No More Learning

In 1881-2 a determined effort was made to turn these district
committees into something more consonant with English ideas. It
was proposed at first that the local administration should be concen-
trated in the hands of one committee for each district with subordinate
committees for the subdivisions, the district or subdivisional officer
1 XVII, XVIII, XX of 1871, IV of 1871 (Madras).
Proceedings, Bengal Legis. Council, 25 March, 1871.
• Idem, 3 June, 1871.


## p. 519 (#559) ############################################

RURAL BOARDS
519
presiding and being responsible for the executive side of the work. At
least one-half of the members of these committees were to be private
persons nominated or elected as might seem best. This did not repre-
sent much advance on the state of affairs then existing, but by the
resolution u. May, 1882, a further step was made towards more liberal
ideas, and it was recognised that the districts were too large for
effective supervision by private persons. It was suggested that the
new boards should have a large preponderance of non-official mem-
bers, chosen wherever practicable by some system of election, and
where possible the chairmanship and control of the executive should
vest in the hands of private persons and not of government officials.
It was desired that the smallest administrative unit-the subdivision
-should ordinarily form the maximum area to be placed under a
local board. The jurisdiction of the primary boards was to be so
limited in area as to ensure both local knowledge and local interest
on the part of each of the members. Internal control by officials over
the boards was to be relaxed, but outside control was to be main-
tained by requiring sanction for certain actions and by retaining the
power of intervention in case of neglect or default, this power ex-
tending in the last resort to the suspension of the delinquent board.
It is curious and significant that control by an auditor empowered to
surcharge was not mentioned, although this had been definitely
provided in the English Public Health Act of 1875 (s. 248).
The legislation that followed in the train of this resolution showed
the greatest div; rsity with only a partial observance of the instructions
issued. The new proposals were too drastic a change from existing
conditions to be accepted with confidence, and the various provinces,
while acting on the resolution, were nowhere prepared to follow it
completely. All, except Burma, accepted the principle, but all asked
that its fulfilment might be gradual. Some attempts were made to
base the system on the existing indigenous self-government in the
villages, and this at first obtained the fullest support from the higher
authorities. In addressing his council on the Local Rates Bill for the
Central Provinces in November, 1882, the governor-general remarked:
"I think it very desirable that here as elsewhere, where there may
still remain indigenous institutions of local self-government, that they
should be made use of to the utmost possible extent". 1 By this bill
the basic electorate was composed of the village headmen who were
grouped together to elect members to the subordinate local boards
which in their turn elected the majority of the district council. The
district officer was carefully excluded from the chairman's office but
the ordinary district remained as the main unit of administration, an
area much too large to be known or even interesting to the private
members of the board, a defect that was to prove fatal to genuine
local self-government on the English model. A little later the same
1 Proceedings, India Legis. Council, 2 November, 1882.
· I of 1883.


## p. 520 (#560) ############################################

520
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
council legislating for the Panjab and the North-Western Provinces and
Oudh departed still further from the principle of utilising indigenous
materials and practically retained the system already in vogue in the
provinces, save that a certain elective element was introduced. The
district officer remained in charge of the administration of the district
council or board, while the subordinate bodies for the subdivisions
had no independent power, little money to use, and only the most
uninteresting routine work to supervise.
As has been noted above, the Bombay Presidency led the way in
the attempt to stimulate local interest in rural improvement, but,
owing to the necessity of concentrating on the construction of good
roads throughout the districts, administration was completely cen-
tralised and the local bodies had little if any power over expenditure.
New legislation, however, in 1884 established again the subdivisional
boards with an electorate somewhat on the lines of that in the Central
Provinces, and placed at their disposal a portion of the cess and certain
fees. The chairmen remained official, but owing to the powers given
to the subordinate boards there was a greater diffusion of work in the
different parts of the districts. Madras went a step further on the
path towards decentralisation by taking for its primary boards com-
mittees or panchayats for the larger and more prosperous villages, in
many of which voluntary sanitary associations already existed. The
duties of the panchayats were to clean up the village and in some cases
to maintain roads and provide a water supply. Their funds were
found from a house-rate, which could in the last resort be imposed by
the governor if the villagers themselves insisted on preferring in-
sanitary conditions to the payment of rates. The subdivisional or
taluk boards were armed with considerable powers and funds, while
the district board exercised administration over the whole district.
There was thus a real association of the people with the work in
connection with communications, education and sanitation at all
stages, but the chairmen of the taluk and district boards remained
official, so that, except in the village unions, executive power re-
mained that of the local government and control was exercised from
within rather than from without.
More striking is the story of the Bengal Local Self-Government Act,
by which a provincial government started to carry out the principles
of the 1882 resolution but was thwarted by the secretary of state.
Mr Macaulay in introducing the bill in January, 1883, referred to the
great progress that had been made in the last twelve years in educa-
tion, the making of roads, etc. , but admitted that little had been done
to develop local self-government. The district committees established
a
1 XIV and XX of 1883.
: Proceedings, Bombay Legis. Council, 25 August, 1883.
3 Act 1 of 1884 (Bombay Council).
• Act V of 1884 (Madras Council).


