"59 This
registers
the fact that
the "hero" of the book finally tracked down Stalin and
shot him to death.
the "hero" of the book finally tracked down Stalin and
shot him to death.
Soviet Union - 1952 - Soviet Civilization
.
.
.
American stra-
tegists are thinking . . . in terms of closing the circle of
air bases around Russia, making it smaller and smaller,
tighter and tighter, until the Russians are throttled. This
means getting bases through combined air, sea and
ground operations ever closer to Russia's heartland,
then using the bases for sustained bombing and guided-
missile attacks. "44
On June 9, 1948, the Soviet Government vigorously
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
protested to the American Government against the
Newsweek article, stating that it violated a United
Nations resolution against war propaganda. This resolu-
tion in part reads: "The General Assembly condemns
all forms of propaganda in whatever country conducted,
which is either designed or likely to provoke or encour-
age any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression. "45 The American Government took no action
regarding the Soviet protest.
In its issue of Sunday, May 30, 1948, The New York
Times Magazine published "What Air Power Can--and
Cannot--Do," by Hanson W. Baldwin, well-known mili-
tary expert of the Times. Mr. Baldwin discussed frankly
some of the chief difficulties in the way of successfully
bombing Soviet Russia from the air and thought that
ordinary strafing in the daytime would be too dangerous
for American planes. "Night bombing," he frankly as-
serted, "or bombing from high above the clouds would,
therefore, be preferable. " Yet, complained Mr. Baldwin,
"and this is perhaps the greatest disadvantage the offense
would suffer in bombing attacks upon Russia, we have
no really satisfactory maps of most of the Russian in-
terior. " It was this article to which Andrei Vishinsky,
then a Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union,
called attention in an address before the United Nations
Assembly at Paris on September 25 as an instance of the
open instigation "of war against the U. S. S. R. and the new
democracies. "
Not to be outdone, Look magazine, on June 22, the
precise anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia,
ran as its lead article, "Air Force Plans for Bombing
Russia," as the title was announced on the front cover.
The author, Ben Kocivar, declared that he had "recently
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? SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
talked about the problem with a number of top Air
Force and Navy officials," one of whom at least favored
a so-called preventive war against the Soviet Union. The
Look analysis pointed out that "the only long-range
planes we have in operation ready to go are our World
War II B-29's with an operating radius of some 2,000
miles. 'Draw a couple of thousand-mile circles around
the industrial heart of Russia,' a general told me [Mr.
Kocivar], 'and you will see why we must have operating
bases outside this country. ' The two-thousand-mile ring,
as the map shows, borders Greenland, Iceland, England,
France, Italy, Greece, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and India.
We need these bases not only for offensive operations,
but to prevent the Russians from using them against
us. "46
In August, Henry Luce's Life, taking up the refrain,
printed a detailed description by General Carl Spaatz,
retired Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force, on how the
United States could bomb the Soviet Union into sub-
mission. General Spaatz said that "air bases have the
same significance that naval bases had in the last century"
and that, comparable to the British Empire in its heyday,
America must at once secure a global framework of bases
for the development of air power. "Space is no longer
an effective shield," asserted the General. "Now an
attacker would not have to plod laboriously and bloodily
along the Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow road to strike at the
Russian vitals. The air offers a direct, operationally feas-
ible route for a determined attacker to knock out the
industries that it has cost the Russians so much to cre-
ate. "47
In September The Saturday Evening Post, determined
to keep up with its rivals, made its own blood-curdling
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
contribution to the master plan of smashing the U. S. S. R.
In an article entitled "If War Comes--", Joseph and Ste-
wart Alsop, using the well-worn pretext of a Soviet attack
on America, predicted: "From Baku north to Leningrad,
from Smolensk east to Novosibirsk, the vitals of the Soviet
state will be scorched and destroyed with the terrible fire
of the atomic bomb. "48 Then the authors listed the many
places where the United States must have air bases, be-
yond its own borders, in Europe, the Near East and the
Far East.
For 1949 I find in my files a clipping from The New
York World-Telegram of March 14, with the dateline of
Washington, D. C, and reading as follows: "About
seventy strategic targets in Russia have been marked by
military planners as possible objectives for attack in event
of a war, it was learned today. The Air Force has given
the Joint Chiefs of Staff documented assurances that the
B-36 superbomber could strike every one of these, flying
out of bases on this continent and returning without re-
fueling. The targets have been marked off on top-secret
maps at the national defense establishment. Reliable
military authorities said they include major Soviet in-
dustrial centers. All would be within a 4,000-mile radius
of air bases in Alaska and Labrador. "
In August, 1950, Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of
the Navy, told an audience in Boston that the United
States should be willing to pay "even the price of insti-
tuting a war to compel cooperation for peace. " This
recommendation of a preventive war against the Soviet
Union caused such a scandal in official circles that the
next day the U. S. State Department issued a special state-
ment: "Secretary Matthews' speech was not cleared with
the Department of State and his views do not represent
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
United States policy. The United States does not favor
instituting a war of any kind. "49 Mr. Matthews, however,
remained as Secretary of the Navy for eleven months
after this episode.
In March, 1951, Lieutenant General Norstad, Com-
mander of the United States Air Forces in Europe, de-
clared at Frankfurt, Germany: "There is no target in the
Soviet Union that cannot be attacked by United States
bombers. "50 In April Charles E. Wilson, Director of
Defense Mobilization, said at Washington that if Stalin
"could see the new bombs, which are far more devastat-
ing than anything we knew in the last war, he'd realize
that these new bombs will make fine 'calling cards' from
the United States for Russia! " Mr. Wilson added the
disclaimer: "I hope we never use these bombs -- that we
never have to -- but it is comforting to know that they
will be on hand if needed. "51
In May Look, one of the most persistent offenders in
outlining sensational attacks on the Soviet Union,
published an article called, "Can Our A-Bombers Get
Through? ", with a map showing the chief centers to be
bombed in the U. S. S. R. and their exact distance from
American air bases. Reported Look: "We have ringed
Russia with a multitude of airfields, scores of them.
