At no period has
the power of France ever appeared with so formidable
an aspect.
the power of France ever appeared with so formidable
an aspect.
Edmund Burke
I have it from very sure information, (and it was, indeed, obvious enough, from the measures which were taken previous to the assembly of the States and afterwards,) that the king's
counsellors had filled him with a strong dislike to his
nobility, his clergy, and the corps of his magistracy.
They represented to him, that he had tried them
all severally, in several ways, and found them all
untractable: that he had twice called an assembly
(the Notables) composed of the first men of the clergy, the nobility, and the magistrates; that he had
himself named every one member in those assemblies, and that, though so picked out, he had not,
in this their collective state, found them more disposed to a compliance with his will than they had
been separately; that there remained for him, with
the least prospect of advantage to his authority in
the States-General, which were to be composed of the
same sorts of men, but not chosen by him, only the
Tiers ]Itat: in this alone he could repose any hope
of extricating himself from his difficulties, and of
settling him in a clear and permanent authority.
They represented, (these are the words of olie of my
? ? ? ? 362 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
informants,) "that the royal authority, compressed
with the weight of these aristocratic bodies, full of
ambition and of faction, when once unloaded, would
rise of itself, and occupy its natural place without
disturbance or control"; that the common people
would protect, cherish, and support, instead of crushing it. "The people" (it was said) "could entertain no objects of ambition"; they were out of the road of intrigue and cabal, and could possibly have
no other view than the support of the mild and parental authority by which they were invested, for
the first time collectively, with real importance in. the state, and protected in their peaceable and useful employments.
King of This unfortunate king (not without a
France.
large share of blame to himself) was deluded to his ruin by a desire to humble and reduce
his nobility, clergy, and his corporate magistracy:
not that I suppose he meant wholly to eradicate
these bodies, in the manner since effected by the
democratic power; I rather believe that even Necker's designs did not go to that extent. With his own
hand, however, Louis the Sixteenth pulled down the
pillars which upheld his throne; and this he did, because he could not bear the inconveniences which are
attached to everything human,- because he found,
himself cooped up, and in durance, by those limits
which Nature prescribes to desire and imagination,
and was taught to consider as low and degrading
that mutual dependence which Providence has ordained that all men should have on one another.
HIe is not at this minute, perhaps, cured of the dread
of the power and credit like to be acquired by those
who would save and rescue him. He leaves those
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 363
who suffer in his cause to their fate, - and hopes, by
various mean, delusive intrigues, in which I am afraid
he is encouraged from abroad, to regain, among traitors and regicides, the power he has joined to take
from his own family, whom he quietly sees proscribed
before his eyes, and called to answer to the lowest of
his rebels, as the vilest of all criminals.
It is to be hoped that the Emperor may Emperor.
be taught better things by this fatal example. But it is sure that he has advisers who endeavor to fill him with the ideas which have brought
his brother-in-law to his present situation. Joseph
the Second was far gone in this philosophy, and some,
if not most, who serve the Emperor, would kindly initiate him into all the mysteries of this freemasonry.
They would persuade him to look on the National
Assembly, not with the hatred of an enemy, but the
jealousy of a rival. They would make him desirous
of doing, in his own dominions, by a royal despotism, what has been done in France by a democratic.
Rather than abandon such enterprises, they would
persuade him to a strange alliance between those
extremes. Their grand object being now, as in his
brother's time, at any rate to destroy the higher orders, they think he cannot compass this end, as certainly he cannot, without elevating the lower. By depressing the one and by raising the other they
hope in the first place to increase his treasures and
his army; and with these common instruments of
royal power they flatter him that the democracy,
which they help in his name to create, will give
him but little trouble. In defiance of the freshest
experience, which might show him that old impossibilities are become modern probabilities, and that the
? ? ? ? 364 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
extent to which evil principles may go, when left to
their own operation, is beyond the power of calculation, they will endeavor'to persuade him that such a democracy is a thing which cannot subsist by itself;
that in whose ever hands the military command is
placed, he must be, in the necessary course of affairs,
sooner or later the master; and that, being the master of various unconnected countries, he may keep them all in order by employing a military force
which to each of them is foreign. This maxim, too,
however formerly plausible, will not now hold water.
This scheme is full of intricacy, and may cause him
everywhere to lose the hearts of his people. These
counsellors forget that a corrupted army was the very
cause of the ruin of his brother-in-law, and that he
is himself far from secure from a similar corruption.
Brabant. Instead of reconciling himself heartily
and bond fide, according to the most obvious
rules of policy, to tile States of Brabant, as they are
constituted, and who in the present state of things
stand on the same foundation with the monarchy
itself, and who might have been gained with the
greatest facility, they have advised him to the most
unkingly proceeding which, either in a good or in a
bad light, has ever been attempted. Under a pretext taken from the spirit of the lowest chicane, they have counselled him wholly to break the public faith,
to annul the amnesty, as well as the other conditions
through which he obtained an entrance into the Provinces of the Netherlands under the guaranty of Great. Britain and Prussia. He is made to declare
his adherence to the indemnity in a criminal sense,
but he is to keep alive in his own name, and to encourage in others, a civil process in the nature of an
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 365
action of damages for what has been suffered during
the troubles. Whilst he keeps up this hopeful lawsuit in view of the damages he may recover against
individuals, he loses the hearts of a whole people, and
the vast subsidies which his ancestors had been used
to receive from them.
This design once admitted unriddles the Emperor's
conduct
mystery of the whole conduct of the Em- with regard
peror's ministers with regard to France. As
soon as they saw the life of the king and queen of
France no longer, as they thought, in danger, they
entirely changed their plan with regard to the
French nation. I believe that the chiefs of the
Revolution (those who led the constituting Assembly) have contrived, as far as they can do it, to
give the Emperor satisfaction on this head. He
keeps a continual tone and posture of menace to
secure this his only point. But it must be observed, that he all along grounds his departure
from the engagement at Pilnitz to the princes on
the will and actions of the king and the majority of
the people, without any regard to the natural and
constitutional orders of the state, or to the opinions
of the whole House of Bourbon. Though it is manifestly under the constraint of imprisonment and the
fear of death that this unhappy man has been guilty
of all those humilities which have astonished mankind, the advisers of the Emperor will consider nothing but the physical person of Louis, which, even in his present degraded and infamous state, they negard
as of sufficient authority to give a complete sanction
to the persecution and utter ruin of all his family,
and of every person who has shown any degree of
attachment or fidelity to him or to his cause, as
? ? ? ? 366 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
well as competent to destroy the whole ancient constitution and frame of the French monarchy.
The present policy, therefore, of the Austrian politicians is, to recover despotism through democracy,or, at least, at any expense, everywhere to ruin the description of men who are everywhere the objects
of their settled and systematic aversion, but more
especially in the Netherlands. Compare this with
the Emperor's refusing at first all intercourse with
the present powers in France, with his endeavoring
to excite all Europe against them, and then, his not
only withdrawing all assistance and all countenance
from the fugitives who had been drawn by his declarations from their houses, situations, and military
commissions, many even from the means of their
very existence, but treating them with every species
of insult and outrage.
Combining this unexampled conduct in the Emperor's advisers with the timidity (operating as perfidy) of the king of France, a fatal example is held
out to all subjects, tending to show what little support, or even countenance, they are to expect from
those for whom their principle of fidelity may induce
them to risk life and fortune. The Emperor's advisers would not for the world rescind one of the acts
of this or of the late French Assembly; nor do they
wish anything better at present for their master's
brother of France than that he should really be,
as he is nominally, at the head of the system of
persecution of religion and good order, and of all
descriptions of dignity, natural and instituted: they
only wish all this done with a little more respect
to the king's person, and with more appearance of
consideration for his new subordinate office, --in
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 367
hopes, that, yielding himself for the present to the
persons who have effected these changes, he may
be able to game for the rest hereafter. On no
other principles than these can the conduct of the
court of Vienna be accounted for. The subordinate court of Brussels talks the language of a club
of Feuillants and Jacobins.
In this state of general rottenness among Moderate
subjects, and of delusion and false politics party.
in princes, comes a new experiment. The king of
France is in the hands of the chiefs of the regicide
faction, - the Barnaves, Lameths, Fayettes, P6rigords,
Duports, Robespierres, Camuses, &c. , &c. , &c. They
who had imprisoned, suspended, and conditionally deposed him are his confidential counsellors. The next
desperate of the desperate rebels call themselves the
moderate party. They are the chiefs of the first Assembly, who are confederated to support their power during their suspension from the present, and to govern the existent body with as sovereign a sway
as they had done the last. They have, for the greater part, succeeded; and they have many advantages
towards procuring their success in future. Just before the close of their regular power, they bestowed
some appearance of prerogatives on the king, which
in their first plans they had refused to him, - partic:
ularly the mischievous, and, in his situation, dreadful
prerogative of a veto. This prerogative, (which they
hold as their bit in the mouth of the National Assembly for the time being,) without the direct assistance
of their club, it was impossible for the king to show
even the desire of exerting with the smallest effect,
or even with safety to his person. However, by
playing, through this veto, the Assembly against the
? ? ? ? 368 THOUGH'rS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
king, and the king against the Assembly, they have
made themselves masters of both. In this situation,
having destroyed the old government by their sedition, they would preserve as much of order as is necessary for the support of their own usurpation. French am- It is believed that this, by far the worst
bassador.
party of the miscreants of France, has received direct encouragement from the counsellors
who betray the Emperor. Thus strengthened by
the possession of the captive king, (now captive in
his mind as well as in body,) and by a good hope
of the Emperor, they intend to send their ministers
to every court in Europe, -having sent before them
such a denunciation of terror and superiority to
every nation without exception as has no example
in the diplomatic world. Hitherto the ministers to
foreign courts had been of the appointment of the
sovereign of France previous to the Revolution; and,
either from inclination, duty, or decorum, most of
them were contented with a merely passive obedience to the new power. At present, the king, being
entirely in the hands of his jailors, and his mind
broken to his situation, canl send none but the enthusiasts of the system, -men framed by the secret
committee of the Feuillants, who meet in the house
of Madame de Stal1, M. Necker's daughter. Such
is every man whom they have talked of sending
hither. These ministers will be so many spies and
incendiaries, so many active emissaries of democracy. Their houses will become places of rendezvous
here, as everywhere else, and centres of cabal for
whatever is mischievous and malignant in this country, particularly among those of rank and fashion.
