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Though in the world of 85
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phenomena three persons are not equal to one person, and one person cannot have two natures, still, they argued, the possibility of this cannot be disputed in the case of the Divine Persons, since they belong to the noumena, of which we know nothing except that in this realm everything is in all respects different from what prevails in the case of phenomena. A similar position was held by Storr and his colleagues and disciples, the so-called older Tubingen school, who exercised greater freedom with regard to ecclesiastical dogmas, but held all the more strictly to Biblical supernaturalism, which they rested upon the traditional theory of inspiration. They main tained their Biblical system against all the objections and doubts of the Aufkldrung by an appeal to the Kantian philo sophy ; since, according to the critical philosophy, reason itself admits its inability to know anything of the supersensible, it has logically no right to protest against what has been made known to us concerning supersensible things by historical revelation ; with regard to the practical reason, Kant himself allows that it demands a requiting Deity for the satisfaction of our desire for happiness, and is therefore in its own interest called upon to receive upon authority the historical revelation
concerning God and his government of the world. Hence the truth of the Biblical doctrines stands higher than the critique of the speculative reason which confesses its own incompetence, and accords with the demands of the practical reason ; it has therefore nothing to fear and nothing to expect from philosophy, but rests entirely upon the positive authority of a supernatural revelation, which has only to be first histori cally proved and then reduced to a system. Storr did this by putting together a dogmatic system, in the fashion of a mosaic, from detached Biblical texts, without caring for any other proof of his propositions, either by appealing to philosophy or to the religious consciousness. We cannot but recognise the strength of this position, which meets all rationalistic objections by a sceptical depreciation of reason ; in all periods this standpoint of faith, founded purely upon authority, has been popular, but especially in those when philosophic thought was at a low ebb owing to the overweening flights of previous speculation. Its weak point is the unhistorical arbitrariness with which individual passages of Scripture, torn from their context, are used in proof of a system which is foreign to them, because unknown to any of the Biblical writers. This
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method of using the Scriptures as one uniform code of doc
trine quite ignores the peculiarities and variety of the religious habit of thought of the Biblical authors, so different in point of time, place, and character. Hence this Biblical dogmatism could not survive a really historical examination of the Scrip tures, such as was undertaken by the later Tubingen school. History had been the sole basis of the system of the older Tubingen school, and by means of history was overthrown
the younger Tubingen school. Profound thinkers, like the youthful Schelling, had, indeed, before this clearly perceived how little this application of the Kantian philosophy to the service of theological dogmatism accorded with its real mean ing and spirit his ridicule of these pseudo-Kantians was not undeserved and dislike of this movement may well have been one of the motives which soon began to lead Schelling himself to subordinate, and this too absolutely, the critical to the speculative side of Kant's system.
The thinker whose position was nearest that of Kant's
philosophy of religion was the theologian and philosopher T1eftrunk. He held that the only possible foundation for a religion with any claim to universal truth the consciousness of unconditional freedom and autonomy, by which we raise ourselves above the world of sense and become members of a world of spirits, or, indeed, even gods, as he says in the hyperbolical language of the then prevalent idealism, and differ from God, the supreme head of all intelligences, only in degree, not kind we have the same will and the same law as God, our existence and independent activity are alike un conditional, and we have by our own will an infinite object in our holiness, wisdom, and blessedness, which also the object
God. But whilst God pure intelligence and therefore his power of good equal to his will of we are at the same time creatures of sense, and our power of execution on that account falls short of our autonomous reason. Thus the law of reason becomes a command to which both our sensuous inclination and the external world of sense are often opposed. Hence as intelligences we are supreme, and have no other reason for obeying the moral law than the demands of the dignity of our own personality. If we could satisfy this law
its infinitude, we should be all-sufficient in ourselves and have no need of a God. But as in reality our personal worth only that wholly depends upon our own will, while our
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circumstantial well-being is not in our own power, inasmuch as though we ought by merit to claim happiness we cannot accord it to ourselves, we are led to acknowledge God, who solves the contradiction between our ethical sovereignty and our natural dependence by making all things subsidiary to the end of created spirits and assigning them a natural condition corresponding to their personal merit. Here, just as in Kant, the existence of God and his government of the world are postulated to make up for our want of power over nature, while our moral nature, taken in itself, is conceived as so abso lute as in its self-sufficiency to have no need of God. It is true that from this point of view faith in God, as thus estab lished, our reason itself, and its autonomy, are traced back to a divine origin, but still the relation of the pre-supposed sovereign autonomy to the divine legislation is not made clear ; ethical idealism and the religious mode of thought have no necessary connection, but move in parallel lines, sometimes supplementing and sometimes restricting each other. -- Though the idea of God cannot be established by speculation, its certainty is grounded on ethical necessities of thought, for it forms the condition of the possibility of the supreme good, in which we are by our moral nature compelled to believe.
Nor, again, is the further determination of our idea of God possible by the methods of ontology, but by those of ethical analogy --by our reasoning analogically from our own moral causality to the relation of the divine causality to the world, whereby we are able, at any rate symbolically, to describe the action though not the nature of God, his moral attributes, holiness, justice, goodness, and wisdom being first inferred, and then the ontological ones deduced. The doctrine of the Trinity is interpreted, with Kant, of the threefold relation of God -- as Creator and Lawgiver, as Ruler, and as Judge. Further, the belief in immortality is rested, in Kantian fashion, upon its being the condition of the possibility of endless moral
progress.
These doctrines, according to Tieftrunk, make up the
essential contents of every religion, no religion being univer sally valid save as it rests upon the principle, cognisable by reason, of freedom and the moral law. From this he infers that Rationalism alone meets the requirements of religion ;
for religion does not originate in feeling, but solely in the spontaneity of the knowing faculty, and is therefore valuable
? ? ? ? Ch. KANTIAN RATIONALISTS.
