No More Learning

by his son, Mackintosh, R. J. , 1835, vol. I, pp. 322--5.


## p. 54 (#76) ##############################################

54
Political Writers and Speakers [CH.
sense about it which is unlike the perverse ingenuity of Fox,
adding argument to argument to obtain an unwise conclusion.
None the less, if Pitt's style be antiquated and, at times, stilted,
it can rise, as it does in his celebrated speech on the slave-trade
in 1792, to magnificent declamation. His perorations, growing
out of his preceding matter as they do, and containing definite
reasoning and not mere verbal finery, show him at his best. It
was in them that he displayed to the full his skill in the then
much prized art of Latin quotation. Every speaker, if he could,
quoted Latin verse to point his sayings; but Pitt excelled all in
his felicitous selection. Long-famous passages seemed hardly
quoted by him, it seemed rather that the orator's stately period
itself rose into poetry.
While Fox shone especially in the witty humour of an illustra-
tion, irresistibly quaint and full of a convincing sound sense, Pitt
employed a dry contumelious sarcasm, in which severe irony was
the distinguishing trait. Thus, he observed of a hopelessly muddled
speech that it was not, I presume, designed for a complete and
systematic view of the subject. Both orators, however, so far as
mere wit was concerned, were outdone by Richard Brinsley Sheri-
dan', who almost turned their dual supremacy into a triumvirate
of eloquence. But in spite of all his brilliancy, he was manifestly
outweighted; unlike Pitt and Fox, he had entered the period of
decline long before he quitted parliament. It is not easy, from
the mere reports of his speeches, to give a satisfactory account
of his comparative lack of weight and influence. He entered
parliament in the same year as Pitt, and his oratorical ability,
although, at first, it was somewhat clouded, soon obtained the
recognition it deserved ; one speech against Warren Hastings, in
February 1787, was declared by the auditors to be the best they had
ever heard. But, perhaps, he was too frankly an advocate, and he
was too clearly bound, by personal attachment, rather than by
interest, to the prince of Wales's chariot-wheels. Although his
special pleading by no means surpassed that of his contem-
poraries, it was more obvious, and his changes of opinion, due to
fresh developments of Napoleon's action, were not condoned as
were those of others. In 1812, the first debater of the day was
left out of parliament through the loss of the prince's favour, and
his political career was closed.
Wit-brilliant, sustained and polished to the utmost—distin-
guished Sheridan from his competitors. Many of his impromptu
i Concerning Sheridan as a dramatist, see post, chap. XII.


## p. 55 (#77) ##############################################

11]
Sheridan
and Grattan
55
>
speeches, alone in contemporary literature, have the true Junian
ring, and, were they known by later publication or could they
have been prepared beforehand, doubtless we should have been
told that they were 'tormented with the file. ' As it is, we must
own that balanced antithesis and mischievous scoffing were native
to him and his readiest means of expression, even if the Letters
of Junius provided him with a favourite model. Nor did his
merits end with wit. In the mere physical part of oratory, his
animated gay expression and his trained musical voice exercised
an 'inconceivable attraction,' although it may be that the absence
of 'violence or excess,' which is also recorded, may have led to
an impression that he was not in earnest. In spite of this, his
gaiety could be very bitter ; and, so far as the words went, his
higher flights could be as impassioned as any. Yet, his merit was
his defect; he is not absorbed in his subject like Fox, or delivering
a ruler's oracles like Pitt; we feel, all along, that here is a celebrated
author, enjoying the use of his powers, impassioned on principles
of taste and arguing with the conscious pleasure of the case-
maker. He bears print better than the two greater men; but, in
the real test of an orator—the spoken word-he was, admittedly,
their inferior.
That weight and respect which Sheridan never gained was
amply enjoyed by his fellow-countryman, Henry Grattan. Perhaps,
as a statesman from his youth up, whose whole energies were en-
grossed in politics and government, he had an inevitable advantage
over the brilliant literary amateur. But the main causes lie deep,
in divergences of genius and temperament. Grattan had none of
Sheridan's exterior advantages ; his gestures were uncouth, his
enunciation difficult. He surmounted these impediments, how-
ever, almost at once, both on his entry into the Irish parliament,
in 1775, and on that into the parliament of the United Kingdom, in
1805. In the former case, he led the party which obtained Irish
legislative independence, and inaugurated a period called by his
name; in the latter, at the time of his death, he had become
venerated as the last survivor of the giants of debate among a
lesser generation. A certain magnanimity in Grattan corresponded
to the greatness of his public career. His fiercest invective, how-
ever severe in intent and effect, had an old-world courtliness. Of
persiflage he knew nothing; his wit, of which he had plenty, was
dignified and almost stern. "You can scarcely answer a prophet;
you can only disbelieve him,' he said grimly, in 1800, of the Irish
predictions of Pitt. He was always, beyond question, in earnest.


## p. 56 (#78) ##############################################

56
[CH, II
Political Writers and Speakers
The excellence of his speeches does not depend on any of the
pettier artistic canons of composition. Rhythmical sentences and
periods are both to seek. There is no architectural arrangement
of matter; he forges straight ahead, seizing on the crucial
points one by one. But he had a magnificent power of states-
manlike reasoning and of lucid exposition, and, if he had not
Fox's capability of making all argument seem to tend his way,
he
was quite able to make opposing reasons seem of little worth.
He could generalise, too, and state, in a pithy way, maxims of
practical philosophy. Pithiness and expressiveness, indeed, were
at the root of his oratory. His thoughts came out double-shotted
and white-hot; his words are the most forcible and convincing for
his meaning, rather than the most apt. It was conviction and force
at which he aimed, not beauty. Yet, every now and then, he
attains a literary charm, more lasting, because more deeply felt,
than the considered grace of Sheridan or Pitt.


