No More Learning

There is an end
to party zeal, and we only take upon ourselves the character of a
guide, which requires a moderate share of authority and good fortune,
rather than talents and excellence. The first admonition relates to
persons, the next to things.

We make no attempt to disturb the system of philosophy that now
prevails, or any other which may or will exist, either more correct or
more complete. For we deny not that the received system of philosophy,
and others of a similar nature, encourage discussion, embellish
harangues, are employed, and are of service in the duties of the
professor, and the affairs of civil life. Nay, we openly express and
declare that the philosophy we offer will not be very useful in such
respects. It is not obvious, nor to be understood in a cursory view,
nor does it flatter the mind in its preconceived notions, nor will
it descend to the level of the generality of mankind unless by its
advantages and effects.

Let there exist then (and may it be of advantage to both), two sources,
and two distributions of learning, and in like manner two tribes, and
as it were kindred families of contemplators or philosophers, without
any hostility or alienation between them; but rather allied and united
by mutual assistance. Let there be in short one method of cultivating
the sciences, and another of discovering them. And as for those who
prefer and more readily receive the former, on account of their haste
or from motives arising from their ordinary life, or because they
are unable from weakness of mind to comprehend and embrace the other
(which must necessarily be the case with by far the greater number),
let us wish that they may prosper as they desire in their undertaking,
and attain what they pursue. But if any individual desire, and is
anxious not merely to adhere to, and make use of present discoveries,
but to penetrate still further, and not to overcome his adversaries
in disputes, but nature by labor, not in short to give elegant and
specious opinions, but to know to a certainty and demonstration, let
him, as a true son of science (if such be his wish), join with us; that
when he has left the antechambers of nature trodden by the multitude,
an entrance may at last be discovered to her inner apartments. And
in order to be better understood, and to render our meaning more
familiar by assigning determinate names, we have accustomed ourselves
to call the one method the anticipation of the mind, and the other the
interpretation of nature.

We have still one request left. We have at least reflected and taken
pains in order to render our propositions not only true, but of easy
and familiar access to men’s minds, however wonderfully prepossessed
and limited. Yet it is but just that we should obtain this favor from
mankind (especially in so great a restoration of learning and the
sciences), that whosoever may be desirous of forming any determination
upon an opinion of this our work either from his own perceptions, or
the crowd of authorities, or the forms of demonstrations, he will not
expect to be able to do so in a cursory manner, and while attending
to other matters; but in order to have a thorough knowledge of the
subject, will himself by degrees attempt the course which we describe
and maintain; will be accustomed to the subtilty of things which is
manifested by experience; and will correct the depraved and deeply
rooted habits of his mind by a seasonable, and, as it were, just
hesitation: and then, finally (if he will), use his judgment when he
has begun to be master of himself.


FOOTNOTE

[1] Because it was idle to draw a logical conclusion from false
principles, error being propagated as much by false premises, which
logic does not pretend to examine, as by illegitimate inference. Hence,
as Bacon says further on, men being easily led to confound legitimate
inference with truth, were confirmed in their errors by the very
subtilty of their genius. --_Ed. _




APHORISMS--BOOK I

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE AND THE EMPIRE OF MAN


I. Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands
as much as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard
to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of
more.

II. The unassisted hand and the understanding left to itself possess
but little power. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and
helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand; and as
instruments either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those
that are applied to the mind prompt or protect the understanding.

III. Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance
of the cause frustrates the effect; for nature is only subdued by
submission, and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with
the cause in practical science becomes the rule.

IV. Man while operating can only apply or withdraw natural bodies;
nature internally performs the rest.

V. Those who become practically versed in nature are, the mechanic, the
mathematician, the physician, the alchemist, and the _magician_,[2] but
all (as matters now stand) with faint efforts and meagre success.

VI. It would be madness and inconsistency to suppose that things which
have never yet been performed can be performed without employing some
hitherto untried means.

