Hamilton replied; indicated more clearly the fallacy of
the arguments which had been used; pointed out the true
construction of the language of the constitution; warned
the house of the folly and danger of this distrust of the
powers of congress, and ridiculed the attempt to draw an
analogy between its powers and those of a monarchy.
the arguments which had been used; pointed out the true
construction of the language of the constitution; warned
the house of the folly and danger of this distrust of the
powers of congress, and ridiculed the attempt to draw an
analogy between its powers and those of a monarchy.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v2
It fell to my lot
to be a member of that committee; my object still was to
avoid the interference of this house in a matter about which
there was a difference of opinion between the United
States and the governor of this state on constitutional
ground. The best way to effect this, was to frame the
answer in the most general terms. This was done; not a
word is said even about the revenue system, which occa-
sioned the request of congress to convene the legislature.
The answer is generally, that the house will take into con-
sideration the different acts of congress, and make such
provisions as appear to them compatible with the abilities
and constitution of the state. By not touching at all on
the topic connected with the origin of the controversy, I
thought we might safely be silent without any implication
of censure on the governor. It was neither my wish to
condemn nor to approve. I was only desirous of avoiding
an interference in a constitutional question, which belong-
ed entirely to the province of the executive authority of
the state, and about which I knew there would be a differ-
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? 398
THE LIFE OF
ence of opinion, even in this house. I submit it to the
house, whether this was not a prudent course, and whether
it is not to be lamented that the proposed amendment
forces the discussion upon us. Constitutional questions
are always delicate; they should never be touched but
from necessity.
"But though I shall be readily acquitted of having had
any agency in bringing the house into this disagreeable
situation, since the question is brought forward, I shall
with freedom meet the discussion. This my duty demands
from me; and whoever may be affected by it, I shall pro-
ceed under an impression that my constituents expect from
me the free exercise of my judgment, and the free decla-
ration of my sentiments on the matters deliberated upon in
this house.
"The question by the honourable member on my right,
has been wrongly stated. He says it is this--whether a re-
quest of congress to convene the legislature is conclusive
upon the governor of the state, or whether a bare intima-
tion of that honourable body lays him under a constitu-
tional necessity of convening the legislature? But this is
not the true question. From the shape in which the busi-
ness comes before us, the inquiry truly is--whether a sol-
emn application of the United States to the executive of
this state to convene the legislature for the purpose of de-
liberating on a matter which is considered by that body as
of essential importance to the nation, and which has been
viewed in a similar light by most of the other states indi-
vidually, is such an extraordinary occasion as left the gov-
ernor under no constitutional impediment to a compliance?
and it may be added, whether that , application, under all
the circumstances, was an attempt to invade the freedom
of deliberation in this house 1
"Here let me ask, what does the constitution say upon
the subject? Simply this--that the governor 'shall have
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? HAMILTON. 399
power to convene the assembly and senate on extraordi-
nary occasions. '
"But what is an extraordinary occasion? what circum-
stances are to concur, what ingredients combine, to con-
stitute one? What general rule can be imagined by which
to define the precise meaning of these vague terms, and
draw the fine between an ordinary and an extraordinary
occasion? Will the gentleman on my right furnish us with
such a criterion? Profoundly skilled as he is in law, (at
least in the local laws of this state,) I fancy it will be diffi-
cult for him to invent one that will suit his present pur-
pose. Let him consult his law books: they will not relieve
his embarrassment. It is easy to see the clause allows the
greatest latitude to opinion. What one may think a very
extraordinary occasion, another may think a very ordinary
one, according to his bias, his interest, or his intellect. If
there is any rule at all, it is this--the governor shall not call
the legislature with a view to the ordinary details of the
state administration. Whatever does not fall within this
description, and has any pretensions to national importance
in any view, leaves him at liberty to exercise the discre-
tion vested in him by the constitution. There is, at least,
no constitutional bar in the way.
"The United States are intrusted with the management
of the general concerns and interests of the community--
they have the power of war and peace, they have the
power of treaty.
"Our affairs with respect to foreign nations are left to
their direction. We must entertain very diminutive ideas
of the government of the union, to conceive that their
earnest call on a subject which they deem of great national
magnitude, which affects their engagements with two re-
spectable foreign powers, France and the United Nether-
lands, which relates to the preservation of their faith at
home and abroad, is not such an occasion as would justify
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? 400
THE LIFE OF
the executive, upon the terms of the constitution, in con-
vening the legislature. If this doctrine is maintained,
where will it lead to--what kind of emergency must exist
before the constitution will authorize the governor to call
the legislature? Is the preservation of our national faith
a matter of such trivial moment? Is the fulfilment of the
public engagements domestic and foreign of no conse-
quence 1 Must we wait for the fleets of the United Neth-
erlands or of France to enforce the observance of them,
before the executive will be at liberty to give the legisla-
ture an opportunity of deliberating on the means of their
just demands? This is straining the indefinite words of
the constitution to a most unreasonable extreme. It would
be a tenable position to say that the call of the United
States is alone sufficient to satisfy the idea of an extraor-
dinary occasion. It is easy to conceive, that such a pos-
ture of European affairs might exist, as would render it
necessary to convene the different legislatures to adopt
measures for the public safety, and at the same time inex-
pedient to disclose the object till they were assembled.
Will we say that congress would be bound to communi-
cate the object of their call to the executive of every state 1
or that the executive of this state, in complying with their
request, would be guilty of a violation of the constitution?
But the present case is not that of a mere general request;
it is specifically to deliberate upon an object of acknow-
ledged importance in one view or another. On one hand
it is alleged to be a measure essential to the honour, inter-
est, and perhaps the existence of the union; on the other,
it is said to be on principles subversive of the constitution
and dangerous to the liberty of the subject. It is, there-
fore, a matter of delicacy and moment, and the earnest
call of the union to have it considered cannot fall within
the notion of so common, so ordinary an occasion, as
would prohibit the executive from summoning a meeting
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? HAMILTON. 401
of the legislature. The only argument urged to denomi-
nate it such, is that it had been recently decided on by the
legislature. But there is an evident fallacy in this position;
the call was addressed to a new and different body, totally
different in the contemplation of the constitution, and ma-
terially different in fact with respect to the members who
compose it. A large proportion of the members of the
present house were not members of the last. For aught
that either congress or the governor could officially know,
there might have been a total change in the individuals,
and, therefore, a total difference in the sentiments. No
inference, of course, could be fairly drawn from the con-
duct of the last legislature to that of the present. Indeed,
however it might be wished to prepossess the minds of the
members of the former house with a contrary idea, it is
plain that there is no necessary connection between what
they did at that time, and what it may be proper for them
to do now. The act of the last session proves the con-
viction of the house then, that the grant of the impost was
an eligible measure. Many of the members were led to
suppose that it would answer the purpose, and might have
been accepted by congress. If the experiment has shown
that they were mistaken in their expectations, and if it
should appear to them that congress could not for good
reasons accept it, the same motives which induce them to
the grant already made, would determine them to consent
to such alterations as would accommodate it to the views
of congress and the other states, and make it practicable
to carry the system into execution.
"It may be observed, that as congress accompanied
their request with an explanation of the object, they by
that mode of proceeding submitted the whole matter to
the discretion of the governor, to act according to the esti-
mate formed in his own mind of its importance. It is not
denied the governor had a discretion upon the occasion.
