Objection 2: Further, different
sciences
are different habits.
Summa Theologica
For when
the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of
habits, as stated above ([1477]Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit
increases when its acts are multiplied.
Objection 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed.
But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
(Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act
should increase it.
Objection 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like
the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not
every act that increases a habit.
I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now
things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different
mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white,
but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from
less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as
stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above
([1478]Q[50], A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or
may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to
the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either
increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak
of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For
not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as
neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the
multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So,
too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls
short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an
increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
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HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
(2) Whether it can be diminished?
(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
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Whether a habit can be corrupted?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit
is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to
act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted.
Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject
remains.
Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either
to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases
through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now
science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its
subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance
that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither
can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible
species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52).
Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.
Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But
the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a
direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved
directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the
body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the
intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or
through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same
reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are
in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10),
"virtue is more lasting than learning. "
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science. " Moreover,
by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are
engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary;
indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit
has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be
corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits---for
instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an
incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are,
however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible
subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such
is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the "possible"
intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as
stated above ([1479]Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of
science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible"
intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted
directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the
part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted
directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly.
Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the
"possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect,
which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in
the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the
active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and
indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both
speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any
forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about
prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being forgotten. "
There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the
reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to
the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the
part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the
reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the
assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the
process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary
to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a
false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of
science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception
is the corruption of science. " As to virtues, some of them are
intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and
to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some,
however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the
soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of
the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to
be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice,
may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is
contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or
deliberate choice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a
second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while
the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a
habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the
body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may
prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in
its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by
corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can
corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the
habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless
when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must
be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act:
because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas
the use of learning does not.
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Whether a habit can diminish?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a
habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it
cannot diminish.
Objection 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by
reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not
become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow
that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And
if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject,
it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto
and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has
something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate,
as stated in De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a
separable form; which is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any
accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined
with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become
more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its
subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.
On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the
same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a
habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.
I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as
we have already explained ([1480]Q[52], A[1]). And since they increase
through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they
diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the
diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even
as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of
its increase.
Reply to Objection 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form.
It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the
different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to
the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its
being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a
greater or a smaller number of things.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself
of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but
that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not
in the habit, but in its subject.
Reply to Objection 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very
notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if
we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject,
which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject:
for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white. " Accordingly in
defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as
though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but we
give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say
that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose. " But if we take accidents
in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in
the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the
accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness. "
Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as
the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a
"simum" is a "snub-nose. " Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident
on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the
accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the
concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents:
wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to
a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save
that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits
increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have already clearly
explained ([1481]Q[52], A[2]).
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Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished
through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than
passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ([1482]Q[49], A[2],
ad 3;[1483] Q[50], A[1]). But passion-like qualities are neither
corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not
lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to
make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or
corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now
nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation
from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit
can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the
intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above
time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither,
therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of
time, if one fails for long to exercise them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of
science. " Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse
has dissolved many a friendship. " In like manner other habits of virtue
are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of
movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement
by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly,
indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this
latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results
through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from
exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened
that habit. For it has been stated [1484](A[1]) that habits are
destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency.
Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary
agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those
habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation
from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.
For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to
choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use
of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds,
the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe
the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive
appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed
or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to the
intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those
things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to
make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in
opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those
fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and
sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the
intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation
from act.
Reply to Objection 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to
give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat
were to increase.
Reply to Objection 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive
of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in
itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and
therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of
the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence
the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether many habits can be in one power?
(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?
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Whether many habits can be in one power?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one
power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the same
thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and
powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts
and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore
there cannot be many habits in one power.
Objection 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple
subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the
cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can
proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in
one power.
Objection 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is
a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the
same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed
at the same time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at
the same time in one power.
On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are
the habits of various sciences.
I answer that, As stated above ([1485]Q[49], A[4]), habits are
dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to
nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those habits
which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in
one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in various
ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are
various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts of the human
body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we
have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take like parts,
such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect
of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i. e.
the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion to
nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in
the same subject.
