No More Learning

Objection 5: Further, Christ has perfect vision, fruition, and joy. Now
these are the dowries. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, A distinction of persons is requisite between the
bridegroom and the bride. But in Christ there is nothing personally
distinct from the Son of God Who is the Bridegroom, as stated in Jn.
3:29, "He that hath the bride is the bridegroom. " Therefore since the
dowry is allotted to the bride or for the bride, it would seem
unfitting for Christ to have a dowry.

Further, the same person does not both give and receive a dowry. But it
is Christ Who gives spiritual dowries. Therefore it is not fitting that
Christ should have a dowry.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that
there is a threefold union in Christ. One is the union of concord,
whereby He is united to God in the bond of love; another is the union
of condescension, whereby the human nature is united to the Divine; the
third is the union whereby Christ is united to the Church. They say,
then, that as regards the first two unions it is fitting for Christ to
have the dowries as such, but as regards the third, it is fitting for
Him to have the dowries in the most excellent degree, considered as to
that in which they consist, but not considered as dowries; because in
this union Christ is the bridegroom and the Church the bride, and a
dowry is given to the bride as regards property and control, although
it is given to the bridegroom as to use. But this does not seem
congruous. For in the union of Christ with the Father by the concord of
love, even if we consider Him as God, there is not said to be a
marriage, since it implies no subjection such as is required in the
bride towards the bridegroom. Nor again in the union of the human
nature with the Divine, whether we consider the Personal union or that
which regards the conformity of will, can there be a dowry, properly
speaking, for three reasons. First, because in a marriage where a dowry
is given there should be likeness of nature between bridegroom and
bride, and this is lacking in the union of the human nature with the
Divine; secondly, because there is required a distinction of persons,
and the human nature is not personally distinct from the Word; thirdly,
because a dowry is given when the bride is first taken to the dwelling
of the bridegroom and thus would seem to belong to the bride, who from
being not united becomes united; whereas the human nature, which was
assumed into the unity of Person by the Word, never was otherwise than
perfectly united. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should say that
the notion of dowry is either altogether unbecoming to Christ, or not
so properly as to the saints; but that the things which we call dowries
befit Him in the highest degree.

Reply to Objection 1: This conformity must be understood to refer to
the thing which is a dowry and not to the notion of a dowry being in
Christ: for it is not requisite that the thing in which we are
conformed to Christ should be in the same way in Christ and in us.

Reply to Objection 2: Human nature is not properly said to be a bride
in its union with the Word, since the distinction of persons, which is
requisite between bridegroom and bride, is not observed therein. That
human nature is sometimes described as being espoused in reference to
its union with the Word is because it has a certain act of the bride,
in that it is united to the Bridegroom inseparably, and in this union
is subject to the Word and ruled by the Word, as the bride by the
bridegroom.

Reply to Objection 3: If Christ is sometimes spoken of as the Bride,
this is not because He is the Bride in very truth, but in so far as He
personifies His spouse, namely the Church, who is united to Him
spiritually. Hence nothing hinders Him, in this way of speaking, from
being said to have the dowries, not that He Himself is dowered, but the
Church.

Reply to Objection 4: The term Church is taken in two senses. For
sometimes it denotes the body only, which is united to Christ as its
Head. In this way alone has the Church the character of spouse: and in
this way Christ is not a member of the Church, but is the Head from
which all the members receive. In another sense the Church denotes the
head and members united together; and thus Christ is said to be a
member of the Church, inasmuch as He fulfills an office distinct from
all others, by pouring forth life into the other members: although He
is not very properly called a member, since a member implies a certain
restriction, whereas in Christ spiritual good is not restricted but is
absolutely entire [*Cf. [5139]TP, Q[8], A[1]], so that He is the entire
good of the Church, nor is He together with others anything greater
than He is by Himself. Speaking of the Church in this sense, the Church
denotes not only the bride, but the bridegroom and bride, in so far as
one thing results from their spiritual union. Consequently although
Christ be called a member of the Church in a certain sense, He can by
no means be called a member of the bride; and therefore the idea of a
dowry is not becoming to Him.

Reply to Objection 5: There is here a fallacy of "accident"; for these
things are not befitting to Christ if we consider them under the aspect
of dowry.
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Whether the angels receive the dowries?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels receive dowries. For a gloss
on Canticle of Canticles 6:8, "One is my dove," says: "One is the
Church among men and angels. " But the Church is the bride, wherefore it
is fitting for the members of the Church to have the dowries. Therefore
the angels have the dowries.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:36, "And you yourselves like to
men who wait for their lord, when he shall return from the wedding,"
says: "Our Lord went to the wedding when after His resurrection the new
Man espoused to Himself the angelic host. " Therefore the angelic hosts
are the spouse of Christ and consequently it is fitting that they
should have the dowries.

Objection 3: Further, the spiritual marriage consists in a spiritual
union. Now the spiritual union between the angels and God is no less
than between beatified men and God. Since, then, the dowries of which
we treat now are assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would
seem that they are becoming to the angels.