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? 402 THE LIFE OP
It is not contended, that he was under a constitutional ne-
cessity to convene the legislature. The resolution of con-
gress itself does not imply or intimate this. They do not
pretend to require, they only earnestly recommend. The
governor might at his peril refuse; responsible, however,
for any ill consequences that might have attended his re-
fusal. But what is contended for is, that the call of the
United States, under all circumstances, was sufficient to
satisfy the terms of the constitution empowering him to
convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions, and
left him at full liberty to comply.
"The admission of his discretion does not admit that it
was properly exercised, nor does it admit that the footing
upon which he placed his refusal was proper. It does not
admit that the constitution interposed an obstacle in his
way, or that the request of congress implied any thing hos-
tile to the right of free deliberation.
"This is the aspect under which the business presents
itself to our consideration, as well from the correspond-
ence between congress and the governor, as from the
manner in which it is ushered to us in the speech. A
general approbation of his conduct, is an approbation of
the principle by which it is professed to have been actuated.
"Are we ready to say that the constitution would have
been violated by a compliance? Are we ready to say that
the call upon us to deliberate is an attempt to infringe the
freedom of deliberation? If we are not ready to say both,
we must reject the amendment. In particular, I think it
must strike us all that there is something singularly forced
in intimating, that an application of congress to the gov-
ernor of the state to convene a new legislature to consider
a very important national subject, has any thing in it dan-
gerous to the freedom of our deliberations. I natter my-
self we should all have felt ourselves as much at liberty to
have pursued our sentiments, if we had met upon an ex-
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? HAMILTON.
403
traordinary call, as we now do when met according to our
own appointment.
"There yet remains an important light in which the
subject merits consideration; I mean as it respects the
executive authority of the state itself. By deciding that
the application of congress, upon which the debate turns,
was not such an extraordinary occasion as left the gov-
ernor at liberty to call the legislature, we may form a pre-
cedent of a very dangerous tendency; we may put a sense
on the constitution very different from the true meaning
of it, and may fetter the present or a future executive
with very inconvenient restraints. A few more such pre-
cedents may tie up the hands of a governor in such a man-
ner as would either oblige him to act at an extreme peril,
or to omit acting when public exigencies required it. The
mere sense of one governor would be no precedent for his
successor; but that sense approved by both houses of the
legislature, would become a rule of conduct. Suppose a
few more precedents of the kind on different combinations
of circumstances equally strong, and let us ask ourselves
what would be the situation of a governor whenever he
came to deliberate on the propriety of exercising the dis-
cretion in this respect vested in him by the constitution?
Would he not be apt to act with a degree of caution, or
rather timidity, which in certain emergencies might be
productive of very pernicious consequences? A mere in-
timation of the constitution to him not to call the legisla-
ture in their recess upon every trifling affair, which is its
true import, would be turned into an injunction not to do
so but upon occasions of the last necessity.
"We see, therefore, that the question upon which we
are pressed to decide, is not less delicate, as it respects the
constitution of the state itself, than as it respects the union;
and that in every possible view it is most prudent to avoid
the determination. Let the conduct of the governor stand
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? 404
THE LIFE OF
on its own merits. If he was right, our approbation will
not make him more right. If he was wrong, it would be
improper to give sanction to his error.
"Several things have been said in the debate which
have no connection with it; but to prevent their making
improper impressions, it may not be amiss to take some no-
tice of them. The danger of a power in congress to com-
pel the convening of the legislature at their pleasure has
been strongly insisted upon. It has been urged, if they
possessed it they might make it an engine to fatigue the
legislature into a compliance with their measures. In-
stances of an abuse of the like power in the crown, under
the former government, have been cited.
"It is a sufficient answer to all this to say, that no such
power is contended for. I do not assert that their request
obliged the governor to convene the legislature; I only
maintain that their request on an important national sub-
ject, was such an occasion as left him at liberty to do it
without any colour for imputing to him a breach of the
constitution; and that from motives of respect to the union,
and to avoid any further degradation of its authority,
already at too low an ebb, he ought to have complied.
"Admitting in the fullest extent that it would be danger-
ous to allow to congress the power of requiring the legis-
lature to be convened at pleasure, yet no injury or incon-
venience can result from supposing the call of the United
States, on a matter by them deemed of importance, to be
an occasion sufficiently extraordinary to authorize, not to
oblige the governor to comply with it.
"I cannot forbear remarking, that it is a common artifice
to insinuate a resemblance between the king under the
former government and congress; though no two things
can be more unlike each other. Nothing can be more dis-
similar than a monarch, permanent, hereditary, the source
of honour and emolument, and a republican body com-
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? HAMILTON.
405
posed of a number of individuals appointed annually, liable
to be recalled within the year, and subject to a continual
rotation; which, with few exceptions, is the fountain
neither of honour nor emolument. If we will exercise
our judgments, we shall readily see no such resemblance
exists, and that all inferences deduced from the comparison
must be false.
"Upon every occasion, however foreign such observa-
tions may be, we hear a loud cry raised about the danger
of intrusting power to congress; we are told it is danger-
ous to trust power any where; that power is liable to
abuse, with a variety of trite maxims of the same kind.
General propositions of this nature are easily framed, the
truth of which cannot be denied, but they rarely convey
any precise idea. To these we might oppose other propo-
sitions equally true, and equally indefinite. It might be
said that too little power is as dangerous as too much; that
it leads to anarchy, and from anarchy to despotism. But
the question still recurs, what is too much or too little 1
Where is the measure or<< standard to ascertain the happy
mean?
"Powers must be granted, or civil society cannot exist:
the possibility of abuse is no argument against the thing;
this possibility is incident to every species of power, how-
ever placed or modified. The United States, for instance,
have the power of war and peace. It cannot be disputed
that conjunctures might occur, in which^hat power might
be turned against the rights of the citizens; but where can
we better place it--in short, where else can we place it at
all?
"In our state constitution we might discover power lia-
ble to be abused to very dangerous purposes. I shall in-
stance only the council of appointment. In that council
the governor claims and exercises the power of nominating
to all offices. This power of nomination, in its operation,
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? 406
THE LIFE OF
amounts to a power of appointment; for it can always be
so managed as to bring in persons agreeable to him, and
exclude all others. Suppose a governor disposed to make
this an instrument of personal influence and aggrandize-
ment--suppose him inclined to exclude from office all inde-
pendent men. and to fill the different departments of the
state with persons devoted to himself--what is to hinder
him from doing it? who can say how far the influence
arising from such a prerogative might be carried? Per-
haps this power, if closely inspected, is a more proper sub-
ject of republican jealousy than any power possessed or
asked by congress, fluctuating and variable as that body is.
"But as my intention is not to instil any unnecessary
jealousies, I shall prosecute these observations no further.
They are only urged to show the imperfections of human
institutions, and to confirm the principle, that the possibility
of a power being abused, is no argument against its exist-
ence.
"Upon the whole, let us venture with caution upon con-
stitutional ground. Let us not court nor invite discussions
of this kind. Let us not endeavour still more to weaken
and degrade the federal government, by heaping fresh
marks of contempt on its authority. Perhaps the time is
not far remote, when . we may be inclined to disapprove
what we now seem eager to commend, and may wish we
had cherished the union with as much zeal as we now dis-
cover apprehension of its encroachments.
"I hope the house will not agree to the amendment. In
saying this, I am influenced by no other motive than a
sense of duty. I trust my conduct will be considered in
this light. I cannot give my consent to put any thing upon
our minutes which, it appears to me, we may one day have
occasion to wish obliterated from them. "
The opposition was again called up, and travelled over
the same ground; inveighed against the dangers of an in-
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? HAMILTON.
