationship.
For two equal masses cannot, as such, be external to one another, and therefore different, without again being one and internal to each other in the third, and this without being added together therein, or the one augmenting the other; for otherwise they would again be merely in this third, and not externally to one another, but in such a way that the two would be one among themselves, and with the third, and each of the first two would be simultaneously all for the third and one side of it. For, as Plato says in the Timeaus, two things cannot, in general, exist without a third, and the fairest bond is that which best unites itself and the bonded into one, so that the first is related to the second as the latter is to the one between.
108: But because, in speculation, it is possible to conceive of attractive and repulsive forces as distinct from matter, people suppose (through a deception by no means uncommon) that what can be separated in thought is also separate in fact.
266: But because, in reflection, it is possible to conceive of attractive and repulsive forces as distinct from matter, people suppose (through a deception by no means uncommon) that what can be separated in thought is also separate in fact (1988: 154).
108: The same illusion of speculation which led people astray about these principles, extends its influence over all the sciences.
267: The same illusion of reflection which led people astray about these principles, extends its influence over all the sciences (1988: 154).
109: Even when Newton found himself faced with the alternatives, of regarding the universal force of attraction either as an occult quality, which he did not want and could not do, or as merely seeming, i. e. , as the effect of an alien cause, he never, so it seems, himself worked out the speculative reason which drove him back and forth uncertainly between two contradictory claims.
268: Our age, which not only discovers itself, but also investigates the possibility of the earlier inventions, has has found out this error of reflection, which runs through all sciences (1988: 155).
154 Appendix
109: Our age, which not only discovers itself, but also investigates the possibility of the earlier inventions, has has found out this error of speculation, which runs through all sciences.
110: Philosophy itself, in the meantime, however much its principles agree with what is generally known to and assumed by common sense, has still not succeeded, as yet, in getting rid of that obscure scholasticism which, ignorant in regard to all the demands which experience and the empirical sciences make upon philosophy, continues even now to indulge its speculative illusions, and, priding itself upon a supposed knowledge of the real, to look down with distain upon all attempts to confine our knowledge solely to the world of experience. People have not seen that things are not distinct from their effects, and are preoccupied even now with fancies about things that are supposed to be present externally to things themselves. Because speculation is able to separate what in itself is never separated, because the fancy can divide the object from its property, the actual from its action, and thereby keep a hold upon them, the supposition is that these real objects without properties, things without action, can also exist outside the fancy - regardless of the fact that, apart from speculation, every object is present for us only through its properties, everything through its action alone.
268f. Philosophy itself, in the meantime, however much its principles agree with what is generally known to and assumed by common sense, has still not succeeded, as yet, in getting rid of that obscure scholasticism, which carries over to sensory things what is valid only in an absolute sphere, that of reason; which degrades Ideas into physical causes; and which, while in actuality not advancing a step beyond the world of experience, still prides itself on a real acquaintance with things supersensible. People have not yet seen, for the most part, that the ideality of things is also the only reality, and are preoccupied with fancies about things external to sensory objects, which still retain their properties about them, nonetheless. Because reflection is able to separate what in itself is never separated, because the fancy can divide the object from its property, the actual from its action, and thereby keep a hold upon them, the supposition is that these real objects without properties, things without action, can also exist outside the fancy - regardless of the fact that, apart from reflection, every object is present for us only through its properties, every thing through its action alone (1988: 155-6).
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 155
275: So the concept of these two forces, as Kant defines it, is a purely formal concept engendered by reflection (1988: 158).
278: For knowledge of these exhalted relationships, the understanding is thus wholly dead - they are evident only to reason (1988: 160).
125: The mechanical physics is a purely speculative system.
292: The mechanical physics is a purely ratiocinatory system (1988: 167).
127: The whole system [of le Sage] proceeds from speculative concepts, which cannot be represented in any intuition.
295: The whole system [of le Sage] proceeds from abstract concepts, which cannot be represented in any intuition (1988: 169).
318: The two first dimensions in physical things are related as quantity and quality; the first is their determination for reflection or the concept, the other for judgment (1988: 181).
142: The basic forces of matter are thus nothing else but the expression of those original activities for the understanding; and thus it will be easy for us to specify them with perfect completeness.
322: The basic forces of matter are thus nothing else but the expression of those original activities for the understanding, for reflection; not the true in-itself, which exists only in intuition; and thus it will be easy for us to specify them with perfect completeness (1988: 183).
149: But the object is never without its limit, or matter without its form. The two may be separated in speculation; to think of them divided in reality is absurd.
331: But the object is never without its limit, or matter without its form. The two may be separated in reflection; to think of them divided in reality is absurd (1988: 187).