Objection 4: Further, a spiritual marriage demands a spiritual
bridegroom and a spiritual bride. Now the angels are by nature more
conformed than men to Christ as the supreme spirit. Therefore a
spiritual marriage is more possible between the angels and Christ than
between men and Christ.

Objection 5: Further, a greater conformity is required between the head
and members than between bridegroom and bride. Now the conformity
between Christ and the angels suffices for Christ to be called the Head
of the angels. Therefore for the same reason it suffices for Him to be
called their bridegroom.

On the contrary, Origen at the beginning of the prologue to his
commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes four persons, namely "the
bridegroom with the bride, the young maidens, and the companions of the
bridegroom": and he says that "the angels are the companions of the
bridegroom. " Since then the dowry is due only to the bride, it would
seem that the dowries are not becoming to the angels.

Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarnation and Passion:
wherefore this is foreshadowed in the words (Ex. 4:25), "A bloody
spouse thou art to me. " Now by His Incarnation and Passion Christ was
not otherwise united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels do
not belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as spouse.
Therefore the dowries are not becoming to the angels.

I answer that, Without any doubt, whatever pertains to the endowments
of the soul is befitting to the angels as it is to men. But considered
under the aspect of dowry they are not as becoming to the angels as to
men, because the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the
angels as to men. For there is required a conformity of nature between
bridegroom and bride, to wit that they should be of the same species.
Now men are in conformity with Christ in this way, since He took human
nature, and by so doing became conformed to all men in the specific
nature of man. on the other hand, He is not conformed to the angels in
unity of species, neither as to His Divine nor as to His human nature.
Consequently the notion of dowry is not so properly becoming to angels
as to men. Since, however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not
necessary to have a likeness in every respect, we must not argue that
one thing is not to be said of another metaphorically on account of
some lack of likeness; and consequently the argument we have adduced
does not prove that the dowries are simply unbecoming to the angels,
but only that they are not so properly befitting to angels as to men,
on account of the aforesaid lack of likeness.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels are included in the unity of
the Church, they are not members of the Church according to conformity
of nature, if we consider the Church as bride: and thus it is not
properly fitting for them to have the dowries.

Reply to Objection 2: Espousal is taken there in a broad sense, for
union without conformity of specific nature: and in this sense nothing
prevents our saying that the angels have the dowries taking these in a
broad sense.

Reply to Objection 3: In the spiritual marriage although there is no
other than a spiritual union, those whose union answers to the idea of
a perfect marriage should agree in specific nature. Hence espousal does
not properly befit the angels.

Reply to Objection 4: The conformity between the angels and Christ as
God is not such as suffices for the notion of a perfect marriage, since
so far are they from agreeing in species that there is still an
infinite distance between them.

Reply to Objection 5: Not even is Christ properly called the Head of
the angels, if we consider the head as requiring conformity of nature
with the members. We must observe, however, that although the head and
the other members are parts of an individual of one species, if we
consider each one by itself, it is not of the same species as another
member, for a hand is another specific part from the head. Hence,
speaking of the members in themselves, the only conformity required
among them is one of proportion, so that one receive from another, and
one serve another. Consequently the conformity between God and the
angels suffices for the notion of head rather than for that of
bridegroom.
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Whether three dowries of the soul are suitably assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to assign to the soul three
dowries, namely, "vision," "love" and "fruition. " For the soul is
united to God according to the mind wherein is the image of the Trinity
in respect of the memory, understanding, and will. Now love regards the
will, and vision the understanding. Therefore there should be something
corresponding to the memory, since fruition regards not the memory but
the will.

Objection 2: Further, the beatific dowries are said to correspond to
the virtues of the way, which united us to God: and these are faith,
hope, and charity, whereby God Himself is the object. Now love
corresponds to charity, and vision to faith. Therefore there should be
something corresponding to hope, since fruition corresponds rather to
charity.

Objection 3: Further, we enjoy God by love and vision only, since "we
are said to enjoy those things which we love for their own sake," as
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). Therefore fruition should not
be reckoned a distinct dowry from love.

Objection 4: Further, comprehension is required for the perfection of
beatitude: "So run that you may comprehend" (1 Cor. 9:24). Therefore we
should reckon a fourth dowry

Objection 5: Further, Anselm says (De Simil. xlviii) that the following
pertain to the soul's beatitude: "wisdom, friendship, concord, power,
honor, security, joy": and consequently the aforesaid dowries are
reckoned unsuitably.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) that "in that
beatitude God will be seen unendingly, loved without wearying, praised
untiringly. " Therefore praise should be added to the aforesaid dowries.

Objection 7: Further, Boethius reckons five things pertaining to
beatitude (De Consol. iii) and these are: Sufficiency which wealth
offers, joy which pleasure offers, celebrity which fame offers,
security which power offers, reverence which dignity offers.
Consequently it seems that these should be reckoned as dowries rather
than the aforesaid.