## p. 57 (#79) ##############################################

1
CHAPTER III
BENTHAM AND THE EARLY UTILITARIANS
JEREMY BENTHAM is famous as the leader of a school of
thought and practice which is known sometimes as utilitarianism,
sometimes as philosophical radicalism. Before his day, the philo-
sophical school was not a characteristic feature of English
speculation. The greater writers influenced the course of ideas
without transmitting a definite body of doctrines to a definite
group of followers. Bacon proclaimed a philosophical revolution ;
but he sought in vain for assistants and collaborators, and the
details of his theory were commonly ignored. Hobbes formulated
a compact system, but he had no disciples. Locke struck out a
new way which many followed to conclusions often very different
from his own. Berkeley never lost courage, but he could not open
other eyes to his own vision, and the verdict of the day upon his
speculations seems to be not unfairly represented by Hume's state-
ment that his arguments admit of no answer and produce no
conviction. ' For his own sceptical results, Hume himself seemed to
desire applause rather than converts. The works of these writers
never led to a combination for the defence and elucidation of a
creed—to any philosophical school which can be compared with
peripateticism, stoicism, or Epicureanism in ancient Greece or
with the Cartesian, Kantian, or Hegelian schools in modern thought.
The nearest approach to such a phenomenon was of the nature of
a revival—the new Platonic movement of the seventeenth century,
associated with the names of Cudworth, Henry More and other
Cambridge scholars'. In this way, the utilitarian group presents
an appearance unknown before in English philosophy—a simple
set of doctrines held in common, with various fields assigned for
their application, and a band of zealous workers, labouring for the
same end, and united in reverence for their master.
Jeremy Bentham was born in 1748 and died in 1832, when his
fame was at its height and his party was on the eve of a great
1 See ante, vol. vin, chap. XI.
a


## p. 58 (#80) ##############################################

58
Bentham and the Early Utilitarians [CH.
112
3
triumph? He was a prodigy from his childhood; he read history
and French, Latin and Greek, when other boys of his years were
feeding their imaginations with fairy tales ; at the tender age of
thirteen, bis religious sensibilities were hurt and theological doubts
raised in his mind when he was required to sign the thirty-nine
articles on matriculating at Queen's college, Oxford ; he sub-
mitted, however, completed his course there and afterwards duly
entered upon the study of law in London. His father had marked
his abilities and expected them to raise him to the woolsack ; he
had several causes 'at nurse' for him before he was called to the
bar; and, when Jeremy neglected the practical for the theoretical
side of his profession, the father said in his grief that the boy
would never be anything more than the obscure son of an obscure
attorney. ' But he made life easy for his son financially, and
had some compensation for the disappointment of his ambition
in the reputation made by Jeremy's first book, A Fragment on
Government, which was published anonymously in 1776, and which
the public voice ascribed to one or another of several great men,
including Burke and Mansfield.
Bentham spent almost his whole life in London or its neigh-
bourhood; but, for over two years, 1785-88, he made an extended
tour in the east of Europe and paid a long visit to his younger
brother Samuel, who held an important industrial appointment
at Kritchev, in Russia. There, he wrote his Defence of Usury
(published 1787). There, also, from his brother's method of in-
specting his work-people, he derived the plan of his ‘panopticon
-a scheme for prison management, which was to dispense with
Botany bay. On this scheme, he laboured for five and twenty
years; the government played with it and finally rejected it,
giving him a large sum by way of compensation for the still larger
sums which he had expended on its advocacy ; but the failure of
this attempt to influence administration left its mark on his
attitude to the English system of government.
After his return from Russia, Bentham published, in 1789, the
work which, more than any other, gives him a place among philo-
sophers-An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation. It had been printed nine years earlier, and only the
urgency of his friends induced him to make it public. As an
author, Bentham was singularly careless about publication and
as to the form in which his writings appeared. He worked
assiduously, in accordance with a plan which he formed early in
1 He died on 6 June, the day before the royal assent was given to the Reform bill.
B


## p. 59 (#81) ##############################################

at
1
IN
.
1
1
111] The Friends of Bentham
59
life; he passed from point to point methodically ; each day he
produced a number of pages of manuscript, indicated their place
in his scheme and then put them aside and never looked at them
again. A doubtful proposition would lead him to turn to a new
line of enquiry, which might mean a new book. According to one
of the friends of his early years, he was 'always running from a
good scheme to a better. In the meantime life passes away and
nothing is completed. ' This method of working had its effect upon
his style. His early writings were clear and terse and pointed, though
without attempt at elegance. Afterwards, he seemed to care only to
avoid ambiguity, and came to imitate the formalism of a legal docu-
ment. He was overfond, also, of introducing new words into the
language ; and few of his inventions have had the success of the
term 'international,' which was used for the first time in the preface
to his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
It was fortunate for Bentham's reputation that he soon came
to be surrounded by a group of devoted friends, who were con-
vinced of the value of his ideas and eager to help in making them
known. And he was content to leave in their hands the selection,
revision and publication of his more important manuscripts. His
first work had brought him to the notice of Lord Shelburne
(afterwards first marquis of Lansdowne), at whose house he
met a number of the statesmen and political thinkers of the
day. There, also, he met Étienne Dumont, who, afterwards, gave
literary form to the principles of legislation and administration
which Bentham elaborated. Dumont was a citizen of Geneva,
who had been minister of one of its churches ; driven from his
native town by political troubles, he settled, for some time, in
St Petersburg, and, in 1785, came to London as tutor to Lansdowne's
son; in 1788 and, again, in 1789, he visited Paris and was in close
relations, literary and political, with Mirabeau. On the earlier of
these visits, he was accompanied by Sir Samuel Romilly, with
whom he had become intimate and who was already known to
Bentham ; Romilly showed him some of Bentham's manuscripts,
written in French, and Dumont became an enthusiastic disciple
and one of the chief agents in spreading the master's ideas. With
Bentham’s manuscripts and published work before him, and with
opportunities for conversation with the author, he produced a
series of works which made the new jurisprudence and political
theory known in the world of letters. He translated, condensed
and even supplied omissions, giving his style to the whole; but he
did not seek to do more than put Bentham's writings into literary
1
1.
EP
.


