In a new, more positive and
effective
sense, it was pro-
Indian.
Indian.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
Out of a total of 56 seats
in Madras, 10 were filled up by the Governor through nomination.
The general seats for Madras, Bombay, Bengal, U. P. , Bihar and
Assam were 35, 20, 10, 34, 9 and 10 respectively. The Muslims
were given 17 seats each in Bihar and U. P. In Bengal and Bihar,
27 and 12 seats were filled by the Legislative Assemblies of those
provinces. Some seats were reserved for Europeans and Indian
Christians. The Provincial Legislative Council was a permanent
body. The tenure of office of members was 9 years and one-third
of them were to retire after
every
3
years.
The age qualification for the membership of the Provincial Legis-
lative Assembly was fixed at 25 and for Legislative Council 30. No
person could become a member of both the Houses of the Legisla-
ture. Residence in the constituency for a certain number of days,
.
usually 180 or 120, was necessary for franchise. The voting quali-
fications varied from province to province. In the case of the
Punjab, the right of voting was given to those who paid an income
tax or a direct municipal tax amounting to not less than Rs. 50 per
year, those who paid land revenue amounting to not less than Rs. 5
per year, those who owned or occupied immovable property of the
rental value of Rs. 60 per year and those who possessed educational
qualifications up to the primary standard.
NATURE OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY
It is true that the provincial autonomy as introduced by the
Government of India Act, 1935, was a definite improvement on
the system set up by the Government of India Act, 1919, but it is
not correct to presume that provincial autonomy was intended to
establish a full-fledged responsible government in the provinces. If
that had been the intention, the authors of the Government of
India Act, 1935, would have chosen to use a different terminology.
The fact is that the British Government did not intend to give full
responsible Government in the provinces. This is clear from the
large number of discretionary powers given to the Governors. The
same intention becomes clear when we consider the nature and
extent of the special responsibilities of the Governors. If the Gov-
ernors were expected to play the role of the guardians of the British
interests and other vested interests in India, that was bound to affect
## p. 650 (#690) ############################################
650 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
adversely the position of the ministers. Lord Zetland who was the
Secretary of State for India in 1937, has rightly pointed out that
the British Parliament reserved to itself a potential measure of con-
trol in a certain limited and clearly defined sphere. While perform-
ing their special responsibilities, the Governors were responsible to
the British Parliament for acts of commission and omission. It was
pointed out by critics that provincial autonomy was merely a farce
and far from a living reality. It has also been characterised as
merely a sham.
General elections were held in the beginning of 1937 and in spite
of its criticism of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian
National Congress took part in those elections. Jawaharlal Nehru
was the President of the Congress at that time and he made a whirl-
wind tour of the country and carried the message of the Congress
to every nook and corner of the country. The people also respond-
ed to the national call and the result was that the Congress was
able to secure clear majority in 6 provinces, viz. , U. P. , Bihar, Orissa,
Bombay, Madras and C. P. Although the Congress was the largest
single party in the legislatures of Assam, Bengal and the North-
West Frontier Province, on the whole it was in a minority. The
Congress did not do well in the Punjab and Sind. The Unionist
Party in the Punjab was able to secure 106 seats out of a total of
175 and it was not under the thumb of the Muslim League. On
the whole, the Muslim League secured 51 seats out of a total of
485 seats reserved for the Muslims in British India. It was found
that the Muslim League was stronger in the Hindu majority pro-
vinces than in the Muslim majority provinces. The Liberals did
.
not fare well in the elections. The Justice Party was ousted from
power in the Madras Presidency. The Congress got 159 seats and
the Justice Party 21.
It is true that the Congress fought elections and won them but
there was a difference of opinion among the Congressmen with
regard to the future course of action to be adopted. One school
of thought led by Sardar Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and C. Raja-
gopalachariar was in favour of accepting office under the new con-
stitution with the object of strengthening the hands of the Congress
in its struggle for national freedom. The other school led by
Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose was not in favour of
accepting office as that was likely to lessen the zeal for its fight for
India's freedom. Mahatma Gandhi intervened and a compromise
was arrived at. The All India Congress Committee passed a resolu-
tion on 30 August 1937 authorising and allowing the “acceptance
of office in the provinces where Congress commands majority in
the legislature, provided that ministerships should not be accepted
## p. 651 (#691) ############################################
FORMATION OF CONGRESS MINISTRIES
651
unless the leader of the Congress party in the legislature is satisfied
and able to state publicly that the Governor will not use his special
powers of interference or set aside the advice of the ministers in
regard to their constitutional activities. "
The Governors were not prepared to act as constitutional heads
and hence refused to give the required assurance to the Congress
party in the Congress majority provinces. Interim ministries were
set up in the Congress majority provinces to carry on the work for
the time being. The minority ministries could not hope to last
long as they could not face the provincial legislative assemblies on
account of the majority being with the Congress. In the non-
Congress provinces, popular ministries began to function from 1
April, 1937. However, the deadlock in the Congress majority pro-
vinces did not last long. Lord Linlithgow, Governor General of
India, declared in a broadcast speech on 21 June 1937 that “There
is no foundation for any suggestion that a Governor is free or is
entitled or would have the power to interfere with the day to day
administration of a province outside the limited range of the res-
ponsibilities resting on him. These special responsibilities are res-
tricted in scope to the narrowest limits possible. Even so limited
as they are, the Governor will at all times be concerned to carry
his ministers with him, while in other spheres in the field of their
ministerial responsibility, it is mandatory on a Governor to be guid-
ed by the advice of his ministers, even though for whatever reasons
he may not be himself wholly satisfied that that advice is in the
circumstances necessarily and decisively the right advice. The
conciliatory speech of the Governor General was welcomed by the
Congress and consequently its Working Committee passed the fol-
lowing resolution at Wardha on 7 July 1937: “The Committee
feels, however, that the situation created as a result of the circum-
stances and events that have since occurred warrants the belief that
it will not be easy for the Governors to use their special powers.
The Committee has resolved that Congressmen be permitted to
accept office where they may be invited thereto, but it desires to
make it clear that the office has to be accepted and utilised for the
purpose of working it in accordance with the lines laid down in the
Congress Election Manifesto and to further in every way the Con-
gress policy of combating the new Act on the one hand and of
prosecuting the constructive programme on the other. ” The resolu-
tion was in fact a turning point in the history of the Congress. So
far it had always been in the opposition but now it decided to take
up the responsibilities of office.
It is said that when the Congress decided to form ministries, the
Muslim League offered to join them on certain terms and conditions
## p. 652 (#692) ############################################
652 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
>
but the Congress decided not to form coalition ministries. There
were many reasons for their decision. The Congress was going to
accept office to carry on the struggle for freedom and to pass con-
structive legislation. In the case of a coalition, there was every
possibility of conflict and friction between the Congress and the
Muslim League members. The Congress was bound to pass legis-
lation in the interests of the peasants and workers and those were
bound to be objected by the vested interests in the Muslim League.
There was always the danger of obstruction and delay. To quote
Jawaharlal Nehru, “There might even be intrigues with the Gov-
ernment over the heads of other ministers. A joint front against
British authority was essential. Any breach in it could be harmful
to our cause. There would have been no binding cement, no com-
mon loyalty, no united objective and individual ministers would
have looked and pulled in different directions. ”
The Congress was not opposed to cooperation from other parties
but it insisted that the Muslim group in the legislature must stop
functioning as a separate group and it must come under the con-
trol and discipline of the Congress High Command. The Muslim
League Parliamentary Board in U. P. should be dissolved and no
candidate should be put up by the Board at any subsequent election.
The Muslim League refused to accept those terms and there the
matter ended.
However, the refusal of the Congress to form coalition ministries
with the Muslim League led to very unfortunate results. Mr. M.
A. Jinnah described the Congress as "drunk with power. ” To quote
Mr. Jinnah, "On the very threshold of what little power and res-
ponsibility is given, the majority community has clearly shown that
Hindustan is for the Hindus. " Hardly the Congress had been in
cffice for a few months, Mr. Jinnah and his lieutenants began to
talk of the atrocities committed on the Muslims in the Congress
majority provinces. The Muslim League appointed an Enquiry
Committee to find out the grievances of the Muslims in Congress
provinces and the report was published towards the end of 1938
and is known as the Pirpur Report. It was declared in the Report
that parliamentary government was not workable in the country.