156: Speculation alone is able to separate what reality always unites.
343: Reflection alone is able to separate what reality always unites (1988: 193).
156 Appendix
From the comparison of these passages (i. e. , the original and the revised edition of the Ideen), it is evident that in most cases Schelling merely replaced the earlier concept of speculation with that of reflection. Speculation meant, in the first edition, a separation of that which is originally united in nature and reality. This concept of speculation has consequences for both the scientific character of the Naturphilosophie and the life of the self-conscious Ich in the world. According to Schelling, then, it is by means of speculatively constructed propositions alone that the fundamental forces of matter, which are essentially united in nature, came to be understood as something divided. Speculation is incapable, therefore, of comprehending the real in its origin; it remains a mere formula, thought abstracted from reality;6 this thought, through which the propositions of Naturphilosophie are determined, is grounded in a relationship to the world characterized by speculation. The first act of speculation and, subsequently, the beginning of philosophy consists in the separation of self-consciousness from the world. This division was proceeded by an early stage in history in which humanity lived in an original unity of nature and itself. The self, which through its freedom has become conscious of itself, is able to produce a reciprocating interaction and, subsequently, a renewed unity with the world. 7 From this starting point, Schelling is able to characterize "mere speculation" - when it gains control over an individual - by diagnosing it as a "mental illness" which disturbs the unity of individual with the world and, at the same time, undermine the necessary foundation of their existence. 8 This anthropological-historical notion of the elementary unity of the individual with the world, which once constituted their whole reality and always remains the unconscious foundation of their existence, is reinterpreted in the second edition as an ideal derivation of their loftier being and the spiritual life intrinsic to absolute identity.
6 See, e. g. , 149/331 (II, 234); 156/343 (II, 242). The number just prior to the slash means here and in the following the page number in the first edition, while that behind the slash refers to the second edition; in passages which are found only in the second edition, we designated by placing a (2) ahead of the page reference. The additional roman and arabic numbers in parethases refer to their position within the Werken (see ftn. 3 above).
7 Schiller's distinction between the state of nature and the state of culture, and their mutual development into a higher unity may well, above all else, stand in the background here.
8 XVIII/6 (II, 13ff. ). See XVII/5 (II,13); also see I, 341.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 157
In contrast to this "mental illness" of merely divided and abstracted thought, which is called "speculation" in the first edition, Schelling now sees "health" as a "balance of powers" - as a reciprocity and unity in the world similar to that which is also possible in the self-conscious Ich. 9 Indeed, this philosophy presupposes the opposition of the self to the world and, therefore, requires speculation; but there is another philosophy within which speculation is employed merely as a means, which Schelling calls "healthy philosophy" - i. e. , a philosophy aimed at reproducing or reestablishing the unity and wholeness of humanity. Perhaps Schelling substitutes "true philosophy"10 for "healthy philosophy" in the second edition in order to avoid any allusion to the healthy and common human understanding with which Hegel and he now opposed so fiercely in the Kritischen Journal. 11
Scientific and philosophic knowledge presupposed, therefore, a division between the self and the world. [Since it tends to think that what is separable in speculation is also separable in actuality, speculation - designated here as dependent on the capacity to separate and abstract - must constantly ward off appearance and illusion. ] Schelling displays this paradigmatically in his discussion of the fundamental powers of matter. Speculation can only grasp matter in divided determinations, namely, in the powers of attraction and repulsion; the "speculative illusion" consists in viewing these separated determinations as also separated in the thing. 12 But it would then follow that one must assume that matter, which one must think of as unified, is different from and independent of these two powers/forces. In this way, the powers of attraction and repulsion were not at all the conditions for the possibility of matter. Employing Kantian terminology, Schelling here characterizes the confusion between the
9 XVIII/6 (II, 13).
10 XVIII/7 (II, 14). See also LV/52 (II, 47); 110/268 (II, 194). In similar contexts, Schelling also often allows the attribute "healthy" to stand, e. g. 125/292 (II, 209); 172/371 (II, 260).
11 See also Hegel's Differenz essay: Gesammelte Werke. Bd 4, 20-3. With regard to the (hier vor allem zugrunde gelegten) interpretation of Schelling's "Introduction" in the Ideen, see Wieland: Die Anfaenge der Philosophie Schellings und die Frage nach der Natur in Natur und Geschichte, K. Loewith (on his 70th Birthday), Stuttgart 1967, 420-426.