## p. 60 (#82) ##############################################

60 Bentham and the Early Utilitarians (CH.
.
4
རྩེད།
美国
​form, and, in Bentham's collected Works, published after his
death, many of the most important treatises are retranslations
into English from Dumont's versions. The first of Dumont's
treatises appeared in 1802, the last in 1825. It is stated that,
by 1830, forty thousand copies of these treatises had been sold
in Paris for the South American trade alone.
Other helpers surrounded Bentham during his long life ; but
his acquaintance with James Mill, which began in 1808, led, for
the first time, to the association of a mastermind with his own in
pursuit of common objects. Mill was less of a jurist than Bentham,
but more of a philosopher, and better equipped for the defence of
their fundamental principles on psychological and general grounds.
He was also a man of affairs, familiar with practical business and
accustomed to deal with other men, and his influence counted for
much in making philosophical radicalism an effective political
force. Bentham was a recluse occupied with ideas and projects,
infinitely patient in elaborating them on paper, and convinced
that they would be carried into effect so soon as he had demon-
strated their value. The men who sought him out regarded him
as a sage, hung upon his lips and approved his doctrines ; and he
expected other men, especially political leaders, to be equally
rational. During the first half of his career, he was not a radicali
in politics ; but the failure of his scheme for a panopticon, which
he regarded as an administrative reform of the first importance,
and in the advocacy of which he had incurred lavish expenditure,
gave him a new—if, also, somewhat perverted—insight into the titel
motives of party politicians, and led to a distrust of the governing
classes. His mind was thus fitted to receive a powerful stimulus
from James Mill, a stern and unbending democrat, whose creed,
in Bentham's caustic phrase, resulted 'less from love to the many
than from hatred of the few. '
Up to this time, the utilitarian philosophy had not met with great
success as an instrument of political propagandism ; it had failed
adequately to influence the old political parties ; an organisation de
of its own was needed with a programme, an organ in the press the
and representatives in parliament. The new party came to be two
known as philosophical radicals. Their organ was The West- tri
minster Review, founded by Bentham in 1824; their programme
laid stress on the necessity for constitutional reform before legis-
lative and administrative improvements could be expected ; and a
number of eminent politicians became the spokesmen of the party
in parliament. It is not possible to assign to the philosophical


## p. 61 (#83) ##############################################

III]
A Fragment on Government
61
radicals their exact share in bringing about the changes which
gradually ensued; many other influences were working in the
same direction. Their power was not due to their numbers,
but to the great ability of many members of the group and to
the clear and definite policy which they advocated. Bentham
was the head of this party ; but, perhaps, it is not too much to
say that James Mill was its leading spirit. Mill, also, joined
with others in giving literary assistance to Bentham; he edited,
with modifications of his own, A Table of the Springs of Action
(1817); he prepared, from the author's manuscripts, an Intro-
ductory view of the Rationale of Evidence (printed, in part, in
1812, and published in the Works); and his brilliant son, John
Stuart Mill, then just out of his 'teens, edited The Rationale of
Evidence in five volumes' (1827). Another prominent assistant
was John Bowring, who was the first editor of The Westminster
Review, wrote from the author's dictation the Deontology (a
work whose accuracy, as an expression of Bentham's mind, was
impugned by the Mills) and became Bentham’s biographer and
editor of his collected Works.
Bentham's Fragment on Government is the first attempt to
apply the principle of utility in a systematic and methodical
manner to the theory of government; it takes the form of 'a
comment on the Commentaries'-a detailed criticism of the
doctrine on the same subject which had been set forth in Black-
stone's famous work. Sir William Blackstone was born in 1723;
he practised at the bar, lectured on the laws of England at
Oxford, and, in 1758, was appointed to the newly-founded Vinerian
professorship of law; in 1770, he was made a judge, first of the
'
court of king's bench, afterwards of the court of common pleas;
he died in 1780. He edited the Great charter and was the author
of a number of Law Tracts (collected and republished under
this title in 1762); but his fame depends upon his Commentaries
on the Laws of England, the first volume of which appeared in
1765 and the fourth and last in 1769. It is a work of many con-
spicuous merits. In it, the vast mass of details which makes up the
common and statute law is brought together and presented as an
organic structure; the meaning of each provision is emphasised,
and the relation of the parts illustrated ; so that the whole body
of law appears as a living thing animated by purpose and a
triumph of reason. The style of the book is clear, dignified and
eloquent. Bentham, who had heard Blackstone's lectures at
1 Reprinted in Works, vols. vi and VII. 2 See ante, vol. x, p. 499.


