Objection 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less
grievous than a sin of thought.
grievous than a sin of thought.
Summa Theologica
2:9): "He that .
.
.
hateth his
brother, is in darkness. " Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore
there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.
I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above ([2622]FS,
Q[29], A[2]); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love
of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of
what he holds from God, i. e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in
respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i. e. in respect
of sin and lack of justice.
Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and
whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate
our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love
for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him,
since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil.
Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is
always sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must
honor our parents---as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must
hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the
perfection of Divine justice.
Reply to Objection 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not
his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods
which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we
should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show
hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we
should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are
hostile to us.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our
neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most
grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:15):
"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer. " Now murder is the most
grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.
Objection 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we
give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to
love. Therefore hatred is the worst.
On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as
Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man
hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e. g. theft, murder and
adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.
Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Mat. 5:19, "He that shall break
one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments of Moses,
Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little
in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the
other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry,
Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little
in the transgression. " Now hatred is an internal movement like anger
and desire. Therefore hatred of one's brother is a less grievous sin
than murder.
I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two
counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins,
secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against.
On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions
that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man's will,
which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that
if a man's outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder
in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill
a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be
anything sinful in a man's outward sins against his neighbor, it is all
to be traced to his inward hatred.
On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a
man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred is a capital sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is
directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the
virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of
the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
Objection 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations
of our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did
work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death. " Now all other
passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown
above ([2623]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned
one of the capital sins.
Objection 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil
more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should
be reckoned a capital sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the
seven capital sins.
I answer that, As stated above ([2624]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital
vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is
contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and
when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it
is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail
in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in
that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first
in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and
foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and
especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.
Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and
therefore it is not a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of
a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its
nature. " Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first
and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the
foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first
among the vices, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an
already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the
reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred
of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,
however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on
account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hatred arises from envy?
Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is
sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for,
on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our
neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above ([2625]Q[25],
A[1];[2626] Q[26], A[2]). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred
to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for
we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those
who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore
hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is
caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows into
hatred. " Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy
cometh hatred. "
I answer that, As stated above [2627](A[5]), hatred of his neighbor is
a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love
which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from
that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is
naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids
sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred
arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us
pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of
good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for
this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy
is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good
becomes hateful to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred. "
Reply to Objection 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive
power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of
circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so
according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, love
gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained
what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the
good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love.
And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for
the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures,
wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor
afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in
God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been
stated above [2628](A[1]), that God is not an object of hatred, except
in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and
consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed
to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred
of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred
towards God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various
causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from
anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which
looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore
hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at
first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a
certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of
vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes
so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is
part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy
formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by
anger.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy
is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or
about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we
must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sloth is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a kind of sorrow,
according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above
([2629]FS, Q[35], A[8] ). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a
sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x,
[*De Institutione Caeobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth
chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and
inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular
and fixed intervals. " Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is,
seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian
says (De Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we
sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other
monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the
one we dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore
sloth is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus.
21:2: "Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent. " Now Cassian says
(De Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth
is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance. "
Therefore sloth is not a sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such
is sloth [acedia]: for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down thy
shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not grieved
[acedieris] with her bands. " Therefore sloth is a sin.
I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is
an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, that he
wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth
implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on Ps.
106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the
definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind
which neglects to begin good. "
Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its
effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is
apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand,
pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in
truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth,
sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also
which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses
man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (2
Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed up with
overmuch sorrow. "
Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for
spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in point
of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil
movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said above
(Q[10], A[2]; [2630]FS, Q[74], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they
are blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just
as they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.
Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame:
whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for
good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in
this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may either
be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And
since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows that on
account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some
particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more
insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring at certain
fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to
sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by sloth
towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be
parched by the sun's heat.
Reply to Objection 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think
too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man
contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from being
a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like
contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon
evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the goods of
others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have received
ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.
Reply to Objection 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of
sin should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance;
by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as
in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly
fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought
diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some
trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more we
think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and
forthwith sloth dies away.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sloth is a special vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that
which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of
vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual
good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of continence,
and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is
sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above [2631](A[1]), it seems that
sloth is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed
to joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth
should not be reckoned a special vice.