The Muslims were not given appointments according to their popu-
! ation and importance. “The flag, the anthem, the reverence paid
to Mr. Gandhi, the emphasis laid by the Mahatma himself on cow
protection, all these are evidence of a deliberate and far-reaching
attack on the civic and cultural rights of the Muslim community,
but its most insidio’s feature is the attempt to extend the use of
Hindi at the expense of Urdu. ” The Bihar Working Committee of
the provincial Muslim League also appointed an Enquiry Com-
## p. 653 (#693) ############################################
WORKING OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY
653
>
mittee and the report which it submitted is known as the Shareef
Report. In 1939, Fazl-ul-Huq issued a statement to the press
which was embodied later on in a pamphlet entitled “Muslim suffer-
ings under Congress rule. ” Dr. Rajendra Prasad who was the
President of the Congress at that time, challenged Mr. Jinnah to
put all the charges before the Chief Justice of the Federal Court
of India for decision but the offer was refused by Mr. Jinnah. The
view of Sir Harry Haig, Governor of U. P. , was that “In dealing with
communal issues, the ministers had clearly acted with impartiality
and a desire to do what was fair. ” The verdict of Coupland is that
the charges "were not very numerous, considering the vast areas
concerned. Many of them were relatively trivial in character and
similar incidents had been occurring from time to time for many
years past. ”
It must be conceded that the Governors played their part well.
Even Mahatma Gandhi admitted in 1939 that the Governors had
"played the game. ” They did not interfere in the day to day affairs
of the provincial administration and left the initiative in the hands
of the ministers. The latter also tried to remain within the bounds
of the Act and did not give any provocation to the Governors. Sir
Roger Lumbly observed: “The Governor must preserve the spirit
in which the constitution was conceived which was the spirit of self-
government. He must be equipped to discharge the special func-
tions laid on him, but without, as far as he can make it possible,
disturbing that spirit. He has his own contribution to make, if
he can, to the success of the Government and he must remain, im-
partial, a neutral in politics not a protagonist. ” In the case of
Bihar and U. P. , differences arose between the Governor and the
Congress ministries on the question of release of political prisoners.
The Governors refused to release them on the ground that peace
and tranquillity of India as a whole was likely to be disturbed there-
by. When the Governor-General consulted the other provinces,
they also opposed the release of the political prisoners in Bihar and
U. P. The result was that the Congress ministries in those two
provinces resigned and thus a deadlock was created. As the Gov-
ernment of India was not prepared to take the matter to extremes,
a via media was found out to suit both the parties. It was decided
to allow the release of the political prisoners but the same was to
be done by stages. It was declared that the cases of the individual
prisoners were to be examined on merits before their release. The
result was that the British Government was able to save its face and
the Congress ministries were able to release the political prisoners.
The Congress ministries in Bihar and U. P. resumed office under the
changed circumstances but this had a very salutary effect on the
## p. 654 (#694) ############################################
654 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
other Governors. Trouble arose in Orissa when a subordinate
bureaucratic official was appointed the Governor of that Province.
In the case of C. P. , the Governor used his discretionary powers and
dismissed the ministry.
The Governor of the Punjab played an important part in the
administration of the province. When he was consulted by the
Governor-General on the question of the release of political prison-
ers in Bihar and U. P. , he wrote back saying that peace and tran-
quillity of his province was likely to be disturbed if the political
prisoners were released. This was done by the Governor without
consulting the Chief Minister or the members of his Cabinet. Chief
Minister Sir Sikander Hayat Khan admitted in the Assembly that
he had not been consulted at all. There was no relaxation of the
police and secret service Raj in the Punjab and Bengal. In Bengal,
thousands of people were put behind the bars without any trial.
The Muslim League ministry was put in office by the Governor in
an arbitrary manner. The Chief Minister was asked by the Gover-
nor either to resign voluntarily or face dismissal. Dr. Shyama
Prasad Mukherjee rightly pointed out that the right place of the
Governor of Bengal was on the Muslim League benches. The
Governor of North-West Frontier Province kept the Muslim League
ministry in power by not summoning the legislature and also by
keeping the Congress members of the Assembly in jail. He refused
to give assent to the Bill passed by the legislature. Chief Minister
Allah Baksh of Sind was dismissed by the Governor on the ground
that he had given up his title of Khan Bahadur. This was done
in spite of the fact that he had the backing of the majority of the
legislature at the time of his dismissal.
In the Congress majority provinces, some healthy conventions
were set up. The ministers acted upon the principle of collective
responsibility. The Congress ministry in Assam set up the conven-
tion that the ministry should resign if a bill introduced by it was
rejected by the legislature. Except in the case of Orissa, the Con-
gress ministries included members of the minority communities.
The Governors continued to preside over the meetings of the provin-
cial ministries. That was not liked by the Congress ministries.
The result was that before going to the meetings to be presided
over by the Governors, the Congress ministries met separately and
arrived at their own conclusions. Then the same matter was put
before the Governor and if he insisted on interfering, he was threa-
tened with the resignation of the ministry. The Congress ministers
went to the meetings to be presided over by the Governor with their
resignations in their pockets. It was in this way that the possibility
## p. 655 (#695) ############################################
WORKING OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY
655
of the Governor influencing the decisions of the ministers was elimi-
pated in the Congress majority provinces.
As regards the part played by the services under provincial auto-
nomy, there were three kinds of civil servants in the country. Some
of them resigned on the eve of the introduction of provincial auto-
nomy as they felt that they could not work under the new set up.
To the second category belonged those civil servants who were pre-
pared to change themselves with the changed circumstances and
carry out the orders of the new ministers. To the third category
belonged those public servants who wanted to continue for the sake
of mischief. The Chief Secretary of U. P. issued a circular to the
Administrative Officers under him saying that no order was to be
executed by them unless the same was countersigned by one of the
Secretaries. Chief Minister G. B. Pant of U. P. protested and ask-
ed for an explanation from the Chief Secretary. He described the
act of the Chief Secretary as one of "insubordination or incompe-
tency. ” The result was that the circular was withdrawn and it had
a wholesome effect on other civil servants in the country.
As regards the beneficial effects of the working of provincial
autonomy, the Congress ministries were able to do a lot of construc-
tive work. A large number of laws dealing with prohibition, educa-
tion, agricultural indebtedness, cottage industries, rural develop-
ment, relations between tenants and landlords etc. were passed.
The Bombay ministry enacted a law by which the lands confiscated
by the British Government on political grounds were restored. The
ministry of Madras removed the statute of General Neil from its
prominent place in Madras. The political prisoners were released
in the Congress majority provinces. Jawaharlal Nehru described
the effect of the Congress ministries on the masses in these words:
“But the psychological change was enormous and the electric cur-
rent seemed to run through the countryside. The change was
noticeable more in the rural areas than in the cities, though in the
industrial centres the industrial workers reacted in the same way.
There was a sense of immense relief as of the lifting of a weight
which had been oppressing the people. There was a release of long
suppressed mass energy which was evident everywhere. The fear
of the police and secret service agent vanished for a while at least
and even the poorest peasant added to his feeling of self-respect and
self-reliance. For the first time, he felt that he counted and could
not be ignored. ”
Critics pointed out that the Congress ministries worked under
the direction and supervision of the Congress High Command and
that was not desirable so far as the working of parliamentary insti-
tutions was concerned. The Congress ministries were responsible
## p. 656 (#696) ############################################
656 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
not to the legislatures but to the members of the Working Com-
mittee of the Congress. However, it was pointed out by the Con-
gress that the unity of direction by the party machine was very
essential under the circumstances. The danger of mutual bicker-
ings was to be provided against.
Coupland points out that although the Congress ministries assum-
ed office with the two-fold object of working the Act and at the
same time combating the same, the latter aspect fell more and more
into the background. Unmindful of the restrictions put on them
by the Government of India Act, 1935, the Congress ministers
bothered themselves with what they could actually achieve with a
view to serve the people and thereby win over their confidence. The
ministers knew that the battle for India's freedom had still to be
fought and everything should be done by them while in office to
win over the confidence of the people. To quote Coupland, “The
Congress had almost become a constructive force in Indian politics.
For 20 years it had lived in the barren wilderness of opposition,
complaining, criticising, putting the blame for everything on Bri-
tain. Now it had shown that power of its great organisation and
the disciplined enthusiasm of its members could be put to a more
practical purpose. It was still anti-British but it was now more
that.
In a new, more positive and effective sense, it was pro-
Indian. ”
As regards the working of non-Congress ministries, they
were also able to do a lot of useful work. This is amply proved by
what was done in the Punjab.