12 See 108ff. /266ff. (II, 192 ff. ) At LV/52 (II, 47), the aforementioned "appearance" had another meaning.
? 158 Appendix
conditions of thought and speculation with the conditions of being itself - a confusion based on a "speculative deception" - as "dogmatism. "13
Exposing this speculative deception proves that speculation, when it is viewed as alone sufficient for the recognition of reality, plainly fails to capture reality. In reference to its understanding of actuality, speculation is more dependent on another act of the human spirit in which thought first actually professes something real, viz. , intuition. For Schelling, intuition is a more original and more highly intellectual capacity than speculation; and since its highest potency is expressed in the production of the genius, it is more than that (something which Schelling does not discuss in the Ideen). Intuition holds a higher position of priority in the Naturphilosophie as well; in the Naturphilosophie, the real is given through intuition alone and the fundamental determination of matter in its original unity is reserved for intuition itself. The understanding merely brings the pre-conscious products of intuition to a state of consciousness in which it separates and, then, isolates those determinations. 14 This "idealist" foundation of matter15 and its fundamental determinations in the productive intuition of the Ich was - for the early Schelling - an initial vindication of the objective reality of nature and, thereby, an answer to the skeptical denial [of every form of cognitive reality. 16] Therefore, speculation - characterized here as abstracted and separated thought, i. e. as understanding - is dependent on the productive activity of intuition; Schelling emphasized this dependence much more clearly in several of the revised passages in the second edition. 17
Although the notion of speculation is - in most contexts - characterized as it was in the first edition of the Ideen, it is replaced in the second edition by the term reflection. Prior to his encounter with Hegel in Jena, Schelling
13 111/270 (II, 195). With regard to the concept of a speculative appearance, Schelling was inspired by Kant - although uses it in a completely different context. Schelling way of arguing corresponds earliest to that of the "Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe" (see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 319ff. ). With regard to Schelling's critique of Newton's "Scheinbrauch" of principles of attraction and repulsion in particulars, also see Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgruend der Naturwissenschaft in Bd 4 of Kant's gesammelten Schriften (Akademieausg. ), 514 f. .
14 See 131f/301ff. (II, 215f); 138ff/311ff (II, 221ff. ). Also see 127/295 (II, 211); I, 355; I,359 f u. a.
15 See (2)339, (II, 239).
16 See also 131 ftn. /302 ftn. (II, 215 ftn.
Goethezeit. Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main), 85-113.
Pinkard, Terry. 2000. Hegel: A Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Parry, Milman. 1971. The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected
Papers of Milman Parry, ed. Adam Parry (Oxford).
Mitscherling. 1977.
Reinhold, Karl Leonard. 1791. Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen
Wissens.
--. 1792. Briefe u? ber die Kantische Philosophie, Zweyter Band.
--. 1794. Beytra? ge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missversta? ndnisse der
Philosophen, Zweyter Band.
Rosen, Michael. 1974. G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of
Wisdom (New Haven and London: Yale University Press)
--. 1982. Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism (Cambridge University
Press).
Schelling, F. W. J. 1797. Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature. Trans. by Errol
Harris and Peter Heath. Cambridge University Press. 1988.
--. 1800a. System des transcendentalen Idealismus, Sa? mmtliche Werke. Vol. 4. Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1858. System of Transcendental Idealism, P. Heath (tr. ) , M. Vater (ed. ). Charlotteville: University of
Virginia Press. 1978.
--. 1800b. "Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy, or Main
Propositions of the Philosophy of Art according to the Principles of Transcendental Idealism," trans. by Albert Hofstadter, in Philosophy of German Idealism (New York: Continuum Publishing Company).
--. 1802. Schelling (and Hegel). "On the Relationship of the Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy in General" in Between Kant and Hegel, 311- 362. Trans. by H. S. Harris. Albany: State University of New York, 1985.
--. 1803. Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature are provided by Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 1988.
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 145
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1799. On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Trans. and ed. by Richard Crouter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1800. "Review of Fichte's Bestimmung des Menschen. " Athaeneum, 3. 2, 283-97.
--. 1860. Aus Schleiermacher's Leben. In Briefen, I-IV. Ed. by Ludwig Jonas and Wilhelm Dilthey. 4 vols. Berlin: G. Reimer.
Schneider, Robert. 1938. Schellings und Hegels schwa? bische geistesahnen. Wu? rzburg-Aumu? hle: K. Triltsch.
Schulze, G. E. 1792. Aenesidemus, as translated in di Giovanni & Harris in Between Kant and Hegel, SUNY Press, 1985.
Seidel, G. 1998. "Fichte and German Idealism: The Heideggerian Reading," Idealistic Studies, 28 (1998) 63-69
Smith, John H. 1988. The Spirit and its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of Bildung. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
--. 1937. Grundprinzipen Hegel und Schleiermacher. Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt Verlag.