## p. 521 (#561) ############################################

RURAL BOARDS
521
in 1871 had not proved satisfactory, as the areas were too large for
such bodies to manage. It was therefore proposed to utilise to
the utmost existing and well-established institutions and base local
self-government on village committees which would form the
“executive hands” of a local board constituted for an area not greater
than a subdivision. He urged that there was no necessity for a district
board, but the necessary supervision could be provided by a central
board for the whole of Bengal. While the sanction of the secretary
of state to these proposals was awaited, some test elections for village
committees were held, and found to give excellent results, as the mode
of election, viz. calling the villagers together and letting them choose
their own representatives after discussion and not by silent votes,
suited the genius of the country. These interesting and bold proposals,
however, were vetoed by the secretary of state, who desired that the
powers of control should be conferred on a district committee pre-
sided over by the district magistrate. ? Both the local government and
the Government of India urged that the proper position of the magis-
trate as the controlling authority of the district was outside these
boards, and again put up a scheme of subdivisional boards with
control by the divisional commissioner. But the secretary of state
would have none of it and insisted on the establishment of district
boards. He wrote:3
If the plan which I have sketched out were adopted, the government would
be able with due regard to the public interest to leave even more in the hands
of the local bodies than it could with safety when trusting only to the supervision
of the magistrate acting apart and without the advantage of constant intercourse
with the members of a district committee.
The result was the act of 1885 and a system by which the district
magistrate controlled the work throughout the district, the needs of
which were known to him better than to any other member of the
board, as his duties took him all over the countryside. The district
board fulfilled the secretary of state's desire for efficiency, for it was
efficient in getting work done, but there was little if any development
of the English form of local self-government and no utilisation of the
existing and old institutions in the villages”. Great was the change
from the spirit of the 1882 resolution, in which Lord Ripon had
declared:
it is not primarily with a view to improvement in administration that the measure
is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as a measure of political and
popular education. His Excellency in Council has himself no doubt that in course
of time as local knowledge and local interest are brought to bear more freely
on local administration improved efficiency will in fact follow.
These high hopes were hardly justified by the actual working of the
various systems of local government which they had inspired. The
1 Proceedings, Bengal Legis. Council, 20 January, 1883.
; Idem, 9 February, 1884.
3 Idem, 14 March, 1885.
a


## p. 522 (#562) ############################################

522
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
!
boards were neither local nor popular, and the machinery of an
election system inspired no enthusiasm. A popular will outside the
village was unknown, and inside was accustomed to find expression
in discussion until a unanimous decision was reached. The hope that
it would be generated by polling booths was disappointed, for the
elected representatives could hardly be said to embody a popular will.
Generally the elections excited little interest and a large proportion
of the vacant seats were filled without contest. Even when sitting on
the board, the representatives of the people were mainly apathetic and
prepared to leave such matters to the disposal of the presiding district
magistrate. Further the districts were units much too large to be
managed by any single representative body. The elected repre-
sentatives knew the immediate vicinity of their respective villages
and the headquarters of the district but were ignorant of the rest of
the area. The subdivision itself was too large an area for an elected
body to manage. The result was that the work of the local bodies was
not spontaneous but actuated by the directing energy and know-
ledge of the district officer who was known to men from all parts of
the district. In the circumstances it was essential that he should
remain in control of these large local bodies, and, even after they had
been working for a quarter of a century, the Decentralisation Com-
mission was of opinion that the district officer should remain at the
head of the board. 1 Even if the outside control of the local bodies had
been increased by giving the auditors, as in England, the power to
surcharge individuals for the misapplication of funds, it is doubtful
whether the services of the district officer could have been dispensed
with, as there was so little vitality in the new bodies.
An example of this lack of vitality may be found in the fact that
these bodies showed little enthusiasm for any attempts to increase
their incomes from those sources which were under their own control,
such as public ferries, cattle-pounds, tolls, etc. The greater part of
their funds came from local cesses assessed and realised by govern-
ment officials. Had it been their duty to collect this money for them-
selves, their income would have been much more attenuated and very
little could have been done to improve life in the districts. As it was,
the district boards, with the exception of those in Madras, kept the
lion's share of the funds for their own work and starved the subordinate
boards, leaving them only enough to carry out works of a petty and
routine nature. It was little wonder that these bodies became com-
pletely apathetic and in most parts of India were condemned as useless.
The contrasting progress of the subdivisional boards armed with
substantial powers and funds, and of the village unions in Madras
realising their own rates, showed clearly that the system elsewhere
was at fault, as it had not been built up from the bottom. A com-
prehensive overhaul was necessary, for the attempt to transplant from
1 Report (1909), para. 795.


## p. 523 (#563) ############################################

PRESIDENCY TOWNS
523
England rural self-government had not been a success. It is now to
be seen how similar efforts fared in connection with the presidency
towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras.
PRESIDENCY TOWNS
In the presidency towns the Western ideas of local self-government
have had a comparatively long trial, as they were introduced by a
statute of George III which gave authority to the governor-general
to appoint justices of the peace in these towns and empowered these
justices to appoint scavengers and watchmen and to levy a rate to
pay them on owners and occupiers of houses and ground. Earlier
English law was followed, a previous statute of the same monarch
being cited as a precedent. It is significant that although the English
statute is closely followed in constituting the local body, the clause
appointing a person to collect the rates and keep accounts, and pro-
viding punishment in the event of his negligence, is omitted. This
omission to provide for the strict supervision of public money, the
backbone of English local self-government, occurs again and again
in the history of Indian municipal government. It is one of the facts
that help to explain the lack of success in transplanting this English
institution to the soil of an oriental country.
The statute was passed none too soon, for Grandpré could write of
Calcutta in 1790 that the public drains were regarded as the natural
receptacles for all refuse and filth, that carcasse: were left to rot and
putrefy in the streets, and that jackals had for two nights preyed on
a human corpse thrown down at his gate. Little change was made
in the next thirty or forty years, but gradually regular establishments
grew up. The body of justices was supposed to control the staff for
the collection of the rates and an engineer in charge of the roads and
conservancy. In all cases, however, the money collected was inade-
quate for the work to be done and the sanitation of the rapidly growing
presidency towns was indescribably bad.
Between 1817 and 1830 spasmodic attempts were made in Madras
and Calcutta to undertake special works paid out of the lottery funds,
and much was done with this money in laying out these towns, the
roads or drains on completion being handed over to the justices to
maintain out of their assessments. Even for the maintenance work
the funds never sufficed, and the provincial governments supplied the
balances required. In Bombay alone was an additional tax-that
on carriages and carts—successfully levied, the proceeds of which
were spent on the roads. The justices as a body did not take much
interest in their work, and their power was gradually concentrated
in the hands of the chief magistrate, who was helped in Calcutta by
1
33
Geo. III, c. 52.
7 Geo. III, c. 42.
: 8. W. Goode, Municipal Calcutta, p. 10.


