(4) Whether it is only of the end
possessed?
Summa Theologica
But the majority of men are led
by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the
majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the
observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy
says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a
though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will,
which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to
such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when
the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden
inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And
since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the
lying spirits. "
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Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as
exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its
superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But
there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God,
namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also,
as exterior principle.
Objection 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the
intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but
also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an
angel.
Objection 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things,
according to Gn. 1:31: "God saw all the things that He had made, and
they were very good. " If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone,
it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin
and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in
us" [Vulg. 'you'] "both to will and to accomplish. "
I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as also is the
movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a
natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that
alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can cause a
natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man,
who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this movement is not
natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused
by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys.
vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things.
Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something
that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an
exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is
evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the
rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated
in the [1073]FP, Q[90], A[2]. Secondly, it is evident from the fact
that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else
can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal
good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some
particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal
inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to
all forms, be created by some particular agent.
Reply to Objection 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be
the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural
forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part
of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to
man's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a
creature from without, as stated above [1074](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to
the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this
universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself
by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good.
Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of
something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He
moves by grace, as we shall state later on ([1075]Q[109], A[2]).
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OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?
(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?
(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is
God?
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Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything
naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary
agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is
not moved to anything naturally.
Objection 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as
"being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will.
Therefore no movement is natural to the will.
Objection 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the
will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing
naturally.
On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the
intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally.
Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.
I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat. ) and the Philosopher
also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For
sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In
this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in
Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even
for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing
which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of
itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong
to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs
of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking
nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever
belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard
to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are
naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements
must be something naturally willed.
Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does
each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in
the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of
demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is
all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature.
For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires,
but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.
Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also
other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the
knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live
and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which
are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind
of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are
done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is
proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner
proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will
is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to
nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what belongs to a
previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing,
being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from
the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
Reply to Objection 2: In the case of natural things, that which is
natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as
heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is
not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality:
because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is
"the act of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1).
Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard
to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always
move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The
Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven,
i. e. the Empyrean. ] And in like manner it is not necessary that the
will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills
something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it
is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure
act, is always in the act of volition.
Reply to Objection 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding,
proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a
genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as
species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the
individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since,
therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one
general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as
to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the
true, or being, or "what a thing is. " And under good in general are
included many particular goods, to none of which is the will
determined.
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Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?
Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its
object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to
movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be
sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be
moved of necessity by its object.
Objection 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is
the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by
its object: therefore the will also, by its object.
Objection 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or
something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end
necessarily: because it is like the principle in speculative matters,
to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason
for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also
necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.
On the contrary, The rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational
power, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9.
Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved,
of necessity, to either of the opposites.
I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise
of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from
the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily,
for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of
it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second
manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by
another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must
consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible
moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore
if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily:
unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the
act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all
respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other
respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for
it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored,
and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually colored is the
object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the
will be offered an object which is good universally and from every
point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything
at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the
will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it
will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever,
is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and
lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it:
and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as
they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from
this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will,
which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
Reply to Objection 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that
object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that
power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not
move of necessity, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an
object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by
that which may be either true or false---viz. by that which is
contingent: as we have said of the good.
Reply to Objection 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because
it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that
end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and
"to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be
gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he
who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the
conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.
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Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a
passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): "The
good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do":
and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion.
Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man
is, such does the end seem to him. " But it is not in man's power to
cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to
will that to which the passion inclines him.
Objection 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular
effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal
reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as
stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the
particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite.
Therefore the will is not moved to will something particular, except
through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite
happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will
cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust
thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it. "
Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
I answer that, As stated above ([1076]Q[9], A[2]), the passion of the
sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by
its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and
such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which
he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence
of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is
wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those
who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious
or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such
like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of
such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of
necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither
movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the
passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent,
its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain
degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not
subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does
not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it.
Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and
the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the
will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of
concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which
I will not, that I do---i. e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the
will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus
it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature,
intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in
respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly
subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is
entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although
reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains
free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion
entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by
the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed
according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him
otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good
apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.
Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a
passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those
cases wherein reason resists passion.
