No More Learning

6:4).
Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed
bodies.

On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was
stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise
functions of life through assumed bodies.

I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in
common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of
a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so
far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far
as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in
assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such
operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects;
because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that which
has the faculty has the action. " Hence nothing can have a function of
life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such
action.

Reply to Objection 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for
intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible
figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that
intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of
intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through
sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels
that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men,
although they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for
this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may
be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not
so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men; because the
properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels.

Reply to Objection 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function.
Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through
the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned
in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation
through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual
powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power
of the angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other
members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. ).

Reply to Objection 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper
function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus
moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved
accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as
movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is not
moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is
everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the
movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the
movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the
movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change
place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is
there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the
world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but
according to a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is always in
the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.

Reply to Objection 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through
their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as
they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.

Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to
eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the
substance of the eater.

Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the
substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter;
nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be
changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by
angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of
such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was
not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the
angel said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and
to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink" (Tob. 12:19).

Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom,
nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the prophets,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).

Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons
affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as
have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk
call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have
sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny
it. But God's holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the
deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth,
who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates
those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at
that giants should be born of them; for they were not all giants,
albeit there were many more before than after the deluge. " Still if
some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of
such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men
taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a
woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other
things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii),
so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE (THREE ARTICLES)

We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are
three subjects of inquiry:

(1) Is the angel in a place?

(2) Can he be in several places at once?

(3) Can several angels be in the same place?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an angel is in a place?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom. ): "The common opinion of the learned is that
things incorporeal are not in a place. " And again, Aristotle observes
(Phys. iv, text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing which is in
a place, but only a movable body. " But an angel is not a body, as was
shown above [478](Q[50]). Therefore an angel is not in a place.

Objection 2: Further, place is a "quantity having position. " But
everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a
position cannot benefit an angel, since his substance is devoid of
quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position.
Therefore an angel is not in a place.

Objection 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be
contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. iv,
text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a
place, because the container is more formal than the contained; as air
with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is not
in a place.

On the contrary, It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline,
Dominican Breviary]: "Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in
peace. "

I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel
and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A body
is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place
according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such
quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an
angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic
power in any manner whatever to any place.

Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed
commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the
continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with
dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this
account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an
incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes
into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body
as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is
said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained,
but as somehow containing it.

And hereby we have the answers to the objections.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an angel can be in several places at once?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at
once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But
the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part
of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be
in several places at once.

Objection 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and,
since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he
is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are
various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "where the
angel operates, there he is. " But occasionally he operates in several
places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gn.
19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while the
angels are in heaven, they are not on earth. "

I answer that, An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the
Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things,
is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and
is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the
angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one
determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be
compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all
being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one
particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since
the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place,
it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in
only one place.

Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were
unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the
indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently
they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point.
But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something
indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is
indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation.
Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one
indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible
or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own
free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the
entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one
place to him.

Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be
everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to what is
first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there
is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the
Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly
mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers
do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres
immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.

So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite
differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a
place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An
angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is
not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place
in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither
circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.

From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the
entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied, is
reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?

Objection 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same time
in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the
same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a
place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as
appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several
angels can be in the one place.

Objection 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel
and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body
are at the one time in the one place: because there is no place which
is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv,
text. 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.

Objection 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according
to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess
souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon
are at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same
reason all other spiritual substances.

On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore
for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place.

I answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason
of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the
causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every
class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and
there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote
movers. Nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat,
since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one man's strength
is sufficient for moving the boat; while all together are as one mover,
in so far as their united strengths all combine in producing the one
movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact
that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect
container, as was said [479](A[1]), there can be but one angel in one
place.

Reply to Objection 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the
same place because of their filling the place; but for another reason,
as has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the
same way; hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a
body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its
form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which
heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.

(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through
intervening space?

(3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an angel can be moved locally?

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as
the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid
of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is
not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," for it is then
already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved,
while it is being moved, is partly in the term "wherefrom" and partly
in the term "whereto. " But an angel is without parts. Therefore an
angel cannot be moved locally.

Objection 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as
the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not
imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.

Objection 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy
angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.

On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved
as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said
that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith
that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is
moved locally.