## p. 524 (#564) ############################################

524
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
1
1
the superintendent of police to collect the taxes and to supervise the
work of conservancy-a Herculean task. No trace of popular govern-
ment is apparent, while there was a general fear of imposing taxation
adequate for the work required and of realising rigorously the rates
imposed.
The first comprehensive attempt to tackle the situation was made
by “The Fever Hospital and Municipal Improvement Committee”,
which from 1836 to 1849 overhauled all the departments of Calcutta,
laying bare the noisome defects in conservancy, and even extracting
Rs. 14,000 from a highly placed official who could not explain a
deficiency in the accounts. During this period began some efforts to
get the residents to take more interest in the work of the town, as their
co-operation was found essential. Accordingly the acts, XXIV of
1840 for Calcutta and XXII of 1841 for Madras, while widening the
purposes to which the municipal assessment might be applied, gave
powers to the inhabitants of the different divisions of the towns to ask
for the control of the assessment and the collection of taxes. This first
attempt to induce co-operation failed, as the residents had no desire
to participate in the disagreeable tasks of collecting and administering
public funds.
Bombay found its own solution in Act XI of 1845 which concen-
trated the administrative power in the hands of a Conservancy Board,
on which were two European and three Indian justices, elected by
the body of justices, with the senior magistrate of police as chairman.
In Calcutta, however, experiments continued to be made to enlist the
help of the people by direct election, but the elections were a farce
and gave opportunity for the grossest abuses. The result was to dis-
credit completely the elective system for years to come and to put a
stop to the efforts of the government to make the public partners in
the management of the town.
A fresh attempt to grapple with the sanitation of the presidency
towns was made in 1856 when Act XIV (for the conservancy and
improvement of the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay) and
Act XXV (for the better assessment and collection of rates) were
passed. The proceedings of the council show that the various points
in the bills were fully debated, the members always referring to the
English statutes for guidance, but also again and again deferring to
such Indian opinion as was expressed. Some change had to be made,
as it was admitted on all hands that the existing system had failed
and that the election of the commissioners could not be entrusted to
a direct vote. Thus Sir James Colville did not suppose there was any
town in the world of equal size and opulence in such a disgraceful
state of darkness as Calcutta, 1 while Mr Peacock emphasised the
importance of drinking water and drainage compared with lighting. ”
1 Proceedings, India Legis. Council, 6 December, 1856.
Idem, 13 December, 1856.
.


## p. 525 (#565) ############################################

PRESIDENCY TOWNS
525
Special acts were passed for the appointment of three commissioners
in each town and the difference in development of each begins to
appear. In the Calcutta act? were special provisions for gas-lighting
and for the construction of sewers. In Bombaya power was given to
levy town-dues, a profitable source of income, while the town was
made to pay part of the cost of the police force and to set aside money
to repay the government the cost of constructing the Vehar waterworks.
For the first time an attempt was made to deal with the conservancy
of the large towns on the lines that had proved successful in England,
but with this fundamental difference that the scheme was not a
natural growth as in England, but an importation, which could be
worked only by the help of officials appointed by the government.
However, many defects soon became evident. For example,
responsibility was divided among the three commissioners; residents
were not associated in any way with the administration; there was no
power to raise the necessu. y funds, while proper audit control was
completely lacking. The towns remained filthy, and the complicated
conservancy system of Act XIV existed only on paper. Each province,
now armed with legislative powers, sought its own solution of the
problem.
In Calcutta the justices were again' vested with the general control
of municipal expenditure while executive power was concentrated in
the hands of their chairman appointed by the government, his position
being further strengthened by his being commissioner of police.
Provided with funds by the raising of the house- and water-rates, Sir
Stewart Hogg seized the opportunity of taking up on a proper scale the
combined system of drainage and water supply, which made possible
the vast strides in sanitation apparent at this time. But the hundred
and twenty justices formed a clumsy body to supervise a strong and
active commissioner, and there were many wrangles between the two
parties. Still the improvements effected made them averse to any
constitutional change till ten years later.
Although Bombay had larger available funds than Calcutta, the
three commissioners had been unable to work together and financial
chaos had been the result. There was no check on accounts, no con-
tracts for works, while three and a half lakhs were unaccoun. ed for by
one officer. The condition of the sanitation of the town was dreadful
and the death-rate was rising rapidly. By the act of 1865 the justices
were constituted a body corporate, with control over the budget, but
all executive power was concentrated in the hands of a highly paid
government official. In view of the financial scandals of the late
régime, a special controller of accounts was appointed, who was to be
independent of the chairman and whose signature was necessary for
any expenditure. With the appointment of Mr Arthur Crawford as
1 XXVIII of 1856.
? XXV of 1858.
· VI of 1863 (Bengal Council). • Bombay Municipal Act of 1865.