Snow, Dale Evarts. 1987. "F. H. Jacobi and the Development of German Idealism. " Journal of the History of Philosophy 23/3: 397-415.
Stoeffler, F. Ernest. 1973. German Pietism During the Eighteenth Century. Studies in the History of Religion 24, Leiden: Brill Press.
Vater, Michael. 1978. "Introduction," F. W. J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, tr. P. Heath. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia), xi-xxxvi.
Wisenman. 1786. An den Herr Professor Kant von den Resultate Williamson, Raymond Keith. 1984. Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of
Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).
Wo? lfflin, Heinrich. 1929. Principles of Art History: The Problem of
Development of Style in Later Art (New York: Dover Publications). Zirngiebl, E. 1867. F. H. Jacobis Leben, Dichten und Denken. Vienna:
Braumuller.
APPENDIX
SPECULATION AND REFLECTION: SCHELLING AND HEGEL'S COLLABORATIVE ENTERPRISE IN JENA
Translator's Preface
The problem of how the philosophy of Hegel is systematically and historically related to that of Schelling, i. e. the so-called "Schelling problem," as Pippen calls it in Hegel's Idealism, has been a "confusing and much debated issue. " According to Heine's Die romantische Schule (1835), the elder Schelling was convinced that Hegel stole all his ideas. But even if Schelling's characterization of Hegel as a concept-monger is wildly exaggerated, it is indisputable that Hegel entered the philosophical frenzy at Jena as a partial supporter and perceived disciple of Schelling's system. Nonetheless, even the earliest collaborative efforts during the Jenaer Zeit are - as Harris puts it - "so nearly explicit [in their critique of the Schellingean system] that one wonders how any of Hegel's readers, let alone Schelling himself, could have regarded him a mere disciple. " Indeed, Harris seems to credit Du? sing with having established what might be considered the moderate thesis of the following article when he claims that "careful study of Schelling's writings in this period does show that he learned some things from Hegel. " Indeed, current consensus tends not only to vindicate Hegel of conceptual thievery, it also credits Hegel with a more durable speculative edifice built from materials which Schelling considered unworthy of the philosophical enterprise (namely, common consciousness or reflection). This current consensus is in no small part due to the article translated below, originally published in Hegel-Studien, entitled "Spekulation und Reflexion: Zur Zusammenarbeit Schellings und Hegel in Jena. " Professor Du? sing's 1969 article not only documents the most salient points of systematic disagreement between the Schelling and Hegel's respective systems, whether before or during and after the Jena collaboration, it also sheds light on the problematic that gave rise to the distinctively Hegelian version of dialectic. Although the central theses of
148 Appendix
the following argument were thickened substantially in several of Du? sing's subsequent works (e. g. , "Tranzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation: Der Streit um die Gestalt einer Ersten Philosophie"), the decisive premises of the argument are essentially all here. Whether one agrees with the conclusions that Professor Du? sing draws toward the end of this essay, his sensitive if not also now iconic analysis of the "Schelling problem" is too important to remain untranslated. When possible, in those places where Du? sing cites passages from Schelling's Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, I have used Harris and Heath's excellent translation (1988). And while I concede that this translation is by no means perfect, and that it errs on the side of the literal, I trust that it does provide a serviceable translation of an important if not seminal essay within the secondary literature on Hegel in English.
The Identita? tsphilosophie and, within the scope of this systematic approach, the novel concept of nature occupy a place of central importance in Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise in Jena (1801-03). The design of the Naturphilosophie can be traced back, obviously, at least in general, to Schelling. This has been assumed to be the case, by and large, with the formulation of the Identita? tssystem as well. It would appear that at this stage of his thought Hegel essentially adopted, reorganized, and - above all else - presented systematically the philosophical suggestions made by Schelling. 1 And while an adoption and adaptation of this sort might possibly account for the realm of Naturphilosophie, though certainly not without essential modifications, such a relationship between Schelling and Hegel with regard to the design of the Identita? tsphilosophie is dubious.
It has already been suggested in various ways, or at least hinted at, in the literature that Hegel's critique of Fichte in the Differenz essay was the last nudge or even the decisive ground for Schelling's disassociation from Fichte. 2 Hegel's critique of Fichte, however, presupposes a systematic
1 See, e. g. , Zeltner: Schelling, Stuttgart, 1954, 53 and 46; Fuhrmans: Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter, Duesseldorf, 1954, 43, 165; also see Dilthey (Gesammelte Werke, Bd 4. Hrsg. v. H. Nohl. 198 ff. , 206 ff. ), which is nonetheless a restrained expression. Perhaps Schelling's later critique of Hegel also contributed to this perception of Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise.