DEFECTS IN THE ACT OF 1935
The Government of India Act, 1935, had many defects. The
Indians were not given control over the Government of their coun-
try. They could not change or amend their constitution. The
Whitehall framed the policy which was followed by the Govern-
ment of India. The Indians detested control from London. They
also detested the dyarchical form of Government at the centre. It
was rightly pointed out that the evils of dyarchy which were found
in the provinces were bound to be repeated at the centre also. The
inauguration of the All-India Federation depended upon the condi-
tion that a specified number of states joined the Federation. The
Act gave the Indian States the option to join or not to join the
Federation. The result was that the federal part of the Act could
not be enforced at all. The Indian states were given a privileged
position under the Act. The representation given to them both in
the Council of State and the Federal Assembly was
more than
what was due to them on the basis of their territory, population or
## p. 657 (#697) ############################################
DEFECTS IN THE ACT OF 1935
657
the contributions to be made by them to the revenues of the Federal
Government. While the members from British India were to be
elected by the people, Indian princes were allowed to nominate their
quota. It was well-known that the Indian princes were absolutely
under the control of the Political Department of the Government
of India and they did what they were directed to do by the Viceroy
who was incharge of the Political Department. They could not
dare to vote against their masters. It was rightly feared that the
nominees from the Indian states would be used by the British Gov-
ernment in India to serve their own interests and stop the progress
of the country. The system of indirect elections to the Federal
Assembly was resented. That was against the very spirit of demo-
cracy and also of the times. The control to be exercised by the
Secretary of State for India over the Indian Civil Service, the Indian
Police Service and other All-India Services was also resented. The
Indian army got the lion's share out of the Indian revenues but
the Indians were not given any control over the Defence part of
the budget as the same was kept as a reserved subject. The seats
in the Legislatures were to be filled on the basis of the Communal
Award and hence the constitution became communalism-ridden.
The Communal Award cut at the very roots of Indian nationalism
and solidarity and was rightly considered to be most dangerous. It
was feared that longer the period for which the Communal Award
worked, the greater will be the difficulty in keeping the unity of
the country. The powers of the Provincial Legislatures and the
Federal Legislature were very much restricted and did not give
enough of scope to the ministers concerned. The rulers of the
Indian states criticized the Federal scheme on the ground that it
did not give them any power or authority to leave the federation
after joining it once. The federation was given the power of coerc-
ing them. The representatives from British India were bound to
dominate the Federal Legislature and Federal executive and there-
by influence the Viceroy to take steps which might impair their
sovereignty. The discretionary powers of the Governors reduced
provincial autonomy to a farce. Those powers and responsibilities
"combine, crib and confine" the powers of the Provincial Legisla-
tures and executive. Some of those powers and responsibilities were
so vaguely defined that those could be interpreted to mean anything
according to the exigencies of the situation. The Governor was
made the sole judge to decide whether any particular matter fell
within the scope of its discretionary powers or not or affected any
of his special responsibilities. He could become a virtual dictator
cf the province within the letter of the law.
The Indian National Congress condemned the federal scheme on
## p. 658 (#698) ############################################
658 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
many grounds. The scheme did not envisage any real transfer of
power into the hands of the Indians. The Federal Legislature was
saddled with an element of conservatism in the form of the nomi-
nated representatives of the states. The constitutional advance-
ment of India was wholly at the mercy of the Indian states.
The view of Dr. A. B. Keith was that the Federal scheme was
not satisfactory. The units of which it was composed were too dis-
parate to be joined suitably together. On the British side, the
scheme was favoured in order to provide an element of pure conser-
vatism in order to combat any dangerous elements of democracy
contributed by British India. On the side of the rulers, their essen-
tial pre-occupation was with the effort to secure immunity from
pressure in regard to the improvement of internal administration
of their states. Particularly unsatisfactory was the effort made to
obtain a definition of paramountcy which would acknowledge the
right of the ruler to mis-govern his state as he was assured of British
support while putting down any resistance to his regime. The
federation was largely cooked by the desire to evade the issue of
extending responsible government to the Central Government of
British India. The withholding of Defence and External Affairs
from federal control rendered the alleged concession of responsibility
all but meaningless. Sir Shanmukham Chetty, at one time the
Speaker of the Central Assembiy under the Government of India
Act, 1919 and later on the Finance Minister in post-independence
India, made the following observation in this connection: "It is
indeed a far cry between the Government Act and the Dominion
Status. The principle of Dominion Status asserts that the Domi-
nion should have the right to the same measure of autonomy in
external affairs as in internal matters and that it is the duty of the
British Government to give effect to the doctrine accepted. But
India has neither control in the internal nor in the external affairs.
The internal administration shall be under the guidance of the
Governor-General and the Governors who are vested with tremen-
dous powers; the external affairs shall be under the guidance of
Parliament, the Crown and the Secretary of State. Indians shall
not be able to work out their own destiny. The safeguards, reser-
vations, special powers of the Governor-General and the Gover-
nors, the weakness of the Indian Legislatures, and the ministers in
the Federal and the Provincial Governments with no Central res-
ponsibility and weak provincial autonomy, the Communal Award,
the States' representation bought at the expense of British Indians,
the financial and other economic drawbacks, half measures of the
Indianisation of the Army with no control over the Defence-all
these things show that Indians shall not be having Dominion Status. "
## p. 659 (#699) ############################################
DEFECTS IN THE ACT OF 1935
659
The view of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya was: “The new
Act has been thrust upon us. It has a somewhat democratic ap-
pearance outwardly, but it is absolutely hollow from inside. " C.
Rajagopalachariar described the new constitution as worse than
dyarchy. Mr. M. A. Jinnah described the scheme of 1935 as
"thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable. ”
C. Y. Chintamani described the Government of India Act, 1935, as
the anti-India Act and the government as "against" India. Mr.
Fazl-ul-Huq, Chief Minister of Bengal, observed that under the
Government of India Act, 1935, there was to be neither Hindu Raj
nor Muslim Raj but British Raj.
The view of Jawaharlal Nehru was that the Government of India
Act, 1935 “provided for some kind of provincial autonomy and a
federal structure, but there were so many reservations and checks
that both political and economic powers continued to be concen-
trated in the hands of the British Government. Indeed, in some
ways it confirmed and enlarged the powers of an executive respon-
sible solely to that Government. The federal structure was so
envisaged as to make any real advance impossible and no loophole
was left for the representatives of the Indian people to interfere with
or modify the system of British-controlled administration. The Act
strengthened the alliance between the British Government and the
princes, landlords and other reactionary elements in India. .
The whole complicated structure of Government remained as it
was. ” (The Discovery of India, pp. 368-69).
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was opposed to the federal part of the Gov-
ernment of India Act, 1935. He was determined to fight the
Government of India Act "until we have that replaced by a Consti-
tution which, we think, is a right one. ” He expressed his attitude
in these words: "If I have to submit to it, I shall submit to it under
protest. I shall see what use I can make of it. The German na-
tion, when it was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, signed it.
If I have to deal with this Constitution as the Germans dealt with
the Versailles Treaty, I shall begin by tearing off as many pages
as the Government of India Act has, and we shall not rest content
until that Constitution is replaced by a Constitution which is ac-
ceptable to us. ” Mr. M. A. Jinnah got the following Resolution
passed from the Muslim League: “The All-India Muslim League
enters its emphatic protest against forcing the Constitution, as
embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, upon the people
of India, against their will and, in spite of the repeated disapproval
and dissent expressed by various parties and bodies in the country.
The League considers that, having regard to the conditions prevail-
ing at present in the country, the Provincial scheme of the Consti-
## p. 660 (#700) ############################################
660 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
tution be utilised for what it is worth, in spite of the most objection-
able features contained therein, which render the real control and
responsibility of the Ministry and the Legislature over the entire
field of Government and the Administration nugatory. The League
is clearly of the opinion that the All-India Federal Scheme of the
Central Government, embodied in the Government of India Act,
1935, is fundamentally bad; it is most reactionary, retrograde, in-
jurious and fatal to the vital interests of British India vis-a-vis the
Indian States, and it is calculated to thwart and delay indefinitely
the realisation of India's most cherished goal of complete responsible
Government and is totally unacceptable.
“The League considers that the British Parliament should still
take the earliest opportunity to review the whole situation afresh
regarding the Central scheme before it is inaugurated; or else the
League feels convinced that the present scheme will not bring peace
and contentment to the people, but on the contrary it will lead to
disaster if forced upon and persisted in as it is entire unworkable
in the interests of India and her people. ”
"Whether at the Round Table Conference or in India, the
Indians had been quarrelling among themselves like the two cats
which, unable to arrive at a settlement, went to a monkey for jus-
tice with the result that the monkey took away the whole cheese.
It was true that despite any resolution of protest which might be
passed they would remain in a helpless condition. But surely one
could at least express one's opinion that the new Constitution was
a fraud being imposed upon them. One could express one's ‘resent-
ment against the fraud that is being perpetrated' and one could
ask others to do it. A question might be asked as to whether pro-
tests would be of any avail when the Constitution was coming into
cperation. The answer was “What did Germany do with the Treaty
of Versailles which was forced on her? ' Did she not sign the
Treaty? Here in India, there was no question of anybody having
to sign. The Constitution was forced upon the country, and it was
going to be the law of the land. Every one knew, and the British
Government knew, that the Constitution had been the grossest
breach of faith on the part of the British Government who had
stated that they would not announce any constitution which did
not receive an adequate amount of support. The question was
whether there had been any agreement at all. Nevertheless, it was
being pointed out that there was a large measure of agreement in
the Conservative Party and that was enough. "
Critics point out that the Government of India Act 1935 pro-
posed a conservative framework for an independent India. The
vital feature of that framework was princely participation. An
## p. 661 (#701) ############################################
ESTIMATE OF ACT OF 1935
661
independent India dominated by the princes might have been deco-
rative and peaceful but could not be effective or forward-looking.