## p. 526 (#566) ############################################

526
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
municipal commissioner and Dr Hewlett as health officer, the work
of sanitation was pushed on vigorously, and the whole administration
tightened up
Madras at first did not alter its constitution, as the justices had been
found to take little interest in municipal work, and they could not
afford to appoint a highly paid official as in Bombay. Even with
fresh taxation they could only maintain the existing services and no
drainage scheme could be attempted. Later on, however, legislation?
was passed to associate the people with the administration by dividing
the town into eight wards, with four councillors appointed by the
government for each. Executive power was concentrated in the
hands of the president and fresh sources of income were found in
liquor-licence fees and tolls on goods entering the port.
In the decade 1865–74 great improvements were made in Calcutta
and Bombay, thanks to the funds available and the vigorous per-
sonalities of the executive heads, but many flaws existed in the con-
stitutions of the towns. Improvements were effected in the legislation
of the next decade, when financial control over the executive was
strengthened and the modern system of election of representatives
directly by ratepayers came at last to stay. In each of the towns half
the councillors were elected, but the executive remained in the hands
of an official nominated by the government. Control over this official
was financial, steps being taken to introduce some sort of continuous
audit or supervision either by paid auditors or by representatives of
the corporation.
A start was made in Bombay, where there had been great popular
agitation against the commissioner on account of his enforcement of
taxation and of pushing on the works necessary for conservancy
without having the full support of the justices. The controller of
expenditure appointed under the act of 1865 did not control, 2 as he
had in practice become a subordinate of the commissioner, while the
justices, five hundred in number, were much too numerous to con-
stitute any detailed check of finance. After much controversy the
corporation was reduced to sixty-four members, sixteen nominated
by the government, sixteen elected by the resident justices, and thirty-
two elected directly by the ratepayers. The executive power was
concentrated in the hands of the commissioner, but provision was
made for the weekly audit of the accounts by the town council, a
standing committee of the corporation, and for a monthly audit
by paid auditors. This constitution stood the test of experience and
remained in force with some additions and improvements till the end
of the period under review. Bombay was thus the first to solve satis-
factorily the problem of successful local self-government, not on a
1 Act IX of 1867 (Madras Council).
2 Proceedings, Bombay Legis. Council, 27 March, 1872.
3 Bombay Municipal Act of 1872.
1


## p. 527 (#567) ############################################

PRESIDENCY TOWNS
527
model of the English system, but in a manner evolved by and for itself
-a strong executive officer controlled rigidly in financial matters
by a committee answerable to the corporation, half of whom were
directly elected by the ratepayers. "
In the meantime various acts had enlarged the powers of the
Calcutta corporation, mainly in connection with the provision of a
proper supply of filtered water. The bringing-in of a consolidating
act was the opportunity to revise the clumsy constitution of one
hundred and twenty justices vis-d-vis a strong commissioner, neither
side possessing clearly defined powers. Direct election by ratepayers
was introduced, two-thirds of the seventy-two members of the corpora-
tion being thus appointed. Salutary provisions for the payment of
interest on municipal debt and for the formation of a reserve fund
were made and special attention was paid to drainage, water supply,
and conservancy. Waterworks and sewers were constructed on a large
scale. Refuse and sweepings were taken outside the town, and the
practice of throwing corpses into the river was at last stopped. In
1882 a large portion of the suburban area was added to the town, as
only thus could efficient water supply and drainage be given to those
places which had become increasingly liable to disease and were a
perpetual menace to the health of Calcutta. The opportunity was
taken to reconstitute the town council”, a body formed in imitation
of the Bombay body of that name, to increase to fifty the number of
commissioners elected by the ratepayers, and to make obligatory the
expenditure of two lakhs on drainage-works and the improvement of
congested areas. The government remitted the annual chargeof almost
three lakhs for the police, and this money was applied to the improve-
ment of the new area. No move however had been made to strengthen
the executive, and experience was soon to show the necessity for
reform in this direction. Sanitary conditions became so menacing
that the government had to intervene, and in 1899 it passed a new
act which put definite limits to the interference with the executive
by the corporation and large committees. Although the executive was
supposed to be centred in the chairman, it was subject to the limita-
tions put upon it by resolutions, not only of the corporation as a whole,
but also of the committees dealing with subjects like water supply,
town improvement, roads, buildings, conservancy, etc. The corpora-
tion and these committees, being large bodies unsuited to deal with
details of administration, good government was an impossibility, as
the members would insist on discussing every little point of the work,
so that prompt action could seldom be taken.
Under the new acts only half the commissioners were elected by
the ratepayers, the remainder being appointed, four each by the
Bengal Chamber of Commerce and the Calcutta Trades' Association,
1 For a full description see Masani, Evolution of Local Self-Government in Bombay.
: IV of 1876 (Bengal Council).
3 III of 1899 (Bengal Council).


## p. 528 (#568) ############################################

528
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
two by the port commissioners and fifteen by the local government.
The powers of the corporation were confined to the fixing of the rates
of taxation and to the performance of general functions-laying down
policy, etc. , subjects which can be efficiently performed by a large
body. The executive was vested in the chairman, while between him
and the corporation was interposed a general committee consisting
of the chairman and twelve commissioners, four elected by the ward
commissioners, four by the other commissioners, and four appointed
by the local government. This committee was empowered to decide
matters too detailed for the decision of the corporation but too im-
portant to be left simply to the decision of the chairman.
The recon-
stituted corporation directed its efforts to the punctual collection of
rates, the completion of the drainage system, and the improvement
of the water supply. Experience showed that there was plenty of
driving power in the corporation and that the revised constitution
had fulfilled its object of preventing action being strangled by debate.
Great strides were made in the health and improvement of the town,
but it was not popular government, and little interest was taken in
the elections.
Madras still suffered from lack of funds, the taxation per head being
in the 'seventies about a fifth of that in the other presidency towns.
There was no adequate water supply, no proper system of drainage,
and no funds to provide the one or the other. Indian members of
the legislative council protested against the need of drains and declared
that the population could bear no more taxation. The state of the
town with its rising death-rate finally convinced them that some-
thing had to be done. In 1878 the elective system was introduced,
sixteen out of the thirty-two members being elected by the ratepayers,
but the president and the two vice-presidents were salaried officials
appointed by the government. 1 The corporation had power to deal
with the budget and the raising of loans, but the detailed scrutiny of
accounts was left to two official auditors who maintained a continuous
audit. Fresh taxes were imposed to carry through the much-needed
work of drainage and water supply as far as funds would allow, but
neither could be made really satisfactory or complete. A further
extension of the elective system was made in 18842 when twenty-four
members were elected by the ratepayers, and the long struggle over
the water supply and drainage still continued. Like Calcutta, the
city of Madras lies in a plain far from hills, so that drainage presents
a problem of peculiar difficulty, while large capital was required to
bring good water from such a distance. As Madras had not developed
into a great commercial centre, like Bombay or Calcutta, there was
always a shortage of funds and continual efforts to find new sources
of taxation. In 1904 a new municipal act' was passed on the lines that
1 Act V of 1878 (Madras Council). 2 Act I of 1884 (Madras Council).
: Act III of 1904 (Madras Council).