If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to
operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may be
several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of
a habit is a passive power, as stated above ([1486]Q[51], A[2]): for it
is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was
clearly shown above ([1487]Q[51], A[2]). Now a passive power is
compared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form:
because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so,
too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object
to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move
one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several
acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or
forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a
determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as several
specifically different acts, can belong to one power.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species
is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter,
as stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter
belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects
entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in
Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ generically belong to
different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of
objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of
habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in species, but not
vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in
species: but it does not follow that different habits are in different
powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may
be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one
species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and
powers.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it
is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically
different acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many
superficially different habits from being in one power.
Reply to Objection 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own
terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a
power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate
term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same
time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another;
just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one
shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure. For
the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time
"actually"; and yet it can know several things at the same time
"habitually. "
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Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their
objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of
science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the
unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects
specifically distinct.
Objection 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the
same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the
physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in
Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by their
objects.
Objection 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the
same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it
be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be
done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in
order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object
can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does
not follow diversity of objects.
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of
their objects, as stated above ([1488]Q[18], A[5]). But habits are
dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according
to the diversity of objects.
I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific
distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms
differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is
proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another
in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every
agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to
something: and all things that imply order to something, are
distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they
are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order:
viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature.
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three
things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of
specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.
Reply to Objection 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must
consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which
may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction
between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both
known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And
consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of
cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
Reply to Objection 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one
means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means
of mathematics, e. g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the
sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e. g. by the
movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the
whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing
science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And
consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect
of which the habits of science are distinguished.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89;
Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is
in speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a
diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does.
Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above
all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said
([1489]Q[18], A[6];[1490] Q[19], A[2], ad 1;[1491] Q[34], A[4]).
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Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and
bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards
contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are
not divided into good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it
is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the
Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation
and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits
cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same
object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of
concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for
instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher
clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into
good and bad.
On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to
vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
I answer that, As stated above [1492](A[2]), habits are specifically
distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles,
but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways.
First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In
this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since
a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's
nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable
to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since
they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from
human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that
habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and
bad.
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact
that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature,
while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And
thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is
distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act
befitting some higher nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far
as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it
happen that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of
habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided
into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another
bad; but not by reason of one habit being something good, and another
about something bad.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the good which is common to every
being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but
some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate,
viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a
difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate
repugnant to a determinate nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing
are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as
stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are
distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in
keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are
contrary to one virtue.
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Whether one habit is made up of many habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits.
For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to
be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once,
but little by little out of several acts, as stated above ([1493]Q[51],
A[3]). Therefore one habit is made up of several.
Objection 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts
are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,
temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
Objection 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a
habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one
science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one
habit is made up of many.
On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But
nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made up
of many.
I answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly
concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every
perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence,
just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so far as
they have something in common, i. e. some general objective aspect, so
also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they are related to
one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to one nature,
or to one principle, as was clearly stated above ([1494]AA[2],3).
If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall
find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this multiplicity is
directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it
is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed to several habits,
even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to
many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.
Reply to Objection 1: That a habit is engendered little by little, is
due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact
that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly
changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being
imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same
applies to other qualities.
Reply to Objection 2: The parts which are assigned to each cardinal
virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but
subjective or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57],
A[6], ad 4; [1495]SS, Q[48]).
Reply to Objection 3: In any science, he who acquires, by
demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit
indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the
scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is
engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is
perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the
conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one
flows from another.
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TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i. e. VIRTUES
(QQ[55]-70)
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OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since
habits, as we have said ([1496]Q[54], A[3]), are divided into good and
bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are
virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts,
Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of
vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1)
the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4)
the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?
(2) Whether it is an operative habit?
(3) Whether it is a good habit?
(4) Of the definition of virtue.
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Whether human virtue is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue
is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit of
anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as
a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is
reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix;
cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will. " But
use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an
act.
Objection 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our
actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep.
But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but
acts.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue
is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering
which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and
using what we ought to use. " Now order, or ordering, denominates either
an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action
or a relation.
Objection 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there
natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers.
Neither therefore are human virtues habits.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and
virtue are habits.
I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a
thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the
end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according
as it is determinate to its act.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their
acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these
natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational
powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular
action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are
determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have
said above ([1497]Q[49], A[4] ). Therefore human virtues are habits.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to
which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its
act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or
to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When
therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken
for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can
reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a
hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say
'strength,' which is the original signification of the Latin 'virtus':
thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its
'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the
objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power.
Reply to Objection 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in
the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to
which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is
nothing else than the good use of free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways.
First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and
thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as
by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive
power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering
of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us
love is set in order by virtue.
Reply to Objection 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to
one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as
we have said.
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Whether human virtue is an operative habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to
be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health and
beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health
and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue.
Objection 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in
reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the
Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while
some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. Now as
natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational
beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to act, but
also to being.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that
virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best. "
Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God
Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3, 6, 14) to Whom the
soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that
virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it
were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, therefore,
an operative habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a
thing is that which makes its work good. "
I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some
perfection of power, as we have said above [1498](A[1]). Wherefore,
since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality'
in the first case, and 'power' in the second] is of two kinds, namely,
power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the
perfection of each of these is called virtue. But power in reference to
being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power
in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle
of action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act.
Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the
soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other
animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to
the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul,
namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human
virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but
belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human
virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act.
Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of the
agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since
virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs
pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding
disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue
itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the
powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that
which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable
disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are suitable
dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a
principle of operation.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper
to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason,
which are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 3: As God's substance is His act, the highest
likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as
we have said above ([1499]Q[3], A[2]), happiness or bliss by which man
is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human
life, consists in an operation.
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Whether human virtue is a good habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it
should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But
there is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. 15:56: "The virtue
[Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law. " Therefore virtue is not always
a good habit.
Objection 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not
only referred to good, but also to evil: according to Is. 5: "Woe to
you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness. "
Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue
[Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity. " But infirmity is an
evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil.
the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of
habits, as stated above ([1477]Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit
increases when its acts are multiplied.
Objection 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed.
But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
(Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act
should increase it.
Objection 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like
the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not
every act that increases a habit.
I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now
things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different
mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white,
but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from
less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as
stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above
([1478]Q[50], A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or
may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to
the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either
increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak
of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For
not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as
neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the
multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So,
too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls
short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an
increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
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HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
(2) Whether it can be diminished?
(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
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Whether a habit can be corrupted?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit
is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to
act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted.
Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject
remains.
Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either
to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases
through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now
science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its
subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance
that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither
can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible
species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52).
Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.
Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But
the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a
direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved
directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the
body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the
intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or
through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same
reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are
in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10),
"virtue is more lasting than learning. "
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science. " Moreover,
by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are
engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary;
indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit
has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be
corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits---for
instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an
incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are,
however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible
subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such
is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the "possible"
intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as
stated above ([1479]Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of
science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible"
intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted
directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the
part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted
directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly.
Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the
"possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect,
which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in
the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the
active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and
indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both
speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any
forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about
prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being forgotten. "
There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the
reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to
the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the
part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the
reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the
assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the
process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary
to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a
false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of
science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception
is the corruption of science. " As to virtues, some of them are
intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and
to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some,
however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the
soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of
the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to
be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice,
may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is
contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or
deliberate choice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a
second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while
the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a
habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the
body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may
prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in
its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by
corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can
corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the
habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless
when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must
be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act:
because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas
the use of learning does not.
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Whether a habit can diminish?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a
habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it
cannot diminish.
Objection 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by
reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not
become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow
that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And
if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject,
it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto
and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has
something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate,
as stated in De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a
separable form; which is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any
accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined
with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become
more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its
subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.
On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the
same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a
habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.
I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as
we have already explained ([1480]Q[52], A[1]). And since they increase
through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they
diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the
diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even
as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of
its increase.
Reply to Objection 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form.
It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the
different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to
the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its
being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a
greater or a smaller number of things.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself
of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but
that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not
in the habit, but in its subject.
Reply to Objection 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very
notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if
we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject,
which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject:
for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white. " Accordingly in
defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as
though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but we
give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say
that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose. " But if we take accidents
in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in
the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the
accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness. "
Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as
the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a
"simum" is a "snub-nose. " Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident
on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the
accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the
concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents:
wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to
a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save
that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits
increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have already clearly
explained ([1481]Q[52], A[2]).
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Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished
through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than
passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ([1482]Q[49], A[2],
ad 3;[1483] Q[50], A[1]). But passion-like qualities are neither
corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not
lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to
make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or
corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now
nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation
from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit
can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the
intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above
time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither,
therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of
time, if one fails for long to exercise them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of
science. " Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse
has dissolved many a friendship. " In like manner other habits of virtue
are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of
movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement
by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly,
indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this
latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results
through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from
exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened
that habit. For it has been stated [1484](A[1]) that habits are
destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency.
Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary
agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those
habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation
from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.
For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to
choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use
of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds,
the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe
the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive
appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed
or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to the
intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those
things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to
make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in
opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those
fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and
sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the
intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation
from act.
Reply to Objection 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to
give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat
were to increase.
Reply to Objection 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive
of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in
itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and
therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of
the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence
the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
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OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether many habits can be in one power?
(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?
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Whether many habits can be in one power?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one
power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the same
thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and
powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts
and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore
there cannot be many habits in one power.
Objection 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple
subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the
cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can
proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in
one power.
Objection 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is
a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the
same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed
at the same time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at
the same time in one power.
On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are
the habits of various sciences.
I answer that, As stated above ([1485]Q[49], A[4]), habits are
dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to
nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those habits
which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in
one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in various
ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are
various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts of the human
body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we
have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take like parts,
such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect
of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i. e.
the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion to
nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in
the same subject.
If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to
operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may be
several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of
a habit is a passive power, as stated above ([1486]Q[51], A[2]): for it
is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was
clearly shown above ([1487]Q[51], A[2]). Now a passive power is
compared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form:
because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so,
too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object
to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move
one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several
acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or
forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a
determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as several
specifically different acts, can belong to one power.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species
is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter,
as stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter
belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects
entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in
Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ generically belong to
different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of
objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of
habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in species, but not
vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in
species: but it does not follow that different habits are in different
powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may
be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one
species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and
powers.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it
is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically
different acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many
superficially different habits from being in one power.
Reply to Objection 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own
terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a
power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate
term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same
time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another;
just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one
shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure. For
the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time
"actually"; and yet it can know several things at the same time
"habitually. "
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Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their
objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of
science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the
unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects
specifically distinct.
Objection 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the
same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the
physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in
Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by their
objects.
Objection 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the
same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it
be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be
done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in
order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object
can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does
not follow diversity of objects.
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of
their objects, as stated above ([1488]Q[18], A[5]). But habits are
dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according
to the diversity of objects.
I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific
distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms
differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is
proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another
in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every
agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to
something: and all things that imply order to something, are
distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they
are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order:
viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature.
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three
things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of
specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.
Reply to Objection 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must
consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which
may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction
between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both
known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And
consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of
cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
Reply to Objection 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one
means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means
of mathematics, e. g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the
sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e. g. by the
movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the
whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing
science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And
consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect
of which the habits of science are distinguished.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89;
Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is
in speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a
diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does.
Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above
all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said
([1489]Q[18], A[6];[1490] Q[19], A[2], ad 1;[1491] Q[34], A[4]).
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Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and
bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards
contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are
not divided into good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it
is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the
Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation
and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits
cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same
object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of
concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for
instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher
clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into
good and bad.
On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to
vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
I answer that, As stated above [1492](A[2]), habits are specifically
distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles,
but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways.
First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In
this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since
a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's
nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable
to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since
they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from
human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that
habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and
bad.
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact
that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature,
while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And
thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is
distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act
befitting some higher nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far
as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it
happen that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of
habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided
into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another
bad; but not by reason of one habit being something good, and another
about something bad.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the good which is common to every
being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but
some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate,
viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a
difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate
repugnant to a determinate nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing
are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as
stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are
distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in
keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are
contrary to one virtue.
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Whether one habit is made up of many habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits.
For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to
be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once,
but little by little out of several acts, as stated above ([1493]Q[51],
A[3]). Therefore one habit is made up of several.
Objection 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts
are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,
temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
Objection 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a
habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one
science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one
habit is made up of many.
On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But
nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made up
of many.
I answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly
concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every
perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence,
just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so far as
they have something in common, i. e. some general objective aspect, so
also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they are related to
one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to one nature,
or to one principle, as was clearly stated above ([1494]AA[2],3).
If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall
find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this multiplicity is
directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it
is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed to several habits,
even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to
many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.
Reply to Objection 1: That a habit is engendered little by little, is
due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact
that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly
changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being
imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same
applies to other qualities.
Reply to Objection 2: The parts which are assigned to each cardinal
virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but
subjective or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57],
A[6], ad 4; [1495]SS, Q[48]).
Reply to Objection 3: In any science, he who acquires, by
demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit
indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the
scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is
engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is
perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the
conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one
flows from another.
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TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i. e. VIRTUES
(QQ[55]-70)
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OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since
habits, as we have said ([1496]Q[54], A[3]), are divided into good and
bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are
virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts,
Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of
vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1)
the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4)
the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?
(2) Whether it is an operative habit?
(3) Whether it is a good habit?
(4) Of the definition of virtue.
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Whether human virtue is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue
is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit of
anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as
a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is
reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix;
cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will. " But
use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an
act.
Objection 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our
actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep.
But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but
acts.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue
is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering
which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and
using what we ought to use. " Now order, or ordering, denominates either
an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action
or a relation.
Objection 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there
natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers.
Neither therefore are human virtues habits.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and
virtue are habits.
I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a
thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the
end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according
as it is determinate to its act.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their
acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these
natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational
powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular
action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are
determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have
said above ([1497]Q[49], A[4] ). Therefore human virtues are habits.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to
which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its
act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or
to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When
therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken
for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can
reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a
hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say
'strength,' which is the original signification of the Latin 'virtus':
thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its
'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the
objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power.
Reply to Objection 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in
the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to
which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is
nothing else than the good use of free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways.
First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and
thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as
by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive
power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering
of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us
love is set in order by virtue.
Reply to Objection 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to
one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as
we have said.
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Whether human virtue is an operative habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to
be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health and
beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health
and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue.
Objection 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in
reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the
Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while
some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. Now as
natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational
beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to act, but
also to being.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that
virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best. "
Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God
Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3, 6, 14) to Whom the
soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that
virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it
were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, therefore,
an operative habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a
thing is that which makes its work good. "
I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some
perfection of power, as we have said above [1498](A[1]). Wherefore,
since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality'
in the first case, and 'power' in the second] is of two kinds, namely,
power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the
perfection of each of these is called virtue. But power in reference to
being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power
in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle
of action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act.
Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the
soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other
animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to
the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul,
namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human
virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but
belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human
virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act.
Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of the
agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since
virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs
pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding
disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue
itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the
powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that
which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable
disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are suitable
dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a
principle of operation.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper
to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason,
which are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 3: As God's substance is His act, the highest
likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as
we have said above ([1499]Q[3], A[2]), happiness or bliss by which man
is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human
life, consists in an operation.
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Whether human virtue is a good habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it
should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But
there is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. 15:56: "The virtue
[Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law. " Therefore virtue is not always
a good habit.
Objection 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not
only referred to good, but also to evil: according to Is. 5: "Woe to
you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness. "
Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue
[Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity. " But infirmity is an
evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil.
