But
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals.
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals.
Summa Theologica
Because in
things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the
approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing
approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing
possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with
light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the
more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity
depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding from
that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of
privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from that
which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at
first we always find some small defect, which afterwards increases as
it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a
thing according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things
that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i. e. to God, there is but
little potentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently,
there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i. e. the apprehensive, power
of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers.
Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active,
because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the
exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive,
namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: since it
is through the external action that we come into contact with things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1208]FP, Q[78], A[3] the organs
of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change,
in respect of which the organ receives an "intention" of the object.
And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is
the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by
receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of
another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition;
for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar
change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of the
sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through
gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the
object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive
appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the
movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the organ;
for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the
heart. " Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more
consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of
the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal
organ.
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Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual
appetite, which is called the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive
than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.
ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction;
not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens]
them. " But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since
its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in the
intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.
Objection 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more
intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which
is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object
of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore
passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the
sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these
are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive
appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and
the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than
in the intellectual appetite.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while
describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a
movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil. "
I answer that, As stated above [1209](A[1]) passion is properly to be
found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal
transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not
only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now
there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the
intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means
of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is more
properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the
intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions
of Damascene quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well
affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place
without any alteration in the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the
power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because
things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty
agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has
greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the
sensitive appetite is more passive.
Reply to Objection 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to
God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite,
they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without
passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels
feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery
while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont
to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they
have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to
ours. "
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HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from
those of the irascible part?
(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based
on the contrariety of good and evil?
(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?
(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in
species, but not contrary to one another?
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Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of
the irascible part?
Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible
and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that
the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy
or sorrow. " But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore
all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the
irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Objection 2: Further, on the words of Mat. 13:33, "The kingdom of
heaven is like to leaven," etc. , Jerome's gloss says: "We should have
prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire
of virtue, in the concupiscible part. " But hatred is in the
concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as
is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the
concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Objection 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically
according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and
concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the
same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species;
for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the
concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is
divided, as stated in the [1210]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore, since the
passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above
(Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically
distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species
from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers
have different objects, as stated in the [1211]FP, Q[77], A[3], the
passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different
objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties
differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required
to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species
of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of
genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while
diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter;
so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers,
differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions
regarding different specific objects, included under the one common
object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible,
and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of
these powers. For we have stated in the [1212]FP, Q[81], A[2], that the
object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply
apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul
must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in
acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as
such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or
avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an
arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty.
Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to
the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and
such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous,
through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible
faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [1213]FP, Q[81], A[2], the
irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the
obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its
object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making
some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions
terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the
passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and
sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible
faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible
passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible
power.
Reply to Objection 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the
concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this
very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and
hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies
to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the
concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible
passions.
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Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the
contrariety of good and evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible
passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible
passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance,
love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the
irascible passions.
Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just
as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other
contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in
Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save
that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil.
Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions
other than that of good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach
and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now
approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the
apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" (Ethic.
i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the
soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated
in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good
and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every
contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii,
3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of
movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and
movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs
properly to changes, i. e. to generation, which is a change "to being,"
and to corruption, which is a change "from being. " The other
contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly
to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is
contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul:
one, according to contrariety of objects, i. e. of good and evil; the
other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to
be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the
irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of
this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
[1214](A[1]), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good,
as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since
nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In
like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it:
wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a
term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of
good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible
passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or
dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there
can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
object.
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good
or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty
or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered
as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it,
which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered
as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to
the passion of "despair. " In like manner the arduous evil, considered
as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs
to the passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to
it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to
evil; and this tendency is called "daring. " Consequently, in the
irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as
between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a
contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or
in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above [1215](A[1]). But both
kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore
every passion of the soul has its contrary.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil
for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive
part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a
passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a
contrary.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of
approach or withdrawal, as stated above [1216](A[2]). But every
approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa.
Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.
On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set
down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore
not every passion has a contrary.
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot
have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or
according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a
difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the
appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the
limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a
movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of
"anger. " But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil
is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary
to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good
and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which
can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor,
when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement,
except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs
to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of
anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary
thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary
to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or
privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different,
but not contrary to one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,
specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.
For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the
objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this
distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no
passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,
differ specifically.
Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of
form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety,
as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that
are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in
approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the
difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and
withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as
stated above [1217](A[2]): whereas the third difference does not
diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power
to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power
there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one
another.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes,
which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now,
the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first,
from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from
water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their
active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference
of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as
if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either
draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing
it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the
first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to
the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the
body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above.
Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover
gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest,
when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause
are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same
applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were,
a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the
first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain
inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this
belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which
is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet
possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment
of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or
"concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion
of "aversion" or "dislike. " Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it
causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this
belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in
respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness. "
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or
inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising
from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.
And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair. "
In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring. " But in
respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is
no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above
[1218](A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of
"anger. "
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are
three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion,
joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible
faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has
not contrary passion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing
specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
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OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the
soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice
of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
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Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good
or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are
properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog. ).
But
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in
accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the
sensitive appetite, as stated above ([1219]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they
have no connection with human, i. e. moral, good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions. " But we are praised and
blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally
good or evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of
the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if
our love is good. "
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:
first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the
reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to
wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral
good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above
([1220]Q[18] , A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the
command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them.
Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to
the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward
members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much
more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be
called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either
from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are
common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they
are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called
rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i,
13).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised
nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not
exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are
subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is
angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a
certain way, i. e. according to, or against reason. "
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Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those
things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances
rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance
of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is
evil morally.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to
nature is passion. " But in movements of the soul, what is against
nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide
Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with
nature to that which is against nature. " Therefore these passions are
morally evil.
Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But
these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of
sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these
emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they
fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they
rejoice in good works. "
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from
that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are
evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are
good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is
nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider
the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between
sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual
and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of
the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of
the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of
the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement
of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a
movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following
their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of
the soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound;
and those who are unsound are wanting in sense. " Hence we speak of
those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound. "
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all
the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them
good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not
controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in
disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a
mean in the passions, when he says that "every evil, though moderate,
should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing,
is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is
not sound. " For passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of
the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.
Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease
in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved
more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it
derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to
deviate always from the order of natural reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are
contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as
they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
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Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of
a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on
which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the
goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of
reason: for Sallust says (Catilin. ): "All those that take counsel about
matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and
pity. " Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.
Objection 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the
better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of
God, as most dear children. " But "God and the holy angels feel no anger
when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve
the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is
better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to
reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion:
for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately.
Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he
who does with passion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion
of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating
right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. " But
nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a
passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is
evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the
goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good
altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by
passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the
sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we
give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive
appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his
passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on
reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according
as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one
questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good,
that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of
reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated
above ([1221]Q[17], A[7]), it belongs to the perfection of moral or
human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by
reason.
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do
it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of
moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of
his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to
Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God":
where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by
"flesh" the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold
relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus,
since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the
moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is
more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason
than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, consequently:
and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit,
when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the
lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that
results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the
intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness.
Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his
reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more
promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a
passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.
Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive
appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend
on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in
us.
Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the
judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either
of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or
else it is a sign of its being more grievous.
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Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil
morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on
reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that
accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing
accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is
good or evil according to its species.
Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their
object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its
species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is
good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that
those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as
hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no
passion is good or evil according to its species.
Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be
found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no
passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a
kind of virtue. " Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or
evil according to their species.
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been
said in regard to acts ([1222]Q[18], AA[5],6;[1223] Q[20], A[1])---viz.
that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be
considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural
genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species
of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch
as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and
evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to
which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with
reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of
"envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to
the same species as the external act.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in their
natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in
itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and
evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the
appetite, but essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are
themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like
manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other
hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a
tendency to evil, are themselves evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does
not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of
estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i. e. the Divine reason,
there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the
soul's passions.
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OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible
passions;
(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;
(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;
(4) The four principal passions.
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Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice
versa?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their
objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good,
which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions
seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the
irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that
which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; [1224]FP,
Q[81], A[2] ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover"
(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions.
Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But
joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it
produces pleasure instead of the previous pain. " Therefore the
concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good,
while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult,
good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good,
it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible.
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity
than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we
find something relating to movement---e. g. desire; and something
belonging to repose, e. g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible
passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which
belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a
thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous;
whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of
intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we
compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible
passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of
execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions
of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes
it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope. " But the
concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes
between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we
become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it
precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication,
that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is
looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the
angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every
passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion
denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible
passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take
precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something
to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the
irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of
the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort,
and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous
good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain
lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those
concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and
those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it
is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and
terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object
of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous,
just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is
arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good
absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the
common precedes the proper.
Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an
accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly
related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the
obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.
Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those
concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads to the
same conclusion.
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Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the
concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from
concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are
named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a
"uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But
concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing
coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is
sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure
(Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently
love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the
passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved
object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy. " Therefore love
is the first of the concupiscible passions.