I answer that, All agree in reckoning three dowries of the soul, in
different ways however. For some say that the three dowries of the soul
are vision, love, and fruition. others reckon them to be vision,
comprehension, and fruition; others, vision, delight, and
comprehension. However, all these reckonings come to the same, and
their number is assigned in the same way. For it has been said
[5140](A[2]) that a dowry is something inherent to the soul, and
directing it to the operation in which beatitude consists. Now two
things are requisite in this operation: its essence which is vision,
and its perfection which is delight: since beatitude must needs be a
perfect operation. Again, a vision is delightful in two ways: first, on
the part of the object, by reason of the thing seen being delightful;
secondly, on the part of the vision, by reason of the seeing itself
being delightful, even as we delight in knowing evil things, although
the evil things themselves delight us not. And since this operation
wherein ultimate beatitude consists must needs be most perfect, this
vision must needs be delightful in both ways. Now in order that this
vision be delightful on the part of the vision, it needs to be made
connatural to the seer by means of a habit; while for it to be
delightful on the part of the visible object, two things are necessary,
namely that the visible object be suitable, and that it be united to
the seer. Accordingly for the vision to be delightful on its own part a
habit is required to elicit the vision, and thus we have one dowry,
which all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two things
are necessary. First, suitableness, which regards the affections---and
in this respect some reckon love as a dowry, others fruition (in so far
as fruition regards the affective part) since what we love most we deem
most suitable. Secondly, union is required on the part of the visible
object, and thus some reckon comprehension, which is nothing else than
to have God present and to hold Him within ourself [*Cf. [5141]FS,
Q[4], A[3]]; while others reckon fruition, not of hope, which is ours
while on the way, but of possession [*Literally "of the reality: non
spei . . . sed rei"] which is in heaven.

Thus the three dowries correspond to the three theological virtues,
namely vision to faith, comprehension (or fruition in one sense) to
hope, and fruition (or delight according to another reckoning to
charity). For perfect fruition such as will be had in heaven includes
delight and comprehension, for which reason some take it for the one,
and some for the other.

Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the three powers of the
soul, namely vision to the rational, delight to the concupiscible, and
fruition to the irascible, seeing that this fruition is acquired by a
victory. But this is not said properly, because the irascible and
concupiscible powers are not in the intellective but in the sensitive
part, whereas the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind.

Reply to Objection 1: Memory and understanding have but one act: either
because understanding is itself an act of memory, or---if understanding
denote a power---because memory does not proceed to act save through
the medium of the understanding, since it belongs to the memory to
retain knowledge. Consequently there is only one habit, namely
knowledge, corresponding to memory and understanding: wherefore only
one dowry, namely vision, corresponds to both.

Reply to Objection 2: Fruition corresponds to hope, in so far as it
includes comprehension which will take the place of hope: since we hope
for that which we have not yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on
account of the distance of the beloved: for which reason it will not
remain in heaven [Cf. [5142]SS, Q[18], A[2]] but will be succeeded by
comprehension.

Reply to Objection 3: Fruition as including comprehension is distinct
from vision and love, but otherwise than love from vision. For love and
vision denote different habits, the one belonging to the intellect, the
other to the affective faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as
denoting comprehension, does not signify a habit distinct from those
two, but the removal of the obstacles which made it impossible for the
mind to be united to God by actual vision. This is brought about by the
habit of glory freeing the soul from all defects; for instance by
making it capable of knowledge without phantasms, of complete control
over the body, and so forth, thus removing the obstacles which result
in our being pilgrims from the Lord.

Reply OBJ 4 is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the dowries are the immediate
principles of the operation in which perfect beatitude consists and
whereby the soul is united to Christ. The things mentioned by Anselm do
not answer to this description; but they are such as in any way
accompany or follow beatitude, not only in relation to the Bridegroom,
to Whom "wisdom" alone of the things mentioned by him refers, but also
in relation to others. They may be either one's equals, to whom
"friendship" refers as regards the union of affections, and "concord"
as regards consent in actions, or one's inferiors, to whom "power"
refers, so far as inferior things are ordered by superior, and "honor"
as regards that which inferiors offer to their superiors. Or again
(they may accompany or follow beatitude) in relation to oneself: to
this "security" refers as regards the removal of evil, and "joy" as
regards the attainment of good.

Reply to Objection 6: Praise, which Augustine mentions as the third of
those things which will obtain in heaven, is not a disposition to
beatitude but rather a sequel to beatitude: because from the very fact
of the soul's union with God, wherein beatitude consists, it follows
that the soul breaks forth into praise. Hence praise has not the
necessary conditions of a dowry.