## p. 62 (#84) ##############################################

62 Bentham and the Early Utilitarians
[CH.
INC
1
Oxford, says that he, 'first of all institutional writers, has taught
jurisprudence to speak the language of the scholar and the gentle-
man. ' These merits, however, were accompanied by defects, less
obvious to the general reader. The author was more prone to see
similarities than differences. His analytical power has been
praised; but it was inadequate to the conceptions with which he
had to deal. His treatment of natural law, in the second section 139
of the introduction, is a case in point; another instance is the
discussion of society and the original contract which Bentham
criticises. His emphasis on meaning and purpose adds interest to
his exposition, and shows insight into the truth that law is not a
haphazard collection of injunctions and prohibitions ; but this
conception also leads him astray; he does not distinguish clearly
enough historical causes from logical grounds; his exposition takes
on the character of an encomium ; and he is too apt to discover,
at every point of the English constitution, 'a direction which con-
stitutes the true line of the liberty and happiness of the community. '
In the preface to his Fragment, Bentham offers a criticism of
the Commentaries in general; but the body of his work is restricted
to an examination of a few pages, of the nature of a digression,
which set forth a theory of government. In these pages, Black-
stone gave a superficial summary of the nature and grounds of
authority, in which the leading conceptions of political theory
were used with more than customary vagueness.
Bentham finds
the doctrine worse than false ; for it is unmeaning. He wishes
'to do something to instruct, but more to undeceive, the timid
and admiring student, . . . to help him to emancipate his judg-
ment from the shackles of authority. He insists upon a precise
meaning for each statement and each term ; and, while he reduces
Blackstone's doctrine to ruins, he succeeds, at the same time, in
conveying at least the outline of a definite and intelligible theory
of government. There are two striking characteristics in the
book which are significant for all Bentham's work. One of these is
.
the constant appeal to fact and the war against fictions; the other
is the standard which he employs—the principle of utility. And
these two are connected in his mind : 'the footing on which this
principle rests every dispute, is that of matter of fact. ' Utility
is matter of fact, at least, of 'future fact—the probability of
certain future contingencies. ' Were debate about laws and
government reduced to terms of utility, men would either come
to an agreement or they would ‘see clearly and explicitly the point
on which the disagreement turned. ' 'All else,' says Bentham, 'is


## p. 63 (#85) ##############################################

1
111)
The Principle of Utility
63
but womanish scolding and childish altercation, which is sure to
irritate, and which never can persuade. '
In an interesting footnote, Bentham gives an account of the
way in which he arrived at this principle. Many causes, he tells
us, had combined to enlist his 'infant affections on the side of
despotism. ' When he proceeded to study law, he found an
'original contract' appealed to "for reconciling the accidental
necessity of resistance with the general duty of submission. ' But
his intellect revolted at the fiction.
*To prove fiction, indeed,' said I, 'there is need of fiction; but it is the
characteristic of truth to need no proof but truth. '. . . Thus continued I
unsatisfying, and unsatisfied, till I learnt to see that utility was the test and
measure of all virtue; of loyalty as much as any; and that the obligation to
minister to general happiness, was an obligation paramount to and inclusive
of every other. Having thus got the instruction I stood in need of, I sat
down to make my profit of it. I bid adieu to the original contract: and I
left it to those to amuse themselves with this rattle, who could think they
needed it.
It was from the third volume of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature
that the instruction came.
'I well remember,' he says, 'no sooner had I read that part of the work
which touches on this subject than I felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes.
I then, for the first time, learnt to call the cause of the people the cause of
Virtue. . . . That the foundations of all virtue are laid in utility, is there
demonstrated, after a few exceptions made, with the strongest evidence:
but I see not, any more than Helvetins saw, what need there was for the
exceptions.
Hume's metaphysics had little meaning for Bentham, but it
is interesting to note that his moral doctrine had this direct
influence upon the new theory of jurisprudence and politics.
Hume was content with showing that utility, or tendency to
pleasure, was a mark of all the virtues; he did not go on to assert
that things were good or evil according to the amounts of pleasure
or pain that they entailed. This quantitative utilitarianism is
adopted by Bentham from the start. In the preface to the Frag-
ment, the 'fundamental axiom,' whose consequences are to be
developed with method and precision, is stated in the words, 'it
is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the
measure of right and wrong. Half a century earlier, Hutcheson
had formulated this axiom' almost in the same words; but
Bentham does not seem to have been influenced directly by him.
Helvétius, whom he had studied closely, comes very near the same
doctrine', and Priestley had preceded Bentham in using a similar
1 La justice consiste . . . dans la pratique des actions utiles au plus grand nombre.
De l'Esprit (1758), Discours II, chap. 24.
:
9


