No More Learning

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only
vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1
Thess. 5:22, "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves. " The
Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should
avoid "not only what is really evil, but also those things that are
regarded as evil. "

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 1) the virtuous man
despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve,
wherefore he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain
extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.

Reply to Objection 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as
though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it:
wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the
first foundation of temperance," by inspiring man with the horror of
whatever is disgraceful.
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OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as
synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum. ]

We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;

(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral
goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];

(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;

(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?
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Whether honesty is the same as virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is
desired for its own sake. " Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake,
but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9)
that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue. " Therefore honesty
is not the same as virtue.

Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an
honorable state. " Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since
"it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12).
Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior
choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems
to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, "Let
all things be done decently [honeste] and according to order" among
you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Objection 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth.
According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death
[poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are omitted
in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has 'honestas']. But
virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not
the same as virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty
into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided.
Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable
state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy
of honor. Now honor, as stated above ([3466]Q[144], A[2], ad 2), is due
to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according
to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly
speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of
those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for
their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as
happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for
their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in
themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but
also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to
some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for
their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that
"some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own
worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge. " And this suffices to give a
thing the character of honest.

Reply to Objection 2: Some of the things which are honored besides
virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and
such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue
which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the
name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in
so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank,
power, and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 3) that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it
is only the good man who is worthy of honor. " Now a man is good in
respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the
latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is due
to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the
character of honesty.

Reply to Objection 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which
honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as
stated above ([3467]Q[103], AA[1],2). But one attests only to what one
knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external
actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so
far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists
radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the
external conduct.

Reply to Objection 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is
commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes
the name of honesty is given to external prosperity.
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Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?

Objection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the
beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since
the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent.
Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision
to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the
honest.

Objection 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is
characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then
honor and glory differ, as stated above ([3468]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), it
seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.

Objection 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above
[3469](A[1]). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it
is written (Ezech. 16:15): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the
harlot because of thy renown. " Therefore the honest is not the same as
the beautiful.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23,24): "Those that are
our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness
[honestatem], but our comely [honesta] parts have no need. " Now by
uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the
beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are
apparently the same.

I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div.
Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity
and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as
being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe. " Hence the
beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well
proportioned, together with a certain clarity of color. In like manner
spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or actions being well
proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is
what is meant by honesty, which we have stated [3470](A[1]) to be the
same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all
that is connected with man. Wherefore "honesty is the same as spiritual
beauty. " Hence Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 30): "By honesty I mean
intelligible beauty, which we properly designate as spiritual," and
further on he adds that "many things are beautiful to the eye, which it
would be hardly proper to call honest. "

Reply to Objection 1: The object that moves the appetite is an
apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon
as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good.
Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good
are beloved by all. " Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies
spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully
says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest the form and the features, so
to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as
Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom. "

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3471]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory
is the effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a
person acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the
same thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing
honest and beautiful.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body:
although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to
play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to Ezech.
28:17, "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy
wisdom in thy beauty. "
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Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?

Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the
useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its
own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired
for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes
to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the
honest does not differ from the pleasant.

Objection 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful
good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that
attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very
nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is
money. " Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written
(Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God," and
(Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship
with one more honorable," i. e. richer, "than himself. " Therefore the
honest differs not from the useful.

Objection 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can
be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De
Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Q[83], qu. 30): "The honest is that
which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to
something else. "

I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful
and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated
above [3472](A[2]), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a
certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is
regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man.
Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man:
and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic.
i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing may be
becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A
pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects his
nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to
something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly the honest the
useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.

Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as
having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its
spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to
desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant,
however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since
whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the
converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).

Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired
for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is
in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it
is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the
opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to
be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing
incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it
follows that it is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in
accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some
respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say
that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are
honest.
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Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part
of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole
in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty,"
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not
a part of temperance.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . .
makes all thoughts honest. " But the use of wine, especially in excess,
in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains
to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a
part of temperance.

Objection 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor.
Now "it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to
the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to
temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said
as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for
the most venerable and most holy laws. "

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part
of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as
pertaining especially to temperance.