VII. The creations of the mind and hand appear very numerous, if we
judge by books and manufactures; but all that variety consists of
an excessive refinement, and of deductions from a few well known
matters--_not of a number of axioms_. [3]

VIII. Even the effects already discovered are due to chance and
experiment rather than to the sciences; for our present sciences are
nothing more than peculiar arrangements of matters already discovered,
and not methods for discovery or plans for new operations.

IX. The sole cause and root of almost every defect in the sciences is
this, that while we falsely admire and extol the powers of the human
mind, we do not search for its real helps.

X. The subtilty of nature is far beyond that of sense or of the
understanding: so that the specious meditations, speculations, and
theories of mankind are but a kind of insanity, only there is no one to
stand by and observe it.

XI. As the present sciences are useless for the discovery of effects,
so the present system of logic[4] is useless for the discovery of the
sciences.

XII. The present system of logic rather assists in confirming and
rendering inveterate the errors founded on vulgar notions than in
searching after truth, and is therefore more hurtful than useful.

XIII. The syllogism is not applied to the principles of the sciences,
and is of no avail in intermediate axioms,[5] as being very unequal to
the subtilty of nature. It forces assent, therefore, and not things.

XIV. The syllogism consists of propositions; propositions of words;
words are the signs of notions. If, therefore, the notions (which form
the basis of the whole) be confused and carelessly abstracted from
things, there is no solidity in the superstructure. Our only hope,
then, is in genuine induction.

XV. We have no sound notions either in logic or physics; substance,
quality, action, passion, and existence are not clear notions; much
less weight, levity, density, tenuity, moisture, dryness, generation,
corruption, attraction, repulsion, element, matter, form, and the
like. They are all fantastical and ill-defined.

XVI. The notions of less abstract natures, as man, dog, dove, and the
immediate perceptions of sense, as heat, cold, white, black, do not
deceive us materially, yet even these are sometimes confused by the
mutability of matter and the intermixture of things. All the rest which
men have hitherto employed are errors, and improperly abstracted and
deduced from things.

XVII. There is the same degree of licentiousness and error in forming
axioms as in abstracting notions, and that in the first principles,
which depend on common induction; still more is this the case in axioms
and inferior propositions derived from syllogisms.

XVIII. The present discoveries in science are such as lie immediately
beneath the surface of common notions. It is necessary, however, to
penetrate the more secret and remote parts of nature, in order to
abstract both notions and axioms from things by a more certain and
guarded method.

XIX. There are and can exist but two ways of investigating and
discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and
particulars to the most general axioms, and from them, as principles
and their supposed indisputable truth, derives and discovers the
intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. The other constructs
its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually
and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms,
which is the true but unattempted way.

XX. The understanding when left to itself proceeds by the same way as
that which it would have adopted under the guidance of logic, namely,
the first; for the mind is fond of starting off to generalities, that
it may avoid labor, and after dwelling a little on a subject is
fatigued by experiment. But those evils are augmented by logic, for the
sake of the ostentation of dispute.

XXI. The understanding, when left to itself in a man of a steady,
patient, and reflecting disposition (especially when unimpeded by
received doctrines), makes some attempt in the right way, but with
little effect, since the understanding, undirected and unassisted,
is unequal to and unfit for the task of vanquishing the obscurity of
things.

XXII. Each of these two ways begins from the senses and particulars,
and ends in the greatest generalities. But they are immeasurably
different; for the one merely touches cursorily the limits of
experiment and particulars, while the other runs duly and regularly
through them--the one from the very outset lays down some abstract and
useless generalities, the other gradually rises to those principles
which are really the most common in nature. [6]

XXIII. There is no small difference between the idols of the human mind
and the ideas of the Divine mind--that is to say, between certain idle
dogmas and the real stamp and impression of created objects, as they
are found in nature.

XXIV. Axioms determined upon in argument can never assist in the
discovery of new effects; for the subtilty of nature is vastly superior
to that of argument. But axioms properly and regularly abstracted from
particulars easily point out and define new particulars, and therefore
impart activity to the sciences.

