But it
must be observed that likeness between things is twofold.
must be observed that likeness between things is twofold.
Summa Theologica
Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive
appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in
so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following
freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is
the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will. "
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the
principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the
principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness
with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love":
thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of
its weight and may be called "natural love. " In like manner the
aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is
to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or
"intellectual" or "rational love. " So that sensitive love is in the
sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual
appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards
good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the
object of the irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or
rational love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and
sadness, not essentially but causally.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the
vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts
of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; since
each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally
suitable to it.
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Whether love is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is
a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine
says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but
rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the
appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.
Therefore love is not a passion.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a
passion. "
I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a
natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the
first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement
that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body
both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight,
from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural
to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called "natural
love. " In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first,
a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that
object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.
For "the appetitive movement is circular," as stated in De Anima iii,
10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing
itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves
towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement
ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the
appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else
than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a
movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and
lastly, there is rest which is "joy. " Since, therefore, love consists
in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is
evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is
in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according
as it is in the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or
action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of
movement in the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of
the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that
which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it
is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is
a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive
force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that
union is the work of love.
Reply to Objection 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the
appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that
movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as
to have complacency therein.
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Whether love is the same as dilection?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is to
twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight
lines. " But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection
denote the same thing.
Objection 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of
their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same.
Therefore these are the same.
Objection 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is
chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love to evil
things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to
either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do not differ:
thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "it is not
one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection. "
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have
held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does. "
I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, to the same
thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ,
however, in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" are
expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either
way.
Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a
wider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity
is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to
love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes:
and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in
the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition
to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that which is loved
is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to
the Latin "carus" (dear)].
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in
so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the
same as dilection.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is more general than the
object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good
and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the
same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of
love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that "a
right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed
love. " However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion,
inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference
spoken of.
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why some held that, even when applied
to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike
than "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so
far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes
the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by
love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can
possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature
of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike
than dilection.
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Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of
concupiscence?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into love
of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, while
friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5).
But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions. Therefore
love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of
friendship.
Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of
the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as
"animal. " But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love,
as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a
division of love.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3)
friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that
which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on
"goodness. " But useful and pleasant friendship are not without
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with
friendship.
On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because we desire
them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness
which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship
for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. Therefore
love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to
wish good to someone. " Hence the movement of love has a twofold
tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or
to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly,
man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to
another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary:
since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply
and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of
concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something
else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while
that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is
convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good
simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good.
Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have
some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved,
that it may be another's good, is relative love.
Reply to Objection 1: Love is not divided into friendship and
concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence.
For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we
are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or
pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this
respect the character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers
this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that
friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with
love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.
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OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?
(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?
(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
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Whether good is the only cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For
good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens
that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: "He that loveth
iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good.
Therefore good is not the only cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love
those who acknowledge their evils. " Therefore it seems that evil is the
cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good"
only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all. "
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good
alone is beloved. " Therefore good alone is the cause of love.
I answer that, As stated above ([1229]Q[26], A[1]), Love belongs to the
appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object
stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore
the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of
love is the good; because, as stated above ([1230]Q[26], AA[1],2), love
implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the
thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin
and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper
cause of love.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect of
good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is
considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so
far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in this
way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some
good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or such like.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved,
not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a
good thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes
insincerity or hypocrisy.
Reply to Objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they
differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of
good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful
is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently
those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most
cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we
speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the
other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression
"beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful
odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to
the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which simply pleases
the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend.
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Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For
it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought
without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have
them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 35),
if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them.
Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving
something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than
they are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but
cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of
love.
Objection 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would
be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is
love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge
in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love
what he does not know. "
I answer that, As stated above [1231](A[1]), good is the cause of love,
as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except
as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension of the
good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12)
says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like
manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the
beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love
for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.
Reply to Objection 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely without
knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some
respect, either in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or
from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2).
But to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Something is required for the perfection of
knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For
knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish
things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a
fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another.
Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know
distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and
properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which
regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the
perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in
itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is
known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly
known. This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love
through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they
know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others;
and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the love of
God.
Reply to Objection 3: Even natural love, which is in all things, is
caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things
themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above
(Q[26], A[1]; cf. [1232]FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2).
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Whether likeness is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For
the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the
cause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that "among the proud
there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
1) that "potters quarrel with one another. " Therefore likeness is not a
cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man
loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an
actor, but would not himself be an actor. " But it would not be so, if
likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would
love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to
possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he
have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches.
But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them.
Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love
those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain
their friendship for the dead. " But all are not such. Therefore
likeness is not a cause of love.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its
like. "
I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love.
But it
must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind of
likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for
example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be
alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having
potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has
actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper
place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or
again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since
act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or
well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it
were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus
two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men are
one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other,
as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the
second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or friendship
founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality,
as such, has the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its
realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being.
Now it has been stated above ([1233]Q[26], A[4]), that in the love of
concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing
the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than another:
because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he
is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's
likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him
from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for
being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This
is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one
another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud,"
because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves
not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as
the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that
which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good
writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has
that which is becoming to him in respect of his art.
Reply to Objection 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to
what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to
its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as
he expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the
man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is
inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on
usefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these
virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to certain
seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man
who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with
his own natural reason.
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Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of
love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved for
the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion.
Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we
desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship
based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no
hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at all,
even if we see how beautiful it is. " Therefore hope too is a cause of
love.
On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that does not
presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion of
the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in
something. Now every movement towards something, or rest in something,
arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does
love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the
soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that
some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one
good is the cause of another.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it
affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure
is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes
pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love for
that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's
being loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from
whom he receives it.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of
pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because
hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which
we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good
that is loved.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether union is an effect of love?
(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?
(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?
(6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
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Whether union is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For
absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with
absence; for the Apostle says (Gal. 4:18): "Be zealous for that which
is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a
gloss), "and not only when I am present with you. " Therefore union is
not an effect of love.
Objection 2: Further, every union is either according to essence, thus
form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the whole,
or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to
likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause union
of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct.
On the other hand, love does not cause union of likeness, but rather is
caused by it, as stated above ([1234]Q[27], A[3]). Therefore union is
not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the
intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in act
is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge
rather than of love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a
"unitive love. "
I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is
real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover.
The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in
relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite
follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of
concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind
of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For
when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to
our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with the love
of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself:
wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he
wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's
"other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well
did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul. "
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love
moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of
something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused
"formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this
sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital
principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit,
and the beloved. " For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the
union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that
"it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of real union. That is
necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real
absence of the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent
or present.
Reply to Objection 2: Union has a threefold relation to love. There is
union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the
love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith
one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above
([1235]Q[27], A[3]). There is also a union which is essentially love
itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened
to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his
love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something
belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a
union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover
seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping
with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii,
1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into
one," but since "this would result in either one or both being
destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union---to live together,
speak together, and be united together in other like things.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being
united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is
that the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the
lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is closer
than that which is caused by knowledge.
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Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling,
so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which is
in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and
contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the
lover be in the beloved and vice versa.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by
means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the reason,
not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are
really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved
and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in
the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union
itself is love, as stated above [1236](A[1]). Therefore it follows that
the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently
false. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:16): "He that abideth in
charity abideth in God, and God in him. " Now charity is the love of
God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be
in the lover, and vice versa.
I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as
referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power.
Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the
lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover,
according to Phil. 1:7, "For that I have you in my heart": while the
lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch
as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the
beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything
pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus
it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He
"searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God" (1 Cor. 2:10).
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover,
inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing
him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in
the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it
with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to
the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic
cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good
to another on account of something else), but because the complacency
in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak
of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity. " On the
other hand, the lover is in the beloved, by the love of concupiscence
and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of
concupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial
possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the
beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas,
in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he
reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and
his friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the
good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is
proper to friends "to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice
at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4).
Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as
affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he
were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills
and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his
friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.
In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be
understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return
love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.