I answer that, As stated above [3473](A[2]), honesty is a kind of
spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and
opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty
belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is
most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by
its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to
which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires. Accordingly
honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is
reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed
virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.

Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of
honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is
reckoned a part of temperance.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his
thoughts honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems
himself great and deserving of honor [*Cf. [3474] Q[148], A[6]].

Reply to Objection 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude
than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good:
yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it
holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above.
Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule
given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that "our uncomely
parts have more abundant comeliness," which, namely, destroys whatever
is uncomely.
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OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those
which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about
pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence,
which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically
about drink.

With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1)
Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice
which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
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Whether abstinence is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power
[virtute]. " Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for
the Apostle says (Rom. 14:17): "The kingdom of God is not meat and
drink," where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11]
observes that "justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating. "
Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing
himself to God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to
take food as physic. " Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical
art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one's
food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in
Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but
to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment.
Therefore abstinence is
not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence
excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "impatience
not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its peaceful
seclusion. " Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "sometimes the sin
of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer," so that abstinence
excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:5,6): "Join with your faith
virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence";
where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence
is a virtue.

I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of
food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as
denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies
neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent.
Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies
either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of
Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we ought "to join
abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining from food a man
should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own
person, and for the requirements of health.

Reply to Objection 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered
in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 8:8): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we
eat not [*Vulg. : 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'], shall we
have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i. e.
spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in so
far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.

Reply to Objection 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quantity
and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of
the body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the
good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ.
Evang. ii, qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or
how much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for
the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the
requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and
uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to
abstain. "

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures
which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to
strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of
reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a
certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name,
so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which all its
parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part of
temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in
so far as it is in accord with right reason.

Reply to Objection 4: Those vices result from abstinence in so far as
it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one
abstain as one ought, i. e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end,
i. e. for God's glory and not one's own.
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Whether abstinence is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For
every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not
praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the
virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues. "
Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet.
xlii) that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any
creature of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body. " Now
this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore
abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.

Objection 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so
should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim. 6:8,
"Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be
[Vulg. : 'are'] content. " Now there is no special virtue in being
content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in
abstinence which moderates food.

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons abstinence as
a special part of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above ([3475]Q[136], A[1];[3476] Q[141], A[3])
moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the
passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs
from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now
pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of
reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary
to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above
all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as
stated above ([3477]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Wherefore one virtue receives
help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude.
Accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation
on account of the other virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not
only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of
gluttony: since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the
onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to
them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue
through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.

Reply to Objection 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas
the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a
special virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of
clothing.
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OF FASTING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?

(2) Of what virtue is it the act?

(3) Whether it is a matter of precept?

(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?

(5) The time of fasting;

(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?

(7) The hour of eating for those who fast;

(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.
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Whether fasting is an act of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For
every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always
acceptable to God, according to Is. 58:3, "Why have we fasted and Thou
hast not regarded? " Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

Objection 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now
fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence
takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature,
whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do
not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is
not an act of virtue.

Objection 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and
evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is
fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts (2
Cor. 6:5,6) where the Apostle says: "In fasting, in knowledge, in
chastity, etc. [Vulg. : 'in chastity, in knowledge']. "

I answer that, An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to
some virtuous [honestum] [*Cf. [3478] Q[145], A[1]] good. Now this is
consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold
purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore
the Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:5,6): "In fasting, in chastity," since
fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome [*Contra
Jov. ii. ] "Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there," that is
to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we
have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely
to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related (Dan. 10)
of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for
three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is
written (Joel 2:12): "Be converted to Me with all your heart, in
fasting and in weeping and in mourning. " The same is declared by
Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de
Tempore)]): "Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one's
flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters
the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the
true light of chastity. "

