Again,
honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a
singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all
things and exceeds them in every way.
honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a
singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all
things and exceeds them in every way.
Summa Theologica
" Thirdly, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for
virtue, and thus "observance" is annexed to justice, consisting
according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) in the "deference and honor
rendered to those who excel in worth. "
A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which
one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is
chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the
other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of
the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind
of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it
moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character
of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of
the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man
represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed.
Wherefore to justice is annexed "truth," whereby, as Tully says (De
invent. ii, 53), present, past and future things are told without
perversion. It may also be considered from the point of view of the
person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what
he has done---sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we
have "gratitude" which "consists in recollecting the friendship and
kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back," as Tully
states (De invent. ii, 53)---and sometimes in evil things, and then to
justice is annexed "revenge," whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii,
53), "we resist force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance
or by self-defense. " [*St. Thomas read 'obscurum,' and explains it as
meaning 'derogatory,' infra[2982] Q[108], A[2]. Cicero, however, wrote
'obfuturum,' i. e. 'hurtful. ']
There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to
greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This
due is the concern of "liberality," "affability" or "friendship," or
the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because
there is little of the nature of anything due in them.
Reply to Objection 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power,
in accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice:
whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not
against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs
to the virtue annexed to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two
integral parts of justice, namely, "declining from evil," to which
"innocence" belongs, and "doing good," to which the six others belong.
Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely,
"friendship" in the external conduct and "concord" internally; two
regard our relations toward superiors, namely, "piety" to parents, and
"religion" to God; while two regard our relations towards inferiors,
namely, "condescension," in so far as their good pleases us, and
"humanity," whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says
(Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a feeling of
love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we
uphold one another. " In this sense "friendship" is understood as
directing our external conduct towards others, from which point of view
the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. "Friendship" may also be
taken as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher
describes it in Ethic. viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain
to friendship, namely, "benevolence" which is here called "affection";
"concord," and "beneficence" which is here called "humanity. " These
three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they
have little of the nature of a due.
Reply to Objection 3: "Obedience" is included in observance, which
Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to
persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his
words" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in
"truthfulness" as to the observance of one's promises: yet
"truthfulness" covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on
([2983]Q[109], AA[1],3). "Discipline" is not due as a necessary duty,
because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a
superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors,
according to Mat. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord
hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by
Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius;
and equity under {epieikeia} or under "friendship. "
Reply to Objection 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true
justice. To particular justice belongs "justice of exchange," which he
describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations. " To
legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes
"legislative justice," which he describes as "the science of political
commutations relating to the community. " As regards things which have
to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions
"common sense" or "good judgment*," which is our guide in such like
matters, as stated above ([2984]Q[51], A[4]) in the treatise on
prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification,"
because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his
judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas indicates
the Greek derivation: {eugnomosyne} quasi 'bona {gnome}. '] These two
are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their
executor. {Eusebeia} [piety] means "good worship" and consequently is
the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of "the
service of God" (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that
'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and
"holiness" comes to the same, as we shall state further on
([2985]Q[81], A[8]). {Eucharistia} (gratitude) means "good
thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says
(Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do
good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that
"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence. " "Liberality" would
seem to pertain to "humanity. "
Reply to Objection 5: {Epieikeia} is annexed, not to particular but to
legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the
name of {eugnomosyne} [common sense].
__________________________________________________________________
OF RELIGION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our
present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3)
observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8)
liberality, (9) {epieikeia}. Of the other virtues that have been
mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of
concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for
instance, of right commutations and of innocence. of legislative
justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.
Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in
itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?
(2) Whether religion is a virtue?
(3) Whether religion is one virtue?
(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?
(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?
(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
(7) Whether religion has any external actions?
(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion directs man to God alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God
alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before
God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their
tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world. " Now "to
visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between oneself and
one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" belongs
to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply
order to God alone.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in
speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere
wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and
relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie,
that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine
worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is
nothing else but the worship of God. " Therefore religion signifies a
relation not only to God but also to our kindred.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly "latria" pertains to religion. Now
"latria signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor,
according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another. "
Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.
Objection 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to
worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of
Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents. "
Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to
God.