## p. 64 (#86) ##############################################

64 Bentham and the Early Utilitarians [CH.
olar
de
TO
23:
6
standard in political reasoning. Priestley is not mentioned in
this place, though the preface begins with a reference to his
scientific discoveries, and Bentham has elsewhere recorded his
youthful enthusiasm for his writings. He even says that he had
found the phrase 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' in
one of Priestley's pamphlets ; but, in this, his memory must have
deceived him, for the phrase does not seem to have been used by
Priestley. So far as Bentham was concerned, its origin (as he in
one place suggests) must be traced to Beccaria, the Italian jurist
whose work on the penal law proceeded on the same principles as
Bentham's and had a notable effect upon the latter. Beccaria's
book on Crimes and Punishments was translated into English in
1767, and, in this translation, the principle of utility is expressed
in the exact words in which, through Bentham's influence, it soon
became both an ethical formula and a party watchword. Bentham
himself used the word 'utilitarian' as early as 1781, and he asserted
that it was the only name for his creed? ; but, in later life, he
came to prefer the alternative phrase 'greatest happiness principle. '
'The word utility,' he said, in a note written in July 1822, 'does
not so clearly point to the ideas of pleasure and pain as the words
happiness and felicity do: nor does it lead us to the consideration
of the number of the interests affected. ' A few months after the
latter date, the term 'utilitarian’ was revived by John Stuart
Mill? , who seems to have been unaware that it had been previously
employed and afterwards discarded by Bentham ; he found the
word in Galt's Annals of the Parish, where it is used in describ-
ing some of the revolutionary parties of the early nineties of the
preceding century; and, with a boy's fondness for a name and a
banner,' he adopted it as a 'sectarian appellation.
After this
time, 'utilitarian' and 'utilitarianism' came into common use to
designate a party and a creed,
The evidence goes to show that the greatest happiness prin-
ciple,' or principle of utility, was arrived at by Bentham, in the
first instance, as a criterion for legislation and administration and
not for individual conduct—as a political, rather than an ethical,
principle. His concern was with politics; the sections of Hume's
Treatise which chiefly influenced him were those on justice;
Beccaria wrote on the penal law; and it was expressly as a
political principle that Priestley made use of the happiness of
a
6
i Works, vol. x, pp. 92, 392.
2 Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. 1879, p. 1n.
3 Autobiography, pp. 79, 80; Utilitarianism, p. 9n.


## p. 65 (#87) ##############################################

65
111]
The Masters of Mankind
the members, that is the majority of the members, of any state,'
as his standard. The point is important, seeing that, from the
time of Locke, the action of every individual had been commonly
interpreted as determined by his own pleasure or pain. It is
difficult to reconcile this interpretation (which Bentham accepted)
with an ethical theory which makes the greatest happiness of all
the end for each. But the same difficulty does not arise when
the point of view is shifted from the individual to the state.
Indeed, the analogical argument will now be open: since each
is concerned with his own greatest happiness, the end for the
community may be taken to be the greatest happiness of the
greatest number. And, when the greatest happiness of the greatest
number' has been accepted in this way, it is easy—though it is
not logical—to adopt it as not merely a political, but, also, in the
strict sense, an ethical, principle.
It is to his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation that we must look for Bentham's fullest and clearest
account of the underlying principles, psychological and ethical, of
his enterprise. The interests of the individual do not always
agree with the interests of the community; and this divergence
sets the problem for penal law. Again, the rule of right is one
question, and the causes of action is another question ; and it is
important not to confuse the ethical with the psychological
problem. This distinction is made, and ignored, in the arresting
paragraph that opens the work :
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do,
as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of
right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened
to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think:
every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to
demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their
empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The
principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the
foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity
by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it,
deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness
instead of light.
These sentences give the gist of Bentham's simple philosophy.
Everything rests upon pleasure and pain. They are, in the first
place, the causes of all human actions. Man is a pleasure-seeking,
pain-avoiding animal. It is true, he has many different impulses,
springs of action, or motives; and, of these, the author essays
some account in this book; and, in A Table of the Springs of
5
B. L, XL.
CH. III.


## p. 66 (#88) ##############################################

66 Bentham and the Early Utilitarians [CH.
Action, he comprehends them all in a diagram with their sources
and their corresponding interests. But the strength of each
impulse or motive lies entirely in the pleasure or pain connected
with it; and there are only quantitative differences among
pleasures themselves, or among pains themselves; and pains can
be compared with pleasures, and marked on the same scale by their
distance below the indifference or zero point where there is neither
pleasure nor pain. To this theory, a later writer has given the
name 'psychological hedonism. ' It still counts many psycholo-
gists among its adherents, but Bentham held it in a special form
which hardly admits of defence. It is not the actual pleasure
or pain experienced at the moment of action which, according to
him, determines action, but the estimate formed by the agent of
the probable balance of pleasure that is likely to result to him
from the action. The cause, as well as the standard, of human
action is thus matter of 'future fact' only. Had this phrase been
used by Blackstone, Bentham might have pointed out that, so
long as anything is future, it is not a fact, but only an expectation
of a fact; it is an estimate of probabilities. Not pleasure, there-
fore, but an idea of pleasure, is the actual motive. Although he
thinks that pleasure is man's only object, Bentham always treats
him as pursuing this object in a deliberate and intelligent way
under the guidance of ideas or opinions ; he commits the philo-
sopher's fallacy of substituting a reason for a cause ; he overlooks
the fact that man was an active being before he was a rational
being, that he is a creature of impulses, inherited and acquired,
that it is only gradually that these impulses come to be organised
and directed by reason, and that this rationalising process is never
completed.
Bentham's views on this point lend emphasis to the importance
of his hedonic calculus. If men are always guided by estimates of
pleasures and pains, these estimates should be rendered as exact
as possible. For this purpose, Bentham analyses the circumstances
that have to be taken into account in estimating the ‘force' or
'value' (notions which, for him, are identical) of pleasures and pains.
A pleasure or pain, he says, taken by itself, will vary in the four
circumstances of intensity, duration, certainty and propinquity? .
1 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Bk 1, chap. IV.
2 Sidgwick points out that, on a rational estimate, propinquity in time (apart from
the greater certainty which it implies) is not an independent ground of value. Bentham
follows Beccaria in introducing it; but Beccaria had a different question in view in his
enquiry, namely, the actual deterrent effect of an immediate, as compared with a remote,
punishment.
ali ni
16


## p. 67 (#89) ##############################################

111]
The Hedonic Calculus
67
If we consider its effects, we must take into account two other
circumstances : its fecundity, or the chance of its being followed
by other feelings of the same kind; and its purity, or the chance
of its not being followed by feelings of an opposite kind. If more
than one person is concerned, then account must also be taken of
the number of persons, that is, the extent of the pleasure or pain.
If we would estimate the benefit to a community of any particular
action, then each person affected by it must be considered
separately; each distinguishable pleasure caused by the action
must have its value for him calculated in accordance with the six
circumstances first mentioned; and each distinguishable pain must
have its value calculated in the same way. When this has been done
for every person affected, and the sum of all the pains subtracted
from the sum of all the pleasures, then the surplus of pleasure will
measure the good tendency of the act; or, if the pains exceed the
pleasures in total amount, then the balance of pain will measure
the evil tendency of the act.
This may seem an elaborate calculation, but it gives only a
faint idea of the minute detail into which Bentham pursued an
estimate of good or evil. The significant feature of his method is
that it is quantitative. The same method had been suggested by
Hutcheson and others before him ; his contemporary Paley used it
to some extent; but Bentham was the first to follow it out into all
its ramifications by an exhaustive enumeration and classification of
every conceivable consequence. His aim was to make morals and
legislation as precise and certain as the physical sciences. For
this purpose, he saw that quantitative propositions were necessary.
He did not stop to enquire whether quantity was applicable at all
to pleasure and pain; he assumed that it was; and, perhaps, the
assumption was correct. Neither did he seek too curiously for
a standard of measurement of these quantities, such as every
physical science possesses for its purposes. Even in the exact
observations which instruments of precision render possible in the
physical sciences, allowance has to be made for the personal equa-
tion of the observer. But Bentham almost disregarded the personal
equation, even in matters of feeling. He did not adequately allow
for the difference of individual susceptibilities, or for the degree in
which they change in a single lifetime and in the history of the
race; nor did he avoid the fallacy of arguing as if one man's pleasure
were always a safe guide for another. Just as he assumed that
men were constantly controlled by intellectual considerations, so
here, he also assumes that men are much more alike than they
5-2


## p. 68 (#90) ##############################################

68
.
Bentham and the Early Utilitarians [CH.
really are: and the two assumptions account for many of the
weaknesses, and even absurdities, of his projects.
Later utilitarians have avoided some of these difficulties by
laying stress on the importance, in personal and social life, of
the permanent objects which are sources of pleasure, rather than
upon particular pleasant experiences. Bentham himself, in another
work', follows similar lines in enumerating four subordinate ends
in which the happiness of society consists. These are subsistence,
abundance, equality and security. Subsistence and security are
the most important of the four : ‘without security equality could
not last a day; without subsistence abundance could not exist at all. '
With subsistence and abundance, law has little or no direct concern :
You may order production; you may command cultivation; and you will
have done nothing. But assure to the cultivator the fruits of his industry,
and perhaps in that alone you will have done enough.
Bentham's treatment of equality is remarkable for certain 'patho-
logical propositions' (as he calls them) which he lays down regarding
the effect of wealth upon happiness. But the chief care of law is
security; and the principle of security extends to the maintenance
of all those expectations which law itself has created. Security,
one may say, is a necessity for social life and for any moderate
degree of human happiness ; equality is rather of the nature of a
luxury, which legislation should promote when it does not inter-
fere with security. As for liberty, it is not one of the principal
objects of law, but a branch of security, and a branch which law
cannot help pruning. Rights of any kind, especially rights of
property, can be created or maintained only by restricting liberty;
‘in particular all laws creative of liberty, are, as far as they go,
abrogative of liberty. '
These suggestions point to a better way of estimating value
than the enumeration of separate pleasures and pains. But the
latter is Bentham's prevailing method; and he brings into clear
light a point which, on any theory such as his, should not be
obscured—the difference between the greatest happiness of an
individual and the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
Even Bentham hesitates, both in his earlier and in his later
writings, to assert that it is each man's duty to promote the happi-
ness of all. How, indeed, can it be so, in Bentham's view, unless
there is sufficient motive to require such conduct ? He says that
a man is never without motives to act in this direction; he has the
social motive of sympathy and the semi-social motive of love of
1 Theory of Legislation, trans. Hildreth, 1876, pp. 96 ff.
ہاکی -


## p. 69 (#91) ##############################################

111] The Sanctions of Morality 69
reputation. But a man may have, and commonly has, motives which
tend in a different direction and may render those insufficient or
powerless. The divergence may be read between the lines of the
halting sentences in which Bentham speaks of the coincidences
between private ethics and legislation. There is no mental fusion
between the two classes of motives (the selfish and the social);
there is no natural identity between the courses of conduct to
which they tend; the identification of self-interest with public
interest can only be brought about artificially by means of super-
added pleasures and pains, especially the latter. These are the
sanctions of the principle of utility, which Bentham reduces to
four : the physical, the political, the popular (or moral) and the
religious. The physical sanction results from natural law, and is
exemplified by the headache that follows intemperance : it sanc-
tions prudence, but not benevolence. The popular sanction results
from the illwill of society in any of its non-political expressions ;
it is often a powerful deterrent, but it is apt to be variable and
inconsistent, and it has no exact correspondence with public
interest. On the religious sanction, Bentham does not rely.
There remains the political sanction, the rewards and punishments
employed by society organised as a state. But rewards count for
little. The whole weight of the doctrine that general happiness
is the rule of right and wrong for individual conduct thus rests
upon the penal law; it is the 'duty-and-interest-junction-prescrib-
ing principle. And this principle, also, is found to be imperfect.
Even when punishment is neither groundless nor needless, there
are cases in which it would be inefficacious and others in which it
would be unprofitable—by causing more unhappiness than it would
avert. In general, it can compel probity but it cannot compel
beneficence. Thus, the doctrine of sanctions fails to establish the
thesis of utilitarianism that general happiness is the rule of right.
And the failure is not covered by the retort: 'if the thunders of
the law prove impotent, the whispers of simple morality can have
but little influence. '
In the preface to his Principles of Morals and Legislation,
Bentham gave a list of the works which he had in preparation
or contemplation and in which his great design would be completed.
According to this list, works were to follow on the principles of
legislation in the following nine matters: civil law; penal law;
.
1 These terms--fusion of interests, natural identity of interests, artificial identifi-
cation of interests—describe different solutions of the same problem and have been
introduced by Halévy, Formation du radicalisme philosophique, vol. 1, pp. 15 ff.