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible
faculty.
things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the
approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing
approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing
possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with
light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the
more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity
depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding from
that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of
privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from that
which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at
first we always find some small defect, which afterwards increases as
it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a
thing according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things
that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i. e. to God, there is but
little potentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently,
there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i. e. the apprehensive, power
of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers.
Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active,
because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the
exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive,
namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: since it
is through the external action that we come into contact with things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1208]FP, Q[78], A[3] the organs
of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change,
in respect of which the organ receives an "intention" of the object.
And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is
the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by
receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of
another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition;
for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar
change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of the
sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through
gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the
object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive
appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the
movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the organ;
for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the
heart. " Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more
consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of
the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal
organ.
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Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual
appetite, which is called the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive
than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.
ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction;
not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens]
them. " But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since
its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in the
intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.
Objection 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more
intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which
is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object
of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore
passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the
sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these
are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive
appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and
the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than
in the intellectual appetite.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while
describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a
movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil. "
I answer that, As stated above [1209](A[1]) passion is properly to be
found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal
transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not
only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now
there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the
intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means
of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is more
properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the
intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions
of Damascene quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well
affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place
without any alteration in the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the
power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because
things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty
agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has
greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the
sensitive appetite is more passive.
Reply to Objection 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to
God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite,
they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without
passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels
feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery
while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont
to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they
have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to
ours. "
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HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from
those of the irascible part?
(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based
on the contrariety of good and evil?
(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?
(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in
species, but not contrary to one another?
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Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of
the irascible part?
Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible
and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that
the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy
or sorrow. " But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore
all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the
irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Objection 2: Further, on the words of Mat. 13:33, "The kingdom of
heaven is like to leaven," etc. , Jerome's gloss says: "We should have
prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire
of virtue, in the concupiscible part. " But hatred is in the
concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as
is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the
concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Objection 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically
according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and
concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the
same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species;
for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the
concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is
divided, as stated in the [1210]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore, since the
passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above
(Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically
distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species
from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers
have different objects, as stated in the [1211]FP, Q[77], A[3], the
passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different
objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties
differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required
to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species
of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of
genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while
diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter;
so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers,
differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions
regarding different specific objects, included under the one common
object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible,
and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of
these powers. For we have stated in the [1212]FP, Q[81], A[2], that the
object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply
apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul
must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in
acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as
such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or
avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an
arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty.
Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to
the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and
such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous,
through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible
faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [1213]FP, Q[81], A[2], the
irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the
obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its
object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making
some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions
terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the
passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and
sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible
faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible
passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible
power.
Reply to Objection 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the
concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this
very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and
hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies
to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the
concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible
passions.
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Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the
contrariety of good and evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible
passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible
passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance,
love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the
irascible passions.
Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just
as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other
contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in
Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save
that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil.
Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions
other than that of good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach
and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now
approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the
apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" (Ethic.
i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the
soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated
in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good
and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every
contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii,
3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of
movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and
movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs
properly to changes, i. e. to generation, which is a change "to being,"
and to corruption, which is a change "from being. " The other
contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly
to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is
contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul:
one, according to contrariety of objects, i. e. of good and evil; the
other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to
be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the
irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of
this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
[1214](A[1]), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good,
as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since
nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In
like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it:
wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a
term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of
good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible
passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or
dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there
can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
object.
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good
or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty
or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered
as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it,
which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered
as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to
the passion of "despair. " In like manner the arduous evil, considered
as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs
to the passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to
it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to
evil; and this tendency is called "daring. " Consequently, in the
irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as
between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a
contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or
in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above [1215](A[1]). But both
kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore
every passion of the soul has its contrary.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil
for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive
part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a
passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a
contrary.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of
approach or withdrawal, as stated above [1216](A[2]). But every
approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa.
Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.
On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set
down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore
not every passion has a contrary.
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot
have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or
according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a
difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the
appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the
limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a
movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of
"anger. " But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil
is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary
to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good
and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which
can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor,
when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement,
except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs
to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of
anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary
thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary
to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or
privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different,
but not contrary to one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,
specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.
For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the
objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this
distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no
passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,
differ specifically.
Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of
form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety,
as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that
are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in
approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the
difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and
withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as
stated above [1217](A[2]): whereas the third difference does not
diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power
to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power
there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one
another.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes,
which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now,
the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first,
from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from
water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their
active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference
of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as
if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either
draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing
it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the
first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to
the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the
body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above.
Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover
gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest,
when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause
are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same
applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were,
a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the
first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain
inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this
belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which
is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet
possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment
of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or
"concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion
of "aversion" or "dislike. " Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it
causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this
belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in
respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness. "
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or
inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising
from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.
And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair. "
In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring. " But in
respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is
no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above
[1218](A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of
"anger. "
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are
three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion,
joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible
faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has
not contrary passion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing
specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
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OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the
soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice
of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
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Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good
or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are
properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog. ).
But
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in
accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the
sensitive appetite, as stated above ([1219]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they
have no connection with human, i. e. moral, good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions. " But we are praised and
blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally
good or evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of
the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if
our love is good. "
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:
first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the
reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to
wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral
good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above
([1220]Q[18] , A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the
command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them.
Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to
the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward
members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much
more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be
called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either
from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are
common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they
are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called
rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i,
13).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised
nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not
exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are
subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is
angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a
certain way, i. e. according to, or against reason. "
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Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those
things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances
rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance
of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is
evil morally.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to
nature is passion. " But in movements of the soul, what is against
nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide
Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with
nature to that which is against nature. " Therefore these passions are
morally evil.
Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But
these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of
sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these
emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they
fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they
rejoice in good works. "
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from
that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are
evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are
good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is
nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider
the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between
sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual
and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of
the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of
the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of
the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement
of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a
movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following
their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of
the soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound;
and those who are unsound are wanting in sense. " Hence we speak of
those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound. "
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all
the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them
good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not
controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in
disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a
mean in the passions, when he says that "every evil, though moderate,
should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing,
is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is
not sound. " For passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of
the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.
Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease
in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved
more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it
derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to
deviate always from the order of natural reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are
contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as
they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
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Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of
a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on
which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the
goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of
reason: for Sallust says (Catilin. ): "All those that take counsel about
matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and
pity. " Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.
Objection 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the
better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of
God, as most dear children. " But "God and the holy angels feel no anger
when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve
the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is
better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to
reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion:
for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately.
Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he
who does with passion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion
of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating
right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. " But
nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a
passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is
evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the
goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good
altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by
passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the
sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we
give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive
appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his
passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on
reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according
as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one
questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good,
that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of
reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated
above ([1221]Q[17], A[7]), it belongs to the perfection of moral or
human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by
reason.
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do
it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of
moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of
his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to
Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God":
where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by
"flesh" the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold
relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus,
since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the
moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is
more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason
than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, consequently:
and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit,
when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the
lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that
results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the
intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness.
Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his
reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more
promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a
passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.
Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive
appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend
on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in
us.
Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the
judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either
of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or
else it is a sign of its being more grievous.
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Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil
morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on
reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that
accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing
accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is
good or evil according to its species.
Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their
object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its
species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is
good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that
those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as
hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no
passion is good or evil according to its species.
Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be
found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no
passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a
kind of virtue. " Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or
evil according to their species.
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been
said in regard to acts ([1222]Q[18], AA[5],6;[1223] Q[20], A[1])---viz.
that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be
considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural
genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species
of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch
as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and
evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to
which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with
reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of
"envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to
the same species as the external act.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in their
natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in
itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and
evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the
appetite, but essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are
themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like
manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other
hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a
tendency to evil, are themselves evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does
not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of
estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i. e. the Divine reason,
there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the
soul's passions.
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OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible
passions;
(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;
(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;
(4) The four principal passions.
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Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice
versa?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their
objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good,
which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions
seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the
irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that
which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; [1224]FP,
Q[81], A[2] ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover"
(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions.
Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But
joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it
produces pleasure instead of the previous pain. " Therefore the
concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good,
while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult,
good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good,
it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible.
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity
than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we
find something relating to movement---e. g. desire; and something
belonging to repose, e. g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible
passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which
belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a
thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous;
whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of
intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we
compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible
passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of
execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions
of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes
it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope. " But the
concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes
between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we
become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it
precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication,
that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is
looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the
angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every
passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion
denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible
passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take
precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something
to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the
irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of
the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort,
and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous
good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain
lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those
concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and
those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it
is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and
terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object
of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous,
just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is
arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good
absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the
common precedes the proper.
Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an
accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly
related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the
obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.
Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those
concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads to the
same conclusion.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the
concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from
concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are
named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a
"uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But
concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing
coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is
sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure
(Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently
love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the
passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved
object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy. " Therefore love
is the first of the concupiscible passions.
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible
faculty.