407
croachment on the rights of the people; justified fully the
conduct of the governor; declared that the decision of the
constitutional question was not necessarily involved, and
closed with a strong appeal to popular feeling on the dan-
gers to be apprehended from countenancing such an inva-
sion of the freedom of their deliberations.
Hamilton replied; indicated more clearly the fallacy of
the arguments which had been used; pointed out the true
construction of the language of the constitution; warned
the house of the folly and danger of this distrust of the
powers of congress, and ridiculed the attempt to draw an
analogy between its powers and those of a monarchy.
"Are we not," he asked, " to respect federal decisions?
are we on the contrary to take every opportunity of hold-
ing up their resolutions and requests in a contemptible and
insignificant light, and tell the world their calls, their re-
quests are nothing to us; that we are bound by none of
their measures? Do not let us add to their embarrassments,
for it is but a slender tie that at present holds us. You
see, alas ! what contempt we are falling into since the peace;
you see to what our commerce is exposed on every side;
you see us the laughing-stock, the sport of foreign nations.
And what may this lead to? I dread, sir, to think. Little
will it avail then to say, we could not attend to your wise
and earnest requests without inconvenience: little will it
avail to say, it would have injured individual interests to
have left our farms. These things arc trifling when com-
pared to bringing the councils and powers of the union into
universal contempt, by saying their call was unimportant,
and that it did not come under the indefinite meaning of
'extraordinary. See, gentlemen, before you may feel, what
may be your situation hereafter. There is more involved
in this measure than presents itself to your view.
"You hear it rung in your ears that, from the resem-
blance between the king and the congress of these states,
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? 408
THE LIFE OF
it would be dangerous to come into measures proposed by
them, and adopted by every state but this. But I say there
is no danger; it is impossible; the constitution, the con-
federation, prevents it. Let us hear the reasoning used ;--
they have the power of declaring war and peace, and re-
quest the power of raising and applying money. This, if
in a king, permanent, hereditary, and independent of the
people, would be danger; but in an annual body chosen
from ourselves, and liable on every turn of popular breath
to be changed, who are checked by twelve other states,
who would not stand by and see the ruin of their associ-
ates, as it would involve their own,--where can be the
danger? How can a similitude exist between bodies so
different--as different as east from west, as north from
south? I regret that these things should be compared, for
there is no necessity for sounding this alarm. It is enough
the danger of republican governments that their very na-
ture tends to their destruction, because of their liability to
change. "
The question was then taken, and such was the force of
the governor's party, that the conciliatory substitute was
rejected by a vote of thirty-six to nine.
A few days after the address was adopted, this irritating
topic being disposed of, the friends of the impost, however
inauspicious the prospect, indulged the hope that the exi-
gencies of the country might induce a compliance with a
measure which had been at this time sanctioned by all of
the other states, and that notwithstanding the views of the
opposition, when the final vote was taken, they would shrink
from the responsibility of placing the state in an attitude
so hostile to the confederation and leading to consequences
so portentous.
A motion was made for a reference of this subject to a
committee, according to the usual practice of the house,
but the speaker having avowed himself a friend of the
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? HAMILTON.
409
measure, and it being apprehended that the report of a
committee favourable to the impost might have weight with
the house, an attempt was made to defeat this motion and
to refer the svibject to a committee of the whole house.
This design was defeated, and a committee was appointed
to investigate the subject. While under its consideration,
Hamilton moved a reference of the laws apparently con-
travening the treaty: one, relative to debts due to persons
within the enemy's lines; the other, the much agitated
"Trespass act:" taking as the basis of this motion the letter
of the secretary of foreign affairs, and the communications
of the British government in relation to its violation. Of
this committee he was appointed chairman, and he intro-
duced a bill after a speech indicating the importance of this
measure to the state, and her obligation to remove all im-
pediments to the foreign negotiations.
The following is a brief outline of his remarks upon this
subject: He first expressed great uneasiness that any op-
position should be made to this bill, particularly as this
state was individually interested therein. He felt greater
regret from a conviction in his own mind on this occasion,
that the bill should be objected to, as there was not a single
law in existence in this state in direct contravention of the
treaty of peace. He urged the committee to pass the bill,
from the consideration that the state of New-York was
the only state to gain any thing by a strict adherence to
the treaty.
There was no other state in the union that had so much
to expect from it. The restoration of the western posts was
an object of more than one hundred thousand pounds per
annum. Great Britain held those posts on the plea that
the United States had not fulfilled the treaty, and which
we have strong assurances she will relinquish on the fulfil-
ment of our engagements with her. But how far Great
Britain might be sincere in her declaration was unknown.
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? 410
THE LIFE OF
Indeed he doubted it himself. But while he doubted the
sincerity of Great Britain, he could not but be of opinion
that it was the duty of this state to enact a law for the re-
peal of all laws which may be against the treaty, as by do-
ing away all exceptions she would be reduced to a crisis;
she would be obliged to show to the world whether she was
in earnest or not, and whether she will sacrifice her honour
and reputation to her interest. With respect to the bill, as
it was drafted in conformity with the recommendation of
congress, he viewed it as a wise and salutary measure;
one calculated to meet the approbation of the different
states, and most likely to answer the end proposed. Were
it possible to examine an intricate maze of laws, and to
determine which of them or what parts of those laws were
opposed to the treaty, it still might not have the intended
effect, as different parties would have the judging of the
matter. What one would say was a law not inconsistent
with the treaty of peace, another might say was so, and
there would be no end, no decision of the business. Even
some of the states might view laws in a different manner.
The only way to comply with the treaty, was to make a
general and unexceptionable repeal. Congress, with an
eye to this, had proposed a general law, from which the
one before them was a copy. lie thought, as it was ob-
vious to every member of the committee, that as there
was no law in direct opposition to the treaty, no difficulty
could arise from passing the bill.
Some gentlemen, he observed, were apprehensive that
the bill would restore confiscated estates. This he did
not admit. However, if they were so disposed, they
might add a proviso to prevent it. He had written one,
which any of the gentlemen might move, if they thought
necessary. In his opinion it was not necessary. The bill
only provided that no future confiscations should take
place, and that congress should earnestly recommend a
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? HAMILTON.
411
restoration of property. But there was nothing obliga-
tory in this.
If this state should not come into the measure, would
it not be a very good plea for the other states to favour
their own citizens, and say, why should we do thus, when
New-York, the most interested of any of the states, refuses
to adopt it? And shall we suffer this imputation, when
we have in fact no laws that militate against the treaty?
He stated the great disadvantages that our merchants
experienced from the western posts being in the hands of
the British, and asked if it was good policy to let them re-
main so.
It had been said that the judges would have too much
power. That was a misapprehension. He stated the
powers of the judges with great clearness and precision.
He insisted that their powers would be the same whether
these laws passed or not; for as all treaties were known
by the constitution as the laws of the land, so must the
judges act on them, any law to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.
Cicero, the great Roman orator and lawyer, lays it down
as a rule, that when two laws clash, that which relates to
the most important matters ought to be preferred. If this
rule prevail, who can doubt what would be the conduct
of the judges, should any laws exist inconsistent with the
treaty of peace? But it would be impolitic to leave them
to the dilemma either of infringing the treaty to enforce
the particular laws of the state, or to explain away the
laws of the state to give effect to the treaty.
He declared that the full operation of the bill would be
no more than merely to declare the treaty the law of the
land; and that the judges viewing if as such, shall do away
all laws that may appear in direct contravention of it.