2 See, possibly, Michelet: Einleitung in Hegel's philosophische Abhandlungen in Hegel's Werke. Bd 1. Berlin 1832; Haym: Hegel und seine Zeit, Berlin, 1832, VI,
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 149
position developed - at least in its essential features - on his own, i. e. separate from Schelling. It should be shown in what follows how Schelling took up and reinterpreted Hegel's systematic suggestions regarding the conceptual pair: speculation and reflection. This conceptual pair proves to be meaningful for Schelling's own development of a system of absolute identity as well as for his critique of the contemporary philosophy, in particular the philosophy of Fichte; and it is of particular importance to Schelling's revision of the concept of speculation in this phase of his thought.
The transformation of the concept of speculation in Schelling prior to and after his encounter with Hegel in Jena is displayed most clearly by comparing the two editions of Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797 and 1803); one such comparison will be provided below in Section I. These changes alone, however, do not sufficiently prove Schelling's adoption of the Hegelian concept of speculation and, its correlate, reflection. Already in the early formulations of the Identita? tssystem, from his Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801) forward, Schelling spoke of speculation in a manner very similar to that of Hegel. As such, it is particularly important to distinguish in detail what was borrowed and modified in order to characterize properly the meaning of this concept for Schelling's system and critique. This discussion of the relationship between speculation and reflection will ultimately lead to the problem of dialectic; this theme is developed in the Section II below.
I.
In the K. F. A. Schelling edition of Schelling's Werke, the differences between the two editions of the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur is in numerous places not easy to recognize. With regard to the theme of speculation and reflection, one merely finds a global statement: namely, "Here and in the following pages, like those still later in the first edition, 'speculation' replaces 'reflection' and 'to speculate' replaces 'to reflect. '"3 But Schelling made use of several other formulations of his early concept of speculation which were neither evident from that edition nor from the further revisions which he undertook - revisions which were not, at least
145 ff. ; Kroner: Von Kant bis Hegel, 2nd edition, Tu? bingen, 1961, Bd. 2, 111, 124, 142; especially, Braun: Differenzen in Hegel-Studien, 4 (1967), 291ff. , 299.
3 II, 13 ftn. Here and in the following, we display the Roman and Arabic numbers as volume and page respectively.
? 150 Appendix
in part, indicated. The aforementioned modifications are understood most precisely and judged most accurately only when one surveys the second edition alterations alongside the original - paying close attention, of course, to the theme of speculation and reflection. We have also listed here a text within which Schelling most likely adopted, within this systematic context, one of Hegel's quotations from the Timaios. 4
Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. 1. Aufl. Leipzig 1797.
Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. Als Einleitung in das Studium dieser W issenschaft. 2. Aufl. Landshut 1803.
XII. In this connection two objects have been kept in view, first to set forth for the friends of philosophy, in the supplement to the Introduction and scattered intermittently elsewhere, the position reached through progressive development of the Philosophy of Nature in its relation to speculation in general . . . (7). 5
XVI. The greatest philosophers we always the first to return to it, and Socrates (as Plato relates), after he stood throughout the night sunk in contemplation [Spekulation], prayed in the early morning to the rising sun (10).
XVII. With that separation, reflection first begins . . . (10).
5: With that separation, speculation first begins . . .
XVIII. Mere speculation, therefore, is a spiritual sickness of mankind, and moreover the most dangerous of all, which kills the germ of man's existence and uproots his being. It is a tribulation, which, where it has once become dominant, cannot be dispelled - not by the stimulation of Nature (for what can that do to a dead soul? ), nor by the bustle of life.
4 The publisher of the fourth volume of the new Hegel-edition had already hinted at the Hegelian influence on the changes to Schelling's second edition in their editorial comments and, indeed, with regard to the conceptual pair: reflection and speculation. They see in this a proof that not only did Hegel learn and adopt a great deal from Schelling, but also Schelling from Hegel.
5 Translations of the following passages in Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature are provided by Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 1988.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 151
Scandit aeratas vitiosa naves
Cura nec turmas equitum relinquit.
Every weapon is justifiable against a philosophy which makes speculation no a means but an end. For it torments human reason with chimeras . . .
6: Mere reflection, therefore, is a spiritual sickness in mankind, the more so where it imposes itself in domination over the whole man, and kills at the root what in germ is his highest being, his spiritual life, which issues only from Identity. It is an evil which accompanies man into life itself, and distorts all his intuition even for the more familiar objects of consideration. But its preoccupation with dissection does not extend only to the phenomenal world; so far as it separates the spiritual principle from this, it fills the intellectual world with chimeras . . . (11).
XVIII: In contrast to this stands the true philosophy, which regards speculation as such merely as a means.
7: In contrast to this stands the true philosophy, which regards reflection as such merely as a means (11).