I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to
be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so
likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it
is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence
it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with
the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the
continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and
according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as
commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is
not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate
with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the
place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous
movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as
was said above ([480]Q[52], A[1]), it follows necessarily that the
movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various
contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an
angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above
([481]Q[52], A[2]). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be
continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in
such contacts. Because, as was said above ([482]Q[52], A[1]), there is
nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel
according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to
a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not
all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises
continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively
quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement
will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in
the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus
his movement will not be continuous.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold
reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what
is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place
necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which
is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be
said that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and
while it is in the term "whereto": because the very succession of
"wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in
whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said to be
moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing
which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is
not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be
not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly
in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the
angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not
hold good. But according as the angel's movement is held to be
continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement,
he is partly in the term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto"
(yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance,
but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the
angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved;
but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place
which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This
very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the
angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his
power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows
regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is
divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his
power can be applied to something which is divisible.

Reply to Objection 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is
the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application
of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.

Reply to Objection 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is
the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for
any need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of
our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are
all [*Vulg. : 'Are they not all . . . ? '] ministering spirits, sent to
minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through
intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space
first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing
through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is
indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes
through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement:
which is not possible.

Objection 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul.
But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another
without going through the middle: for I can think of France and
afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands
between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to
another without going through the middle.

On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then,
when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but is
changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change:
consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he
was not moved so long as he was in the term "whence. " Therefore, he was
moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him to
pass through intervening space.

I answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the
local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it
be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another
without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the
Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), "The middle is that into
which a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the
last into which it is moved"; because the order of first and last in
continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last in
magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99).

But if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him to
pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle:
which is evident thus.
Between the two extreme limits there are
infinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible
or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which
are indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite
intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a
middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of
necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the
continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to
place except in time. But in the whole time which measures the movement
of a body, there are not two "nows" in which the body moved is not in
one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same place in
two "nows," it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be
at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and
previously. Therefore since there are infinite "nows" between the first
and the last "now" of the time which measures the movement, there must
be infinite places between the first from which the movement begins,
and the last where the movement ceases. This again is made evident from
sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm's length, and let
there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is
evident that the first place from which the movement starts is that of
the one palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that of the
other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually
quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as the
magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate places
multiplied; because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first
palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude
of the other palm is the limit of the same. Accordingly, since
magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are
likewise infinite in potentiality, it follows that between every two
places there are infinite intermediate places.

Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate
places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the intermediate
places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned
some infinitudes in movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the
movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement will be
actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by
continuous movement, it follows, either that it does not pass through
all the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite
places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then, as the angel's
movement is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate
places.

Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going
through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature; but
not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained
under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its
movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained
thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence it is under his
control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or
without the intervening place.

Reply to Objection 1: The place of an angel is not taken as equal to
him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so
the angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet
even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above:
but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident
from the foregoing.

Reply to Objection 2: While an angel is moved locally, his essence is
applied to various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the
things thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there
is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: In continuous movement the actual change is not a
part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede
change. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in
movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is a
part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even
without the mid-space, constitutes such movement.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous.
For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist
the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel
moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a
body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the
lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other
length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in
time, an angel is moved in an instant.

Objection 2: Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily
change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as
illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated successively,
as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner
what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel's
movement instantaneous.

Objection 3: Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time,
it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term
"whereto": but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the
place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term "wherefrom"; or
else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that
he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the
preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom. " Therefore he rests there:
since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as
was said [483](A[2]). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except
in the last instant of time.

On the contrary, In every change there is a before and after. Now the
before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently every
movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and
after in it.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel
is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place to
place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term
"wherefrom"; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term
"whereto. " Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just
as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But there is
a mid-time between two "nows" of time: hence they say that a last "now"
cannot be assigned in which it was in the term "wherefrom," just as in
illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, there is no
last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the
matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a last time can
be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in
the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and
substantial generation are called instantaneous movements.

But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus.
It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise
disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time
which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the same "where" in the
first, in the middle, and in the last "now. " On the other hand, it is
of the very nature of movement for the subject moved to be otherwise
now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time which
measures movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions;
hence in the last "now" it must have a different form from what it had
before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some
(disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it in every
instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in
one term during the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the
last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible
in movement: because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the
same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore all
instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement:
just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and
illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating
body. Now the local movement of an angel is not the term of any other
continuous movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other
movement. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place
during the whole time, and that in the last "now" he is in another
place: but some "now" must be assigned in which he was last in the
preceding place. But where there are many "nows" succeeding one
another, there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than the
reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the
movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his
movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time if his movement is
non-continuous for, as was said [484](A[1]), his movement can be of
either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of
movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99).