As the minister of the National Assembly will be
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 369
admitted at this court, at least with his usual rank,
and as entertainments will be naturally given and
received by the king's own ministers, any attempt
to discountenance the resort of other people to that
minister would be ineffectual, and indeed absurd,
and full of contradiction. The women who come
with these ambassadors will assist in fomenting factions amongst ours, which cannot fail of extending the evil. Some of them I hear are already arrived.
There is no doubt they will do as much mischief as
they can.
Whilst the public ministers are received Connection
under the general law of the communication between nations, the correspondences between
the factious clubs in France and ours will be, as they
now are, kept up; but this pretended embassy will
be a closer, more steady, and more effectual link
between the partisans of the new system on both
sides of the water. I do not mean that these Anglo-Gallic clubs in London, Manchester, &c. , are not dangerous in a high degree. The appointment of
festive anniversaries has ever in the sense of mankind been held the best method of keeping alive the spirit of any institution. We have one settled in
London; and at the last of them, that of the 14th
of July, the strong discountenance of government,
the unfavorable time of the year, and the then uncertainty of the disposition of foreign powers, did not hinder the meeting of at least nine hundred people,
with good coats on their backs, who could afford to
pay half a guinea a head to show their zeal for the
new principles. They were with great difficulty,
and all possible address, hindered from inviting the:
French ambassador. His real indisposition, besides.
voXL. IV. 24
? ? ? ? 370 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
the fear of offending any party, sent him out of town.
But when our court shall have recognized a government in France founded on the principles announced
in Montmorin's letter, how call the French ambassador be frowned upon for an attendance on those meetings wherein the establishment of the govern
ment he represents is celebrated? An event happened a few days ago, which in many particulars
was very ridiculous; yet, even from the ridicule
and absurdity of the proceedings, it marks the
more strongly the spirit of the French Assembly:
I mean the reception they have given to the Frith
Street Alliance. This, though the delirium of a low,
drunken alehouse club, they have publicly announced
as a formal alliance with the people of England, as
such ordered it to be presented to their king, and to
be published in every province in France. This leads,
more directly and with much greater force than any
proceeding with a regular and rational appearance,
to two very material considerations. First, it shows
that they are of opinion that the current opinions of
the English have the greatest influence on the minds
of the people in France, and indeed of all the people
in Europe, since they catch with such astonishing
eagerness at every the most trifling show of such
opinions in their favor. Next, and what appears to. me to be full as important, it shows that they are
willing publicly to countenance, and even to adopt,
every factious conspiracy that can be formed in this
nation, however low and base in itself, in order to
excite in the most miserable wretches here an idea
of their own sovereign importance, and to encourage
them to look up to France, whenever they may be matured into something of more force, for assistance iin
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 371
the subversion of their domestic government. This
address of the alehouse club was actually proposed
and accepted by the Assembly as an alliance. The
procedure was in my opinion a high misdemeanor in
those who acted thus in England, if they were not so
very low and so very base that no acts of theirs can
be called high, even as a description of criminality;
and the Assembly, in accepting, proclaiming, and
publishing this forged alliance, has been guilty of
a plain aggression, which would justify our court in
demanding a direct disavowal, if our policy should
not lead us to wink at it.
Whilst I look over this paper to have it copied, I
see a manifesto of the Assembly, as a preliminary
to a declaration of war against the German princes
on the Rhine. This manifesto contains the whole
substance of the French politics with regard to foreign states. They have ordered it to be circulated amongst the people in every country of Europe, --
even previously to its acceptance by the king, and
his new privy council, the club of the Feuillants.
Therefore, as a summary of their policy avowed by
themselves, let us consider some of the circumstances attending that piece, as well as the spirit and temper of the piece itself.
It was preceded by a speech from Bris- Declaration
against the
sot, full of unexampled insolence towards Emperor.
all the sovereign states of Germany, if not of Europe. The Assembly, to express their satisfaction in the sentiments which it contained, ordered it to be
printed. This Brissot had been in the lowest and
basest employ under the deposed monarchy,- a sort
of thief-taker, or spy of police, - in which character
he acted after the manner of persons in that descrip
? ? ? ? 372 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH Al FAIRS.
tion. He had been employed by his master, the Lieutenant de Police, for a considerable time in London,
in the same or some such honorable occupation. The
Revolution, which has brought forward all merit of
that kind, raised him, with others of a similar class
and disposition, to fame and eminence. On the Revolution he became a publisher of an infamous newspaper, which he still continues. He is charged, and I believe justly, as the first mover of the troubles
in Hispaniola. There is no wickedness, if I am
rightly informed, in which he is not versed, and of
which he is not perfectly capable. His quality of
news-writer, now an employment of the first dignity in France, and his practices and principles, procured his election into the Assembly, where he is
one of the leading members. M. Condorcet produced on the same day a draught of a declaration
to the king, which the Assembly published before it
was presented.
Condorcet (though no marquis, as he styled himself before the Revolution) is a man of another sort
of birth, fashion, and occupation from Brissot,- but
in every principle, and every disposition to the lowest as well as the highest and most determined villanies, fully his equal. He seconds Brissot in the Assembly, and is at once his coadjutor and his rival
in a newspaper, which, in his own name, and as successor to M. Garat, a member also of the Assembly,
he has just set up in that empire of gazettes. Condorcet was chosen to draw the first declaration presented
by the Assembly to the king, as a threat to the Elector of Treves, and the other princes on the Rhine.
In that piece, in which both Feuillants and Jacobins
concurred, they declared publicly, and most proudly
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 373
and insolently, the principle on which they mean to
proceed in their future disputes with any of the sovereigns of Europe; for they say, " that it is not with
fire and sword they mean to attack their territories,
but by what will be more dreadful to them, the introduction of liberty. " --I have not the paper by me,
to give the exact words, but I believe they are nearly
as I state them. -- Dreadful, indeed, will be their
hostility, if they should be able to carry it on according to the example of their modes of introducing liberty. They have shown a perfect model of
their whole design, very complete, though in little.
This gang of murderers and savages have wholly laid
waste and utterly ruined the beautiful and happy
country of the Comtat Venaissin and the city of Avignon. This cruel and treacherous outrage the sovereigns of Europe, in my opinion, with a great mistake of their honor and interest, have permitted, even without a remonstrance, to be carried to the desired point,
on the principles on which they are now themselves
threatened in their own states; and this, because,
according to the poor and narrow spirit now in fashion, their brother sovereign, whose subjects have been
thus traitorously and inhumanly treated in violation
of the law of Nature and of nations, has a name somewhat different from theirs, and, instead of being styled
King, or Duke, or Landgrave, is usually called Pope.
The Electors of Treves and Mentz were Stateofthe
frightened with the menace of a similar Empire
mode of war. The Assembly, however, not thinking
that the Electors of Treves and Mentz had done
enough under their first terror, have again brought
forward Condorcet, preceded by Brissot, as I have just
stated. The declaration, which they have ordered
? ? ? ? ; 4 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
now to be circulated in all countries, is in substance
the same as the first, but still more insolent, because
more full of detail. There they have the impudence
to state that they aimn at no conquest: insinuating
that all the old, lawful powers of the world had each
made a constant, open profession of a design of subduing his neighbors. They add, that, if they are provoked, their war will be directed only against those
who assume to be masters; but to the people they
will bring peace, law, liberty, &c. , &c. There is not
the least hint that they consider those whom they call
persons " assuming to be masters " to be the lawful government of their country, or persons to be treated with
the least management or respect. They regard them
as usurpers and enslavers of the people. If I do not
mistake, they are described by the name of tyrants in
Condorcet's first draught. I am sure they are so in
Brissot's speech, ordered by the Assembly to be printed at the same time and for the same purposes. The
whole is in the same strain, full of false philosophy
and false rhetoric,- both, however, calculated to captivate and influence the vulgar mind, and to excite sedition in the countries in which it is ordered to be circulated. Indeed, it is such, that, if any of the lawful, acknowledged sovereigns of Europe had publicly ordered such a manifesto to be circulated in the dominions of another, the ambassador of that power would
instantly be ordered to quit every court without an
audience.
Effect of fear The powers of Europe have a pretext for
on the sovereign powers. concealing their fears, by saying that this
language is not used by the king; though they well
know that there is in effect no such person, -- that the
Assembly is in reality, and by that king is acknowl
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 375
edged to be, the master, - that what he does is but
matter of formality, - and that he can neither cause
nor hinder, accelerate nor retard, any measure whatsoever, nor add to nor soften the manifesto which the
Assembly has directed to be published, with the declared purpose of exciting mutiny and rebellion in the
several countries governed by these powers. By the
generality also of the menaces contained in this paper,
(though infinitely aggravating the outrage,) they hope
to remove from each power separately the idea of a
distinct affront. The persons first pointed at by the
menace are certainly the princes of Germany, who
harbor the persecuted House of Bourbon and the nobility of France; the declaration, however, is general,
and goes to every state with which they may have a
cause of quarrel. But the terror of France has fallen
upon all nations. A few months since all sovereigns
seemed disposed to unite against her; at present they
all seem to combine in her favor.
At no period has
the power of France ever appeared with so formidable
an aspect. In particular the liberties of the Empire
can have nothing more than an existence the most
tottering and precarious, whilst France exists with a
great power of fomenting rebellion, and the greatest
in the weakest,- but with neither power nor disposition to support the smaller states in their independence against the attempts of the more powerful. I wind up all in a full conviction within my own
breast, and the substance of which I must repeat over
and over again, that the state of France is the first
consideration in the politics of Europe, and of each
state, externally as well as internally considered.
Most of the topics I have used are drawn from fear
and apprehension. Topics derived from fear or ad
? ? ? ? 376 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
dressed to it are, I well know, of doubtful appearance.
To be sure, hope is in general the incitement to action. Alarm some men,- you do not drive them to
provide for their security; you put them to a stand;
you induce them, not to take measures to prevent the
approach of danger, but to remove so unpleasant an
idea from their minds; you persuade them to remain
as they are, from a new fear that their activity may
bring on the apprehended mischief before its time. I
confess freely that this evil sometimes happens from
an overdone precaution; but it is when the measures
are rash, ill-chosen, or ill-combined, and the effects
rather of blind terror than of enlightened foresight.
But the few to whom I wish to submit my thoughts
are of a character which will enable them to see danger without astonishment, and to provide against it
without perplexity.
To what lengths this method of circulating mutinous manifestoes, and of keeping emissaries of sedition in every court under the name of ambassadors, to propagate the same principles and to follow the
practices, will go, and how soon they will operate, it
is hard to say; but go on it will, more or less
rapidly, according to events, and to the humor of the
time. The princes menaced with the revolt of their
subjects, at the same time that they have obsequiously obeyed the sovereign mandate of the new Roman
senate, have received with distinction, in a public
character, ambassadors from those who in the same
act had circulated the manifesto of sedition in their
dominions. This was the only thing wanting to the
degradation and disgrace of the Germanic body.
The ambassadors from the rights of man, and their
admission into the diplomatic system, I hold to be a
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 377
new era in this business. It will be the most important step yet taken to affect the existence of sovereigns, and the higher classes of life: I do not mean to exclude its effects upon all classes; but the first
blow is aimed at the more prominent parts in the ancient order of things.
What is to be done?
It would be presumption in me to do more than to
make a case. Many things occur. But as they, like
all political measures, depend on dispositions, tempers, means, and external circumstances, for all their
effect, not being well assured of these, I do not know
how to let loose any speculations of mine on the subject. The evil is stated, in my opinion, as it exists.
The remedy must be where power, wisdom, and information, I hope, are more united with good intentions than they can be with me. I have done with this subject, I believe, forever. It has given me
many anxious moments for the two last years. If a
great change is to be made in human affairs, the
minds of men will be fitted'to it, the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear,
every hope, will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mighty current in human affairs
will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence
itself than the mere designs of men. They will not
be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate.
? ? ? ? HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE
PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER, 1792.
? ? ? ? HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION.
TIHAT France by its mere geographical position,
independently of every other circumstance, must
affect every state of Europe: some of them immediately, all of them through mediums not very remote. That the standing policy of this kingdom ever has
been to watch over the external proceedings of France,
(whatever form the interior government of that kingdom might take,) and to prevent the extension of its dominion or its ruling influence over other states.
That there is nothing in the present internal state
of things in France which alters the national policy
with regard to the exterior relations of that country.
That there are, on the contrary, many things in
the internal circumstances of France (and perhaps of
this country, too) which tend to fortify the principles
of that fundamental policy, and which render the
active assertion of those principles more pressing at
this than at any former time.
That, by a change effected in about three weeks,
France has been able to penetrate into the heart of
Germany, to make an absolute conquest of Savoy,
to menace an immediate invasion of the Netherlands,
and to awe and overbear the whole Helvetic body,
which is in a most perilous situation: the great
aristocratic Cantons having, perhaps, as much or
more to dread from their own people, whom they
? ? ? ? 382 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION.
arm, but do not choose or dare to employ, as from
the foreign enemy, which against all public faith has
butchered their troops serving by treaty in France.
To this picture it is hardly necessary to add the
means by which France has been enabled to effect all
this, -namely, the apparently entire destruction of
one of the largest and certainly the highest disciplined and best appointed army ever seen, headed by
the first military sovereign in Europe, with a captain.
under him of the greatest refnown; and that without
a blow given or received on any side. This state of
things seems to me, even if it went no further, truly
serious.
Circumstances have enabled France to do all this
by land. On the other element she has begun to exert herself; and she must succeed in her designs, if
enemies very different from those she has hitherto
had to encounter do not resist her.
She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at
sea, by which she is enabled to give law to the whole
Mediterranean. It is known as a fact, (and if not so
known, it is in the nature of things highly probable,)
that she proposes the ravage of the Ecclesiastical
State and the pillage of Rome, as her first object;
that next she means to bombard Naples, -to awe, to
humble, and thus to command, all Italy, --to force
it to a nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence,
-- to compel the Italian princes and republics to admit the free entrance of the French commerce, an
open intercourse, and, the sure concomitant of that
intercourse, the affiliated societies, in a manner similar to those she has established at Avignon, the Comtat, Chambdry, London, Manchester, &c. , &c. , which are so many colonies planted in all these countries,
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 383
for extending the influence and securing the dominion of the French republic.
That there never has been hitherto a period in
which this kingdom would have suffered a French
fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to force
Italy to submit to such terms as France would think
fit to impose, - to say nothing of what has been done
upon land in support of the same system. The great
object for which we preserved Minorca, whilst we
could keep it, and for which we still retain Gibraltar,
both at a great expense, was, and is, to prevent the
predominance of France over the Mediterranean.
Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of
that armament upon the Italian States. The probable effect which that armament, and the other ar maments preparing at Toulon and other ports, may
have upon Spain, on the side of the Mediterranean, is
worthy of the serious attention of the British councils.
That it is most probable, we may say in a manner
certain, that, if there should be a rupture between
France and Spain, France will not confine her offensive piratical operations against Spain to her efforts in the Mediterranean; on which side, however, she
may grievously affect Spain, especially if she excites
Morocco and Algiers, which undoubtedly she will, to
fall upon that power.
That she will fit out armaments upon the ocean,
by which the flota itself may be intercepted, and thus
the treasures of all Europe, as well as the largest and
surest resources of the Spanish monarchy, may be
conveyed into France, and become powerful instruments for the annoyance of all her neighbors.
That she makes no secret of her designs.
? ? ? ? 384 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
That, if the inward and outward bound flota should
escape, still France has more and better means of dissevering many of the provinces in the West and East
Indies from the state of Spain than Holland had,
when she succeeded in the same attempt. The
French marine resembles not a little the old armaments of the Flibustiers, which about a century back,
in conjunction with pirates of our nation, brought
such calamities upon the Spanish colonies. They
differ only in this, - that the present piratical force
is out of all measure and comparison greater: one
hundred and fifty ships of the line and frigates
being ready-built, most of them in a manner new,
and all applicable in different ways to that service.
Privateers and Moorish corsairs possess not the best
seamanship, and very little discipline, and indeed
can make no figure in regular service; but in desperate adventures, and animated with a lust of plunder, they are truly formidable.
That the land forces of France are well adapted to
concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions of
this nature. In such expeditions, enterprise supplies
the want of discipline, and perhaps more than supplies it. Both for this, and for other service, (however contemptible their military is in other respects,) one arm is extremely good, the engineering and artillery branch. The old officer corps in both being
composed for the greater part of those who were not
gentlemen, or gentlemen newly such, few have abaildoned the service, and the men are veterans, well
enough disciplined, and very expert. In this piratical way they must make war with good advantage.
They must do so, even on the side of Flanders, either
offensively or defensively. This shows the difference
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 385
between the policy of Louis the Fourteenth, who
built a wall of brass about his kingdom, and that
of Joseph the Second, who premeditatedly uncovered
his whole frontier.
That Spain, from the actual and expected prevalence of French power, is in a most perilous situation, -perfectly dependent on the mercy of that republic. If Austria is broken, or even humbled,
she will not dare to dispute its mandates.
In the present state of things, we have nothing at
all to dread from the power of Spain by sea or by
land, or from any rivalry in commerce.
That we have much to dread from the connections
into which Spain may be forced.
From the circumstances of her territorial possessions, of her resources, and the whole of her civil
and political state, we may be authorized safely and
with undoubted confidence to affirm that
Spain is not a substantive power.
That she must lean on France or on England.
That it is as much for the interest of Great Britain
to prevent the predominancy of a French interest in
that kingdom as if Spain were a province of the
crown of Great Britain, or a state actually dependent
on it, --full as much so as ever Portugal was reputed
to be. This is a dependency of much greater value;
and its destruction, or its being carried to any other
dependency, of much more serious misfortune.
One of these two things must happen: either Spain
must submit to circumstances and take such conditions as France will impose, or she must engage in
hostilities along with the Emperor and the king of
Sardinia.
If Spain should be forced or awed into a treaty
VOL. IV. 25
? ? ? ? 386 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
with the republic of France, she must open her ports
and her commerce, as well as the land communication for the French laborers, who were accustomed
annually to gather in the harvest in Spain. Indeed,
she must grant a free communication for travellers
and traders through her whole country. In that
case it is not conjectural, it is certain, the clubs will
give law in the provinces; Bourgoing, or some such
miscreant, will give law at Madrid.
In this England may acquiesce, if she pleases; and
France will conclude a triumphant peace with Spain
under her absolute dependence, with a broad highway
into that, and into every state of Europe. She actually invites Great Britain to divide with her the
spoils of the New World, and to make a partition of
the Spanish monarchy. Clearly, it is better to do so
than to suffer France to possess those spoils and that
territory alone; which, without doubt, unresisted by
us, she is altogether as able as she is willing to do.
This plan is proposed by the French in the way in
which they propose all their plans,- and in the only
way in which, indeed, they can propose them, where
there is no regular communication between his Majesty and their republic.
What they propose is a plan. It is a plan also to
resist their predatory project. To remain quiet, and,to suffer them to make their own use of a naval power before our face, so as to awe and bully Spain into a submissive peace, or to drive them into a ruinous
war, without any measure on our part, I fear is no
plan at all.
However, if the plan of cooperation which France
desires, and which her affiliated societies here ardently wish and are constantly writing up, should not
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 387
be adopted, and the war between the Emperor and
France should continue, I think it not at all likely
that Spain should not be drawn into the quarrel. In
that case, the neutrality of England will be a thing
absolutely impossible. The time only is the subject
of deliberation.
Then the question will be, whether we are to defer
putting ourselves into a posture for the common defence, either by armament, or negotiation, or both,
until Spain is actually attacked, - that is, whether
our court will take a decided part for Spain, whilst
Spain, on her side, is yet in a condition to act with
whatever degree of vigor she may have, whilst that
vigor is yet unexhausted, - or whether we shall connIlect ourselves with her broken fortunes, after she shall
have received material blows, and when we shall have
the whole slow length of that always unwieldy and illconstructed, and then wounded and crippled body, to
drag after us, rather than to aid us. Whilst our disposition is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herself in such a state of defence as will make her hostility formidable or her neutrality respectable. If the decision is such as the solution of this question (I take it to be the true question) conducts to,
no time is to be lost. But the measures, though
prompt, ought not to be rash and indigested. They
ought to be well chosen, well combined, and well
pursued. The system must be general; but it must
be executed, not successively, or with interruption,
but all together, uno flatu, in one melting, and one
mould.
For this purpose we must put Europe before us,
which plainly is, just now, in all its parts, in a state
of dismay, derangement, and confusion, and, very
? ? ? ? 388 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
possibly amongst all its sovereigns, full of secret heartburning, distrust, and mutual accusation. Perhaps
it may labor under worse evils. There is no vigor
anywhere, except the distempered vigor and energy
of France. That country has but too much life in it,
when everything around is so disposed to tameness
and languor. The very vices of the French system at
home tend to give force to foreign exertions. The
generals must join the armies. They must lead them
to enterprise, or they are likely to perish by their
hands. Thus, without law or government of her
own, France gives law to all the governments in Europe.
This great mass of political matter must have been
always under the view of thinkers for the public,
whether they act in office or not. Amongst events,
even the late calamitous events were in the book of
contingency. Of course they must have been in design, at least, provided for. A plan which takes in
as many as possible of the states concerned will rather tend to facilitate and simplify a rational scheme
for preserving Spain (if that were our sole, as I think
it ought to be our principal object) thai to delay and
perplex it.
If we should think that a provident policy (perlaps n1ow more than provident, urgent and necessary)
should lead us to act, we cannot take measures as
if hothing had been done. We must see the faults,
if any, which have conducted to the present misfortunes: not for the sake of criticism, military or political, or from the common motives of blaming persons and counsels which have not been successful; but in order, if we can, to administer some remedy
to these disasters, by the adoption of plans more bot
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 389
tomed in principle, and built on with more discretion.
Mistakes may be lessons.
There seem, indeed, to have been several mistakes
in the political principles on which the war was entered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was
conducted, -- some of them very fundamental, and not
only visibly, but I may say palpably erroneous; and
I think him to have less than the discernment of a
very ordinary statesman, who could not foresee, from
the very beginning, unpleasant consequences from
those plans, though not the unparalleled disgraces
and disasters which really did attend them: for they
were, both principles and measures, wholly new and
out of the common course, without anything apparently very grand in the conception to justify this total departure from all rule.
For, in the first place, the united sovereigns very
much injured their cause by admitting that they
had nothing to do with the interior arrangements of
France, - in contradiction to the whole tenor of the
public law of Europe, and to the correspondent practice of all its states, from the time we have any history of them. In this particular, the two German courts seem to have as little consulted the publicists
of Germany as their own true interests, and those of
all the sovereigns of Germany and Europe. This
admission of a false principle in the law of nations
brought them into an apparent contradiction, when
they insisted on the reestablishment of the royal atmthority in France. But this confused and contradictory proceeding gave rise to a practical error of worse consequence. It was derived from one and the same
root: namely, that the person of the monarch of France
was everything; and the monarchy, and the interme
? ? ? ? 390 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
diate orders of the state, by which the monarchy was
upheld, were nothing. So that, if the united potentates had succeeded so far as to reestablish the
authority of that king, and that he should be so illadvised as to confirm all the confiscations, and to recognize as a lawful body and to class himself with that rabble of murderers, (and there wanted not persons
who would so have advised him,) there was nothing
in the principle or in the proceeding of the united
powers to prevent such an arrangement.
An expedition to free a brother sovereign from
prison was undoubtedly a generous and chivalrous
undertaking. But the spirit and generosity would
not have been less, if the policy had been more profound and more comprehensive, -that is, if it had
taken in those considerations and those persons by
whom, and, in some measure, for whom, monarchy
exists. This would become a bottom for a system
of solid and permanent policy, and of operations conformable to that system.
The same fruitful error was the cause why nothing
was done to impress the people of France (so far as
we can at all consider the inhabitants of France as a
people) with an idea that the government was ever
to be really French, or indeed anything else than the
nominal government of a monarch, a monarch absolute as over them, but whose sole support was to arise
from foreign potentates, and who was to be kept on
his throne by German forces,- in short, that the
king of France was to be a viceroy to the Emrperor
and the king of Prussia.
It was the first time that foreign powers, interfering in the concerns of a nation divided into parties,
have thought proper to thrust wholly out of their
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 391
councils, to postpone, to discountenance, to reject,
and, in a manner, to disgrace, the party whom those
powers came to support. The single person of a
king cannot be a party. Woe to the king who is
himself his party! The royal party, with the king
or his representatives at its head, is the royal cause.
Foreign powers have hitherto chosen to give to such
wars as this the appearance of a civil contest, and not
that of an hostile invasion. When the Spaniards, in'
the sixteenth century, sent aids to the chiefs of the
League, they appeared as allies to that league, and to
the imprisoned king (the Cardinal de Bourbon) which
that league had set up. When the Germans came to
the aid of the Protestant princes, in the same series
of civil wars, they came as allies. When the English
came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appeared
as allies to that prince. So did the French always,
when they intermeddled in the affairs of Germany:
they came to aid a party there. When the English
and Dutch intermeddled in the succession of Spain,
they appeared as allies to the Emperor, Charles the
Sixth. In short, the policy has been as uniform as
its principles were. obvious to an ordinary eye.
According to all the old principles of law and policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by the
French princes of the blood, nobles, and parliaments,
and then recognized by the combined powers. Fundamental law and ancient usage, as well as the clear
reason of the thing, have always ordained it during
an imprisonment of the king of France: as in the
case of John, and of Francis the First. A monarchy
ought not to be left a moment without a representative having an interest in the -succession. The orders of the state ought also to have been recognized
? ? ? ? 392 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
in those amongst whom alone they existed in freedom, that is, in the emigrants.
Thus, laying down a firm foundation on the recognition of the authorities of the kingdom of France, according to Nature and to its fundamental laws, and
not according to the novel and inconsiderate principles of the usurpation which the united powers were come to extirpate, the king of Prussia and the Emperor, as allies of the ancient kingdom of France, would have proceeded with dignity, first, to free the
monarch, if possible,-if not, to secure tlhe monarchy
as principal in the design; and in order to avoid all
risks to that great object, (the object of other ages
than the present, and of other countries than that of
France,) they would of course avoid proceeding with
more haste or in a different manner than what the
nature of such an object required.
counsellors had filled him with a strong dislike to his
nobility, his clergy, and the corps of his magistracy.
They represented to him, that he had tried them
all severally, in several ways, and found them all
untractable: that he had twice called an assembly
(the Notables) composed of the first men of the clergy, the nobility, and the magistrates; that he had
himself named every one member in those assemblies, and that, though so picked out, he had not,
in this their collective state, found them more disposed to a compliance with his will than they had
been separately; that there remained for him, with
the least prospect of advantage to his authority in
the States-General, which were to be composed of the
same sorts of men, but not chosen by him, only the
Tiers ]Itat: in this alone he could repose any hope
of extricating himself from his difficulties, and of
settling him in a clear and permanent authority.
They represented, (these are the words of olie of my
? ? ? ? 362 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
informants,) "that the royal authority, compressed
with the weight of these aristocratic bodies, full of
ambition and of faction, when once unloaded, would
rise of itself, and occupy its natural place without
disturbance or control"; that the common people
would protect, cherish, and support, instead of crushing it. "The people" (it was said) "could entertain no objects of ambition"; they were out of the road of intrigue and cabal, and could possibly have
no other view than the support of the mild and parental authority by which they were invested, for
the first time collectively, with real importance in. the state, and protected in their peaceable and useful employments.
King of This unfortunate king (not without a
France.
large share of blame to himself) was deluded to his ruin by a desire to humble and reduce
his nobility, clergy, and his corporate magistracy:
not that I suppose he meant wholly to eradicate
these bodies, in the manner since effected by the
democratic power; I rather believe that even Necker's designs did not go to that extent. With his own
hand, however, Louis the Sixteenth pulled down the
pillars which upheld his throne; and this he did, because he could not bear the inconveniences which are
attached to everything human,- because he found,
himself cooped up, and in durance, by those limits
which Nature prescribes to desire and imagination,
and was taught to consider as low and degrading
that mutual dependence which Providence has ordained that all men should have on one another.
HIe is not at this minute, perhaps, cured of the dread
of the power and credit like to be acquired by those
who would save and rescue him. He leaves those
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 363
who suffer in his cause to their fate, - and hopes, by
various mean, delusive intrigues, in which I am afraid
he is encouraged from abroad, to regain, among traitors and regicides, the power he has joined to take
from his own family, whom he quietly sees proscribed
before his eyes, and called to answer to the lowest of
his rebels, as the vilest of all criminals.
It is to be hoped that the Emperor may Emperor.
be taught better things by this fatal example. But it is sure that he has advisers who endeavor to fill him with the ideas which have brought
his brother-in-law to his present situation. Joseph
the Second was far gone in this philosophy, and some,
if not most, who serve the Emperor, would kindly initiate him into all the mysteries of this freemasonry.
They would persuade him to look on the National
Assembly, not with the hatred of an enemy, but the
jealousy of a rival. They would make him desirous
of doing, in his own dominions, by a royal despotism, what has been done in France by a democratic.
Rather than abandon such enterprises, they would
persuade him to a strange alliance between those
extremes. Their grand object being now, as in his
brother's time, at any rate to destroy the higher orders, they think he cannot compass this end, as certainly he cannot, without elevating the lower. By depressing the one and by raising the other they
hope in the first place to increase his treasures and
his army; and with these common instruments of
royal power they flatter him that the democracy,
which they help in his name to create, will give
him but little trouble. In defiance of the freshest
experience, which might show him that old impossibilities are become modern probabilities, and that the
? ? ? ? 364 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
extent to which evil principles may go, when left to
their own operation, is beyond the power of calculation, they will endeavor'to persuade him that such a democracy is a thing which cannot subsist by itself;
that in whose ever hands the military command is
placed, he must be, in the necessary course of affairs,
sooner or later the master; and that, being the master of various unconnected countries, he may keep them all in order by employing a military force
which to each of them is foreign. This maxim, too,
however formerly plausible, will not now hold water.
This scheme is full of intricacy, and may cause him
everywhere to lose the hearts of his people. These
counsellors forget that a corrupted army was the very
cause of the ruin of his brother-in-law, and that he
is himself far from secure from a similar corruption.
Brabant. Instead of reconciling himself heartily
and bond fide, according to the most obvious
rules of policy, to tile States of Brabant, as they are
constituted, and who in the present state of things
stand on the same foundation with the monarchy
itself, and who might have been gained with the
greatest facility, they have advised him to the most
unkingly proceeding which, either in a good or in a
bad light, has ever been attempted. Under a pretext taken from the spirit of the lowest chicane, they have counselled him wholly to break the public faith,
to annul the amnesty, as well as the other conditions
through which he obtained an entrance into the Provinces of the Netherlands under the guaranty of Great. Britain and Prussia. He is made to declare
his adherence to the indemnity in a criminal sense,
but he is to keep alive in his own name, and to encourage in others, a civil process in the nature of an
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 365
action of damages for what has been suffered during
the troubles. Whilst he keeps up this hopeful lawsuit in view of the damages he may recover against
individuals, he loses the hearts of a whole people, and
the vast subsidies which his ancestors had been used
to receive from them.
This design once admitted unriddles the Emperor's
conduct
mystery of the whole conduct of the Em- with regard
peror's ministers with regard to France. As
soon as they saw the life of the king and queen of
France no longer, as they thought, in danger, they
entirely changed their plan with regard to the
French nation. I believe that the chiefs of the
Revolution (those who led the constituting Assembly) have contrived, as far as they can do it, to
give the Emperor satisfaction on this head. He
keeps a continual tone and posture of menace to
secure this his only point. But it must be observed, that he all along grounds his departure
from the engagement at Pilnitz to the princes on
the will and actions of the king and the majority of
the people, without any regard to the natural and
constitutional orders of the state, or to the opinions
of the whole House of Bourbon. Though it is manifestly under the constraint of imprisonment and the
fear of death that this unhappy man has been guilty
of all those humilities which have astonished mankind, the advisers of the Emperor will consider nothing but the physical person of Louis, which, even in his present degraded and infamous state, they negard
as of sufficient authority to give a complete sanction
to the persecution and utter ruin of all his family,
and of every person who has shown any degree of
attachment or fidelity to him or to his cause, as
? ? ? ? 366 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
well as competent to destroy the whole ancient constitution and frame of the French monarchy.
The present policy, therefore, of the Austrian politicians is, to recover despotism through democracy,or, at least, at any expense, everywhere to ruin the description of men who are everywhere the objects
of their settled and systematic aversion, but more
especially in the Netherlands. Compare this with
the Emperor's refusing at first all intercourse with
the present powers in France, with his endeavoring
to excite all Europe against them, and then, his not
only withdrawing all assistance and all countenance
from the fugitives who had been drawn by his declarations from their houses, situations, and military
commissions, many even from the means of their
very existence, but treating them with every species
of insult and outrage.
Combining this unexampled conduct in the Emperor's advisers with the timidity (operating as perfidy) of the king of France, a fatal example is held
out to all subjects, tending to show what little support, or even countenance, they are to expect from
those for whom their principle of fidelity may induce
them to risk life and fortune. The Emperor's advisers would not for the world rescind one of the acts
of this or of the late French Assembly; nor do they
wish anything better at present for their master's
brother of France than that he should really be,
as he is nominally, at the head of the system of
persecution of religion and good order, and of all
descriptions of dignity, natural and instituted: they
only wish all this done with a little more respect
to the king's person, and with more appearance of
consideration for his new subordinate office, --in
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 367
hopes, that, yielding himself for the present to the
persons who have effected these changes, he may
be able to game for the rest hereafter. On no
other principles than these can the conduct of the
court of Vienna be accounted for. The subordinate court of Brussels talks the language of a club
of Feuillants and Jacobins.
In this state of general rottenness among Moderate
subjects, and of delusion and false politics party.
in princes, comes a new experiment. The king of
France is in the hands of the chiefs of the regicide
faction, - the Barnaves, Lameths, Fayettes, P6rigords,
Duports, Robespierres, Camuses, &c. , &c. , &c. They
who had imprisoned, suspended, and conditionally deposed him are his confidential counsellors. The next
desperate of the desperate rebels call themselves the
moderate party. They are the chiefs of the first Assembly, who are confederated to support their power during their suspension from the present, and to govern the existent body with as sovereign a sway
as they had done the last. They have, for the greater part, succeeded; and they have many advantages
towards procuring their success in future. Just before the close of their regular power, they bestowed
some appearance of prerogatives on the king, which
in their first plans they had refused to him, - partic:
ularly the mischievous, and, in his situation, dreadful
prerogative of a veto. This prerogative, (which they
hold as their bit in the mouth of the National Assembly for the time being,) without the direct assistance
of their club, it was impossible for the king to show
even the desire of exerting with the smallest effect,
or even with safety to his person. However, by
playing, through this veto, the Assembly against the
? ? ? ? 368 THOUGH'rS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
king, and the king against the Assembly, they have
made themselves masters of both. In this situation,
having destroyed the old government by their sedition, they would preserve as much of order as is necessary for the support of their own usurpation. French am- It is believed that this, by far the worst
bassador.
party of the miscreants of France, has received direct encouragement from the counsellors
who betray the Emperor. Thus strengthened by
the possession of the captive king, (now captive in
his mind as well as in body,) and by a good hope
of the Emperor, they intend to send their ministers
to every court in Europe, -having sent before them
such a denunciation of terror and superiority to
every nation without exception as has no example
in the diplomatic world. Hitherto the ministers to
foreign courts had been of the appointment of the
sovereign of France previous to the Revolution; and,
either from inclination, duty, or decorum, most of
them were contented with a merely passive obedience to the new power. At present, the king, being
entirely in the hands of his jailors, and his mind
broken to his situation, canl send none but the enthusiasts of the system, -men framed by the secret
committee of the Feuillants, who meet in the house
of Madame de Stal1, M. Necker's daughter. Such
is every man whom they have talked of sending
hither. These ministers will be so many spies and
incendiaries, so many active emissaries of democracy. Their houses will become places of rendezvous
here, as everywhere else, and centres of cabal for
whatever is mischievous and malignant in this country, particularly among those of rank and fashion.
As the minister of the National Assembly will be
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 369
admitted at this court, at least with his usual rank,
and as entertainments will be naturally given and
received by the king's own ministers, any attempt
to discountenance the resort of other people to that
minister would be ineffectual, and indeed absurd,
and full of contradiction. The women who come
with these ambassadors will assist in fomenting factions amongst ours, which cannot fail of extending the evil. Some of them I hear are already arrived.
There is no doubt they will do as much mischief as
they can.
Whilst the public ministers are received Connection
under the general law of the communication between nations, the correspondences between
the factious clubs in France and ours will be, as they
now are, kept up; but this pretended embassy will
be a closer, more steady, and more effectual link
between the partisans of the new system on both
sides of the water. I do not mean that these Anglo-Gallic clubs in London, Manchester, &c. , are not dangerous in a high degree. The appointment of
festive anniversaries has ever in the sense of mankind been held the best method of keeping alive the spirit of any institution. We have one settled in
London; and at the last of them, that of the 14th
of July, the strong discountenance of government,
the unfavorable time of the year, and the then uncertainty of the disposition of foreign powers, did not hinder the meeting of at least nine hundred people,
with good coats on their backs, who could afford to
pay half a guinea a head to show their zeal for the
new principles. They were with great difficulty,
and all possible address, hindered from inviting the:
French ambassador. His real indisposition, besides.
voXL. IV. 24
? ? ? ? 370 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
the fear of offending any party, sent him out of town.
But when our court shall have recognized a government in France founded on the principles announced
in Montmorin's letter, how call the French ambassador be frowned upon for an attendance on those meetings wherein the establishment of the govern
ment he represents is celebrated? An event happened a few days ago, which in many particulars
was very ridiculous; yet, even from the ridicule
and absurdity of the proceedings, it marks the
more strongly the spirit of the French Assembly:
I mean the reception they have given to the Frith
Street Alliance. This, though the delirium of a low,
drunken alehouse club, they have publicly announced
as a formal alliance with the people of England, as
such ordered it to be presented to their king, and to
be published in every province in France. This leads,
more directly and with much greater force than any
proceeding with a regular and rational appearance,
to two very material considerations. First, it shows
that they are of opinion that the current opinions of
the English have the greatest influence on the minds
of the people in France, and indeed of all the people
in Europe, since they catch with such astonishing
eagerness at every the most trifling show of such
opinions in their favor. Next, and what appears to. me to be full as important, it shows that they are
willing publicly to countenance, and even to adopt,
every factious conspiracy that can be formed in this
nation, however low and base in itself, in order to
excite in the most miserable wretches here an idea
of their own sovereign importance, and to encourage
them to look up to France, whenever they may be matured into something of more force, for assistance iin
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 371
the subversion of their domestic government. This
address of the alehouse club was actually proposed
and accepted by the Assembly as an alliance. The
procedure was in my opinion a high misdemeanor in
those who acted thus in England, if they were not so
very low and so very base that no acts of theirs can
be called high, even as a description of criminality;
and the Assembly, in accepting, proclaiming, and
publishing this forged alliance, has been guilty of
a plain aggression, which would justify our court in
demanding a direct disavowal, if our policy should
not lead us to wink at it.
Whilst I look over this paper to have it copied, I
see a manifesto of the Assembly, as a preliminary
to a declaration of war against the German princes
on the Rhine. This manifesto contains the whole
substance of the French politics with regard to foreign states. They have ordered it to be circulated amongst the people in every country of Europe, --
even previously to its acceptance by the king, and
his new privy council, the club of the Feuillants.
Therefore, as a summary of their policy avowed by
themselves, let us consider some of the circumstances attending that piece, as well as the spirit and temper of the piece itself.
It was preceded by a speech from Bris- Declaration
against the
sot, full of unexampled insolence towards Emperor.
all the sovereign states of Germany, if not of Europe. The Assembly, to express their satisfaction in the sentiments which it contained, ordered it to be
printed. This Brissot had been in the lowest and
basest employ under the deposed monarchy,- a sort
of thief-taker, or spy of police, - in which character
he acted after the manner of persons in that descrip
? ? ? ? 372 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH Al FAIRS.
tion. He had been employed by his master, the Lieutenant de Police, for a considerable time in London,
in the same or some such honorable occupation. The
Revolution, which has brought forward all merit of
that kind, raised him, with others of a similar class
and disposition, to fame and eminence. On the Revolution he became a publisher of an infamous newspaper, which he still continues. He is charged, and I believe justly, as the first mover of the troubles
in Hispaniola. There is no wickedness, if I am
rightly informed, in which he is not versed, and of
which he is not perfectly capable. His quality of
news-writer, now an employment of the first dignity in France, and his practices and principles, procured his election into the Assembly, where he is
one of the leading members. M. Condorcet produced on the same day a draught of a declaration
to the king, which the Assembly published before it
was presented.
Condorcet (though no marquis, as he styled himself before the Revolution) is a man of another sort
of birth, fashion, and occupation from Brissot,- but
in every principle, and every disposition to the lowest as well as the highest and most determined villanies, fully his equal. He seconds Brissot in the Assembly, and is at once his coadjutor and his rival
in a newspaper, which, in his own name, and as successor to M. Garat, a member also of the Assembly,
he has just set up in that empire of gazettes. Condorcet was chosen to draw the first declaration presented
by the Assembly to the king, as a threat to the Elector of Treves, and the other princes on the Rhine.
In that piece, in which both Feuillants and Jacobins
concurred, they declared publicly, and most proudly
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 373
and insolently, the principle on which they mean to
proceed in their future disputes with any of the sovereigns of Europe; for they say, " that it is not with
fire and sword they mean to attack their territories,
but by what will be more dreadful to them, the introduction of liberty. " --I have not the paper by me,
to give the exact words, but I believe they are nearly
as I state them. -- Dreadful, indeed, will be their
hostility, if they should be able to carry it on according to the example of their modes of introducing liberty. They have shown a perfect model of
their whole design, very complete, though in little.
This gang of murderers and savages have wholly laid
waste and utterly ruined the beautiful and happy
country of the Comtat Venaissin and the city of Avignon. This cruel and treacherous outrage the sovereigns of Europe, in my opinion, with a great mistake of their honor and interest, have permitted, even without a remonstrance, to be carried to the desired point,
on the principles on which they are now themselves
threatened in their own states; and this, because,
according to the poor and narrow spirit now in fashion, their brother sovereign, whose subjects have been
thus traitorously and inhumanly treated in violation
of the law of Nature and of nations, has a name somewhat different from theirs, and, instead of being styled
King, or Duke, or Landgrave, is usually called Pope.
The Electors of Treves and Mentz were Stateofthe
frightened with the menace of a similar Empire
mode of war. The Assembly, however, not thinking
that the Electors of Treves and Mentz had done
enough under their first terror, have again brought
forward Condorcet, preceded by Brissot, as I have just
stated. The declaration, which they have ordered
? ? ? ? ; 4 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
now to be circulated in all countries, is in substance
the same as the first, but still more insolent, because
more full of detail. There they have the impudence
to state that they aimn at no conquest: insinuating
that all the old, lawful powers of the world had each
made a constant, open profession of a design of subduing his neighbors. They add, that, if they are provoked, their war will be directed only against those
who assume to be masters; but to the people they
will bring peace, law, liberty, &c. , &c. There is not
the least hint that they consider those whom they call
persons " assuming to be masters " to be the lawful government of their country, or persons to be treated with
the least management or respect. They regard them
as usurpers and enslavers of the people. If I do not
mistake, they are described by the name of tyrants in
Condorcet's first draught. I am sure they are so in
Brissot's speech, ordered by the Assembly to be printed at the same time and for the same purposes. The
whole is in the same strain, full of false philosophy
and false rhetoric,- both, however, calculated to captivate and influence the vulgar mind, and to excite sedition in the countries in which it is ordered to be circulated. Indeed, it is such, that, if any of the lawful, acknowledged sovereigns of Europe had publicly ordered such a manifesto to be circulated in the dominions of another, the ambassador of that power would
instantly be ordered to quit every court without an
audience.
Effect of fear The powers of Europe have a pretext for
on the sovereign powers. concealing their fears, by saying that this
language is not used by the king; though they well
know that there is in effect no such person, -- that the
Assembly is in reality, and by that king is acknowl
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 375
edged to be, the master, - that what he does is but
matter of formality, - and that he can neither cause
nor hinder, accelerate nor retard, any measure whatsoever, nor add to nor soften the manifesto which the
Assembly has directed to be published, with the declared purpose of exciting mutiny and rebellion in the
several countries governed by these powers. By the
generality also of the menaces contained in this paper,
(though infinitely aggravating the outrage,) they hope
to remove from each power separately the idea of a
distinct affront. The persons first pointed at by the
menace are certainly the princes of Germany, who
harbor the persecuted House of Bourbon and the nobility of France; the declaration, however, is general,
and goes to every state with which they may have a
cause of quarrel. But the terror of France has fallen
upon all nations. A few months since all sovereigns
seemed disposed to unite against her; at present they
all seem to combine in her favor.
At no period has
the power of France ever appeared with so formidable
an aspect. In particular the liberties of the Empire
can have nothing more than an existence the most
tottering and precarious, whilst France exists with a
great power of fomenting rebellion, and the greatest
in the weakest,- but with neither power nor disposition to support the smaller states in their independence against the attempts of the more powerful. I wind up all in a full conviction within my own
breast, and the substance of which I must repeat over
and over again, that the state of France is the first
consideration in the politics of Europe, and of each
state, externally as well as internally considered.
Most of the topics I have used are drawn from fear
and apprehension. Topics derived from fear or ad
? ? ? ? 376 THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.
dressed to it are, I well know, of doubtful appearance.
To be sure, hope is in general the incitement to action. Alarm some men,- you do not drive them to
provide for their security; you put them to a stand;
you induce them, not to take measures to prevent the
approach of danger, but to remove so unpleasant an
idea from their minds; you persuade them to remain
as they are, from a new fear that their activity may
bring on the apprehended mischief before its time. I
confess freely that this evil sometimes happens from
an overdone precaution; but it is when the measures
are rash, ill-chosen, or ill-combined, and the effects
rather of blind terror than of enlightened foresight.
But the few to whom I wish to submit my thoughts
are of a character which will enable them to see danger without astonishment, and to provide against it
without perplexity.
To what lengths this method of circulating mutinous manifestoes, and of keeping emissaries of sedition in every court under the name of ambassadors, to propagate the same principles and to follow the
practices, will go, and how soon they will operate, it
is hard to say; but go on it will, more or less
rapidly, according to events, and to the humor of the
time. The princes menaced with the revolt of their
subjects, at the same time that they have obsequiously obeyed the sovereign mandate of the new Roman
senate, have received with distinction, in a public
character, ambassadors from those who in the same
act had circulated the manifesto of sedition in their
dominions. This was the only thing wanting to the
degradation and disgrace of the Germanic body.
The ambassadors from the rights of man, and their
admission into the diplomatic system, I hold to be a
? ? ? ? THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS. 377
new era in this business. It will be the most important step yet taken to affect the existence of sovereigns, and the higher classes of life: I do not mean to exclude its effects upon all classes; but the first
blow is aimed at the more prominent parts in the ancient order of things.
What is to be done?
It would be presumption in me to do more than to
make a case. Many things occur. But as they, like
all political measures, depend on dispositions, tempers, means, and external circumstances, for all their
effect, not being well assured of these, I do not know
how to let loose any speculations of mine on the subject. The evil is stated, in my opinion, as it exists.
The remedy must be where power, wisdom, and information, I hope, are more united with good intentions than they can be with me. I have done with this subject, I believe, forever. It has given me
many anxious moments for the two last years. If a
great change is to be made in human affairs, the
minds of men will be fitted'to it, the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear,
every hope, will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mighty current in human affairs
will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence
itself than the mere designs of men. They will not
be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate.
? ? ? ? HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE
PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER, 1792.
? ? ? ? HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION.
TIHAT France by its mere geographical position,
independently of every other circumstance, must
affect every state of Europe: some of them immediately, all of them through mediums not very remote. That the standing policy of this kingdom ever has
been to watch over the external proceedings of France,
(whatever form the interior government of that kingdom might take,) and to prevent the extension of its dominion or its ruling influence over other states.
That there is nothing in the present internal state
of things in France which alters the national policy
with regard to the exterior relations of that country.
That there are, on the contrary, many things in
the internal circumstances of France (and perhaps of
this country, too) which tend to fortify the principles
of that fundamental policy, and which render the
active assertion of those principles more pressing at
this than at any former time.
That, by a change effected in about three weeks,
France has been able to penetrate into the heart of
Germany, to make an absolute conquest of Savoy,
to menace an immediate invasion of the Netherlands,
and to awe and overbear the whole Helvetic body,
which is in a most perilous situation: the great
aristocratic Cantons having, perhaps, as much or
more to dread from their own people, whom they
? ? ? ? 382 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION.
arm, but do not choose or dare to employ, as from
the foreign enemy, which against all public faith has
butchered their troops serving by treaty in France.
To this picture it is hardly necessary to add the
means by which France has been enabled to effect all
this, -namely, the apparently entire destruction of
one of the largest and certainly the highest disciplined and best appointed army ever seen, headed by
the first military sovereign in Europe, with a captain.
under him of the greatest refnown; and that without
a blow given or received on any side. This state of
things seems to me, even if it went no further, truly
serious.
Circumstances have enabled France to do all this
by land. On the other element she has begun to exert herself; and she must succeed in her designs, if
enemies very different from those she has hitherto
had to encounter do not resist her.
She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at
sea, by which she is enabled to give law to the whole
Mediterranean. It is known as a fact, (and if not so
known, it is in the nature of things highly probable,)
that she proposes the ravage of the Ecclesiastical
State and the pillage of Rome, as her first object;
that next she means to bombard Naples, -to awe, to
humble, and thus to command, all Italy, --to force
it to a nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence,
-- to compel the Italian princes and republics to admit the free entrance of the French commerce, an
open intercourse, and, the sure concomitant of that
intercourse, the affiliated societies, in a manner similar to those she has established at Avignon, the Comtat, Chambdry, London, Manchester, &c. , &c. , which are so many colonies planted in all these countries,
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 383
for extending the influence and securing the dominion of the French republic.
That there never has been hitherto a period in
which this kingdom would have suffered a French
fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to force
Italy to submit to such terms as France would think
fit to impose, - to say nothing of what has been done
upon land in support of the same system. The great
object for which we preserved Minorca, whilst we
could keep it, and for which we still retain Gibraltar,
both at a great expense, was, and is, to prevent the
predominance of France over the Mediterranean.
Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of
that armament upon the Italian States. The probable effect which that armament, and the other ar maments preparing at Toulon and other ports, may
have upon Spain, on the side of the Mediterranean, is
worthy of the serious attention of the British councils.
That it is most probable, we may say in a manner
certain, that, if there should be a rupture between
France and Spain, France will not confine her offensive piratical operations against Spain to her efforts in the Mediterranean; on which side, however, she
may grievously affect Spain, especially if she excites
Morocco and Algiers, which undoubtedly she will, to
fall upon that power.
That she will fit out armaments upon the ocean,
by which the flota itself may be intercepted, and thus
the treasures of all Europe, as well as the largest and
surest resources of the Spanish monarchy, may be
conveyed into France, and become powerful instruments for the annoyance of all her neighbors.
That she makes no secret of her designs.
? ? ? ? 384 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
That, if the inward and outward bound flota should
escape, still France has more and better means of dissevering many of the provinces in the West and East
Indies from the state of Spain than Holland had,
when she succeeded in the same attempt. The
French marine resembles not a little the old armaments of the Flibustiers, which about a century back,
in conjunction with pirates of our nation, brought
such calamities upon the Spanish colonies. They
differ only in this, - that the present piratical force
is out of all measure and comparison greater: one
hundred and fifty ships of the line and frigates
being ready-built, most of them in a manner new,
and all applicable in different ways to that service.
Privateers and Moorish corsairs possess not the best
seamanship, and very little discipline, and indeed
can make no figure in regular service; but in desperate adventures, and animated with a lust of plunder, they are truly formidable.
That the land forces of France are well adapted to
concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions of
this nature. In such expeditions, enterprise supplies
the want of discipline, and perhaps more than supplies it. Both for this, and for other service, (however contemptible their military is in other respects,) one arm is extremely good, the engineering and artillery branch. The old officer corps in both being
composed for the greater part of those who were not
gentlemen, or gentlemen newly such, few have abaildoned the service, and the men are veterans, well
enough disciplined, and very expert. In this piratical way they must make war with good advantage.
They must do so, even on the side of Flanders, either
offensively or defensively. This shows the difference
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 385
between the policy of Louis the Fourteenth, who
built a wall of brass about his kingdom, and that
of Joseph the Second, who premeditatedly uncovered
his whole frontier.
That Spain, from the actual and expected prevalence of French power, is in a most perilous situation, -perfectly dependent on the mercy of that republic. If Austria is broken, or even humbled,
she will not dare to dispute its mandates.
In the present state of things, we have nothing at
all to dread from the power of Spain by sea or by
land, or from any rivalry in commerce.
That we have much to dread from the connections
into which Spain may be forced.