It was something like stopping the clock just before the alarm for
the new age was due to go off. Moreover, the new Act failed to
prevent the partition of India. The Muslims felt that the Act was
devised mainly in the interests of the Hindus. It is true that the
federal principle which granted larger powers to the provinces could
help the Muslims to control provinces like Sind and the North-west
Frontier Province, but the representation in Bengal was such that
they had to form a coalition ministry with some other parties. The
same was the case with the Punjab. There also they were not given
absolute majority to control the destiny of their province. The
view of the Muslims was that regional federalism was not enough
to safeguard their interests. They had no faith in the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty and rule by majority. The fear of domi-
nance by one community over another created the atmosphere
which made partition inevitable.
ESTIMATE OF ACT OF 1935
It has rightly been pointed out that for all its ifs and buts, its
complications and hesitations, the Government of India Act, 1935,
proved to be a land-mark in the development of India. It marked
a point of no-return in constitutional development. While the Re-
form of 1919 had left the ultimate goal hazy and uncertain, the
Act of 1935 definitely fixed the goal of Dominion status for India
which was to have a federal form of Government along with the
parliamentary institutions. There were to be no periodic enquiries
as under the Act of 1919. Provision was made for changing the
Constitution from within. In many ways, the new Act was a blue-
print for independence. What is remarkable about this Act is that
in the new Constitution of India which came into force in January
1950, many of its Articles have been copied from the Act of 1935.
Even the general shape of the new Constitution of India is on the
pattern set in the Government of India Act of 1935.
The Act of 1935 represented not only a consensus of British pub-
lic opinion but also a considered attempt to provide conservative
form for ultimate Indian independence. England was to enter into
a partnership with an independent India but in that India, conserva-
tive interests were to predominate and that fact was ensured by the
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was for that
purpose that the princes were given a very privileged position in
the federal set up. It was with the same object that provision was
made for safeguarding the trade interests of Englishmen.
## p. 662 (#702) ############################################
662 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
The view of Prof. Percival Speare is that “Unlike the Montford
Reform of 1921 or anything that was done after World War II,
the Government of India Act of 1935 was enacted from strength.
It could be said that after both World Wars, Britain was too en-
feebled to take an uncompromising stand. But in the thirties, she
had recovered from World War I, was emerging from the Great
Depression and had just defeated the strongest frontal attack on
the Indian Government authority since the Mutiny. There was no
compelling force dictating concession or constitutional advance.
What was done was done through conviction and might be said
to represent a minimum rather than a maximum. That was wh
there was an air of solidity about the Act and why its major fea-
tures proved to be so fruitful in the future. It was generally real-
ized that there could be no going back on it. The Act was the
constructive half of the dual policy of suppression of Congress defi-
ance and advance towards self-Government. It was meticulously
drawn up and represented, in effect, a draft Constitution for an
Indian Dominion. It was made easy to fill in gaps later; old fea-
tures which were left such as the Office of the Secretary of State,
could be lopped off without difficulty, and provision was made for
a measure of change within the Constitution. The London con-
nection began to assume the appearance of legal umbilical cord
which could be snipped at the right moment. "
In spite of the best efforts on the part of Lord Linlithgow, the
federal part of the Government of India Act, 1935, could not be
brought into force. The Indian States put forward all kinds of
hurdles in the way. Moreover, the Muslim League was deadly
opposed to the introduction of federation at the Centre. The Con
gress also unwittingly opposed the federal part of the Constitution
even after the inauguration of provincial autonomy, little realising
that this action of theirs would strengthen the centrifugal tenden-
cies which could ultimately disrupt the unity of the country.
When World War II broke out in September 1939, India was
immediately declared a belligerent country by the British Govern-
ment without consulting the people of India. The Congress Work-
ing Committee lodged a strong protest and called upon the British
Government to declare their war aims in clear terms. The Con-
gress enquired from the Government whether those aims included
"the treatment of India as a free nation whose policy will be guid-
ed in accordance with the wishes of the people. ” The Congress
Working Committee declared in unequivocal terms that "the Com-
mittee cannot associate themselves or offer any cooperation in a
war which is conducted on imperialistic lines and which is meant
to consolidate imperialism in India and elsewhere. "
## p. 663 (#703) ############################################
THE AUGUST OFFER (1940)
663
The British Government refused to give the assurance demanded
by the Congress. It made vague promises to the effect that at the
end of the war the British Government would be willing to consult
the various interests in India to make such modifications in the
Government of India Act 1935 as might appear to be desirable.
The result was that the Congress decided to non-cooperate with
the British Government and called upon the Congress ministries in
8 provinces to resign. This was done in October 1939. This ac-
tion of the Congress has been criticised by V. P. Menon on the
ground that it was the resignation of the Congress ministries which
helped Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League to become strong in
Indian politics. Moreover, if the Congress ministries had not re-
signed voluntarily, the British Government would not have got the
courage to dismiss them as they could not afford to lose the good-
will of the people in those critical days.
There was a lot of discontentment in the country and in order to
meet that Lord Linlithgow declared in January 1940 that “Domi-
nion status of the Westminster variety as soon as possible after the
war” was the goal of British policy in India. However, this did
not bring any response from the Congress side.
THE AUGUST OFFER (1940)
On the eve of the battle of Britain, a new declaration of British
policy known as the August Offer was made on 8 August 1940.
This offer was made by the Viceroy on behalf of the British Gov-
ernment. It was pointed out that though the differences which
prevented national unity remained unbridged in India, the expan-
sion of the Executive Council of the Governor-General and the
establishment of an Advisory War Council should not be postponed
any longer. In view of the doubts as to whether the position of
the minorities would be sufficiently safeguarded in any future consti-
tutional change or not, the British Government reaffirmed its desire
that full weight would be given to minority opinion. To quote the
words of the Viceroy, “It goes without saying that they could not
contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace
and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority
is directly denied by large and powerful elements of India's national
life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements
into submission to such a Government. ” Subject to the fulfilment
of their obligations—an allusion to such questions as defence, mino-
rity rights, the treaties with the states and the position of the Secre-
tary of State Services, the British Government concurred in the
Indian desire that the framing of the new constitution should be
## p. 664 (#704) ############################################
664 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
"primarily the responsibility of Indians themselves and should origi-
nate from Indian conceptions of the social, economic and political
structure of the Indian life. ” Constitutional issues could not be
decided at "a moment when the national life is engaged in a strug-
gle for existence,” but after the War, a representative Indian body
would be set up to formulate the new constitution. In the mean-
time, the British Government would welcome and assist any efforts
to reach agreement as to the form and operation of this constitu-
tion-making body and as to the principles of the constitution. In
the interval, the British Government hoped that all parties and
communities in India would cooperate in India's war effort and
by thus working together pave the way for India's attainment of
free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The August Offer undoubtedly registered an advance of first-
rate importance in the method of handling the constitutional prob-
lem. It was clearly stated that the Indians were to be primarily
responsible for making the new constitution of India. It followed
that if the Indians agreed to the kind of constitution they wanted
and if that constitution provided for the due discharge of British
obligations, it would be virtually impossible for the British Parlia-
ment to reject that constitution. Mr. Amery pointed out that
Dominion status was not inferior to that of nations that stood alone,
but was actually superior. “There is no higher status in the
world. ”
The August Offer was rejected by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad,
the Congress President. Jawaharlal Nehru declared that the whole
conception of Dominion Status for India was “as dead as a door-
nail. ” The view of Mahatma Gandhi was that the August Offer
widened the gulf between India as represented by the Congress
and England.
The response of the Muslim League to the August Offer was
different. Its Working Committee welcomed that part of the Offer
which was condemned by the Congress. According to the Muslim
League, the August Offer met its demand "for a clear assurance
to the fact that no future constitution, interim or final, should be
adopted by the British Government without their approval and
consent. " The League declared that "the partition of India was
the only solution of the most difficult problem of India's future
constitution. ” In spite of this, the League neither accepted nor
rejected the August Offer.
The Liberals of India asked for a further clarification from the
British Government. They demanded that the enjoyment of Domi-
nion Status must be unqualified and a time limit for its attainment
must be fixed. That must not be delayed on account of the atti-
>
## p. 665 (#705) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
665
tude of any minority in India. The Indian members of the Execu-
tive Council of the Governor-General must be party leaders and
they should also be in a majority.
Nothing came out of the August Offer on account of the attitude
of the Congress. The comments of Mr. Amery were in these words:
"Inspired by an ardent national patriotism, the (Congress) have
striven to make that organization national and all-embracing. If
only they had succeeded, if Congress could in fact speak, as it pro-
fesses to speak, for all the main elements in India's national life,
then however advanced their demands, our problem might have
been very different and in many respects far easier than it is today. ”
CRIPPS PROPOSALS (1942)
The deadlock in Indian politics continued.
in Madras, 10 were filled up by the Governor through nomination.