## p. 529 (#569) ############################################

DISTRICT TOWNS
529
had proved successful in Calcutta. The number of commissioners
elected by the ratepayers was reduced, while special representation
was given to the commercial interests in the town. The separate
functions of the corporation, standing committee, and the chairman,
were clearly defined, while the provisions for continuous audit were
maintained. Armed with this new constitution and large grants from
the government, Madras at last tackled its problems of water supply
and drainage on a comprehensive scale and started to deal with its
congested areas.
In the end all three towns, although by devious routes, found
ultimately the same solution for municipal administration, namely a
limited electorate, elaborate provisions for audit, a large corporation
with full control over finance, and a strong executive centred in a
government official, who was left much freedom of action within
well-defined limits. It was not local self-government as known in
England, or indeed in Europe, but a curious hybrid that solved the
elementary problems of water supply, drainage and conservancy, and
was later able to give these towns most of the amenities of modern
cities. The control of the government was mainly through the person of
the official who was in charge of the executive. Apart from this it was
limited to making comments on the annual and audit reports. If a
corporation failed to carryout certain statutory duties, the government
had the power to step in and have them done, but there was no power
of control over these bodies like that vested in England in the person
of an auditor armed with the power of surcharge. In its place are most
elaborate systems of audit and supervision but nothing of the simple
direct discipline of enforcing responsibility for public money by
touching the pockets of those who either misuse it or neglect to realise
it on behalf of the public.
DISTRICT TOWNS
In Moghul times municipal administration, where it existed, was in
the hands of the kotwal or town-governor, who also combined the
duties of magistrate and police officer. An autocrat, who could do as
he pleased so long as the imperial government remained stable and
received the necessary revenues, the kotwal maintained a few simple
municipal services for the benefit of traders, as his income depended
on the flow of trade into the town. When the British took over the
administration of the country, it was only natural that the officials
and the people should sit down together to decide how funds could be
raised to pay a conservancy staff or a night-watch, who should be
responsible for the supervision and payment of the staff, etc. Leading
merchants, householders and landlords in concert decided how the
money should be raised, whether by house-rates, town-duties, tolls
1 Moreland, India at the Death of Akbar, chap. ü.
34
CHIVI


## p. 530 (#570) ############################################

530
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
a
or otherwise. They drew up an assessment list and appointed a man
to collect the money. Such a body, with the magistrate at its head,
was so powerful that nobody thought of opposing the demands of the
tax collector so long as these were reasonable-a committee of the
above description would not impose oppressive taxes—while all had
the satisfaction of a conservancy staff to clean up the town and of
hearing the night-watchman on his rounds in the dark. In some such
way municipal committees, without any legal sanction and without
any rules, started in the old commercial centres and political capitals
of India. Similar methods were employed for the larger villages,
which, when they contained administrative headquarters, soon began
to exhibit features characteristic of the town rather than of the
village. Such action has been known even in recent years and was
easy to take, as it suited the people who were ready for concerted
action but had a dread of putting themselves definitely under a new
law. This process can be illustrated from various parts of India.
In the Panjab, before the days of British administration, there had
been levied a taxma handful-on all goods coming into the town.
After annexation the British officials continued this levy in many
places, devoting the proceeds to the maintenance of a police force and
then to improvements in the town. For the supervision of the latter
municipal committees, the members of which were often chosen by
the different communities, were called together and assisted the
officials in this work. 1 The Panjab was a province of many towns,
which varied from large commercial and political capitals like Delhi,
Lahore, Amritsar, Peshawar and Multan, to big agricultural villages.
Municipal life grew naturally, suiting itself to the diversity of local
conditions, depending for guidance on the local officials. In the
Administration Report of 1855–6 it was noted that drainage existed
in all cities and elaborate projects had been formed for Lahore,
Amritsar and Ambala, the cost of which would be “chiefly defrayed
in the most spirited manner by the citizens”. Although a few planes
availed themselves of the general municipal act (XXVI of 1850), the
great majority were without legislation till Act XV of 1867 was passed.
This was a brief measure enacted as an experiment for five years,
reserving wide powers to the lieutenant-governor and leaving to the
local committees the choice of their own form of taxation. Expendi-
ture from the municipal fund was to be applied first to the main-
tenance of a police force and then to the making and repair of roads,
drains and tanks, and to the provision of lighting, poor-houses,
market-places and education.
In Bombay Presidency, on the other hand, great use was made of
Act XXVI, so that by 1856 it was in force in 336 “towns”. To bring
it into force the local people had to petition the government for its
introduction, and the government, after giving the necessary sanction,
Proceedings, India Legis. Council, 14 December, 1866.
.


## p. 531 (#571) ############################################

DISTRICT TOWNS
531
a
appointed the local magistrate and others to form a local committee,
which had power to propose taxes and carry out improvements in the
town. Apparently in this province the district officers had little
difficulty in finding half a dozen people in a town to forward a petition
on which action was taken to bring the act into force. This act was
naturally vague in its provisions and so the greatest diversity of
customs and rules grew up under its nominal control. A peculiarly
fruitful field was found in the large villages of the Satara district,
where in pre-British days there had existed institutions of a municipal
type. By 1856 as many as 292 municipalities had been established in
this district but most of them existed only for a year or two. Bombay
Presidency remained content with this act for some years, but legis-
lated so that dispensaries and schools might be paid out of municipal
funds, and later threw on them a proportion of the police charges.
The application of municipal government to many of these “towns”
was farcical, one mentioned in council when Act VI of 1873 was being
considered having an annual income of only Rs. 88, most of which
was used to pay an orderly. By the act of 1873 Bombay brought its
legislation into line with that of the rest of India and classified its
towns with a population of not less than 10,000 as "cities” and as
“towns” those of not less than 2000. It put a large non-official ele-
ment on the “city” boards and prescribed special conservancy work
for these places. The “town" municipalities remained still in the
hands of their presidents, the district officers, while even for the
“cities” there were no elected members.
In Madras the people stoutly resisted the introduction of Act XXVI
and none of the inhabitants could be persuaded to petition the govern-
ment for its introduction. As elsewhere the necessity arose of some sort
of municipal administration and voluntary associations were started in
a few places. These the government recognised by making grants equal
to the amount raised by private subscription. But the government did
not long remain satisfied with this system, and passed Act X of 1865
so that funds could be raised for the police in the country towns and
provision be made for the construction, repairing and cleansing of
drains, the making and repairing of roads, etc. The government
decided how much was to be raised in each town and then contributed
a quarter of that amount, partly to help the local people and partly to
prevent the local officers making too extravagant demands. There
was a strong official element on each board, and even the private
persons were all nominated and held office for one year only. By 1869
the act had been introduced into forty-four towns, being received
with indifference in most places, and fierce opposition where strong
religious feelings existed. In some places, however, "the interest of
1 Proceedings, Bombay Legis. Council, 11 August, 1873.
· Administration Report, 1855-6.
• Proceedings, Bombay Legis. Council, 11 August, 1873.
34-2


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LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
a
the native commissioners was aroused and the act carried out with
great heartiness". 1
In the Central Provinces and Oudh, Act XV of 1867, framed for
the Panjab, was introduced into several towns, the elective system
being adopted in many places from the first. The Jubbalpore
committee led the way in boldly borrowing money on perfectly
adequate security to carry out a large water supply scheme,a while
in Nagpur great progress had been made without any legislation in
cleaning up the town, driving streets through the worst areas, and
laying the foundations of a good drainage system. Lucknow, a city
that had been besieged and sacked, was in such a dreadful state that
a “Conservancy Committee” was formed in 1858, which worked on
the lines of Act XXVI, raised funds by means of long-established
octroi, and generally cleaned up the city. The position of the com-
mittee was legalised by Act XVIII of 1864, an act ahead of the times,
as provision was made in it for the annual election of nineteen out of
twenty-five commissioners. Funds were raised by octroi, but the old
tradition of imperial taxation remained as the divisional commissioner
retained for general purposes a share of the takings, being by law
compelled to give only one-third to the municipal committee. In the
North-Western Provinces legislation was modelled on that framed for
the Panjab the year before, save that the taxes were laid down and
limited by law and that the proportion of official members on the
boards was smaller.
In Bengal legislation was enacted to enable local officials to deal
with the insanitary conditions of the towns, which were thought to
be the reason for the widespread virulent epidemic in 1863. Act III
of 1864, which governed the larger towns, followed the lines of the
Calcutta Suburbs Act, with elaborate conservancy clauses. For the
smaller places Act VI of 1868 gave the local magistrate power to tax
for police and conservancy, and furnished him with a consultative
committee which might advise him about assessments and local im-
provements. In both cases all the non-officials were nominated and
control rested entirely with the magistrate. Taxation was strictly
limited, being mainly a house-rate in the former act and in the latter
a personal tax on the income of the inhabitants.
In Burma as early as 1853 two funds were started in Rangoon, one
from the proceeds of the sale of the town and suburban allotments,
which was spent on the reclamation of swamps, construction of roads,
etc. , and the other, a municipal tax imposed on each site, used to pay
for the town police, conservancy staff, and regular repairs to roads,
bridges, etc. In 1858, after consultation with influential local in-
habitants, the riunicipal tax was extended to fourteen other towns. In
1 Report of the Committee on Local Self-Government in Madras, 1882, pt 1, chap. i.
: Proceedings, India Legis. Council, 11 March, 1873.
• Administration Report, 1862–3.


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DISTRICT TOWNS
533
1861 there was some correspondence with the Government of India
about the introduction of municipal committees, but the chief com-
missioner reported that, except in Rangoon, the people desired only to
be consulted occasionally about the disposal of municipal funds, but
not to have the actual management in their own hands. Finally,
however, in 1874 the British Burma Municipal Act was passed and
applied to seven towns. Under this act committees were nominated
for each of these towns, the elective principle not coming into force
till 1882. In addition to these seven towns there were in that year
twenty-four other places in which town-funds were raised though not
under any act, the funds being spent by the district officers with such
advice as could be obtained from the town elders. The people of the
lesser towns, where funds were raised, objected strenuously to any
proposals that their towns should be constituted municipalities, as
they feared that the establishment of a municipality would cause new
and heavy taxes to be levied and would lead to restrictions on their
freedom. 1
The start of municipal institutions. was thus of diverse origin and
of varying procedure. Only in Bengal could they be said to be a
development of that in the presidency towns, where their power of
taxation and the interference of thegovernment were strictly limited by
law. On the other hand, in the Panjab, Central Provinces and Bombay
municipal laws were vague, there were no legal limits to taxation, and
the local government had complete powers of control. Midway
between these two cases came the towns in Madras, where taxes were
prescribed and moderate limits imposed on taxation. It is noteworthy
that municipal life flourished most in the second group, as the form
of administration by a government official who consulted the leading
people was a natural and liberal growth from the rule of the kotwal,
while the system of octroi gave them easily and without oppression
the funds necessary for the simplest amenities of town life. In almost
all cases the members of the municipal committees were appointed
on the recommendation of the district magistrate, so there was little
responsible local government, although there was considerable asso-
ciation of the local people with the officials in the administration of
the towns. Some slight extension of the system occurred in the
'seventies, mainly in giving municipal bodies power to deal more
effectively with conservancy and water supply. Little was done,
however, to introduce the system of elected representatives, and,
where elections were held, they were not found to give satisfactory
results. The better-class Indian disliked soliciting or being dependent
on the votes of the crowd and much preferred to find his way to the
committee by government nomination. Not that the seats were not
prized. It was most agreeable to sit with the head of the district to
discuss what ought to be done in the town, and there was keen com-
* Memoranda submitted to the Statutory Commission, 1930, p. 453 (Burma).
!


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534
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
a
petition for this honour. These gentlemen did excellent and hard
work in many towns, numerous tributes existing in the administration
reports and elsewhere to the wisdom of their advice in sanitation and
their usefulness in explaining new measures to their fellow-townsmen.
Much was done to improve water supply, to promote public health
and to provide for education. It was not, however, local self-govern-
ment, but, as described by Lord Hobart, governor of Madras in 1874,
government by"an oligarchy dependent upon a superior power which
may control its action to almost any conceivable extent":1
Into such an atmosphere came the resolution of Lord Ripon's
government in May, 1882, insisting that government control over
local bodies should be from without rather than from within. It was
thought that sufficient control could be obtained if government
sanction were necessary for by-laws, new taxation, and the raising of
loans, and a final power left in the hands of the government to set aside
resolutions that were ultra vires or even to supersede altogether a local
body that habitually neglected its duties or abused its powers. These
proposals were largely borrowed from the powers of control over local
bodies in England, but again it may be noted that the most efficient
and educative part of the English control was omitted, namely the
power of the auditor to bring home to the individual members of the
local bodies through surcharge their financial responsibility for the
proper realisation and disbursement of public money. With the control
thus proposed the greatest possible extension of the elective system
was urged, so that the local townspeople might have the opportunity
of learning to govern themselves through their own representatives,
even though the elective system as tested by a few experiments had
had no wide success. It was further urged that municipalities should
be relieved by the provincial governments of the heavy police charges,
as the local bodies had no control over the police, but that they should
be given definite duties to perform in connection with education,
sanitation, public health, etc,, matters which should prove of the
greatest interest to the people themselves.
Under this stimulus acts2 were passed for all the provinces, making
election compulsory for a large proportion-from one-half to three-
quarters of the municipal commissioners, and giving power for the
appointment of an elected chairman. This power was not utilised to
any great extent. Even when the power to elect the chairman was
granted, the municipal commissioners often elected an official, usually
the district officer, to this post. This not only indicated the friendly
co-operation already existing between the officials and the people,
but also the knowledge that the district officer could maintain their
rights better than any elected non-official. On the whole, great
1 Report of the Committee on Local Self-Government in Madras, 1882, p. 9.
• XV of 1883, XIII of 1884, XVII of 1884, XVIII of 1889, III of 1884 (Bengal
Council), IV of 1884 (Madras Council), II of 1884 (Bombay Council).


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DISTRICT TOWNS
535
interest was not taken in the elections, only a small proportion of the
voters exercising their rights, and many of the seats were uncontested.
There were, of course, exceptions in all the provinces, but at the end
of the nineteenth century it was generally held to be too soon to say
that Lord Ripon's policy in introducing self-government had been a
success. In some large towns, thanks to exceptional individual non-
officials of strong personality, it had succeeded, but in most places it
was still necessary for the local officials to help the private chairman
in administration.
While most of the larger towns in the west and north of India were
making good progress in providing wholesome water, proper drainage,
lighting, etc. , the need for much simpler administration for the
small towns and large villages was met by leaving such places
outside the ordinary municipal law. These were constituted "notified
areas”, areas in which only a few provisions of the municipal acts
applied, but where, as they developed, other sections could be brought
into force. Such places were administered by nominated committees
with the local officials at their head.
Except in Madras and Bengal the executive of the towns remained
largely official, as the election of non-official chairmen came very
slowly and was by no means universal by 1918. In the Panjab in 1915
out of the eighty-three towns that had the privilege of electing their
own chairman, only ten chose a non-official," while in Bombay and
the United Provinces the number of non-official chairmen was in-
creased only by continual efforts on the part of the local governments.
In many cases local factions and sectarian differences made the posi-
tion of an elected private person untenable, while in others he had
neither the time nor the staff to maintain administration at a reason-
able level. Latterlyseveral towns in Bombay and the United Provinces
have tried the experiment of concentrating executive power in the
hands of an experienced paid officer on the model that had been
found to work well in Bombay city.
Octroi or town-duties, the main source of municipal revenues in
Bombay, the Panjab, the United and the Central Provinces, had been
in existence in some form or other from a very early period. Megas-
thenes and Strabo refer to them, while the Ain-i-Akbari records show
that they were in force in the period of Muhammadan power and
that the duty of collection was in the hands of the kotwal. These town-
duties had been part of the imperial revenues, but at the beginning
of the nineteenth century began to be utilised for municipal purposes.
In the hands of energetic officers who wanted to carry out local
improvements, desired by the residents in the towns, they furnished
an easy means of finding the necessary funds. The East India Com-
pany, alarmed at the hindrance to trade that was caused by the
numerous imposts, abolished the tax in Bengal and the North-Western
1 Panjab Municipal Resolution, 1915--16.