Objection 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are
subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called
religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and
observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion
seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists in
offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men
call divine. "
I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a man
is said to be religious from 'religio,' because he often ponders over,
and, as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the
worship of God," so that religion would seem to take its name from
reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we
ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to
Prov. 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him. " According to Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that "we ought
to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect" [*St. Augustine
plays on the words 'reeligere,' i. e. to choose over again, and
'negligere,' to neglect or despise. ]. Or again, religion may be derived
from "religare" [to bind together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera
Relig. 55): "May religion bind us to the one Almighty God. " However,
whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a
repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being
a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we
ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our
choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we
lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him
and confessing our faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its
proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is
directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like.
But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the
virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because
the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which
are concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and
widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and
an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from this
world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of
some similar virtue as eliciting.
Reply to Objection 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits
to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense,
but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the
passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems to
denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord,
wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a
special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God
in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has
supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is
due to Him, which is known as "latria" in Greek; and therefore it
belongs to religion.
Reply to Objection 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and
to cultivate [*In the Latin the same word 'colere' stands for 'worship'
and 'cultivate']: a man's memory or presence: we even speak of
cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one
who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who
cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is
due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a
special kind of worship, which in Greek is {Eusebeia} or {Theosebeia},
as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
Reply to Objection 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all
in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those
who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing
from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied, not
to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to
contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man's sake
but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. 4:14),
"You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it
belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of
fear which is a gift, as stated above ([2986]Q[19], A[9]). Therefore
religion is not a virtue but a gift
Objection 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will,
wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit"
[*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A[1], ad 3) "latria" belongs to
religion, and "latria" denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion
is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is
in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the
dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer
ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [*Cf. A[1]], and ceremonial matters,
as stated above ([2987]FS, Q[99], A[3], ad 2; [2988]FS, Q[101])
, do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is
not a virtue.
On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears
from what has been said above ([2989]Q[80]).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[58], A[3]; [2990]FS, Q[55], AA[3],4)
"a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good
likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a
virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect
of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably
proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner.
But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species,
according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to
religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident
that religion is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of
fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence
for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of
fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent;
for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated
above (Q[9], A[1], ad 3; [2991]FS, Q[68], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his
master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad
Furiam. ], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due
service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so
voluntarily.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that
man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should
do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of
natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is one virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion
directs us to God, as stated above [2992](A[1]). Now in God there are
three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least
logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object
suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q[50], A[2], ad
2). Therefore religion is not one virtue.
Objection 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since
habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of
religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to
sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.
Objection 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is
paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God
Himself. Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it
would seem that religion is not one virtue.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): "One God [Vulg. : 'Lord'],
one faith. " Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore
religion is one virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2993]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits
are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now
it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect,
namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of
things. Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): "If . . . I be a
father, where is My honor? " For it belongs to a father to beget and to
govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of
the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one
religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the
aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs
them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion
is one virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships
God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is
due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition,
is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong
all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness
to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, either by
offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.
Reply to Objection 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as
considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to
God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the
image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither "latria"
nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious
worship is paid to the images of Christ.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue
distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any
action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true
sacrifice. " But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous
deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the
glory of God. " Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence
of God, as stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2]). Therefore religion is not a
special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct
from the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to Ethic.
viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved. " Therefore the religion
whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from observance,
or "dulia," or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion
is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the
other parts.
I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is
a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the good
to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God.
Again,
honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a
singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all
things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor
due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is due to
different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another
to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in
so far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove
that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other
virtues, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's
honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those
belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God
by reason of their specific character.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of
honor and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is
communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is
not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the
charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby God
is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is a theological virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue.
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith, hope
and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion
to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its
object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God
alone, as stated above [2994](A[1]). Therefore religion is a
theological virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (FS,
QQ[57],58,62). Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual
virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of
truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing
the mean between too much and too little. for one cannot worship God
too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as
much as you can; for He is above all praise. " Therefore it remains that
it is a theological virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral
virtue.
I answer that, As stated above [2995](A[4]) religion pays due worship
to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that
which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and
object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz.
God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped
do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to
Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q[1], AA[1],2,4) that
God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but
because we believe God.
Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God
is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done
out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to
religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion
is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral
virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an
end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with
matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope
and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object:
wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which
performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God
is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but
as its end.
Reply to Objection 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an
intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and
observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God,
by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality,"
I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God
as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability
and God's acceptance.
And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine
worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards
other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not
due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other
circumstance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the
other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its
observing the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to
observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal
to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more
praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater
need: wherefore it is written (Is. 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the
hungry. " But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps.