Treaties were known constitutionally to be the law of the
land, and why be afraid to leave the interpretation of those
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THE LIFE OF
laws to the judges. The constitution knows them as the
interpreters of the law. He asked if there was any mem-
ber of the committee who would be willing to see the first
treaty of peace ever made by this country violated?
This he did not believe. He could not think that any
member on that floor harboured such sentiments. He was
in hopes that the committee would agree with him in opin-
ion, and give a proof of their attachment to our national
engagements by passing the bill, which would do away
every exception of the British court. " This exposition
overcame every objection, and this important act passed
the house, but fell in the senate.
At the commencement of the session he was appointed
chairman of the committee on expiring laws, to report which
should be continued, and also such new laws as they should
conceive would be beneficial to the state. In the perform-
ance of this duty his mind was directed to a great variety
of topics. The first matter of local interest which called
forth his exertions, was an "act to regulate the elections" of
the state. This act not only involved several important
principles, but had a special bearing on its political charac-
ter. Its details have not enough of general interest to
warrant their introduction in this place. It is sufficient to
remark the singular inconsistency evinced on this occasion
in the conduct of the opponents to the power of the gene-
ral government, who claimed the exclusive merit of pro-
tecting the liberties of the state.
On questions which arose involving the highest consti-
tutional principles, while Hamilton and his friends were -
foremost in resisting all attempts to explain away the state
constitution, and to abridge the freedom of elections, and
were endeavouring to maintain a complete and full tolera-
tion of religious opinions, the state party was found advo-
cating measures tending to the most dangerous consequen-
ces. They opposed a mere request of congress for conve-
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? HAMILTON.
413
ning the legislature of the state, as threatening danger to the
freedom of deliberation, and they proposed a test not sanc-
tioned by its constitution. They refused a grant of power
necessary to the existence of the union, as dangerous to
the liberties of the people; and they sought to violate the
constitution of their state, by restraining the free exercise
of the right of suffrage--the first principle of all free insti-
tutions--the sovereignty of the people.
One proposition was to enable the inspectors of the elec-
tions to take aside every illiterate person, and examine him
privately, respecting his ballot. Against this, Hamilton
took a decided stand, showing the danger of an improper
influence being exercised, and the probability that the
leaning of the inspectors would produce an improper bias;
contending that "it was better that the illiterate should
take the chance of imposition from parties equally active,
than to leave them subject to party views, concentred in
inspectors, upon whom the fate of the election depended.
That it was wholly contrary to the very genius and inten-
tion of balloting, which means, that a man's vote should be
secret, and known only to himself; but by this proviso he
was not merely permitted, he was obliged to discover his
vote, thus depriving the unlettered person of that liberty
which his more instructed fellow-citizen had secured to
him. These reasons, he hoped, would be deemed sufficient
to induce the house to reject the clause, as repugnant to
the genius and liberty of our republic. " He prevailed.
Another clause authorized the inspectors to impose an
oath of abjuration of ecclesiastical as well as civil obedi-
ence, which was defended by the leader of the democratic
party, on the ground that this distinction was warranted
by the constitution. Hamilton declared " that the consti-
tution was their creed and standard, and ought never to
be departed from, but that its provisions had not been cor-
rectly understood; that there were two different bodies
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THE LIFE OF
in the state to which the proposition had reference. These
were the Roman Catholics who were already citizens, who
were born among us, and those coming from abroad. That
from foreigners wishing to be naturalized, the abjuration
of their former sovereign might be required for reasons
which do not exist on the part of the person born and ed-
ucated here, unencumbered with that dangerous fanaticism
which terrified the world some centuries back, but which
is now dissipated by the light of philosophy. These acts
are therefore no longer necessary, for the dangers are now
only imaginary, and are void of existence, at least with
respect to us, the object being to exclude Roman Catho-
lics from their right of representation.
He animadverted on the little influence possessed by the
pope in Europe--spoke of the reformation going forward
in the German empire, and of the total independence of
the French church, and compared the requiring of oaths
of this nature, to the vigilance of those who would bring
engines to extinguish fires which had long subsided. He
observed, also, that the Roman Catholics were not the only
society affected--that some of the Dutch Reformed church-
es held a species of ecclesiastical foreign jurisdiction; he
alluded to the classes of Amsterdam. "But," he asked,
"is the natural subject, the man born among us, educated
with us, possessing our habits, possessing our manners,
with an equal ardent love of his native country, to be re-
quired to take the same oath of abjuration? What has he
to abjure? He owes no fealty to any other power upon
earth. There is no probability that his mind will be led
astray by bigotiy or foreign influence. Then why give
him cause of dissatisfaction, by bringing forward a test
which will not add to his fidelity? "
He stated that the clause in the constitution confined the
test to foreigners, and that it was adopted after much de-
bate, and by a small majority, and that even as to them, he
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? HAMILTON.
415
questioned whether the test ought to be proposed. That
he was decidedly against going so far as to extend it to ec-
clesiastical matters. "Why should we wound the tender
conscience of any man? and why present oaths to those
who are known to be good citizens? why alarm them?
why set them upon inquiry that is useless and unnecessary 1
You give them reason to suppose that you request too
much of them, and they cannot but refuse compliance.
"The constitution does not require such a criterion to try
the fidelity of any citizen. It is solely intended for aliens
and foreigners, coming from abroad with manners and
habits different from our own, and whose intentions are
concealed. The oath should be confined to civil matters.
It is all that we ought or can require. A man will not
then be alarmed in his interpretation. It will not set his
mind to inquire if his religious tenets are affected, and much
inconvenience would be avoided. We should be cautious
how we carry the principle of requiring and multiplying
tests upon our fellow-citizens, so far as to practise it to
the exclusion or disfranchisement of any. " The clause
was, nevertheless, in part retained.
"A further provision was proposed, excluding pensioners
and officers holding under congress, from seats in the
senate and assembly. This clause gave rise to the discussion
of a most important question, whether the legislature pos-
sessed the power of abridging the constitutional rights of
the people.
By the state party it was contended, that while the con-
stitution protected the rights of the electors, it was silent as
to the elected, and that therefore the legislature had the
right to annex qualifications to the elected.
Colonel Hamilton observed, " that they were going on
dangerous ground; that the best rule to follow was the
rule of the constitution, which it would be safest to adhere
to without alteration or addition. If we once depart from
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THE LIFE OF
this rule, it is impossible to see where we would end.
To-day, a majority of the persons sitting here, from a par-
ticular mode of ihinking, disqualify one description of men;
a future legislature, from a particular mode of thinking on
another point, disqualify another set of men. One prece-
dent is the pretext of another, till we narrow the ground
of qualifications to a degree subversive of the constitution.
It is impossible to suppose that the convention who framed
the constitution were inattentive to this point. It is a mat-
ter of too much importance not to have been well considered.
"They have fixed the qualification of electors with pre-
cision. They have defined those of senator and governor,
but they have been silent as to the qualifications of mem-
bers of assembly. It may be said that, being silent, they
have left the matter to the discretion of the legislature.