Reply to Objection 1: The beloved is contained in the lover, by being
impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency.
On the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as
the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing
hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different
ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.
Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the reason precedes the
movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the
movement of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the third kind of mutual
indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.
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Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For
ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result
in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times.
Therefore love does not cause ecstasy.
Objection 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to
him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes
himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.
Objection 3: Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated
above [1237](A[1]). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in
order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover
always loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false.
Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love
produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through
love. " Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv),
every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that
every love causes ecstasy.
I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself.
This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive
power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside
himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. This
may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is
said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is placed outside the connatural
apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to
comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to
his being cast down into a state of debasement; thus a man may be said
to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness.
As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that
power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from
itself, as it were.
The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far,
namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above
[1238](A[2]), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from
other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of
friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a
restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is
carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not
being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy
something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic
good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this
movement remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love of
friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he
wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him,
for his sake.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of the first kind of
ecstasy.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence,
which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.
Reply to Objection 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as
he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will
the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not
follow that he loves another more than himself.
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Whether zeal is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal
is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 3:3):
"Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention,"
etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an
effect of love.
Objection 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which
communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication;
since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the
object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous
of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others.
Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is
there without love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): "I had a zeal on
occasion of the wicked. " Therefore it should not be set down as an
effect of love any more than of hatred.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a
zealot, on account of his great love for all things. "
I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity
of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to
anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance.
Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object loved," as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove
everything that opposes it.
But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence,
and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires
something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or
quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are
said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a
hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those
who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though
these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of
envy, of which it is written (Ps. 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers,
nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity. "
On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good:
wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against
everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is
said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of
repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In
this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he
endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to
the honor or will of God; according to 3 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I have
been zealous for the Lord of hosts. " Again on the words of Jn. 2:17:
"The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is
eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he
perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the
zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the
object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.
Reply to Objection 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated
to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this
communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But
through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot,
in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the
love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise,
properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their
entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the
knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps
one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.
Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that a man hates whatever is
opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is
set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.
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Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?
Objection 1: It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor
denotes a hurt in the one that languishes.
appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in
so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following
freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is
the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will. "
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the
principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the
principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness
with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love":
thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of
its weight and may be called "natural love. " In like manner the
aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is
to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or
"intellectual" or "rational love. " So that sensitive love is in the
sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual
appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards
good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the
object of the irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or
rational love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and
sadness, not essentially but causally.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the
vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts
of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; since
each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally
suitable to it.
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Whether love is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is
a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine
says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but
rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the
appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.
Therefore love is not a passion.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a
passion. "
I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a
natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the
first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement
that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body
both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight,
from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural
to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called "natural
love. " In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first,
a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that
object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.
For "the appetitive movement is circular," as stated in De Anima iii,
10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing
itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves
towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement
ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the
appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else
than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a
movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and
lastly, there is rest which is "joy. " Since, therefore, love consists
in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is
evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is
in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according
as it is in the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or
action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of
movement in the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of
the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that
which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it
is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is
a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive
force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that
union is the work of love.
Reply to Objection 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the
appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that
movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as
to have complacency therein.
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Whether love is the same as dilection?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is to
twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight
lines. " But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection
denote the same thing.
Objection 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of
their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same.
Therefore these are the same.
Objection 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is
chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love to evil
things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to
either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do not differ:
thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "it is not
one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection. "
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have
held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does. "
I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, to the same
thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ,
however, in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" are
expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either
way.
Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a
wider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity
is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to
love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes:
and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in
the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition
to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that which is loved
is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to
the Latin "carus" (dear)].
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in
so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the
same as dilection.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is more general than the
object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good
and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the
same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of
love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that "a
right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed
love. " However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion,
inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference
spoken of.
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why some held that, even when applied
to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike
than "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so
far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes
the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by
love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can
possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature
of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike
than dilection.
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Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of
concupiscence?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into love
of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, while
friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5).
But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions. Therefore
love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of
friendship.
Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of
the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as
"animal. " But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love,
as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a
division of love.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3)
friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that
which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on
"goodness. " But useful and pleasant friendship are not without
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with
friendship.
On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because we desire
them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness
which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship
for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. Therefore
love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to
wish good to someone. " Hence the movement of love has a twofold
tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or
to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly,
man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to
another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary:
since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply
and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of
concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something
else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while
that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is
convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good
simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good.
Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have
some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved,
that it may be another's good, is relative love.
Reply to Objection 1: Love is not divided into friendship and
concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence.
For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we
are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or
pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this
respect the character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers
this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that
friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with
love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.
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OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?
(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?
(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
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Whether good is the only cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For
good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens
that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: "He that loveth
iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good.
Therefore good is not the only cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love
those who acknowledge their evils. " Therefore it seems that evil is the
cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good"
only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all. "
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good
alone is beloved. " Therefore good alone is the cause of love.
I answer that, As stated above ([1229]Q[26], A[1]), Love belongs to the
appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object
stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore
the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of
love is the good; because, as stated above ([1230]Q[26], AA[1],2), love
implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the
thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin
and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper
cause of love.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect of
good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is
considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so
far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in this
way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some
good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or such like.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved,
not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a
good thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes
insincerity or hypocrisy.
Reply to Objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they
differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of
good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful
is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently
those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most
cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we
speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the
other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression
"beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful
odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to
the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which simply pleases
the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend.
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Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For
it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought
without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have
them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 35),
if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them.
Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving
something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than
they are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but
cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of
love.
Objection 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would
be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is
love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge
in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love
what he does not know. "
I answer that, As stated above [1231](A[1]), good is the cause of love,
as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except
as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension of the
good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12)
says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like
manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the
beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love
for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.
Reply to Objection 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely without
knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some
respect, either in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or
from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2).
But to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Something is required for the perfection of
knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For
knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish
things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a
fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another.
Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know
distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and
properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which
regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the
perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in
itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is
known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly
known. This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love
through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they
know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others;
and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the love of
God.
Reply to Objection 3: Even natural love, which is in all things, is
caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things
themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above
(Q[26], A[1]; cf. [1232]FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2).
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Whether likeness is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For
the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the
cause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that "among the proud
there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
1) that "potters quarrel with one another. " Therefore likeness is not a
cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man
loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an
actor, but would not himself be an actor. " But it would not be so, if
likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would
love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to
possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he
have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches.
But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them.
Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love
those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain
their friendship for the dead. " But all are not such. Therefore
likeness is not a cause of love.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its
like. "
I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love.
But it
must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind of
likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for
example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be
alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having
potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has
actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper
place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or
again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since
act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or
well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it
were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus
two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men are
one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other,
as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the
second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or friendship
founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality,
as such, has the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its
realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being.
Now it has been stated above ([1233]Q[26], A[4]), that in the love of
concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing
the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than another:
because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he
is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's
likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him
from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for
being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This
is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one
another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud,"
because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves
not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as
the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that
which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good
writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has
that which is becoming to him in respect of his art.
Reply to Objection 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to
what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to
its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as
he expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the
man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is
inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on
usefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these
virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to certain
seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man
who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with
his own natural reason.
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Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of
love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved for
the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion.
Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we
desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship
based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no
hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at all,
even if we see how beautiful it is. " Therefore hope too is a cause of
love.
On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that does not
presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion of
the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in
something. Now every movement towards something, or rest in something,
arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does
love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the
soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that
some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one
good is the cause of another.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it
affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure
is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes
pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love for
that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's
being loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from
whom he receives it.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of
pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because
hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which
we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good
that is loved.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether union is an effect of love?
(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?
(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?
(6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
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Whether union is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For
absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with
absence; for the Apostle says (Gal. 4:18): "Be zealous for that which
is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a
gloss), "and not only when I am present with you. " Therefore union is
not an effect of love.
Objection 2: Further, every union is either according to essence, thus
form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the whole,
or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to
likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause union
of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct.