But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the
time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all
corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the
movement of the heavens; because the angel's movement does not depend
upon the movement of the heavens.

Reply to Objection 1: If the time of the angel's movement be not
continuous, but a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no
proportion to the time which measures the movement of corporeal things,
which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however,
it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of
the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the
proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides, the
swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity of
his power, but according to the determination of his will.

Reply to Objection 2: Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an
alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood
to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But
the angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of
movement; hence there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection is based on continuous time. But
the same time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel
can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next
instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel's
movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places
throughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now'; as was already
shown [485](A[2]). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous
places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible
of parts, but because his power is applied to a part of the first place
and to a part of the second, as was said above [486](A[2]).
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OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)

After considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now proceed
to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first
place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into
his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects known: and fourthly,
into the manner whereby he knows them.

Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Is the angel's understanding his substance?

(2) Is his being his understanding?

(3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?

(4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?

(5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the
intellect?
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Whether an angel's act of understanding is his substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his
substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active
intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its
own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his
Commentator [*Averroes, A. D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more is the
angel's substance his action---that is, his act of understanding.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that
"the action of the intellect is life. " But "since in living things to
live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life
is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an
angel who understands.

Objection 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not
differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the
middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are
the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence.
Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and
the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who
understands.

On the contrary, The action of anything differs more from its substance
than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance,
for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above
([487]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any
other creature, is its substance.

I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any
creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the
actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance
or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure
act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own
actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone
is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His
existence and His action.

Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it
would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of
intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.
Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from
God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in
itself, nor from the substance of another angel.

Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then
be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes
about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.

Reply to Objection 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own
action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because,
since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in
itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive
intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to
act.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation between "life" and "to live" is not
the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that
between "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the
abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if
"to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence. " Although life is
sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), "Memory
and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it is not
taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the act of
the intellect is life. "

Reply to Objection 3: The action which is transient, passing to some
extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject
receiving the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not
really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according to
the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object
with the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the
union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an
effect which differs from both.
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Whether in the angel to understand is to exist?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist.
For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live" (De
Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.

Objection 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect
to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the
form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel
to understand is to exist.

On the contrary, The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as
is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement.
Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.

I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any
creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text.
16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to
something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and
another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the
agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing
outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent.
It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be
the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified
as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from
the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature
has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple
infinity, we have the act "to understand," of which the object is "the
true"; and the act "to will," of which the object is "the good"; each
of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will,
of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its
species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively
infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does
to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to
one in genus and species; God's being alone is simply infinite,
comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its
own act of will.

Reply to Objection 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the
living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one
whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher
says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he
distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the
various functions of life.

Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his
entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding,
since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in
its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the
existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is
compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely,
truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the
same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding
according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow
that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand. '
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Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of
understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and
"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages of
his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds. "
Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.

Objection 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything
besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which
is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple
form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an
angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been
previously said ([488]Q[50], A[2]).

Objection 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the
angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh
unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler
nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter
is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of
intelligence.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are
divided into substance, power, and operation. " Therefore substance,
power, and operation, are all distinct in them.

I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or
operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus.
Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the
diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account
it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in
every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared
to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been
already said ([489]Q[44], A[1]). Now the act to which the operative
power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not
the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other
created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is
not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its
power of operation.

Reply to Objection 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind,"
because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a
soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.

Reply to Objection 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the
subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as
potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is
Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own
existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the
subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the
species: for such accident belongs to the form---whereas an accident
which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole
species, results from the matter, which is the principle of
individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard
to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards
accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
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Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive
intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17)
that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby
it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make
all things. " But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an
active and a passive intellect in an angel.

Objection 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is
to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active
intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel
receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one.
Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.

On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us
is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive
intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors
to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not
so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in
the angel.

I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is
derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in
potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power,
which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to
intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it
apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the
power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for
admitting an active intellect is due to this---that the natures of the
material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as
immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in
potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is
necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such
natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the
active intellect.

But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are
neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to
such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their
intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they
first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear
later ([490]Q[84], A[7]; [491]Q[85], A[1]). Therefore there cannot be
an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally.

Reply to Objection 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher
understands those two things to be in every nature in which there
chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not
generated in the angels, but is present naturally.