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only when the product of perfect insight and thorough convic tion. " Religious feelings must be produced by knowledge, and not vice versa the perception of the moral law, of the existence of God, and of our own immortality, the first step, and pro duces in us an interest, which, as resulting from our recogni tion of these truths, we can call a religious emotion. " But the theologian Tieftrunk could not rest satisfied with this
formal and self-sufficient Rationalism. He endeavoured to find an opening for historical religion and its claim to revelation. In the first place, he showed in general that a revelation logically conceivable and morally probable on the supposition of a declension of human morality so profound as to be remediable only by a direct divine proclamation of the moral law, together with the necessary outward means of securing its observance. Among the latter he includes mira cles wrought on nature, which are considered quite possible, as the sensible effects of a supersensible cause, as our own free will operates the world of sense as intelligible causality. When once supernaturalism, after its repulse at the hands of arrogant Rationalism, had thus been re-admitted by a back door, maintained its position, at any rate so far as the Christian religion based, upon the historical testimony of the Biblical writings. Since these satisfy the moral criteria, a priori necessary, of a divine revelation, their acceptance may be regarded as rationally justified. Still, Tieftrunk far from constructing upon this foundation a positive system of Biblical dogmas after the manner of Storr's. On the
contrary, he holds that the content of revealed religion the same as that of natural religion, inasmuch as the essence of the teaching of Jesus consists the love of God and of our neighbour, which equivalent to Kant's "joyful recognition and observance of the moral law as divine command. " He cannot however but see that even the revealed religion of the Bible (not to speak of the theology of the Church) contains some things beyond natural religion. Though what this addition consists, and what its value
and importance for us, are questions to which this Rationalism can give only confused and indefinite answers.
The Rationalists Ammon, Bretschneidek, Wegscheider, and Rohr sought to keep closer touch, to some extent, with the historical theology of the Protestant churches, and were thus enabled to exercise more widespread influence on the
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thought of the churches. In their theological manuals it was their custom to begin with an historical sketch of the develop ment of the various doctrines in the Bible, the Fathers, and the Protestant creeds, and only then to state their own view in the form of a final judgment. This method had several advantages : in the first place, it involved a full historical statement of the facts of the case, and thus put the student in a position to form an independent opinion from his knowledge of the actual materials ; and secondly, it brought clearly out the mutability of dogmatic conceptions, and their dependence in every case upon contemporary thought, and thus destroyed a naive faith in the infallible authority of a particular form of doctrine, and established the right of the present to form an opinion, from its own point of view, on the dogmatic decisions of past ages, and to restate them in more adequate forms. This procedure constitutes both the justification and the his torical merit of these theologians, who have been too uncere moniously and disdainfully dismissed by the later conservative theology. By their learned and impartial presentation of the history of dogmas they trained up a generation of scientific and liberal-minded theologians such as we do not afterwards meet with in equal numbers. And with regard to the conclu sions they themselves drew from the history of doctrine, we must recognise not only their intelligent clearness and manly honesty, but also their profound moral earnestness, their sin cere piety, and their living trust in God ; in other words, a disposition of mind which could justly claim to be Christian piety, even though it did not adequately represent the specifi cally Christian doctrines of salvation, and on that account could not satisfy profounder religious needs. In any case this theological school has as much historical justification as any other, and it is undeniable that its representatives in the first half of our century presented Christianity to the great majority of the German people in the form most intelligible to them, and did better work in the cause of quiet, practical Christi anity than many of those who from the proud position of a reactionary theology, artificially conformed to the creeds, assumed the right to condemn these men.
By its juster appreciation of the importance of the historical element in religion, this post-Kantian Rationalism contrasts favourably with Kant's unhistorical Rationalism. While Kant had held everything positive which goes beyond the moral
? ? ? ? Ch. KANTIAN RATIONALISTS.
faith of reason to be simply " statutory," the product of man's imagination and caprice, Ammon pronounced the positive re
of the Bible divinely revealed, inasmuch as, while not
ligion
contradicting natural religion, still did not originate solely
the reason common to all men, but was imparted by divine Providence througrr "definite historical persons and events to supplement and confirm the truths of natural religion. Hence the relation of natural to positive religion resembles that of the universal moral consciousness to the definite morals and laws of individual nations, or that of the common constitution of men as men to the special unfolding of history. From this very useful point of view Bretschneider explained the relation of a general and a special revelation the former lays the foundation of religious knowledge in the constitution of the world and of our nature, the latter extends and de velops this foundation by gradually educating us to a higher wisdom. The need of special revelation owing to the
mind's need of education, or to the fact that our knowledge of God, as well as our knowledge of the world, can only gradu ally arise and be made perfect. Revelation and reason come from the same source--the divine Logos, and hence cannot contradict each other. But revelation related to reason as religious education to the individual does not give religious ideas all at once in their complete form, but at first only general outlines and without a clear perception of their foundations, as truths to be received on authority but by de grees reason, led and growing strong in the leading strings of authority, attains to a clearer and purer comprehension of religious ideas, and to a perception of their inward truth and agreement with the nature of the world and of man. The very fact that immediate revelation harmonises with the uni versal revelation, and really develops further religious ideas,
the final proof of its divine origin while its possibility cannot, according to Bretschneider, be denied, since the Spirit of God pervades all creation, including therefore the human spirit, and hence able to impart illumination to though this always conditioned by men's general culture and knowledge of the world.
Whilst therefore Ammon and Bretschneider, neither of whom remained uninfluenced by the advanced thought of their time, held the idea of revelation in such a way as to avoid an absolute antithesis between the divine immediateness and the
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historical medium, and so between the supernatural and the natural, Wegscheider and Rohr, who were unable to escape from the narrowing abstract rationalistic habit of thought of the 1 8th century, pressed the antithesis to the point of direct contradiction, denying altogether supernatural revelation. Their reasons were psychological and metaphysical : man possesses in his reason a power adequate for the knowledge of everything required by his vocation. It is the renunciation of the true dignity of man to suppose, with a denial of that rational power, a foreign and supernatural authority. To call in a supernatural cause contradicts the laws of our thought, according to which we are compelled to trace all phenomena to a cause within the natural connection of things, and are unable to state any indications whatever of any other cause. Any supernatural interference would be a magical disturbance of the rational connection of our thought and of our mental life generally, would expose us to all kinds of fanaticism, and also in particular lame or destroy our moral activities, which
are based upon rational conviction. Finally, the supposition of supernatural interference, by which the orderly course of nature would be interrupted, is opposed to the true idea of God --his unchangeable omnipotence and infinite wisdom, which have so arranged the world that it needs no miraculous interventions and improvements. The notion of a super natural and direct revelation must be ascribed therefore to men's way of regarding things, when they do not know the natural causes of certain occurrences, and on that account deny their existence, whilst improved knowledge shows in every case that what was supposed to be supernatural can be quite well explained from natural causes. The idea of revela tion is nevertheless retained, but it must be conceived as
mediate and natural, being founded in the constitution and government of the world, in creation and providence. Thus
the true religion, Christianity, in particular, is based upon an historical arrangement of divine Providence, under which
Jesus preached the idea of a reason inspired by true religion, and personally represented, as it were in a mirror, the divine reason. Accordingly between Christianity and Rationalism there exists complete accord,
It cannot be questioned that these reasons for Rationalism, if the antithesis between it and supernaturalism is once ac cepted in this absolute form, have been logically thought out,
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and they retain at all events their validity in opposition to abstract supernaturalism, which sets aside the laws of reason and the creation. The only question whether that exclusive conception of the relation of the natural and the supernatural
required, and whether in the characteristic experiences of the religious life are taken into account. Or whether these facts, when conceived as they are, do not rather point to a view of God's relation to man and the world such as allows man to experience the action of God within the natural and spiritual order of the world, the supernatural and the natural thus ceasing to be exclusive, and only different and comple mentary aspects of the religious relation. But the unyielding
intellectuality of Wegscheider and Rohr was in its self-satis faction impervious to this deeper view of the matter which might have reconciled the antitheses. And the unyielding intolerance of the two men toward new and deeper tendencies
? Marheinike, Hase) has done much to discredit Rationalism the public view, and to give currency to an opinion of which really did injustice by
superciliously failing to recognise its relative truth. In this conveyed the lesson, which well to lay to heart, that the religious consciousness of the churches has no sympathy what ever with the domineering arrogance of any heresy which seeks to proclaim its own frigid intellectuality as the one valid canon and the infallible authority in matters of faith. This will be repeated in every period when a doctrinaire pedantry tries, with the ridiculous claim of possessing the only true system of doctrine, to force itself upon the churches. And we must add that precisely true theological science which, perceiv ing the irreconcilability of any such claim with the proper nature of theology, must most thoroughly justify the protest and the practical consciousness of the churches.
The inspiration of the Scriptures Wegscheider finds in the fact that their authors, under Divine guidance, committed to
writing their teaching on religion, which, like their good thoughts generally, they traced back with devout feeling to
God's will and operation and these their writings, although designed only for the readers of their day, are of such a nature that the doctrines of the Christian religion can still be drawn from them, even though they must be adapted to the en lightenment of a more educated age. Jesus himself (John vii.
17) declared that the doctrine communicated by him was
theology (Schleiermacher,
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divine, in so far as its divine nature can be readily perceived and understood by the truly devout and upright. It how ever, divine also because was first discovered and handed down non sine numine. For the Omnipresent God far from no one who earnestly seeks him and prepared to carry out his counsels. And who was ever more deserving of his help, or ever enjoyed more marked proofs of the favour of divine Providence, than the founder of the Christian religion As regards the person of Jesus, the Gospel story of his supernatural birth must be considered a pious legend of Jew ish origin, having also its parallels in many other nations and
with all assertions of the miraculous nature of Jesus fall to the ground but this not the case with the conviction that his remarkable endowments and powers, as well as the con ditions of the age favourable to their development and em
must be ascribed to God as their cause. Of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the two natures in Christ, there are, Wegscheider does not wish to deny, some germs in the Bibli cal writings but since in its developed form the doctrine gives no assistance to virtue, and in fact in the highest degree detrimental to the influence of the example of Jesus, which was given for our imitation, besides wholly contra
sound reason and some plain passages of Scripture, best to adhere to the more simple form of doctrine
revering and imitating Jesus as truly a Divine delegate, terpreter of the Divine will, prototype of men destined to be filled with true religion and virtue, who was himself full of the Divine (numen, Oeiov), and placed before us in this capa
city a dignity not without God. Against the ecclesiastical doctrine of the substitutionary satisfaction of the death of Christ, the objections of a theological and moral character which had been urged from the time of the Socinians are brought forward, and to them others are added of a cosmo-
nature difficult to suppose, he holds, that in the second person of the Trinity God himself, the Governor of innumerable sidereal systems, should have determined to descend in a human form to this earth, such tiny part of the universe, to suffer death at the hands of the Jews, and there by to offer himself as a propitiatory sacrifice to himself. A
