2 In these cases, as also in the case of Bishop Herman of Bamberg in 1075,
when his attitude to the Pope was dictated by the same motives, he protested his
own innocence of simony in the appointments.
when his attitude to the Pope was dictated by the same motives, he protested his
own innocence of simony in the appointments.
Cambridge Medieval History - v5 - Contest of Empire and the Papacy
It was a particular feature of the
period. Conrad II had especially encouraged the formation of this class
of royal servant, and on it his successors continued to rely.
As in the countryside, so in the towns there was a tendency to
1
obliterate the distinction between the free and half-free classes, though
in the towns this took the form of a levelling-up rather than a levelling-
down. The “ free air” of the towns, the encouragement to settlers, the
development of trade especially in the Rhine district, as well as the pro-
tection of the town walls, caused a considerable increase in their
population ; they acquired both constitutional and economic importance.
Some towns were royal towns, but all were under a lord, usually a bishop,
and it was to the bishops that the trading element in the town owed its
first privileges. It was to the bishop's interest to obtain for his town from
the king special rights such as the holding of a market and exemption
from tolls in royal towns, and all charters to towns till the latter part of
the eleventh century are granted through the bishops. The first sign of
a change is in the charter of Henry IV to Worins in 1074. The privileges
1 The original home of the Welfs was Altdorf in Swabia. So it was to a diet of
Swabian nobles that Henry the Lion, Duke of Bavaria and Saxony, was first sum-
moned to answer the charges against him.
CH. INI.
## p. 120 (#166) ############################################
120
Alliance of the towns with the king
granted are of the usual nature-exemption from toll in certain (in this
case, specified) royal towns. But for the first time the charter is given
not to the bishop but to the townsmen, and they are described, for the
first time, not as “negotiatores” or “mercatores” but as “ cives. ” The
circumstances attending the grant of this charter', including the welcome
to the king, the well-equipped military support given to him, the pay-
ment by the community of a financial aid, the reception and preservation
of the charter, all imply a town-organisation of a more advanced nature
than previous charters would have led us to expect. The Jews played an
important part in these early trading communities, and they are specially
mentioned in the charter to Worms; so too the Bishop of Spires in 1086
for the advantage of his town was careful, as he states, to plant a colony
of Jews and to give them special privileges, which were confirmed by the
king in 1090? If Worms was the first town which gives evidence of an
organisation independent of its bishop, it was soon followed by others
where the bishop as at Worms was hostile to the king. The rising of the
people at Cologne against Archbishop Anno in 1074, the expulsion of
Archbishop Siegfried and the anti-king Rudolf from Mayence in 1077,
the expulsion of Bishop Adalbert from Würzburg the same year and the
defence of the city against Rudolf, and, above all, the devotion of the
Rhine towns to Henry IV during his last years, shew clearly a wide
extension of this movements.
The townsmen, then, were coming into more direct relations with the
king. As far as the nobles were concerned, the change is rather in the
contrary direction. The duty of fidelity to the head of the State was still
a general conception; even ecclesiastics who scrupled to take an oath of
liege-fealty to the king did not disavow this obligation. The oath of
fealty was not taken by the people as a whole, but only by the princes of
the kingdom, whether to the king or to his representative, and they took
the oath in virtue of their official capacity and as representing the whole
community. It mattered not whether they held fiefs from the king
or from another noble; it was not the fief but the office, through which
the royal authority had been, and in theory still was, asserted, that
created the responsibility on behalf of the people within their spheres of
control. So the relation of the king with the nobles was not yet strictly
1 See H. Wibel, Die ältesten deutschen Stadtprivilegien (Archiv für Urkunden-
forschung, 1918, Vol. vi, pp. 234 sqq. ).
2 Altmann and Bernheim, Ausgewählte Urkunden zur Erläuterung der Verfass-
ungsgeschichte Deutschlands, pp. 158 sqq.
3 In Flanders, Cambrai set the example by founding a commune in 1077. Here
the movement was also directed against the bishop, but in this case it was, as at
Milan, allied with the Church reform movement. See Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique,
Vol. 1, pp. 192 sq. In Germany proper the movement was definitely royalist in
character.
4 Cf. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, Vol. vi (ed. Seeliger), pp. 487 sqq. ;
G. von Below, Der deutsche Staat des Mittelalters, Vol. 1, pp. 232 sqq.
## p. 121 (#167) ############################################
The growth of feudalism
121
a feudal relation. It was not to become so until the end of the twelfth
century, when the status of prince was confined to those nobles who held
directly from the king. The feudum was not yet the all-important thing,
at any rate in theory and law. There were many fiefs without military
service, some without service at all; there were vassals too without fiefs.
But these became, more and more, exceptional cases, and rapidly the
change from the official to the feudal status was being accomplished
in practice. Always the grant of a fief had accompanied the bestowal of
an office; and, as the fiefs had become hereditary, so too had the offices.
In the majority of cases, offices and fiefs had become identified, and the
official origin was preserved in little more than the title'.
In fact, the great nobles were no longer royal officials but territorial
magnates with alods and fiefs to which their children (sons if possible,
but failing them daughters) succeeded, and their aim was to loosen the
tie which bound them to the sovereign and to create an independent
position for themselves. Two circumstances combined to assist them in
this ambition-the rise of the class of ministeriales and the continual
civil war. The military fief became the normal type, and every important
noble had his band of armed and mounted retainers. He soon had his
castle, or castles, as well, built in defiance of the king; for castle-building
was a sovereign right, which only the stress of civil war enabled the noble
to usurp. Medieval society was based especially on custom and precedent.
If the central authority was weak, the nobles began at once to encroach ;
usurpations were in a few years translated into rights, and it was difficult,
if not impossible, for the king to recover what had been lost. Moreover,
while the counts had ceased to be royal officers, the system of maintain-
ing the royal control by missi had long disappeared. This made a fixed
seat of government impossible. The king himself had to progress cease-
lessly throughout his dominions to enforce his will on the local magnates.
There was no system of itinerant justices, and, except in the royal
domains, no official class to relieve the direct burden of the central
government. So there was no permanent machinery which could function
normally ; everything depended on the personality of the ruler.
But from the point of view of the king there were compensations.
Each noble played for his own hand, and there was rarely any unity of
purpose among them. It was from the dukes that the king had most to
fear, and with regard to them he started with many advantages. They
had no claim to divine appointment, no royal majesty or insignia, no
sovereign rights but such as he had granted. The nobles in each duchy
held office in theory from the king, to whom, and not to the duke, they
1 This is true even of the counts-palatine, with the exception of the Count-
Palatine of the Rhine who still retained much of his old official position; for instance,
when Henry IV went to Italy in 1090, the Count-Palatine of the Rhine was appointed
co-regent of the German kingdom with Duke Frederick of Swabia. So too when
Henry V went to Italy in 1116.
CH. III.
## p. 122 (#168) ############################################
122
The royal domain
had sworn liege-fealty', and they were far more jealous of the assertion
of the ducal, than of the royal, authority over them. Moreover the duke
by virtue of his office acquired little, if any, domain in his duchy? Where
his family possessions lay, there alone, in most cases, was he really power-
ful. Agnes in her appointments had at any rate shewn herself wise
in this, that she had appointed as dukes nobles whose hereditary lands
lay outside the duchies to which they were appointed. Berthold of Zäh-
ringen, the most powerful noble in Swabia, was a nonentity as Duke in
Carinthia; Otto of Nordheim, one of the leading nobles in Saxony, could
not maintain himself in his duchy of Bavaria when he revolted in 1070.
In other words, the noble depended on his domain, and this is equally
true of the king. There was no direct taxation' as in England, and the
king had in a very real sense to live of his own. The royal domain* was
scattered throughout the kingdom ; in each duchy there were royal
estates and royal palaces, though the largest and richest portion lay in
eastern Saxony, stretching from Goslar to Merseburg, the inheritance of
the Saxon kings. In the first place, it supplied the needs of the royal
household, and this, as well as the maintenance of royal authority, made
necessary the continual journeyings of the king and his court. The
domain, too, provided a means whereby the king could make grants of
lands whether in reward for faithful service or, more usually, in donations
to bishoprics and abbeys. And, finally, in these manors, as also in the
manors of nobles and ecclesiastics, there emerged out of the mass of half-
free tenants a class of men who played an important and peculiar rôle in
Germany. These royal ministeriales were employed by the king in adminis-
trative posts, as well as in the management of his estates; they were
armed and mounted, and provided an important part of the king's army.
On them he began to rely, therefore, to counteract the growing indepen-
dence of the greater nobles, both in his Council and on military expeditions.
In return, they were granted fiefs, and rose often to knightly ranks,
1 A duke or other noble might obtain an oath of fealty from his vassals, but
there should, by right, be in it a saving clause, preserving the superior fealty due
to the king.
2 Cf. Waitz, op. cit. Vol. vii, pp. 133 sq.
3 Unless the bede comes under this category. But all nobiles were exempt from
this, and other exemptions had been granted by charter.