The general seats for Madras, Bombay, Bengal, U. P. , Bihar and
Assam were 35, 20, 10, 34, 9 and 10 respectively. The Muslims
were given 17 seats each in Bihar and U. P. In Bengal and Bihar,
27 and 12 seats were filled by the Legislative Assemblies of those
provinces. Some seats were reserved for Europeans and Indian
Christians. The Provincial Legislative Council was a permanent
body. The tenure of office of members was 9 years and one-third
of them were to retire after
every
3
years.
The age qualification for the membership of the Provincial Legis-
lative Assembly was fixed at 25 and for Legislative Council 30. No
person could become a member of both the Houses of the Legisla-
ture. Residence in the constituency for a certain number of days,
.
usually 180 or 120, was necessary for franchise. The voting quali-
fications varied from province to province. In the case of the
Punjab, the right of voting was given to those who paid an income
tax or a direct municipal tax amounting to not less than Rs. 50 per
year, those who paid land revenue amounting to not less than Rs. 5
per year, those who owned or occupied immovable property of the
rental value of Rs. 60 per year and those who possessed educational
qualifications up to the primary standard.
NATURE OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY
It is true that the provincial autonomy as introduced by the
Government of India Act, 1935, was a definite improvement on
the system set up by the Government of India Act, 1919, but it is
not correct to presume that provincial autonomy was intended to
establish a full-fledged responsible government in the provinces. If
that had been the intention, the authors of the Government of
India Act, 1935, would have chosen to use a different terminology.
The fact is that the British Government did not intend to give full
responsible Government in the provinces. This is clear from the
large number of discretionary powers given to the Governors. The
same intention becomes clear when we consider the nature and
extent of the special responsibilities of the Governors. If the Gov-
ernors were expected to play the role of the guardians of the British
interests and other vested interests in India, that was bound to affect
## p. 650 (#690) ############################################
650 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
adversely the position of the ministers. Lord Zetland who was the
Secretary of State for India in 1937, has rightly pointed out that
the British Parliament reserved to itself a potential measure of con-
trol in a certain limited and clearly defined sphere. While perform-
ing their special responsibilities, the Governors were responsible to
the British Parliament for acts of commission and omission. It was
pointed out by critics that provincial autonomy was merely a farce
and far from a living reality. It has also been characterised as
merely a sham.
General elections were held in the beginning of 1937 and in spite
of its criticism of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian
National Congress took part in those elections. Jawaharlal Nehru
was the President of the Congress at that time and he made a whirl-
wind tour of the country and carried the message of the Congress
to every nook and corner of the country. The people also respond-
ed to the national call and the result was that the Congress was
able to secure clear majority in 6 provinces, viz. , U. P. , Bihar, Orissa,
Bombay, Madras and C. P. Although the Congress was the largest
single party in the legislatures of Assam, Bengal and the North-
West Frontier Province, on the whole it was in a minority. The
Congress did not do well in the Punjab and Sind. The Unionist
Party in the Punjab was able to secure 106 seats out of a total of
175 and it was not under the thumb of the Muslim League. On
the whole, the Muslim League secured 51 seats out of a total of
485 seats reserved for the Muslims in British India. It was found
that the Muslim League was stronger in the Hindu majority pro-
vinces than in the Muslim majority provinces. The Liberals did
.
not fare well in the elections. The Justice Party was ousted from
power in the Madras Presidency. The Congress got 159 seats and
the Justice Party 21.
It is true that the Congress fought elections and won them but
there was a difference of opinion among the Congressmen with
regard to the future course of action to be adopted. One school
of thought led by Sardar Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and C. Raja-
gopalachariar was in favour of accepting office under the new con-
stitution with the object of strengthening the hands of the Congress
in its struggle for national freedom. The other school led by
Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose was not in favour of
accepting office as that was likely to lessen the zeal for its fight for
India's freedom. Mahatma Gandhi intervened and a compromise
was arrived at. The All India Congress Committee passed a resolu-
tion on 30 August 1937 authorising and allowing the “acceptance
of office in the provinces where Congress commands majority in
the legislature, provided that ministerships should not be accepted
## p. 651 (#691) ############################################
FORMATION OF CONGRESS MINISTRIES
651
unless the leader of the Congress party in the legislature is satisfied
and able to state publicly that the Governor will not use his special
powers of interference or set aside the advice of the ministers in
regard to their constitutional activities. "
The Governors were not prepared to act as constitutional heads
and hence refused to give the required assurance to the Congress
party in the Congress majority provinces. Interim ministries were
set up in the Congress majority provinces to carry on the work for
the time being. The minority ministries could not hope to last
long as they could not face the provincial legislative assemblies on
account of the majority being with the Congress. In the non-
Congress provinces, popular ministries began to function from 1
April, 1937. However, the deadlock in the Congress majority pro-
vinces did not last long. Lord Linlithgow, Governor General of
India, declared in a broadcast speech on 21 June 1937 that “There
is no foundation for any suggestion that a Governor is free or is
entitled or would have the power to interfere with the day to day
administration of a province outside the limited range of the res-
ponsibilities resting on him. These special responsibilities are res-
tricted in scope to the narrowest limits possible. Even so limited
as they are, the Governor will at all times be concerned to carry
his ministers with him, while in other spheres in the field of their
ministerial responsibility, it is mandatory on a Governor to be guid-
ed by the advice of his ministers, even though for whatever reasons
he may not be himself wholly satisfied that that advice is in the
circumstances necessarily and decisively the right advice. The
conciliatory speech of the Governor General was welcomed by the
Congress and consequently its Working Committee passed the fol-
lowing resolution at Wardha on 7 July 1937: “The Committee
feels, however, that the situation created as a result of the circum-
stances and events that have since occurred warrants the belief that
it will not be easy for the Governors to use their special powers.
The Committee has resolved that Congressmen be permitted to
accept office where they may be invited thereto, but it desires to
make it clear that the office has to be accepted and utilised for the
purpose of working it in accordance with the lines laid down in the
Congress Election Manifesto and to further in every way the Con-
gress policy of combating the new Act on the one hand and of
prosecuting the constructive programme on the other. ” The resolu-
tion was in fact a turning point in the history of the Congress. So
far it had always been in the opposition but now it decided to take
up the responsibilities of office.
It is said that when the Congress decided to form ministries, the
Muslim League offered to join them on certain terms and conditions
## p. 652 (#692) ############################################
652 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
>
but the Congress decided not to form coalition ministries. There
were many reasons for their decision. The Congress was going to
accept office to carry on the struggle for freedom and to pass con-
structive legislation. In the case of a coalition, there was every
possibility of conflict and friction between the Congress and the
Muslim League members. The Congress was bound to pass legis-
lation in the interests of the peasants and workers and those were
bound to be objected by the vested interests in the Muslim League.
There was always the danger of obstruction and delay. To quote
Jawaharlal Nehru, “There might even be intrigues with the Gov-
ernment over the heads of other ministers. A joint front against
British authority was essential. Any breach in it could be harmful
to our cause. There would have been no binding cement, no com-
mon loyalty, no united objective and individual ministers would
have looked and pulled in different directions. ”
The Congress was not opposed to cooperation from other parties
but it insisted that the Muslim group in the legislature must stop
functioning as a separate group and it must come under the con-
trol and discipline of the Congress High Command. The Muslim
League Parliamentary Board in U. P. should be dissolved and no
candidate should be put up by the Board at any subsequent election.
The Muslim League refused to accept those terms and there the
matter ended.
However, the refusal of the Congress to form coalition ministries
with the Muslim League led to very unfortunate results. Mr. M.
A. Jinnah described the Congress as "drunk with power. ” To quote
Mr. Jinnah, "On the very threshold of what little power and res-
ponsibility is given, the majority community has clearly shown that
Hindustan is for the Hindus. " Hardly the Congress had been in
cffice for a few months, Mr. Jinnah and his lieutenants began to
talk of the atrocities committed on the Muslims in the Congress
majority provinces. The Muslim League appointed an Enquiry
Committee to find out the grievances of the Muslims in Congress
provinces and the report was published towards the end of 1938
and is known as the Pirpur Report. It was declared in the Report
that parliamentary government was not workable in the country.