Even if by some military miracle all these bases in Ger-
many, England, Spain and North Africa should be denied
to us, the U. S. Air Force still could deliver the A-bomb
on Russia from air bases in the continental United States.
. . . Ten planes, B-50s and B-36s, would cross the frontiers
of Russia at approximately the same time from ten dif-
ferent directions. Each would be carrying an atomic
bomb, and each would have a target or choice of targets.
From the Air Force point of view it would be ideal if
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
the weather were extremely murky. . . . Attacking planes
would be scheduled over targets at night. They would
bomb by radar sighting, which is reasonably accurate. "52
There can be no doubt about it--Look has the plans
worked out in meticulous detail.
In November, 1951, Senator J. Allen Frear, Jr. , a
Delaware Democrat, declared that the United States
should drop an A-bomb on the Kremlin. The Senator
said: "The one place to use the atomic bomb is at the
source of the Korean war. That source is the Soviet. I
think the Soviet has given us provocation. "53 The Very
Reverend J. Brooke Mosley, Dean of the Cathedral
Church of St. John in Wilmington, promptly sent to
Senator Frear a telegram of protest, reading: "This is
suggesting that we immediately destroy 100,000 civilian
men, women and children in an act of murderous aggres-
sion. I believe that such an amazing recommendation
should be labeled for what it plainly is: a morally irres-
ponsible, vicious and bloody suggestion, unworthy of
this country and certainly unworthy of Christian peo-
ple. "54
In March, 1952, The Washington Post broke the story
of the astounding passages in Major General Robert W.
Grow's diary, written while he was U. S. military attache
in Moscow and later presumably photocopied secretly by
Communist agents during the General's visit to Frank-
furt, Germany. The quotations were reproduced in a
book published in Eastern Germany by a former British
officer. Typical entries in General Grow's diary for
1951 were: January 27-- "The bridge here [at Rostov]
is best target in S. Russia. This, together with bridge over
Kuban R. at Kavkazskaya, would cut off all the Caucasus
except for poor line to Astrakhan which could easily be
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
cut"; February 5-- "We need a voice to lead us without
equivocation: Communism must be destroyed. . . . This
war cannot be conducted according to Marquis of Queens-
berry rules. . . . We must employ every subversive device
to undermine the confidence and loyalty of Soviet sub-
jects for their regime. . . . Anything, truth or falsehood,
to poison the thoughts of the population. "55
On April 28, 1952, the U. S. Army initiated court-
martial proceedings against General Grow "on charges
of having improperly recorded secret military informa-
tion in private records and of having failed to safeguard
such classified information. "56 In July an army court-
martial found Grow guilty of these charges and sentenced
him to "a reprimand and suspension from command
for six months. "57 The conviction was to be reviewed by
higher army authorities.
Morally on the same plane as American threats of war
or bombing against the U. S. S. R. have been the various
suggestions made in the United States to assassinate
Premier Joseph Stalin. The worst example I have seen
of this outright incitement to murder appeared in The
American Magazine of February, 1951, under the title
"Why Doesn't Somebody Kill Stalin? " The article was
featured on the cover. Its author was Ellsworth Ray-
mond, who served for six years as a political analyst and
translator for the American Embassy in Moscow and who
during World War II was stationed in Washington as
Chief of the U. S. S. R. Economic Section, Military Intel-
ligence, U. S. Army General Staff.
Mr. Raymond started his shameful article as follows:
"'Wouldn't it be a wonderful thing if somebody killed
Stalin? ' This is a question I've heard over and over since
the cold war turned hot. Many people today blame the
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? SOVIET CIVILlZATiOH
world's troubles on this one man, who has held Russia
in his iron grip for twenty-five years. They believe his
death would bring peace to mankind. "58 The author goes
on to show that unfortunately Stalin is very well protected
against assassins and outlines the many precautions the
Soviet leader has taken. In the middle of the piece there
is a picture of Premier Stalin with the reproduction of a
target and its concentric circles superimposed over his
face. The obvious intent is to suggest that someone
should shoot for the bull's-eye.
In August, 1951, the publishing house of Farrar,
Straus and Young brought out a new novel by Sterling
Noel called / Killed Stalin. The story is told in the first
person and the advertisements played up the quotation:
"The date was 1959 when the most dangerous manhunt
in the world was ended.
"59 This registers the fact that
the "hero" of the book finally tracked down Stalin and
shot him to death. Eton Books later published the novel
in a cheap, paper-bound edition. The back cover had a
representation of Stalin lying dead with a large blood-
stain on his tunic just over the heart. Again to reverse the
situation, imagine the reaction of Americans in every
walk of life if a leading Soviet magazine ran an article
called "Why Doesn't Somebody Kill Truman? " and a
Soviet publisher followed this up a few months later by
issuing a book with the title "I Killed Truman! "
We must not blink the fact that terrorism in foreign
lands is a method that now definitely figures in the minds
of American officials. In September, 1951, the American
Congress passed a Mutual Security Act, signed by Pres-
ident Truman, which sets aside the handsome total of
$100,000,000 to finance the activities of "selected persons
who are residing in or escapees" from Soviet Russia or
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
any country in the Communist bloc. An amendment
incorporated in the new law reads that this sum is to be
used "either to form such persons into elements of the
military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization or for other purposes. " It is the vague
clause "for other purposes" which carries the most sinis-
ter connotation.