But is not the language of the framers of the constitution
rather this--We will fix the qualifications of electors;
we will take care that persons absolutely indigent shall be
excluded; we will provide that the right of voting shall be
on a broad and secure basis, and we will trust to the dis-
cretion of the electors themselves the choice of those who
are to represent them in assembly 1
"Every qualification implies a disqualification. The per-
sons who do not possess the qualification required, become
ineligible. Is not this to restrain the freedom of choice
allowed by the constitution to the body of electors? An
improper exercise of this liberty cannot constitutionally be
presumed. Why, therefore, should we circumscribe it
within limits unknown to the constitution? Why should
we abridge the rights of any citizens in so important an
article? By the constitution, every citizen is eligible to a
seat in the assembly.
to be a member of that committee; my object still was to
avoid the interference of this house in a matter about which
there was a difference of opinion between the United
States and the governor of this state on constitutional
ground. The best way to effect this, was to frame the
answer in the most general terms. This was done; not a
word is said even about the revenue system, which occa-
sioned the request of congress to convene the legislature.
The answer is generally, that the house will take into con-
sideration the different acts of congress, and make such
provisions as appear to them compatible with the abilities
and constitution of the state. By not touching at all on
the topic connected with the origin of the controversy, I
thought we might safely be silent without any implication
of censure on the governor. It was neither my wish to
condemn nor to approve. I was only desirous of avoiding
an interference in a constitutional question, which belong-
ed entirely to the province of the executive authority of
the state, and about which I knew there would be a differ-
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THE LIFE OF
ence of opinion, even in this house. I submit it to the
house, whether this was not a prudent course, and whether
it is not to be lamented that the proposed amendment
forces the discussion upon us. Constitutional questions
are always delicate; they should never be touched but
from necessity.
"But though I shall be readily acquitted of having had
any agency in bringing the house into this disagreeable
situation, since the question is brought forward, I shall
with freedom meet the discussion. This my duty demands
from me; and whoever may be affected by it, I shall pro-
ceed under an impression that my constituents expect from
me the free exercise of my judgment, and the free decla-
ration of my sentiments on the matters deliberated upon in
this house.
"The question by the honourable member on my right,
has been wrongly stated. He says it is this--whether a re-
quest of congress to convene the legislature is conclusive
upon the governor of the state, or whether a bare intima-
tion of that honourable body lays him under a constitu-
tional necessity of convening the legislature? But this is
not the true question. From the shape in which the busi-
ness comes before us, the inquiry truly is--whether a sol-
emn application of the United States to the executive of
this state to convene the legislature for the purpose of de-
liberating on a matter which is considered by that body as
of essential importance to the nation, and which has been
viewed in a similar light by most of the other states indi-
vidually, is such an extraordinary occasion as left the gov-
ernor under no constitutional impediment to a compliance?
and it may be added, whether that , application, under all
the circumstances, was an attempt to invade the freedom
of deliberation in this house 1
"Here let me ask, what does the constitution say upon
the subject? Simply this--that the governor 'shall have
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? HAMILTON. 399
power to convene the assembly and senate on extraordi-
nary occasions. '
"But what is an extraordinary occasion? what circum-
stances are to concur, what ingredients combine, to con-
stitute one? What general rule can be imagined by which
to define the precise meaning of these vague terms, and
draw the fine between an ordinary and an extraordinary
occasion? Will the gentleman on my right furnish us with
such a criterion? Profoundly skilled as he is in law, (at
least in the local laws of this state,) I fancy it will be diffi-
cult for him to invent one that will suit his present pur-
pose. Let him consult his law books: they will not relieve
his embarrassment. It is easy to see the clause allows the
greatest latitude to opinion. What one may think a very
extraordinary occasion, another may think a very ordinary
one, according to his bias, his interest, or his intellect. If
there is any rule at all, it is this--the governor shall not call
the legislature with a view to the ordinary details of the
state administration. Whatever does not fall within this
description, and has any pretensions to national importance
in any view, leaves him at liberty to exercise the discre-
tion vested in him by the constitution. There is, at least,
no constitutional bar in the way.
"The United States are intrusted with the management
of the general concerns and interests of the community--
they have the power of war and peace, they have the
power of treaty.
"Our affairs with respect to foreign nations are left to
their direction. We must entertain very diminutive ideas
of the government of the union, to conceive that their
earnest call on a subject which they deem of great national
magnitude, which affects their engagements with two re-
spectable foreign powers, France and the United Nether-
lands, which relates to the preservation of their faith at
home and abroad, is not such an occasion as would justify
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? 400
THE LIFE OF
the executive, upon the terms of the constitution, in con-
vening the legislature. If this doctrine is maintained,
where will it lead to--what kind of emergency must exist
before the constitution will authorize the governor to call
the legislature? Is the preservation of our national faith
a matter of such trivial moment? Is the fulfilment of the
public engagements domestic and foreign of no conse-
quence 1 Must we wait for the fleets of the United Neth-
erlands or of France to enforce the observance of them,
before the executive will be at liberty to give the legisla-
ture an opportunity of deliberating on the means of their
just demands? This is straining the indefinite words of
the constitution to a most unreasonable extreme. It would
be a tenable position to say that the call of the United
States is alone sufficient to satisfy the idea of an extraor-
dinary occasion. It is easy to conceive, that such a pos-
ture of European affairs might exist, as would render it
necessary to convene the different legislatures to adopt
measures for the public safety, and at the same time inex-
pedient to disclose the object till they were assembled.
Will we say that congress would be bound to communi-
cate the object of their call to the executive of every state 1
or that the executive of this state, in complying with their
request, would be guilty of a violation of the constitution?
But the present case is not that of a mere general request;
it is specifically to deliberate upon an object of acknow-
ledged importance in one view or another. On one hand
it is alleged to be a measure essential to the honour, inter-
est, and perhaps the existence of the union; on the other,
it is said to be on principles subversive of the constitution
and dangerous to the liberty of the subject. It is, there-
fore, a matter of delicacy and moment, and the earnest
call of the union to have it considered cannot fall within
the notion of so common, so ordinary an occasion, as
would prohibit the executive from summoning a meeting
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? HAMILTON. 401
of the legislature. The only argument urged to denomi-
nate it such, is that it had been recently decided on by the
legislature. But there is an evident fallacy in this position;
the call was addressed to a new and different body, totally
different in the contemplation of the constitution, and ma-
terially different in fact with respect to the members who
compose it. A large proportion of the members of the
present house were not members of the last. For aught
that either congress or the governor could officially know,
there might have been a total change in the individuals,
and, therefore, a total difference in the sentiments. No
inference, of course, could be fairly drawn from the con-
duct of the last legislature to that of the present. Indeed,
however it might be wished to prepossess the minds of the
members of the former house with a contrary idea, it is
plain that there is no necessary connection between what
they did at that time, and what it may be proper for them
to do now. The act of the last session proves the con-
viction of the house then, that the grant of the impost was
an eligible measure. Many of the members were led to
suppose that it would answer the purpose, and might have
been accepted by congress. If the experiment has shown
that they were mistaken in their expectations, and if it
should appear to them that congress could not for good
reasons accept it, the same motives which induce them to
the grant already made, would determine them to consent
to such alterations as would accommodate it to the views
of congress and the other states, and make it practicable
to carry the system into execution.
"It may be observed, that as congress accompanied
their request with an explanation of the object, they by
that mode of proceeding submitted the whole matter to
the discretion of the governor, to act according to the esti-
mate formed in his own mind of its importance. It is not
denied the governor had a discretion upon the occasion.
51
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? 402 THE LIFE OP
It is not contended, that he was under a constitutional ne-
cessity to convene the legislature. The resolution of con-
gress itself does not imply or intimate this. They do not
pretend to require, they only earnestly recommend. The
governor might at his peril refuse; responsible, however,
for any ill consequences that might have attended his re-
fusal. But what is contended for is, that the call of the
United States, under all circumstances, was sufficient to
satisfy the terms of the constitution empowering him to
convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions, and
left him at full liberty to comply.