Objection 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,
which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing,
seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special
vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they
are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: while dislike of
toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be due to the same cause, viz.
idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems
untrue, for idleness is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is
opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not a special vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the
other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.
I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
because, as stated above ([2632]FS, Q[71], A[1]), every vice shuns the
spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that
sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as
toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's
pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.
Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual
goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each
virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,
about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper
to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in
its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that
spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In like manner
the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in
each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every
vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices,
belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
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Whether sloth is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth seems
contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of
the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less
grievous than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain
in deed from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a
mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal
sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore
sloth is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man.
But sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.
Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a most
vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit. " Therefore sloth is not
always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the world
worketh death. " But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow "according to
God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world. Therefore it is a
mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([2633]FS, Q[88], AA[1],2), mortal sin
is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the effect
of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which by its
very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its
genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy
in God, as stated above (Q[28], A[1]), while sloth is sorrow about
spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore sloth is a
mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be observed with regard
to all sins that are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are
not mortal, save when they attain to their perfection. Because the
consummation of sin is in the consent of reason: for we are speaking
now of human sins consisting in human acts, the principle of which is
the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the
sensuality alone, without attaining to the consent of reason, it is a
venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus
of adultery, the concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality
is a venial sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a
mortal sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the
sensuality alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the
spirit, and then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to
the reason, which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of
the Divine good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the
spirit. In this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing
the Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept,
implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind
about the Divine good is contrary thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any
spiritual good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged
to adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do
acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of sloth;
but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in
holy men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a
capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful
acts, as stated above ([2634]Q[34], A[5]). Now sloth does not move one
to action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it
should not be accounted a capital sin.
Objection 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are
assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to sloth,
viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard
to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful things. " Now
these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For "spite" is,
seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as stated above
([2635]Q[34], A[6]); "malice" is a genus which contains all vices, and,
in like manner, a "wandering" of the mind after unlawful things is to
be found in every vice; "sluggishness" about the commandments seems to
be the same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness" and "despair" may arise
from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the
vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man
shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow,
and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: and of
sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite, faint-heartedness,
bitterness, despair," whereas he states that from sloth seven things
arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of the mind, restlessness
of the body, instability, loquacity, curiosity. " Therefore it seems
that either Gregory or Isidore has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital
sin together with its daughters.
On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that sloth
is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.
I answer that, As stated above ([2636]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital
vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final
cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in
order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the
impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow,
either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing
something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of
sorrow, as stated above [2637](A[2]; FS, Q[85], A[8]), it is fittingly
reckoned a capital sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from
doing things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do
certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such as
weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth.
For since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) "no man can
be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it
follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man
shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things
that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual
pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order
observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and
secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now
spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both
end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of "despair," while
avoidance of those goods which are the means to the end, in matters of
difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of
"faint-heartedness," and in matters of common righteousness, is the
effect of "sluggishness about the commandments. " The struggle against
spiritual goods that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others
to spiritual goods, and this is called "spite"; and sometimes it
extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to
detest them, and this is properly called "malice. " In so far as a man
has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is
called "wandering after unlawful things. " From this it is clear how to
reply to the objections against each of the daughters: for "malice"
does not denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be
understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with
hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same
applies to the others.
Reply to Objection 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also
given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly
(Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated
above [2638](A[2]), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man
shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any
other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on account of
the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth
seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the
things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are
reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for "bitterness" which Isidore
states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect of "spite. " "Idleness"
and "drowsiness" are reduced to "sluggishness about the precepts": for
some are idle and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and
fulfil them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons as
effects of sloth, belong to the "wandering of the mind after unlawful
things. " This tendency to wander, if it reside in the mind itself that
is desirous of rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is
called "uneasiness of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative
power, it is called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called
"loquacity"; and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it
is called "restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the
unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of his
body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to another, it
is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote changeableness of
purpose.
__________________________________________________________________
OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) What is envy?
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
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Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the
object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the
envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which
is racked by the prosperity of another. " Therefore envy is not a kind
of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of
pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, in
knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation. " Therefore envy is
not a kind of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who
are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above ([2639]FS,
Q[47], A[3]) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack
little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are envious,
according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a
kind of sorrow.
Objection 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite
effects have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the
recollection of goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated
above ([2640]FS, Q[32], A[3]) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it
is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we
envy those who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or
which we possessed at some time. " Therefore sloth is not a kind of
sorrow.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a species
of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good. "
I answer that, The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it may
happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and in
this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in two
ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far as it
threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves
for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some harm: such
like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).
Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in so
far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or
excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good: and
consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name
consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being
reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for sorrow
to be about good, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far
as it diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a
man is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in
reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed from
one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors to
rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a
commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner whom
he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed
from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who are near
him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our
will that these should be in better repute than we are, and that gives
rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far
as it is in agreement with the will.
Reply to Objection 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters
where he is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses
him in such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems
to him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;
wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation
surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be
honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are
envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may
befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in
something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the
little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those
only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves. "
Reply to Objection 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have
had them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes
sorrow; and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that,
above all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much
in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending
little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that
others have acquired goods.
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Whether envy is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to
Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have
companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and be
nettled when they are praised. " But no one should be advised to commit
a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin
Objection 1: Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it
is written (Prov. 29:2): "When the wicked shall bear rule, the people
shall mourn. " Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good
zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up. "
Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Objection 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is
a kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul
sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself
shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes
the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed,
while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is
gnashing with the teeth. " Therefore envy is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made
desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another. "
I answer that, As stated above [2641](A[1]), envy is sorrow for
another's good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First,
when a man grieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause
harm either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not
envy, as stated above [2642](A[1]), and may be void of sin. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that without
charity being lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and
again his glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he
falls, we believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he
prospers, we dread lest many suffer unjustly. "
Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it, but
because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly
speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this
zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.
14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about temporal
goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may grieve over
another's good, because he who happens to have that good is unworthy of
it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which
make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is about riches,
and those things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and
he calls this sorrow {nemesis} [*The nearest equivalent is
"indignation. " The use of the word "nemesis" to signify "revenge" does
not represent the original Greek. ], saying that it belongs to good
morals. But he says this because he considered temporal goods in
themselves, in so far as they may seem great to those who look not to
eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching of faith, temporal
goods that accrue to those who are unworthy, are so disposed according
to God's just ordinance, either for the correction of those men, or for
their condemnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison with
the goods to come, which are prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of
this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: "Be not
emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere
(Ps. 72:2,3): "My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the
wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a
zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']. "
Fourthly, we grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses
ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over
what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.
Reply to Objection 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought
to strive to progress with those who are better than we are.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good
in the first sense given above.
Reply to Objection 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a
certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.
Reply to Objection 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal
accidentally, as stated above ([2643]FS, Q[87], A[2]) when we were
treating of sins.
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Whether envy is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since
envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason,
as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. [2644]FS, Q[74], A[4]].
Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy
can be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen
and known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale
and looked bitterly on its foster-brother. " Therefore envy is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But
envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to {nemesis}, which is a passion,
according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little
one. " Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore envy
is a mortal sin.
I answer that, Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For the
genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the
aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives
its spiritual life, according to 1 Jn. 3:14: "We know that we have
passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. " Now the
object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by
contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,
while envy grieves over it, as stated above [2645](A[1]). Therefore it
is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.
Nevertheless, as stated above (Q[35], A[4]; [2646]FS, Q[72], A[5], ad
1), in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in
the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of
concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of
anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find
sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are venial
sins.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion
of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts,
the principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not
a mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have
not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is
manifest.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy
is contrary both to {nemesis} and to pity, but for different reasons.
For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being
contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his
neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's
evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same
passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is
contrary to {nemesis} on the part of the man whose good grieves the
envious man, for {nemesis} is sorrow for the good of the undeserving
according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the
prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion of
the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners'], whereas the envious
grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is
clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now
pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is
contrary to pity and charity.
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Whether envy is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the
capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the
daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that
"those who love honor and glory are more envious. " Therefore envy is
not a capital vice.
brother, is in darkness. " Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore
there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.