XXV. The axioms now in use are derived from a scanty handful, as it
were, of experience, and a few particulars of frequent occurrence,
whence they are of much the same dimensions or extent as their origin.
And if any neglected or unknown instance occurs, the axiom is saved by
some frivolous distinction, when it would be more consistent with truth
to amend it.

XXVI. We are wont, for the sake of distinction, to call that human
reasoning which we apply to nature the anticipation of nature (as being
rash and premature), and that which is properly deduced from things the
interpretation of nature.

XXVII. Anticipations are sufficiently powerful in producing unanimity,
for if men were all to become even uniformly mad, they might agree
tolerably well with each other.

XXVIII. Anticipations again, will be assented to much more readily
than interpretations, because being deduced from a few instances, and
these principally of familiar occurrence, they immediately hit the
understanding and satisfy the imagination; while, on the contrary,
interpretations, being deduced from various subjects, and these widely
dispersed, cannot suddenly strike the understanding, so that in common
estimation they must appear difficult and discordant, and almost like
the mysteries of faith.

XXIX. In sciences founded on opinions and dogmas, it is right to make
use of anticipations and logic if you wish to force assent rather than
things.

XXX. If all the capacities of all ages should unite and combine and
transmit their labors, no great progress will be made in learning
by anticipations, because the radical errors, and those which occur
in the first process of the mind, are not cured by the excellence of
subsequent means and remedies.

XXXI. It is in vain to expect any great progress in the sciences by the
superinducing or ingrafting new matters upon old. An instauration must
be made from the very foundations, if we do not wish to revolve forever
in a circle, making only some slight and contemptible progress.

XXXII. The ancient authors and all others are left in undisputed
possession of their honors; for we enter into no comparison of capacity
or talent, but of method, and assume the part of a guide rather than of
a critic.

XXXIII. To speak plainly, no correct judgment can be formed either of
our method or its discoveries by those anticipations which are now in
common use; for it is not to be required of us to submit ourselves to
the judgment of the very method we ourselves arraign.

XXXIV. Nor is it an easy matter to deliver and explain our sentiments;
for those things which are in themselves new can yet be only understood
from some analogy to what is old.

XXXV. Alexander Borgia[7] said of the expedition of the French into
Italy that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their
lodgings, and not with weapons to force their passage. Even so do we
wish our philosophy to make its way quietly into those minds that are
fit for it, and of good capacity; for we have no need of contention
where we differ in first principles, and in our very notions, and even
in our forms of demonstration.

XXXVI. We have but one simple method of delivering our sentiments,
namely, we must bring men to particulars and their regular series and
order, and they must for a while renounce their notions, and begin to
form an acquaintance with things.

XXXVII. Our method and that of the sceptics[8] agree in some respects
at first setting out, but differ most widely, and are completely
opposed to each other in their conclusion; for they roundly assert that
nothing can be known; we, that but a small part of nature can be known,
by the present method; their next step, however, is to destroy the
authority of the senses and understanding, while we invent and supply
them with assistance.

XXXVIII. The idols and false notions which have already preoccupied the
human understanding, and are deeply rooted in it, not only so beset
men’s minds that they become difficult of access, but even when access
is obtained will again meet and trouble us in the instauration of the
sciences, unless mankind when forewarned guard themselves with all
possible care against them.

XXXIX. Four species of idols beset the human mind,[9] to which (for
distinction’s sake) we have assigned names, calling the first Idols of
the Tribe, the second Idols of the Den, the third Idols of the Market,
the fourth Idols of the Theatre.

XL. The formation of notions and axioms on the foundation of true
induction is the only fitting remedy by which we can ward off and expel
these idols. It is, however, of great service to point them out; for
the doctrine of idols bears the same relation to the interpretation of
nature as that of the confutation of sophisms does to common logic. [10]

XLI. The idols of the tribe are inherent in human nature and the very
tribe or race of man; for man’s sense is falsely asserted to be the
standard of things; on the contrary, all the perceptions both of the
senses and the mind bear reference to man and not to the universe,
and the human mind resembles those uneven mirrors which impart their
own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted and
distort and disfigure them. [11]

XLII. The idols of the den are those of each individual; for everybody
(in addition to the errors common to the race of man) has his own
individual den or cavern, which intercepts and corrupts the light of
nature, either from his own peculiar and singular disposition, or from
his education and intercourse with others, or from his reading, and
the authority acquired by those whom he reverences and admires, or
from the different impressions produced on the mind, as it happens to
be preoccupied and predisposed, or equable and tranquil, and the like;
so that the spirit of man (according to its several dispositions), is
variable, confused, and as it were actuated by chance; and Heraclitus
said well that men search for knowledge in lesser worlds, and not in
the greater or common world.

XLIII. There are also idols formed by the reciprocal intercourse and
society of man with man, which we call idols of the market, from the
commerce and association of men with each other; for men converse by
means of language, but words are formed at the will of the generality,
and there arises from a bad and unapt formation of words a wonderful
obstruction to the mind. Nor can the definitions and explanations with
which learned men are wont to guard and protect themselves in some
instances afford a complete remedy--words still manifestly force the
understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into
vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies.

XLIV. Lastly, there are idols which have crept into men’s minds from
the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from the
perverted rules of demonstration, and these we denominate idols of the
theatre: for we regard all the systems of philosophy hitherto received
or imagined, as so many plays brought out and performed, creating
fictitious and theatrical worlds. Nor do we speak only of the present
systems, or of the philosophy and sects of the ancients, since numerous
other plays of a similar nature can be still composed and made to agree
with each other, the causes of the most opposite errors being generally
the same. Nor, again, do we allude merely to general systems, but also
to many elements and axioms of sciences which have become inveterate by
tradition, implicit credence, and neglect. We must, however, discuss
each species of idols more fully and distinctly in order to guard the
human understanding against them.

XLV. The human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes
a greater degree of order and equality in things than it really finds;
and although many things in nature be _sui generis_ and most irregular,
will yet invent parallels and conjugates and relatives, where no
such thing is. Hence the fiction, that all celestial bodies move in
perfect circles, thus rejecting entirely spiral and serpentine lines
(except as explanatory terms). [12] Hence also the element of fire
is introduced with its peculiar orbit,[13] to keep square with those
other three which are objects of our senses. The relative rarity of the
elements (as they are called) is arbitrarily made to vary in tenfold
progression, with many other dreams of the like nature. [14] Nor is this
folly confined to theories, but it is to be met with even in simple
notions.

XLVI. The human understanding, when any proposition has been once
laid down (either from general admission and belief, or from the
pleasure it affords), forces everything else to add fresh support and
confirmation; and although most cogent and abundant instances may
exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe or despises them,
or gets rid of and rejects them by some distinction, with violent
and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of its
first conclusions. It was well answered by him[15] who was shown in a
temple the votive tablets suspended by such as had escaped the peril of
shipwreck, and was pressed as to whether he would then recognize the
power of the gods, by an inquiry, But where are the portraits of those
who have perished in spite of their vows? All superstition is much
the same, whether it be that of astrology, dreams, omens, retributive
judgment, or the like, in all of which the deluded believers observe
events which are fulfilled, but neglect and pass over their failure,
though it be much more common. But this evil insinuates itself still
more craftily in philosophy and the sciences, in which a settled maxim
vitiates and governs every other circumstance, though the latter be
much more worthy of confidence. Besides, even in the absence of that
eagerness and want of thought (which we have mentioned), it is the
peculiar and perpetual error of the human understanding to be more
moved and excited by affirmatives than negatives, whereas it ought duly
and regularly to be impartial; nay, in establishing any true axiom the
negative instance is the most powerful.

XLVII. The human understanding is most excited by that which strikes
and enters the mind at once and suddenly, and by which the imagination
is immediately filled and inflated. It then begins almost imperceptibly
to conceive and suppose that everything is similar to the few objects
which have taken possession of the mind, while it is very slow and
unfit for the transition to the remote and heterogeneous instances by
which axioms are tried as by fire, unless the office be imposed upon it
by severe regulations and a powerful authority.

XLVIII. The human understanding is active and cannot halt or rest, but
even, though without effect, still presses forward. Thus we cannot
conceive of any end or external boundary of the world, and it seems
necessarily to occur to us that there must be something beyond. Nor can
we imagine how eternity has flowed on down to the present day, since
the usually received distinction of an infinity, a parte ante and a
parte post,[16] cannot hold good; for it would thence follow that one
infinity is greater than another, and also that infinity is wasting
away and tending to an end. There is the same difficulty in considering
the infinite divisibility of lines, arising from the weakness of our
minds, which weakness interferes to still greater disadvantage with the
discovery of causes; for although the greatest generalities in nature
must be positive, just as they are found, and in fact not causable,
yet the human understanding, incapable of resting, seeks for something
more intelligible. Thus, however, while aiming at further progress, it
falls back to what is actually less advanced, namely, final causes;
for they are clearly more allied to man’s own nature, than the system
of the universe, and from this source they have wonderfully corrupted
philosophy. But he would be an unskilful and shallow philosopher who
should seek for causes in the greatest generalities, and not be
anxious to discover them in subordinate objects.

XLIX. The human understanding resembles not a dry light, but admits
a tincture of the will[17] and passions, which generate their own
system accordingly; for man always believes more readily that which
he prefers. He, therefore, rejects difficulties for want of patience
in investigation; sobriety, because it limits his hope; the depths of
nature, from superstition; the light of experiment, from arrogance
and pride, lest his mind should appear to be occupied with common
and varying objects; paradoxes, from a fear of the opinion of the
vulgar; in short, his feelings imbue and corrupt his understanding in
innumerable and sometimes imperceptible ways.

L. But by far the greatest impediment and aberration of the human
understanding proceeds from the dulness, incompetence, and errors
of the senses; since whatever strikes the senses preponderates over
everything, however superior, which does not immediately strike them.
Hence contemplation mostly ceases with sight, and a very scanty, or
perhaps no regard is paid to invisible objects. The entire operation,
therefore, of spirits inclosed in tangible bodies[18] is concealed,
and escapes us. All that more delicate change of formation in the
parts of coarser substances (vulgarly called alteration, but in fact
a change of position in the smallest particles) is equally unknown;
and yet, unless the two matters we have mentioned be explored and
brought to light, no great effect can be produced in nature. Again,
the very nature of common air, and all bodies of less density (of
which there are many) is almost unknown; for the senses are weak and
erring, nor can instruments be of great use in extending their sphere
or acuteness--all the better interpretations of nature are worked out
by instances, and fit and apt experiments, where the senses only judge
of the experiment, the experiment of nature and the thing itself.

LI. The human understanding is, by its own nature, prone to
abstraction, and supposes that which is fluctuating to be fixed. But
it is better to dissect than abstract nature: such was the method
employed by the school of Democritus,[19] which made greater progress
in penetrating nature than the rest. It is best to consider matter, its
conformation, and the changes of that conformation, its own action,[20]
and the law of this action or motion; for forms are a mere fiction
of the human mind, unless you will call the laws of action by that
name. [21]

LII. Such are the idols of the tribe, which arise either from the
uniformity of the constitution of man’s spirit, or its prejudices, or
its limited faculties or restless agitation, or from the interference
of the passions, or the incompetence of the senses, or the mode of
their impressions.

LIII. The idols of the den derive their origin from the peculiar nature
of each individual’s mind and body, and also from education, habit, and
accident; and although they be various and manifold, yet we will treat
of some that require the greatest caution, and exert the greatest power
in polluting the understanding.

LIV. Some men become attached to particular sciences and
contemplations, either from supposing themselves the authors and
inventors of them, or from having bestowed the greatest pains upon
such subjects, and thus become most habituated to them. [22] If men of
this description apply themselves to philosophy and contemplations of
a universal nature, they wrest and corrupt them by their preconceived
fancies, of which Aristotle affords us a single instance, who made
his natural philosophy completely subservient to his logic, and thus
rendered it little more than useless and disputatious. The chemists,
again, have formed a fanciful philosophy with the most confined views,
from a few experiments of the furnace. Gilbert,[23] too, having
employed himself most assiduously in the consideration of the magnet,
immediately established a system of philosophy to coincide with his
favorite pursuit.