15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my
goods. " Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other
virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.
Objection 3: Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing, the
less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the
Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me. " Now the more
a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then,
what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it
would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human
virtues.
On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion are given
precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of
precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts
of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of
the moral virtues.
I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from
being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the
better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above [2996](A[5]; Q[4],
A[7]), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And
religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so
far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of
God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not
because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality
which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue
deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of
his will.
Reply to Objection 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its
usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the
offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God
not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory,
and on account of its usefulness to us.
Reply to Objection 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it
loses the luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue,
provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion has an external act?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is
written (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must
adore Him in spirit and in truth. " Now external acts pertain, not to
the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration
belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.
Objection 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and
honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one
were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since
then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed
properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior
creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence
to God.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca
for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are
wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals
is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to
the true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore it
would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore religion
has no bodily actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God. " Now just as internal actions belong to the
heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh.
Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal
but also by external actions.
I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake
(because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add
anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we
revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its
perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to
its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by
the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human
mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible
world, since "invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made," as the Apostle says (Rom. 1:20).
Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of
corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs,
to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore
the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong
to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and
subordinate to the internal acts.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most
important and directly intended in the worship of God.
Reply to Objection 2: These external things are offered to God, not as
though He stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, "Shall I eat
the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats? " but as
signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves
acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The
visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible
sacrifice. "
Reply to Objection 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols
things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain
spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to
the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is the same as sanctity?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity.
Religion is a special virtue, as stated above [2997](A[4]): whereas
sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil
our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [*De Affectibus].
Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
Objection 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all
uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity. " Now
purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels
bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would
seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.
Objection 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division
are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above
(Q[80], ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct
from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:74,75): "That . . . we may serve
Him . . . in holiness and justice. " Now, "to serve God" belongs to
religion, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3], ad 2). Therefore religion
is the same as sanctity.
I answer that, The word "sanctity" seems to have two significations. In
one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the
Greek, for {hagios} means "unsoiled. " In another way it denotes
firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied to
such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a
thing is said to be sacred [sancitum] when it is ratified by law.
Again, in Latin, this word "sanctus" may be connected with purity, if
it be resolved into "sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who
wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim's blood,"
according to Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification
requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to
the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels
and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to
the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be
applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior
things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things,
for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the
mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from
inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be
applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace
with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. " Again,
firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is
applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things
must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38,39): "I
am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg. :
'shall be able to separate us'] from the love of God. "
Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and
its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but
only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives
God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship,
such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called
sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but also the
works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain
good works disposes himself to the worship of God
Reply to Objection 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its
essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion.
But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs
the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice
is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all
the virtues to the common good.
Reply to Objection 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to
have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of
virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored
not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained
above, not really but logically.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DEVOTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the
interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts;
secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The
interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer.
Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether devotion is a special act?
(2) Whether it is an act of religion?
(3) Of the cause of devotion?
(4) Of its effect?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether devotion is a special act?
Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That
which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion
seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip 29:31): "All
the multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a
devout mind. " Therefore devotion is not a special act.
Objection 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various
genera of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts,
namely, corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate
devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special
act.
Objection 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive
or to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as
may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either
faculty, as enumerated above (FP, QQ[78], seqq. ; [2998]FS, Q[23],
A[4]). Therefore devotion is not a special act.
On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (FS,
Q[21], AA[34]). But devotion has a special reason for merit. Therefore
devotion is a special act.
I answer that, Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin 'devovere'
means 'to vow']; wherefore those persons are said to be "devout" who,
in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject themselves wholly
to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who
vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy
relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is
apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things
concerning the service of God. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 35:20,21)
that "the multitude of the children of Israel . . . offered
first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind. " Now it is
evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of God is
a special kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of
the thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to
their acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both
itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above ([2999]FS,
Q[9], A[3]). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a
man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it
follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they
be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of
the other powers that are moved by the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of
acts, not as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover
is found virtually in the movements of the things moved.
Reply to Objection 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the
soul, and is a movement of the will, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether devotion is an act of religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion.
Devotion, as stated above [3000](A[1]), consists in giving oneself up
to God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it
takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved. "
Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.
Objection 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to
precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by
fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of
fire [*Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of
religion.
Objection 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as
stated above ([3001]Q[81], A[1]). But devotion is directed also to men;
for we speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects
are said to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm.
viii, De Pass. Dom.