I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above ([2622]FS,
Q[29], A[2]); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love
of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of
what he holds from God, i. e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in
respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i. e. in respect
of sin and lack of justice.
Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and
whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate
our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love
for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him,
since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil.
Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is
always sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must
honor our parents---as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must
hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the
perfection of Divine justice.
Reply to Objection 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not
his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods
which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we
should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show
hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we
should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are
hostile to us.
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Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our
neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most
grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:15):
"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer. " Now murder is the most
grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.
Objection 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we
give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to
love. Therefore hatred is the worst.
On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as
Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man
hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e. g. theft, murder and
adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.
Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Mat. 5:19, "He that shall break
one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments of Moses,
Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little
in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the
other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry,
Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little
in the transgression. " Now hatred is an internal movement like anger
and desire. Therefore hatred of one's brother is a less grievous sin
than murder.
I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two
counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins,
secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against.
On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions
that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man's will,
which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that
if a man's outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder
in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill
a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be
anything sinful in a man's outward sins against his neighbor, it is all
to be traced to his inward hatred.
On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a
man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether hatred is a capital sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is
directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the
virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of
the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
Objection 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations
of our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did
work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death. " Now all other
passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown
above ([2623]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned
one of the capital sins.
Objection 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil
more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should
be reckoned a capital sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the
seven capital sins.
I answer that, As stated above ([2624]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital
vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is
contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and
when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it
is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail
in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in
that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first
in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and
foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and
especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.
Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and
therefore it is not a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of
a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its
nature. " Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first
and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the
foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first
among the vices, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an
already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the
reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred
of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,
however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on
account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
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Whether hatred arises from envy?
Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is
sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for,
on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our
neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above ([2625]Q[25],
A[1];[2626] Q[26], A[2]). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred
to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for
we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those
who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore
hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is
caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows into
hatred. " Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy
cometh hatred. "
I answer that, As stated above [2627](A[5]), hatred of his neighbor is
a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love
which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from
that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is
naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids
sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred
arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us
pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of
good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for
this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy
is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good
becomes hateful to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred. "
Reply to Objection 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive
power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of
circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so
according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, love
gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained
what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the
good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love.
And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for
the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures,
wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor
afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in
God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been
stated above [2628](A[1]), that God is not an object of hatred, except
in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and
consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed
to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred
of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred
towards God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various
causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from
anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which
looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore
hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at
first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a
certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of
vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes
so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is
part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy
formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by
anger.
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OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy
is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or
about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we
must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
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Whether sloth is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a kind of sorrow,
according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above
([2629]FS, Q[35], A[8] ). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a
sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x,
[*De Institutione Caeobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth
chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and
inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular
and fixed intervals. " Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is,
seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian
says (De Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we
sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other
monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the
one we dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore
sloth is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus.
21:2: "Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent. " Now Cassian says
(De Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth
is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance. "
Therefore sloth is not a sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such
is sloth [acedia]: for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down thy
shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not grieved
[acedieris] with her bands. " Therefore sloth is a sin.
I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is
an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, that he
wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth
implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on Ps.
106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the
definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind
which neglects to begin good. "
Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its
effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is
apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand,
pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in
truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth,
sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also
which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses
man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (2
Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed up with
overmuch sorrow. "
Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for
spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in point
of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil
movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said above
(Q[10], A[2]; [2630]FS, Q[74], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they
are blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just
as they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.
Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame:
whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for
good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in
this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may either
be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And
since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows that on
account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some
particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more
insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring at certain
fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to
sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by sloth
towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be
parched by the sun's heat.
Reply to Objection 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think
too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man
contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from being
a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like
contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon
evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the goods of
others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have received
ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.
Reply to Objection 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of
sin should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance;
by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as
in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly
fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought
diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some
trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more we
think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and
forthwith sloth dies away.
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Whether sloth is a special vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that
which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of
vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual
good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of continence,
and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is
sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above [2631](A[1]), it seems that
sloth is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed
to joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth
should not be reckoned a special vice.
Objection 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,
which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing,
seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special
vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they
are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: while dislike of
toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be due to the same cause, viz.
idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems
untrue, for idleness is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is
opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not a special vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the
other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.
I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
because, as stated above ([2632]FS, Q[71], A[1]), every vice shuns the
spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that
sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as
toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's
pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.
Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual
goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each
virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,
about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper
to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in
its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that
spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In like manner
the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in
each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every
vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices,
belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
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Whether sloth is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth seems
contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of
the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less
grievous than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain
in deed from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a
mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal
sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore
sloth is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man.
But sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.
Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a most
vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit. " Therefore sloth is not
always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the world
worketh death. " But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow "according to
God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world. Therefore it is a
mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([2633]FS, Q[88], AA[1],2), mortal sin
is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the effect
of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which by its
very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its
genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy
in God, as stated above (Q[28], A[1]), while sloth is sorrow about
spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore sloth is a
mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be observed with regard
to all sins that are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are
not mortal, save when they attain to their perfection. Because the
consummation of sin is in the consent of reason: for we are speaking
now of human sins consisting in human acts, the principle of which is
the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the
sensuality alone, without attaining to the consent of reason, it is a
venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus
of adultery, the concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality
is a venial sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a
mortal sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the
sensuality alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the
spirit, and then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to
the reason, which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of
the Divine good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the
spirit. In this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing
the Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept,
implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind
about the Divine good is contrary thereto.
Reply to Objection 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any
spiritual good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged
to adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do
acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of sloth;
but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in
holy men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.
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Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a
capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful
acts, as stated above ([2634]Q[34], A[5]). Now sloth does not move one
to action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it
should not be accounted a capital sin.
Objection 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are
assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to sloth,
viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard
to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful things. " Now
these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For "spite" is,
seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as stated above
([2635]Q[34], A[6]); "malice" is a genus which contains all vices, and,
in like manner, a "wandering" of the mind after unlawful things is to
be found in every vice; "sluggishness" about the commandments seems to
be the same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness" and "despair" may arise
from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the
vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man
shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow,
and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: and of
sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite, faint-heartedness,
bitterness, despair," whereas he states that from sloth seven things
arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of the mind, restlessness
of the body, instability, loquacity, curiosity. " Therefore it seems
that either Gregory or Isidore has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital
sin together with its daughters.
On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that sloth
is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.
I answer that, As stated above ([2636]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital
vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final
cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in
order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the
impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow,
either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing
something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of
sorrow, as stated above [2637](A[2]; FS, Q[85], A[8]), it is fittingly
reckoned a capital sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from
doing things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do
certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such as
weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth.
For since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) "no man can
be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it
follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man
shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things
that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual
pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order
observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and
secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now
spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both
end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of "despair," while
avoidance of those goods which are the means to the end, in matters of
difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of
"faint-heartedness," and in matters of common righteousness, is the
effect of "sluggishness about the commandments. " The struggle against
spiritual goods that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others
to spiritual goods, and this is called "spite"; and sometimes it
extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to
detest them, and this is properly called "malice. " In so far as a man
has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is
called "wandering after unlawful things. " From this it is clear how to
reply to the objections against each of the daughters: for "malice"
does not denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be
understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with
hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same
applies to the others.
Reply to Objection 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also
given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly
(Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated
above [2638](A[2]), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man
shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any
other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on account of
the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth
seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the
things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are
reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for "bitterness" which Isidore
states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect of "spite. " "Idleness"
and "drowsiness" are reduced to "sluggishness about the precepts": for
some are idle and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and
fulfil them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons as
effects of sloth, belong to the "wandering of the mind after unlawful
things. " This tendency to wander, if it reside in the mind itself that
is desirous of rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is
called "uneasiness of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative
power, it is called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called
"loquacity"; and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it
is called "restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the
unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of his
body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to another, it
is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote changeableness of
purpose.
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OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) What is envy?
(2) Whether it is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
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Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the
object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the
envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which
is racked by the prosperity of another. " Therefore envy is not a kind
of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of
pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, in
knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation. " Therefore envy is
not a kind of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who
are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above ([2639]FS,
Q[47], A[3]) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack
little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are envious,
according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a
kind of sorrow.