In October, 1951, Congressman Charles J. Kersten,
Wisconsin Republican and sponsor of the amendment in
question, publicly protested that a new United Nations
code under consideration would conflict with the Amer-
ican legislation. He was referring to Section 5 of "Of-
fenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind," pre-
pared by the U. N. International Law Commission. This
section outlaws "the undertaking or encouragement by
the authorities of a state, of terrorist activities in another
state, or the toleration by the authorities of a state, of
organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts
in another state. "
In a letter to Warren R. Austin, chief United States
delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Kersten said that
the enactment of the proposed U. N. code "might prevent
groups in this country, as well as our Government, from
assisting in the liberation of the peoples of Eastern Eu-
ropean countries and other countries enslaved by the
Communist tyranny. " He added that "one of the main
objectives of a real liberation movement is to strike ter-
ror into the hearts of the Communist tyrants. . . . Libera-
tion will not be achieved merely by propaganda and par-
liamentary maneuver. "60 Mr. Austin replied to the frank
and undiplomatic Representative from Wisconsin that
"the attempt to restore a people's freedom does not seem
to merit the characterization of 'terrorist. ' "61
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
The Soviet Government, however, felt that Mr. Kers-
ten knew what his amendment was meant to accomplish
better than Mr. Austin; and in November, 1951, pro-
tested officially to the U. S. Government that the Mutual
Security Act violated the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements
made in 1933 at the time of American recognition of the
Soviet Union. The Soviet note charged that the Act
"constitutes crass intervention of the United States in
the internal affairs of other countries. At the same time
it represents unparalleled violation of the standards of
international law and is incompatible with the normal
relations between countries and respect for state sover-
eignty. The adoption of such a law cannot be regarded
as other than an aggressive act aimed at further compli-
cating relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union. . . . The law envisages financing persons and
armed groups in the territory of the Soviet Union and a
number of other states for carrying out subversive activ-
ity and sabotage within the above states. "62 We must
grant that the Soviet Government presents a very strong
case.
This matter of the Mutual Security Act ties in closely
with the general saber-rattling against Soviet Russia and
the whole hysterical atmosphere prevailing in America.
The United States Government has done little to dis-
courage this state of mind. President Truman could have
vetoed the Mutual Security Act; and from 1948 to 1952
he or his Cabinet officers could have administered some
effective rebuke to the American provocateurs of war.
Instead a high Government official, the Secretary of the
Navy, joined, as we have seen, in the hate-Russia, hit-
Russia chorus. In fact, it must be admitted that the war
incitements aid and abet the Truman-Acheson foreign
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
policy by conditioning the people of the United States to
the idea of American-Soviet hostilities and by creating a
psychology favorable to colossal armaments.
In this section I have included only the highlights in
provocative statements carried by the American press
calling for or describing war with or subjugation of the
Soviet Union. Because I listen to the radio so infrequent-
ly, I have undoubtedly missed many similar utterances
over the air which were not reproduced in the news-
papers. And in any case I do not pretend that my cover-
age of the press has been thorough. But the quotations
I have given, a number of them from officials or ex-offi-
cials of the U. S. Government or armed forces, are repre-
sentative of an influential group in the United States.
Although this group is a minority one at present, it is
conceivable that a swing in the political pendulum could
bring it into power.
Here we have one set of reasons why the Soviet leaders
and the Soviet people harbor some doubts as to America's
peaceful intentions. Nor is it only people in Soviet
Russia or other Communist lands who are apprehensive
about where the United States is heading. Mr. Frank
Owen, editor of the conservative London Daily Mail,
recently remarked that American war hysteria was "not
only terrific but terrifying. " And Professor Arnold Toyn-
bee, noted British historian, was so appalled by what he
learned that after returning from a visit to America in
1952, he coined for his countrymen the slogan, "No An-
nihilation without Representation. "
A leading Republican, Mr. John Cowles, President
of The Minneapolis Star and Tribune, summed up the
matter in Look in October, 1951, when he wrote: "Many
highly intelligent Europeans and Asians, individuals who
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
loathe Russian totalitarianism and believe completely in
the democratic ideal, fear that through ineptness the
United States is going to blunder into war with Russia,
or that we will become so provoked at Russia's exaspe-
rating conduct that we will ourselves precipitate war. "68
Actions are of course more important than words.
Yet in the tense situation that has developed since the
Second World War, widely publicized statements that
threaten the Soviets with armed violence, bombing, mili-
tary conquest and dismemberment can hardly be said to
help the cause of international amity. Such fulminations,
furthermore, can be interpreted as a conscious effort to
counteract the American people's traditional longing for
peace. Yet some of those who indulge in this bombastic
war talk evidently do not themselves realize fully the
serious implications of what they are saying. And their
attitude is typical of the immaturity which many keen
observers see as a widespread trait of American political
life.
While Soviet writers, speakers and government offi-
cials currently use harsh and vituperative language only
too often in reference to foreign countries, their public
pronouncements do not threaten war, aggression or any
incendiary act on the part of the Soviet armed forces.
There is to be found in the Soviet press not a single
statement by anyone concerning war that is comparable
to the shocking, clenched-fist abuse which pours forth
year after year from the United States. The fundamental
attitude of the Russians is well represented, I venture to
suggest, in the new legislation outlawing war propaganda
throughout the U. S. S. R. *
? Cf. p. 328.
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? CHAPTER IX CO-EXISTENCE OR CO-
DESTRUCTION?