The Muslims were not given appointments according to their popu-
! ation and importance. “The flag, the anthem, the reverence paid
to Mr. Gandhi, the emphasis laid by the Mahatma himself on cow
protection, all these are evidence of a deliberate and far-reaching
attack on the civic and cultural rights of the Muslim community,
but its most insidio’s feature is the attempt to extend the use of
Hindi at the expense of Urdu. ” The Bihar Working Committee of
the provincial Muslim League also appointed an Enquiry Com-
## p. 653 (#693) ############################################
WORKING OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY
653
>
mittee and the report which it submitted is known as the Shareef
Report. In 1939, Fazl-ul-Huq issued a statement to the press
which was embodied later on in a pamphlet entitled “Muslim suffer-
ings under Congress rule. ” Dr. Rajendra Prasad who was the
President of the Congress at that time, challenged Mr. Jinnah to
put all the charges before the Chief Justice of the Federal Court
of India for decision but the offer was refused by Mr. Jinnah. The
view of Sir Harry Haig, Governor of U. P. , was that “In dealing with
communal issues, the ministers had clearly acted with impartiality
and a desire to do what was fair. ” The verdict of Coupland is that
the charges "were not very numerous, considering the vast areas
concerned. Many of them were relatively trivial in character and
similar incidents had been occurring from time to time for many
years past. ”
It must be conceded that the Governors played their part well.
Even Mahatma Gandhi admitted in 1939 that the Governors had
"played the game. ” They did not interfere in the day to day affairs
of the provincial administration and left the initiative in the hands
of the ministers. The latter also tried to remain within the bounds
of the Act and did not give any provocation to the Governors. Sir
Roger Lumbly observed: “The Governor must preserve the spirit
in which the constitution was conceived which was the spirit of self-
government. He must be equipped to discharge the special func-
tions laid on him, but without, as far as he can make it possible,
disturbing that spirit. He has his own contribution to make, if
he can, to the success of the Government and he must remain, im-
partial, a neutral in politics not a protagonist. ” In the case of
Bihar and U. P. , differences arose between the Governor and the
Congress ministries on the question of release of political prisoners.
The Governors refused to release them on the ground that peace
and tranquillity of India as a whole was likely to be disturbed there-
by. When the Governor-General consulted the other provinces,
they also opposed the release of the political prisoners in Bihar and
U. P. The result was that the Congress ministries in those two
provinces resigned and thus a deadlock was created. As the Gov-
ernment of India was not prepared to take the matter to extremes,
a via media was found out to suit both the parties. It was decided
to allow the release of the political prisoners but the same was to
be done by stages. It was declared that the cases of the individual
prisoners were to be examined on merits before their release. The
result was that the British Government was able to save its face and
the Congress ministries were able to release the political prisoners.
The Congress ministries in Bihar and U. P. resumed office under the
changed circumstances but this had a very salutary effect on the
## p. 654 (#694) ############################################
654 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
other Governors. Trouble arose in Orissa when a subordinate
bureaucratic official was appointed the Governor of that Province.
In the case of C. P. , the Governor used his discretionary powers and
dismissed the ministry.
The Governor of the Punjab played an important part in the
administration of the province. When he was consulted by the
Governor-General on the question of the release of political prison-
ers in Bihar and U. P. , he wrote back saying that peace and tran-
quillity of his province was likely to be disturbed if the political
prisoners were released. This was done by the Governor without
consulting the Chief Minister or the members of his Cabinet. Chief
Minister Sir Sikander Hayat Khan admitted in the Assembly that
he had not been consulted at all. There was no relaxation of the
police and secret service Raj in the Punjab and Bengal. In Bengal,
thousands of people were put behind the bars without any trial.
The Muslim League ministry was put in office by the Governor in
an arbitrary manner. The Chief Minister was asked by the Gover-
nor either to resign voluntarily or face dismissal. Dr. Shyama
Prasad Mukherjee rightly pointed out that the right place of the
Governor of Bengal was on the Muslim League benches. The
Governor of North-West Frontier Province kept the Muslim League
ministry in power by not summoning the legislature and also by
keeping the Congress members of the Assembly in jail. He refused
to give assent to the Bill passed by the legislature. Chief Minister
Allah Baksh of Sind was dismissed by the Governor on the ground
that he had given up his title of Khan Bahadur. This was done
in spite of the fact that he had the backing of the majority of the
legislature at the time of his dismissal.
In the Congress majority provinces, some healthy conventions
were set up. The ministers acted upon the principle of collective
responsibility. The Congress ministry in Assam set up the conven-
tion that the ministry should resign if a bill introduced by it was
rejected by the legislature. Except in the case of Orissa, the Con-
gress ministries included members of the minority communities.
The Governors continued to preside over the meetings of the provin-
cial ministries. That was not liked by the Congress ministries.
The result was that before going to the meetings to be presided
over by the Governors, the Congress ministries met separately and
arrived at their own conclusions. Then the same matter was put
before the Governor and if he insisted on interfering, he was threa-
tened with the resignation of the ministry. The Congress ministers
went to the meetings to be presided over by the Governor with their
resignations in their pockets. It was in this way that the possibility
## p. 655 (#695) ############################################
WORKING OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY
655
of the Governor influencing the decisions of the ministers was elimi-
pated in the Congress majority provinces.
As regards the part played by the services under provincial auto-
nomy, there were three kinds of civil servants in the country. Some
of them resigned on the eve of the introduction of provincial auto-
nomy as they felt that they could not work under the new set up.
To the second category belonged those civil servants who were pre-
pared to change themselves with the changed circumstances and
carry out the orders of the new ministers. To the third category
belonged those public servants who wanted to continue for the sake
of mischief. The Chief Secretary of U. P. issued a circular to the
Administrative Officers under him saying that no order was to be
executed by them unless the same was countersigned by one of the
Secretaries. Chief Minister G. B. Pant of U. P. protested and ask-
ed for an explanation from the Chief Secretary. He described the
act of the Chief Secretary as one of "insubordination or incompe-
tency. ” The result was that the circular was withdrawn and it had
a wholesome effect on other civil servants in the country.
As regards the beneficial effects of the working of provincial
autonomy, the Congress ministries were able to do a lot of construc-
tive work. A large number of laws dealing with prohibition, educa-
tion, agricultural indebtedness, cottage industries, rural develop-
ment, relations between tenants and landlords etc. were passed.
The Bombay ministry enacted a law by which the lands confiscated
by the British Government on political grounds were restored. The
ministry of Madras removed the statute of General Neil from its
prominent place in Madras. The political prisoners were released
in the Congress majority provinces. Jawaharlal Nehru described
the effect of the Congress ministries on the masses in these words:
“But the psychological change was enormous and the electric cur-
rent seemed to run through the countryside. The change was
noticeable more in the rural areas than in the cities, though in the
industrial centres the industrial workers reacted in the same way.
There was a sense of immense relief as of the lifting of a weight
which had been oppressing the people. There was a release of long
suppressed mass energy which was evident everywhere. The fear
of the police and secret service agent vanished for a while at least
and even the poorest peasant added to his feeling of self-respect and
self-reliance. For the first time, he felt that he counted and could
not be ignored. ”
Critics pointed out that the Congress ministries worked under
the direction and supervision of the Congress High Command and
that was not desirable so far as the working of parliamentary insti-
tutions was concerned. The Congress ministries were responsible
## p. 656 (#696) ############################################
656 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
not to the legislatures but to the members of the Working Com-
mittee of the Congress. However, it was pointed out by the Con-
gress that the unity of direction by the party machine was very
essential under the circumstances. The danger of mutual bicker-
ings was to be provided against.
Coupland points out that although the Congress ministries assum-
ed office with the two-fold object of working the Act and at the
same time combating the same, the latter aspect fell more and more
into the background. Unmindful of the restrictions put on them
by the Government of India Act, 1935, the Congress ministers
bothered themselves with what they could actually achieve with a
view to serve the people and thereby win over their confidence. The
ministers knew that the battle for India's freedom had still to be
fought and everything should be done by them while in office to
win over the confidence of the people. To quote Coupland, “The
Congress had almost become a constructive force in Indian politics.
For 20 years it had lived in the barren wilderness of opposition,
complaining, criticising, putting the blame for everything on Bri-
tain. Now it had shown that power of its great organisation and
the disciplined enthusiasm of its members could be put to a more
practical purpose. It was still anti-British but it was now more
that.
In a new, more positive and effective sense, it was pro-
Indian. ”
As regards the working of non-Congress ministries, they
were also able to do a lot of useful work. This is amply proved by
what was done in the Punjab.
DEFECTS IN THE ACT OF 1935
The Government of India Act, 1935, had many defects. The
Indians were not given control over the Government of their coun-
try. They could not change or amend their constitution. The
Whitehall framed the policy which was followed by the Govern-
ment of India. The Indians detested control from London. They
also detested the dyarchical form of Government at the centre. It
was rightly pointed out that the evils of dyarchy which were found
in the provinces were bound to be repeated at the centre also. The
inauguration of the All-India Federation depended upon the condi-
tion that a specified number of states joined the Federation. The
Act gave the Indian States the option to join or not to join the
Federation. The result was that the federal part of the Act could
not be enforced at all. The Indian states were given a privileged
position under the Act. The representation given to them both in
the Council of State and the Federal Assembly was
more than
what was due to them on the basis of their territory, population or
## p. 657 (#697) ############################################
DEFECTS IN THE ACT OF 1935
657
the contributions to be made by them to the revenues of the Federal
Government. While the members from British India were to be
elected by the people, Indian princes were allowed to nominate their
quota. It was well-known that the Indian princes were absolutely
under the control of the Political Department of the Government
of India and they did what they were directed to do by the Viceroy
who was incharge of the Political Department. They could not
dare to vote against their masters. It was rightly feared that the
nominees from the Indian states would be used by the British Gov-
ernment in India to serve their own interests and stop the progress
of the country. The system of indirect elections to the Federal
Assembly was resented. That was against the very spirit of demo-
cracy and also of the times. The control to be exercised by the
Secretary of State for India over the Indian Civil Service, the Indian
Police Service and other All-India Services was also resented. The
Indian army got the lion's share out of the Indian revenues but
the Indians were not given any control over the Defence part of
the budget as the same was kept as a reserved subject. The seats
in the Legislatures were to be filled on the basis of the Communal
Award and hence the constitution became communalism-ridden.