"The admission of his discretion does not admit that it
was properly exercised, nor does it admit that the footing
upon which he placed his refusal was proper. It does not
admit that the constitution interposed an obstacle in his
way, or that the request of congress implied any thing hos-
tile to the right of free deliberation.
"This is the aspect under which the business presents
itself to our consideration, as well from the correspond-
ence between congress and the governor, as from the
manner in which it is ushered to us in the speech. A
general approbation of his conduct, is an approbation of
the principle by which it is professed to have been actuated.
"Are we ready to say that the constitution would have
been violated by a compliance? Are we ready to say that
the call upon us to deliberate is an attempt to infringe the
freedom of deliberation? If we are not ready to say both,
we must reject the amendment. In particular, I think it
must strike us all that there is something singularly forced
in intimating, that an application of congress to the gov-
ernor of the state to convene a new legislature to consider
a very important national subject, has any thing in it dan-
gerous to the freedom of our deliberations. I natter my-
self we should all have felt ourselves as much at liberty to
have pursued our sentiments, if we had met upon an ex-
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? HAMILTON.
403
traordinary call, as we now do when met according to our
own appointment.
"There yet remains an important light in which the
subject merits consideration; I mean as it respects the
executive authority of the state itself. By deciding that
the application of congress, upon which the debate turns,
was not such an extraordinary occasion as left the gov-
ernor at liberty to call the legislature, we may form a pre-
cedent of a very dangerous tendency; we may put a sense
on the constitution very different from the true meaning
of it, and may fetter the present or a future executive
with very inconvenient restraints. A few more such pre-
cedents may tie up the hands of a governor in such a man-
ner as would either oblige him to act at an extreme peril,
or to omit acting when public exigencies required it. The
mere sense of one governor would be no precedent for his
successor; but that sense approved by both houses of the
legislature, would become a rule of conduct. Suppose a
few more precedents of the kind on different combinations
of circumstances equally strong, and let us ask ourselves
what would be the situation of a governor whenever he
came to deliberate on the propriety of exercising the dis-
cretion in this respect vested in him by the constitution?
Would he not be apt to act with a degree of caution, or
rather timidity, which in certain emergencies might be
productive of very pernicious consequences? A mere in-
timation of the constitution to him not to call the legisla-
ture in their recess upon every trifling affair, which is its
true import, would be turned into an injunction not to do
so but upon occasions of the last necessity.
"We see, therefore, that the question upon which we
are pressed to decide, is not less delicate, as it respects the
constitution of the state itself, than as it respects the union;
and that in every possible view it is most prudent to avoid
the determination. Let the conduct of the governor stand
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? 404
THE LIFE OF
on its own merits. If he was right, our approbation will
not make him more right. If he was wrong, it would be
improper to give sanction to his error.
"Several things have been said in the debate which
have no connection with it; but to prevent their making
improper impressions, it may not be amiss to take some no-
tice of them. The danger of a power in congress to com-
pel the convening of the legislature at their pleasure has
been strongly insisted upon. It has been urged, if they
possessed it they might make it an engine to fatigue the
legislature into a compliance with their measures. In-
stances of an abuse of the like power in the crown, under
the former government, have been cited.
"It is a sufficient answer to all this to say, that no such
power is contended for. I do not assert that their request
obliged the governor to convene the legislature; I only
maintain that their request on an important national sub-
ject, was such an occasion as left him at liberty to do it
without any colour for imputing to him a breach of the
constitution; and that from motives of respect to the union,
and to avoid any further degradation of its authority,
already at too low an ebb, he ought to have complied.
"Admitting in the fullest extent that it would be danger-
ous to allow to congress the power of requiring the legis-
lature to be convened at pleasure, yet no injury or incon-
venience can result from supposing the call of the United
States, on a matter by them deemed of importance, to be
an occasion sufficiently extraordinary to authorize, not to
oblige the governor to comply with it.
"I cannot forbear remarking, that it is a common artifice
to insinuate a resemblance between the king under the
former government and congress; though no two things
can be more unlike each other. Nothing can be more dis-
similar than a monarch, permanent, hereditary, the source
of honour and emolument, and a republican body com-
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? HAMILTON.
405
posed of a number of individuals appointed annually, liable
to be recalled within the year, and subject to a continual
rotation; which, with few exceptions, is the fountain
neither of honour nor emolument. If we will exercise
our judgments, we shall readily see no such resemblance
exists, and that all inferences deduced from the comparison
must be false.
"Upon every occasion, however foreign such observa-
tions may be, we hear a loud cry raised about the danger
of intrusting power to congress; we are told it is danger-
ous to trust power any where; that power is liable to
abuse, with a variety of trite maxims of the same kind.
General propositions of this nature are easily framed, the
truth of which cannot be denied, but they rarely convey
any precise idea. To these we might oppose other propo-
sitions equally true, and equally indefinite. It might be
said that too little power is as dangerous as too much; that
it leads to anarchy, and from anarchy to despotism. But
the question still recurs, what is too much or too little 1
Where is the measure or<< standard to ascertain the happy
mean?
"Powers must be granted, or civil society cannot exist:
the possibility of abuse is no argument against the thing;
this possibility is incident to every species of power, how-
ever placed or modified. The United States, for instance,
have the power of war and peace. It cannot be disputed
that conjunctures might occur, in which^hat power might
be turned against the rights of the citizens; but where can
we better place it--in short, where else can we place it at
all?
"In our state constitution we might discover power lia-
ble to be abused to very dangerous purposes. I shall in-
stance only the council of appointment. In that council
the governor claims and exercises the power of nominating
to all offices. This power of nomination, in its operation,
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? 406
THE LIFE OF
amounts to a power of appointment; for it can always be
so managed as to bring in persons agreeable to him, and
exclude all others. Suppose a governor disposed to make
this an instrument of personal influence and aggrandize-
ment--suppose him inclined to exclude from office all inde-
pendent men. and to fill the different departments of the
state with persons devoted to himself--what is to hinder
him from doing it? who can say how far the influence
arising from such a prerogative might be carried? Per-
haps this power, if closely inspected, is a more proper sub-
ject of republican jealousy than any power possessed or
asked by congress, fluctuating and variable as that body is.
"But as my intention is not to instil any unnecessary
jealousies, I shall prosecute these observations no further.
They are only urged to show the imperfections of human
institutions, and to confirm the principle, that the possibility
of a power being abused, is no argument against its exist-
ence.
"Upon the whole, let us venture with caution upon con-
stitutional ground. Let us not court nor invite discussions
of this kind. Let us not endeavour still more to weaken
and degrade the federal government, by heaping fresh
marks of contempt on its authority. Perhaps the time is
not far remote, when . we may be inclined to disapprove
what we now seem eager to commend, and may wish we
had cherished the union with as much zeal as we now dis-
cover apprehension of its encroachments.
"I hope the house will not agree to the amendment. In
saying this, I am influenced by no other motive than a
sense of duty. I trust my conduct will be considered in
this light. I cannot give my consent to put any thing upon
our minutes which, it appears to me, we may one day have
occasion to wish obliterated from them. "
The opposition was again called up, and travelled over
the same ground; inveighed against the dangers of an in-
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? HAMILTON.
407
croachment on the rights of the people; justified fully the
conduct of the governor; declared that the decision of the
constitutional question was not necessarily involved, and
closed with a strong appeal to popular feeling on the dan-
gers to be apprehended from countenancing such an inva-
sion of the freedom of their deliberations.