Objection 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite
effects have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the
recollection of goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated
above ([2640]FS, Q[32], A[3]) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it
is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we
envy those who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or
which we possessed at some time. " Therefore sloth is not a kind of
sorrow.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a species
of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good. "
I answer that, The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it may
happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and in
this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in two
ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far as it
threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves
for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some harm: such
like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).
Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in so
far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or
excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good: and
consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name
consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being
reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for sorrow
to be about good, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far
as it diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a
man is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in
reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed from
one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors to
rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a
commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner whom
he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed
from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who are near
him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our
will that these should be in better repute than we are, and that gives
rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far
as it is in agreement with the will.
Reply to Objection 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters
where he is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses
him in such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems
to him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;
wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation
surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be
honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are
envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may
befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in
something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the
little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those
only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves. "
Reply to Objection 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have
had them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes
sorrow; and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that,
above all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much
in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending
little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that
others have acquired goods.
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Whether envy is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to
Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have
companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and be
nettled when they are praised. " But no one should be advised to commit
a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin
Objection 1: Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it
is written (Prov. 29:2): "When the wicked shall bear rule, the people
shall mourn. " Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good
zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up. "
Therefore envy is not always a sin.
Objection 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is
a kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul
sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself
shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes
the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed,
while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is
gnashing with the teeth. " Therefore envy is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made
desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another. "
I answer that, As stated above [2641](A[1]), envy is sorrow for
another's good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First,
when a man grieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause
harm either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not
envy, as stated above [2642](A[1]), and may be void of sin. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that without
charity being lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and
again his glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he
falls, we believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he
prospers, we dread lest many suffer unjustly. "
Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it, but
because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly
speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this
zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.
14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about temporal
goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may grieve over
another's good, because he who happens to have that good is unworthy of
it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which
make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is about riches,
and those things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and
he calls this sorrow {nemesis} [*The nearest equivalent is
"indignation. " The use of the word "nemesis" to signify "revenge" does
not represent the original Greek. ], saying that it belongs to good
morals. But he says this because he considered temporal goods in
themselves, in so far as they may seem great to those who look not to
eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching of faith, temporal
goods that accrue to those who are unworthy, are so disposed according
to God's just ordinance, either for the correction of those men, or for
their condemnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison with
the goods to come, which are prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of
this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: "Be not
emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere
(Ps. 72:2,3): "My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the
wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a
zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']. "
Fourthly, we grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses
ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over
what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.
Reply to Objection 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought
to strive to progress with those who are better than we are.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good
in the first sense given above.
Reply to Objection 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a
certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.
Reply to Objection 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal
accidentally, as stated above ([2643]FS, Q[87], A[2]) when we were
treating of sins.
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Whether envy is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since
envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason,
as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. [2644]FS, Q[74], A[4]].
Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy
can be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen
and known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale
and looked bitterly on its foster-brother. " Therefore envy is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But
envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to {nemesis}, which is a passion,
according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little
one. " Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore envy
is a mortal sin.
I answer that, Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For the
genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the
aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives
its spiritual life, according to 1 Jn. 3:14: "We know that we have
passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. " Now the
object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by
contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,
while envy grieves over it, as stated above [2645](A[1]). Therefore it
is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.
Nevertheless, as stated above (Q[35], A[4]; [2646]FS, Q[72], A[5], ad
1), in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in
the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of
concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of
anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find
sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are venial
sins.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion
of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts,
the principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not
a mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have
not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is
manifest.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy
is contrary both to {nemesis} and to pity, but for different reasons.
For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being
contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his
neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's
evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same
passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is
contrary to {nemesis} on the part of the man whose good grieves the
envious man, for {nemesis} is sorrow for the good of the undeserving
according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the
prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion of
the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners'], whereas the envious
grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is
clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now
pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is
contrary to pity and charity.
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Whether envy is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the
capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the
daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that
"those who love honor and glory are more envious. " Therefore envy is
not a capital vice.