thought which gives expression to the undoubtedly just feel ing that the Christian consciousness has not remained unin fluenced by the Copernican theory, and must abandon anti-
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quated mythological ideas. Moreover, Wegscheider suffi ciently unprejudiced to perceive that the doctrine of satisfaction cannot by fair exegesis be wholly eliminated from the Scrip tures he looks upon as conveying Christian truth in form suited to the times of the apostles, and to which a certain
pedagogical value still attaches for some minds, while on the other hand more advanced minds are entitled, on the ground of other forms of Scriptural teaching, to regard the doctrine as a mere symbol, intended to indicate that by a faithful ob servance of the religion taught by Jesus and attested by his death, we shall be pleasing to God without any further sacri fices and ceremonies. The doctrine of the atonement may also be interpreted as a symbol of the love of God and Christ
to men, or of the consecration of a new religion as a new covenant between God and men. With regard to these criticisms of the doctrine of the atoning work of Christ, we must allow, as undoubtedly just, that various religious motives are represented in which we can accept as valuable, though we are able to give expression to them in another form. Moreover, precisely the deepest religious element in the doc trine, which was also adumbrated in the Pauline germs of had
been previously much better expressed by Kant his ethical
idealistic version of the dogma, than by any of his successors
amongst the theologians, who none of them penetrated so far as he beneath the mere surface of the matter. The same was the case with respect to the doctrine of salvation. Presup posing the fact of a "radical evil," Kant had pronounced not
merely a reformation of morals, but a change of mind and principle, or a "regeneration" of the entire man, the condi tion under which we may hope to be regarded by God as good, the Searcher of hearts accepting the good principles instead of the actual perfect goodness which can never exist and with this Kant had connected the Protestant doctrine of
justification by faith. The theologians of the school under consideration continued, true, to lay great stress upon feeling and disposition as opposed to external and individual acts, and looked upon this as the pivot of Protestant soterio- logy but that this good disposition something profoundly different from the natural selfish mind, and based upon a radical transformation of the mind, they did not teach, because, unlike Kant, they regarded men as by nature essentially good and only in part morally enfeebled and impeded by sensuous
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ness or bad example. By this view the Biblical and ecclesi astical distinction between the natural and the new man was in their case softened down to a gradual moral reformation, under which a man may feel assured of the Divine approba tion according to the measure of his worthiness. And it can hardly be disputed that but poor provision is thereby made to meet either the moral earnestness of ideal requirements or the religious need of an assured salvation and a quieted con science--two objects which the Protestant doctrine of justifi cation by faith is intended to secure. Kant's teaching was more profound and was in closer touch with the Protestant soteriology than the post- Kantian Rationalism ; as Fichte and Schleiermacher show, a development of Kant's moral and re ligious philosophy in the direction of religious mysticism was possible ; but from the Kantian Rationalists it was rather a retrogressive turn in the direction of the popular philosophy that it actually received.
This school could not for long satisfy the newly awakened
and deeper religious feeling, and had accordingly to make room for a more profound mode of thought. At the same time, it had not merely done good service in its day in freeing the churches from the curse of an intolerant dogmatism, but there is conveyed a lasting lesson, worthy to be laid to heart now not less than then, in the words of Wegscheider, in the preface of his Institutiones Theologies: "In the interpre tation and criticism of the opinions and doctrines of early times, theologians ought to take greatest care to combine the use of sound reason with the results of the learning of so many centuries. Then only will they follow in the footsteps of the great Reformers, who in their noble struggle against so many injurious errors never claimed themselves to have made an end of all inquiry, and never grudged to their successors progress in religious knowledge. The teachers of the Church ought particularly to endeavour to communi cate to the people the teaching of Christ and his Apostles regarding God and duty in all its purity ; to show that the truth of this teaching does not depend on ancient dogmatic formulas and pedantic interpretations of Biblical
? passages, but is borne out by the properly developed nature of our own mind ; to no longer try to defend forms of doctrine which were adapted only for the thought of certain people and times, but gradually to lay them aside and adopt a simple
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form of teaching, such as indicated in the New Testament itself to permit the sparks of true morality and piety to flash from the light of genuine Christian doctrine, instead of offering the smoke of ancient opinions as the light of know ledge " We honour the genuine Protestant love of truth which finds utterance in such words we still acknowledge the vocation proposed to theology by those men but, certainly, in the meantime we have learnt that the fulfilment of this vocation far more difficult than they thought, that presupposes both more thorough historical inquiry and more profound insight into the facts and laws of the religious and moral life than they could command. For this reason we have not only grown more cautious in our criticisms of what
old, but also more patient with its adherents, than was the habit of the Rationalism of the Kantian school.
The transition from the rationalistic theology of the Kantian school to the theology of Schleiermacher was made De Wette, who adopted the philosophic standpoint of the semi-
Kantian Fries, who desired to complete the Kantian critical system in an anthropological direction. All our knowledge,
? Fries and De Wette taught, limited to the world of phenomena, which directly perceived in space and time, and has to be reduced to concepts by the understanding.
But this " philosophy of the understanding " not the true one, for beyond the world of ideas demanded by the reason these ideas are not objects of knowledge, but of faith: namely, the idea of imperishable being, or of the soul, of absolute independent power, or of freedom, and of the unity of the absolute Whole, or of all-conditioning cause -- God. These ideas have no connection which can be philosophically proved with the phenomenal world which the object of our knowledge, but they are in complete contradiction to
since our experience presents everywhere only the finite and incomplete, nowhere the eternal and infinite. Nevertheless we feel that these ideas have full truth and unconditional certainty. true they must never be assigned a place
our philosophy of the understanding, which has to do solely with the mechanism of finite causes and effects but they form the foundation of our higher or " ideal philosophy," which arises when we, by means of emotional presentiment, bring those ideas to bear upon the world, and judge of the
world aesthetically and religiously their light. The religious g. t.
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ideas are of themselves, when conceived by the speculative faculty, without life, inasmuch as they arise only by the nega tion of finite limitations, that by means of the abstraction of reality but they obtain their positive significance, and become of value in life when they are taken up by the emotions, and clothed the picture-language of the poetic and symbolising imagination. All religious propositions with which theology occupied must therefore be carefully distinguished from intellectual knowledge, as they are part of the ideal view of the world, and only the symbolical expression of
be set at rest only both are completely separated, --know ledge being confined to the world of experience, faith being directed to the ideal world, and comprehended under the aesthetic view of things. In particular three kinds of aesthetico- religious feeling must be distinguished enthusiasm, kindled by the idea of the personal dignity and immortal destination of man, and also by the view of the beauty of nature, and the reign of purpose in history submission, which, under the feeling of one's own imperfection, rises above the evils of the world to faith in the higher spiritual realm of things, which blooms in eternal undimmed beauty beyond the imperfections
and fragments of terrestrial things lastly, the feeling of
which quickens the idea of God into the idea of eternal Goodness, guiding all things for the best, and recti fying all confusion while for the understanding the idea of God nothing more than the empty form of absolute Unity. To these three religious feelings, to which correspond, De Wette holds, the aesthetic ideas of the epic, the drama, and the lyric, all religious statements must be referred, in such a way as to be symbols of the feelings, and find in them the test of their truth. In this consists the true function theology. not its business to substitute for dogmas its own speculations or mere moral doctrine (after the manner of the Kantians), but in the first instance to give an historical account of them, and then to interpret them in accordance with their religious symbolism. Figures and symbols must
to the erroneous confusion of this
surmising feeling.
ideal philosophy, expressing itself in symbols, with intellectual knowledge, that all dogmatism and scholasticism must be ascribed. And dogmatism misunderstands as much the
? nature of religious feeling as of knowledge, whilst to owing the endless conflict between faith and knowledge, which can
worship,
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not be dispensed with, for we always want them in the repre sentation of religious feelings, and do best to adhere to the figurative language which we have inherited. But must be set free from the fetters of intellectual abstractions, and re stored to aesthetic intuition. This the goal at which Pro testantism must finally arrive. When scientific criticism has succeeded in releasing religion from the misleading influence of the understanding, leaves to the rule of religious feeling and its handmaid --art.
De Wette has laboured to recast dogmatic theology from this point of view such way that we cannot withhold from him the praise of having done his best to reconcile the just claims of religious feeling with those of rational thought, although must be confessed that his attempted reconcilia tion was led too much by subjective considerations of taste, without the needed objective foundation, to hold its place beside the theology of Schleiermacher, with its profounder structure. At the same time, well worth while even now to take a glance at his mode of treating the leading ideas of dogmatic theology. 1
Divine revelation we find in every religious phenomenon which so impresses us with the power of the religious truth and beauty conveyed in as to make us feel ourselves lifted beyond ourselves and our own spiritual capacity. That Chris tianity a divine revelation, an ideal judgment, which cannot be proved by evidence of the understanding, though theological reflection has to show its general necessity just as a judgment of taste regarding the beauty of work of art cannot be proved, though can be so far established as to be shown to satisfy the requirements of art. In doing this the content of this revelation must be first examined, to see what relation holds to reason, with which nothing good and beautiful can be in opposition, as otherwise man would come
into collision with himself. Inasmuch, therefore, as will be found that nothing has been prescribed Christianity but the eternal ideas of reason in their greatest purity and fulness, the belief in as a revelation thereby justified. Rationalism
accordingly itself nothing else than the philosophical view of faith in revelation, so far that we must acknowledge a revelation whatever furthers an important degree the
We follow his work, Ueber Religion und Theologic, and ed. , 1821.
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historical development of the religious mind, such as has been the case with Christianity in the very highest degree. The
doctrine of inspiration is likewise only a form of expressing
the fact that the Biblical writers were animated enthusiasm, without however possessing infallible wisdom, which, moreover, is a matter belonging to the understanding. Canonicity, in the religious sense, may be ascribed to those writings which contain divine truth, and is therefore indepen dent of the historical view of the Biblical books.
The part of dogmatics which deals with general principles must be criticised strictly in accordance with the speculative and ethical ideas of philosophy. Definitions of the Divine attributes must be referred to the philosophical ideas of God, without sacrificing their virtue as popular symbols. The Mosaic myth of the creation may pass as a figurative repre
sentation of the truth that the world is eternally postulated by the divine omnipotence. Angels and devils are mytho logical figures which may be retained in sacred symbolism and art, though neither historical nor metaphysical truth may be looked for in them. The doctrine of the Trinity must be
interpreted
exaggeration to deny that man has any power to do good ; such a doctrine
overlooks the fact that there is in man an inward moral power, which, it is true, requires to be aroused from without in order to act. In so far, therefore, man stands in need of salvation, of divine grace. Yet the Holy Spirit and human reason must not be conceived as opposed to each other, but the latter subordinated to the former ; grace and freedom are two views taken from different standpoints, the
by holy
? as the forms of the revelation of God, whether in the world generally, when Son and Spirit can be referred respectively to the formal and the real principle of the universe, or in the Christian revelation in particular, the doctrine then containing the truth of the different views of God (though in the false scholastic conception of these views
as persons), giving expression to the superiority of Christi anity to Judaism and Heathenism. Of the anthropological doctrines, the myth of the Fall must be regarded as a symbol of what is always taking place in each man. On the one hand, it is correct that we must look upon our propensity to evil as guilt, and that we are unable, with all our moral effort, to attain to inward peace, inasmuch as we cannot rise to true holiness. On the other hand, it is a dogmatic
? ? ? Ch. THE THEOLOGY OF DE WETTE. IOI
former belonging to faith, the latter to observation and reflection, while both are correct and are not mutually ex clusive. Election and reprobation at the same time the work of God and man, though God's not according to his absolute will, but according to his relative operation within the historical world of sinful men. The dogma of the two natures in Christ as a conception a contradiction, but easily admits of reduction to these two views in relation to nature, Jesus a man, but regarded aesthetically and relation to the ideal, he God and as both ways of regarding him are at bottom one, so he but one person, the God-man, not two persons. " Away, therefore, with those barren dogmatic formulas, of which, moreover, the Bible and the
people's faith know nothing Let Christ be regarded as a divine
? messenger, as God-man, as the image of God let us not be too stingy with our glorification of him, let us not too anxiously weigh our expressions At the same time, we must not forget that we are dealing not with truths of the intellect, but simply with religious ideality (Sclibnheit), and whoever speaks of this subject to the people, let him never do with out the elevation and the warmth of devout enthusiasm. " While hitherto the history of this dogma has been occupied with the conflict of truth with beauty, from this time forth " the period must follow in which beauty will maintain its claims side by side with truth. " (De Wette correctly per ceives that the essence of Christological controversies about the relation of the historical and the ideal, but the problem not solved by the simple comparison of the intellectual, or true, and the ideal, or aesthetic view. The doctrine of the atonement
only a beautiful, aesthetico-religious symbol of the thought that Christ has restored to our sin-troubled hearts inward peace, so that we can look up to God, the holy Judge, with confidence. As Christ all ideas take an historical and personal form, so also this highest idea of atonement, order that the whole life of humanity might be mirrored in him. As his death, suffered for us, he represented the highest moral perfection and the complete victory of the spirit over the flesh and sin,
we may make this our own by faith him he raises us to his own height, as we with him set ourselves free from the rule of the flesh and this assurance gives us peace of mind, so that we no longer dread God, but are sure of his grace. The idea of sacrifice this connection to be understood
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? 102 DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. [Bk. II.
only in the sense of a moral example and type of purified
and pardoned humanity. The doctrine of justification by faith contains the religious truth, unrecognised by modern moral theology, that man cannot be saved by his own merit, which is as nothing before God's holiness, but alone by the grace of God. The doctrines of eschatology must be interpreted as symbolical mythology, which have at their basis the truths of anthropology and soteriology (eternal life, the victory of good in the kingdom of God).
It appears from these dogmatic views, as well as from the excellent hints for practical theologians, that De Wette occu pied as free a position as the Rationalists with regard to the literal authority of the creeds of the Church, but that he sought to give their due value to the religious feelings, which the
Rationalists had not done, and, with a more unfettered mind towards history, to maintain the connexion of the present life of the Church with the past. It may be regarded as a defect from the point of view of a scientific theology, that he tried to effect this only by means of an aesthetical treatment of the dogmas in question, which was often somewhat confused ; but
for the practical purposes of theology, which he always kept in view, the advantages of his method of treatment may well have exceeded its disadvantages. In this respect De Wette occupies a position nearest to Herder in his relation to the
Rationalists ; and, of our contemporary theologians, Hase is the spirit nearest of kin to him. And in the prosperity of the churches of Thuringia lies the best proof that the prospects of that church are not unpromising, which follows in the course marked out by Herder, De Wette, and Hase.
? ? ? ? CHAPTER II.
"
Whilst Rationalists and Supernaturalists carried on their warfare with each other, without either side being able to gain the victory, because both represented a partial truth and shared false premises, a stronger than either came upon them, who struck into new courses. I refer to Schleiermacher, from whose work, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsdtzen der evangelisclien Kirche im Zusammenhang dargestellt ( i st ed. ,
182 1 ; 2nd ed. , 1831), dates an epoch in the history of modern theology. The error common to both of these contending par ties had been that they conceived the Christian faith as a num ber of traditionary doctrines which appeared to stand in such hopeless opposition to the rational thought of modern times that one of the two must make room for the other ; the endless contention being -- which of the two must yield, and how far ?
Schleiermacher took the ground from under this contention by removing its main pre-supposition. The Christian faith, as he showed, does not consist in any number of positive doc trinal propositions such as have arisen from intellectual reflec tion upon that faith ; this faith is not a doctrine, or a system of doctrines, but a condition of devout feeling, a fact accord ingly of inward experience, neither produced by thought nor depending on its existence, but, like all experience, simply an object to be observed and described. He took up, therefore, a position opposed to the standpoint of the Supernaturalists,
on the one hand, by conceiving the Christian faith not as a doctrinal authority given us from without, but as an inward condition of our own self-consciousness, which must be con nected with the remaining contents of our consciousness and the laws of our mind. On this point Schleiermacher occupies completely the position of modern idealism, for which there can be no truth that does not rise out of and answer to the
human mind. On the other hand, he maintained, in opposition 103
THE THEOLOGY OF SCIILEIERMACHER's " GLAUBENSLEHRE AND HIS SCHOOL.
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essentially the same as that of the Christian Church, at all events in the Protestant form of That this supposition can be taken as correct only with very considerable limitation, what might
be expected in the case of man whose religious nature had been in his youth nurtured in the peculiar form of piety of the Moravian community, and whose mind had been formed by the study of Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, Schelling, and who his first work, his Discourses on Religion, had appeared as a disciple of Romanticism, with its thoroughly modern form of thought. may be allowed that in the two decades which lapsed between his Discourses and his Glaubens-
lehre, Schleiermacher had thrown off the extravagances of Romanticism, and had brought his entire mode of thought much more into accord with the faith of the Church still,
TV cannot be doubted, and his Glaubenslehre shows most plainly, that the varied elements of his rich education had a far-reaching influence upon his religious consciousness so that his religious feeling differed from that of the Church in some character istic points. Accordingly, in spite of all his honest effort to harmonise and bring into one the individual and the com
mon elements, his Glaubenslehre, which proceeds from this
subjective experience, retains everywhere a marked indivi dual character which could not make any direct claim to
104 DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. [Bk. II.
[ ,' to the Rationalists, the view that the Christian faith is not a product of rational thinking, but a condition of the heart, a feeling preceding thought and supplied independently of it ; moreover, a feeling not of the devout individual only, but of the Christian, or specifically of the Protestant, Church ; accord ingly a fact not merely of individual experience, but of the common experience of a historical community ; an experience,
which, like all positive experiences in history, must j >>y>>e received and intelligently described, while it cannot and may
therefore,
AF rr not be reasoned away.
From the basis of religious experience, therefore, Schleier- macher seeks to give an account of the Christian faith, sup
all that his own is posing along religious experience
? the Church. However, we must not on this account reproach Schleiermacher, when we remember that the same objection would some degree have to be made to
every attempt to give an account of the Christian faith from
the standpoint of the present fact, must be pronounced really one of Schleiermacher's merits, that by his example he
general acceptance
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asserted the claims of individuality to a place in theology also, / and put an end to the miserable delusion of a sole and exclu
sive possession of the truth. It is true that the perception
of this is yet far from being universal ; but I venture boldly
to assert that in future it will be regarded as a principal cri terion of true theological education, that the theologian should remain conscious of the individuality of his way of looking at things, and should renounce all claims to doctrinal authority of universal validity.
The individual character of Schleiermacher's
system appears forthwith in his definition of religion, which
had great influence also upon his doctrine of God. "Religion,
he teaches, is " the feeling of absolute dependence ; in our
relation to the world our consciousness is always divided be
tween a feeling of relative freedom and a feeling of relative dependence, according as our active or passive states of mind predominate ; but when we rise above the interchange of these
relative states of feeling to the unity of the higher conscious iW
ness, we get the feeling of an absolute dependence, which is one with the consciousness of God ; inasmuch as the source of this feeling, in which the antithesis of relative freedom and dependence vanishes, can only be the unconditioned cause of all conditioned interaction of beings, that is -- God. Acute as this deduction is, it cannot be said that it describes accurately or fully the nature of the religious feeling, particularly in its Christian form. The religious feeling of reverence contains, together with the sense of dependence on God, the sense of obligation towards him, and of relationship and of exaltation to him ; in this devout consciousness there is in addition to the feeling of passive dependence also the feeling of moral alliance, and accordingly of a free relation of the will ; where by the idea of God also obtains a much richer content than that of mere causality ; at the same time the immediate reli gious feeling can receive a different qualitative characterisa tion, as the basis of the difference in relative value of the feelings belonging to various stages of religion ; whilst in the case of Schleiermacher's simple feeling of dependence nothing more is possible than a quantitative difference in the degree of strength possessed by the religious feeling in proportion to the secular consciousness. But it is clear that a merely quanti tative estimate of the religious feeling, according to the strength of its presence in consciousness, is not sufficient for the deter-
theological
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io6 DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. [Bk II.
mination of its qualitative value ; otherwise the devout feeling, for instance, of a Mohammedan would be equal to that of a Christian. If we ask how Schleiermacher came to give such a meagre account of religious feeling, emphasising what may be called the physical side of dependence on an infinite cause, to the neglect of the moral side, represented in the feeling of alliance with a voluntary power related spiritually to ourselves, we can hardly be wrong in tracing the origin of this defect to the influence of the philosophy of Spinoza, whose cognitio Dei intuitiva is nothing else than the reference of all finite phenomena to the necessary causality of God, --that the feel ing of our dependence upon it. This supposition confirmed by Schleiermacher's doctrine of God, which connected with his imperfect theory of the nature of religion.
Having based his system of belief upon devout states of feeling, of which he conscious as a member of the Church, for Schleiermacher the questions with which apologetics had usually been occupied lose their relative importance and appear in an entirely new light. Above all the Scriptures cannot, from
v his position, be any longer regarded as the foundation of faith. In the introduction to his dogmatic system, Schleiermacher
hardly comes to speak of them at all, but deals with them under the head of the Church's means of grace. He regards them as a product of the Holy Spirit as far as the latter the common- spirit (Gemeingeist) of the Church. This spirit has borne witness to Christ in the apostolic writings, not essentially otherwise than later writings, only more at first hand, and more under the immediate impression of the Apostles' per sonal acquaintance with Jesus, such as the men of a later generation did not enjoy. On this account the writings of the New Testament possess a special dignity as normative for all subsequent accounts of Christianity but not so the writings of the Old Testament since the connexion of Chris tianity with the religion of the Old Testament according to Schleiermacher, only very loose and indirect. Speaking gene rally, not the reputation of the Scriptures upon which faith Christ rests, but this faith must be pre-supposed before a special reputation can be assigned to the Scriptures. Least of all may this reputation be based upon their inspiration, for supposing even that the latter could be proved from the New Testament writings, the conviction of would still be very far from Christian faith, and could by no means directly pro
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duce since this faith can proceed only from the total impres sion of the personality of Jesus. The normative dignity of the New Testament writings rests solely upon the fact that that
impression can be obtained from them, that they, therefore, truly transmit the image of Christ. On the other hand, the reports they contain of external miracles, which Jesus said to have done or been the subject of, are matter for criticism. The miracles cannot be regarded, according to the usual habit, as supports of Christian faith, for the simple reason that they presuppose the latter, and must be understood by means of For as Christian faith finds in Christ the highest revelation, miracles may reasonably be expected of him (though they can be called such only relatively, as con taining something extraordinary for contemporary knowledge of the connexion between physical and mental life), without at all taking them out of the realm of the regular and orderly phenomena of nature. Though Schleiermacher nowhere offers an express critique of the traditional doctrine of miracles, whether of the actuality or the possibility of the recorded miracles, he still lays down the general principle that the interests of religion the necessity can never arise of regarding an event as taken out of its connexion with nature in conse quence of its dependence on God. Even the miracles at the beginning and the end of the life of Jesus, which are so often looked upon in the Church as the foundation of faith in Christ, do not form, according to Schleiermacher, an essential part of
faith in the person of Jesus, since his disciples already pos sessed this faith, although they still knew nothing of those particular miracles.
At the same time Schleiermacher does not altogether reject the idea of the miraculous, or the supernatural, or revelation. All these terms represent in his view facts of religious experi ence which exceed ordinary experience but inasmuch as they are experiences of the religious emotions, which, must be remembered, are part of human nature, they must also have a side related to nature, and can accordingly be supernatural only
a relative sense. By revelation he understands the origi
nality of religious phenomenon, whether be in a personality or in life, of such moment as to form the foundation of reli gious community this definition excludes both external com munication and tradition, and also intentional invention and reflection, while includes divine communication and promul-
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I08 DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. [BV. II.
gation. Only this communication must not be regarded as in the first instance a didactic influence upon the mind in the form of knowledge, but as the peculiar and extraordinary effect pro
duced by the total impression of a personality upon the general consciousness of those who come within its range ; which does not exclude direct instruction, but includes it only as one factor amongst others. In heathenism, too, such personalities must be looked upon as revelations of God, in whom the divine is like wise typically made known in an original manner, and such as cannot be explained from the immediate historical surroundings. Yet every such revelation is still only something relative, since only the universe as a whole could be called the absolute reve lation, every individual phenomenon, however original it may be, being intelligible only from the general condition of the community to which it belongs. In any case, therefore, no claim of absolute truth can be made for any revelation, since this would" "involve a manifestation of God as he is in himself, whilst an effective manifestation of him can only give expres sion to what he is in his relation to us. This is true also of Christianity. Its origin in the person of Jesus is super
natural in so far as the peculiar spiritual contents of his per son cannot be explained from the natural surroundings of his life, but can have proceeded only from the general source of spiritual life by a creative act of God. But this supernatural origin is at the same time natural, in so far as the rise of a higher original life must be conceived as the effect of a power of development inherent in the race, a power which finds expression, in conformity with divinely ordered laws, though laws hidden from us, in certain men at certain points, that by them the rest of mankind may be helped onwards. As the highest development of the spiritual power of our race, the unique phenomenon of Christ is not an absolute, but only a relative miracle. In the same way, that which is "above reason " in Christianity consists only in its transcending the or dinary human reason, not in its exceeding the rational faculties of mankind at large, Christianity being in reality their highest perfection. And, again, the doctrinal propositions of the Christian faith are in so far beyond reason as their religious content is not evolved from rational reflection, but is given as a special experience, which, like every other similar experience, can be received only by a love willing to behold it ; but they are at the same time perfectly rational, in as far as they must
? ? ? Ch. II. ] THE THEOLOGY OF SCHLEIERMACHER. 109
conform to the same laws of logical thought to which all other propositions are subject.
In these statements the relation of Schleiermacher to Ration
alism and Supernaturalism is very plainly presented. With the former he rejects the absolute miracle, and looks upon
Christianity as a productof human nature, of its original spiritual energy, yet -- and thereby he goes over to the position of the
--
latter not as the product of ordinary thought and reflection,
of man's rational nature ; and moreover, as an unique historical phenomenon, which is embodied in the person of the Saviour,
but as an original creation of the highest development
and has accordingly to be acknowledged as a positive fact of revelation. Christian faith therefore, according to Schleier macher, not merely faith in universal religious or moral truths, but the historical person of Jesus as the Saviour, whose characteristic influence to produce in us the Christian con sciousness of salvation. And hereby the business of Christian theology becomes for Schleiermacher even more positive than for the Supernaturalists of that time has, according to him, to describe faith in Christ as the Saviour, as given the Christian Church, and to draw out connectedly into the various doctrinal propositions therein implied but has nothing to do with other sciences and philosophy. Dog matic propositions, he demands, ought to be " the outcome of the observation of religious states of feeling," and ought on no account to be mixed up nor confounded with speculative propositions which are due to quite different interests. " Dog matic theology will never stand as firmly upon its basis as the physical sciences have long done upon theirs, till the separation of the two kinds of propositions so complete that such a strange question, for instance, as whether the same proposition can be true philosophy and false in theology, could not arise, for the reason that a proposition cannot occur in the one in the same form as occurs in the other, but the difference must be presupposed however great the similarity may seem to be. "
? " The Protestant Church convinced that the special shape peculiar to its doctrinal propositions quite independent of all schools of philosophy, and does not owe its origin at all to any speculative interest, but solely to the satisfaction of im mediate self-consciousness means of the genuine and unadulterated institution of Christ. " Neither will Schleier macher admit that at the beginning of the formation of
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Christian doctrine speculation had any influence on the subject-
matter of dogmatic propositions ; an opinion with which no historian of the present day will agree, seeing the influence of
Greek speculation is plain enough in the theology of Paul or
John !
We have not here to ask whether the rigid separation of
from philosophy demanded by Schleiermacher is possible, but whether he himself fully carried it out. So far as the form of his doctrinal propositions goes, this is undoubt edly the case ; he carefully avoids all reference to philosophical matter, and all direct and declared dependence on philosophical schools and systems. Still, no one can fail to see that not only his own philosophical education generally, but also a definite philosophical system, exerted a profound influence upon his theology. Nor could his critical distinction between the form of ecclesiastical doctrine and its religious subject- matter, his appeal from the traditionary objects of faith to the religious subject's own inner life as the source of their origin, be conceivable apart from the school of critical idealism. And how could we explain the wide departure of Schleier- macher's doctrine regarding God and the world from that in vogue in the Church, and its close approach to the doctrine of Spinoza, if it had really been deduced simply from the con sideration of the religious feelings of Christians ? Strauss, we must allow, was right when he said,1 " None of the leading propositions of the first part of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre can be fully understood save as they are re-translated into the formulae of Spinoza, from which they were originally taken. The relation of God to the world (which forms the basis of his entire theology), according to which both God and world are conceived as equal magnitudes, only that the former is the absolute and undivided unity, while the latter is the unity divided and differentiated, can be explained only from the relation of the natura naturans to the natura naturata of Spinoza. "
theology
? In a note in his Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher
throws out the passing but pregnant remark, that pantheism is consistent with religion if it is only meant to represent some form of theism, and the word is not simply a masked materialistic negation of theism. " If we keep pantheism to the customary formula, One and All, even then God and the
Charaktcristikcn und Kritiken, p. 166.
incidentally
? ? ? Ch. II. ] THE THEOLOGY OF SCHLEIERMACHER.
Ill
world remain distinct, at least in point of function ; and there fore a pantheist of this kind, when he regards himself as part of the world, feels himself with this All dependent on that which is the One.