Reply to Objection 7: The five things aforesaid mentioned by Boethius
are certain conditions of beatitude, but not dispositions to beatitude
or to its act, because beatitude by reason of its perfection has of
itself alone and undividedly all that men seek in various things, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7; x, 7,8). Accordingly Boethius
shows that these five things obtain in perfect beatitude, because they
are what men seek in temporal happiness. For they pertain either, as
"security," to immunity from evil, or to the attainment either of the
suitable good, as "joy," or of the perfect good, as "sufficiency," or
to the manifestation of good, as "celebrity," inasmuch as the good of
one is made known to others, or as "reverence," as indicating that good
or the knowledge thereof, for reverence is the showing of honor which
bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that these five should not
be called dowries, but conditions of beatitude.
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OF THE AUREOLES (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under this head there
are thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the aureoles differ from the essential reward?

(2) Whether they differ from the fruit?

(3) Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence only?

(4) Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of
continence?

(5) Whether an aureole is due to virgins?

(6) Whether it is due to martyrs?

(7) Whether it is due to doctors?

(8) Whether it is due to Christ?

(9) Whether to the angels?

(10) Whether it is due to the human body?

(11) Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned?

(12) Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest?

(13) Whether one has the same aureole in a higher degree than another?
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Whether the aureole is the same as the essential reward which is called the
aurea?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aureole is not distinct from the
essential reward which is called the "aurea. " For the essential reward
is beatitude itself. Now according to Boethius (De Consol. iii),
beatitude is "a state rendered perfect by the aggregate of all goods. "
Therefore the essential reward includes every good possessed in heaven;
so that the aureole is included in the "aurea. "

Objection 2: Further, "more" and "less" do not change a species. But
those who keep the counsels and commandments receive a greater reward
than those who keep the commandments only, nor seemingly does their
reward differ, except in one reward being greater than another. Since
then the aureole denotes the reward due to works of perfection it would
seem that it does not signify something distinct from the "aurea. "

Objection 3: Further, reward corresponds to merit. Now charity is the
root of all merit. Since then the "aurea" corresponds to charity, it
would seem that there will be no reward in heaven other than the
"aurea. "

Objection 4: Further, "All the blessed are taken into the angelic
orders" as Gregory declares (Hom. xxxiv in Evang. ). Now as regards the
angels, "though some of them receive certain gifts in a higher degree,
nothing is possessed by any of them exclusively, for all gifts are in
all of them, though not equally, because some are endowed more highly
than others with gifts which, however, they all possess," as Gregory
says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang. ). Therefore as regards the blessed, there
will be no reward other than that which is common to all. Therefore the
aureole is not a distinct reward from the "aurea. "

Objection 5: Further, a higher reward is due to higher merit. If, then,
the "aurea" is due to works which are of obligation, and the aureole to
works of counsel, the aureole will be more perfect than the "aurea,"
and consequently should not be expressed by a diminutive [*"Aureola,"
i. e. a little "aurea"]. Therefore it would seem that the aureole is not
a distinct reward from the "aurea. "

On the contrary, A gloss [*Ven. Bede, De Tabernaculis i, 6] on Ex.
25:24,25, "Thou shalt make . . . another little golden crown [coronam
aureolam]," says: "This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins
alone sing in the presence of the Lamb. " Wherefore apparently the
aureole is a crown awarded, not to all, but especially to some: whereas
the aurea is awarded to all the blessed. Therefore the aureole is
distinct from the "aurea. "

Further, a crown is due to the fight which is followed by victory: "He
. . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" (2 Tim. 2:5). Hence
where there is a special kind of conflict, there should be a special
crown. Now in certain works there is a special kind of conflict.
Therefore they deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an
aureole.

Further, the Church militant comes down from the Church triumphant: "I
saw the Holy City," etc. (Apoc. 21:2). Now in the Church militant
special rewards are given to those who perform special deeds, for
instance a crown to the conqueror, a prize to the runner. Therefore the
same should obtain in the Church triumphant.

I answer that, Man's essential reward, which is his beatitude, consists
in the perfect union of the soul with God, inasmuch as it enjoys God
perfectly as seen and loved perfectly. Now this reward is called a
"crown" or "aurea" metaphorically, both with reference to merit which
is gained by a kind of conflict---since "the life of man upon earth is
a warfare" (Job 7:1)---and with reference to the reward whereby in a
way man is made a participator of the Godhead, and consequently endowed
with regal power: "Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom," etc. (Apoc.
5:10); for a crown is the proper sign of regal power.

In like manner the accidental reward which is added to the essential
has the character of a crown.
For a crown signifies some kind of
perfection, on account of its circular shape, so that for this very
reason it is becoming to the perfection of the blessed. Since, however,
nothing can be added to the essential, but what is less than it, the
additional reward is called an "aureole. " Now something may be added in
two ways to this essential reward which we call the "aurea. " First, in
consequence of a condition attaching to the nature of the one rewarded:
thus the glory of the body is added to the beatitude of the soul,
wherefore this same glory of the body is sometimes called an "aureole. "
Thus a gloss of Bede on Ex. 25:25, "Thou . . . shalt make another
little golden crown," says that "finally the aureole is added, when it
is stated in the Scriptures that a higher degree of glory is in store
for us when our bodies are resumed. " But it is not in this sense that
we speak of an aureole now. Secondly, in consequence of the nature of
the meritorious act. Now this has the character of merit on two counts,
whence also it has the character of good. First, to wit, from its root
which is charity, since it is referred to the last end, and thus there
is due to it the essential reward, namely the attainment of the end,
and this is the "aurea. " Secondly, from the very genus of the act which
derives a certain praiseworthiness from its due circumstances, from the
habit eliciting it and from its proximate end, and thus is due to it a
kind of accidental reward which we call an "aureole": and it is in this
sense that we regard the aureole now. Accordingly it must be said that
an "aureole" denotes something added to the "aurea," a kind of joy, to
wit, in the works one has done, in that they have the character of a
signal victory: for this joy is distinct from the joy in being united
to God, which is called the "aurea. " Some, however, affirm that the
common reward, which is the "aurea," receives the name of "aureole,"
according as it is given to virgins, martyrs, or doctors: even as money
receives the name of debt through being due to some one, though the
money and the debt are altogether the same. And that nevertheless this
does not imply that the essential reward is any greater when it is
called an "aureole"; but that it corresponds to a more excellent act,
more excellent not in intensity of merit but in the manner of meriting;
so that although two persons may have the Divine vision with equal
clearness, it is called an "aureole" in one and not in the other in so
far as it corresponds to higher merit as regards the way of meriting.
But this would seem contrary to the meaning of the gloss quoted above.
For if "aurea" and "aureole" were the same, the "aureole" would not be
described as added to the "aurea. " Moreover, since reward corresponds
to merit, a more excellent reward must needs correspond to this more
excellent way of meriting: and it is this excellence that we call an
"aureole. " Hence it follows that an "aureole" differs from the "aurea. "

Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude includes all the goods necessary for
man's perfect life consisting in his perfect operation. Yet some things
can be added, not as being necessary for that perfect operation as
though it were impossible without them, but as adding to the glory of
beatitude. Hence they regard the well-being of beatitude and a certain
fitness thereto. Even so civic happiness is embellished by nobility and
bodily beauty and so forth, and yet it is possible without them as
stated in Ethic. i, 8: and thus is the aureole in comparison with the
happiness of heaven.

Reply to Objection 2: He who keeps the counsels and the commandments
always merits more than he who keeps the commandments only, if we
gather the notion of merit in works from the very genus of those works;
but not always if we gauge the merit from its root, charity: since
sometimes a man keeps the commandments alone out of greater charity
than one who keeps both commandments and counsels. For the most part,
however, the contrary happens, because the "proof of love is in the
performance of deeds," as Gregory says (Hom. xxx in Evang. ). Wherefore
it is not the more excellent essential reward that is called an
aureole, but that which is added to the essential reward without
reference to the essential reward of the possessor of an aureole being
greater, or less than, or equal to the essential reward of one who has
no aureole.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity is the first principle of merit: but our
actions are the instruments, so to speak, whereby we merit. Now in
order to obtain an effect there is requisite not only a due disposition
in the first mover, but also a right disposition in the instrument.
Hence something principal results in the effect with reference to the
first mover, and something secondary with reference to the instrument.
Wherefore in the reward also there is something on the part of charity,
namely the "aurea," and something on the part of the kind of work,
namely the "aureole. "

Reply to Objection 4: All the angels merited their beatitude by the
same kind of act namely by turning to God: and consequently no
particular reward is found in anyone which another has not in some way.
But men merit beatitude by different kinds of acts: and so the
comparison fails.

Nevertheless among men what one seems to have specially, all have in
common in some way, in so far as each one, by charity, deems another's
good his own. Yet this joy whereby one shares another's joy cannot be
called an aureole, because it is not given him as a reward for his
victory, but regards more the victory of another: whereas a crown is
awarded the victors themselves and not to those who rejoice with them
in the victory.

Reply to Objection 5: The merit arising from charity is more excellent
than that which arises from the kind of action: just as the end to
which charity directs us is more excellent than the things directed to
that end, and with which our actions are concerned. Wherefore the
reward corresponding to merit by reason of charity, however little it
may be, is greater than any reward corresponding to an action by reason
of its genus. Hence "aureole" is used as a diminutive in comparison
with "aurea. "
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Whether the aureole differs from the fruit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aureole does not differ from the
fruit. For different rewards are not due to the same merit. Now the
aureole and the hundredfold fruit correspond to the same merit,
according to a gloss on Mat. 13:8, "Some a hundredfold. " Therefore the
aureole is the same as the fruit.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virgin xlv) that the
"hundredfold fruit is due to the martyrs, and also to virgins. "
Therefore the fruit is a reward common to virgins and martyrs. But the
aureole also is due to them. Therefore the aureole is the same as the
fruit.

Objection 3: Further, there are only two rewards in beatitude, namely
the essential, and the accidental which is added to the essential. Now
that which is added to the essential reward is called an aureole, as
evidenced by the statement (Ex. 25:25) that the little crown [aureola]
is added to the crown. But the fruit is not the essential reward, for
in that case it would be due to all the blessed. Therefore it is the
same as the aureole.