Reply to Objection 1: An act that is virtuous generically may be
rendered vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence
the text goes on to say: "Behold in the day of your fast your own will
is founded," and a little further on (Is. 58:4): "You fast for debates
and strife and strike with the fist wickedly. " These words are
expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: "The will indicates
joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh restrained if the
mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be wrecked by vice. " And
Augustine says (in the same sermon) that "fasting loves not many words,
deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends humility, helps man to
perceive what is frail and paltry. "

Reply to Objection 2: The mean of virtue is measured not according to
quantity but according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Now
reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a
man to take less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary
circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to
perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much more does
reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and the pursuit
of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much from one's
food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus Jerome says:* "It
matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in destroying
thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, whether by excessive
lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping too little, is to offer a
sacrifice of stolen goods. " [*The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon
Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there
ascribes the quotation to St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the
saint's works. ] In like manner right reason does not retrench so much
from a man's food as to render him incapable of fulfilling his duty.
Hence Jerome says (in the same reference) "Rational man forfeits his
dignity, if he sets fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before
the well-being of his senses. "

Reply to Objection 3: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man
is said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure
negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only
the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a
reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting
[jejunium jejunii] [*Literally the 'fast of fasting']: while the latter
is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence.
For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the
reference is lacking] commenting on Mat. 17:20, "This kind of devil"
says: "To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all
manner of lusts. " Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting
is not exclusively an act of abstinence.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang. )
that "the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year. " Now paying tithes
is an act of religion, as stated above ([3479]Q[87], A[1]). Therefore
fasting is an act of religion and not of abstinence.

Objection 3: Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated
above (QQ[143],146, A[1], ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with
fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very
applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "fasting is frugality
of fare and abstinence from food. "

I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every
virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that
appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food,
wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident
that fasting is an act of abstinence.

Reply to Objection 1: Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining
from food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from
anything harmful, and such especially is sin.

We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence
from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), an act
ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging
to another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that
virtue, as explained above ([3480]Q[32], A[1], ad 2;[3481] Q[85],
A[3]). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act
of religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to
endure, not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the
danger of death. To endure hardships resulting from privation of
pleasure of touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are
the hardships of fasting.
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Whether fasting is a matter of precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. For
precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a matter
of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have
to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting is
not a matter of precept.

Objection 2: Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin.
Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast
would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that "the
Wisdom of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of
freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the
community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude,
should be bound together in subjection to one God. " Now the liberty of
the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of
observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine
says (Ad inquis. Januar. , Ep. lv) that "whereas God in His mercy wished
our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and
small number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive
with slavish burdens. " Therefore it seems that the Church should not
have made fasting a matter of precept.

On the contrary, Jerome (Ad Lucin. , Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting says:
"Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands
of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles. " Therefore
fasting is a matter of precept.

I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make
legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal in
temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to
prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the
faithful in spiritual goods.

Now it has been stated above [3482](A[1]) that fasting is useful as
atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual
things. And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to
practice fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes.
Wherefore fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law,
while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and
profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of positive
law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is the Church
fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Fasting considered in itself denotes something
not eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is
useful to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding
under precept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands
in need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this
remedy, both because "in many things we all offend" (James 3:2), and
because "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. 5:17), it was
fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all
in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter
of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of
general obligation.

Reply to Objection 2: Those commandments which are given under the form
of a general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but
subject to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It
will be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the
lawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate
the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to
keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially
if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present.
Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin
mortally.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking there of those things "that
are neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found
among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the
custom of the universal Church. " On the other hand, the fasts that are
of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are
sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they opposed
to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in hindering the
slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is
written (Gal. 5:13): "You, brethren, have been called unto liberty;
only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh. "
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Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of the
Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as the
commandments of God, according to Lk. 10:16, "He that heareth you
heareth Me. " Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God.
Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by
the Church.

Objection 2: Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from
fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (Joel 2:15):
"Sanctify a fast," and further on (Joel 2:16): "Gather together the
little ones, and them that suck the breasts. " Much more therefore are
all others bound to keen the fasts.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal,
and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily works
are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to
spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since
fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing
by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of the Church
ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or bodily works.

Objection 4: Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through
necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast
through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought
they to fast willingly.

On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast.