Francois Duaren was also a pupil of Alciatus and a con-
temporary of Connon, dying in 1559, and in his Commentaries
on the 'Digest' we find some important observations on the
sources of law and the authority of the prince.
temporary of Connon, dying in 1559, and in his Commentaries
on the 'Digest' we find some important observations on the
sources of law and the authority of the prince.
Thomas Carlyle
2
He also discusses the question whether the prince can insert,
in his briefs, clauses which derogate from the law; he says in
one place that no one can do this except the prince, and such
persons as have received authority from him. 3 That is, he
would seem to maintain the dispensing power of the prince. It
should, however, be observed that in another place Alciatus
allows this only under important reservations. The prince,
he says, has power to remit all punishments for offences
against himself, but he cannot deal in this way with "our"
rights anymore than the peopledid who gave him this authority;
fitebatur, nihil non Imperatori run-
cedentis, sententiam confutaretur. "
For the story about Martin, cf.
Savigny, 'Geschichte des Romischen
Rechts,' vol. iv. p. 180.
1 Id. , Opera, vol. iii. col. 26,' Comm.
on Cod. ,' i. , 2, 5: "Rationabilis Consilii.
Non enim debent principes ex se ipsis,
leges promulgate, sed adhibito peri-
torum consilio. "
* Id. id. , vol. iv. ,eol. 816, "Traotatus
de Praesumptionibus,' 'Regula Tertia
Praescriptionum ': "Et probatur ista
opinio, quao videtur communior . . .
ubi non presumitur causa in principe
volente rescindere proprium con-
tract um: imo iatud non potest etiam
de plenitudine potestatis, secundum
Paulus de Castro in L. Digna Vox
C. De Legibus. (Cod. i. xiv. 4. )
Et Baldus in Cap. I. Ad haec de pace
jur. firm, Et Lud. Rom. . . .
Queritur primo, dicens, quod princeps
non potest revocare contractum a ee
factum. . . . Item est in feudo. "
>> Id. id. , vol. i. col. 1108, 'Comm. on
Dig. ,' xxx. i. 55: "Adnotavit in primis
Doct. non posse testatorem ad versus
leges quicquam inducere. Et ideo neo
ipsum, nec quemquam alium, excepto
principe, posse clausula derogatoria
legum uti. Principibus quidem id
permit 1 itur, qui legibus soluti sunt;
aliis vero minime, nisi quatenus ex
principisindulgentiahocconsequantur. "
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 301
there is, therefore, in ' jure nostro ' no mention of "plenitudo
potestatis," or of "non obstante" clauses. Much less can
marquises, dukes, or counts take away another man's rights. 1
Alciatus seems clearly to interpret the doctrine that the
prince is "legibus solutus " as meaning little more than that
he can remit penalties that he has himself imposed, and
not as meaning that he can suspend any law at his pleasure.
The conception of political authority which we find in
Alciatus is obviously very important, even if it stood alone,
but its importance is greatly increased when we bring it into
comparison with that of some other important Civilians of
the sixteenth century.
How far it may be thought that some of the conceptions of
other important French Civilians of the sixteenth century
are due to the influence of Alciatus, and his teaching at
Bourges, we cannot positively say, but it is certainly remark-
able that several of them set out conceptions which are more
nearly akin to his than to those of the Italian Civilians of the
fifteenth century with which we have dealt in the second part
of this volume.
Francois Connon, who died in 1551, is said to have studied
law at Bourges under Alciatus,2 and his Commentaries on
the Eoman Law contain some very important observations
on the nature of law and its relation to the king. The primitive
world, he says in one place, was ruled by kings who were
chosen for their capacity and virtue, and they ruled without
any fixed system of law. When, however, they began to abuse
their power, and men saw how dangerous it was to entrust
the wellbeing of all to the goodwill of one, they either thrust
1 Id. id. , vol iii. col. 113, 'Comm.
on Cod. ,' U. , 2, 2: "Dubinin tamen non
ost. quinsupremi principes,si volunt. has
poenas, libers, quam sibi vendicant,
potestate romittere possiunt. De jure
autem nostro non pes sunt, cum enim
omne jus et imperium ex translationo
populi habeant, non aliter eo debent
uti, quam ipsi qui transtulerunt
uterentur: qua propter in jure nostro,
nullus est mentio plenitudinis potes-
tatis, item clausula? non obstante,
Ac, ut Baldus ait. Sed quid in Mar.
chionibus, Ducibus, Comitibusquo ab
his constituti? Et multo minus posse,
dicendum est, nec in ejus dignitatis con.
cessione id actum videri potest, ut jus
alterius auferant. "
* Cf. 'Biographic Universelle. '
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? 302
[PABT EH.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
out the kings and made laws, or retained the kings and im-
posed upon them the restraints of law. 1 He goes on to cite
a judgment which he attributes to Aristotle, that to obey
the Law is to obey God and the Law, while to obey a man
is to obey a wild beast, for the greed and anger which
turns the magistrate from virtue is like that of a wild
beast. 2
These are general conceptions, and when he turns to the
actual conditions of his time, his statements are different
but significant. In discussing the source of Law he first
mentions with approval the saying of Demosthenes that law
is the agreement of the whole "Civitas" and the similar
doctrine of Papinian (' Digest,' i. 3, 1), but he admits that
in France it is the authority of the king which binds men by
laws. Even here, however, Connon maintains that it was
from the consent of the people that this authority was drawn,
and thus no law is made without the will of the people,
either by their own decree, or by that of the person to
whom they have given authority to make it. 3
1 F. Connanus, 'Libri Commen-
tariorum Juris Civilis,' vol. i. Bk. i. 7
(p. 25): "Hoc est quod dicitur,
priscis illis seculis omnia fuisse guber-
nata manu regia. . . . Erat enim
regibus sola naturae ratio et juris et
injuriae regula. . . . Itaque non
quilibet creabatur rex, sod inter ipsos
esset ad res gerendas maxime idoneus,
qui virtute, consilio, prudentia, ac
animi magnitudine et robore maxime
praestaret. . . . Qui non amore aut
odio, non cupiditate aut iracundia
duceretur ad judicandum, sed quod jus,
quod equitas et veritas postularet,
id omnibus in rebus constitueret, id
sequeretur et tueretur.
Postquam vero coepissent ii, quibus
ad hunc modum fuerat data rerum
omnium potestas, contra rationis prae-
sumptionem, multa pro animi libidine
facere, et periculosum videretur, unius
arbitrio fortunas et vitam omnium
committi; quidam, eiectis regibus,
leges posuerunt, alii, retentis regibus,
tamquam frenos legum iniecerunt, ut
eos nimia potentia ferocientos duritia
juris cohiberent. "
* Id. id. id. , "Bene Aristoteles:
Qui legem praeesse vult, is videtur
Deum et leges imperare: qui autem
vult hominem, adiungit et beluam:
nam belue similis est cupiditas et
iracundia, quae magiatratus et opti-
mum quemque a virtute detorquent. "
? Id. id. , i. 8 (p. 28): "Quod voro
lex dicitur esse convontum quoddam
totius civitatis, bene a Domosthene
dicitur quod Atheniensibus lex nulla
nisi de ipsorum consensu imponi
potuerit. Bene et Papinianus, 'lex
est commune preceptum . . . com-
munis reipublicae sponsio. ' (Dig. i.
3, 1. ) Nam et Romanis legis sciscendi
potestas fuit penes populum.
Nos qui regibus paremus, non
communis sponsio, sed principis auth-
? ? oritas alligat legibus: nisi jam tum
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 303
Connon is, however, clear that the legislative authority
of the prince (at least, of the Eoman Emperor) was unfettered
by the necessity of taking counsel; he cites the opinion of
Papinian that the Law is "consultum virorum prudentum,"
but adds that this does not imply that the prince must consult
the jurists; it is customary to do so, and it is right and
honourable, as the Code says " Humanum est," &c. (' Code,' i.
14, 8), but as Bartolus says, this is a counsel of " Humanitas,"
not a legal necessity. Connon holds clearly and emphatically
that the legislative power of the prince was as complete as
that of the whole Eoman people. 1
On the other hand, he contemptuously repudiates the notion
that law is superior to custom; their authority is equal, and
the later prevails over the earlier2; and he is equally dogmatic
in repudiating the doctrine that the prince is " legibus solutus. "
The prince is, indeed, over the people, but he is still one
of the people, and he wishes that all princes should re-
member the " Digna Vox " (' Code,' i. 121, 4), and should suffer
their authority to be controlled by the law and by equity. 3
A little later he lays down dogmatically the principle that an
unjust law is not a law at all, and should be corrected or
annulled; and that, if a king by hereditary right becomes a
tyrant and violates the divine and human laws, he should
be deposed. The law and the king are sacred, and not to be
violated, but evil law is to be abrogated and the tyrant to be
expelled. Until this has been done, they must be obeyed;
cum et illi regnandi pot est os data est,
et nobis imposita necessitas parendi.
Sic fit ut nulla lex non de populi
volunt ate constituatur, et sit tanquam
pactum quod dam consentientium inter
se civium, ut dicebat Lycophron
sophistes; quod eam aut sciscunt ipsi,
aut is cui eius sciscendae ferendaequo
dederunt potestatem. Ergo vel utilitas
ipsa justi prope mater et equi, ut
scribit Horatius, vel conventio ipsa
nostra, nos obligat legibus, iis ut
omnes pexere debeamus. "
1 Id. id. , 8 (p. 29).
>> Id. id. , 10 (p. ii).
? Id. id. , 8 (p. 28): "Quod si ita
est, ne prince ps quidem ipse legibus
solutus est, quoniam ita praeest
populo, ut unus tamen sit de populo,
'Digna vox est majestate Regnantis
. . . et re vera majus imperii est
submittere legibus principatum. Et
oraculo praesentis edioti quod nobis
licere non patimur, aliis indicamus. '
Quod utinam sibi oditum puterint
omnes principes omnium qui unius
imperio subsunt populorum: et poten-
tiain suam jure, lege, equitate prae-
ponderari sinant. "
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? 304 THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT III.
but when it is done, men are free from them. 1 We cannot
say that these conceptions of Connon are derived from those
of Alciatus, but there are obviously important parallels
between them.
Francois Duaren was also a pupil of Alciatus and a con-
temporary of Connon, dying in 1559, and in his Commentaries
on the 'Digest' we find some important observations on the
sources of law and the authority of the prince.
There is no doubt, he says in one place, that the prince
can make law, but he raises the question how far the people
also have the right to do this, and he contends that they
clearly possessed this right in the time of Julianus, that is, in
the second century; he also cites Dion and Suetonius as showing
that Augustus and Caligula were in the habit of submitting
legislative proposals to the people, and in a later passage he
suggests that it is at least possible that the people shared
their power of legislation with the prince, and did not re-
nounce it entirely, and he cites the words of Julianus as
illustrating this. 2
1 Id. id. , 8 (p. 30): "Haec igitur
disputationis nostrae summa sit, in-
justam legem, legem non esse, et vel
tollendam esse, errore cognito, vel
certe corrigendam; dum id fiat
parendum ei esse.
Ut ei qui justa hereditate rex est,
tyranuk-os mores induat, divina atque
humana jura pervertat, suorum non
salutem petat, sed sanguinem, eiicien-
dus regno est: dum id fiat, rex est:
nec attentandus a quoquam est, nisi
communi suorum decreto deliberatum
sit et constitutum. Sanctum est,
enim nomen legis, sanctum et regis:
neutrum quod fieri potest violandum:
sed ilia abroganda, si mala est; hie,
si tyrannus, expollendus est. Tum
utrique impune non pareas, utroque
solutus. Ante vero si obedientiam
abjeceris, manus quodammodo videris
afferre patriae. "
Cf. 'Sachsenspiegel,' iii. , 54, 4
(cf. vol. iii. p. 61, note 2). Vacarius,
cf. this volumo, p. 23, note 4.
* F. Duarenus, 'Comment, in
Digest. ' i. 3, cap. 3: "Principem
nulla dubitatio est legem condere posse,
cum potestas populi in eum translata
sit. . . . Sed de populo quaeri potest
an legis constituendae potestatem
habeat. Et Julianus satis aperte
ostendit in 1. De qui bus, hie (Dig.
i. 3, 32) tempore suo populum legem
condere potuisse. Ac scribit Dion,
Augustum leges ad populum ferre
solitum, postquam urbis imperium ei
delatum est. Sed et Suetonius, de
Caligula loquens: 'tentavit, inquit, et
comitiorum more revocato, suffragia
populo reddere. '"
Id. id. , i. 4, cap. i. : "Nam jus
quod prinoeps constituit, vim legis
habet, etsi non intervenerit populi
consensus, sed sola principis voluntas.
? ? . . . Quarm'is autem juris consti-
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? CHAP. V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTCB. Y.
305
His treatment of custom seems to us to be related.
He first asks whether custom can override the law when
made by the prince, for "the event shows that the law did
not correspond with the customs of the people "; and he cites
as from Gratian the words of St Augustine that laws are
confirmed when they are approved by the custom of those
who are concerned. He also repudiates the interpretation
of the famous rescript of Constantino as moaning that custom
could not override law; Constantino only meant that custom
had in itself no greater authority than law. 1
Duaren accepts the principle that the prince is "legibus
solutus," though he adds that he does voluntarily submit to
the law, and he cites "Digna Vox" (' Code,' i. xiV. 4), but
he very emphatically contradicts the conception that the
rescripts of tho prince are to be always obeyed. They have
no authority against the law or the public interest, they
cannot deprive a man of his legal rights, they cannot annul
a judicial decision (" res judicata ") when there is no legal
right of appeal. 2
tuendi potestas fuerit principi concessa
a populo: tamen credibilo est popu-
lum eam potestatem mag is cum prin-
cipe quodammodo communicasso,
quam a se omnino abdicasse, quod et
Julianue ostendit, paulo ante dis-
putans de consuetudine. D. 1. De
quibus, supra prox. Tit. (Dig. i. 3, 32). "
1 Id. id. , i. 3, cap. 12, 4: "Poet-
quam vero desiit populus leges condere,
queritur, an possit consuetudo jus a
principe constitutum tollere. Et
exist imo, si princeps ab initio non
eoegerit inobedientes ad parendum legi,
sed dissimulaverit longo tempore,
adeo ut consuetudo inoleverit paulatim
legi contraria, ea consuetudine legem
abrogari. Eventus enim docet eam
legem moribus populi non convenien-
tem, atque ideo contemnendam esse.
Can. erit autem 4 Dist. (Oratian
Decret. D. 4). Inde illud Augustini
oelebratum est, 'leges firmantur, cum
moribus utentiumapprobantur. . . . '
Verum obiicitur nobis resoriptum
Constantini 1. 2. Quae sit longa
consuetudo (Cod. viii. 52, 2). . . . Ex
quo consequi videtur legem consuetu-
dine abrogari non posse.
Sed alius mihi videtur eorum
verborum sensus quam vulgo credatur.
Non enim his verbis signifiest Con-
stantinus, si consuetudo legi omnino
contraria sit, non posse legem ea
abrogari, sed consuetudinem majoris
auctoritatis non esse quam legem,
imitatur enim legem, et vim legis
habet. "
* Id. id. , i. 3, cap. 5: "Excipitur
Princeps, qui legibus solutus est lege,
et sonatas consultis. . . . Sed is se
sponto sua legibus se subiicit, et
secundum leges profitetur se vello
vivere 1. Digna Vox (C. i. 14, 4). "
Id. id. , i. 4, cap. 4: "Resoriptum
parendum esse sine recusatione. . . .
Quae res multas cautiones habet,
ut saepe acoidit ut rescripto parendum
? ? VOL. VI.
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? 306
[PABT in.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
This means, as we understand it, that while the prince
stands personally in some way outside of the law, he cannot
interfere with the due process of law, or, by his brief, deprive
a man of his legal rights. We are again reminded of
Alciatus.
We turn to another French Civilian of a little later date,
Nicolas Vigeliu8, whose work on the' Digest' was first published
in 1568.
His discussion of the sources of law does not seem to us
to be much more than a collection of some of the passages
in the 'Digest' and 'Code' which refer to it,1 except when
he deals with the relation of custom to law. This he discusses
in some detail, and he states his own conclusions dogmatically.
He first refers to it in dealing with what he terms "Ex-
ceptiones adversus leges. " The seventeenth "exceptio" is
"nisi lex alia lege vel consuetudine sit mutata," and he cites
some words of that passage of Julianus, to which we have
so often referred, in which he says that laws are abrogated
not only by the will of the legislator, but also by the tacit
consent of all, " per desuetudinem. " 2
Vigelius returns to the subject a little later, and at some
length. Custom, he says, has the force of law, and he confirms
this by citing various passages from the' Digest' and the' Code. '
He cites as an "exceptio" that important rescript of Con-
stantino which seems to imply that custom had no force
against law (' Code,' viii. 52, 2) and some words of Ulpian
(Digest, i. 32, 3); but he concludes dogmatically that if the
non sit; idque variis ex causis, propter Quaeritur de eo, qui adversus senten-
quas hodie in judiciis rescripta im- tiam rescriptum impetravit. Et cer-
pugnari solent. Primum, quod re- tum est, si res judicata sit, ut nullua
scriptum juri contrarium sit, aut supersit locum appellationi aut supplica-
contra utilitatem publicam, 1. neo tioni, rescripta ejus i
1. rescripta C. De Preoibus impetrata, nullius esse momenti. . . .
imper. offer. 1. ult (Cod. i. 19, 3, and 7). Praeteroa adversum rescriptum obiicitur
C. si contra jus vel utilitatem publi- quod per mendacium et obreptionem
cam (Cod. i. 22, 6). Quo in genere impetratum sit. "
poni debet rescriptum, quo jus alienum 1 Vigelius, 'Digestorum Juris Civilia
tollitur . . . unde intelligitur rescripta Libri Quinquaginta,' i. , 1,4; i. 3, I;
impetrari solum posse a principe de iis i. 4, 1 i i. 4, 3.
quae nomini damnum inferunt. . . . * Id. id. , i. 7, 17.
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? CHAP. V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 307
custom were subsequent to the written law, it prevails against
it. (We cite the last words of the passage. )1
When he turns to the relations of the prince to the law,
while he cannot directly repudiate the doctrine "Princeps
legibus solutus," he argues that to act upon this is contrary
to the " Digna Vox," and that in several cases the Emperor
had said they would not act upon it, but that while they were
"legibus soluti" they lived according to the laws; and he
quotes some lines of Claudian. 2 Vigelius clearly does not
like the principle that the prince is " legibus solutus. " When
we come to the authority of the prince's briefs, he states
dogmatically the limits which are set upon it by the law.
In spite of the reverence which is due to the briefs of the prince,
no such brief is to be accepted in a Court of Law which is
contrary to the general law or the public service, unless it is
such that it inflicts no injury upon anyone. 3
1 Id. id. , i. 8 (col. 28): "Ergo si
scripta lex extet contra consuetudinom,
consuetudo legi scriptae cedit. Hujus
exceptionis replicatio haeo est: nisi
lex scripta consuetudinem praocesserit,
tunc enim consuetudo postea in-
secuta praecedentem legem tollit,
eaque potior habetur. "
?
He also discusses the question whether the prince can insert,
in his briefs, clauses which derogate from the law; he says in
one place that no one can do this except the prince, and such
persons as have received authority from him. 3 That is, he
would seem to maintain the dispensing power of the prince. It
should, however, be observed that in another place Alciatus
allows this only under important reservations. The prince,
he says, has power to remit all punishments for offences
against himself, but he cannot deal in this way with "our"
rights anymore than the peopledid who gave him this authority;
fitebatur, nihil non Imperatori run-
cedentis, sententiam confutaretur. "
For the story about Martin, cf.
Savigny, 'Geschichte des Romischen
Rechts,' vol. iv. p. 180.
1 Id. , Opera, vol. iii. col. 26,' Comm.
on Cod. ,' i. , 2, 5: "Rationabilis Consilii.
Non enim debent principes ex se ipsis,
leges promulgate, sed adhibito peri-
torum consilio. "
* Id. id. , vol. iv. ,eol. 816, "Traotatus
de Praesumptionibus,' 'Regula Tertia
Praescriptionum ': "Et probatur ista
opinio, quao videtur communior . . .
ubi non presumitur causa in principe
volente rescindere proprium con-
tract um: imo iatud non potest etiam
de plenitudine potestatis, secundum
Paulus de Castro in L. Digna Vox
C. De Legibus. (Cod. i. xiv. 4. )
Et Baldus in Cap. I. Ad haec de pace
jur. firm, Et Lud. Rom. . . .
Queritur primo, dicens, quod princeps
non potest revocare contractum a ee
factum. . . . Item est in feudo. "
>> Id. id. , vol. i. col. 1108, 'Comm. on
Dig. ,' xxx. i. 55: "Adnotavit in primis
Doct. non posse testatorem ad versus
leges quicquam inducere. Et ideo neo
ipsum, nec quemquam alium, excepto
principe, posse clausula derogatoria
legum uti. Principibus quidem id
permit 1 itur, qui legibus soluti sunt;
aliis vero minime, nisi quatenus ex
principisindulgentiahocconsequantur. "
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 301
there is, therefore, in ' jure nostro ' no mention of "plenitudo
potestatis," or of "non obstante" clauses. Much less can
marquises, dukes, or counts take away another man's rights. 1
Alciatus seems clearly to interpret the doctrine that the
prince is "legibus solutus " as meaning little more than that
he can remit penalties that he has himself imposed, and
not as meaning that he can suspend any law at his pleasure.
The conception of political authority which we find in
Alciatus is obviously very important, even if it stood alone,
but its importance is greatly increased when we bring it into
comparison with that of some other important Civilians of
the sixteenth century.
How far it may be thought that some of the conceptions of
other important French Civilians of the sixteenth century
are due to the influence of Alciatus, and his teaching at
Bourges, we cannot positively say, but it is certainly remark-
able that several of them set out conceptions which are more
nearly akin to his than to those of the Italian Civilians of the
fifteenth century with which we have dealt in the second part
of this volume.
Francois Connon, who died in 1551, is said to have studied
law at Bourges under Alciatus,2 and his Commentaries on
the Eoman Law contain some very important observations
on the nature of law and its relation to the king. The primitive
world, he says in one place, was ruled by kings who were
chosen for their capacity and virtue, and they ruled without
any fixed system of law. When, however, they began to abuse
their power, and men saw how dangerous it was to entrust
the wellbeing of all to the goodwill of one, they either thrust
1 Id. id. , vol iii. col. 113, 'Comm.
on Cod. ,' U. , 2, 2: "Dubinin tamen non
ost. quinsupremi principes,si volunt. has
poenas, libers, quam sibi vendicant,
potestate romittere possiunt. De jure
autem nostro non pes sunt, cum enim
omne jus et imperium ex translationo
populi habeant, non aliter eo debent
uti, quam ipsi qui transtulerunt
uterentur: qua propter in jure nostro,
nullus est mentio plenitudinis potes-
tatis, item clausula? non obstante,
Ac, ut Baldus ait. Sed quid in Mar.
chionibus, Ducibus, Comitibusquo ab
his constituti? Et multo minus posse,
dicendum est, nec in ejus dignitatis con.
cessione id actum videri potest, ut jus
alterius auferant. "
* Cf. 'Biographic Universelle. '
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? 302
[PABT EH.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
out the kings and made laws, or retained the kings and im-
posed upon them the restraints of law. 1 He goes on to cite
a judgment which he attributes to Aristotle, that to obey
the Law is to obey God and the Law, while to obey a man
is to obey a wild beast, for the greed and anger which
turns the magistrate from virtue is like that of a wild
beast. 2
These are general conceptions, and when he turns to the
actual conditions of his time, his statements are different
but significant. In discussing the source of Law he first
mentions with approval the saying of Demosthenes that law
is the agreement of the whole "Civitas" and the similar
doctrine of Papinian (' Digest,' i. 3, 1), but he admits that
in France it is the authority of the king which binds men by
laws. Even here, however, Connon maintains that it was
from the consent of the people that this authority was drawn,
and thus no law is made without the will of the people,
either by their own decree, or by that of the person to
whom they have given authority to make it. 3
1 F. Connanus, 'Libri Commen-
tariorum Juris Civilis,' vol. i. Bk. i. 7
(p. 25): "Hoc est quod dicitur,
priscis illis seculis omnia fuisse guber-
nata manu regia. . . . Erat enim
regibus sola naturae ratio et juris et
injuriae regula. . . . Itaque non
quilibet creabatur rex, sod inter ipsos
esset ad res gerendas maxime idoneus,
qui virtute, consilio, prudentia, ac
animi magnitudine et robore maxime
praestaret. . . . Qui non amore aut
odio, non cupiditate aut iracundia
duceretur ad judicandum, sed quod jus,
quod equitas et veritas postularet,
id omnibus in rebus constitueret, id
sequeretur et tueretur.
Postquam vero coepissent ii, quibus
ad hunc modum fuerat data rerum
omnium potestas, contra rationis prae-
sumptionem, multa pro animi libidine
facere, et periculosum videretur, unius
arbitrio fortunas et vitam omnium
committi; quidam, eiectis regibus,
leges posuerunt, alii, retentis regibus,
tamquam frenos legum iniecerunt, ut
eos nimia potentia ferocientos duritia
juris cohiberent. "
* Id. id. id. , "Bene Aristoteles:
Qui legem praeesse vult, is videtur
Deum et leges imperare: qui autem
vult hominem, adiungit et beluam:
nam belue similis est cupiditas et
iracundia, quae magiatratus et opti-
mum quemque a virtute detorquent. "
? Id. id. , i. 8 (p. 28): "Quod voro
lex dicitur esse convontum quoddam
totius civitatis, bene a Domosthene
dicitur quod Atheniensibus lex nulla
nisi de ipsorum consensu imponi
potuerit. Bene et Papinianus, 'lex
est commune preceptum . . . com-
munis reipublicae sponsio. ' (Dig. i.
3, 1. ) Nam et Romanis legis sciscendi
potestas fuit penes populum.
Nos qui regibus paremus, non
communis sponsio, sed principis auth-
? ? oritas alligat legibus: nisi jam tum
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 303
Connon is, however, clear that the legislative authority
of the prince (at least, of the Eoman Emperor) was unfettered
by the necessity of taking counsel; he cites the opinion of
Papinian that the Law is "consultum virorum prudentum,"
but adds that this does not imply that the prince must consult
the jurists; it is customary to do so, and it is right and
honourable, as the Code says " Humanum est," &c. (' Code,' i.
14, 8), but as Bartolus says, this is a counsel of " Humanitas,"
not a legal necessity. Connon holds clearly and emphatically
that the legislative power of the prince was as complete as
that of the whole Eoman people. 1
On the other hand, he contemptuously repudiates the notion
that law is superior to custom; their authority is equal, and
the later prevails over the earlier2; and he is equally dogmatic
in repudiating the doctrine that the prince is " legibus solutus. "
The prince is, indeed, over the people, but he is still one
of the people, and he wishes that all princes should re-
member the " Digna Vox " (' Code,' i. 121, 4), and should suffer
their authority to be controlled by the law and by equity. 3
A little later he lays down dogmatically the principle that an
unjust law is not a law at all, and should be corrected or
annulled; and that, if a king by hereditary right becomes a
tyrant and violates the divine and human laws, he should
be deposed. The law and the king are sacred, and not to be
violated, but evil law is to be abrogated and the tyrant to be
expelled. Until this has been done, they must be obeyed;
cum et illi regnandi pot est os data est,
et nobis imposita necessitas parendi.
Sic fit ut nulla lex non de populi
volunt ate constituatur, et sit tanquam
pactum quod dam consentientium inter
se civium, ut dicebat Lycophron
sophistes; quod eam aut sciscunt ipsi,
aut is cui eius sciscendae ferendaequo
dederunt potestatem. Ergo vel utilitas
ipsa justi prope mater et equi, ut
scribit Horatius, vel conventio ipsa
nostra, nos obligat legibus, iis ut
omnes pexere debeamus. "
1 Id. id. , 8 (p. 29).
>> Id. id. , 10 (p. ii).
? Id. id. , 8 (p. 28): "Quod si ita
est, ne prince ps quidem ipse legibus
solutus est, quoniam ita praeest
populo, ut unus tamen sit de populo,
'Digna vox est majestate Regnantis
. . . et re vera majus imperii est
submittere legibus principatum. Et
oraculo praesentis edioti quod nobis
licere non patimur, aliis indicamus. '
Quod utinam sibi oditum puterint
omnes principes omnium qui unius
imperio subsunt populorum: et poten-
tiain suam jure, lege, equitate prae-
ponderari sinant. "
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? 304 THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT III.
but when it is done, men are free from them. 1 We cannot
say that these conceptions of Connon are derived from those
of Alciatus, but there are obviously important parallels
between them.
Francois Duaren was also a pupil of Alciatus and a con-
temporary of Connon, dying in 1559, and in his Commentaries
on the 'Digest' we find some important observations on the
sources of law and the authority of the prince.
There is no doubt, he says in one place, that the prince
can make law, but he raises the question how far the people
also have the right to do this, and he contends that they
clearly possessed this right in the time of Julianus, that is, in
the second century; he also cites Dion and Suetonius as showing
that Augustus and Caligula were in the habit of submitting
legislative proposals to the people, and in a later passage he
suggests that it is at least possible that the people shared
their power of legislation with the prince, and did not re-
nounce it entirely, and he cites the words of Julianus as
illustrating this. 2
1 Id. id. , 8 (p. 30): "Haec igitur
disputationis nostrae summa sit, in-
justam legem, legem non esse, et vel
tollendam esse, errore cognito, vel
certe corrigendam; dum id fiat
parendum ei esse.
Ut ei qui justa hereditate rex est,
tyranuk-os mores induat, divina atque
humana jura pervertat, suorum non
salutem petat, sed sanguinem, eiicien-
dus regno est: dum id fiat, rex est:
nec attentandus a quoquam est, nisi
communi suorum decreto deliberatum
sit et constitutum. Sanctum est,
enim nomen legis, sanctum et regis:
neutrum quod fieri potest violandum:
sed ilia abroganda, si mala est; hie,
si tyrannus, expollendus est. Tum
utrique impune non pareas, utroque
solutus. Ante vero si obedientiam
abjeceris, manus quodammodo videris
afferre patriae. "
Cf. 'Sachsenspiegel,' iii. , 54, 4
(cf. vol. iii. p. 61, note 2). Vacarius,
cf. this volumo, p. 23, note 4.
* F. Duarenus, 'Comment, in
Digest. ' i. 3, cap. 3: "Principem
nulla dubitatio est legem condere posse,
cum potestas populi in eum translata
sit. . . . Sed de populo quaeri potest
an legis constituendae potestatem
habeat. Et Julianus satis aperte
ostendit in 1. De qui bus, hie (Dig.
i. 3, 32) tempore suo populum legem
condere potuisse. Ac scribit Dion,
Augustum leges ad populum ferre
solitum, postquam urbis imperium ei
delatum est. Sed et Suetonius, de
Caligula loquens: 'tentavit, inquit, et
comitiorum more revocato, suffragia
populo reddere. '"
Id. id. , i. 4, cap. i. : "Nam jus
quod prinoeps constituit, vim legis
habet, etsi non intervenerit populi
consensus, sed sola principis voluntas.
? ? . . . Quarm'is autem juris consti-
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? CHAP. V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTCB. Y.
305
His treatment of custom seems to us to be related.
He first asks whether custom can override the law when
made by the prince, for "the event shows that the law did
not correspond with the customs of the people "; and he cites
as from Gratian the words of St Augustine that laws are
confirmed when they are approved by the custom of those
who are concerned. He also repudiates the interpretation
of the famous rescript of Constantino as moaning that custom
could not override law; Constantino only meant that custom
had in itself no greater authority than law. 1
Duaren accepts the principle that the prince is "legibus
solutus," though he adds that he does voluntarily submit to
the law, and he cites "Digna Vox" (' Code,' i. xiV. 4), but
he very emphatically contradicts the conception that the
rescripts of tho prince are to be always obeyed. They have
no authority against the law or the public interest, they
cannot deprive a man of his legal rights, they cannot annul
a judicial decision (" res judicata ") when there is no legal
right of appeal. 2
tuendi potestas fuerit principi concessa
a populo: tamen credibilo est popu-
lum eam potestatem mag is cum prin-
cipe quodammodo communicasso,
quam a se omnino abdicasse, quod et
Julianue ostendit, paulo ante dis-
putans de consuetudine. D. 1. De
quibus, supra prox. Tit. (Dig. i. 3, 32). "
1 Id. id. , i. 3, cap. 12, 4: "Poet-
quam vero desiit populus leges condere,
queritur, an possit consuetudo jus a
principe constitutum tollere. Et
exist imo, si princeps ab initio non
eoegerit inobedientes ad parendum legi,
sed dissimulaverit longo tempore,
adeo ut consuetudo inoleverit paulatim
legi contraria, ea consuetudine legem
abrogari. Eventus enim docet eam
legem moribus populi non convenien-
tem, atque ideo contemnendam esse.
Can. erit autem 4 Dist. (Oratian
Decret. D. 4). Inde illud Augustini
oelebratum est, 'leges firmantur, cum
moribus utentiumapprobantur. . . . '
Verum obiicitur nobis resoriptum
Constantini 1. 2. Quae sit longa
consuetudo (Cod. viii. 52, 2). . . . Ex
quo consequi videtur legem consuetu-
dine abrogari non posse.
Sed alius mihi videtur eorum
verborum sensus quam vulgo credatur.
Non enim his verbis signifiest Con-
stantinus, si consuetudo legi omnino
contraria sit, non posse legem ea
abrogari, sed consuetudinem majoris
auctoritatis non esse quam legem,
imitatur enim legem, et vim legis
habet. "
* Id. id. , i. 3, cap. 5: "Excipitur
Princeps, qui legibus solutus est lege,
et sonatas consultis. . . . Sed is se
sponto sua legibus se subiicit, et
secundum leges profitetur se vello
vivere 1. Digna Vox (C. i. 14, 4). "
Id. id. , i. 4, cap. 4: "Resoriptum
parendum esse sine recusatione. . . .
Quae res multas cautiones habet,
ut saepe acoidit ut rescripto parendum
? ? VOL. VI.
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? 306
[PABT in.
THE EARLIER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
This means, as we understand it, that while the prince
stands personally in some way outside of the law, he cannot
interfere with the due process of law, or, by his brief, deprive
a man of his legal rights. We are again reminded of
Alciatus.
We turn to another French Civilian of a little later date,
Nicolas Vigeliu8, whose work on the' Digest' was first published
in 1568.
His discussion of the sources of law does not seem to us
to be much more than a collection of some of the passages
in the 'Digest' and 'Code' which refer to it,1 except when
he deals with the relation of custom to law. This he discusses
in some detail, and he states his own conclusions dogmatically.
He first refers to it in dealing with what he terms "Ex-
ceptiones adversus leges. " The seventeenth "exceptio" is
"nisi lex alia lege vel consuetudine sit mutata," and he cites
some words of that passage of Julianus, to which we have
so often referred, in which he says that laws are abrogated
not only by the will of the legislator, but also by the tacit
consent of all, " per desuetudinem. " 2
Vigelius returns to the subject a little later, and at some
length. Custom, he says, has the force of law, and he confirms
this by citing various passages from the' Digest' and the' Code. '
He cites as an "exceptio" that important rescript of Con-
stantino which seems to imply that custom had no force
against law (' Code,' viii. 52, 2) and some words of Ulpian
(Digest, i. 32, 3); but he concludes dogmatically that if the
non sit; idque variis ex causis, propter Quaeritur de eo, qui adversus senten-
quas hodie in judiciis rescripta im- tiam rescriptum impetravit. Et cer-
pugnari solent. Primum, quod re- tum est, si res judicata sit, ut nullua
scriptum juri contrarium sit, aut supersit locum appellationi aut supplica-
contra utilitatem publicam, 1. neo tioni, rescripta ejus i
1. rescripta C. De Preoibus impetrata, nullius esse momenti. . . .
imper. offer. 1. ult (Cod. i. 19, 3, and 7). Praeteroa adversum rescriptum obiicitur
C. si contra jus vel utilitatem publi- quod per mendacium et obreptionem
cam (Cod. i. 22, 6). Quo in genere impetratum sit. "
poni debet rescriptum, quo jus alienum 1 Vigelius, 'Digestorum Juris Civilia
tollitur . . . unde intelligitur rescripta Libri Quinquaginta,' i. , 1,4; i. 3, I;
impetrari solum posse a principe de iis i. 4, 1 i i. 4, 3.
quae nomini damnum inferunt. . . . * Id. id. , i. 7, 17.
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? CHAP. V. ] CIVILIANS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 307
custom were subsequent to the written law, it prevails against
it. (We cite the last words of the passage. )1
When he turns to the relations of the prince to the law,
while he cannot directly repudiate the doctrine "Princeps
legibus solutus," he argues that to act upon this is contrary
to the " Digna Vox," and that in several cases the Emperor
had said they would not act upon it, but that while they were
"legibus soluti" they lived according to the laws; and he
quotes some lines of Claudian. 2 Vigelius clearly does not
like the principle that the prince is " legibus solutus. " When
we come to the authority of the prince's briefs, he states
dogmatically the limits which are set upon it by the law.
In spite of the reverence which is due to the briefs of the prince,
no such brief is to be accepted in a Court of Law which is
contrary to the general law or the public service, unless it is
such that it inflicts no injury upon anyone. 3
1 Id. id. , i. 8 (col. 28): "Ergo si
scripta lex extet contra consuetudinom,
consuetudo legi scriptae cedit. Hujus
exceptionis replicatio haeo est: nisi
lex scripta consuetudinem praocesserit,
tunc enim consuetudo postea in-
secuta praecedentem legem tollit,
eaque potior habetur. "
?