1. The Madness of a Third World War
Those Americans who talk so blithely about knocking
out the Soviet Union in a quick atom-bomb war and who
draw up cocky blueprints for the conquest of the U. S. S. R.
know very little about either modern warfare or modern
communism. They are essentially political dreamers out
of touch with reality and the victims of their own foolish
propaganda. They are the sort who spread the silly story
that Hitler would have defeated the Soviet Government
in short order, except that his invading troops treated the
Russians so badly that they decided not to revolt against
Stalin after all. These wishful thinkers, preoccupied with
their fantasies of Soviet doom, choose to forget or ignore
the lessons of modern European history, the fate of Na-
poleon, the immensity of the Russian tableland, the cold-
ness of the Russian winter, the heroism of the Russian
people and, above all, everything that the Soviets accom-
plished in the Second World War.
In this year 1952, however, Soviet Russia is a good
deal more powerful than in 1941 when the Nazis attacked.
Seven additional years of peacetime planning have ad-
vanced it far beyond pre-war strength as regards both its
economic system and armaments. It possesses both the
atom bomb in various calibres and improved jet planes.
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? SOVIET CP/ILIZATIOH
Also there is not the slightest indication that the Soviet
people, whatever their dissatisfactions, are in a mood to
overthrow the Stalin regime or to greet a fresh wave of
invaders as saviors. Indeed, the Soviet Government, hav-
ing led the nation successfully through the Great Patriotic
War of 1941-45, as the Russians call it, and then to com-
plete recuperation during the post-war years, is more
firmly entrenched than ever before. It is very doubtful
indeed that a revolutionary movement can make head-
way in any country when, as in the U. S. S. R. , its people
have recently won a smashing military victory and are
enjoying full employment and a steady bettering of eco-
nomic conditions.
Furthermore, insofar as defense is concerned, a string
of buffer-state allies buttress the European borders of
Soviet Russia; while in Asia Communist China, with its
huge resources, a population of 460 million and a rapidly
developing economy, is allied to the U. S. S. R. in a mutual
security pact. A war with the Soviet Union clearly means
a conflict with the entire bloc of Communist-led countries
from Poland and Czechoslovakia in the West to China
and North Korea in the East. The military deadlock in
the Korean struggle has demonstrated that the Commun-
ist-trained troops of the Asiatic mainland are formidable
fighters.
The Library of Congress has estimated that the Sec-
ond World War cost mankind approximately $4,000,000,-
000,000-four trillion dollars- and 40,000,000 in human
casualties. The United States alone spent $351,000,000,-
000 initially, but the ultimate expense -- including inte-
rest, pensions, bonuses and so on -- will come to about
$1,400,000,000,000,000. We can be sure that a Third
World War, with atom and quite possibly hydrogen
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? CO-EXISTENCE OR CO-DESTRUCTIOW
bombs showering down upon the great industrial centers
of Europe, Asia and America, will be far more costly in
terms of property and human life. But the main question
I want to ask is this: When the fearful holocaust is over,
what will the net gain be for the United States or any
of the belligerents? In a war to the death between the
American-led bloc and the Communist-led bloc will not
both sides essentially be losers, no matter who "wins"?
In the New York Herald Tribune of June 18, 1951,
Mr. Walter Lippmann, the most intelligent columnist
of the conservative press in America, made some interest-
ing predictions about the over-all economic and political
consequences of a total war between the American and
the Communist coalitions. Mr. Lippmann is of the
opinion that the United States and its allies would ulti-
mately win the global conflict. But in the process "West-
ern Europe would sink into anarchy, and North America,
victorious but weary, impoverished and isolated, would
find it hard to preserve the remnants of its freedom and
harder still to bring back to life again the stricken civili-
zation of the Western World. "
This terrible war, Mr. Lippmann goes on to say,
"would be so devastating and prolonged that in all of the
Eurasian continent there would be left no governments of
sufficient power and authority to restore order and recon-
struct the ruined world. " The final outcome would be
"a vast and formless disorder . . . for in a total war we
would have to destroy many of the great cities, and part-
icularly the great centers of administration and communi-
cation, in order to achieve victory. " Accordingly, Mr.
Lippmann prophesies, there would be a breakdown of
national states throughout Eurasia, with local dictator-
ships and terrorist gangs taking their place.
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
Mr. Lippmann's analysis makes clear that even an
American military triumph in the Great Atomic War
would result disastrously for both America and the world
at large. It would be a Pyrrhic victory of immeasurable
proportions. Instead of preserving and extending demo-
cracy, such a duel with communism would probably
bring about dictatorships throughout Europe and Asia,
and quite possibly in the United States as well. Instead of
bolstering capitalism, it would finish it abroad and very
much weaken it in America. However, and this Mr.
Lippmann does not state, it would create on a widespread
scale such catastrophic conditions of poverty, starvation,
economic collapse and political chaos that Communist
and socialist movements would have a unique opportun-
ity for triumphant resurgence.
Those who think they can contain communism
through military power overlook the revolutionary pos-
sibilities, if not probabilities, of international conflict.
As Dorothy Thompson explains: "Revolutions, to be
sure, carry on wars; but wars create the revolutions. For
war is, itself, a revolution, embodying the very spirit of
violence in its most complete expression, infecting the
human spirit, accustoming men to hideous cruelties, dis-
locating stable economies, and intensifying all the griev-
ances and injustices which are present in every society,
by adding to them the supreme injustice -- injustice
against the very order of nature. For in the order of na-
ture, the sons of men bury their parents; but in the order
of war, the parents bury their sons. Both ancient and
modern revolutions illustrate this inter-relationship be-
tween war and revolution. "1
Miss Thompson goes on to state that the French,
Russian and Chinese Revolutions all followed on the
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tegists are thinking . . . in terms of closing the circle of
air bases around Russia, making it smaller and smaller,
tighter and tighter, until the Russians are throttled. This
means getting bases through combined air, sea and
ground operations ever closer to Russia's heartland,
then using the bases for sustained bombing and guided-
missile attacks. "44
On June 9, 1948, the Soviet Government vigorously
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
protested to the American Government against the
Newsweek article, stating that it violated a United
Nations resolution against war propaganda. This resolu-
tion in part reads: "The General Assembly condemns
all forms of propaganda in whatever country conducted,
which is either designed or likely to provoke or encour-
age any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression. "45 The American Government took no action
regarding the Soviet protest.
In its issue of Sunday, May 30, 1948, The New York
Times Magazine published "What Air Power Can--and
Cannot--Do," by Hanson W. Baldwin, well-known mili-
tary expert of the Times. Mr. Baldwin discussed frankly
some of the chief difficulties in the way of successfully
bombing Soviet Russia from the air and thought that
ordinary strafing in the daytime would be too dangerous
for American planes. "Night bombing," he frankly as-
serted, "or bombing from high above the clouds would,
therefore, be preferable. " Yet, complained Mr. Baldwin,
"and this is perhaps the greatest disadvantage the offense
would suffer in bombing attacks upon Russia, we have
no really satisfactory maps of most of the Russian in-
terior. " It was this article to which Andrei Vishinsky,
then a Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union,
called attention in an address before the United Nations
Assembly at Paris on September 25 as an instance of the
open instigation "of war against the U. S. S. R. and the new
democracies. "
Not to be outdone, Look magazine, on June 22, the
precise anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia,
ran as its lead article, "Air Force Plans for Bombing
Russia," as the title was announced on the front cover.
The author, Ben Kocivar, declared that he had "recently
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? SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
talked about the problem with a number of top Air
Force and Navy officials," one of whom at least favored
a so-called preventive war against the Soviet Union. The
Look analysis pointed out that "the only long-range
planes we have in operation ready to go are our World
War II B-29's with an operating radius of some 2,000
miles. 'Draw a couple of thousand-mile circles around
the industrial heart of Russia,' a general told me [Mr.
Kocivar], 'and you will see why we must have operating
bases outside this country. ' The two-thousand-mile ring,
as the map shows, borders Greenland, Iceland, England,
France, Italy, Greece, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and India.
We need these bases not only for offensive operations,
but to prevent the Russians from using them against
us. "46
In August, Henry Luce's Life, taking up the refrain,
printed a detailed description by General Carl Spaatz,
retired Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force, on how the
United States could bomb the Soviet Union into sub-
mission. General Spaatz said that "air bases have the
same significance that naval bases had in the last century"
and that, comparable to the British Empire in its heyday,
America must at once secure a global framework of bases
for the development of air power. "Space is no longer
an effective shield," asserted the General. "Now an
attacker would not have to plod laboriously and bloodily
along the Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow road to strike at the
Russian vitals. The air offers a direct, operationally feas-
ible route for a determined attacker to knock out the
industries that it has cost the Russians so much to cre-
ate. "47
In September The Saturday Evening Post, determined
to keep up with its rivals, made its own blood-curdling
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
contribution to the master plan of smashing the U. S. S. R.
In an article entitled "If War Comes--", Joseph and Ste-
wart Alsop, using the well-worn pretext of a Soviet attack
on America, predicted: "From Baku north to Leningrad,
from Smolensk east to Novosibirsk, the vitals of the Soviet
state will be scorched and destroyed with the terrible fire
of the atomic bomb. "48 Then the authors listed the many
places where the United States must have air bases, be-
yond its own borders, in Europe, the Near East and the
Far East.
For 1949 I find in my files a clipping from The New
York World-Telegram of March 14, with the dateline of
Washington, D. C, and reading as follows: "About
seventy strategic targets in Russia have been marked by
military planners as possible objectives for attack in event
of a war, it was learned today. The Air Force has given
the Joint Chiefs of Staff documented assurances that the
B-36 superbomber could strike every one of these, flying
out of bases on this continent and returning without re-
fueling. The targets have been marked off on top-secret
maps at the national defense establishment. Reliable
military authorities said they include major Soviet in-
dustrial centers. All would be within a 4,000-mile radius
of air bases in Alaska and Labrador. "
In August, 1950, Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of
the Navy, told an audience in Boston that the United
States should be willing to pay "even the price of insti-
tuting a war to compel cooperation for peace. " This
recommendation of a preventive war against the Soviet
Union caused such a scandal in official circles that the
next day the U. S. State Department issued a special state-
ment: "Secretary Matthews' speech was not cleared with
the Department of State and his views do not represent
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
United States policy. The United States does not favor
instituting a war of any kind. "49 Mr. Matthews, however,
remained as Secretary of the Navy for eleven months
after this episode.
In March, 1951, Lieutenant General Norstad, Com-
mander of the United States Air Forces in Europe, de-
clared at Frankfurt, Germany: "There is no target in the
Soviet Union that cannot be attacked by United States
bombers. "50 In April Charles E. Wilson, Director of
Defense Mobilization, said at Washington that if Stalin
"could see the new bombs, which are far more devastat-
ing than anything we knew in the last war, he'd realize
that these new bombs will make fine 'calling cards' from
the United States for Russia! " Mr. Wilson added the
disclaimer: "I hope we never use these bombs -- that we
never have to -- but it is comforting to know that they
will be on hand if needed. "51
In May Look, one of the most persistent offenders in
outlining sensational attacks on the Soviet Union,
published an article called, "Can Our A-Bombers Get
Through? ", with a map showing the chief centers to be
bombed in the U. S. S. R. and their exact distance from
American air bases. Reported Look: "We have ringed
Russia with a multitude of airfields, scores of them.
Even if by some military miracle all these bases in Ger-
many, England, Spain and North Africa should be denied
to us, the U. S. Air Force still could deliver the A-bomb
on Russia from air bases in the continental United States.
. . . Ten planes, B-50s and B-36s, would cross the frontiers
of Russia at approximately the same time from ten dif-
ferent directions. Each would be carrying an atomic
bomb, and each would have a target or choice of targets.
From the Air Force point of view it would be ideal if
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
the weather were extremely murky. . . . Attacking planes
would be scheduled over targets at night. They would
bomb by radar sighting, which is reasonably accurate. "52
There can be no doubt about it--Look has the plans
worked out in meticulous detail.
In November, 1951, Senator J. Allen Frear, Jr. , a
Delaware Democrat, declared that the United States
should drop an A-bomb on the Kremlin. The Senator
said: "The one place to use the atomic bomb is at the
source of the Korean war. That source is the Soviet. I
think the Soviet has given us provocation. "53 The Very
Reverend J. Brooke Mosley, Dean of the Cathedral
Church of St. John in Wilmington, promptly sent to
Senator Frear a telegram of protest, reading: "This is
suggesting that we immediately destroy 100,000 civilian
men, women and children in an act of murderous aggres-
sion. I believe that such an amazing recommendation
should be labeled for what it plainly is: a morally irres-
ponsible, vicious and bloody suggestion, unworthy of
this country and certainly unworthy of Christian peo-
ple. "54
In March, 1952, The Washington Post broke the story
of the astounding passages in Major General Robert W.
Grow's diary, written while he was U. S. military attache
in Moscow and later presumably photocopied secretly by
Communist agents during the General's visit to Frank-
furt, Germany. The quotations were reproduced in a
book published in Eastern Germany by a former British
officer. Typical entries in General Grow's diary for
1951 were: January 27-- "The bridge here [at Rostov]
is best target in S. Russia. This, together with bridge over
Kuban R. at Kavkazskaya, would cut off all the Caucasus
except for poor line to Astrakhan which could easily be
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
cut"; February 5-- "We need a voice to lead us without
equivocation: Communism must be destroyed. . . . This
war cannot be conducted according to Marquis of Queens-
berry rules. . . . We must employ every subversive device
to undermine the confidence and loyalty of Soviet sub-
jects for their regime. . . . Anything, truth or falsehood,
to poison the thoughts of the population. "55
On April 28, 1952, the U. S. Army initiated court-
martial proceedings against General Grow "on charges
of having improperly recorded secret military informa-
tion in private records and of having failed to safeguard
such classified information. "56 In July an army court-
martial found Grow guilty of these charges and sentenced
him to "a reprimand and suspension from command
for six months. "57 The conviction was to be reviewed by
higher army authorities.
Morally on the same plane as American threats of war
or bombing against the U. S. S. R. have been the various
suggestions made in the United States to assassinate
Premier Joseph Stalin. The worst example I have seen
of this outright incitement to murder appeared in The
American Magazine of February, 1951, under the title
"Why Doesn't Somebody Kill Stalin? " The article was
featured on the cover. Its author was Ellsworth Ray-
mond, who served for six years as a political analyst and
translator for the American Embassy in Moscow and who
during World War II was stationed in Washington as
Chief of the U. S. S. R. Economic Section, Military Intel-
ligence, U. S. Army General Staff.
Mr. Raymond started his shameful article as follows:
"'Wouldn't it be a wonderful thing if somebody killed
Stalin? ' This is a question I've heard over and over since
the cold war turned hot. Many people today blame the
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? SOVIET CIVILlZATiOH
world's troubles on this one man, who has held Russia
in his iron grip for twenty-five years. They believe his
death would bring peace to mankind. "58 The author goes
on to show that unfortunately Stalin is very well protected
against assassins and outlines the many precautions the
Soviet leader has taken. In the middle of the piece there
is a picture of Premier Stalin with the reproduction of a
target and its concentric circles superimposed over his
face. The obvious intent is to suggest that someone
should shoot for the bull's-eye.
In August, 1951, the publishing house of Farrar,
Straus and Young brought out a new novel by Sterling
Noel called / Killed Stalin. The story is told in the first
person and the advertisements played up the quotation:
"The date was 1959 when the most dangerous manhunt
in the world was ended.
"59 This registers the fact that
the "hero" of the book finally tracked down Stalin and
shot him to death. Eton Books later published the novel
in a cheap, paper-bound edition. The back cover had a
representation of Stalin lying dead with a large blood-
stain on his tunic just over the heart. Again to reverse the
situation, imagine the reaction of Americans in every
walk of life if a leading Soviet magazine ran an article
called "Why Doesn't Somebody Kill Truman? " and a
Soviet publisher followed this up a few months later by
issuing a book with the title "I Killed Truman! "
We must not blink the fact that terrorism in foreign
lands is a method that now definitely figures in the minds
of American officials. In September, 1951, the American
Congress passed a Mutual Security Act, signed by Pres-
ident Truman, which sets aside the handsome total of
$100,000,000 to finance the activities of "selected persons
who are residing in or escapees" from Soviet Russia or
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
any country in the Communist bloc. An amendment
incorporated in the new law reads that this sum is to be
used "either to form such persons into elements of the
military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization or for other purposes. " It is the vague
clause "for other purposes" which carries the most sinis-
ter connotation.
In October, 1951, Congressman Charles J. Kersten,
Wisconsin Republican and sponsor of the amendment in
question, publicly protested that a new United Nations
code under consideration would conflict with the Amer-
ican legislation. He was referring to Section 5 of "Of-
fenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind," pre-
pared by the U. N. International Law Commission. This
section outlaws "the undertaking or encouragement by
the authorities of a state, of terrorist activities in another
state, or the toleration by the authorities of a state, of
organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts
in another state. "
In a letter to Warren R. Austin, chief United States
delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Kersten said that
the enactment of the proposed U. N. code "might prevent
groups in this country, as well as our Government, from
assisting in the liberation of the peoples of Eastern Eu-
ropean countries and other countries enslaved by the
Communist tyranny. " He added that "one of the main
objectives of a real liberation movement is to strike ter-
ror into the hearts of the Communist tyrants. . . . Libera-
tion will not be achieved merely by propaganda and par-
liamentary maneuver. "60 Mr. Austin replied to the frank
and undiplomatic Representative from Wisconsin that
"the attempt to restore a people's freedom does not seem
to merit the characterization of 'terrorist. ' "61
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATIOH
The Soviet Government, however, felt that Mr. Kers-
ten knew what his amendment was meant to accomplish
better than Mr. Austin; and in November, 1951, pro-
tested officially to the U. S. Government that the Mutual
Security Act violated the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements
made in 1933 at the time of American recognition of the
Soviet Union. The Soviet note charged that the Act
"constitutes crass intervention of the United States in
the internal affairs of other countries. At the same time
it represents unparalleled violation of the standards of
international law and is incompatible with the normal
relations between countries and respect for state sover-
eignty. The adoption of such a law cannot be regarded
as other than an aggressive act aimed at further compli-
cating relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union. . . . The law envisages financing persons and
armed groups in the territory of the Soviet Union and a
number of other states for carrying out subversive activ-
ity and sabotage within the above states. "62 We must
grant that the Soviet Government presents a very strong
case.
This matter of the Mutual Security Act ties in closely
with the general saber-rattling against Soviet Russia and
the whole hysterical atmosphere prevailing in America.
The United States Government has done little to dis-
courage this state of mind. President Truman could have
vetoed the Mutual Security Act; and from 1948 to 1952
he or his Cabinet officers could have administered some
effective rebuke to the American provocateurs of war.
Instead a high Government official, the Secretary of the
Navy, joined, as we have seen, in the hate-Russia, hit-
Russia chorus. In fact, it must be admitted that the war
incitements aid and abet the Truman-Acheson foreign
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? SOVIET FOREIGH POLICY
policy by conditioning the people of the United States to
the idea of American-Soviet hostilities and by creating a
psychology favorable to colossal armaments.
In this section I have included only the highlights in
provocative statements carried by the American press
calling for or describing war with or subjugation of the
Soviet Union. Because I listen to the radio so infrequent-
ly, I have undoubtedly missed many similar utterances
over the air which were not reproduced in the news-
papers. And in any case I do not pretend that my cover-
age of the press has been thorough. But the quotations
I have given, a number of them from officials or ex-offi-
cials of the U. S. Government or armed forces, are repre-
sentative of an influential group in the United States.
Although this group is a minority one at present, it is
conceivable that a swing in the political pendulum could
bring it into power.
Here we have one set of reasons why the Soviet leaders
and the Soviet people harbor some doubts as to America's
peaceful intentions. Nor is it only people in Soviet
Russia or other Communist lands who are apprehensive
about where the United States is heading. Mr. Frank
Owen, editor of the conservative London Daily Mail,
recently remarked that American war hysteria was "not
only terrific but terrifying. " And Professor Arnold Toyn-
bee, noted British historian, was so appalled by what he
learned that after returning from a visit to America in
1952, he coined for his countrymen the slogan, "No An-
nihilation without Representation. "
A leading Republican, Mr. John Cowles, President
of The Minneapolis Star and Tribune, summed up the
matter in Look in October, 1951, when he wrote: "Many
highly intelligent Europeans and Asians, individuals who
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
loathe Russian totalitarianism and believe completely in
the democratic ideal, fear that through ineptness the
United States is going to blunder into war with Russia,
or that we will become so provoked at Russia's exaspe-
rating conduct that we will ourselves precipitate war. "68
Actions are of course more important than words.
Yet in the tense situation that has developed since the
Second World War, widely publicized statements that
threaten the Soviets with armed violence, bombing, mili-
tary conquest and dismemberment can hardly be said to
help the cause of international amity. Such fulminations,
furthermore, can be interpreted as a conscious effort to
counteract the American people's traditional longing for
peace. Yet some of those who indulge in this bombastic
war talk evidently do not themselves realize fully the
serious implications of what they are saying. And their
attitude is typical of the immaturity which many keen
observers see as a widespread trait of American political
life.
While Soviet writers, speakers and government offi-
cials currently use harsh and vituperative language only
too often in reference to foreign countries, their public
pronouncements do not threaten war, aggression or any
incendiary act on the part of the Soviet armed forces.
There is to be found in the Soviet press not a single
statement by anyone concerning war that is comparable
to the shocking, clenched-fist abuse which pours forth
year after year from the United States. The fundamental
attitude of the Russians is well represented, I venture to
suggest, in the new legislation outlawing war propaganda
throughout the U. S. S. R. *
? Cf. p. 328.
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? CHAPTER IX CO-EXISTENCE OR CO-
DESTRUCTION?
1. The Madness of a Third World War
Those Americans who talk so blithely about knocking
out the Soviet Union in a quick atom-bomb war and who
draw up cocky blueprints for the conquest of the U. S. S. R.
know very little about either modern warfare or modern
communism. They are essentially political dreamers out
of touch with reality and the victims of their own foolish
propaganda. They are the sort who spread the silly story
that Hitler would have defeated the Soviet Government
in short order, except that his invading troops treated the
Russians so badly that they decided not to revolt against
Stalin after all. These wishful thinkers, preoccupied with
their fantasies of Soviet doom, choose to forget or ignore
the lessons of modern European history, the fate of Na-
poleon, the immensity of the Russian tableland, the cold-
ness of the Russian winter, the heroism of the Russian
people and, above all, everything that the Soviets accom-
plished in the Second World War.
In this year 1952, however, Soviet Russia is a good
deal more powerful than in 1941 when the Nazis attacked.
Seven additional years of peacetime planning have ad-
vanced it far beyond pre-war strength as regards both its
economic system and armaments. It possesses both the
atom bomb in various calibres and improved jet planes.
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? SOVIET CP/ILIZATIOH
Also there is not the slightest indication that the Soviet
people, whatever their dissatisfactions, are in a mood to
overthrow the Stalin regime or to greet a fresh wave of
invaders as saviors. Indeed, the Soviet Government, hav-
ing led the nation successfully through the Great Patriotic
War of 1941-45, as the Russians call it, and then to com-
plete recuperation during the post-war years, is more
firmly entrenched than ever before. It is very doubtful
indeed that a revolutionary movement can make head-
way in any country when, as in the U. S. S. R. , its people
have recently won a smashing military victory and are
enjoying full employment and a steady bettering of eco-
nomic conditions.
Furthermore, insofar as defense is concerned, a string
of buffer-state allies buttress the European borders of
Soviet Russia; while in Asia Communist China, with its
huge resources, a population of 460 million and a rapidly
developing economy, is allied to the U. S. S. R. in a mutual
security pact. A war with the Soviet Union clearly means
a conflict with the entire bloc of Communist-led countries
from Poland and Czechoslovakia in the West to China
and North Korea in the East. The military deadlock in
the Korean struggle has demonstrated that the Commun-
ist-trained troops of the Asiatic mainland are formidable
fighters.
The Library of Congress has estimated that the Sec-
ond World War cost mankind approximately $4,000,000,-
000,000-four trillion dollars- and 40,000,000 in human
casualties. The United States alone spent $351,000,000,-
000 initially, but the ultimate expense -- including inte-
rest, pensions, bonuses and so on -- will come to about
$1,400,000,000,000,000. We can be sure that a Third
World War, with atom and quite possibly hydrogen
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? CO-EXISTENCE OR CO-DESTRUCTIOW
bombs showering down upon the great industrial centers
of Europe, Asia and America, will be far more costly in
terms of property and human life. But the main question
I want to ask is this: When the fearful holocaust is over,
what will the net gain be for the United States or any
of the belligerents? In a war to the death between the
American-led bloc and the Communist-led bloc will not
both sides essentially be losers, no matter who "wins"?
In the New York Herald Tribune of June 18, 1951,
Mr. Walter Lippmann, the most intelligent columnist
of the conservative press in America, made some interest-
ing predictions about the over-all economic and political
consequences of a total war between the American and
the Communist coalitions. Mr. Lippmann is of the
opinion that the United States and its allies would ulti-
mately win the global conflict. But in the process "West-
ern Europe would sink into anarchy, and North America,
victorious but weary, impoverished and isolated, would
find it hard to preserve the remnants of its freedom and
harder still to bring back to life again the stricken civili-
zation of the Western World. "
This terrible war, Mr. Lippmann goes on to say,
"would be so devastating and prolonged that in all of the
Eurasian continent there would be left no governments of
sufficient power and authority to restore order and recon-
struct the ruined world. " The final outcome would be
"a vast and formless disorder . . . for in a total war we
would have to destroy many of the great cities, and part-
icularly the great centers of administration and communi-
cation, in order to achieve victory. " Accordingly, Mr.
Lippmann prophesies, there would be a breakdown of
national states throughout Eurasia, with local dictator-
ships and terrorist gangs taking their place.
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? SOVIET CIVILIZATION
Mr. Lippmann's analysis makes clear that even an
American military triumph in the Great Atomic War
would result disastrously for both America and the world
at large. It would be a Pyrrhic victory of immeasurable
proportions. Instead of preserving and extending demo-
cracy, such a duel with communism would probably
bring about dictatorships throughout Europe and Asia,
and quite possibly in the United States as well. Instead of
bolstering capitalism, it would finish it abroad and very
much weaken it in America. However, and this Mr.
Lippmann does not state, it would create on a widespread
scale such catastrophic conditions of poverty, starvation,
economic collapse and political chaos that Communist
and socialist movements would have a unique opportun-
ity for triumphant resurgence.
Those who think they can contain communism
through military power overlook the revolutionary pos-
sibilities, if not probabilities, of international conflict.
As Dorothy Thompson explains: "Revolutions, to be
sure, carry on wars; but wars create the revolutions. For
war is, itself, a revolution, embodying the very spirit of
violence in its most complete expression, infecting the
human spirit, accustoming men to hideous cruelties, dis-
locating stable economies, and intensifying all the griev-
ances and injustices which are present in every society,
by adding to them the supreme injustice -- injustice
against the very order of nature. For in the order of na-
ture, the sons of men bury their parents; but in the order
of war, the parents bury their sons. Both ancient and
modern revolutions illustrate this inter-relationship be-
tween war and revolution. "1
Miss Thompson goes on to state that the French,
Russian and Chinese Revolutions all followed on the
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