For the
267
Blessed One said that recourse is to the Sutra.
267
Blessed One said that recourse is to the Sutra.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
?
According to another opinion, atmavdda is both a view of soul
221
? of an atman {dtmavada)\ if Scripture uses the word vdda, "affirmation," it is because the atman does not exist. It is said in faa, "The fool, the ignorant, the Prthagjana, conforming to the manners of vulgar speech,
222 thinks 'me,' or 'mine;' but there is not any 'me* or 'mine. *"
Attachment to the kdmas, views, etc. , is chanda or desire, and raga or 2V>
craving, with regard to them. As the Blessed One said in the Sarva 224
'What is attachment? It is chandardga. "
Because of attachment, accumulated action produces a new existence:
this is bhava. The Sutra says, "Ananda, action that produces a new
225 existence is the nature of bhava! *
By reason of bhava, and by means of the descent of the con- 226
sciousness, future arising (janman) is birth, which is made up of the five skandhas, being namarupa in nature.
227 Because of birth, there is old age and death as defined in the Sutra.
It is in this manner that, sufficient unto itself (kevala)--that is, without any relation to an atman--there is produced this great mass of suffering, great because it has neither beginning nor end
##*
The theory that has just been taught--according to which the twelve parts of dependent origination are twelve states made up of the five skandhas--is a theory of the Vaibhasikas.
***
What is avidya (ignorance)?
The non-vidyd9 that which is not vidyd.
Impossible; for the eye is also non-vidyd.
It is an absence of vidyd, "ignorance. "
This is also impossible, for an absence is not a thing (dravya) (iv.
2b-3b) and avidya must be a thing, since it is a cause (pratyaya). Thus 28c-dAvidyaisaseparateentity{dharma),theoppositeofvidyd
228
The non-friend (amitra) is the opposite of a friend, not a non-friend, that is, anyone other than a friend, not the absence of the friend Ifra or
or knowledge, like a non-friend, the untrue, etc
The World 419
? 420 Chapter Three
satya is truth; non-truth (anrta) is speech contrary to true speech; so too non-righteousness (adharma), non-useful (anattha) and the not-to-be-
229 done (akdrya) are the opposite of righteousness, useful, and duty.
Thus avidya--"non-knowledge"--is the opposite of vidyd, a real separate dharma. The Sutra defines it as the cause of the samskdras, from whence it results that it is not a mere negatioa Further,
230
The Sutra regards ignorance as a separate yoke (samyojana), a bond (bandhana), a latent defilement (anuSayd), a canker (dsrava), a torrent or flood (ogha), and a yoke (yoga). Thus ignorance cannot be a mere negation; it cannot be everything that is not vidyd, the eyes, etc
Yet the prefix nan--the privative a--has a pejorative sense. One terms a bad wife a "non-wife" (akalatra), and a bad son, a "non-son" (aputra). Should we not think then that avidya is bad vidyd, that is, bad prajtidl
231 29b. Avidydisnotbadprajnd,becausethisisseeing(dar/ana).
Bad prajfid (kuprajnd) or defiled prajfid would be a type of seeing
(drspi); one of the five bad views (v. 3). Now avidya or ignorance is
certainly not seeing, for ignorance and seeing are two distinct yokes
252 (samyojanas).
[TheSautrantikas:]Avidyawouldbethedefiledprajfidwhichisnot seeing by nature, [for example prajnd associated with rdga or craving].
This is impossible,
29c. Because views are associated with ignorance,
In fact moha (error or aberration), which is defined as avidya (ignorance) is among the mahdbhUmika kief as (defilements which are found in all defiled minds, ii. 26a); now all the mahdbhumika kief as are associated with them, thus avidya (under the name of moha) is associated with seeing (fivefold bad view) which is prajfid in nature; thus avidya is not prajfid, for two items of prajnd cannot be associated.
29d and because ignorance is defined as a defilement ofprajnd. The Sutra says, "The mind defiled by desire is not liberated; prajnd
233
defiled by ignorance is not purified. " Now prajnd cannot be defiled by
29a. Because it is declared to be bound (sarhyojana), etc
? prajnd: if desire is a defilement of the mind, then desire is not the mind; if ignorance is a defilement of prajnd, then ignorance is not prajOd.
[Reply of the Sautrantikas]. Good prajnd can be mixed with defiled prajnd, as when moments of good and defiled prajnd succeed one another. In the same way, when one says that a mind defiled by desire is not liberated, one is speaking of a mind that is not necessarily associated with aaving, but which is oppressed by craving [craving is not aaive,
samuddcaran\ but its traces remain and the mind is oppressed]. When an ascetic avoids aaving, [that is, by suppressing its traces and repairing the bad state, dausfhulya, of the mind], then the mind is liberated. In the same way prajnd, defiled by ignorance (bad prajnd), is not pure: it is oppressed, even when it is good, by ignorance.
234
What is capable of arresting the imaginations of a scholar?
Ignorance is not, in its nature, prajna-
The scholar who maintains that ignorance is all the defilements
236
(kiefas) is refuted at the same time. If ignorance is all the defilements,
it cannot be named separately among the yokes (samyojanas), etc; it is not associated with views and with the other defilements; Scripture should not say, "The mind, defiled by desire, is not liberated," but rather, "The mind defiled by ignorance . . . " Do you say that one expresses oneself in this manner in order to be more specific, and that the Sutra should say, "The mind, defiled by ignorance which consists of desire, is not liberated? " In this hypothesis, Scripture should specify what type of ignorance it is that hinders the purity of the prajnd: now it says, "Prajnd defiled by ignorance is not purified. "
If you hold that ignorance is a separate dharma, and not merely a certain type of prajnd, you should define it.
Ignorance is the non-samprakhydna of the Four Truths, the Three Jewels, of aaion and its result. [Samprakhydna is the same thing as
237 prajrid, discernment, orJnana, knowledge].
What is non-samprakhydna?
It is Tiot'Samprakhydna, nor absenceof->samprakhyana, in the same way that avidydis not non-vidyd or absence-of-f*/^. It is then a certain separate dharma, the opposite of samprakhydna.
Good enough; but as for ignorance, you have not told us the nature of asamprakhyana.
The World All
? 422 Chapter Three
Definitions are often thus, that is, not definitions through self lature or essence, but definitions through funaioa For example, the eye
s defined as "the pure rupa that serves as a support for the eye ronsciousness" because one does not know this invisible rupa except :hrough inference (Chap, ix, French trans, p. 231. ). [In the same way the inique nature oiavidyd is known through its aaion {karman) or aaivity [kdritra); this aaion is contrary to vidyddso it is thus a dharma contrary [vipaksa) to vidyd].
***
The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defines ignorance in the following
238 erms: asmUi sattvamayana.
Does this mayanddiffer from asmimdna (v. 10)? 239
The Bhadanta answers: As the Sutra says, "I know, I see--
hrough the perfe a abandoning and the perfea knowledge of desire, of
iews, mayands, attachments and latent defilements to the idea of self 240
a$magrdha)\ to the idea of mine (mamagrdha), to asmindna -- 241
without shade, Parinirvana. " [This Sutra shows that mayand--in the ingular since it is a genre--is distina from asmimdna].
So be it, there is mayand; but from whence do you hold that it is jnorance?
The Bhadanta answers: Because one cannot identify mayand with ny other defilement, since it is named separately from desire, views, nd asmimdna.
But could it not be a mdna other than asmimdna} [Mdna is in faa six r sevenfold, v. 10]. However we would have to say too much in order to smplete this examination. Let us stop here.
***
242
As for ndmarupa rupa has already been explained (19).
245 30a. Ndman are the skandhas that are not rupa.
The four nonmaterial skandhas,--sensation, ideas, samskdras, and >nsciousness, are called ndman, for ndman signifies "that which bends, elds," (namatiti ndma).
? The nonmaterial skandhas bend, [that is, "are active," pravartante, "arise," utpadyante], towards the objea (artha) by reason of name
244 (ndman), the organs, and the object.
In this phrase, "by reason of name," one takes the word "name" in its popular sense, (samjndkarana, ii. 47a, English trans, p. 250), as a "designation," which designates and causes to be understood either a collection, "cattle," "horses," etc. ,ora single thing, "rupa" "taste," etc.
Why is samjndkarana termed "name? "
Because the samjndkarana causes the nonmaterial skandhas to bend (namayatiti noma) towards their objea.
According to another explanation, the nonmaterial skandhas are termed ndman, because, then the body dissolves, these skandhas bend,
245 that is, go towards another existence.
***
We have already explained the six dyatanas (i. 9). *#*
246 30b. There are six contaas. They arise from encounter.
The first is the contaa of the eye, and the sixth is contaa of the manas or mind (Digha, iii. 243, etc. )
They arise from the coming together of three things, an organ, its objea, and a consciousness.
One can see indeed that there can be a coming together of the five material organs, with their objeas and their corresponding con- sciousnesses, for the three are simultaneous. But the mental organ or manas (manodhdtu) is destroyed when a mental consciousness (mano- vijnana) arises (i. 172); and the objea (i. e. , dharmas) of this con- sciousness can be future: how can there be a coming together of the three?
There is a coming together because the organ (the manas) and the objea (the dharmas) are the causal conditions of the mental con- sciousness; or rather because the organ, the objea and the consciousness produce the same single effea, namely the contaa.
The World 423
? 424 Chapter Three
***
What is the nature of contact?
The masters are not in agreement.
Some--[the Sautrantikas]--say: Contact is merely the coming
together itself. According to the Sutra, 'The coming together, the 247
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact. "
Others--[the Sarvastivadins]--say: Contact is a dharma associated
with the mind (ii. 24, English trans, p. 190), distina from any coming 248 249
together. According to the Smra of the Six Hexades, "The six internal sources of consciousness (ayatanas, eye, etc. ), the six external sources of consciousness (visible things, etc), the six consciousness, the six contacts, the six sensations, and the six desires. " The Sutra thus knows of the six contacts, together with the six categories of internal ayatanas, external ayatanas, and the consciousnesses: [thus the contacts are separate dharmas; for the Sutra does not contain any repetition or double usages].
[The Sautrantikas explain this Sutra:] If the Sutra does not contain any repetition, it follows that sensations and desires exist apart from the dharmayatana which is the sixth internal source of consciousness (the object of the manas), since you can hold only that the first two categories (six organs and six objects) refer to the organs and their objects without any relation to the consciousness.
[Reply of the Sautrantika, the Bhadanta Srllabha:] Every eye and
visible thing is not the cause of a visual consciousness, as all visual
25 consciousness is not the result of the eye and a visible thing. ? Thus
what is defined as contact in the Sutra, "Six collections of contacts," is the eye, a visible thing and the consciousnesses which are cause and effect. (See p. 428, line 13a).
But how do the Sarvastivadins, who maintain that contact exists
apart from the coming together of any eye, a visible thing and a
consciousness, explain the Sutra, 'The coming together (samgati), the
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact? " 251
They do not read the Sutra in this form; or rather they say that the
252
expression is metaphorical: when the text says "the coming
together," it means "the result of the coming together. "
253 But this discussion is taking us too far afield
? ***
The Abhidharmikas think that contact is a dharma, a separate entity.
30c-d Five are contact through (actual) contact; the sixth is
254 so-called through denomination.
The contact of the eye, the ear, etc. , have sapratigha organs (i. 29b) for their support (dfraya); thus they are termed pratigha spar $ a taking
255 their name from their support.
The sixth, the contact of the mental organ, is called adhivaca- 256
nasamsparfa.
What is the meaning of the term adhivacanam
257 Adhivacana is a name.
Now name is the object (alambana) par excellence of contact
associated with the mental consciousness. In fact it is said, "Through the
visual consciousness, he knows blue; but he does not know, 'It is blue;'
through the mental consciousness, he knows blue and he knows, It is
258 blue/"
Thus the contact of the mental organ takes its name--a contact of
denomination--from its characteristic object.
259
According to another opinion, one takes into account the fact that
only the mental consciousness is activated (pravartate) with regard to its objeas (color, etc. ), or applies itself to its object, by reason of expression
260
or speech (adhikrtya vacanam = vacanam avadhatya): mental
consciousness is thus adhivacana. The contact (sparfa) that is associated with it is thus called adhivacanasamsparia.
#*#
The sixth contact is of three types:
31a-b. Contact of knowledge, non-knowledge, other: which are
261 respectively pure, defiled, other.
These are the contacts associated with vidya, that is, with pure prajna-, with avidya, that is, with defiled non-knowledge; and with naivavidya-navidyd, that is, with good, but impure prajnd.
The World 425
? 262 with all the defilements and which is always active,
the two:
31c. Contacts of antipathy and sympathy
which are associated with hatred and with desire.
one distinguishes
***
In considering the contact of non-knowledge which is associated
Contact in its totality, is threefold.
3Id. Three contacts, leading to pleasure (sukhavedya), etc.
These are contacts that lead to the acquisition of pleasure, of suffering, and of neither pleasure nor suffering. These contacts are so called because they are beneficial to pleasure, to suffering, and to neither pleasure nor suffering [that is: propitious to the sensation of pleasure, etc. , = sukhavedamya, etc. ] (Pdnini, 5,1. 1); or rather because "that" is felt or can be felt (vedyate tadvedayiturh vasakyam) (Panini, 3,1. 169).
"That" is sensation, vedana. The contact where a pleasure should be felt (sukham vedyam), is a contact that is called sukhavedya. There is in fact an agreeable (sukha) sensation there.
*##
We have defined the sixfold contact, contact of the eye, etc.
264 32a. Six sensations arise from contact.
That is: sensation arisen from contact with the eye, etc. 32a-b. Five are bodily sensations and one is mental.
The five sensations that arise from the contact of the eye and from the other bodily organs, having for support (asraya) the bodily organs, are bodily. The sixth sensation arises from contact with the manas: its support is the mind (manas) so it is mental or caitasi.
263
? [The Sautrantikas] ask if the sensation is later than, or simultaneous to contact.
The Vaibhasikas maintain that sensation and contact are simul- taneous, being sahabhilhetu, "reciprocal causes" (ii. 50a).
[The Sautrantikas:] How can two things arisen together be "that which produces" (janaka) and "that which is produced" (janya)?
[The Vaibhasikas:] Why would they not be?
[The Sautrantikas:] When two things arise together, how could the dharma "which produces" have any efficacy with regard to the dharma "to be produced," which has already arisen?
[The Vaibhasikas:] This argument (sddhana) only repeats the thesis (pratijna) that two things arisen together cannot be "that which produces" and "that which is produced. "
[The Sautrantikas:] We would say then that, in your hypothesis, there would be reciprocal causality of two dharmas arisen together.
[The Vaibhasikas:] But this is not a fault, for we admit this consequence. We define sahabhilhetu as ye mithahphalah, "The dharmas that are results of one other are a sahabhu cause" (ii. 50c).
[The Sautrantikas:] So be it, that is your system. But the Sutra condemns this system. It says, "By reason of the contact of the eye, there arises a sensation which arises from the contact of the eye;" it does not say, "By reason of the sensation which arises from the contact of the eye, the contact of the eye arises. " And again the thesis that "Two things arisen together can be cause and result" is in contradiction to the characteristics of a cause. It is taken for granted that the dharma which produces another dharma is not simultaneous to this other dharma', a seed precedes its shoot; milk precedes dadhi\ a blow precedes the noise; and the manas (the mental organ) precedes the mental consciousness (manovijndna) (i. 17).
[The Vaibhasikas:] We do not deny that a cause is sometimes earlier than its result; but we affirm that a cause and its result can be simultaneous: for example, the visual organ and color, and the visual consciousness; or the primary elements {mahahhutas) and "secondary (bhautika) matter. "
The World 421
? 428 Chapter Three
[The Sautrantikas:] We do not admit your examples: the visual organ and color precede the visual consciousness; but the primary elements and derived matter, which are simultaneous, arise together from a complex of earlier causes.
The Vaibhasikas: Contact and sensation are simultaneous, like the
265 shoot and its shade.
***
According to another opinion, [the Bhadanta Srllabha]: Sensation is later than contact. There is first the organ and the object (first moment), then the consciousness (second moment); contact is the "coming together," that is, the quality of cause and result of these three: organ and object, and consciousness; finally (third moment) there arises sensation which has contact for its cause.
The Vaibhasikas: In this theory, there is no sensation wherever there is consciousness: for there is consciousness in the second and third moment, but sensation only in the third And all consciousness is not contact, for there is contact only in the first two moments.
[Srilabha:] No. One sensation, having for its cause an earlier contact, exists at the moment of a later contact: thus all contact is accompanied by sensation.
[The Vaibhasikas:] According to you, there would thus be simul- taneous contact and a sensation of different objects: a sensation produced by earlier contact of color would exist at the moment of a second contact of sound. Now a sensation produced by a contact of color should have this color for its object, for a sensation cannot have an object different from the object of the consciousness with which it is associated [and this consciousness, produced by color, should have color for its object]. Thus you are forced to an inadmissible conclusion.
[Srllabha:] Let us say then that consciousness is not always contact, and that it is not always accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of color, contemporaneous with the contact of sound, is not contact, but is accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of the sound is contact, but it is not accompaned by sensation.
[The Vaibhasikas:] This theory is incompatible with the rule of the universal (sarvatraga) or mahabhumika dharmas (ii. 23c-d). This rule
? establishes that ten dharmas,--sensation, contaa, idea, etc. --are associated with every mental state.
[Srilabha:] Upon what authority does this rule rest?
266 [The Vaibhasikas:] On the Sastra or Abhidharma.
[Srllabha:] We recognize Sutra and not Sastra as authority.
For the
267
Blessed One said that recourse is to the Sutra. Or rather we propose
for the doctrine of the mahabhumikas an interpretation different from yours.
[The Vaibhasikas:] What then is the meaning of the expression
26s mahdbhumika"i
[The Sautrantikas:] There are three bhumis or spheres, 1. savitarka-
savicdra: Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, 2. avitarka-savicdra: the
intermediate dhyana, and 3. avitarka-avicdra: the Second Dhyana, etc.
(viii. 23c); three other bhumis, good, bad, and neutral [that is, the good,
bad, and neutral dharmas]', and three other bhumis, of Saiksas, Asaiksas,
and neither-Saiksa-nor-Asaiksa [that is, the pure dharmas of the Saiksa 269
and ASaiksa, and the impure dharmas, ii. 70c]. The mental dharmas 210
which are found in all these bhumis are called mahdbhumika [these are sensation, volition, as ii. 24]; those which are found only in a good bhumi are called kusalamahdbhumika [these are faith, etc. , as ii. 25]; those which are found only in a defiled bhumi are called klesamahd- bhumika [these are ignorance, etc. , as ii. 26]. But all these dharmas are called mahdbhumika, kusalamahdbhumika, and klesamahdbhumika because they can be found in the bhumi proper to them: but it is false that they are necessarily found all at once. Sensation, for example, exists
in all the bhumis, as too ideas, volition, etc. : but this does not mean that 271
every mental state includes all these dharmas, sensation, etc.
Certain masters observe that the category of the akusalamaha-
272
bhumikas, at first unknown, has been added later; and the Sutras
273 would suggest this idea.
[The Vaibhasikas:] If sensation is later than contact, you have to take into account the Sutra, "By reason of the eye and visible things there arises visual consciousness; the coming together of the three is contact;
274 together there arises (sahajdbd) sensation, ideas, volition. "
[The Sautrantikas:] This Sutra say that sensation, ideas and volition
arise together; it does not say that they arise together with contact: we
275
say that they arise together among themselves. Let us observe also
The World 429
? 430 Chapter Three
that the word "together" (saha) is used, not only to indicate simultaneity,
but also to indicate immediate succession. The Sutra, for example, says,
with compassion. " Now compassion, which is always "worldly," evidently cannot be simultaneous to a part of Bodhi: for the parts of Bodhi are always transworldly. Thus the Sutra not only does not prove that sensation is simultaneous to contact; it does not even prove that sensation, ideas and volition are associated with, and simultaneous to consciousness (visual consciousness, etc).
[The Sarvastivadins:] But the Sutra says, "The dharmas of sensation, ideas, volition, and consciousness are mixed; they are not
277
separate. " "Mixed" signifies "arisen together. " From this Sutra we
conclude that there are no consciousnesses, sensations, ideas or volitions which are not simultaneous.
"He cultivates the part of Bodhi called mindfulness together (sahagata) 276
[The Sautrantikas:] But what is the meaning of the word "mixed", 278
samsrspa! We read in the Sutra that you have just quoted, "That which
he feels (vedayata), he thinks of (cetayate)\ that about which he thinks,
he discerns (vijandti)" In other words, the same thing is the object (alambana) of sensation, volition, and consciousness. The question is thus posed whether sensation, volition and ideas are called mixed because they have the same object--which is our opinion--or because they are simultaneous, as you say.
28
[The Vaibhasikas: ? ] The word samsrspa refers to simultaneous
samsrspa. They cannot be samsrspa except through simultaneity, not by the fact that they would have a common object, since they do not have any object. Furthermore the Sutra says, "The coming together of the three is contact. " How could there be a consciousness without there being a coming together of the three? How could there be encounter of the three without there being contact? Thus all consciousness is accompanied by contact and all contact is accompanied by sensation, etc.
But this discussion is carrying us too far afield. Let us return to our subject.
he grasps an idea of (samjandti)\ that about which he grasps an idea of, 219
things. It is said in fact that life (ayus) and warmth (usmaka) are 281
***
? We have explained, in summary, mental (caitast) sensation. 32c-d. This same sensation is of eighteen types by reason of the
22 objects of the mind (manopavicdras). *
Mental sensation is made up of eighteen types, because there are six upavicdras of satisfaaion (samanasya), six of dissatisfaaion {daurma- nasya), and six of indifference (upeksa) (ii. 7): these are the upavicdras of satisfaaion relating to visible things, sounds, color, tastes, tangible things, and the dharmas; the same for the upavicdras of dissatisfaaion and indifference.
How does one distinguish these eighteen?
In considering their nature, their quality of being sensation, the
upavicdras are three: of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference;
considering their quality of associates, they are one, all being associated
with the mental consciousness; and considering their objeas, they are
six: having visible things, sounds, etc. , for their objeas. We answer then
that one must take into account, at one and the same time, these three
283 qualities.
There is no variety in the object of the first fifteen upavicdras: the
objea of manopavicdra relating to visible things is only these visible
things. . . But, as for the three dharmopavkdras--the three upavicdras
(satisfaaion, etc. ) relating to the dharmas--one would distinguish: they
can arise relating to the distina dharmas of the five sense objects; in this
case, their objea presents no variety, and is not mixed; they can bear on
one, two, three,. . . six categories of dharmas (visible things, sounds,. . .
284
dharmas); in this case, their objea is mixed
What is the meaning of the expression manopavicdra?
Why are the different types of mental sensation (satisfaaion, etc. )
called manopavicdra}
The Vaibhasikas say wrongly, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference are supported by the manas in order to grasp visible 2
things, etc. , as an objea (upavicaranti = dlambante). " *^
According to another opinion, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference cause the manas to reconsider {upavicdrayanti) visible 286
things, etc. " For it is by reason of sensation (sensation of satisfaction, etc. ) that the manas repeatedly considers visible things, etc.
The World 431
? sphere of a single manas, not placed among the manopavicara} 288
***
Objections or difficulties. 1. Why not define bodily (kdyikt) sensation as manopavicdra.
Without doubt bodily sensation has the manas for its support, but it also has the material organs (eye, etc) for its support. It is free from vikalpa (like the visual consciousness, etc, to which it is associated, i. 33,
trans, p. 97); and it is no longer upavicarikd, [that is9 susceptible of 27
"consideration," samthikd]. *
2. But why is the sukha of the Third Dhyana (viii. 9b), which is of the
[The Vaibhasikas say (wrongly), ] "Because, initially, that is, in Kamadhatu, there is no sukha which is of the sphere of the manas, [In Kamadhatu, sukha is solely bodily sensation]; and because there does not exist any duhkha-upavicdra which would oppose the sukha- upavicdra that you imagine. "
3. But, if the upavicdras are only of the sphere of the manas, you have
to take into account the Sutra which says, "Having seen visible things
through the eye, he considers (upavicdrati) the visible things which 289
satisfy {saumanasyasthdntya). " The relationship is characterized, in the Sutra, by the visual organ and by upavicdra.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] 1. The Blessed One expresses himself in this manner because he takes into consideration the fact that the upavicdras can be produced by the five sense consciousnesses. The upavicdras are no less that the sphere of the single manas: in the same way, for example, that the aiubhds (meditation on a cadaver turning blue, etc, vi. 9), which are produced by the visual consciousness, are of the sphere of the manas: these meditations, in fact, suppose absorption; 2. on the other hand, the Suutra says, "Having seen visible things. . . ," it does not say, "Seeing visible things . . . ," which would justify your objection; 3. there is upavicdra of the visible things, etc, without having seen them, etc (For example one can "consider" the visible things that one intends to speak of, with satisfaction). If it were otherwise, a being
in Kamadhatu could not "consider" the visible things, sounds and tangible things of Rupadhatu [which he does not perceive], and a being of Rupadhatu would not be able to consider the smells and tastes of Kamadhatu; 4. the Sutra says, "Having seen visible things . . . he
? considers visible things," because his "consideration" is "clearer" when it bears on an object which is "experienced. " It is not doubtful that, having seen a visible thing, one cannot consider the sound [which accompaned the visible thing]; there is here "consideration" or upavkdra, of a sound not experienced: but the text, in order to avoid any confusion, makes a correspondence between the organs and the objeas which correspond to them.
***
The objects are given, in the Sutra, as saumanasyasthdmya, etc. , "which produce satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion, or indifference. " Are they such by their natures?
No. The same objea can be saumanasthaniya for one person, but daurmanasyasthdniya for another. It all depends on the "series," on the dispositions of the mind itself.
#*#
Among the manopavicdras, how many are in Kamadhatu? Which Dhatu takes the manopavicdras of Kamadhatu for its objea? The same questions for the other two Dhatus.
33a. In Kamadhatu all of the manopavicdras have their own Dhatu for their objea.
The eighteen manopavicdras are produced among beings in Kamadhatu, but all can have Kamadhatu for their objea.
33b. Rupadhatu is the objea of twelve.
Twelve of them can have Rupadhatu for their objea, with the exception of the three manopavicdras (of satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion, and indifference) relative to odor and the three relative to taste, since odors and tastes do not exist in Rupadhatu (i. 30b).
33c. The highest Dhatu (=Arupyadhatu) is the objea of three.
Three, namely the dharmanopavicdras, can have Arupyadhatu for their objea, but not the fifteen others, since visible things, etc. , do not
The World 433
? 434 Chapter Three
exist in Arupyadhatu (viii. 3c).
***
In Rupadhatu, one must distinguish the first two Dhyanas and the last two.
33d. In two Dhyanas, twelve.
In Rupadhatu the upavicdras of dissatisfaction (daurmanasya) are completely absent. [In the first two Dhyanas there exists six upavicdras of satisfaaion and six of indifference].
34a. All have Kamadhatu for their object. These twelve can have Kamadhatu for their object.
34b. Eight have their own Dhatu for their object.
Eight of them can have Rupadhatu for their object, with the
exception of the upavicdras of odor and taste.
34c. Two have Arupyadhatu for their object.
Two can have Arupyadhatu for their object, namely the dhanno- pavicdras of satisfaaion and indifference.
34d. But, in the other two Dhyanas, six.
The upavicdras of dissatisfaction and satisfaaion are absent in the last two Dhyanas.
34e. Kamadhatu is the objea of six.
There remains then the six upavicdras of indifference which have the visible things, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible things, and dharmas of Kamadhatu for their objea.
34f. Of their own Dhatu, four.
The visible things, sounds, tangible things, and dharmas of Rupadhatu.
34g. The highest Dhatu (=Arupyadhatu) is the objea of one.
290
? The dharmas of Arupyadhaatu. ***
In Arupyadhatu, one must distinguish the preliminary absorption of Aka? anantyayatana and the absorption which follows it:
35a. In the preliminary stage of Arupyadhatu
In the Karika, the word "ampisamanta" signifies Akasanantyayata- nasamantaka (viii. 22). Four upavicaras: the upavicaras of indifference (upeksa) with regard to visible things, sounds, tangible things and dharmas of the Fourth Dhyana are produced in this absorption.
35b. four have Rupadhatu for their object.
This is the opinion of the masters who think that the mind of this absorption is vyavacchinndlambana, that is, that it considers visible things, sounds, etc. , separately.
According to other masters, this mind is paripinditdlambana: it considers the five skandhas of the Fourth Dhyana without any distinction; for these masters, this absorption is thus made up of only one upavicdra which has for its objea the Fourth Dhyana, namely the dharmopavicara of mixed objects.
35c. One has the highest sphere for its objea.
In this same absorption, in Arupyadhatu, there is only the
dharmopavicara.
35d In Arupyadhatu itself, one, 291
In the principle (maula) Dhatu, or Arupyadhatu itself, there is only one upavicdra, dharmopavicara
35e. which has its own Dhatu for its objea.
which has Arupyadhatu for its objea. As we shall see, the mind, in the principle absorption of Arupyadhatu, does not grasp lower Dhatus for its objea (viii. 21).
35f. All of these eighteen are impure.
The World 435
? 436 Chapter Three
There is no upavicdra which is pure.
A being born in Kamadhatu who has not taken possession of a good mind of Rupadhatu [by penetration into Anagamya, viii. 22; who is all the more not detached from Kamadhatu and who has not entered into the Dhyanas], is in possession of (samanvdga$a\ ii. 36b): 1. the eighteen upavicdras of Kamadhatu; 2. the eight upavicdras of the First and Second Dhyana (four of satisfaction and four of indifference, having visible things, sounds, tangible things and dharmas for their objects). The upavicdras of satisfactfon and indifference, having for their objea the odors and tastes of Kamadhatu, which are produced in the Dhyanas, are not defiled [since the possessor of the Dhyanas is in Kamadhatu]: hence the being in question is not filled with these upavicdras [for a being in an lower sphere is filled with the defiled dharmas of the superior spheres]; 3. the four upavkdras (of indifference) of the last two Dhyanas [same remark as for 2]; and 4. an upavicdra (dharmopavkdra) of the sphere of Arupyadhatu, also defiled
When this being has obtained a good mind of Rupadhatu [by penetrating into Anagamya], but is not detached from Kamadhatu, he is filled with: 1. the eighteen upavicdras of Kamadhatu; 2. the ten upavicdras of the First Dhyana: four upavicdras\ defiled, of satisfaction, by omitting the upavicdras of odor and taste, and the six upavicdras of indifference of the sphere of Anagamya; 3. as above for the other Dhyanas and Arupyadhatu.
One can decide any other case on the basis of these principles.
A being in one sphere of Dhyana is in possession of a single upavicdra of Kamadhatu, the dharmopavkdra of indifference associated
with a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nirmdnacitta, vii. 49c). *#*
292
Another master: It is in this way that the Vaibhasikas understand
the upavicdras\ but we understand the Sutra in a different way. One cannot say of one who is detached {vitardga) from an object, a visible thing, etc. , that he produces upavicdras with regard to this objea. All the satisfaaions, etc. (saumanasya, etc. ), are not upavicdras, though they are impure. They are upavicdras when they are "defiling" (sdmklesika), following the expression of the Sutra, "when one has sympathy,
? antipathy, or indifference not proceeding from exact consciousness/' And it is in order to combat these upavicdras that the six "manners of
293
being, or perpetual methods" (satatavihdra) are taught, "Having seen
a visible thing with the eye, there is no sympathy and no antipathy: he
294 remains indifferent in full mindfulness and conscious . . . " We can
show that our interpietation is correct by observing that the Arhat is not
withoutexperiencingasatisfaaionofaworldlyorder (andconsequently 295
impure), but good, having a dharma for its object (that is, the dharmaydtana, i. 24, or the adhigama or dgama, viii. 39a). What he
196 arrests is the satisfaction which, being defiled, is upavkdra.
According to another opinion, atmavdda is both a view of soul
221
? of an atman {dtmavada)\ if Scripture uses the word vdda, "affirmation," it is because the atman does not exist. It is said in faa, "The fool, the ignorant, the Prthagjana, conforming to the manners of vulgar speech,
222 thinks 'me,' or 'mine;' but there is not any 'me* or 'mine. *"
Attachment to the kdmas, views, etc. , is chanda or desire, and raga or 2V>
craving, with regard to them. As the Blessed One said in the Sarva 224
'What is attachment? It is chandardga. "
Because of attachment, accumulated action produces a new existence:
this is bhava. The Sutra says, "Ananda, action that produces a new
225 existence is the nature of bhava! *
By reason of bhava, and by means of the descent of the con- 226
sciousness, future arising (janman) is birth, which is made up of the five skandhas, being namarupa in nature.
227 Because of birth, there is old age and death as defined in the Sutra.
It is in this manner that, sufficient unto itself (kevala)--that is, without any relation to an atman--there is produced this great mass of suffering, great because it has neither beginning nor end
##*
The theory that has just been taught--according to which the twelve parts of dependent origination are twelve states made up of the five skandhas--is a theory of the Vaibhasikas.
***
What is avidya (ignorance)?
The non-vidyd9 that which is not vidyd.
Impossible; for the eye is also non-vidyd.
It is an absence of vidyd, "ignorance. "
This is also impossible, for an absence is not a thing (dravya) (iv.
2b-3b) and avidya must be a thing, since it is a cause (pratyaya). Thus 28c-dAvidyaisaseparateentity{dharma),theoppositeofvidyd
228
The non-friend (amitra) is the opposite of a friend, not a non-friend, that is, anyone other than a friend, not the absence of the friend Ifra or
or knowledge, like a non-friend, the untrue, etc
The World 419
? 420 Chapter Three
satya is truth; non-truth (anrta) is speech contrary to true speech; so too non-righteousness (adharma), non-useful (anattha) and the not-to-be-
229 done (akdrya) are the opposite of righteousness, useful, and duty.
Thus avidya--"non-knowledge"--is the opposite of vidyd, a real separate dharma. The Sutra defines it as the cause of the samskdras, from whence it results that it is not a mere negatioa Further,
230
The Sutra regards ignorance as a separate yoke (samyojana), a bond (bandhana), a latent defilement (anuSayd), a canker (dsrava), a torrent or flood (ogha), and a yoke (yoga). Thus ignorance cannot be a mere negation; it cannot be everything that is not vidyd, the eyes, etc
Yet the prefix nan--the privative a--has a pejorative sense. One terms a bad wife a "non-wife" (akalatra), and a bad son, a "non-son" (aputra). Should we not think then that avidya is bad vidyd, that is, bad prajtidl
231 29b. Avidydisnotbadprajnd,becausethisisseeing(dar/ana).
Bad prajfid (kuprajnd) or defiled prajfid would be a type of seeing
(drspi); one of the five bad views (v. 3). Now avidya or ignorance is
certainly not seeing, for ignorance and seeing are two distinct yokes
252 (samyojanas).
[TheSautrantikas:]Avidyawouldbethedefiledprajfidwhichisnot seeing by nature, [for example prajnd associated with rdga or craving].
This is impossible,
29c. Because views are associated with ignorance,
In fact moha (error or aberration), which is defined as avidya (ignorance) is among the mahdbhUmika kief as (defilements which are found in all defiled minds, ii. 26a); now all the mahdbhumika kief as are associated with them, thus avidya (under the name of moha) is associated with seeing (fivefold bad view) which is prajfid in nature; thus avidya is not prajfid, for two items of prajnd cannot be associated.
29d and because ignorance is defined as a defilement ofprajnd. The Sutra says, "The mind defiled by desire is not liberated; prajnd
233
defiled by ignorance is not purified. " Now prajnd cannot be defiled by
29a. Because it is declared to be bound (sarhyojana), etc
? prajnd: if desire is a defilement of the mind, then desire is not the mind; if ignorance is a defilement of prajnd, then ignorance is not prajOd.
[Reply of the Sautrantikas]. Good prajnd can be mixed with defiled prajnd, as when moments of good and defiled prajnd succeed one another. In the same way, when one says that a mind defiled by desire is not liberated, one is speaking of a mind that is not necessarily associated with aaving, but which is oppressed by craving [craving is not aaive,
samuddcaran\ but its traces remain and the mind is oppressed]. When an ascetic avoids aaving, [that is, by suppressing its traces and repairing the bad state, dausfhulya, of the mind], then the mind is liberated. In the same way prajnd, defiled by ignorance (bad prajnd), is not pure: it is oppressed, even when it is good, by ignorance.
234
What is capable of arresting the imaginations of a scholar?
Ignorance is not, in its nature, prajna-
The scholar who maintains that ignorance is all the defilements
236
(kiefas) is refuted at the same time. If ignorance is all the defilements,
it cannot be named separately among the yokes (samyojanas), etc; it is not associated with views and with the other defilements; Scripture should not say, "The mind, defiled by desire, is not liberated," but rather, "The mind defiled by ignorance . . . " Do you say that one expresses oneself in this manner in order to be more specific, and that the Sutra should say, "The mind, defiled by ignorance which consists of desire, is not liberated? " In this hypothesis, Scripture should specify what type of ignorance it is that hinders the purity of the prajnd: now it says, "Prajnd defiled by ignorance is not purified. "
If you hold that ignorance is a separate dharma, and not merely a certain type of prajnd, you should define it.
Ignorance is the non-samprakhydna of the Four Truths, the Three Jewels, of aaion and its result. [Samprakhydna is the same thing as
237 prajrid, discernment, orJnana, knowledge].
What is non-samprakhydna?
It is Tiot'Samprakhydna, nor absenceof->samprakhyana, in the same way that avidydis not non-vidyd or absence-of-f*/^. It is then a certain separate dharma, the opposite of samprakhydna.
Good enough; but as for ignorance, you have not told us the nature of asamprakhyana.
The World All
? 422 Chapter Three
Definitions are often thus, that is, not definitions through self lature or essence, but definitions through funaioa For example, the eye
s defined as "the pure rupa that serves as a support for the eye ronsciousness" because one does not know this invisible rupa except :hrough inference (Chap, ix, French trans, p. 231. ). [In the same way the inique nature oiavidyd is known through its aaion {karman) or aaivity [kdritra); this aaion is contrary to vidyddso it is thus a dharma contrary [vipaksa) to vidyd].
***
The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defines ignorance in the following
238 erms: asmUi sattvamayana.
Does this mayanddiffer from asmimdna (v. 10)? 239
The Bhadanta answers: As the Sutra says, "I know, I see--
hrough the perfe a abandoning and the perfea knowledge of desire, of
iews, mayands, attachments and latent defilements to the idea of self 240
a$magrdha)\ to the idea of mine (mamagrdha), to asmindna -- 241
without shade, Parinirvana. " [This Sutra shows that mayand--in the ingular since it is a genre--is distina from asmimdna].
So be it, there is mayand; but from whence do you hold that it is jnorance?
The Bhadanta answers: Because one cannot identify mayand with ny other defilement, since it is named separately from desire, views, nd asmimdna.
But could it not be a mdna other than asmimdna} [Mdna is in faa six r sevenfold, v. 10]. However we would have to say too much in order to smplete this examination. Let us stop here.
***
242
As for ndmarupa rupa has already been explained (19).
245 30a. Ndman are the skandhas that are not rupa.
The four nonmaterial skandhas,--sensation, ideas, samskdras, and >nsciousness, are called ndman, for ndman signifies "that which bends, elds," (namatiti ndma).
? The nonmaterial skandhas bend, [that is, "are active," pravartante, "arise," utpadyante], towards the objea (artha) by reason of name
244 (ndman), the organs, and the object.
In this phrase, "by reason of name," one takes the word "name" in its popular sense, (samjndkarana, ii. 47a, English trans, p. 250), as a "designation," which designates and causes to be understood either a collection, "cattle," "horses," etc. ,ora single thing, "rupa" "taste," etc.
Why is samjndkarana termed "name? "
Because the samjndkarana causes the nonmaterial skandhas to bend (namayatiti noma) towards their objea.
According to another explanation, the nonmaterial skandhas are termed ndman, because, then the body dissolves, these skandhas bend,
245 that is, go towards another existence.
***
We have already explained the six dyatanas (i. 9). *#*
246 30b. There are six contaas. They arise from encounter.
The first is the contaa of the eye, and the sixth is contaa of the manas or mind (Digha, iii. 243, etc. )
They arise from the coming together of three things, an organ, its objea, and a consciousness.
One can see indeed that there can be a coming together of the five material organs, with their objeas and their corresponding con- sciousnesses, for the three are simultaneous. But the mental organ or manas (manodhdtu) is destroyed when a mental consciousness (mano- vijnana) arises (i. 172); and the objea (i. e. , dharmas) of this con- sciousness can be future: how can there be a coming together of the three?
There is a coming together because the organ (the manas) and the objea (the dharmas) are the causal conditions of the mental con- sciousness; or rather because the organ, the objea and the consciousness produce the same single effea, namely the contaa.
The World 423
? 424 Chapter Three
***
What is the nature of contact?
The masters are not in agreement.
Some--[the Sautrantikas]--say: Contact is merely the coming
together itself. According to the Sutra, 'The coming together, the 247
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact. "
Others--[the Sarvastivadins]--say: Contact is a dharma associated
with the mind (ii. 24, English trans, p. 190), distina from any coming 248 249
together. According to the Smra of the Six Hexades, "The six internal sources of consciousness (ayatanas, eye, etc. ), the six external sources of consciousness (visible things, etc), the six consciousness, the six contacts, the six sensations, and the six desires. " The Sutra thus knows of the six contacts, together with the six categories of internal ayatanas, external ayatanas, and the consciousnesses: [thus the contacts are separate dharmas; for the Sutra does not contain any repetition or double usages].
[The Sautrantikas explain this Sutra:] If the Sutra does not contain any repetition, it follows that sensations and desires exist apart from the dharmayatana which is the sixth internal source of consciousness (the object of the manas), since you can hold only that the first two categories (six organs and six objects) refer to the organs and their objects without any relation to the consciousness.
[Reply of the Sautrantika, the Bhadanta Srllabha:] Every eye and
visible thing is not the cause of a visual consciousness, as all visual
25 consciousness is not the result of the eye and a visible thing. ? Thus
what is defined as contact in the Sutra, "Six collections of contacts," is the eye, a visible thing and the consciousnesses which are cause and effect. (See p. 428, line 13a).
But how do the Sarvastivadins, who maintain that contact exists
apart from the coming together of any eye, a visible thing and a
consciousness, explain the Sutra, 'The coming together (samgati), the
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact? " 251
They do not read the Sutra in this form; or rather they say that the
252
expression is metaphorical: when the text says "the coming
together," it means "the result of the coming together. "
253 But this discussion is taking us too far afield
? ***
The Abhidharmikas think that contact is a dharma, a separate entity.
30c-d Five are contact through (actual) contact; the sixth is
254 so-called through denomination.
The contact of the eye, the ear, etc. , have sapratigha organs (i. 29b) for their support (dfraya); thus they are termed pratigha spar $ a taking
255 their name from their support.
The sixth, the contact of the mental organ, is called adhivaca- 256
nasamsparfa.
What is the meaning of the term adhivacanam
257 Adhivacana is a name.
Now name is the object (alambana) par excellence of contact
associated with the mental consciousness. In fact it is said, "Through the
visual consciousness, he knows blue; but he does not know, 'It is blue;'
through the mental consciousness, he knows blue and he knows, It is
258 blue/"
Thus the contact of the mental organ takes its name--a contact of
denomination--from its characteristic object.
259
According to another opinion, one takes into account the fact that
only the mental consciousness is activated (pravartate) with regard to its objeas (color, etc. ), or applies itself to its object, by reason of expression
260
or speech (adhikrtya vacanam = vacanam avadhatya): mental
consciousness is thus adhivacana. The contact (sparfa) that is associated with it is thus called adhivacanasamsparia.
#*#
The sixth contact is of three types:
31a-b. Contact of knowledge, non-knowledge, other: which are
261 respectively pure, defiled, other.
These are the contacts associated with vidya, that is, with pure prajna-, with avidya, that is, with defiled non-knowledge; and with naivavidya-navidyd, that is, with good, but impure prajnd.
The World 425
? 262 with all the defilements and which is always active,
the two:
31c. Contacts of antipathy and sympathy
which are associated with hatred and with desire.
one distinguishes
***
In considering the contact of non-knowledge which is associated
Contact in its totality, is threefold.
3Id. Three contacts, leading to pleasure (sukhavedya), etc.
These are contacts that lead to the acquisition of pleasure, of suffering, and of neither pleasure nor suffering. These contacts are so called because they are beneficial to pleasure, to suffering, and to neither pleasure nor suffering [that is: propitious to the sensation of pleasure, etc. , = sukhavedamya, etc. ] (Pdnini, 5,1. 1); or rather because "that" is felt or can be felt (vedyate tadvedayiturh vasakyam) (Panini, 3,1. 169).
"That" is sensation, vedana. The contact where a pleasure should be felt (sukham vedyam), is a contact that is called sukhavedya. There is in fact an agreeable (sukha) sensation there.
*##
We have defined the sixfold contact, contact of the eye, etc.
264 32a. Six sensations arise from contact.
That is: sensation arisen from contact with the eye, etc. 32a-b. Five are bodily sensations and one is mental.
The five sensations that arise from the contact of the eye and from the other bodily organs, having for support (asraya) the bodily organs, are bodily. The sixth sensation arises from contact with the manas: its support is the mind (manas) so it is mental or caitasi.
263
? [The Sautrantikas] ask if the sensation is later than, or simultaneous to contact.
The Vaibhasikas maintain that sensation and contact are simul- taneous, being sahabhilhetu, "reciprocal causes" (ii. 50a).
[The Sautrantikas:] How can two things arisen together be "that which produces" (janaka) and "that which is produced" (janya)?
[The Vaibhasikas:] Why would they not be?
[The Sautrantikas:] When two things arise together, how could the dharma "which produces" have any efficacy with regard to the dharma "to be produced," which has already arisen?
[The Vaibhasikas:] This argument (sddhana) only repeats the thesis (pratijna) that two things arisen together cannot be "that which produces" and "that which is produced. "
[The Sautrantikas:] We would say then that, in your hypothesis, there would be reciprocal causality of two dharmas arisen together.
[The Vaibhasikas:] But this is not a fault, for we admit this consequence. We define sahabhilhetu as ye mithahphalah, "The dharmas that are results of one other are a sahabhu cause" (ii. 50c).
[The Sautrantikas:] So be it, that is your system. But the Sutra condemns this system. It says, "By reason of the contact of the eye, there arises a sensation which arises from the contact of the eye;" it does not say, "By reason of the sensation which arises from the contact of the eye, the contact of the eye arises. " And again the thesis that "Two things arisen together can be cause and result" is in contradiction to the characteristics of a cause. It is taken for granted that the dharma which produces another dharma is not simultaneous to this other dharma', a seed precedes its shoot; milk precedes dadhi\ a blow precedes the noise; and the manas (the mental organ) precedes the mental consciousness (manovijndna) (i. 17).
[The Vaibhasikas:] We do not deny that a cause is sometimes earlier than its result; but we affirm that a cause and its result can be simultaneous: for example, the visual organ and color, and the visual consciousness; or the primary elements {mahahhutas) and "secondary (bhautika) matter. "
The World 421
? 428 Chapter Three
[The Sautrantikas:] We do not admit your examples: the visual organ and color precede the visual consciousness; but the primary elements and derived matter, which are simultaneous, arise together from a complex of earlier causes.
The Vaibhasikas: Contact and sensation are simultaneous, like the
265 shoot and its shade.
***
According to another opinion, [the Bhadanta Srllabha]: Sensation is later than contact. There is first the organ and the object (first moment), then the consciousness (second moment); contact is the "coming together," that is, the quality of cause and result of these three: organ and object, and consciousness; finally (third moment) there arises sensation which has contact for its cause.
The Vaibhasikas: In this theory, there is no sensation wherever there is consciousness: for there is consciousness in the second and third moment, but sensation only in the third And all consciousness is not contact, for there is contact only in the first two moments.
[Srilabha:] No. One sensation, having for its cause an earlier contact, exists at the moment of a later contact: thus all contact is accompanied by sensation.
[The Vaibhasikas:] According to you, there would thus be simul- taneous contact and a sensation of different objects: a sensation produced by earlier contact of color would exist at the moment of a second contact of sound. Now a sensation produced by a contact of color should have this color for its object, for a sensation cannot have an object different from the object of the consciousness with which it is associated [and this consciousness, produced by color, should have color for its object]. Thus you are forced to an inadmissible conclusion.
[Srllabha:] Let us say then that consciousness is not always contact, and that it is not always accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of color, contemporaneous with the contact of sound, is not contact, but is accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of the sound is contact, but it is not accompaned by sensation.
[The Vaibhasikas:] This theory is incompatible with the rule of the universal (sarvatraga) or mahabhumika dharmas (ii. 23c-d). This rule
? establishes that ten dharmas,--sensation, contaa, idea, etc. --are associated with every mental state.
[Srilabha:] Upon what authority does this rule rest?
266 [The Vaibhasikas:] On the Sastra or Abhidharma.
[Srllabha:] We recognize Sutra and not Sastra as authority.
For the
267
Blessed One said that recourse is to the Sutra. Or rather we propose
for the doctrine of the mahabhumikas an interpretation different from yours.
[The Vaibhasikas:] What then is the meaning of the expression
26s mahdbhumika"i
[The Sautrantikas:] There are three bhumis or spheres, 1. savitarka-
savicdra: Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, 2. avitarka-savicdra: the
intermediate dhyana, and 3. avitarka-avicdra: the Second Dhyana, etc.
(viii. 23c); three other bhumis, good, bad, and neutral [that is, the good,
bad, and neutral dharmas]', and three other bhumis, of Saiksas, Asaiksas,
and neither-Saiksa-nor-Asaiksa [that is, the pure dharmas of the Saiksa 269
and ASaiksa, and the impure dharmas, ii. 70c]. The mental dharmas 210
which are found in all these bhumis are called mahdbhumika [these are sensation, volition, as ii. 24]; those which are found only in a good bhumi are called kusalamahdbhumika [these are faith, etc. , as ii. 25]; those which are found only in a defiled bhumi are called klesamahd- bhumika [these are ignorance, etc. , as ii. 26]. But all these dharmas are called mahdbhumika, kusalamahdbhumika, and klesamahdbhumika because they can be found in the bhumi proper to them: but it is false that they are necessarily found all at once. Sensation, for example, exists
in all the bhumis, as too ideas, volition, etc. : but this does not mean that 271
every mental state includes all these dharmas, sensation, etc.
Certain masters observe that the category of the akusalamaha-
272
bhumikas, at first unknown, has been added later; and the Sutras
273 would suggest this idea.
[The Vaibhasikas:] If sensation is later than contact, you have to take into account the Sutra, "By reason of the eye and visible things there arises visual consciousness; the coming together of the three is contact;
274 together there arises (sahajdbd) sensation, ideas, volition. "
[The Sautrantikas:] This Sutra say that sensation, ideas and volition
arise together; it does not say that they arise together with contact: we
275
say that they arise together among themselves. Let us observe also
The World 429
? 430 Chapter Three
that the word "together" (saha) is used, not only to indicate simultaneity,
but also to indicate immediate succession. The Sutra, for example, says,
with compassion. " Now compassion, which is always "worldly," evidently cannot be simultaneous to a part of Bodhi: for the parts of Bodhi are always transworldly. Thus the Sutra not only does not prove that sensation is simultaneous to contact; it does not even prove that sensation, ideas and volition are associated with, and simultaneous to consciousness (visual consciousness, etc).
[The Sarvastivadins:] But the Sutra says, "The dharmas of sensation, ideas, volition, and consciousness are mixed; they are not
277
separate. " "Mixed" signifies "arisen together. " From this Sutra we
conclude that there are no consciousnesses, sensations, ideas or volitions which are not simultaneous.
"He cultivates the part of Bodhi called mindfulness together (sahagata) 276
[The Sautrantikas:] But what is the meaning of the word "mixed", 278
samsrspa! We read in the Sutra that you have just quoted, "That which
he feels (vedayata), he thinks of (cetayate)\ that about which he thinks,
he discerns (vijandti)" In other words, the same thing is the object (alambana) of sensation, volition, and consciousness. The question is thus posed whether sensation, volition and ideas are called mixed because they have the same object--which is our opinion--or because they are simultaneous, as you say.
28
[The Vaibhasikas: ? ] The word samsrspa refers to simultaneous
samsrspa. They cannot be samsrspa except through simultaneity, not by the fact that they would have a common object, since they do not have any object. Furthermore the Sutra says, "The coming together of the three is contact. " How could there be a consciousness without there being a coming together of the three? How could there be encounter of the three without there being contact? Thus all consciousness is accompanied by contact and all contact is accompanied by sensation, etc.
But this discussion is carrying us too far afield. Let us return to our subject.
he grasps an idea of (samjandti)\ that about which he grasps an idea of, 219
things. It is said in fact that life (ayus) and warmth (usmaka) are 281
***
? We have explained, in summary, mental (caitast) sensation. 32c-d. This same sensation is of eighteen types by reason of the
22 objects of the mind (manopavicdras). *
Mental sensation is made up of eighteen types, because there are six upavicdras of satisfaaion (samanasya), six of dissatisfaaion {daurma- nasya), and six of indifference (upeksa) (ii. 7): these are the upavicdras of satisfaaion relating to visible things, sounds, color, tastes, tangible things, and the dharmas; the same for the upavicdras of dissatisfaaion and indifference.
How does one distinguish these eighteen?
In considering their nature, their quality of being sensation, the
upavicdras are three: of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference;
considering their quality of associates, they are one, all being associated
with the mental consciousness; and considering their objeas, they are
six: having visible things, sounds, etc. , for their objeas. We answer then
that one must take into account, at one and the same time, these three
283 qualities.
There is no variety in the object of the first fifteen upavicdras: the
objea of manopavicdra relating to visible things is only these visible
things. . . But, as for the three dharmopavkdras--the three upavicdras
(satisfaaion, etc. ) relating to the dharmas--one would distinguish: they
can arise relating to the distina dharmas of the five sense objects; in this
case, their objea presents no variety, and is not mixed; they can bear on
one, two, three,. . . six categories of dharmas (visible things, sounds,. . .
284
dharmas); in this case, their objea is mixed
What is the meaning of the expression manopavicdra?
Why are the different types of mental sensation (satisfaaion, etc. )
called manopavicdra}
The Vaibhasikas say wrongly, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference are supported by the manas in order to grasp visible 2
things, etc. , as an objea (upavicaranti = dlambante). " *^
According to another opinion, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference cause the manas to reconsider {upavicdrayanti) visible 286
things, etc. " For it is by reason of sensation (sensation of satisfaction, etc. ) that the manas repeatedly considers visible things, etc.
The World 431
? sphere of a single manas, not placed among the manopavicara} 288
***
Objections or difficulties. 1. Why not define bodily (kdyikt) sensation as manopavicdra.
Without doubt bodily sensation has the manas for its support, but it also has the material organs (eye, etc) for its support. It is free from vikalpa (like the visual consciousness, etc, to which it is associated, i. 33,
trans, p. 97); and it is no longer upavicarikd, [that is9 susceptible of 27
"consideration," samthikd]. *
2. But why is the sukha of the Third Dhyana (viii. 9b), which is of the
[The Vaibhasikas say (wrongly), ] "Because, initially, that is, in Kamadhatu, there is no sukha which is of the sphere of the manas, [In Kamadhatu, sukha is solely bodily sensation]; and because there does not exist any duhkha-upavicdra which would oppose the sukha- upavicdra that you imagine. "
3. But, if the upavicdras are only of the sphere of the manas, you have
to take into account the Sutra which says, "Having seen visible things
through the eye, he considers (upavicdrati) the visible things which 289
satisfy {saumanasyasthdntya). " The relationship is characterized, in the Sutra, by the visual organ and by upavicdra.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] 1. The Blessed One expresses himself in this manner because he takes into consideration the fact that the upavicdras can be produced by the five sense consciousnesses. The upavicdras are no less that the sphere of the single manas: in the same way, for example, that the aiubhds (meditation on a cadaver turning blue, etc, vi. 9), which are produced by the visual consciousness, are of the sphere of the manas: these meditations, in fact, suppose absorption; 2. on the other hand, the Suutra says, "Having seen visible things. . . ," it does not say, "Seeing visible things . . . ," which would justify your objection; 3. there is upavicdra of the visible things, etc, without having seen them, etc (For example one can "consider" the visible things that one intends to speak of, with satisfaction). If it were otherwise, a being
in Kamadhatu could not "consider" the visible things, sounds and tangible things of Rupadhatu [which he does not perceive], and a being of Rupadhatu would not be able to consider the smells and tastes of Kamadhatu; 4. the Sutra says, "Having seen visible things . . . he
? considers visible things," because his "consideration" is "clearer" when it bears on an object which is "experienced. " It is not doubtful that, having seen a visible thing, one cannot consider the sound [which accompaned the visible thing]; there is here "consideration" or upavkdra, of a sound not experienced: but the text, in order to avoid any confusion, makes a correspondence between the organs and the objeas which correspond to them.
***
The objects are given, in the Sutra, as saumanasyasthdmya, etc. , "which produce satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion, or indifference. " Are they such by their natures?
No. The same objea can be saumanasthaniya for one person, but daurmanasyasthdniya for another. It all depends on the "series," on the dispositions of the mind itself.
#*#
Among the manopavicdras, how many are in Kamadhatu? Which Dhatu takes the manopavicdras of Kamadhatu for its objea? The same questions for the other two Dhatus.
33a. In Kamadhatu all of the manopavicdras have their own Dhatu for their objea.
The eighteen manopavicdras are produced among beings in Kamadhatu, but all can have Kamadhatu for their objea.
33b. Rupadhatu is the objea of twelve.
Twelve of them can have Rupadhatu for their objea, with the exception of the three manopavicdras (of satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion, and indifference) relative to odor and the three relative to taste, since odors and tastes do not exist in Rupadhatu (i. 30b).
33c. The highest Dhatu (=Arupyadhatu) is the objea of three.
Three, namely the dharmanopavicdras, can have Arupyadhatu for their objea, but not the fifteen others, since visible things, etc. , do not
The World 433
? 434 Chapter Three
exist in Arupyadhatu (viii. 3c).
***
In Rupadhatu, one must distinguish the first two Dhyanas and the last two.
33d. In two Dhyanas, twelve.
In Rupadhatu the upavicdras of dissatisfaction (daurmanasya) are completely absent. [In the first two Dhyanas there exists six upavicdras of satisfaaion and six of indifference].
34a. All have Kamadhatu for their object. These twelve can have Kamadhatu for their object.
34b. Eight have their own Dhatu for their object.
Eight of them can have Rupadhatu for their object, with the
exception of the upavicdras of odor and taste.
34c. Two have Arupyadhatu for their object.
Two can have Arupyadhatu for their object, namely the dhanno- pavicdras of satisfaaion and indifference.
34d. But, in the other two Dhyanas, six.
The upavicdras of dissatisfaction and satisfaaion are absent in the last two Dhyanas.
34e. Kamadhatu is the objea of six.
There remains then the six upavicdras of indifference which have the visible things, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible things, and dharmas of Kamadhatu for their objea.
34f. Of their own Dhatu, four.
The visible things, sounds, tangible things, and dharmas of Rupadhatu.
34g. The highest Dhatu (=Arupyadhatu) is the objea of one.
290
? The dharmas of Arupyadhaatu. ***
In Arupyadhatu, one must distinguish the preliminary absorption of Aka? anantyayatana and the absorption which follows it:
35a. In the preliminary stage of Arupyadhatu
In the Karika, the word "ampisamanta" signifies Akasanantyayata- nasamantaka (viii. 22). Four upavicaras: the upavicaras of indifference (upeksa) with regard to visible things, sounds, tangible things and dharmas of the Fourth Dhyana are produced in this absorption.
35b. four have Rupadhatu for their object.
This is the opinion of the masters who think that the mind of this absorption is vyavacchinndlambana, that is, that it considers visible things, sounds, etc. , separately.
According to other masters, this mind is paripinditdlambana: it considers the five skandhas of the Fourth Dhyana without any distinction; for these masters, this absorption is thus made up of only one upavicdra which has for its objea the Fourth Dhyana, namely the dharmopavicara of mixed objects.
35c. One has the highest sphere for its objea.
In this same absorption, in Arupyadhatu, there is only the
dharmopavicara.
35d In Arupyadhatu itself, one, 291
In the principle (maula) Dhatu, or Arupyadhatu itself, there is only one upavicdra, dharmopavicara
35e. which has its own Dhatu for its objea.
which has Arupyadhatu for its objea. As we shall see, the mind, in the principle absorption of Arupyadhatu, does not grasp lower Dhatus for its objea (viii. 21).
35f. All of these eighteen are impure.
The World 435
? 436 Chapter Three
There is no upavicdra which is pure.
A being born in Kamadhatu who has not taken possession of a good mind of Rupadhatu [by penetration into Anagamya, viii. 22; who is all the more not detached from Kamadhatu and who has not entered into the Dhyanas], is in possession of (samanvdga$a\ ii. 36b): 1. the eighteen upavicdras of Kamadhatu; 2. the eight upavicdras of the First and Second Dhyana (four of satisfaction and four of indifference, having visible things, sounds, tangible things and dharmas for their objects). The upavicdras of satisfactfon and indifference, having for their objea the odors and tastes of Kamadhatu, which are produced in the Dhyanas, are not defiled [since the possessor of the Dhyanas is in Kamadhatu]: hence the being in question is not filled with these upavicdras [for a being in an lower sphere is filled with the defiled dharmas of the superior spheres]; 3. the four upavkdras (of indifference) of the last two Dhyanas [same remark as for 2]; and 4. an upavicdra (dharmopavkdra) of the sphere of Arupyadhatu, also defiled
When this being has obtained a good mind of Rupadhatu [by penetrating into Anagamya], but is not detached from Kamadhatu, he is filled with: 1. the eighteen upavicdras of Kamadhatu; 2. the ten upavicdras of the First Dhyana: four upavicdras\ defiled, of satisfaction, by omitting the upavicdras of odor and taste, and the six upavicdras of indifference of the sphere of Anagamya; 3. as above for the other Dhyanas and Arupyadhatu.
One can decide any other case on the basis of these principles.
A being in one sphere of Dhyana is in possession of a single upavicdra of Kamadhatu, the dharmopavkdra of indifference associated
with a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nirmdnacitta, vii. 49c). *#*
292
Another master: It is in this way that the Vaibhasikas understand
the upavicdras\ but we understand the Sutra in a different way. One cannot say of one who is detached {vitardga) from an object, a visible thing, etc. , that he produces upavicdras with regard to this objea. All the satisfaaions, etc. (saumanasya, etc. ), are not upavicdras, though they are impure. They are upavicdras when they are "defiling" (sdmklesika), following the expression of the Sutra, "when one has sympathy,
? antipathy, or indifference not proceeding from exact consciousness/' And it is in order to combat these upavicdras that the six "manners of
293
being, or perpetual methods" (satatavihdra) are taught, "Having seen
a visible thing with the eye, there is no sympathy and no antipathy: he
294 remains indifferent in full mindfulness and conscious . . . " We can
show that our interpietation is correct by observing that the Arhat is not
withoutexperiencingasatisfaaionofaworldlyorder (andconsequently 295
impure), but good, having a dharma for its object (that is, the dharmaydtana, i. 24, or the adhigama or dgama, viii. 39a). What he
196 arrests is the satisfaction which, being defiled, is upavkdra.