From the circumstances of her territorial possessions, of her resources, and the whole of her civil
and political state, we may be authorized safely and
with undoubted confidence to affirm that
Spain is not a substantive power.
That she must lean on France or on England.
That it is as much for the interest of Great Britain
to prevent the predominancy of a French interest in
that kingdom as if Spain were a province of the
crown of Great Britain, or a state actually dependent
on it, --full as much so as ever Portugal was reputed
to be. This is a dependency of much greater value;
and its destruction, or its being carried to any other
dependency, of much more serious misfortune.
One of these two things must happen: either Spain
must submit to circumstances and take such conditions as France will impose, or she must engage in
hostilities along with the Emperor and the king of
Sardinia.
If Spain should be forced or awed into a treaty
VOL. IV. 25
? ? ? ? 386 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
with the republic of France, she must open her ports
and her commerce, as well as the land communication for the French laborers, who were accustomed
annually to gather in the harvest in Spain. Indeed,
she must grant a free communication for travellers
and traders through her whole country. In that
case it is not conjectural, it is certain, the clubs will
give law in the provinces; Bourgoing, or some such
miscreant, will give law at Madrid.
In this England may acquiesce, if she pleases; and
France will conclude a triumphant peace with Spain
under her absolute dependence, with a broad highway
into that, and into every state of Europe. She actually invites Great Britain to divide with her the
spoils of the New World, and to make a partition of
the Spanish monarchy. Clearly, it is better to do so
than to suffer France to possess those spoils and that
territory alone; which, without doubt, unresisted by
us, she is altogether as able as she is willing to do.
This plan is proposed by the French in the way in
which they propose all their plans,- and in the only
way in which, indeed, they can propose them, where
there is no regular communication between his Majesty and their republic.
What they propose is a plan. It is a plan also to
resist their predatory project. To remain quiet, and,to suffer them to make their own use of a naval power before our face, so as to awe and bully Spain into a submissive peace, or to drive them into a ruinous
war, without any measure on our part, I fear is no
plan at all.
However, if the plan of cooperation which France
desires, and which her affiliated societies here ardently wish and are constantly writing up, should not
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 387
be adopted, and the war between the Emperor and
France should continue, I think it not at all likely
that Spain should not be drawn into the quarrel. In
that case, the neutrality of England will be a thing
absolutely impossible. The time only is the subject
of deliberation.
Then the question will be, whether we are to defer
putting ourselves into a posture for the common defence, either by armament, or negotiation, or both,
until Spain is actually attacked, - that is, whether
our court will take a decided part for Spain, whilst
Spain, on her side, is yet in a condition to act with
whatever degree of vigor she may have, whilst that
vigor is yet unexhausted, - or whether we shall connIlect ourselves with her broken fortunes, after she shall
have received material blows, and when we shall have
the whole slow length of that always unwieldy and illconstructed, and then wounded and crippled body, to
drag after us, rather than to aid us. Whilst our disposition is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herself in such a state of defence as will make her hostility formidable or her neutrality respectable. If the decision is such as the solution of this question (I take it to be the true question) conducts to,
no time is to be lost. But the measures, though
prompt, ought not to be rash and indigested. They
ought to be well chosen, well combined, and well
pursued. The system must be general; but it must
be executed, not successively, or with interruption,
but all together, uno flatu, in one melting, and one
mould.
For this purpose we must put Europe before us,
which plainly is, just now, in all its parts, in a state
of dismay, derangement, and confusion, and, very
? ? ? ? 388 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
possibly amongst all its sovereigns, full of secret heartburning, distrust, and mutual accusation. Perhaps
it may labor under worse evils. There is no vigor
anywhere, except the distempered vigor and energy
of France. That country has but too much life in it,
when everything around is so disposed to tameness
and languor. The very vices of the French system at
home tend to give force to foreign exertions. The
generals must join the armies. They must lead them
to enterprise, or they are likely to perish by their
hands. Thus, without law or government of her
own, France gives law to all the governments in Europe.
This great mass of political matter must have been
always under the view of thinkers for the public,
whether they act in office or not. Amongst events,
even the late calamitous events were in the book of
contingency. Of course they must have been in design, at least, provided for. A plan which takes in
as many as possible of the states concerned will rather tend to facilitate and simplify a rational scheme
for preserving Spain (if that were our sole, as I think
it ought to be our principal object) thai to delay and
perplex it.
If we should think that a provident policy (perlaps n1ow more than provident, urgent and necessary)
should lead us to act, we cannot take measures as
if hothing had been done. We must see the faults,
if any, which have conducted to the present misfortunes: not for the sake of criticism, military or political, or from the common motives of blaming persons and counsels which have not been successful; but in order, if we can, to administer some remedy
to these disasters, by the adoption of plans more bot
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 389
tomed in principle, and built on with more discretion.
Mistakes may be lessons.
There seem, indeed, to have been several mistakes
in the political principles on which the war was entered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was
conducted, -- some of them very fundamental, and not
only visibly, but I may say palpably erroneous; and
I think him to have less than the discernment of a
very ordinary statesman, who could not foresee, from
the very beginning, unpleasant consequences from
those plans, though not the unparalleled disgraces
and disasters which really did attend them: for they
were, both principles and measures, wholly new and
out of the common course, without anything apparently very grand in the conception to justify this total departure from all rule.
For, in the first place, the united sovereigns very
much injured their cause by admitting that they
had nothing to do with the interior arrangements of
France, - in contradiction to the whole tenor of the
public law of Europe, and to the correspondent practice of all its states, from the time we have any history of them. In this particular, the two German courts seem to have as little consulted the publicists
of Germany as their own true interests, and those of
all the sovereigns of Germany and Europe. This
admission of a false principle in the law of nations
brought them into an apparent contradiction, when
they insisted on the reestablishment of the royal atmthority in France. But this confused and contradictory proceeding gave rise to a practical error of worse consequence. It was derived from one and the same
root: namely, that the person of the monarch of France
was everything; and the monarchy, and the interme
? ? ? ? 390 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
diate orders of the state, by which the monarchy was
upheld, were nothing. So that, if the united potentates had succeeded so far as to reestablish the
authority of that king, and that he should be so illadvised as to confirm all the confiscations, and to recognize as a lawful body and to class himself with that rabble of murderers, (and there wanted not persons
who would so have advised him,) there was nothing
in the principle or in the proceeding of the united
powers to prevent such an arrangement.
An expedition to free a brother sovereign from
prison was undoubtedly a generous and chivalrous
undertaking. But the spirit and generosity would
not have been less, if the policy had been more profound and more comprehensive, -that is, if it had
taken in those considerations and those persons by
whom, and, in some measure, for whom, monarchy
exists. This would become a bottom for a system
of solid and permanent policy, and of operations conformable to that system.
The same fruitful error was the cause why nothing
was done to impress the people of France (so far as
we can at all consider the inhabitants of France as a
people) with an idea that the government was ever
to be really French, or indeed anything else than the
nominal government of a monarch, a monarch absolute as over them, but whose sole support was to arise
from foreign potentates, and who was to be kept on
his throne by German forces,- in short, that the
king of France was to be a viceroy to the Emrperor
and the king of Prussia.
It was the first time that foreign powers, interfering in the concerns of a nation divided into parties,
have thought proper to thrust wholly out of their
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 391
councils, to postpone, to discountenance, to reject,
and, in a manner, to disgrace, the party whom those
powers came to support. The single person of a
king cannot be a party. Woe to the king who is
himself his party! The royal party, with the king
or his representatives at its head, is the royal cause.
Foreign powers have hitherto chosen to give to such
wars as this the appearance of a civil contest, and not
that of an hostile invasion. When the Spaniards, in'
the sixteenth century, sent aids to the chiefs of the
League, they appeared as allies to that league, and to
the imprisoned king (the Cardinal de Bourbon) which
that league had set up. When the Germans came to
the aid of the Protestant princes, in the same series
of civil wars, they came as allies. When the English
came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appeared
as allies to that prince. So did the French always,
when they intermeddled in the affairs of Germany:
they came to aid a party there. When the English
and Dutch intermeddled in the succession of Spain,
they appeared as allies to the Emperor, Charles the
Sixth. In short, the policy has been as uniform as
its principles were. obvious to an ordinary eye.
According to all the old principles of law and policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by the
French princes of the blood, nobles, and parliaments,
and then recognized by the combined powers. Fundamental law and ancient usage, as well as the clear
reason of the thing, have always ordained it during
an imprisonment of the king of France: as in the
case of John, and of Francis the First. A monarchy
ought not to be left a moment without a representative having an interest in the -succession. The orders of the state ought also to have been recognized
? ? ? ? 392 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
in those amongst whom alone they existed in freedom, that is, in the emigrants.
Thus, laying down a firm foundation on the recognition of the authorities of the kingdom of France, according to Nature and to its fundamental laws, and
not according to the novel and inconsiderate principles of the usurpation which the united powers were come to extirpate, the king of Prussia and the Emperor, as allies of the ancient kingdom of France, would have proceeded with dignity, first, to free the
monarch, if possible,-if not, to secure tlhe monarchy
as principal in the design; and in order to avoid all
risks to that great object, (the object of other ages
than the present, and of other countries than that of
France,) they would of course avoid proceeding with
more haste or in a different manner than what the
nature of such an object required.