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536
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
Provinces in 1835, but acquiesced in its revival in the latter province
and its use in the Panjab, Bombay and Central Provinces. The tax
had many obvious advantages as a means of finding money wanted
for municipal improvements. It was highly productive; it was borne by
all, yet hardly felt by the townspeople; it grew with the prosperity and
needs of the town and was paid apparently by others, the traders, who
could well afford the chungi or handful from their goods, or the country
people who had in return the privilege of using the town market;
above all it was the old customary tax of India. The Government of
India, which always had its suspicions about this tax, as it was con-
trary to the English tradition of local taxation and freedom of trade,
wrote in 1868: “It is to little purpose that the imperial government
reduces or abolishes customs duties in the interests of trade if muni-
cipalities are permitted to levy duties on articles of commerce passing
through their limits. In all parts of India municipal taxation is
largely on the increase and there is a growing tendency to overlook
for the sake of small local improvements the real injury that is being
inflicted upon important general interests". 1 For the next fifty years
there was a continual struggle between the government and the muni-
cipalities, the latter always wanting more and more money for their
development and finding it with least difficulty by an extension of the
octroi system, while the former struggled to keep it confined to articles
actually consumed within the towns. For the latter purpose elaborate
systems of bonded warehouses and refunds for goods in transit through
towns were utilised, but these did little to mitigate the evils of the
octroi system that became more and more apparent as municipal
administration improved. These were laid bare by the report of the
municipality taxation committee of the United Provinces in 1909,
who found that the advantages of the system were outweighed by the
disadvantages, namely, the heavy cost of collection of the tax, the
prevalence of corruption owing to the necessity of employing a large
and poorly paid staff, and the delay and loss caused to all traders both
by the imposition of the tax and the procedure for getting refunds.
They recommended its replacement in the smaller towns by direct
taxation and at the larger centres by a terminal tax, a system that
had been found to work well at Cawnpore and to be no hindrance to
trade. The change proved difficult, as there was the most vehemenc
opposition to direct taxation. Even where this had been in existence
for some time, it was found that the revision of assessments led to no
increase in the rates, as a committee of elected commissioners seldom
raised the assessments, although with the growth of the town there
had been a large rise in the value of the properties concerned.
Gradually, however, octroi was replaced by direct taxation in many
of the smaller towns and elsewhere by terminal charges. The latter
were collected without difficulty, but collections of the former were
Proceedings, Government of India, 6 November, 1868.


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OCTROI DUTIES
537
a
always in arrears, sometimes so great that the taxes themselves
lapsed.
In Madras and Bengal more progress had been made in the intro-
duction of elected non-official chairmen, but, as in other places, they
lacked an efficient staff. In the absence of octroi, they had the addi-
tional difficulty of being entirely dependent for their funds on the
assessment and collection of direct taxation, whether in the shape of
a rate or of a charge for services rendered. Seldom did the municipal
executive dare to use their powers to make full and prompt collections
of the rates assessed, while the periodical revision of assessments was
undertaken in a half-hearted manner. Often insanitary conditions
were preferred to a strict administration, with the result that progress
towards a good water supply and proper drainage was spasmodic
rather than continuous, depending as it did mainly on donations from
the local government. Elections were keenly contested, not only at
the polls but also in the courts, one-sixth of the elections in Bengal in
1915 being the subject of civil suits. But the zeal for the public good
seemed to grow weaker after the acquisition of a seat on the local
authority. In some cases, it is true, the members of municipalities did
excellent work. The majority, however, did not recognise the fact that
as trustees of the public they were bound to see that public money was
collected fairly and also spent to the best advantage. Government
control had been reduced to the extent advocated in 1882, and was
much less than that exercised in England by the Local Government
Board over local authorities; but municipal bodies showed few signs
of that healthy exercise of public spirit and enterprise to be found in
those after whose fashion they had been created. In 1919 the gover'i-
ment of Bengal observed:
One of the most noticeable features of the reports for the year is the reiterated
and general complaint of the inadequacy of municipal funds to maintain any high
standard of administration, combined with a general disinclination on the part
of municipal boards to raise funds for the purpose. . . . Many boards have only
elementary ideas of the duties and responsibilities of municipal administration.
The incidence of taxation is below R. i per head in more than one-fourth of the
municipalities, and at this figure it is impossible to expect much in the way of
civic amenities.
From the above review it will be seen that British administrators
were more successful in retaining and developing the indigenous local
self-government of the villages than in transplanting urban and rural
organisations to their appropriate habitats in India. After many ex-
periments an efficient system was evolved for the presidency towns,
thanks to the intimate intermingling of official and private elements
in these corporations. In the smaller towns and districts, however, no
great success was achieved in establishing a local self-government at
once competent and capable of a healthy natural development.
Bengal Municipal Resolution for 1915-16.
: Idem, 1918-19.
1


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CHAPTER XXIX
THE NATIONAL CONGRESS AND EARLY
POLITICAL LITERATURE
Political activity in India has been marked by a tardy
beginning and very rapid development. For the first thirty or forty
years after the decision to base higher education on occidental rather
than on oriental literature, educated Indians were engaged in ab-
sorbing the new ideas. The first effects of the impact were noticeable
in the religious field, causing the formation and growth of new sects,
accompanied by a revival of orthodoxy. Higher education was so
largely in the hands of missionaries that the earliest activities were
directed towards examination of faith and consequently led to move-
ments for social reform. In Bengal the Brahmo Samaj founded by
Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) was a theistic sect, the members
of which supported the abolition of sati. While it was under the
leadership of Debendranath Tagore a schism occurred. A young
minister of the sect, Keshub Chundra Sen (1838–84) was dismissed
and founded a new society, the main question in dispute being the
toleration of Hindu usages and customs which appeared innocent. 1
Members of this pressed on radical social reforms in regard to mar-
riage, female education and temperance. Sir Surendranath Banerjee
in his autobiography2 describes the great effect on young minds of
public speeches on religious and social topics by Keshub Chundra
Sen, on temperance by Peary Churn Sircar, and on the remarriage of
widows by Pandit Iswar Chunder Vidyasagar. From ethics and social
improvement the step to political activity was short. Works by the
English liberals provided inspiration, and the affairs of Italy, and
above all, the career and writings of Mazzini, quickened the imagina-
tion of young Bengalis, already enlivened by religious and ethical
excitement.
At Calcutta there already existed a British Indian Association,
chiefly supported by the landed proprietors to look after their interests.