The Communal Award cut at the very roots of Indian nationalism
and solidarity and was rightly considered to be most dangerous. It
was feared that longer the period for which the Communal Award
worked, the greater will be the difficulty in keeping the unity of
the country. The powers of the Provincial Legislatures and the
Federal Legislature were very much restricted and did not give
enough of scope to the ministers concerned. The rulers of the
Indian states criticized the Federal scheme on the ground that it
did not give them any power or authority to leave the federation
after joining it once. The federation was given the power of coerc-
ing them. The representatives from British India were bound to
dominate the Federal Legislature and Federal executive and there-
by influence the Viceroy to take steps which might impair their
sovereignty. The discretionary powers of the Governors reduced
provincial autonomy to a farce. Those powers and responsibilities
"combine, crib and confine" the powers of the Provincial Legisla-
tures and executive. Some of those powers and responsibilities were
so vaguely defined that those could be interpreted to mean anything
according to the exigencies of the situation. The Governor was
made the sole judge to decide whether any particular matter fell
within the scope of its discretionary powers or not or affected any
of his special responsibilities. He could become a virtual dictator
cf the province within the letter of the law.
The Indian National Congress condemned the federal scheme on
## p. 658 (#698) ############################################
658 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
many grounds. The scheme did not envisage any real transfer of
power into the hands of the Indians. The Federal Legislature was
saddled with an element of conservatism in the form of the nomi-
nated representatives of the states. The constitutional advance-
ment of India was wholly at the mercy of the Indian states.
The view of Dr. A. B. Keith was that the Federal scheme was
not satisfactory. The units of which it was composed were too dis-
parate to be joined suitably together. On the British side, the
scheme was favoured in order to provide an element of pure conser-
vatism in order to combat any dangerous elements of democracy
contributed by British India. On the side of the rulers, their essen-
tial pre-occupation was with the effort to secure immunity from
pressure in regard to the improvement of internal administration
of their states. Particularly unsatisfactory was the effort made to
obtain a definition of paramountcy which would acknowledge the
right of the ruler to mis-govern his state as he was assured of British
support while putting down any resistance to his regime. The
federation was largely cooked by the desire to evade the issue of
extending responsible government to the Central Government of
British India. The withholding of Defence and External Affairs
from federal control rendered the alleged concession of responsibility
all but meaningless. Sir Shanmukham Chetty, at one time the
Speaker of the Central Assembiy under the Government of India
Act, 1919 and later on the Finance Minister in post-independence
India, made the following observation in this connection: "It is
indeed a far cry between the Government Act and the Dominion
Status. The principle of Dominion Status asserts that the Domi-
nion should have the right to the same measure of autonomy in
external affairs as in internal matters and that it is the duty of the
British Government to give effect to the doctrine accepted. But
India has neither control in the internal nor in the external affairs.
The internal administration shall be under the guidance of the
Governor-General and the Governors who are vested with tremen-
dous powers; the external affairs shall be under the guidance of
Parliament, the Crown and the Secretary of State. Indians shall
not be able to work out their own destiny. The safeguards, reser-
vations, special powers of the Governor-General and the Gover-
nors, the weakness of the Indian Legislatures, and the ministers in
the Federal and the Provincial Governments with no Central res-
ponsibility and weak provincial autonomy, the Communal Award,
the States' representation bought at the expense of British Indians,
the financial and other economic drawbacks, half measures of the
Indianisation of the Army with no control over the Defence-all
these things show that Indians shall not be having Dominion Status. "
## p. 659 (#699) ############################################
DEFECTS IN THE ACT OF 1935
659
The view of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya was: “The new
Act has been thrust upon us. It has a somewhat democratic ap-
pearance outwardly, but it is absolutely hollow from inside. " C.
Rajagopalachariar described the new constitution as worse than
dyarchy. Mr. M. A. Jinnah described the scheme of 1935 as
"thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable. ”
C. Y. Chintamani described the Government of India Act, 1935, as
the anti-India Act and the government as "against" India. Mr.
Fazl-ul-Huq, Chief Minister of Bengal, observed that under the
Government of India Act, 1935, there was to be neither Hindu Raj
nor Muslim Raj but British Raj.
The view of Jawaharlal Nehru was that the Government of India
Act, 1935 “provided for some kind of provincial autonomy and a
federal structure, but there were so many reservations and checks
that both political and economic powers continued to be concen-
trated in the hands of the British Government. Indeed, in some
ways it confirmed and enlarged the powers of an executive respon-
sible solely to that Government. The federal structure was so
envisaged as to make any real advance impossible and no loophole
was left for the representatives of the Indian people to interfere with
or modify the system of British-controlled administration. The Act
strengthened the alliance between the British Government and the
princes, landlords and other reactionary elements in India. .
The whole complicated structure of Government remained as it
was. ” (The Discovery of India, pp. 368-69).
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was opposed to the federal part of the Gov-
ernment of India Act, 1935. He was determined to fight the
Government of India Act "until we have that replaced by a Consti-
tution which, we think, is a right one. ” He expressed his attitude
in these words: "If I have to submit to it, I shall submit to it under
protest. I shall see what use I can make of it. The German na-
tion, when it was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, signed it.
If I have to deal with this Constitution as the Germans dealt with
the Versailles Treaty, I shall begin by tearing off as many pages
as the Government of India Act has, and we shall not rest content
until that Constitution is replaced by a Constitution which is ac-
ceptable to us. ” Mr. M. A. Jinnah got the following Resolution
passed from the Muslim League: “The All-India Muslim League
enters its emphatic protest against forcing the Constitution, as
embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, upon the people
of India, against their will and, in spite of the repeated disapproval
and dissent expressed by various parties and bodies in the country.
The League considers that, having regard to the conditions prevail-
ing at present in the country, the Provincial scheme of the Consti-
## p. 660 (#700) ############################################
660 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
tution be utilised for what it is worth, in spite of the most objection-
able features contained therein, which render the real control and
responsibility of the Ministry and the Legislature over the entire
field of Government and the Administration nugatory. The League
is clearly of the opinion that the All-India Federal Scheme of the
Central Government, embodied in the Government of India Act,
1935, is fundamentally bad; it is most reactionary, retrograde, in-
jurious and fatal to the vital interests of British India vis-a-vis the
Indian States, and it is calculated to thwart and delay indefinitely
the realisation of India's most cherished goal of complete responsible
Government and is totally unacceptable.
“The League considers that the British Parliament should still
take the earliest opportunity to review the whole situation afresh
regarding the Central scheme before it is inaugurated; or else the
League feels convinced that the present scheme will not bring peace
and contentment to the people, but on the contrary it will lead to
disaster if forced upon and persisted in as it is entire unworkable
in the interests of India and her people. ”
"Whether at the Round Table Conference or in India, the
Indians had been quarrelling among themselves like the two cats
which, unable to arrive at a settlement, went to a monkey for jus-
tice with the result that the monkey took away the whole cheese.
It was true that despite any resolution of protest which might be
passed they would remain in a helpless condition. But surely one
could at least express one's opinion that the new Constitution was
a fraud being imposed upon them. One could express one's ‘resent-
ment against the fraud that is being perpetrated' and one could
ask others to do it. A question might be asked as to whether pro-
tests would be of any avail when the Constitution was coming into
cperation. The answer was “What did Germany do with the Treaty
of Versailles which was forced on her? ' Did she not sign the
Treaty? Here in India, there was no question of anybody having
to sign. The Constitution was forced upon the country, and it was
going to be the law of the land. Every one knew, and the British
Government knew, that the Constitution had been the grossest
breach of faith on the part of the British Government who had
stated that they would not announce any constitution which did
not receive an adequate amount of support. The question was
whether there had been any agreement at all. Nevertheless, it was
being pointed out that there was a large measure of agreement in
the Conservative Party and that was enough. "
Critics point out that the Government of India Act 1935 pro-
posed a conservative framework for an independent India. The
vital feature of that framework was princely participation. An
## p. 661 (#701) ############################################
ESTIMATE OF ACT OF 1935
661
independent India dominated by the princes might have been deco-
rative and peaceful but could not be effective or forward-looking.