4 Cf. M. Stimming, Das deutsche Königsgut im 11 und 12 Jahrhundert; B. Heusinger,
Servitium regis in der deutschen Kaiserzeit (Archiv für Urkundenforschung, Vol. viii,
pp. 26–159). Between the royal and the private domain of the king as a rule little
distinction was made. But the issue sometimes arose, notably on the question of the
inheritance of the Hohenstaufen from Henry V; see infra, p. 336.
6 Eventually this had its result in the rise of a number of new noble families to
take the place in German history of older ones that had become extinct. One leading
cause for the disappearance of old noble families—the ecclesiastical career (with its
enforced celibacy) which in the abbeys especially had been almost a prerogative of the
nobility-is very clearly demonstrated by A. Schulte, Der Adel und die deutsche Kirche
im Mittelalter (Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen, ed. U. Stutz, LXIII, LXIV).
## p. 123 (#169) ############################################
Alliance with the episcopate
123
sometimes even to episcopal. The same process was occurring in the
domains of the nobles. The ecclesiastical nobles had probably set the
example? , which was followed by the secular nobility and by the king.
As it provided him with the possibility of making himself self-sufficient and
so independent of princely support, it provided them too with a means of
furthering their independence of him.
The royal domain, then, plays a central part in the policy of the
Salian kings, as it was to do with the Capetians in France. During the
regency it had been grievously depleted. But there were many ways
in which it could be increased and in which gaps could be made good-
by inheritance, by exchange, by conquest, by escheat. There were also
other sources of royal revenue, notably the sovereign rights, of justice
and the like, which were assumed by the king wherever he might happen
to be and which were frequently lucrative. From the towns too, as well
as from the domain, he could levy contributions? , and, as has been indicated
above, could look to them for valuable support especially in time of war.
The loyalty and devotion of the Rhine towns is most marked, particularly
when the episcopal lord of the town was disloyal. But only in a few cases
was the bishop himself among the king's enemies, and so a direct alliance
with the townsmen, which might have been as useful to the German
monarchy as it was to the French, occurred only in isolated cases. It was
not to the king's interest to make the bishops antagonistic.
For the alliance with the episcopate had, from the time of Otto I,
been a cardinal factor in the policy of the king of Germany. The political
importance of the ecclesiastical nobles was evident: on them, as well as on
ministeriales and lesser nobles, the king relied both for his Council and
government and for his military expeditions. They could never make
their offices and fiefs hereditary, and they could be depended upon as
a counterpoise to the dangerous power of the dukes; while in the con-
tinual civil wars of this period the summons to the host was not of much
avail, nor could it be made effective without the consent of the nobles.
But they were equally valuable to the king from the economic point of
view. In the first place, the royal abbeys made annual payments in kind,
which began to be converted into money payments or at any rate to
1 Compare with this the prominent part played by ecclesiastics in the drift
towards feudalism in Saxon England (supra, Vol. 11, pp. 375–7). The great differ-
ence is that in Germany it was an unfree class to whom these military fiefs were
granted.
? The tax known as “bede” (petitio, precaria)originally, as its name shews, a
voluntary contribution. On the nature of this tax see G. von Below, op. cit.
pp. 85 sqq. , and generally for the taxation of towns, K. Zeumer, Die deutsche
Städtesteuern (Staats- und socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, ed. G. Schmoller,
Vol. 1, No. 2).
3 The lay nobles would take part only if they happened to be present, or if they
were summoned to diets on important issues of state or to judge one of their
number. The great offices of the household were held by dukes, but had become
merely titular and ceremonial.
CB. II.
## p. 124 (#170) ############################################
124
The complication of Italy
be reckoned on a monetary basis early in the twelfth century; from these
abbeys, too, when he visited them, he could claim hospitality. There
is no evidence that the episcopal services included fixed payments in kind,
but the obligation seems to have been imposed upon the bishops of main-
taining the king and his retinue during the king's stay in their towns,
whether or no these contained a royal palace. It is at any rate noticeable
how prominently they figure in the itineraries of the Salian kings! . And
on the death of a bishop the king exercised his rights of regalia and took
possession of the revenues of the see during the vacancy, and sometimes
of spolia as well, seizing the personal effects of the dead bishop. These
great ecclesiastical offices were regarded by the king as very distinctly
part of his personal possessions? . His lavish grants to them of territory
were therefore not lost to the Crown, and the ecclesiastical as distinct from
the lay nobles remained essentially royal officials. Royal control of
appointments to bishoprics and abbeys was a reality and at the same
time a necessity; and the royal chapel, which was a natural centre for the
training of ecclesiastics, was also a stepping-stone to advancement. From
among the royal chaplains, trained under the king's eye and experienced
often in the work of his chancery, appointments were commonly made to
vacant bishoprics.
This was bound to lead sooner or later to conflict with the reformed
Papacy, though the conflict might have been delayed and would certainly
have been less fatal in result had not this control of the German king in
ecclesiastical matters been extended to Italy and to the Papacy itself. To
the crown of Germany were attached the crowns of Burgundy and Italy,
and finally the imperial crown as well. These additional dignities brought
little real advantage to the German king. In Burgundy, the royal
authority was slight and rarely asserted; it was, however, of some impor-
tance to the Emperor that his suzerainty and not that of the French king
should be recognised. In Italy, the royal domain and episcopal support
were sometimes of definite advantage, but usually the interest of the king
in his Italian kingdom prejudiced his position in Germany. And the
imperial title was a similar handicap'. It magnified the importance of his
office and gave him increased prestige, but it added enormously to his
responsibilities and prevented him from concentrating on his real interests.
The imperial title added nothing to the royal authority in Germany. In
a sense it added nothing in Italy either. The title “ rex Romanorum
was used before imperial coronation occasionally by Henry IV, frequently
>
1 B. Heusinger, op. cit. Cf, especially, p. 70, “Für das 11 Jahrhundert ergibt
sich also, dass das deutsche Königtum in stärkstem Masse, vielleicht überwiegend
auf den bischöflichen Servitien ruhte. ”
2 Cf. U. Stutz, Die Eigenkirche als Element des mittelalterlich-germanischen
Kirchenrechtes, pp. 32 sqq.
3 See, for a discussion of this question, and a consideration of opposing views on
the revival of the Empire by Otto I, G. von Below, op. cit. pp. 353-369.
## p. 125 (#171) ############################################
Henry IV's policy
125
by Henry V, and as Emperor-designate the king acted with full imperial
authority in Italy and with regard to the Pope. But the imperial crown
was the right of the German king, to his mind an essential right, and it
was by virtue of this right that he claimed the control from which
the Papacy was now beginning to free itself, with results fatal to the
monarchy in Germany.
The task that Henry IV set before himself was to undo the damage
that had been wrought during his minority and to restore imperial
authority both in Germany and Italy; he was determined to be master
as his father had been at the height of his power. In Germany, he had
first of all to build up the royal domain, to force the nobles to a direct
subordination to his will, and to break down the independence of Saxony.
In Italy, where imperial authority was practically ignored, there were the
special problems of Tuscany', the Normans, and above all the Papacy.
But, determined as he was to revive the authority over the Papacy that
his father had exercised from 1046 until his death, the question of Ger-
many had to come first, and so for a time he was willing to make
concessions. Control of the Church in Germany and Italy was so essential
to him that he could not be in sympathy with the reform policy of the
Papacy. This was now beginning to be directed not only against the
simony and secularisation that resulted from lay control but against the
lay control itself; and it was a definite feature of that policy to demand
from the higher clergy an obedience to papal authority which could not
fail to be prejudicial to the royal interests. But at present the king was
anxious to keep on good terms with the Pope; as he was obedient to his
orders on the divorce question in 1069, so in 1070 he allowed Charles,
whom he had invested as Bishop of Constance, to be deposed for simony,
and in 1072 Abbot Robert of Reichenau to suffer the same penalty? The
Papacy was given no indication of his real intentions.
His compliant attitude to the Papacy on this question was in accor-
dance with his general policy. He worked patiently for his ends, and
strove to do the task first that lay within his power, careful to separate
his adversaries and to placate one while he was overcoming the other.
Adversity always displayed him at his best. Again and again he revived
his fortunes, shewing a speedy recognition and making a wise use of the
1 The death of Duke Godfrey in 1069 removed one great obstacle from Henry's
path. His son Godfrey (Gibbosus) succeeded to the duchy of Lower Lorraine and
was already the husband of Countess Matilda. But he quarrelled with his wife and
confined his interests to his German duchy, where he remained loyal to Henry.
2 In these cases, as also in the case of Bishop Herman of Bamberg in 1075,
when his attitude to the Pope was dictated by the same motives, he protested his
own innocence of simony in the appointments. There is no evidence against him.
Probably the offenders had paid money to court-favourites, whose influence had
secured the appointinents.
CH. III.
## p. 126 (#172) ############################################
126
His character
possibilities at his disposal, dividing his enemies by concessions and by
stimulating causes of ill-feeling between them, biding his time patiently
till his opportunity came. Nor was he prevented from following out his
plan by considerations of personal humiliation. Not only at Canossa but
also in 1073 a personal humiliation was his surest road to success, and he
took it. He was not the typically direct and brutal knight of the Middle
Ages, and he was not usually successful in battle; he generally avoided a
pitched battle, in contrast to his rival Rudolf, to whom he really owed
his one great victory in the field-over the Saxons in 1075. He recog-
nised his limitations. His armies were rarely as well-equipped as those of
his opponents: they were often composed of ministeriales, royal and
episcopal, and of levies from the towns, which were not a match for the
Saxon knights; also he had more to lose than they had by staking all on
the result of a battle. In an unstatesmanlike generation he shewed many
statesmanly qualities, which was the more remarkable in that he had
received so little training in the duties of his office. His enemies, when
they comment with horror on his guile and cunning, are really testifying
to these qualities; for it was natural that they should give an evil name
to the ability which so often overcame their perfidy and disloyalty.
But, as his greatness is best seen in adversity, so in the moment of
victory were the weaknesses of his character revealed. He allowed himself
to be overcome by the arrogance of success both in 1072 and 1075.
Having decisively defeated his Saxon enemies, he made a vindictive use
of his victory, when clemency was the right policy; by his arbitrary
actions he alienated the other nobles whose assistance had ensured his
success, and they formed a coalition against him to anticipate his too
clearly revealed intentions against themselves. His victory gave him so
false a sense of security that on both occasions he chose the moment to
throw down the challenge to the Pope, entirely miscalculating both the
reality of his position in Germany and the strength of his new adversary.
He profited by his lesson later, but never again did he have the same
opportunity. He certainly shewed a clear sense of the strength of the
papal position in the years 1077–1080, and also of the means by which this
strength could be discounted. On the whole he was a good judge of the
men with whom he had to deal. It may appear short-sighted in him to
pardon so readily a man like Otto of Nordheim and to advance him to a
position of trust in 1075; but he was faced with treachery on every side
and he had to attempt to bind men to his cause by their interests. At
any rate he was successful with Otto's sons, and also even in detaching
Duke Magnus himself from the party of Rudolf. The only occasions
when he was really overwhelmed were when the treachery came from his
own sons, and there is no more moving document in this period than his
letter to King Philip of France, in which he relates the calculated perfidy
and perjury of his son Henry V. For he was naturally of an affectionate and
sympathetic disposition, a devoted father and a kind master, especially to
## p. 127 (#173) ############################################
The peculiar position of Saxony
127
the non-noble classes throughout his dominions. Even if we discount the
glowing panegyric of the author of the Vita Heinrici IV, we cannot ignore
the passionate devotion of the people of Liège, who, scorning the wrath
of all the powers of Church and kingdom, refused to dissemble their grief
or to refrain from the last tokens of respect over the body of their beloved
master. That tribute was repeated again at Spires; and, though for five
years his body was denied the rites of Christian burial, few kings have
had so genuine a mourning.
The reconciliation of Henry with his wife in 1069 marked a definite
stage in his career. From this time he devoted himself wholeheartedly
to affairs of state, and his policy at once began to take shape. The par-
ticularist tendencies of the German princes in general had to be overcome,
but the extreme form which particularism took was to be found in Saxony.
Saxony, ever since it had ceased to supply the king to Germany, had
held itself aloof and independent. In various ways was its distinctive
character marked. It held proudly to its own more primitive customs,
which it had translated into rights, and the maintenance of which had
been guaranteed to it by Conrad II and Henry III; especially was the
royal system of justice, with inquest and oath-takers, foreign to Saxon
custom', which stood as a permanent bar to unity of government. These
customary rights formed a link between the classes in Saxony, giving it
a homogeneity lacking in the other duchies. Allodial lands were more ex-
tensive here than elsewhere, and the nobles accordingly more independent.
Among them the duke took the leading place, but only in precedence.
Margraves and counts did not recognise his authority over them; on the
other hand, the ducal office was hereditary in the Billung family, and so
it was not at the free disposal of the king. Finally, beneath the nobles,
the proportion of free men was exceptionally high; they were trained to
arms, and, though they usually fought on foot, were formidable soldiers
in an age when cavalry was regarded as the decisive arm. It was a bold
policy for a young king to attempt, at the beginning of his reign, to
grasp the Saxon nettle. It was essential that he should obtain assistance
from the other duchies, and this he might expect. The Saxons looked
with contempt on the other German peoples, who in their turn were
jealous of the Saxons and irritated by their aloofness. The ill-feeling
between the two was always a factor on which he could count.
But the determination of Henry IV to attack the problem of Saxony
had a further and more immediate cause. The effects of his minority had
not merely been to give the opportunity to particularism, here as else-
where. It had been disastrous also to the royal domain, that essential
basis of royal power, which had suffered from neglect or deliberate
squandering at the hands of the unscrupulous archbishops who had con-
trolled the government for their own advantage. The first task of the
· K. Hampe, Deutsche Kaisergeschichte im Zeitalter der Salier und Staufen, p. 40.
CH. III.
## p. 128 (#174) ############################################
128
The importance of the royal domain in Saxony
young king was to concentrate on the domain, to fill up gaps and make
compact areas where possible, to take effective measures to recover services
that had been lost, and finally to protect it against further usurpation.
It was natural that his attention should first be directed to eastern Saxony
and Thuringia, where lay by far the richest portion of the domain', and
which afforded the best opportunity for creating a compact royal territory.
It was here, moreover, that the domain had suffered most; it had not
only been wasted by grants, but also services had been withheld, minis-
teriales had usurped their freedom', and probably neighbouring lords had
made encroachments. One of Henry's first measures was the building of
castles on an extensive scale in this region, designed primarily for the
recovery and maintenance of the domain and the services attached to it,
and having at the same time the strategic advantage of being situated so
as to divide the duchy and in case of revolt to prevent a coalition of
Saxon princes. This was a menace to the independent spirit of the Saxons,
and he irritated them still more by appointing royal ministeriales from
South Germanyó as officials in the domain-lands and as garrisons in the
castles. There were clearly grievances on both sides, which only made the
subsequent contest the more bitter. The Saxons had infringed royal
rights by neglect and usurpation. The South German ministeriales in
their turn shewed little respect for Saxon customs, and acted in an op-
pressive manner in making requisitions and forcing labour. And probably
the Saxons were right in their suspicion that the king would take every
1 This is evident from the Indiculus curiarum ad mensam regis Romanorum perti-
nentium (best text in Neu. Arch. Vol. xli, pp. 572–4). A comprehensive survey of
this has been made by B. Heusinger, Servitium regis (Archiv für Urkundenforschung,
Vol. viii, pp. 26–159). M. Stimming, Das deutsche Königsgut, pp. 86 sqq. , has elabo-
rated the central importance of the domain on Henry's policy in Saxony and on the
subsequent Saxon revolt. J. Haller, Das Verzeichnis der Tafelgüter des römischen
Königs (Neu. Arch. Vol. xlv, pp. 48–81), rejects the accepted date (1065) of the Indi-
culus and dates it 1185. His arguments seem to me to be untenable, and to raise
more difficulties than they solve. I am convinced that it was drawn up at any rate
for one of the last two Salian kings, and that it is a rough draft prepared at a time
when an imperial coronation was anticipated. Anyhow, the statement in the text
is not really affected by the date of the Indiculus.
? Lampert of Hersfeld, sub 1066, ed. Holder-Egger, SGUS, p.
100.
3 Bruno, c. 16, ed. Wattenbach, SGUS, p. 11. Cf. Stimming, op. cit. p. 93.
4 Cf. Stimming (op. cit. pp. 98 sqq. ), who supports the view that the policy was
originated by Archbishop Adalbert of Bremen. He also points out the contiguity
of the chief leaders of the Saxon revolt, bishops as well as lay nobles, to the royal
domain.
• The Saxons especially complained of the low-born “Swabians” employed by
the king on official and garrison duty in their duchy. The term Swabian in their
mouth seems to be a generic term for the rest of Germany (or, at any rate, for
Franconia and Swabia), just as in southern Europe we find Alemannia used for
Germany (ef. Gregorii VII Reg. 11, 15), a use which has been continued to the
present day in France. There cannot have been many royal ministeriales in the
duchy of Swabia.
## p. 129 (#175) ############################################
ما
The revolt of Duke Otto of Bavaria
129
opportunity of increasing the royal domain at their expense, and that he
was anxious to suppress their customary rights which stood in the way of
the centralising policy of the monarchy.
It is significant in this connexion, firstly, that the two nobles men-
tioned as Anno's colleagues in his coups d'état at Kaiserswerth in 1062
and at Tribur in 1066 were Otto of Nordheim and Ekbert of Brunswick,
whose allodial territories were adjacent to the main portion of the royal
domain and were so extensive as to make them, next to the duke, the
most powerful nobles in Saxony. Otto was already Duke of Bavaria, and
in 1067 Ekbert was appointed Margrave of Meissen; on his death in
1068 his son Ekbert II succeeded to the margravate as well as to Bruns-
wick. Similarly adjacent, and equally concerned in the great revolt of
1073, were Anno's two relatives, Archbishop Werner of Magdeburg and
Bishop Burchard of Halberstadt. In the second place, the actual outbreak
of civil war, which was to be henceforth almost continuous, had its origin
in the downfall of Duke Otto in 1070. Probably Henry rather seized
than created the opportunity. Otto's military skill had been of consider-
able assistance to him on more than one occasion, and there is no actual
evidence either to justify the charge of treachery brought against Otto
or to convict Henry of a deliberate intention to ruin the duke. A diet
at Mayence left the decision to the test of battle between Otto and his
low-born accuser. Otto refused to submit to the indignity of such a
contest, and was accordingly condemned in his absence by a diet of Saxon
nobles at Goslar and deprived of his possessions in Saxony. His duchy
was forfeited and, at the special instance of Duke Rudolf of Swabia, was
given by Henry to Welf, the first of the new line of that name? The
fall of Otto was not viewed with alarm in Upper Germany; the replace-
ment of a Saxon by a Swabian noble was rather a cause for congratulation.
The ill-feeling of the rest of Germany towards Saxony was very pronounced,
and only identity of interest against the king could lead to common
action.
In Saxony, however, where Otto immediately took refuge, he obtained
the powerful support of Magnus, son and heir of Duke Ordulf. This
brought the king into direct conflict with the Billung family. The rebels
were not able to resist for long-revolt was not yet organised—and they
had to submit unconditionally to the king in 1071. Otto, after a year's
detention, was released, and was allowed to retain his hereditary
possessions in Saxony; Magnus was kept in close confinement at the
castle of Harzburg. In this can be seen the influence of Archbishop
1 As he was of Saxon origin, his case, in accordance with constitutional practice,
had to be decided by Saxons.
2 The male line had died out with Welf III, whose sister Cuniza (Cunegunda)
had married Marquess Azzo of Este. Their son Welf IV, who had become Duke of
Bavaria, had acquired his uncle's estates in Germany, which lay in Swabia and on
the borders of Bavaria.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. III.
9
## p. 130 (#176) ############################################
130
Henry's victory. His over-confidence
Adalbert, who in the last year of his life entered into public affairs again
to revenge himself for the humiliations he had suffered from the Billungs
in 1066. He brought about a meeting with King Svein of Denmark, and
a regular coalition was concerted against the Billungs. The king's
interests were all in the same direction. Magnus, by his marriage with
the sister of Géza, cousin and rival of Henry's brother-in-law Salomo, had
allied himself with the anti-imperial party in Hungary. Moreover, when
Duke Ordulf died in 1072, Magnus was recognised as duke throughout
Saxony. Henry did not deny Magnus' right of succession, but it was the
more necessary to him to retain so important a hostage. The king's
policy in Saxony could now be definitely advanced in both directions.
The building of the castles was continued and extended, and the king
took possession of Lüneburg, the chief town of the Billungs, and placed
in its castle a garrison of seventy men under Count Eberhard of Nellen-
burg
The victory had been an easy one: too easy, because it deluded him
as to the strength of the forces he had to counteract. Saxony was
thoroughly alarmed, and in the mood for a more serious revolt than the
previous one; with Magnus in his hands, Henry perhaps discounted this
danger. But the other German princes were alarmed too. Henry had
shewn his hand too plainly, and it was a fatal misjudgment that led him
to rely on their further concurrence against the Saxons. To him, however,
it seemed that he had recovered his position in Germany, and that the
necessity to humour the Pope no longer existed. It can hardly be due to
chance that at this very time he threw down a deliberate challenge to the
Pope, to whose injunctions he had previously so meekly submitted, over
the archbishopric of Milan. Just before his death, at the Lenten synod of
1073, Alexander II replied by excommunicating the counsellors of the
king. Henry did not refrain from communion with them, and so, when
Alexander died and Gregory VII became Pope, there was a breach
between the German king and the Roman Church.
In spite of his commitments in Saxony and Italy, Henry chose the
occasion for an emphatic assertion of imperial majesty in another quarter.
In 1071 the Dukes of Poland and Bohemia had been summoned to appear
before the king at Meissen, and had received the royal command to keep
the peace. This was significant of the recovery that Henry had already
effected, and, when the Duke of Poland disobeyed the injunction in 1073,
it was necessary to take immediate measures to punish him. The king
accordingly summoned an expedition against Poland to assemble on
22 August, and came to Goslar himself, probably to ensure obedience to
the summons. The expedition was not destined to take place. Under
cover of the assembling of troops for the Polish campaign, a formidable
conspiracy was organised in eastern Saxony. The bishops, led by Werner
of Magdeburg and Burchard of Halberstadt, played a leading part. All
the chief nobles were concerned in it, especially Margrave Ekbert of
## p. 131 (#177) ############################################
The Saxon revolt of 1073
131
Meissen and the Margraves of the North and East Marks. Count Otto of
Nordheim was soon induced to join. Count Herman, uncle of Magnus
and so the acting-head of the Billung family, needed no inducement.
Moreover, the Thuringians, equally affected by the building of the
castles, with customary rights of their own to defend, and having a
private grievance arising out of the claims of the Archbishop of Mayence
to the payment of tithes', soon threw in their lot with the Saxons. Their
plans were concerted to anticipate the date for the expedition, and so to
take Henry by surprise before the troops from the rest of Germany were
assembled.
The plot was successful. Taken completely by surprise, the king sought
refuge in his castle at Harzburg, but the sudden appearance of a large
Saxon army made his further stay there impossible. On the night of
9-10 August he made his escape with a few followers, and after four days
of hardship and peril arrived at the monastery of Hersfeld. Count
Herman had recaptured Lüneburg and taken captive the royal
garrison; to effect their release the king on 15 August had to consent to
the surrender of Magnus; the castles were now closely besieged, and his
hold on Saxony was lost. But the day appointed for the Polish expedition
(22 August) was close at hand. The army was assembling, and he
determined to use it against the Saxons. He summoned the princes to
meet him at the village of Kappel near Hersfeld, to obtain their consent
to this change of plan. And now the fundamental insecurity of his
position was to be revealed to him. The princes debated, and finally
decided to postpone the expedition to October. They were determined to
make it clear that on their will was the king dependent, and the royal
authority suffered a blow more serious than defeat in battle. Henry had
to submit, and he retired to the Rhine district, conscious that the
initiative had passed from his hands. There he came to a wise decision.
Germany must for the time engage his whole attention; the challenge to
the Papacy must be postponed to a more favourable opportunity. He
wrote, accordingly, to the Pope a humble letter acknowledging his faults
and asking for absolution. The Pope, as anxious as Henry for peace,
welcomed this apparent repentance, and the breach was healed. This left
the king free to concentrate on Germany. Enlightened at last as to the
true state of affairs, he shewed remarkable judgment in appreciating the
factors that could be turned to his advantage, and great patience and skill
in so making use of them that he was able gradually to build up again
the shaken edifice of royal power.
He had, first of all, to endure further humiliation. The princes met
in October for the deferred expedition, but having obtained the upper
hand they were determined to maintain it; in place of an expedition they
1 A synod at Erfurt at the beginning of 1073 had just decided this question in
the archbishop's favour.
CH, III.
942
## p. 132 (#178) ############################################
132
Henry's humiliation. Help from the towns
instituted negotiations on their own account with the Saxons. Henry had
no choice but to acquiesce; he was sovereign in name only. But at this
crisis he found assistance in a new quarter. Coming to Worms, whose
bishop, Adalbert, was his constant foe for more than thirty years, he
met with an enthusiastic reception from the citizens, who expelled their
bishop on news of the king's approach. In return he granted them, on
18 January 1074, the first charter given directly to the citizens of a
town', and in the preamble he expressed his gratitude for the loyalty which
set so striking an example amid the disloyalty of all the magnates of the
kingdom. The action of Worms was contagious, and from this time he
was able to rely on the support of the Rhine towns, whatever the attitude
of the bishops. The serious rising of the trading classes at Cologne in
1074, on the occasion of the Easter fair, against Archbishop Anno, was
probably inspired by the example of Worms? The towns indeed had
everything to gain from royal favour. A strong central authority, able to
enforce peace and order throughout the kingdom, was a necessity if trade
was to flourish and expand, and from the king alone could the privileges
dear to the trading classes be obtained.
The king's circumstances were immediately improved, and he was
able, in spite of the aloofness of the leading nobles, to raise an army and
march north again; he was accompanied by a number of bishops, who in
view of the independent action of the towns found it to their interest to
render material support to the king once more. But he was not yet
strong enough to meet the Saxons in the field, and was forced to come to
terms with them, which were confirmed in an assembly at Gerstungen on
2 February 1074. The castles built by both sides during his reign were
to be destroyed, a general amnesty was to be proclaimed, and the Saxons
returned to his allegiance on condition that in matters concerning their
duchy the king should be advised by Saxons only. He had to pardon the
rebels, but the peace was a sign of recovered authority. The South
German dukes had no part in it, and did not readily forgive the Saxons 3
for thus depriving them of their control of the king's actions. Henry by
this peace divided his enemies in Germany.
period. Conrad II had especially encouraged the formation of this class
of royal servant, and on it his successors continued to rely.
As in the countryside, so in the towns there was a tendency to
1
obliterate the distinction between the free and half-free classes, though
in the towns this took the form of a levelling-up rather than a levelling-
down. The “ free air” of the towns, the encouragement to settlers, the
development of trade especially in the Rhine district, as well as the pro-
tection of the town walls, caused a considerable increase in their
population ; they acquired both constitutional and economic importance.
Some towns were royal towns, but all were under a lord, usually a bishop,
and it was to the bishops that the trading element in the town owed its
first privileges. It was to the bishop's interest to obtain for his town from
the king special rights such as the holding of a market and exemption
from tolls in royal towns, and all charters to towns till the latter part of
the eleventh century are granted through the bishops. The first sign of
a change is in the charter of Henry IV to Worins in 1074. The privileges
1 The original home of the Welfs was Altdorf in Swabia. So it was to a diet of
Swabian nobles that Henry the Lion, Duke of Bavaria and Saxony, was first sum-
moned to answer the charges against him.
CH. INI.
## p. 120 (#166) ############################################
120
Alliance of the towns with the king
granted are of the usual nature-exemption from toll in certain (in this
case, specified) royal towns. But for the first time the charter is given
not to the bishop but to the townsmen, and they are described, for the
first time, not as “negotiatores” or “mercatores” but as “ cives. ” The
circumstances attending the grant of this charter', including the welcome
to the king, the well-equipped military support given to him, the pay-
ment by the community of a financial aid, the reception and preservation
of the charter, all imply a town-organisation of a more advanced nature
than previous charters would have led us to expect. The Jews played an
important part in these early trading communities, and they are specially
mentioned in the charter to Worms; so too the Bishop of Spires in 1086
for the advantage of his town was careful, as he states, to plant a colony
of Jews and to give them special privileges, which were confirmed by the
king in 1090? If Worms was the first town which gives evidence of an
organisation independent of its bishop, it was soon followed by others
where the bishop as at Worms was hostile to the king. The rising of the
people at Cologne against Archbishop Anno in 1074, the expulsion of
Archbishop Siegfried and the anti-king Rudolf from Mayence in 1077,
the expulsion of Bishop Adalbert from Würzburg the same year and the
defence of the city against Rudolf, and, above all, the devotion of the
Rhine towns to Henry IV during his last years, shew clearly a wide
extension of this movements.
The townsmen, then, were coming into more direct relations with the
king. As far as the nobles were concerned, the change is rather in the
contrary direction. The duty of fidelity to the head of the State was still
a general conception; even ecclesiastics who scrupled to take an oath of
liege-fealty to the king did not disavow this obligation. The oath of
fealty was not taken by the people as a whole, but only by the princes of
the kingdom, whether to the king or to his representative, and they took
the oath in virtue of their official capacity and as representing the whole
community. It mattered not whether they held fiefs from the king
or from another noble; it was not the fief but the office, through which
the royal authority had been, and in theory still was, asserted, that
created the responsibility on behalf of the people within their spheres of
control. So the relation of the king with the nobles was not yet strictly
1 See H. Wibel, Die ältesten deutschen Stadtprivilegien (Archiv für Urkunden-
forschung, 1918, Vol. vi, pp. 234 sqq. ).
2 Altmann and Bernheim, Ausgewählte Urkunden zur Erläuterung der Verfass-
ungsgeschichte Deutschlands, pp. 158 sqq.
3 In Flanders, Cambrai set the example by founding a commune in 1077. Here
the movement was also directed against the bishop, but in this case it was, as at
Milan, allied with the Church reform movement. See Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique,
Vol. 1, pp. 192 sq. In Germany proper the movement was definitely royalist in
character.
4 Cf. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, Vol. vi (ed. Seeliger), pp. 487 sqq. ;
G. von Below, Der deutsche Staat des Mittelalters, Vol. 1, pp. 232 sqq.
## p. 121 (#167) ############################################
The growth of feudalism
121
a feudal relation. It was not to become so until the end of the twelfth
century, when the status of prince was confined to those nobles who held
directly from the king. The feudum was not yet the all-important thing,
at any rate in theory and law. There were many fiefs without military
service, some without service at all; there were vassals too without fiefs.
But these became, more and more, exceptional cases, and rapidly the
change from the official to the feudal status was being accomplished
in practice. Always the grant of a fief had accompanied the bestowal of
an office; and, as the fiefs had become hereditary, so too had the offices.
In the majority of cases, offices and fiefs had become identified, and the
official origin was preserved in little more than the title'.
In fact, the great nobles were no longer royal officials but territorial
magnates with alods and fiefs to which their children (sons if possible,
but failing them daughters) succeeded, and their aim was to loosen the
tie which bound them to the sovereign and to create an independent
position for themselves. Two circumstances combined to assist them in
this ambition-the rise of the class of ministeriales and the continual
civil war. The military fief became the normal type, and every important
noble had his band of armed and mounted retainers. He soon had his
castle, or castles, as well, built in defiance of the king; for castle-building
was a sovereign right, which only the stress of civil war enabled the noble
to usurp. Medieval society was based especially on custom and precedent.
If the central authority was weak, the nobles began at once to encroach ;
usurpations were in a few years translated into rights, and it was difficult,
if not impossible, for the king to recover what had been lost. Moreover,
while the counts had ceased to be royal officers, the system of maintain-
ing the royal control by missi had long disappeared. This made a fixed
seat of government impossible. The king himself had to progress cease-
lessly throughout his dominions to enforce his will on the local magnates.
There was no system of itinerant justices, and, except in the royal
domains, no official class to relieve the direct burden of the central
government. So there was no permanent machinery which could function
normally ; everything depended on the personality of the ruler.
But from the point of view of the king there were compensations.
Each noble played for his own hand, and there was rarely any unity of
purpose among them. It was from the dukes that the king had most to
fear, and with regard to them he started with many advantages. They
had no claim to divine appointment, no royal majesty or insignia, no
sovereign rights but such as he had granted. The nobles in each duchy
held office in theory from the king, to whom, and not to the duke, they
1 This is true even of the counts-palatine, with the exception of the Count-
Palatine of the Rhine who still retained much of his old official position; for instance,
when Henry IV went to Italy in 1090, the Count-Palatine of the Rhine was appointed
co-regent of the German kingdom with Duke Frederick of Swabia. So too when
Henry V went to Italy in 1116.
CH. III.
## p. 122 (#168) ############################################
122
The royal domain
had sworn liege-fealty', and they were far more jealous of the assertion
of the ducal, than of the royal, authority over them. Moreover the duke
by virtue of his office acquired little, if any, domain in his duchy? Where
his family possessions lay, there alone, in most cases, was he really power-
ful. Agnes in her appointments had at any rate shewn herself wise
in this, that she had appointed as dukes nobles whose hereditary lands
lay outside the duchies to which they were appointed. Berthold of Zäh-
ringen, the most powerful noble in Swabia, was a nonentity as Duke in
Carinthia; Otto of Nordheim, one of the leading nobles in Saxony, could
not maintain himself in his duchy of Bavaria when he revolted in 1070.
In other words, the noble depended on his domain, and this is equally
true of the king. There was no direct taxation' as in England, and the
king had in a very real sense to live of his own. The royal domain* was
scattered throughout the kingdom ; in each duchy there were royal
estates and royal palaces, though the largest and richest portion lay in
eastern Saxony, stretching from Goslar to Merseburg, the inheritance of
the Saxon kings. In the first place, it supplied the needs of the royal
household, and this, as well as the maintenance of royal authority, made
necessary the continual journeyings of the king and his court. The
domain, too, provided a means whereby the king could make grants of
lands whether in reward for faithful service or, more usually, in donations
to bishoprics and abbeys. And, finally, in these manors, as also in the
manors of nobles and ecclesiastics, there emerged out of the mass of half-
free tenants a class of men who played an important and peculiar rôle in
Germany. These royal ministeriales were employed by the king in adminis-
trative posts, as well as in the management of his estates; they were
armed and mounted, and provided an important part of the king's army.
On them he began to rely, therefore, to counteract the growing indepen-
dence of the greater nobles, both in his Council and on military expeditions.
In return, they were granted fiefs, and rose often to knightly ranks,
1 A duke or other noble might obtain an oath of fealty from his vassals, but
there should, by right, be in it a saving clause, preserving the superior fealty due
to the king.
2 Cf. Waitz, op. cit. Vol. vii, pp. 133 sq.
3 Unless the bede comes under this category. But all nobiles were exempt from
this, and other exemptions had been granted by charter.
4 Cf. M. Stimming, Das deutsche Königsgut im 11 und 12 Jahrhundert; B. Heusinger,
Servitium regis in der deutschen Kaiserzeit (Archiv für Urkundenforschung, Vol. viii,
pp. 26–159). Between the royal and the private domain of the king as a rule little
distinction was made. But the issue sometimes arose, notably on the question of the
inheritance of the Hohenstaufen from Henry V; see infra, p. 336.
6 Eventually this had its result in the rise of a number of new noble families to
take the place in German history of older ones that had become extinct. One leading
cause for the disappearance of old noble families—the ecclesiastical career (with its
enforced celibacy) which in the abbeys especially had been almost a prerogative of the
nobility-is very clearly demonstrated by A. Schulte, Der Adel und die deutsche Kirche
im Mittelalter (Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen, ed. U. Stutz, LXIII, LXIV).
## p. 123 (#169) ############################################
Alliance with the episcopate
123
sometimes even to episcopal. The same process was occurring in the
domains of the nobles. The ecclesiastical nobles had probably set the
example? , which was followed by the secular nobility and by the king.
As it provided him with the possibility of making himself self-sufficient and
so independent of princely support, it provided them too with a means of
furthering their independence of him.
The royal domain, then, plays a central part in the policy of the
Salian kings, as it was to do with the Capetians in France. During the
regency it had been grievously depleted. But there were many ways
in which it could be increased and in which gaps could be made good-
by inheritance, by exchange, by conquest, by escheat. There were also
other sources of royal revenue, notably the sovereign rights, of justice
and the like, which were assumed by the king wherever he might happen
to be and which were frequently lucrative. From the towns too, as well
as from the domain, he could levy contributions? , and, as has been indicated
above, could look to them for valuable support especially in time of war.
The loyalty and devotion of the Rhine towns is most marked, particularly
when the episcopal lord of the town was disloyal. But only in a few cases
was the bishop himself among the king's enemies, and so a direct alliance
with the townsmen, which might have been as useful to the German
monarchy as it was to the French, occurred only in isolated cases. It was
not to the king's interest to make the bishops antagonistic.
For the alliance with the episcopate had, from the time of Otto I,
been a cardinal factor in the policy of the king of Germany. The political
importance of the ecclesiastical nobles was evident: on them, as well as on
ministeriales and lesser nobles, the king relied both for his Council and
government and for his military expeditions. They could never make
their offices and fiefs hereditary, and they could be depended upon as
a counterpoise to the dangerous power of the dukes; while in the con-
tinual civil wars of this period the summons to the host was not of much
avail, nor could it be made effective without the consent of the nobles.
But they were equally valuable to the king from the economic point of
view. In the first place, the royal abbeys made annual payments in kind,
which began to be converted into money payments or at any rate to
1 Compare with this the prominent part played by ecclesiastics in the drift
towards feudalism in Saxon England (supra, Vol. 11, pp. 375–7). The great differ-
ence is that in Germany it was an unfree class to whom these military fiefs were
granted.
? The tax known as “bede” (petitio, precaria)originally, as its name shews, a
voluntary contribution. On the nature of this tax see G. von Below, op. cit.
pp. 85 sqq. , and generally for the taxation of towns, K. Zeumer, Die deutsche
Städtesteuern (Staats- und socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, ed. G. Schmoller,
Vol. 1, No. 2).
3 The lay nobles would take part only if they happened to be present, or if they
were summoned to diets on important issues of state or to judge one of their
number. The great offices of the household were held by dukes, but had become
merely titular and ceremonial.
CB. II.
## p. 124 (#170) ############################################
124
The complication of Italy
be reckoned on a monetary basis early in the twelfth century; from these
abbeys, too, when he visited them, he could claim hospitality. There
is no evidence that the episcopal services included fixed payments in kind,
but the obligation seems to have been imposed upon the bishops of main-
taining the king and his retinue during the king's stay in their towns,
whether or no these contained a royal palace. It is at any rate noticeable
how prominently they figure in the itineraries of the Salian kings! . And
on the death of a bishop the king exercised his rights of regalia and took
possession of the revenues of the see during the vacancy, and sometimes
of spolia as well, seizing the personal effects of the dead bishop. These
great ecclesiastical offices were regarded by the king as very distinctly
part of his personal possessions? . His lavish grants to them of territory
were therefore not lost to the Crown, and the ecclesiastical as distinct from
the lay nobles remained essentially royal officials. Royal control of
appointments to bishoprics and abbeys was a reality and at the same
time a necessity; and the royal chapel, which was a natural centre for the
training of ecclesiastics, was also a stepping-stone to advancement. From
among the royal chaplains, trained under the king's eye and experienced
often in the work of his chancery, appointments were commonly made to
vacant bishoprics.
This was bound to lead sooner or later to conflict with the reformed
Papacy, though the conflict might have been delayed and would certainly
have been less fatal in result had not this control of the German king in
ecclesiastical matters been extended to Italy and to the Papacy itself. To
the crown of Germany were attached the crowns of Burgundy and Italy,
and finally the imperial crown as well. These additional dignities brought
little real advantage to the German king. In Burgundy, the royal
authority was slight and rarely asserted; it was, however, of some impor-
tance to the Emperor that his suzerainty and not that of the French king
should be recognised. In Italy, the royal domain and episcopal support
were sometimes of definite advantage, but usually the interest of the king
in his Italian kingdom prejudiced his position in Germany. And the
imperial title was a similar handicap'. It magnified the importance of his
office and gave him increased prestige, but it added enormously to his
responsibilities and prevented him from concentrating on his real interests.
The imperial title added nothing to the royal authority in Germany. In
a sense it added nothing in Italy either. The title “ rex Romanorum
was used before imperial coronation occasionally by Henry IV, frequently
>
1 B. Heusinger, op. cit. Cf, especially, p. 70, “Für das 11 Jahrhundert ergibt
sich also, dass das deutsche Königtum in stärkstem Masse, vielleicht überwiegend
auf den bischöflichen Servitien ruhte. ”
2 Cf. U. Stutz, Die Eigenkirche als Element des mittelalterlich-germanischen
Kirchenrechtes, pp. 32 sqq.
3 See, for a discussion of this question, and a consideration of opposing views on
the revival of the Empire by Otto I, G. von Below, op. cit. pp. 353-369.
## p. 125 (#171) ############################################
Henry IV's policy
125
by Henry V, and as Emperor-designate the king acted with full imperial
authority in Italy and with regard to the Pope. But the imperial crown
was the right of the German king, to his mind an essential right, and it
was by virtue of this right that he claimed the control from which
the Papacy was now beginning to free itself, with results fatal to the
monarchy in Germany.
The task that Henry IV set before himself was to undo the damage
that had been wrought during his minority and to restore imperial
authority both in Germany and Italy; he was determined to be master
as his father had been at the height of his power. In Germany, he had
first of all to build up the royal domain, to force the nobles to a direct
subordination to his will, and to break down the independence of Saxony.
In Italy, where imperial authority was practically ignored, there were the
special problems of Tuscany', the Normans, and above all the Papacy.
But, determined as he was to revive the authority over the Papacy that
his father had exercised from 1046 until his death, the question of Ger-
many had to come first, and so for a time he was willing to make
concessions. Control of the Church in Germany and Italy was so essential
to him that he could not be in sympathy with the reform policy of the
Papacy. This was now beginning to be directed not only against the
simony and secularisation that resulted from lay control but against the
lay control itself; and it was a definite feature of that policy to demand
from the higher clergy an obedience to papal authority which could not
fail to be prejudicial to the royal interests. But at present the king was
anxious to keep on good terms with the Pope; as he was obedient to his
orders on the divorce question in 1069, so in 1070 he allowed Charles,
whom he had invested as Bishop of Constance, to be deposed for simony,
and in 1072 Abbot Robert of Reichenau to suffer the same penalty? The
Papacy was given no indication of his real intentions.
His compliant attitude to the Papacy on this question was in accor-
dance with his general policy. He worked patiently for his ends, and
strove to do the task first that lay within his power, careful to separate
his adversaries and to placate one while he was overcoming the other.
Adversity always displayed him at his best. Again and again he revived
his fortunes, shewing a speedy recognition and making a wise use of the
1 The death of Duke Godfrey in 1069 removed one great obstacle from Henry's
path. His son Godfrey (Gibbosus) succeeded to the duchy of Lower Lorraine and
was already the husband of Countess Matilda. But he quarrelled with his wife and
confined his interests to his German duchy, where he remained loyal to Henry.
2 In these cases, as also in the case of Bishop Herman of Bamberg in 1075,
when his attitude to the Pope was dictated by the same motives, he protested his
own innocence of simony in the appointments. There is no evidence against him.
Probably the offenders had paid money to court-favourites, whose influence had
secured the appointinents.
CH. III.
## p. 126 (#172) ############################################
126
His character
possibilities at his disposal, dividing his enemies by concessions and by
stimulating causes of ill-feeling between them, biding his time patiently
till his opportunity came. Nor was he prevented from following out his
plan by considerations of personal humiliation. Not only at Canossa but
also in 1073 a personal humiliation was his surest road to success, and he
took it. He was not the typically direct and brutal knight of the Middle
Ages, and he was not usually successful in battle; he generally avoided a
pitched battle, in contrast to his rival Rudolf, to whom he really owed
his one great victory in the field-over the Saxons in 1075. He recog-
nised his limitations. His armies were rarely as well-equipped as those of
his opponents: they were often composed of ministeriales, royal and
episcopal, and of levies from the towns, which were not a match for the
Saxon knights; also he had more to lose than they had by staking all on
the result of a battle. In an unstatesmanlike generation he shewed many
statesmanly qualities, which was the more remarkable in that he had
received so little training in the duties of his office. His enemies, when
they comment with horror on his guile and cunning, are really testifying
to these qualities; for it was natural that they should give an evil name
to the ability which so often overcame their perfidy and disloyalty.
But, as his greatness is best seen in adversity, so in the moment of
victory were the weaknesses of his character revealed. He allowed himself
to be overcome by the arrogance of success both in 1072 and 1075.
Having decisively defeated his Saxon enemies, he made a vindictive use
of his victory, when clemency was the right policy; by his arbitrary
actions he alienated the other nobles whose assistance had ensured his
success, and they formed a coalition against him to anticipate his too
clearly revealed intentions against themselves. His victory gave him so
false a sense of security that on both occasions he chose the moment to
throw down the challenge to the Pope, entirely miscalculating both the
reality of his position in Germany and the strength of his new adversary.
He profited by his lesson later, but never again did he have the same
opportunity. He certainly shewed a clear sense of the strength of the
papal position in the years 1077–1080, and also of the means by which this
strength could be discounted. On the whole he was a good judge of the
men with whom he had to deal. It may appear short-sighted in him to
pardon so readily a man like Otto of Nordheim and to advance him to a
position of trust in 1075; but he was faced with treachery on every side
and he had to attempt to bind men to his cause by their interests. At
any rate he was successful with Otto's sons, and also even in detaching
Duke Magnus himself from the party of Rudolf. The only occasions
when he was really overwhelmed were when the treachery came from his
own sons, and there is no more moving document in this period than his
letter to King Philip of France, in which he relates the calculated perfidy
and perjury of his son Henry V. For he was naturally of an affectionate and
sympathetic disposition, a devoted father and a kind master, especially to
## p. 127 (#173) ############################################
The peculiar position of Saxony
127
the non-noble classes throughout his dominions. Even if we discount the
glowing panegyric of the author of the Vita Heinrici IV, we cannot ignore
the passionate devotion of the people of Liège, who, scorning the wrath
of all the powers of Church and kingdom, refused to dissemble their grief
or to refrain from the last tokens of respect over the body of their beloved
master. That tribute was repeated again at Spires; and, though for five
years his body was denied the rites of Christian burial, few kings have
had so genuine a mourning.
The reconciliation of Henry with his wife in 1069 marked a definite
stage in his career. From this time he devoted himself wholeheartedly
to affairs of state, and his policy at once began to take shape. The par-
ticularist tendencies of the German princes in general had to be overcome,
but the extreme form which particularism took was to be found in Saxony.
Saxony, ever since it had ceased to supply the king to Germany, had
held itself aloof and independent. In various ways was its distinctive
character marked. It held proudly to its own more primitive customs,
which it had translated into rights, and the maintenance of which had
been guaranteed to it by Conrad II and Henry III; especially was the
royal system of justice, with inquest and oath-takers, foreign to Saxon
custom', which stood as a permanent bar to unity of government. These
customary rights formed a link between the classes in Saxony, giving it
a homogeneity lacking in the other duchies. Allodial lands were more ex-
tensive here than elsewhere, and the nobles accordingly more independent.
Among them the duke took the leading place, but only in precedence.
Margraves and counts did not recognise his authority over them; on the
other hand, the ducal office was hereditary in the Billung family, and so
it was not at the free disposal of the king. Finally, beneath the nobles,
the proportion of free men was exceptionally high; they were trained to
arms, and, though they usually fought on foot, were formidable soldiers
in an age when cavalry was regarded as the decisive arm. It was a bold
policy for a young king to attempt, at the beginning of his reign, to
grasp the Saxon nettle. It was essential that he should obtain assistance
from the other duchies, and this he might expect. The Saxons looked
with contempt on the other German peoples, who in their turn were
jealous of the Saxons and irritated by their aloofness. The ill-feeling
between the two was always a factor on which he could count.
But the determination of Henry IV to attack the problem of Saxony
had a further and more immediate cause. The effects of his minority had
not merely been to give the opportunity to particularism, here as else-
where. It had been disastrous also to the royal domain, that essential
basis of royal power, which had suffered from neglect or deliberate
squandering at the hands of the unscrupulous archbishops who had con-
trolled the government for their own advantage. The first task of the
· K. Hampe, Deutsche Kaisergeschichte im Zeitalter der Salier und Staufen, p. 40.
CH. III.
## p. 128 (#174) ############################################
128
The importance of the royal domain in Saxony
young king was to concentrate on the domain, to fill up gaps and make
compact areas where possible, to take effective measures to recover services
that had been lost, and finally to protect it against further usurpation.
It was natural that his attention should first be directed to eastern Saxony
and Thuringia, where lay by far the richest portion of the domain', and
which afforded the best opportunity for creating a compact royal territory.
It was here, moreover, that the domain had suffered most; it had not
only been wasted by grants, but also services had been withheld, minis-
teriales had usurped their freedom', and probably neighbouring lords had
made encroachments. One of Henry's first measures was the building of
castles on an extensive scale in this region, designed primarily for the
recovery and maintenance of the domain and the services attached to it,
and having at the same time the strategic advantage of being situated so
as to divide the duchy and in case of revolt to prevent a coalition of
Saxon princes. This was a menace to the independent spirit of the Saxons,
and he irritated them still more by appointing royal ministeriales from
South Germanyó as officials in the domain-lands and as garrisons in the
castles. There were clearly grievances on both sides, which only made the
subsequent contest the more bitter. The Saxons had infringed royal
rights by neglect and usurpation. The South German ministeriales in
their turn shewed little respect for Saxon customs, and acted in an op-
pressive manner in making requisitions and forcing labour. And probably
the Saxons were right in their suspicion that the king would take every
1 This is evident from the Indiculus curiarum ad mensam regis Romanorum perti-
nentium (best text in Neu. Arch. Vol. xli, pp. 572–4). A comprehensive survey of
this has been made by B. Heusinger, Servitium regis (Archiv für Urkundenforschung,
Vol. viii, pp. 26–159). M. Stimming, Das deutsche Königsgut, pp. 86 sqq. , has elabo-
rated the central importance of the domain on Henry's policy in Saxony and on the
subsequent Saxon revolt. J. Haller, Das Verzeichnis der Tafelgüter des römischen
Königs (Neu. Arch. Vol. xlv, pp. 48–81), rejects the accepted date (1065) of the Indi-
culus and dates it 1185. His arguments seem to me to be untenable, and to raise
more difficulties than they solve. I am convinced that it was drawn up at any rate
for one of the last two Salian kings, and that it is a rough draft prepared at a time
when an imperial coronation was anticipated. Anyhow, the statement in the text
is not really affected by the date of the Indiculus.
? Lampert of Hersfeld, sub 1066, ed. Holder-Egger, SGUS, p.
100.
3 Bruno, c. 16, ed. Wattenbach, SGUS, p. 11. Cf. Stimming, op. cit. p. 93.
4 Cf. Stimming (op. cit. pp. 98 sqq. ), who supports the view that the policy was
originated by Archbishop Adalbert of Bremen. He also points out the contiguity
of the chief leaders of the Saxon revolt, bishops as well as lay nobles, to the royal
domain.
• The Saxons especially complained of the low-born “Swabians” employed by
the king on official and garrison duty in their duchy. The term Swabian in their
mouth seems to be a generic term for the rest of Germany (or, at any rate, for
Franconia and Swabia), just as in southern Europe we find Alemannia used for
Germany (ef. Gregorii VII Reg. 11, 15), a use which has been continued to the
present day in France. There cannot have been many royal ministeriales in the
duchy of Swabia.
## p. 129 (#175) ############################################
ما
The revolt of Duke Otto of Bavaria
129
opportunity of increasing the royal domain at their expense, and that he
was anxious to suppress their customary rights which stood in the way of
the centralising policy of the monarchy.
It is significant in this connexion, firstly, that the two nobles men-
tioned as Anno's colleagues in his coups d'état at Kaiserswerth in 1062
and at Tribur in 1066 were Otto of Nordheim and Ekbert of Brunswick,
whose allodial territories were adjacent to the main portion of the royal
domain and were so extensive as to make them, next to the duke, the
most powerful nobles in Saxony. Otto was already Duke of Bavaria, and
in 1067 Ekbert was appointed Margrave of Meissen; on his death in
1068 his son Ekbert II succeeded to the margravate as well as to Bruns-
wick. Similarly adjacent, and equally concerned in the great revolt of
1073, were Anno's two relatives, Archbishop Werner of Magdeburg and
Bishop Burchard of Halberstadt. In the second place, the actual outbreak
of civil war, which was to be henceforth almost continuous, had its origin
in the downfall of Duke Otto in 1070. Probably Henry rather seized
than created the opportunity. Otto's military skill had been of consider-
able assistance to him on more than one occasion, and there is no actual
evidence either to justify the charge of treachery brought against Otto
or to convict Henry of a deliberate intention to ruin the duke. A diet
at Mayence left the decision to the test of battle between Otto and his
low-born accuser. Otto refused to submit to the indignity of such a
contest, and was accordingly condemned in his absence by a diet of Saxon
nobles at Goslar and deprived of his possessions in Saxony. His duchy
was forfeited and, at the special instance of Duke Rudolf of Swabia, was
given by Henry to Welf, the first of the new line of that name? The
fall of Otto was not viewed with alarm in Upper Germany; the replace-
ment of a Saxon by a Swabian noble was rather a cause for congratulation.
The ill-feeling of the rest of Germany towards Saxony was very pronounced,
and only identity of interest against the king could lead to common
action.
In Saxony, however, where Otto immediately took refuge, he obtained
the powerful support of Magnus, son and heir of Duke Ordulf. This
brought the king into direct conflict with the Billung family. The rebels
were not able to resist for long-revolt was not yet organised—and they
had to submit unconditionally to the king in 1071. Otto, after a year's
detention, was released, and was allowed to retain his hereditary
possessions in Saxony; Magnus was kept in close confinement at the
castle of Harzburg. In this can be seen the influence of Archbishop
1 As he was of Saxon origin, his case, in accordance with constitutional practice,
had to be decided by Saxons.
2 The male line had died out with Welf III, whose sister Cuniza (Cunegunda)
had married Marquess Azzo of Este. Their son Welf IV, who had become Duke of
Bavaria, had acquired his uncle's estates in Germany, which lay in Swabia and on
the borders of Bavaria.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. III.
9
## p. 130 (#176) ############################################
130
Henry's victory. His over-confidence
Adalbert, who in the last year of his life entered into public affairs again
to revenge himself for the humiliations he had suffered from the Billungs
in 1066. He brought about a meeting with King Svein of Denmark, and
a regular coalition was concerted against the Billungs. The king's
interests were all in the same direction. Magnus, by his marriage with
the sister of Géza, cousin and rival of Henry's brother-in-law Salomo, had
allied himself with the anti-imperial party in Hungary. Moreover, when
Duke Ordulf died in 1072, Magnus was recognised as duke throughout
Saxony. Henry did not deny Magnus' right of succession, but it was the
more necessary to him to retain so important a hostage. The king's
policy in Saxony could now be definitely advanced in both directions.
The building of the castles was continued and extended, and the king
took possession of Lüneburg, the chief town of the Billungs, and placed
in its castle a garrison of seventy men under Count Eberhard of Nellen-
burg
The victory had been an easy one: too easy, because it deluded him
as to the strength of the forces he had to counteract. Saxony was
thoroughly alarmed, and in the mood for a more serious revolt than the
previous one; with Magnus in his hands, Henry perhaps discounted this
danger. But the other German princes were alarmed too. Henry had
shewn his hand too plainly, and it was a fatal misjudgment that led him
to rely on their further concurrence against the Saxons. To him, however,
it seemed that he had recovered his position in Germany, and that the
necessity to humour the Pope no longer existed. It can hardly be due to
chance that at this very time he threw down a deliberate challenge to the
Pope, to whose injunctions he had previously so meekly submitted, over
the archbishopric of Milan. Just before his death, at the Lenten synod of
1073, Alexander II replied by excommunicating the counsellors of the
king. Henry did not refrain from communion with them, and so, when
Alexander died and Gregory VII became Pope, there was a breach
between the German king and the Roman Church.
In spite of his commitments in Saxony and Italy, Henry chose the
occasion for an emphatic assertion of imperial majesty in another quarter.
In 1071 the Dukes of Poland and Bohemia had been summoned to appear
before the king at Meissen, and had received the royal command to keep
the peace. This was significant of the recovery that Henry had already
effected, and, when the Duke of Poland disobeyed the injunction in 1073,
it was necessary to take immediate measures to punish him. The king
accordingly summoned an expedition against Poland to assemble on
22 August, and came to Goslar himself, probably to ensure obedience to
the summons. The expedition was not destined to take place. Under
cover of the assembling of troops for the Polish campaign, a formidable
conspiracy was organised in eastern Saxony. The bishops, led by Werner
of Magdeburg and Burchard of Halberstadt, played a leading part. All
the chief nobles were concerned in it, especially Margrave Ekbert of
## p. 131 (#177) ############################################
The Saxon revolt of 1073
131
Meissen and the Margraves of the North and East Marks. Count Otto of
Nordheim was soon induced to join. Count Herman, uncle of Magnus
and so the acting-head of the Billung family, needed no inducement.
Moreover, the Thuringians, equally affected by the building of the
castles, with customary rights of their own to defend, and having a
private grievance arising out of the claims of the Archbishop of Mayence
to the payment of tithes', soon threw in their lot with the Saxons. Their
plans were concerted to anticipate the date for the expedition, and so to
take Henry by surprise before the troops from the rest of Germany were
assembled.
The plot was successful. Taken completely by surprise, the king sought
refuge in his castle at Harzburg, but the sudden appearance of a large
Saxon army made his further stay there impossible. On the night of
9-10 August he made his escape with a few followers, and after four days
of hardship and peril arrived at the monastery of Hersfeld. Count
Herman had recaptured Lüneburg and taken captive the royal
garrison; to effect their release the king on 15 August had to consent to
the surrender of Magnus; the castles were now closely besieged, and his
hold on Saxony was lost. But the day appointed for the Polish expedition
(22 August) was close at hand. The army was assembling, and he
determined to use it against the Saxons. He summoned the princes to
meet him at the village of Kappel near Hersfeld, to obtain their consent
to this change of plan. And now the fundamental insecurity of his
position was to be revealed to him. The princes debated, and finally
decided to postpone the expedition to October. They were determined to
make it clear that on their will was the king dependent, and the royal
authority suffered a blow more serious than defeat in battle. Henry had
to submit, and he retired to the Rhine district, conscious that the
initiative had passed from his hands. There he came to a wise decision.
Germany must for the time engage his whole attention; the challenge to
the Papacy must be postponed to a more favourable opportunity. He
wrote, accordingly, to the Pope a humble letter acknowledging his faults
and asking for absolution. The Pope, as anxious as Henry for peace,
welcomed this apparent repentance, and the breach was healed. This left
the king free to concentrate on Germany. Enlightened at last as to the
true state of affairs, he shewed remarkable judgment in appreciating the
factors that could be turned to his advantage, and great patience and skill
in so making use of them that he was able gradually to build up again
the shaken edifice of royal power.
He had, first of all, to endure further humiliation. The princes met
in October for the deferred expedition, but having obtained the upper
hand they were determined to maintain it; in place of an expedition they
1 A synod at Erfurt at the beginning of 1073 had just decided this question in
the archbishop's favour.
CH, III.
942
## p. 132 (#178) ############################################
132
Henry's humiliation. Help from the towns
instituted negotiations on their own account with the Saxons. Henry had
no choice but to acquiesce; he was sovereign in name only. But at this
crisis he found assistance in a new quarter. Coming to Worms, whose
bishop, Adalbert, was his constant foe for more than thirty years, he
met with an enthusiastic reception from the citizens, who expelled their
bishop on news of the king's approach. In return he granted them, on
18 January 1074, the first charter given directly to the citizens of a
town', and in the preamble he expressed his gratitude for the loyalty which
set so striking an example amid the disloyalty of all the magnates of the
kingdom. The action of Worms was contagious, and from this time he
was able to rely on the support of the Rhine towns, whatever the attitude
of the bishops. The serious rising of the trading classes at Cologne in
1074, on the occasion of the Easter fair, against Archbishop Anno, was
probably inspired by the example of Worms? The towns indeed had
everything to gain from royal favour. A strong central authority, able to
enforce peace and order throughout the kingdom, was a necessity if trade
was to flourish and expand, and from the king alone could the privileges
dear to the trading classes be obtained.
The king's circumstances were immediately improved, and he was
able, in spite of the aloofness of the leading nobles, to raise an army and
march north again; he was accompanied by a number of bishops, who in
view of the independent action of the towns found it to their interest to
render material support to the king once more. But he was not yet
strong enough to meet the Saxons in the field, and was forced to come to
terms with them, which were confirmed in an assembly at Gerstungen on
2 February 1074. The castles built by both sides during his reign were
to be destroyed, a general amnesty was to be proclaimed, and the Saxons
returned to his allegiance on condition that in matters concerning their
duchy the king should be advised by Saxons only. He had to pardon the
rebels, but the peace was a sign of recovered authority. The South
German dukes had no part in it, and did not readily forgive the Saxons 3
for thus depriving them of their control of the king's actions. Henry by
this peace divided his enemies in Germany.