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Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God.
For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God
cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is
written (Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will? " Therefore God moves the
will of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it
wills naturally, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). But "whatever God does
in a thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi,
3). Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves
it.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible
follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from
the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it:
because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it
is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it.
Therefore it wills it of necessity.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the
beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. " Therefore He
does not of necessity move man's will.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine
providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things. "
Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so
that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of
necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.
Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to
one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so
moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but
its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those
things to which it is moved naturally.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine will extends not only to the doing of
something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a
way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it
would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved
of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be
moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
Reply to Objection 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in
it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a
thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish
that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for
instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be
natural to each thing---that it be subject to the Divine power.
Reply to Objection 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is
incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto.
But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that
the will is moved by God necessarily.
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OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to
irrational animals?
(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?
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Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the
appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the
fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as
shown above ([1077]Q[3], A[4]), that receives the fruit of human life,
which is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive
power, but of the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, each power has its proper end, which is its
perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the
hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is
its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to
the appetite.
Objection 3: Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible
delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for the
same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore
enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin.
x, 10,11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own
sake. " But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to
enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.
I answer that, "Fruitio" [enjoyment] and "fructus" [fruit] seem to
refer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which,
matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one
which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those things are most
manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that
the word "fruition" is derived from sensible fruits. But sensible fruit
is that which we expect the tree to produce in the last place, and in
which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to
have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the
longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the
object of the appetitive power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition
is the act of the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one and the same thing from
belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly
the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good
and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition
thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive
power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards
the end and enjoying the end attained.
Reply to Objection 2: The perfection and end of every other power is
contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is
contained in the common, as stated above ([1078]Q[9], A[1]). Hence the
perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to
the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other
powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of them
reaches the end.
Reply to Objection 3: In delight there are two things: perception of
what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and
complacency in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to
the appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.
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Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to
irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men to
enjoy and to use. " Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
Objection 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational
animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to
enjoy.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the
intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the
sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite,
it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural
appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight
in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: and
accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so absurd
to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure. "
I answer that, As was stated above [1079](A[1]) to enjoy is not the act
of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that
commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the
appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of
achieving an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body has
a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet
the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in some
higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things
endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to their
acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, although
they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is only for
those that are endowed with knowledge.
Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect
knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is
the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and
the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On
the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the
good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational
animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are
moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend.
Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect
degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at
all.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but
of that which each one chooses for his last end.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge;
not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect
enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it
is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it
would be, if one were to say that they "use. "
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Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end.
For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in
the Lord. " But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a
man. Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end.
Objection 2: Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says
(Gal. 5:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and
other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end.
Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.
Objection 3: Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for
I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will:
since "it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De Trin.
x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man
is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore
enjoyment is not only of the last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy
that which he desires for the sake of something else. " But the last end
alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else.
Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.
I answer that, As stated above [1080](A[1]) the notion of fruit implies
two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm
the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last
either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else;
relatively, if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that
which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end, is
properly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly said to
enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only
as referred to something else, e. g. a bitter potion for the sake of
health, can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something
delightful about it, to which a number of preceding things are
referred, may indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot
be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the
notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy
what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein. " But its rest
is not absolute save in the possession of the last end: for as long as
something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense,
although it has reached something. Thus in local movement, although any
point between the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not
considered as an actual end, except when the movement stops there.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if
he had said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would
seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he
set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him": as if we
were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a
term but as a means.
Reply to Objection 2: Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore
it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it,
it is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final
object of his longing and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly
these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are
certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they are called
"fruits of the spirit": but not as though we are to enjoy them as our
last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits
because "we should desire them for their own sake": not indeed as
though they were not ordained to the last end; but because they are
such that we ought to find pleasure in them.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1081]Q[1], A[8];[1082] Q[2],
A[7]), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing
itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are not, of course,
two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to
something else. Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is
ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this
last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God,
another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby
we enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to created
happiness which consists in enjoyment.
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Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to use joyfully,
with the joy, not of hope, but of possession. " But so long as a thing
is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of hope. Therefore
enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1083](A[3]), enjoyment is not
properly otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest
to the appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of
the end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end
possessed.