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for
virtue, and thus "observance" is annexed to justice, consisting
according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) in the "deference and honor
rendered to those who excel in worth. "
A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which
one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is
chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the
other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of
the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind
of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it
moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character
of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of
the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man
represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed.
Wherefore to justice is annexed "truth," whereby, as Tully says (De
invent. ii, 53), present, past and future things are told without
perversion. It may also be considered from the point of view of the
person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what
he has done---sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we
have "gratitude" which "consists in recollecting the friendship and
kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back," as Tully
states (De invent. ii, 53)---and sometimes in evil things, and then to
justice is annexed "revenge," whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii,
53), "we resist force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance
or by self-defense. " [*St. Thomas read 'obscurum,' and explains it as
meaning 'derogatory,' infra[2982] Q[108], A[2]. Cicero, however, wrote
'obfuturum,' i. e. 'hurtful. ']
There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to
greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This
due is the concern of "liberality," "affability" or "friendship," or
the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because
there is little of the nature of anything due in them.
Reply to Objection 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power,
in accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice:
whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not
against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs
to the virtue annexed to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two
integral parts of justice, namely, "declining from evil," to which
"innocence" belongs, and "doing good," to which the six others belong.
Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely,
"friendship" in the external conduct and "concord" internally; two
regard our relations toward superiors, namely, "piety" to parents, and
"religion" to God; while two regard our relations towards inferiors,
namely, "condescension," in so far as their good pleases us, and
"humanity," whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says
(Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a feeling of
love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we
uphold one another. " In this sense "friendship" is understood as
directing our external conduct towards others, from which point of view
the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. "Friendship" may also be
taken as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher
describes it in Ethic. viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain
to friendship, namely, "benevolence" which is here called "affection";
"concord," and "beneficence" which is here called "humanity. " These
three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they
have little of the nature of a due.
Reply to Objection 3: "Obedience" is included in observance, which
Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to
persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his
words" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in
"truthfulness" as to the observance of one's promises: yet
"truthfulness" covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on
([2983]Q[109], AA[1],3). "Discipline" is not due as a necessary duty,
because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a
superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors,
according to Mat. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord
hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by
Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius;
and equity under {epieikeia} or under "friendship. "
Reply to Objection 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true
justice. To particular justice belongs "justice of exchange," which he
describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations. " To
legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes
"legislative justice," which he describes as "the science of political
commutations relating to the community. " As regards things which have
to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions
"common sense" or "good judgment*," which is our guide in such like
matters, as stated above ([2984]Q[51], A[4]) in the treatise on
prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification,"
because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his
judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas indicates
the Greek derivation: {eugnomosyne} quasi 'bona {gnome}. '] These two
are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their
executor. {Eusebeia} [piety] means "good worship" and consequently is
the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of "the
service of God" (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that
'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and
"holiness" comes to the same, as we shall state further on
([2985]Q[81], A[8]). {Eucharistia} (gratitude) means "good
thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says
(Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do
good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that
"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence. " "Liberality" would
seem to pertain to "humanity. "
Reply to Objection 5: {Epieikeia} is annexed, not to particular but to
legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the
name of {eugnomosyne} [common sense].
__________________________________________________________________
OF RELIGION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our
present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3)
observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8)
liberality, (9) {epieikeia}. Of the other virtues that have been
mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of
concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for
instance, of right commutations and of innocence. of legislative
justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.
Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in
itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?
(2) Whether religion is a virtue?
(3) Whether religion is one virtue?
(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?
(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?
(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
(7) Whether religion has any external actions?
(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion directs man to God alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God
alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before
God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their
tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world. " Now "to
visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between oneself and
one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" belongs
to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply
order to God alone.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in
speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere
wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and
relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie,
that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine
worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is
nothing else but the worship of God. " Therefore religion signifies a
relation not only to God but also to our kindred.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly "latria" pertains to religion. Now
"latria signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor,
according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another. "
Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.
Objection 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to
worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of
Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents. "
Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to
God.
Objection 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are
subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called
religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and
observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion
seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists in
offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men
call divine. "
I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a man
is said to be religious from 'religio,' because he often ponders over,
and, as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the
worship of God," so that religion would seem to take its name from
reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we
ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to
Prov. 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him. " According to Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that "we ought
to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect" [*St. Augustine
plays on the words 'reeligere,' i. e. to choose over again, and
'negligere,' to neglect or despise. ]. Or again, religion may be derived
from "religare" [to bind together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera
Relig. 55): "May religion bind us to the one Almighty God. " However,
whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a
repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being
a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we
ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our
choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we
lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him
and confessing our faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its
proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is
directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like.