## p. 70 (#92) ##############################################

70 Bentham and the Early Utilitarians [[
CH.
a
procedure; reward; constitutional law; political tactics (that is,
rules for the direction of political assemblies so that they may
attain the end of their institution); international law; finance ;
political economy; and these were to be followed by a tenth
treatise, giving a complete plan of law in all its branches, in
respect of its form, including all that properly belongs to the topic
of universal jurisprudence. In the course of his life, he dealt
with all these subjects, as well as with many others, in separate
works. In the more important and complete of his works, he de-
pended on the literary assistance of Dumont and others. But the
ideas and the method were always his own. For the exposure of
the anomalies of English law, and for the elaboration of a rational
and businesslike system to serve as a model for its reform, he
deserves almost the sole credit.
Bentham's power was derived from the combination in his
mind of two qualities—the firm grasp of a single principle, and a
truly astonishing mastery of details. Every concrete situation was
analysed into its elements and these followed out into all their
ramifications. The method of division and subdivision was arti-
ficial; but it tended to clearness and exhaustiveness, and it could
be applied to any subject. Whatever did not yield to this analysis
was dismissed as 'vague generality. ' Applying this method with
infinite patience, he covered the whole field of ethics, jurisprudence
and politics. Everything in human nature and in society was
reduced to its elements, and then reconstructed out of these
elements. And, in each element, only one feature counted, whether
in respect of force or of value—its quantum of pleasure or pain.
The whole system would have been upset if an independent quali-
tative distinction between pleasures had been allowed, such as
Plato contended for, or John Stuart Mill afterwards attempted to
introduce into utilitarianism. 'Quantity of pleasure being equal,'
says Bentham, “pushpin is as good as poetry. As regards the
principle itself, there was no opportunity for originality: Hume
had suggested its importance to his mind; Priestley had shown its
use in political reasoning ; he picked up the formula from Beccaria;
and in his exposition of its nature there is, perhaps, nothing that
had not been stated already by Helvétius. But the relentless
consistency and thoroughness with which he applied it had never
been anticipated ; and this made him the founder of a new and
powerful school.
His method was not that most characteristic of the revolu-
tionary thought of the period. The ideas of the revolution
6


## p. 71 (#93) ##############################################

III] Criticism of Natural Rights 71
centred in certain abstract conceptions. Equality and freedom
were held to be natural rights of which men had been robbed by
governments, and the purpose of the revolutionists was to regain
and realise those rights. This mode of thought was represented in
England by Richard Price; through Rousseau, it came to dominate
the popular consciousness; in the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence of 1776, it was made the foundation of a democratic
reconstruction of government. The year 1776 is of note in literary
history, also. It marks the death of Hume, and the publication
of The Wealth of Nations, of the first volume of Gibbon's Decline
and Fall and of Bentham's Fragment on Government. The last-
named work preaches a radical reform, but without appealing to
natural or abstract rights. Although he was an admirer of the
American constitution, Bentham was never deceived by the crude
'meta politics' (to use Coleridge's word) of the Declaration of
Independence, or by the same doctrine as it was expounded at
greater length, in the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen,' decreed in the French Constituent Assembly of 1791. His
Anarchical Fallacies, written about this time, is a masterly ex-
posure of the crudities and confusions of the latter document. All
rights, in his view, are the creation of law; 'natural rights is simple
nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,-
nonsense upon stilts. Yet the difference between Bentham's theory
and that of continental and American revolutionists was not im-
mediately obvious. He was in correspondence with some of the
leaders of the revolution, recommended his panopticon scheme for
adoption in France, and offered himself as chief gaoler ; in 1792,
he was made a citizen of France. Nevertheless, his Anarchical
Fallacies made his position clear : and it is owing to him that
philosophical radicalism in England, unlike the corresponding
revolutionary doctrines in other countries, was based upon an
empirical utilitarianism and not upon a priori ideas about natural
rights. A comparison of his argument in Anarchical Fallacies
with his criticism of our 'matchless constitution' in The Book of
Fallacies (1824) shows that he was a foe to all kinds of loose
thinking, whether in praise of revolutionary ideals or in the
interests of the established order.
The Constitutional Code, which Bentham published towards
the end of his life, exhibits an endeavour to give to the people
concerned the fullest possible control over the acts of government.
The author had become increasingly impressed by the extent to
which 'sinister interests,' especially the personal and class interests