On the contrary, Things which are not divided in the same way are not
of the same nature. Now fruit and aureole are not divided in the same
way, since aureole is divided into the aureole of virgins, of martyrs,
and of doctors: whereas fruit is divided into the fruit of the married,
of widows, and of virgins. Therefore fruit and aureole are not the
same.

Further, if fruit and aureole were the same, the aureole would be due
to whomsoever the fruit is due. But this is manifestly untrue, since a
fruit is due to widowhood, while an aureole is not. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Metaphorical expressions can be taken in various ways,
according as we find resemblances to the various properties of the
thing from which the comparison is taken. Now since fruit, properly
speaking, is applied to material things born of the earth, we employ it
variously in a spiritual sense, with reference to the various
conditions that obtain in material fruits. For the material fruit has
sweetness whereby it refreshes so far as it is used by man: again it is
the last thing to which the operation of nature attains: moreover it is
that to which husbandry looks forward as the result of sowing or any
other process. Accordingly fruit is taken in a spiritual sense
sometimes for that which refreshes as being the last end: and according
to this signification we are said to enjoy [frui] God perfectly in
heaven, and imperfectly on the way. From this signification we have
fruition which is a dowry: but we are not speaking of fruit in this
sense now. Sometimes fruit signifies spiritually that which refreshes
only, though it is not the last end; and thus the virtues are called
fruits, inasmuch as "they refresh the mind with genuine sweetness," as
Ambrose says [*De Parad. xiii]. In this sense fruit is taken (Gal.
6:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy," etc. Nor again is
this the sense in which we speak of fruit now; for we have treated of
this already [*Cf. [5143]FS, Q[70], A[1], ad 2].

We may, however, take spiritual fruit in another sense, in likeness to
material fruit, inasmuch as material fruit is a profit expected from
the labor of husbandry: so that we call fruit that reward which man
acquires from his labor in this life: and thus every reward which by
our labors we shall acquire for the future life is called a "fruit. " In
this sense fruit is taken (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto
sanctification, and the end life everlasting. " Yet neither in this
sense do we speak of fruit now, but we are treating of fruit as being
the product of seed: for it is in this sense that our Lord speaks of
fruit (Mat. 13:23), where He divides fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold,
and hundredfold. Now fruit is the product of seed in so far as the seed
power is capable of transforming the humors of the soil into its own
nature; and the more efficient this power, and the better prepared the
soil, the more plentiful fruit will result. Now the spiritual seed
which is sown in us is the Word of God: wherefore the more a person is
transformed into a spiritual nature by withdrawing from carnal things,
the greater is the fruit of the Word in him. Accordingly the fruit of
the Word of God differs from the aurea and the aureole, in that the
"aurea" consists in the joy one has in God, and the "aureole" in the
joy one has in the perfection of one's works, whereas the "fruit"
consists in the joy that the worker has in his own disposition as to
his degree of spirituality to which he has attained through the seed of
God's Word.

Some, however, distinguish between aureole and fruit, by saying that
the aureole is due to the fighter, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, "He . . .
shall not be crowned, except he strive lawfully"; whereas the fruit is
due to the laborer, according to the saying of Wis. 3:15, "The fruit of
good labors is glorious. " Others again say that the "aurea" regards
conversion to God, while the "aureole" and the "fruit" regard things
directed to the end; yet so that the fruit regards the will rather, and
the aureole the body. Since, however, labor and strife are in the same
subject and about the same matter, and since the body's reward depends
on the soul's, these explanations of the difference between fruit,
aurea and aureole would only imply a logical difference: and this
cannot be, since fruit is assigned to some to whom no aureole is
assigned.

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing incongruous if various rewards
correspond to the same merit according to the various things contained
therein. Wherefore to virginity corresponds the aurea in so far as
virginity is kept for God's sake at the command of charity; the
aureole, in so far as virginity is a work of perfection having the
character of a signal victory; and the fruit, in so far as by virginity
a person acquires a certain spirituality by withdrawing from carnal
things.

Reply to Objection 2: Fruit, according to the proper acceptation as we
are speaking of it now, does not denote the reward common to martyrdom
and virginity, by that which corresponds to the three degrees of
continency. This gloss which states that the hundredfold fruit
corresponds to martyrs takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any
reward is called a fruit, the hundredfold fruit thus denoting the
reward due to any perfect works whatever.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the aureole is an accidental reward
added to the essential reward, nevertheless not every accidental reward
is an aureole, but only that which is assigned to works of perfection,
whereby man is most conformed to Christ in the achievement of a perfect
victory. Hence it is not unfitting that another accidental reward,
which is called the fruit, be due sometimes to the withdrawal from a
carnal life.
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Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that a fruit is not due to the virtue of
continence alone. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:41, "One is the glory of the
sun," says that "the worth of those who have the hundredfold fruit is
compared to the glory of the sun; to the glory of the moon those who
have the sixtyfold fruit; and to the stars those who have the
thirtyfold fruit. " Now this difference of glory, in the meaning of the
Apostle, regards any difference whatever of beatitude. Therefore the
various fruits should correspond to none but the virtue of continence.