On the other hand, love does not cause union of likeness, but rather is
caused by it, as stated above ([1234]Q[27], A[3]). Therefore union is
not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the
intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in act
is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge
rather than of love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a
"unitive love. "
I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is
real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover.
The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in
relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite
follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of
concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind
of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For
when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to
our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with the love
of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself:
wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he
wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's
"other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well
did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul. "
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love
moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of
something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused
"formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this
sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital
principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit,
and the beloved. " For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the
union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that
"it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of real union. That is
necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real
absence of the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent
or present.
Reply to Objection 2: Union has a threefold relation to love. There is
union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the
love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith
one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above
([1235]Q[27], A[3]). There is also a union which is essentially love
itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened
to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his
love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something
belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a
union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover
seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping
with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii,
1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into
one," but since "this would result in either one or both being
destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union---to live together,
speak together, and be united together in other like things.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being
united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is
that the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the
lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is closer
than that which is caused by knowledge.
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Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling,
so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which is
in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and
contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the
lover be in the beloved and vice versa.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by
means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the reason,
not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are
really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved
and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in
the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union
itself is love, as stated above [1236](A[1]). Therefore it follows that
the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently
false. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:16): "He that abideth in
charity abideth in God, and God in him. " Now charity is the love of
God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be
in the lover, and vice versa.
I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as
referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power.
Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the
lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover,
according to Phil. 1:7, "For that I have you in my heart": while the
lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch
as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the
beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything
pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus
it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He
"searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God" (1 Cor. 2:10).
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover,
inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing
him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in
the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it
with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to
the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic
cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good
to another on account of something else), but because the complacency
in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak
of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity. " On the
other hand, the lover is in the beloved, by the love of concupiscence
and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of
concupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial
possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the
beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas,
in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he
reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and
his friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the
good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is
proper to friends "to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice
at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4).
Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as
affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he
were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills
and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his
friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.
In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be
understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return
love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.
Reply to Objection 1: The beloved is contained in the lover, by being
impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency.
On the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as
the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing
hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different
ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.
Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the reason precedes the
movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the
movement of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the third kind of mutual
indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.
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Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For
ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result
in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times.
Therefore love does not cause ecstasy.
Objection 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to
him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes
himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.
Objection 3: Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated
above [1237](A[1]). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in
order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover
always loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false.
Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love
produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through
love. " Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv),
every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that
every love causes ecstasy.
I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself.
This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive
power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside
himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. This
may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is
said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is placed outside the connatural
apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to
comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to
his being cast down into a state of debasement; thus a man may be said
to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness.
As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that
power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from
itself, as it were.
The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far,
namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above
[1238](A[2]), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from
other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of
friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a
restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is
carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not
being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy
something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic
good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this
movement remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love of
friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he
wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him,
for his sake.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of the first kind of
ecstasy.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence,
which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.
Reply to Objection 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as
he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will
the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not
follow that he loves another more than himself.
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Whether zeal is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal
is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 3:3):
"Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention,"
etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an
effect of love.
Objection 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which
communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication;
since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the
object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous
of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others.
Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is
there without love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): "I had a zeal on
occasion of the wicked. " Therefore it should not be set down as an
effect of love any more than of hatred.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a
zealot, on account of his great love for all things. "
I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity
of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to
anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance.
Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object loved," as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove
everything that opposes it.
But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence,
and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires
something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or
quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are
said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a
hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those
who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though
these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of
envy, of which it is written (Ps. 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers,
nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity. "
On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good:
wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against
everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is
said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of
repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In
this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he
endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to
the honor or will of God; according to 3 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I have
been zealous for the Lord of hosts. " Again on the words of Jn. 2:17:
"The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is
eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he
perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the
zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the
object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.
Reply to Objection 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated
to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this
communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But
through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot,
in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the
love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise,
properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their
entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the
knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps
one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.
Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that a man hates whatever is
opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is
set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.
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Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?
Objection 1: It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor
denotes a hurt in the one that languishes.