XVIII: Therefore it assigns to speculation only negative value.
7: Therefore it assigns to reflection only negative value (11).
XIX. The philosopher who spends his life, or part of it, pursuing speculative philosophy into its bottomless abysses, in order there to dig out its deepest foundation, brings to humanity an offering which, because it is the sacrifice of the noblest that he has, may perhaps be respected as much as most others. It is fortunate enough if he brings philosophy to the point at which even the ultimate necessity for it as a special science, and therewith his own name, vanishes forever from the memory of mankind.
7: The philosopher who might employ his life, or a part of it, in pursuing the philosophy of reflection in its endless dichotomizing, in order to eliminate it in its ultimate ramifications, would earn for himself the most worthy place by this service, which, although it remains negative, may be respected equally with the highest, even if he were not himself to have the satisfaction of seeing philosophy in its absolute form resurrect itself self- consciously out of the dismembering activities of reflection (11-12).
152 Appendix
LV. Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the philosophy of mere speculation, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us more intelligibly the less we think of her in a merely speculative way.
52: Hence the peculiar aura which surrounds this problem, an aura which the philosophy of mere reflection, which sets out only to separate, can never develop, whereas the pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us more intelligibly the less we think of her in a merely reflective way (1988: 35).
83: From the side of the speculative cognition of nature as such, or considered as a speculative physics, there is nothing comparable to the philosophy of nature. . .
86: Fichte's philosophy was the first to restore validity to the universal form of subject-objectivity, as the one and all of philosophy; but the more it developed, the more it seemed to restrict that very identity, again as a special feature, to the subjective consciousness; yet as absolute and in itself, to make it the object of an endless task, an absolute demand, and in this way after extracting all substance from speculation, to abandon it as just empty froth, which proceeding, on the other hand, like the Kantian theory, to reconnect absoluteness with the deepest subjectivity, through action and faith (1988: 54).
86 Note: It is not even necessary to invoke the Bestimmung des Menschen, the Sonnenklaren Berichte, etc. , on behalf of this total rejection of all speculation from pure knowing and the integration of the latter in its vacuity through faith (1988: 54).
97: We posit, however, a third mass (similar, again, to the first two), but what follows?
Let us suppose that the combined powers of attraction and repulsion were directed against those which originally empowered A and B, the power of each exercising its influence in tandem on the remaining two, handicapping the other in such a way that the remaining two draw their original power from the third.
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 153
247f. . . . but if we posit a third mass (similar, again, to the first two), this will be the purest, the fairest and the most fundamental relationship.
For two equal masses cannot, as such, be external to one another, and therefore different, without again being one and internal to each other in the third, and this without being added together therein, or the one augmenting the other; for otherwise they would again be merely in this third, and not externally to one another, but in such a way that the two would be one among themselves, and with the third, and each of the first two would be simultaneously all for the third and one side of it. For, as Plato says in the Timeaus, two things cannot, in general, exist without a third, and the fairest bond is that which best unites itself and the bonded into one, so that the first is related to the second as the latter is to the one between.
108: But because, in speculation, it is possible to conceive of attractive and repulsive forces as distinct from matter, people suppose (through a deception by no means uncommon) that what can be separated in thought is also separate in fact.
266: But because, in reflection, it is possible to conceive of attractive and repulsive forces as distinct from matter, people suppose (through a deception by no means uncommon) that what can be separated in thought is also separate in fact (1988: 154).
108: The same illusion of speculation which led people astray about these principles, extends its influence over all the sciences.
267: The same illusion of reflection which led people astray about these principles, extends its influence over all the sciences (1988: 154).
109: Even when Newton found himself faced with the alternatives, of regarding the universal force of attraction either as an occult quality, which he did not want and could not do, or as merely seeming, i. e. , as the effect of an alien cause, he never, so it seems, himself worked out the speculative reason which drove him back and forth uncertainly between two contradictory claims.
268: Our age, which not only discovers itself, but also investigates the possibility of the earlier inventions, has has found out this error of reflection, which runs through all sciences (1988: 155).
154 Appendix
109: Our age, which not only discovers itself, but also investigates the possibility of the earlier inventions, has has found out this error of speculation, which runs through all sciences.
110: Philosophy itself, in the meantime, however much its principles agree with what is generally known to and assumed by common sense, has still not succeeded, as yet, in getting rid of that obscure scholasticism which, ignorant in regard to all the demands which experience and the empirical sciences make upon philosophy, continues even now to indulge its speculative illusions, and, priding itself upon a supposed knowledge of the real, to look down with distain upon all attempts to confine our knowledge solely to the world of experience. People have not seen that things are not distinct from their effects, and are preoccupied even now with fancies about things that are supposed to be present externally to things themselves. Because speculation is able to separate what in itself is never separated, because the fancy can divide the object from its property, the actual from its action, and thereby keep a hold upon them, the supposition is that these real objects without properties, things without action, can also exist outside the fancy - regardless of the fact that, apart from speculation, every object is present for us only through its properties, everything through its action alone.