But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the
virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because
the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which
are concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and
widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and
an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from this
world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of
some similar virtue as eliciting.
Reply to Objection 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits
to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense,
but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the
passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems to
denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord,
wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a
special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God
in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has
supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is
due to Him, which is known as "latria" in Greek; and therefore it
belongs to religion.
Reply to Objection 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and
to cultivate [*In the Latin the same word 'colere' stands for 'worship'
and 'cultivate']: a man's memory or presence: we even speak of
cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one
who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who
cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is
due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a
special kind of worship, which in Greek is {Eusebeia} or {Theosebeia},
as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
Reply to Objection 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all
in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those
who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing
from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied, not
to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to
contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man's sake
but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. 4:14),
"You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it
belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of
fear which is a gift, as stated above ([2986]Q[19], A[9]). Therefore
religion is not a virtue but a gift
Objection 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will,
wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit"
[*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A[1], ad 3) "latria" belongs to
religion, and "latria" denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion
is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is
in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the
dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer
ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [*Cf. A[1]], and ceremonial matters,
as stated above ([2987]FS, Q[99], A[3], ad 2; [2988]FS, Q[101])
, do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is
not a virtue.
On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears
from what has been said above ([2989]Q[80]).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[58], A[3]; [2990]FS, Q[55], AA[3],4)
"a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good
likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a
virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect
of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably
proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner.
But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species,
according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to
religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident
that religion is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of
fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence
for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of
fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent;
for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated
above (Q[9], A[1], ad 3; [2991]FS, Q[68], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his
master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad
Furiam. ], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due
service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so
voluntarily.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that
man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should
do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of
natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion is one virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion
directs us to God, as stated above [2992](A[1]). Now in God there are
three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least
logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object
suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q[50], A[2], ad
2). Therefore religion is not one virtue.
Objection 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since
habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of
religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to
sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.
Objection 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is
paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God
Himself. Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it
would seem that religion is not one virtue.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): "One God [Vulg. : 'Lord'],
one faith. " Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore
religion is one virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2993]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits
are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now
it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect,
namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of
things. Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): "If . . . I be a
father, where is My honor? " For it belongs to a father to beget and to
govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of
the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one
religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the
aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs
them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion
is one virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships
God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is
due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition,
is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong
all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness
to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, either by
offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.
Reply to Objection 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as
considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to
God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the
image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither "latria"
nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious
worship is paid to the images of Christ.
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Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue
distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any
action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true
sacrifice. " But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous
deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the
glory of God. " Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence
of God, as stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2]). Therefore religion is not a
special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct
from the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to Ethic.
viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved. " Therefore the religion
whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from observance,
or "dulia," or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion
is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the
other parts.
I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is
a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the good
to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God.
Again,
honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a
singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all
things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor
due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is due to
different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another
to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in
so far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove
that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other
virtues, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's
honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those
belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God
by reason of their specific character.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of
honor and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is
communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is
not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the
charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby God
is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.
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Whether religion is a theological virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue.
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith, hope
and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion
to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its
object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God
alone, as stated above [2994](A[1]). Therefore religion is a
theological virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (FS,
QQ[57],58,62). Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual
virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of
truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing
the mean between too much and too little. for one cannot worship God
too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as
much as you can; for He is above all praise. " Therefore it remains that
it is a theological virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral
virtue.
I answer that, As stated above [2995](A[4]) religion pays due worship
to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that
which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and
object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz.
God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped
do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to
Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q[1], AA[1],2,4) that
God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but
because we believe God.
Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God
is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done
out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to
religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion
is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral
virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an
end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with
matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope
and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object:
wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which
performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God
is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but
as its end.
Reply to Objection 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an
intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and
observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God,
by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality,"
I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God
as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability
and God's acceptance.
And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine
worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards
other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not
due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other
circumstance.
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Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the
other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its
observing the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to
observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal
to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more
praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater
need: wherefore it is written (Is. 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the
hungry. " But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps.
15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my
goods. " Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other
virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.
Objection 3: Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing, the
less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the
Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me. " Now the more
a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then,
what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it
would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human
virtues.