Hamilton replied; indicated more clearly the fallacy of
the arguments which had been used; pointed out the true
construction of the language of the constitution; warned
the house of the folly and danger of this distrust of the
powers of congress, and ridiculed the attempt to draw an
analogy between its powers and those of a monarchy.
"Are we not," he asked, " to respect federal decisions?
are we on the contrary to take every opportunity of hold-
ing up their resolutions and requests in a contemptible and
insignificant light, and tell the world their calls, their re-
quests are nothing to us; that we are bound by none of
their measures? Do not let us add to their embarrassments,
for it is but a slender tie that at present holds us. You
see, alas ! what contempt we are falling into since the peace;
you see to what our commerce is exposed on every side;
you see us the laughing-stock, the sport of foreign nations.
And what may this lead to? I dread, sir, to think. Little
will it avail then to say, we could not attend to your wise
and earnest requests without inconvenience: little will it
avail to say, it would have injured individual interests to
have left our farms. These things arc trifling when com-
pared to bringing the councils and powers of the union into
universal contempt, by saying their call was unimportant,
and that it did not come under the indefinite meaning of
'extraordinary. See, gentlemen, before you may feel, what
may be your situation hereafter. There is more involved
in this measure than presents itself to your view.
"You hear it rung in your ears that, from the resem-
blance between the king and the congress of these states,
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it would be dangerous to come into measures proposed by
them, and adopted by every state but this. But I say there
is no danger; it is impossible; the constitution, the con-
federation, prevents it. Let us hear the reasoning used ;--
they have the power of declaring war and peace, and re-
quest the power of raising and applying money. This, if
in a king, permanent, hereditary, and independent of the
people, would be danger; but in an annual body chosen
from ourselves, and liable on every turn of popular breath
to be changed, who are checked by twelve other states,
who would not stand by and see the ruin of their associ-
ates, as it would involve their own,--where can be the
danger? How can a similitude exist between bodies so
different--as different as east from west, as north from
south? I regret that these things should be compared, for
there is no necessity for sounding this alarm. It is enough
the danger of republican governments that their very na-
ture tends to their destruction, because of their liability to
change. "
The question was then taken, and such was the force of
the governor's party, that the conciliatory substitute was
rejected by a vote of thirty-six to nine.
A few days after the address was adopted, this irritating
topic being disposed of, the friends of the impost, however
inauspicious the prospect, indulged the hope that the exi-
gencies of the country might induce a compliance with a
measure which had been at this time sanctioned by all of
the other states, and that notwithstanding the views of the
opposition, when the final vote was taken, they would shrink
from the responsibility of placing the state in an attitude
so hostile to the confederation and leading to consequences
so portentous.
A motion was made for a reference of this subject to a
committee, according to the usual practice of the house,
but the speaker having avowed himself a friend of the
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? HAMILTON.
409
measure, and it being apprehended that the report of a
committee favourable to the impost might have weight with
the house, an attempt was made to defeat this motion and
to refer the svibject to a committee of the whole house.
This design was defeated, and a committee was appointed
to investigate the subject. While under its consideration,
Hamilton moved a reference of the laws apparently con-
travening the treaty: one, relative to debts due to persons
within the enemy's lines; the other, the much agitated
"Trespass act:" taking as the basis of this motion the letter
of the secretary of foreign affairs, and the communications
of the British government in relation to its violation. Of
this committee he was appointed chairman, and he intro-
duced a bill after a speech indicating the importance of this
measure to the state, and her obligation to remove all im-
pediments to the foreign negotiations.
The following is a brief outline of his remarks upon this
subject: He first expressed great uneasiness that any op-
position should be made to this bill, particularly as this
state was individually interested therein. He felt greater
regret from a conviction in his own mind on this occasion,
that the bill should be objected to, as there was not a single
law in existence in this state in direct contravention of the
treaty of peace. He urged the committee to pass the bill,
from the consideration that the state of New-York was
the only state to gain any thing by a strict adherence to
the treaty.
There was no other state in the union that had so much
to expect from it. The restoration of the western posts was
an object of more than one hundred thousand pounds per
annum. Great Britain held those posts on the plea that
the United States had not fulfilled the treaty, and which
we have strong assurances she will relinquish on the fulfil-
ment of our engagements with her. But how far Great
Britain might be sincere in her declaration was unknown.
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THE LIFE OF
Indeed he doubted it himself. But while he doubted the
sincerity of Great Britain, he could not but be of opinion
that it was the duty of this state to enact a law for the re-
peal of all laws which may be against the treaty, as by do-
ing away all exceptions she would be reduced to a crisis;
she would be obliged to show to the world whether she was
in earnest or not, and whether she will sacrifice her honour
and reputation to her interest. With respect to the bill, as
it was drafted in conformity with the recommendation of
congress, he viewed it as a wise and salutary measure;
one calculated to meet the approbation of the different
states, and most likely to answer the end proposed. Were
it possible to examine an intricate maze of laws, and to
determine which of them or what parts of those laws were
opposed to the treaty, it still might not have the intended
effect, as different parties would have the judging of the
matter. What one would say was a law not inconsistent
with the treaty of peace, another might say was so, and
there would be no end, no decision of the business. Even
some of the states might view laws in a different manner.
The only way to comply with the treaty, was to make a
general and unexceptionable repeal. Congress, with an
eye to this, had proposed a general law, from which the
one before them was a copy. lie thought, as it was ob-
vious to every member of the committee, that as there
was no law in direct opposition to the treaty, no difficulty
could arise from passing the bill.
Some gentlemen, he observed, were apprehensive that
the bill would restore confiscated estates. This he did
not admit. However, if they were so disposed, they
might add a proviso to prevent it. He had written one,
which any of the gentlemen might move, if they thought
necessary. In his opinion it was not necessary. The bill
only provided that no future confiscations should take
place, and that congress should earnestly recommend a
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? HAMILTON.
411
restoration of property. But there was nothing obliga-
tory in this.
If this state should not come into the measure, would
it not be a very good plea for the other states to favour
their own citizens, and say, why should we do thus, when
New-York, the most interested of any of the states, refuses
to adopt it? And shall we suffer this imputation, when
we have in fact no laws that militate against the treaty?
He stated the great disadvantages that our merchants
experienced from the western posts being in the hands of
the British, and asked if it was good policy to let them re-
main so.
It had been said that the judges would have too much
power. That was a misapprehension. He stated the
powers of the judges with great clearness and precision.
He insisted that their powers would be the same whether
these laws passed or not; for as all treaties were known
by the constitution as the laws of the land, so must the
judges act on them, any law to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.
Cicero, the great Roman orator and lawyer, lays it down
as a rule, that when two laws clash, that which relates to
the most important matters ought to be preferred. If this
rule prevail, who can doubt what would be the conduct
of the judges, should any laws exist inconsistent with the
treaty of peace? But it would be impolitic to leave them
to the dilemma either of infringing the treaty to enforce
the particular laws of the state, or to explain away the
laws of the state to give effect to the treaty.
He declared that the full operation of the bill would be
no more than merely to declare the treaty the law of the
land; and that the judges viewing if as such, shall do away
all laws that may appear in direct contravention of it.
Treaties were known constitutionally to be the law of the
land, and why be afraid to leave the interpretation of those
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THE LIFE OF
laws to the judges. The constitution knows them as the
interpreters of the law. He asked if there was any mem-
ber of the committee who would be willing to see the first
treaty of peace ever made by this country violated?