Objection 2: Further, fruits are so called from fruition. But fruition
belongs to the essential reward which corresponds to all the virtues.
Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, fruit is due to labor: "The fruit of good labors
is glorious" (Wis. 3:15). Now there is greater labor in fortitude than
in temperance or continence. Therefore fruit does not correspond to
continence alone.

Objection 4: Further, it is more difficult not to exceed the measure in
food which is necessary for life, than in sexual matters without which
life can be sustained: and thus the labor of frugality is greater than
that of continence. Therefore fruit corresponds to frugality rather
than to continence.

Objection 5: Further, fruit implies delight, and delight regards
especially the end. Since then the theological virtues have the end for
their object, namely God Himself, it would seem that to them especially
the fruit should correspond.

On the contrary, is the statement of the gloss on Mat. 13:23, "The one
a hundredfold," which assigns the fruits to virginity, widowhood, and
conjugal continence, which are parts of continence.

I answer that, A fruit is a reward due to a person in that he passes
from the carnal to the spiritual life. Consequently a fruit corresponds
especially to that virtue which more than any other frees man from
subjection to the flesh. Now this is the effect of continence, since it
is by sexual pleasures that the soul is especially subject to the
flesh; so much so that in the carnal act, according to Jerome (Ep. ad
Ageruch. ), "not even the spirit of prophecy touches the heart of the
prophet," nor "is it possible to understand anything in the midst of
that pleasure," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11). Therefore
fruit corresponds to continence rather than to another virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss takes fruit in a broad sense,
according as any reward is called a fruit.

Reply to Objection 2: Fruition does not take its name from fruit by
reason of any comparison with fruit in the sense in which we speak of
it now, as evidenced by what has been said.

Reply to Objection 3: Fruit, as we speak of it now, corresponds to
labor not as resulting in fatigue, but as resulting in the production
of fruit. Hence a man calls his crops his labor, inasmuch as he labored
for them, or produced them by his labor. Now the comparison to fruit,
as produced from seed, is more adapted to continence than to fortitude,
because man is not subjected to the flesh by the passions of fortitude,
as he is by the passions with which continence is concerned.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the pleasures of the table are more
necessary than the pleasures of sex, they are not so strong: wherefore
the soul is not so much subjected to the flesh thereby.

Reply to Objection 5: Fruit is not taken here in the sense in which
fruition applies to delight in the end; but in another sense as stated
above (A[2] ). Hence the argument proves nothing.
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Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of
continence?

Objection 1: It would seem that three fruits are unfittingly assigned
to the three parts of continence: because twelve fruits of the Spirit
are assigned, "charity, joy, peace," etc. (Gal. 5:22). Therefore
seemingly we should reckon only three.

Objection 2: Further, fruit denotes a special reward. Now the reward
assigned to virgins, widows, and married persons is not a special
reward, because all who are to be saved are comprised under one of
these three, since no one is saved who lacks continence, and continence
is adequately divided by these three. Therefore three fruits are
unfittingly assigned to the three aforesaid.

Objection 3: Further, just as widowhood surpasses conjugal continence,
so does virginity surpass widowhood. But the excess of sixtyfold over
thirtyfold is not as the excess of a hundredfold over sixtyfold;
neither in arithmetical proportion, since sixty exceeds thirty by
thirty, and a hundred exceeds sixty by forty; nor in geometrical
proportion, since sixty is twice thirty and a hundred surpasses sixty
as containing the whole and two-thirds thereof. Therefore the fruits
are unfittingly adapted to the degrees of continence.

Objection 4: Further, the statements contained in Holy Writ stand for
all time: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not
pass away" (Lk. 21:33): whereas human institutions are liable to change
every day. Therefore human institutions are not to be taken as a
criterion of the statements of Holy Writ: and it would seem in
consequence that the explanation of these fruits given by Bede is
unfitting. For he says (Expos. in Luc. iii, 8) that "the thirtyfold
fruit is assigned to married persons, because in the signs drawn on the
'abacus' the number 30 is denoted by the thumb and index finger
touching one another at the tips as though kissing one another: so that
the number 30 denotes the embraces of married persons. The number 60 is
denoted by the contact of the index finger above the middle joint of
the thumb, so that the index finger by lying over the thumb and
weighing on it, signifies the burden which widows have to bear in this
world. When, however, in the course of enumeration we come to the
number 100 we pass from the left to the right hand, so that the number
100 denotes virginity, which has a share in the angelic excellence; for
the angels are on the right hand, i. e. in glory, while we are on the
left on account of the imperfection of the present life. "