On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion are given
precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of
precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts
of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of
the moral virtues.
I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from
being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the
better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above [2996](A[5]; Q[4],
A[7]), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And
religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so
far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of
God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not
because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality
which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue
deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of
his will.
Reply to Objection 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its
usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the
offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God
not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory,
and on account of its usefulness to us.
Reply to Objection 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it
loses the luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue,
provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
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Whether religion has an external act?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is
written (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must
adore Him in spirit and in truth. " Now external acts pertain, not to
the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration
belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.
Objection 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and
honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one
were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since
then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed
properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior
creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence
to God.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca
for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are
wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals
is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to
the true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore it
would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore religion
has no bodily actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God. " Now just as internal actions belong to the
heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh.
Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal
but also by external actions.
I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake
(because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add
anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we
revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its
perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to
its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by
the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human
mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible
world, since "invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made," as the Apostle says (Rom. 1:20).
Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of
corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs,
to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore
the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong
to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and
subordinate to the internal acts.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most
important and directly intended in the worship of God.
Reply to Objection 2: These external things are offered to God, not as
though He stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, "Shall I eat
the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats? " but as
signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves
acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The
visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible
sacrifice. "
Reply to Objection 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols
things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain
spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to
the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.
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Whether religion is the same as sanctity?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity.
Religion is a special virtue, as stated above [2997](A[4]): whereas
sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil
our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [*De Affectibus].
Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
Objection 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all
uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity. " Now
purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels
bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would
seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.
Objection 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division
are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above
(Q[80], ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct
from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:74,75): "That . . . we may serve
Him . . . in holiness and justice. " Now, "to serve God" belongs to
religion, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3], ad 2). Therefore religion
is the same as sanctity.
I answer that, The word "sanctity" seems to have two significations. In
one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the
Greek, for {hagios} means "unsoiled. " In another way it denotes
firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied to
such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a
thing is said to be sacred [sancitum] when it is ratified by law.
Again, in Latin, this word "sanctus" may be connected with purity, if
it be resolved into "sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who
wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim's blood,"
according to Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification
requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to
the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels
and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to
the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be
applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior
things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things,
for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the
mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from
inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be
applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace
with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. " Again,
firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is
applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things
must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38,39): "I
am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg. :
'shall be able to separate us'] from the love of God. "
Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and
its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but
only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives
God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship,
such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called
sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but also the
works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain
good works disposes himself to the worship of God
Reply to Objection 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its
essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion.
But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs
the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice
is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all
the virtues to the common good.
Reply to Objection 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to
have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of
virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored
not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained
above, not really but logically.
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OF DEVOTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the
interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts;
secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The
interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer.
Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether devotion is a special act?
(2) Whether it is an act of religion?
(3) Of the cause of devotion?
(4) Of its effect?
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Whether devotion is a special act?
Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That
which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion
seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip 29:31): "All
the multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a
devout mind. " Therefore devotion is not a special act.
Objection 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various
genera of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts,
namely, corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate
devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special
act.
Objection 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive
or to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as
may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either
faculty, as enumerated above (FP, QQ[78], seqq. ; [2998]FS, Q[23],
A[4]). Therefore devotion is not a special act.
On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (FS,
Q[21], AA[34]). But devotion has a special reason for merit. Therefore
devotion is a special act.
I answer that, Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin 'devovere'
means 'to vow']; wherefore those persons are said to be "devout" who,
in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject themselves wholly
to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who
vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy
relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is
apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things
concerning the service of God. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 35:20,21)
that "the multitude of the children of Israel . . . offered
first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind. " Now it is
evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of God is
a special kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of
the thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to
their acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both
itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above ([2999]FS,
Q[9], A[3]). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a
man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it
follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they
be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of
the other powers that are moved by the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of
acts, not as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover
is found virtually in the movements of the things moved.
Reply to Objection 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the
soul, and is a movement of the will, as stated above.
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Whether devotion is an act of religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion.
Devotion, as stated above [3000](A[1]), consists in giving oneself up
to God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it
takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved. "
Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.
Objection 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to
precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by
fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of
fire [*Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of
religion.
Objection 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as
stated above ([3001]Q[81], A[1]). But devotion is directed also to men;
for we speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects
are said to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm.
viii, De Pass. Dom.