It was something like stopping the clock just before the alarm for
the new age was due to go off. Moreover, the new Act failed to
prevent the partition of India. The Muslims felt that the Act was
devised mainly in the interests of the Hindus. It is true that the
federal principle which granted larger powers to the provinces could
help the Muslims to control provinces like Sind and the North-west
Frontier Province, but the representation in Bengal was such that
they had to form a coalition ministry with some other parties. The
same was the case with the Punjab. There also they were not given
absolute majority to control the destiny of their province. The
view of the Muslims was that regional federalism was not enough
to safeguard their interests. They had no faith in the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty and rule by majority. The fear of domi-
nance by one community over another created the atmosphere
which made partition inevitable.
ESTIMATE OF ACT OF 1935
It has rightly been pointed out that for all its ifs and buts, its
complications and hesitations, the Government of India Act, 1935,
proved to be a land-mark in the development of India. It marked
a point of no-return in constitutional development. While the Re-
form of 1919 had left the ultimate goal hazy and uncertain, the
Act of 1935 definitely fixed the goal of Dominion status for India
which was to have a federal form of Government along with the
parliamentary institutions. There were to be no periodic enquiries
as under the Act of 1919. Provision was made for changing the
Constitution from within. In many ways, the new Act was a blue-
print for independence. What is remarkable about this Act is that
in the new Constitution of India which came into force in January
1950, many of its Articles have been copied from the Act of 1935.
Even the general shape of the new Constitution of India is on the
pattern set in the Government of India Act of 1935.
The Act of 1935 represented not only a consensus of British pub-
lic opinion but also a considered attempt to provide conservative
form for ultimate Indian independence. England was to enter into
a partnership with an independent India but in that India, conserva-
tive interests were to predominate and that fact was ensured by the
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was for that
purpose that the princes were given a very privileged position in
the federal set up. It was with the same object that provision was
made for safeguarding the trade interests of Englishmen.
## p. 662 (#702) ############################################
662 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
The view of Prof. Percival Speare is that “Unlike the Montford
Reform of 1921 or anything that was done after World War II,
the Government of India Act of 1935 was enacted from strength.
It could be said that after both World Wars, Britain was too en-
feebled to take an uncompromising stand. But in the thirties, she
had recovered from World War I, was emerging from the Great
Depression and had just defeated the strongest frontal attack on
the Indian Government authority since the Mutiny. There was no
compelling force dictating concession or constitutional advance.
What was done was done through conviction and might be said
to represent a minimum rather than a maximum. That was wh
there was an air of solidity about the Act and why its major fea-
tures proved to be so fruitful in the future. It was generally real-
ized that there could be no going back on it. The Act was the
constructive half of the dual policy of suppression of Congress defi-
ance and advance towards self-Government. It was meticulously
drawn up and represented, in effect, a draft Constitution for an
Indian Dominion. It was made easy to fill in gaps later; old fea-
tures which were left such as the Office of the Secretary of State,
could be lopped off without difficulty, and provision was made for
a measure of change within the Constitution. The London con-
nection began to assume the appearance of legal umbilical cord
which could be snipped at the right moment. "
In spite of the best efforts on the part of Lord Linlithgow, the
federal part of the Government of India Act, 1935, could not be
brought into force. The Indian States put forward all kinds of
hurdles in the way. Moreover, the Muslim League was deadly
opposed to the introduction of federation at the Centre. The Con
gress also unwittingly opposed the federal part of the Constitution
even after the inauguration of provincial autonomy, little realising
that this action of theirs would strengthen the centrifugal tenden-
cies which could ultimately disrupt the unity of the country.
When World War II broke out in September 1939, India was
immediately declared a belligerent country by the British Govern-
ment without consulting the people of India. The Congress Work-
ing Committee lodged a strong protest and called upon the British
Government to declare their war aims in clear terms. The Con-
gress enquired from the Government whether those aims included
"the treatment of India as a free nation whose policy will be guid-
ed in accordance with the wishes of the people. ” The Congress
Working Committee declared in unequivocal terms that "the Com-
mittee cannot associate themselves or offer any cooperation in a
war which is conducted on imperialistic lines and which is meant
to consolidate imperialism in India and elsewhere. "
## p. 663 (#703) ############################################
THE AUGUST OFFER (1940)
663
The British Government refused to give the assurance demanded
by the Congress. It made vague promises to the effect that at the
end of the war the British Government would be willing to consult
the various interests in India to make such modifications in the
Government of India Act 1935 as might appear to be desirable.
The result was that the Congress decided to non-cooperate with
the British Government and called upon the Congress ministries in
8 provinces to resign. This was done in October 1939. This ac-
tion of the Congress has been criticised by V. P. Menon on the
ground that it was the resignation of the Congress ministries which
helped Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League to become strong in
Indian politics. Moreover, if the Congress ministries had not re-
signed voluntarily, the British Government would not have got the
courage to dismiss them as they could not afford to lose the good-
will of the people in those critical days.
There was a lot of discontentment in the country and in order to
meet that Lord Linlithgow declared in January 1940 that “Domi-
nion status of the Westminster variety as soon as possible after the
war” was the goal of British policy in India. However, this did
not bring any response from the Congress side.
THE AUGUST OFFER (1940)
On the eve of the battle of Britain, a new declaration of British
policy known as the August Offer was made on 8 August 1940.
This offer was made by the Viceroy on behalf of the British Gov-
ernment. It was pointed out that though the differences which
prevented national unity remained unbridged in India, the expan-
sion of the Executive Council of the Governor-General and the
establishment of an Advisory War Council should not be postponed
any longer. In view of the doubts as to whether the position of
the minorities would be sufficiently safeguarded in any future consti-
tutional change or not, the British Government reaffirmed its desire
that full weight would be given to minority opinion. To quote the
words of the Viceroy, “It goes without saying that they could not
contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace
and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority
is directly denied by large and powerful elements of India's national
life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements
into submission to such a Government. ” Subject to the fulfilment
of their obligations—an allusion to such questions as defence, mino-
rity rights, the treaties with the states and the position of the Secre-
tary of State Services, the British Government concurred in the
Indian desire that the framing of the new constitution should be
## p. 664 (#704) ############################################
664 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
"primarily the responsibility of Indians themselves and should origi-
nate from Indian conceptions of the social, economic and political
structure of the Indian life. ” Constitutional issues could not be
decided at "a moment when the national life is engaged in a strug-
gle for existence,” but after the War, a representative Indian body
would be set up to formulate the new constitution. In the mean-
time, the British Government would welcome and assist any efforts
to reach agreement as to the form and operation of this constitu-
tion-making body and as to the principles of the constitution. In
the interval, the British Government hoped that all parties and
communities in India would cooperate in India's war effort and
by thus working together pave the way for India's attainment of
free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The August Offer undoubtedly registered an advance of first-
rate importance in the method of handling the constitutional prob-
lem. It was clearly stated that the Indians were to be primarily
responsible for making the new constitution of India. It followed
that if the Indians agreed to the kind of constitution they wanted
and if that constitution provided for the due discharge of British
obligations, it would be virtually impossible for the British Parlia-
ment to reject that constitution. Mr. Amery pointed out that
Dominion status was not inferior to that of nations that stood alone,
but was actually superior. “There is no higher status in the
world. ”
The August Offer was rejected by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad,
the Congress President. Jawaharlal Nehru declared that the whole
conception of Dominion Status for India was “as dead as a door-
nail. ” The view of Mahatma Gandhi was that the August Offer
widened the gulf between India as represented by the Congress
and England.
The response of the Muslim League to the August Offer was
different. Its Working Committee welcomed that part of the Offer
which was condemned by the Congress. According to the Muslim
League, the August Offer met its demand "for a clear assurance
to the fact that no future constitution, interim or final, should be
adopted by the British Government without their approval and
consent. " The League declared that "the partition of India was
the only solution of the most difficult problem of India's future
constitution. ” In spite of this, the League neither accepted nor
rejected the August Offer.
The Liberals of India asked for a further clarification from the
British Government. They demanded that the enjoyment of Domi-
nion Status must be unqualified and a time limit for its attainment
must be fixed. That must not be delayed on account of the atti-
>
## p. 665 (#705) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
665
tude of any minority in India. The Indian members of the Execu-
tive Council of the Governor-General must be party leaders and
they should also be in a majority.
Nothing came out of the August Offer on account of the attitude
of the Congress. The comments of Mr. Amery were in these words:
"Inspired by an ardent national patriotism, the (Congress) have
striven to make that organization national and all-embracing. If
only they had succeeded, if Congress could in fact speak, as it pro-
fesses to speak, for all the main elements in India's national life,
then however advanced their demands, our problem might have
been very different and in many respects far easier than it is today. ”
CRIPPS PROPOSALS (1942)
The deadlock in Indian politics continued.