This he did not believe. He could not think that any
member on that floor harboured such sentiments. He was
in hopes that the committee would agree with him in opin-
ion, and give a proof of their attachment to our national
engagements by passing the bill, which would do away
every exception of the British court. " This exposition
overcame every objection, and this important act passed
the house, but fell in the senate.
At the commencement of the session he was appointed
chairman of the committee on expiring laws, to report which
should be continued, and also such new laws as they should
conceive would be beneficial to the state. In the perform-
ance of this duty his mind was directed to a great variety
of topics. The first matter of local interest which called
forth his exertions, was an "act to regulate the elections" of
the state. This act not only involved several important
principles, but had a special bearing on its political charac-
ter. Its details have not enough of general interest to
warrant their introduction in this place. It is sufficient to
remark the singular inconsistency evinced on this occasion
in the conduct of the opponents to the power of the gene-
ral government, who claimed the exclusive merit of pro-
tecting the liberties of the state.
On questions which arose involving the highest consti-
tutional principles, while Hamilton and his friends were -
foremost in resisting all attempts to explain away the state
constitution, and to abridge the freedom of elections, and
were endeavouring to maintain a complete and full tolera-
tion of religious opinions, the state party was found advo-
cating measures tending to the most dangerous consequen-
ces. They opposed a mere request of congress for conve-
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? HAMILTON.
413
ning the legislature of the state, as threatening danger to the
freedom of deliberation, and they proposed a test not sanc-
tioned by its constitution. They refused a grant of power
necessary to the existence of the union, as dangerous to
the liberties of the people; and they sought to violate the
constitution of their state, by restraining the free exercise
of the right of suffrage--the first principle of all free insti-
tutions--the sovereignty of the people.
One proposition was to enable the inspectors of the elec-
tions to take aside every illiterate person, and examine him
privately, respecting his ballot. Against this, Hamilton
took a decided stand, showing the danger of an improper
influence being exercised, and the probability that the
leaning of the inspectors would produce an improper bias;
contending that "it was better that the illiterate should
take the chance of imposition from parties equally active,
than to leave them subject to party views, concentred in
inspectors, upon whom the fate of the election depended.
That it was wholly contrary to the very genius and inten-
tion of balloting, which means, that a man's vote should be
secret, and known only to himself; but by this proviso he
was not merely permitted, he was obliged to discover his
vote, thus depriving the unlettered person of that liberty
which his more instructed fellow-citizen had secured to
him. These reasons, he hoped, would be deemed sufficient
to induce the house to reject the clause, as repugnant to
the genius and liberty of our republic. " He prevailed.
Another clause authorized the inspectors to impose an
oath of abjuration of ecclesiastical as well as civil obedi-
ence, which was defended by the leader of the democratic
party, on the ground that this distinction was warranted
by the constitution. Hamilton declared " that the consti-
tution was their creed and standard, and ought never to
be departed from, but that its provisions had not been cor-
rectly understood; that there were two different bodies
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in the state to which the proposition had reference. These
were the Roman Catholics who were already citizens, who
were born among us, and those coming from abroad. That
from foreigners wishing to be naturalized, the abjuration
of their former sovereign might be required for reasons
which do not exist on the part of the person born and ed-
ucated here, unencumbered with that dangerous fanaticism
which terrified the world some centuries back, but which
is now dissipated by the light of philosophy. These acts
are therefore no longer necessary, for the dangers are now
only imaginary, and are void of existence, at least with
respect to us, the object being to exclude Roman Catho-
lics from their right of representation.
He animadverted on the little influence possessed by the
pope in Europe--spoke of the reformation going forward
in the German empire, and of the total independence of
the French church, and compared the requiring of oaths
of this nature, to the vigilance of those who would bring
engines to extinguish fires which had long subsided. He
observed, also, that the Roman Catholics were not the only
society affected--that some of the Dutch Reformed church-
es held a species of ecclesiastical foreign jurisdiction; he
alluded to the classes of Amsterdam. "But," he asked,
"is the natural subject, the man born among us, educated
with us, possessing our habits, possessing our manners,
with an equal ardent love of his native country, to be re-
quired to take the same oath of abjuration? What has he
to abjure? He owes no fealty to any other power upon
earth. There is no probability that his mind will be led
astray by bigotiy or foreign influence. Then why give
him cause of dissatisfaction, by bringing forward a test
which will not add to his fidelity? "
He stated that the clause in the constitution confined the
test to foreigners, and that it was adopted after much de-
bate, and by a small majority, and that even as to them, he
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? HAMILTON.
415
questioned whether the test ought to be proposed. That
he was decidedly against going so far as to extend it to ec-
clesiastical matters. "Why should we wound the tender
conscience of any man? and why present oaths to those
who are known to be good citizens? why alarm them?
why set them upon inquiry that is useless and unnecessary 1
You give them reason to suppose that you request too
much of them, and they cannot but refuse compliance.
"The constitution does not require such a criterion to try
the fidelity of any citizen. It is solely intended for aliens
and foreigners, coming from abroad with manners and
habits different from our own, and whose intentions are
concealed. The oath should be confined to civil matters.
It is all that we ought or can require. A man will not
then be alarmed in his interpretation. It will not set his
mind to inquire if his religious tenets are affected, and much
inconvenience would be avoided. We should be cautious
how we carry the principle of requiring and multiplying
tests upon our fellow-citizens, so far as to practise it to
the exclusion or disfranchisement of any. " The clause
was, nevertheless, in part retained.
"A further provision was proposed, excluding pensioners
and officers holding under congress, from seats in the
senate and assembly. This clause gave rise to the discussion
of a most important question, whether the legislature pos-
sessed the power of abridging the constitutional rights of
the people.
By the state party it was contended, that while the con-
stitution protected the rights of the electors, it was silent as
to the elected, and that therefore the legislature had the
right to annex qualifications to the elected.
Colonel Hamilton observed, " that they were going on
dangerous ground; that the best rule to follow was the
rule of the constitution, which it would be safest to adhere
to without alteration or addition. If we once depart from
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this rule, it is impossible to see where we would end.
To-day, a majority of the persons sitting here, from a par-
ticular mode of ihinking, disqualify one description of men;
a future legislature, from a particular mode of thinking on
another point, disqualify another set of men. One prece-
dent is the pretext of another, till we narrow the ground
of qualifications to a degree subversive of the constitution.
It is impossible to suppose that the convention who framed
the constitution were inattentive to this point. It is a mat-
ter of too much importance not to have been well considered.
"They have fixed the qualification of electors with pre-
cision. They have defined those of senator and governor,
but they have been silent as to the qualifications of mem-
bers of assembly. It may be said that, being silent, they
have left the matter to the discretion of the legislature.
But is not the language of the framers of the constitution
rather this--We will fix the qualifications of electors;
we will take care that persons absolutely indigent shall be
excluded; we will provide that the right of voting shall be
on a broad and secure basis, and we will trust to the dis-
cretion of the electors themselves the choice of those who
are to represent them in assembly 1
"Every qualification implies a disqualification. The per-
sons who do not possess the qualification required, become
ineligible. Is not this to restrain the freedom of choice
allowed by the constitution to the body of electors? An
improper exercise of this liberty cannot constitutionally be
presumed. Why, therefore, should we circumscribe it
within limits unknown to the constitution? Why should
we abridge the rights of any citizens in so important an
article? By the constitution, every citizen is eligible to a
seat in the assembly.