Objection 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one
does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.
Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
On the contrary, "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its
own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is
possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession.
Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not
possessed.
I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the
last end, according as the will has something by way of last end. Now
an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly,
when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality;
imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment,
therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is
also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at
rest. First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the
last end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the
one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession
of it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent
depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect,
as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent. Therefore
enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly
speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of
the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but
imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.
Reply to Objection 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not
only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.
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OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?
(2) Whether it is only of the last end?
(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the
means?
(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
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Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect,
and not of the will. For it is written (Mat. 6:22): "If thy eye be
single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to
Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention.
But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive
power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the
apprehensive power.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13)
that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Mat. 6:23):
"If the light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains to
knowledge. Therefore intention does too.
Objection 3: Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end.
But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs not to
the will but to the reason.
Objection 4: Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the
means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called
volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from
which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the
intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the
images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's
inner thought. " Therefore intention is an act of the will.
I answer that, Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to tend
to something. " Now both the action of the mover and the movement of
thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing
moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover.
Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which
moves to the end: hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in
authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now
the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown
above ([1084]Q[9], A[1]). Wherefore it is evident that intention,
properly speaking, is an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The eye designates intention figuratively, not
because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it
presupposes knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the
latter moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with
our bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: Intention is called a light because it is
manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness
because a man knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may
be, as Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).
Reply to Objection 3: The will does not ordain, but tends to something
according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention"
indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason
orders something to the end.
Reply to Objection 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to the
end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First,
absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to
have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place
of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers
the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus
"intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have
health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by
means of something else.
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Whether intention is only of the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For
it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The
intention of the heart is a cry to God. " But God is the last end of the
human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end.
Objection 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as
stated above (A[1], ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore
intention always regards the last end.
Objection 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does
enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention
is too.
On the contrary, There is but one last end of human wills, viz.
Happiness, as stated above ([1085]Q[1], A[7]). If, therefore,
intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different
intentions: which is evidently false.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 4), intention regards the end
as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement
may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the
movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement.
Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the
movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in the movement
from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus,
but not the last. And intention can be both.
by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the
majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the
observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy
says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a
though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will,
which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to
such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when
the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden
inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And
since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the
lying spirits. "
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Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as
exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its
superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But
there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God,
namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also,
as exterior principle.
Objection 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the
intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but
also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an
angel.
Objection 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things,
according to Gn. 1:31: "God saw all the things that He had made, and
they were very good. " If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone,
it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin
and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in
us" [Vulg. 'you'] "both to will and to accomplish. "
I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as also is the
movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a
natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that
alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can cause a
natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man,
who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this movement is not
natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused
by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys.
vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things.
Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something
that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an
exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is
evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the
rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated
in the [1073]FP, Q[90], A[2]. Secondly, it is evident from the fact
that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else
can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal
good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some
particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal
inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to
all forms, be created by some particular agent.
Reply to Objection 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be
the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural
forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part
of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to
man's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a
creature from without, as stated above [1074](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to
the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this
universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself
by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good.
Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of
something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He
moves by grace, as we shall state later on ([1075]Q[109], A[2]).
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OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?
(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?
(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is
God?
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Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything
naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary
agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is
not moved to anything naturally.
Objection 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as
"being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will.
Therefore no movement is natural to the will.
Objection 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the
will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing
naturally.
On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the
intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally.
Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.
I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat. ) and the Philosopher
also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For
sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In
this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in
Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even
for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing
which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of
itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong
to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs
of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking
nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever
belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard
to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are
naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements
must be something naturally willed.
Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does
each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in
the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of
demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is
all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature.
For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires,
but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.
Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also
other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the
knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live
and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which
are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind
of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are
done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is
proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner
proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will
is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to
nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what belongs to a
previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing,
being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from
the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
Reply to Objection 2: In the case of natural things, that which is
natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as
heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is
not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality:
because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is
"the act of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1).
Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard
to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always
move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The
Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven,
i. e. the Empyrean. ] And in like manner it is not necessary that the
will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills
something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it
is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure
act, is always in the act of volition.