I answer that, By continence, to which the fruit corresponds, man is
brought to a kind of spiritual nature, by withdrawing from carnal
things. Consequently various fruits are distinguished according to the
various manners of the spirituality resulting from continence. Now
there is a certain spirituality which is necessary, and one which is
superabundant. The spirituality that is necessary consists in the
rectitude of the spirit not being disturbed by the pleasures of the
flesh: and this obtains when one makes use of carnal pleasures
according to the order of right reason. This is the spirituality of
married persons. Spirituality is superabundant when a man withdraws
himself entirely from those carnal pleasures which stifle the spirit.
This may be done in two ways: either in respect of all time past,
present, and future, and this is the spirituality of virgins; or in
respect of a particular time, and this is the spirituality of widows.
Accordingly to those who keep conjugal continence, the thirtyfold fruit
is awarded; to those who keep the continence of widows, the sixtyfold
fruit; and to those who keep virginal continence, the hundredfold
fruit: and this for the reason given by Bede quoted above, although
another motive may be found in the very nature of the numbers. For 30
is the product of 3 multiplied by 10. Now 3 is the number of
everything, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo i, and contains a certain
perfection common to all, namely of beginning, middle, and end.
Wherefore the number 30 is fittingly assigned to married persons, in
whom no other perfection is added to the observance of the Decalogue,
signified by the number 10, than the common perfection without which
there is no salvation. The number six the multiplication of which by 10
amounts to 60 has perfection from its parts, being the aggregate of all
its parts taken together; wherefore it corresponds fittingly to
widowhood, wherein we find perfect withdrawal from carnal pleasures as
to all its circumstances (which are the parts so to speak of a virtuous
act), since widowhood uses no carnal pleasures in connection with any
person, place, or any other circumstance; which was not the case with
conjugal continence. The number 100 corresponds fittingly to virginity;
because the number 10 of which 100 is a multiple is the limit of
numbers: and in like manner virginity occupies the limit of
spirituality, since no further spirituality can be added to it. The
number 100 also being a square number has perfection from its figure:
for a square figure is prefect through being equal on all sides, since
all its sides are equal: wherefore it is adapted to virginity wherein
incorruption is found equally as to all times.

Reply to Objection 1: Fruit is not taken there in the sense in which we
are taking it now.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing obliges us to hold that fruit is a reward
that is not common to all who will be saved. For not only the essential
reward is common to all, but also a certain accidental reward, such as
joy in those works without which one cannot be saved. Yet it may be
said that the fruits are not becoming to all who will be saved, as is
evidently the case with those who repent in the end after leading an
incontinent life, for to such no fruit is due but only the essential
reward.

Reply to Objection 3: The distinction of the fruits is to be taken
according to the species and figures of the numbers rather than
according to their quantity. Nevertheless even if we regard the excess
in point of quantity, we may find an explanation. For the married man
abstains only from one that is not his, the widow from both hers and
not hers, so that in the latter case we find the notion of double, just
as 60 is the double of 30. Again 100 is 60 X 40, which latter number is
the product of 4 X 10, and the number 4 is the first solid and square
number. Thus the addition of this number is fitting to virginity, which
adds perpetual incorruption to the perfection of widowhood.

Reply to Objection 4: Although these numerical signs are a human
institution, they are founded somewhat on the nature of things, in so
far as the numbers are denoted in gradation, according to the order of
the aforesaid joints and contacts.
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Whether an aureole is due on account of virginity?

Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due on account of
virginity. For where there is greater difficulty in the work, a greater
reward is due. Now widows have greater difficulty than virgins in
abstaining from the works of the flesh. For Jerome says (Ep. ad
Ageruch. ) that the greater difficulty certain persons experience in
abstaining from the allurements of pleasure, the greater their reward,
and he is speaking in praise of widows. Moreover, the Philosopher says
(De Anim. Hist. vii) that "young women who have been deflowered desire
sexual intercourse the more for the recollection of the pleasure. "
Therefore the aureole which is the greatest reward is due to widows
more than to virgins.

Objection 2: Further, if an aureole were due to virginity, it would be
especially found where there is the most perfect virginity. Now the
most prefect virginity is in the Blessed Virgin, wherefore she is
called the Virgin of virgins: and yet no aureole is due to her because
she experienced no conflict in being continent, for she was not
infected with the corruption of the fomes [*Cf. [5144]TP, Q[27], A[3]].
Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Objection 3: Further, a special reward is not due to that which has not
been at all times praiseworthy. Now it would not have been praiseworthy
to observe virginity in the state of innocence, since then was it
commanded: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth" (Gn. 1:28): nor
again during the time of the Law, since the barren were accursed.
Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Objection 4: Further, the same reward is not due to virginity observed,
and virginity lost. Yet an aureole is sometimes due to lost virginity;
for instance if a maiden be violated unwillingly at the order of a
tyrant for confessing Christ. Therefore an aureole is not due to
virginity.

Objection 5: Further, a special reward is not due to that which is in
us by nature. But virginity is inborn in every man both good and
wicked. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Objection 6: Further, as widowhood is to the sixtyfold fruit, so is
virginity to the hundredfold fruit, and to the aureole.