268f. Philosophy itself, in the meantime, however much its principles agree with what is generally known to and assumed by common sense, has still not succeeded, as yet, in getting rid of that obscure scholasticism, which carries over to sensory things what is valid only in an absolute sphere, that of reason; which degrades Ideas into physical causes; and which, while in actuality not advancing a step beyond the world of experience, still prides itself on a real acquaintance with things supersensible. People have not yet seen, for the most part, that the ideality of things is also the only reality, and are preoccupied with fancies about things external to sensory objects, which still retain their properties about them, nonetheless. Because reflection is able to separate what in itself is never separated, because the fancy can divide the object from its property, the actual from its action, and thereby keep a hold upon them, the supposition is that these real objects without properties, things without action, can also exist outside the fancy - regardless of the fact that, apart from reflection, every object is present for us only through its properties, every thing through its action alone (1988: 155-6).
Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 155
275: So the concept of these two forces, as Kant defines it, is a purely formal concept engendered by reflection (1988: 158).
278: For knowledge of these exhalted relationships, the understanding is thus wholly dead - they are evident only to reason (1988: 160).
125: The mechanical physics is a purely speculative system.
292: The mechanical physics is a purely ratiocinatory system (1988: 167).
127: The whole system [of le Sage] proceeds from speculative concepts, which cannot be represented in any intuition.
295: The whole system [of le Sage] proceeds from abstract concepts, which cannot be represented in any intuition (1988: 169).
318: The two first dimensions in physical things are related as quantity and quality; the first is their determination for reflection or the concept, the other for judgment (1988: 181).
142: The basic forces of matter are thus nothing else but the expression of those original activities for the understanding; and thus it will be easy for us to specify them with perfect completeness.
322: The basic forces of matter are thus nothing else but the expression of those original activities for the understanding, for reflection; not the true in-itself, which exists only in intuition; and thus it will be easy for us to specify them with perfect completeness (1988: 183).
149: But the object is never without its limit, or matter without its form. The two may be separated in speculation; to think of them divided in reality is absurd.
331: But the object is never without its limit, or matter without its form. The two may be separated in reflection; to think of them divided in reality is absurd (1988: 187).
156: Speculation alone is able to separate what reality always unites.
343: Reflection alone is able to separate what reality always unites (1988: 193).
156 Appendix
From the comparison of these passages (i. e. , the original and the revised edition of the Ideen), it is evident that in most cases Schelling merely replaced the earlier concept of speculation with that of reflection. Speculation meant, in the first edition, a separation of that which is originally united in nature and reality. This concept of speculation has consequences for both the scientific character of the Naturphilosophie and the life of the self-conscious Ich in the world. According to Schelling, then, it is by means of speculatively constructed propositions alone that the fundamental forces of matter, which are essentially united in nature, came to be understood as something divided. Speculation is incapable, therefore, of comprehending the real in its origin; it remains a mere formula, thought abstracted from reality;6 this thought, through which the propositions of Naturphilosophie are determined, is grounded in a relationship to the world characterized by speculation. The first act of speculation and, subsequently, the beginning of philosophy consists in the separation of self-consciousness from the world. This division was proceeded by an early stage in history in which humanity lived in an original unity of nature and itself. The self, which through its freedom has become conscious of itself, is able to produce a reciprocating interaction and, subsequently, a renewed unity with the world. 7 From this starting point, Schelling is able to characterize "mere speculation" - when it gains control over an individual - by diagnosing it as a "mental illness" which disturbs the unity of individual with the world and, at the same time, undermine the necessary foundation of their existence. 8 This anthropological-historical notion of the elementary unity of the individual with the world, which once constituted their whole reality and always remains the unconscious foundation of their existence, is reinterpreted in the second edition as an ideal derivation of their loftier being and the spiritual life intrinsic to absolute identity.
6 See, e. g. , 149/331 (II, 234); 156/343 (II, 242). The number just prior to the slash means here and in the following the page number in the first edition, while that behind the slash refers to the second edition; in passages which are found only in the second edition, we designated by placing a (2) ahead of the page reference. The additional roman and arabic numbers in parethases refer to their position within the Werken (see ftn. 3 above).
7 Schiller's distinction between the state of nature and the state of culture, and their mutual development into a higher unity may well, above all else, stand in the background here.