Reply to Objection 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding,
proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a
genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as
species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the
individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since,
therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one
general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as
to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the
true, or being, or "what a thing is. " And under good in general are
included many particular goods, to none of which is the will
determined.
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Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?
Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its
object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to
movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be
sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be
moved of necessity by its object.
Objection 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is
the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by
its object: therefore the will also, by its object.
Objection 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or
something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end
necessarily: because it is like the principle in speculative matters,
to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason
for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also
necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.
On the contrary, The rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational
power, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9.
Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved,
of necessity, to either of the opposites.
I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise
of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from
the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily,
for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of
it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second
manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by
another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must
consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible
moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore
if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily:
unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the
act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all
respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other
respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for
it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored,
and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually colored is the
object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the
will be offered an object which is good universally and from every
point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything
at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the
will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it
will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever,
is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and
lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it:
and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as
they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from
this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will,
which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
Reply to Objection 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that
object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that
power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not
move of necessity, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an
object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by
that which may be either true or false---viz. by that which is
contingent: as we have said of the good.
Reply to Objection 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because
it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that
end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and
"to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be
gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he
who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the
conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.
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Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a
passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): "The
good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do":
and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion.
Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man
is, such does the end seem to him. " But it is not in man's power to
cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to
will that to which the passion inclines him.
Objection 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular
effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal
reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as
stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the
particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite.
Therefore the will is not moved to will something particular, except
through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite
happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will
cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust
thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it. "
Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
I answer that, As stated above ([1076]Q[9], A[2]), the passion of the
sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by
its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and
such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which
he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence
of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is
wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those
who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious
or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such
like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of
such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of
necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither
movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the
passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent,
its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain
degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not
subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does
not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it.
Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and
the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the
will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of
concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which
I will not, that I do---i. e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the
will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus
it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature,
intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in
respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly
subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is
entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although
reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains
free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion
entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by
the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed
according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him
otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good
apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.
Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a
passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those
cases wherein reason resists passion.
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Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God.
For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God
cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is
written (Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will? " Therefore God moves the
will of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it
wills naturally, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). But "whatever God does
in a thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi,
3). Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves
it.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible
follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from
the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it:
because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it
is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it.
Therefore it wills it of necessity.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the
beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. " Therefore He
does not of necessity move man's will.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine
providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things. "
Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so
that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of
necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.
Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to
one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so
moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but
its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those
things to which it is moved naturally.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine will extends not only to the doing of
something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a
way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it
would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved
of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be
moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
Reply to Objection 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in
it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a
thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish
that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for
instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be
natural to each thing---that it be subject to the Divine power.
Reply to Objection 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is
incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto.
But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that
the will is moved by God necessarily.
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OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to
irrational animals?
(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?
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Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the
appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the
fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as
shown above ([1077]Q[3], A[4]), that receives the fruit of human life,
which is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive
power, but of the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, each power has its proper end, which is its
perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the
hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is
its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to
the appetite.
Objection 3: Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible
delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for the
same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore
enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin.
x, 10,11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own
sake. " But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to
enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.
I answer that, "Fruitio" [enjoyment] and "fructus" [fruit] seem to
refer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which,
matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one
which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those things are most
manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that
the word "fruition" is derived from sensible fruits. But sensible fruit
is that which we expect the tree to produce in the last place, and in
which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to
have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the
longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the
object of the appetitive power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition
is the act of the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one and the same thing from
belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly
the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good
and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition
thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive
power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards
the end and enjoying the end attained.
Reply to Objection 2: The perfection and end of every other power is
contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is
contained in the common, as stated above ([1078]Q[9], A[1]). Hence the
perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to
the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other
powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of them
reaches the end.
Reply to Objection 3: In delight there are two things: perception of
what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and
complacency in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to
the appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.
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Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to
irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men to
enjoy and to use. " Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
Objection 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational
animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to
enjoy.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the
intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the
sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite,
it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural
appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight
in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: and
accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so absurd
to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure. "
I answer that, As was stated above [1079](A[1]) to enjoy is not the act
of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that
commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the
appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of
achieving an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body has
a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet
the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in some
higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things
endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to their
acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, although
they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is only for
those that are endowed with knowledge.
Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect
knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is
the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and
the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On
the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the
good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational
animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are
moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend.
Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect
degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at
all.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but
of that which each one chooses for his last end.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge;
not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect
enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it
is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it
would be, if one were to say that they "use. "
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Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end.
For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in
the Lord. " But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a
man. Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end.
Objection 2: Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says
(Gal. 5:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and
other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end.
Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.
Objection 3: Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for
I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will:
since "it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De Trin.
x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man
is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore
enjoyment is not only of the last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy
that which he desires for the sake of something else. " But the last end
alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else.
Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.
I answer that, As stated above [1080](A[1]) the notion of fruit implies
two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm
the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last
either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else;
relatively, if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that
which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end, is
properly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly said to
enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only
as referred to something else, e. g. a bitter potion for the sake of
health, can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something
delightful about it, to which a number of preceding things are
referred, may indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot
be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the
notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy
what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein. " But its rest
is not absolute save in the possession of the last end: for as long as
something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense,
although it has reached something. Thus in local movement, although any
point between the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not
considered as an actual end, except when the movement stops there.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if
he had said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would
seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he
set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him": as if we
were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a
term but as a means.
Reply to Objection 2: Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore
it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it,
it is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final
object of his longing and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly
these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are
certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they are called
"fruits of the spirit": but not as though we are to enjoy them as our
last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits
because "we should desire them for their own sake": not indeed as
though they were not ordained to the last end; but because they are
such that we ought to find pleasure in them.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1081]Q[1], A[8];[1082] Q[2],
A[7]), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing
itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are not, of course,
two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to
something else. Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is
ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this
last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God,
another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby
we enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to created
happiness which consists in enjoyment.
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Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to use joyfully,
with the joy, not of hope, but of possession. " But so long as a thing
is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of hope. Therefore
enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1083](A[3]), enjoyment is not
properly otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest
to the appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of
the end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end
possessed.
Objection 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one
does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.
Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
On the contrary, "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its
own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is
possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession.
Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not
possessed.
I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the
last end, according as the will has something by way of last end. Now
an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly,
when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality;
imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment,
therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is
also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at
rest. First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the
last end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the
one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession
of it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent
depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect,
as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent. Therefore
enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly
speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of
the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but
imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.
Reply to Objection 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not
only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.
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OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?
(2) Whether it is only of the last end?
(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the
means?
(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?
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Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect,
and not of the will. For it is written (Mat. 6:22): "If thy eye be
single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to
Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention.
But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive
power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the
apprehensive power.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13)
that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Mat. 6:23):
"If the light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains to
knowledge. Therefore intention does too.
Objection 3: Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end.
But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs not to
the will but to the reason.
Objection 4: Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the
means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called
volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from
which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the
intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the
images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's
inner thought. " Therefore intention is an act of the will.
I answer that, Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to tend
to something. " Now both the action of the mover and the movement of
thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing
moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover.
Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which
moves to the end: hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in
authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now
the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown
above ([1084]Q[9], A[1]). Wherefore it is evident that intention,
properly speaking, is an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The eye designates intention figuratively, not
because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it
presupposes knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the
latter moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with
our bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: Intention is called a light because it is
manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness
because a man knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may
be, as Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).
Reply to Objection 3: The will does not ordain, but tends to something
according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention"
indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason
orders something to the end.
Reply to Objection 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to the
end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First,
absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to
have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place
of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers
the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus
"intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have
health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by
means of something else.
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Whether intention is only of the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For
it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The
intention of the heart is a cry to God. " But God is the last end of the
human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end.
Objection 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as
stated above (A[1], ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore
intention always regards the last end.
Objection 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does
enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention
is too.
On the contrary, There is but one last end of human wills, viz.
Happiness, as stated above ([1085]Q[1], A[7]). If, therefore,
intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different
intentions: which is evidently false.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 4), intention regards the end
as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement
may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the
movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement.
Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the
movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in the movement
from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus,
but not the last. And intention can be both.