## p. 72 (#94) ##############################################

72
.
Bentham and the Early Utilitarians (CH.
comers.
of the rulers, interfered with public interest; and he seeks to
check their operation at every turn. His work is intended for
'
the use of all nations and all governments professing liberal
opinions. Some years earlier, he had published Codification
Proposals, offering his services in the matter to any nation that
wanted them. Portugal had already applied to him for assistance.
He had negotiations of a similar, if less official, kind, with Spain,
Mexico, Venezuela, the United States, Russia, Greece and Tripoli.
The world seemed to be at his feet, anxious to learn from him the
arts of law and government; and he was willing to instruct all
But he did not disregard entirely differences of national
character and historical conditions. In his essay on The Influence
of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, he attributes
immutability to the grounds of law rather than to the laws them-
selves, and rebukes as 'hot-headed innovators' those legislators
who "only pay attention to abstract advantage. '
Bentham's genius was comprehensive and tenacious rather than
profound. He covered an extensive field, always following the
same clue. He passed from social science to religion, and analysed
its influence 'upon the temporal happiness of mankind,' part of his
work being edited by a disciple, George Grote, and published
under a pseudonym (1822). He wrote, also, a number of papers
on education under the title Chrestomathia (1816); and he and
his friends projected a chrestomathic school in which the youth of
the middle and upper classes were to be trained in correct utili-
tarian principles. Thus, he dealt, in a way, with the deeper things
of life, and yet only with the surface-aspect of these things. With
forces and values that cannot be measured in terms of pleasure or
pain, he had no concern; into history, art and religion he had
little insight; but he was unconscious of his limitations, and he
attempted to deal with these things by his own scale of values.
6
9
6
Certain of Bentham's occasional papers—those on Poor Laws
and Pauper Management-appeared in Young's Annals of Agri-
culture. This periodical was started in 1784, and extended to
.
forty-five volumes. Its editor, Arthur Young, was already known
as the greatest of English writers on agriculture. At the age of
seventeen, he had published a pamphlet on The War in North
America (1758), and had afterwards written a great variety of
works chiefly on English farming, including the records of a series
of tours through different districts of England. He was not only
an agricultural expert, but, also, a social observer and theorist, as


## p. 73 (#95) ##############################################

111)
Thomas Robert Malthus
73
is shown in many of his works, such as Political Arithmetic (1774),
Tour in Ireland (1780) and-most famous of all—Travels in
France (1792). He had the good fortune to visit France shortly
before the revolution, as well as after it had broken out; and his
trained power of observation enabled him to see and point out the
social conditions which made the continuance of the ancien régime
impossible. Young's close observation of actual conditions and his
apt reflections upon them have made his works important authorities
for economists, especially on the question of the relative values of
different systems of land tenure. He had also an epigrammatic
gift that has made some of his phrases remembered. *The magic
of property turns sand to gold' is one of his sayings which has
become famous.
On the ground of his general principles, Thomas Robert Malthus
may be counted among the utilitarians; but he was a follower of
Tucker and Paley rather than of Bentham. He did not share
Bentham's estimate of the intellectual factor in conduct, and the
exaggeration of this estimate in other thinkers of the time was the
indirect cause of his famous work. Hume had spoken of reason
as the slave of the passions ; but William Godwin wrote as if men
were compact of pure intellect. He, too, was a utilitarian, in the
sense that he took happiness as the end of conduct; but he was
under the sway of the revolutionary idea ; he put down all human
ills to government, regarding it as an unnecessary evil, and thought
that, with its abolition, man's reason would have free play and the
race would advance rapidly towards perfection. It was the doctrine
of the perfectibility of man that gave Malthus pause. His criticism
.
of the doctrine was first thrown out in conversation with his father.
The elder Malthus, a friend and executor of Rousseau, expressed
approval of the idea of human perfectibility set forth, in 1793, in
Godwin's Political Justice and in Condorcet's Esquisse d'un
tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain. Robert
Malthus took a more sombre view of things than his father ; he
had had a scientific education; and, as a clergyman, he knew
something of the life of the people ; above all, he was of the new
generation, and the dreams of an earlier day did not blind him to
existing facts. He saw an obstacle in the way of all Utopias.
Even if equality and happiness were once attained, they could not
last ; population would soon expand beyond the means of sub-
sistence; and the result would be inequality and misery. The
argument thus struck out in the course of debate was expanded,


## p. 74 (#96) ##############################################

74 Bentham and the Early Utilitarians [CH. .
6
soon after, in An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798).
A storm of controversy followed its publication ; but its teaching
made notable converts, such as Pitt among statesmen and Paley
among philosophers ; and it soon came to be adopted as part of
the orthodox utilitarian tradition. To his critics, Malthus replied
with the thoroughness of an honest enquirer; he travelled on the
continent, studied social conditions and investigated the actual
circumstances which had kept the numbers of the people and their
food in equilibrium. The answer came in the second edition of his
Essay (1803), which, in contents, is, practically, a new book. Even
the title is modified. The first edition discusses the principle of
population 'as it affects the future improvement of society'; the
second is 'a view of its past and present effects on human happiness.
The former shattered the picture of a future golden age, to be
reached by the abolition of government or by any communistic
device; the effect it produces on the reader is one of unrelieved
depression ; mankind is in the power of an impulse hostile to
welfare; only vice and misery prevent the world from being over-
peopled. The second edition turns from the future to the past and
the present; it is informed by a fuller study of facts; it finds that
the pressure of the people on the food has diminished with the
advance of civilisation ; not vice and misery only, but morality
also, is reckoned among the checks to the increase of population.
Thus, as he says in the preface, he tried to soften some of the
harshest conclusions of the first essay. '
The main doctrine of Malthus was not entirely new. The
question of the populousness of ancient and modern nations had
been discussed by a number of writers, including Hume; there
were anticipations of Malthus in Joseph Townsend's Dissertation
on the Poor Laws (1786); and, still earlier, in 1761, Robert Wallace,
in his Various Prospects of Mankind, had at first suggested com-
munity of goods as a solution of the social problem and then
pointed out that the increase of population, which would result
from communism, was a fatal flaw in his own solution.