8 XVIII/6 (II, 13ff. ). See XVII/5 (II,13); also see I, 341.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 157
In contrast to this "mental illness" of merely divided and abstracted thought, which is called "speculation" in the first edition, Schelling now sees "health" as a "balance of powers" - as a reciprocity and unity in the world similar to that which is also possible in the self-conscious Ich. 9 Indeed, this philosophy presupposes the opposition of the self to the world and, therefore, requires speculation; but there is another philosophy within which speculation is employed merely as a means, which Schelling calls "healthy philosophy" - i. e. , a philosophy aimed at reproducing or reestablishing the unity and wholeness of humanity. Perhaps Schelling substitutes "true philosophy"10 for "healthy philosophy" in the second edition in order to avoid any allusion to the healthy and common human understanding with which Hegel and he now opposed so fiercely in the Kritischen Journal. 11
Scientific and philosophic knowledge presupposed, therefore, a division between the self and the world. [Since it tends to think that what is separable in speculation is also separable in actuality, speculation - designated here as dependent on the capacity to separate and abstract - must constantly ward off appearance and illusion. ] Schelling displays this paradigmatically in his discussion of the fundamental powers of matter. Speculation can only grasp matter in divided determinations, namely, in the powers of attraction and repulsion; the "speculative illusion" consists in viewing these separated determinations as also separated in the thing. 12 But it would then follow that one must assume that matter, which one must think of as unified, is different from and independent of these two powers/forces. In this way, the powers of attraction and repulsion were not at all the conditions for the possibility of matter. Employing Kantian terminology, Schelling here characterizes the confusion between the
9 XVIII/6 (II, 13).
10 XVIII/7 (II, 14). See also LV/52 (II, 47); 110/268 (II, 194). In similar contexts, Schelling also often allows the attribute "healthy" to stand, e. g. 125/292 (II, 209); 172/371 (II, 260).
11 See also Hegel's Differenz essay: Gesammelte Werke. Bd 4, 20-3. With regard to the (hier vor allem zugrunde gelegten) interpretation of Schelling's "Introduction" in the Ideen, see Wieland: Die Anfaenge der Philosophie Schellings und die Frage nach der Natur in Natur und Geschichte, K. Loewith (on his 70th Birthday), Stuttgart 1967, 420-426.
12 See 108ff. /266ff. (II, 192 ff. ) At LV/52 (II, 47), the aforementioned "appearance" had another meaning.
? 158 Appendix
conditions of thought and speculation with the conditions of being itself - a confusion based on a "speculative deception" - as "dogmatism. "13
Exposing this speculative deception proves that speculation, when it is viewed as alone sufficient for the recognition of reality, plainly fails to capture reality. In reference to its understanding of actuality, speculation is more dependent on another act of the human spirit in which thought first actually professes something real, viz. , intuition. For Schelling, intuition is a more original and more highly intellectual capacity than speculation; and since its highest potency is expressed in the production of the genius, it is more than that (something which Schelling does not discuss in the Ideen). Intuition holds a higher position of priority in the Naturphilosophie as well; in the Naturphilosophie, the real is given through intuition alone and the fundamental determination of matter in its original unity is reserved for intuition itself. The understanding merely brings the pre-conscious products of intuition to a state of consciousness in which it separates and, then, isolates those determinations. 14 This "idealist" foundation of matter15 and its fundamental determinations in the productive intuition of the Ich was - for the early Schelling - an initial vindication of the objective reality of nature and, thereby, an answer to the skeptical denial [of every form of cognitive reality. 16] Therefore, speculation - characterized here as abstracted and separated thought, i. e. as understanding - is dependent on the productive activity of intuition; Schelling emphasized this dependence much more clearly in several of the revised passages in the second edition. 17
Although the notion of speculation is - in most contexts - characterized as it was in the first edition of the Ideen, it is replaced in the second edition by the term reflection. Prior to his encounter with Hegel in Jena, Schelling
13 111/270 (II, 195). With regard to the concept of a speculative appearance, Schelling was inspired by Kant - although uses it in a completely different context. Schelling way of arguing corresponds earliest to that of the "Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe" (see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 319ff. ). With regard to Schelling's critique of Newton's "Scheinbrauch" of principles of attraction and repulsion in particulars, also see Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgruend der Naturwissenschaft in Bd 4 of Kant's gesammelten Schriften (Akademieausg. ), 514 f. .
14 See 131f/301ff. (II, 215f); 138ff/311ff (II, 221ff. ). Also see 127/295 (II, 211); I, 355; I,359 f u. a.
15 See (2)339, (II, 239).
16 See also 131 ftn. /302 ftn. (II, 215 ftn.