LV. The greatest and, perhaps, radical distinction between different
men’s dispositions for philosophy and the sciences is this, that
some are more vigorous and active in observing the differences of
things, others in observing their resemblances; for a steady and acute
disposition can fix its thoughts, and dwell upon and adhere to a point,
through all the refinements of differences, but those that are sublime
and discursive recognize and compare even the most delicate and general
resemblances; each of them readily falls into excess, by catching
either at nice distinctions or shadows of resemblance.

LVI. Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration of antiquity,
others eagerly embrace novelty, and but few can preserve the just
medium, so as neither to tear up what the ancients have correctly laid
down, nor to despise the just innovations of the moderns. But this
is very prejudicial to the sciences and philosophy, and instead of a
correct judgment we have but the factions of the ancients and moderns.
Truth is not to be sought in the good fortune of any particular
conjuncture of time, which is uncertain, but in the light of nature
and experience, which is eternal. Such factions, therefore, are to be
abjured, and the understanding must not allow them to hurry it on to
assent.

LVII. The contemplation of nature and of bodies in their individual
form distracts and weakens the understanding; but the contemplation
of nature and of bodies in their general composition and formation
stupefies and relaxes it. We have a good instance of this in the school
of Leucippus and Democritus compared with others, for they applied
themselves so much to particulars as almost to neglect the general
structure of things, while the others were so astounded while gazing
on the structure that they did not penetrate the simplicity of nature.
These two species of contemplation must, therefore, be interchanged,
and each employed in its turn, in order to render the understanding at
once penetrating and capacious, and to avoid the inconveniences we have
mentioned, and the idols that result from them.

LVIII. Let such, therefore, be our precautions in contemplation, that
we may ward off and expel the idols of the den, which mostly owe their
birth either to some predominant pursuit, or, secondly, to an excess
in synthesis and analysis, or, thirdly, to a party zeal in favor
of certain ages, or, fourthly, to the extent or narrowness of the
subject. In general, he who contemplates nature should suspect whatever
particularly takes and fixes his understanding, and should use so much
the more caution to preserve it equable and unprejudiced.

LIX. The idols of the market are the most troublesome of all, those
namely which have entwined themselves round the understanding from the
associations of words and names. For men imagine that their reason
governs words, while, in fact, words react upon the understanding; and
this has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inactive.
Words are generally formed in a popular sense, and define things by
those broad lines which are most obvious to the vulgar mind; but when
a more acute understanding or more diligent observation is anxious to
vary those lines, and to adapt them more accurately to nature, words
oppose it. Hence the great and solemn disputes of learned men often
terminate in controversies about words and names, in regard to which it
would be better (imitating the caution of mathematicians) to proceed
more advisedly in the first instance, and to bring such disputes to
a regular issue by definitions. Such definitions, however, cannot
remedy the evil in natural and material objects, because they consist
themselves of words, and these words produce others;[24] so that we
must necessarily have recourse to particular instances, and their
regular series and arrangement, as we shall mention when we come to
the mode and scheme of determining notions and axioms.

LX. The idols imposed upon the understanding by words are of two
kinds. They are either the names of things which have no existence
(for as some objects are from inattention left without a name, so
names are formed by fanciful imaginations which are without an
object), or they are the names of actual objects, but confused, badly
defined, and hastily and irregularly abstracted from things. Fortune,
the _primum mobile_, the planetary orbits,[25] the element of fire,
and the like fictions, which owe their birth to futile and false
theories, are instances of the first kind. And this species of idols
is removed with greater facility, because it can be exterminated by
the constant refutation or the desuetude of the theories themselves.
The others, which are created by vicious and unskilful abstraction,
are intricate and deeply rooted. Take some word, for instance, as
moist, and let us examine how far the different significations of this
word are consistent. It will be found that the word moist is nothing
but a confused sign of different actions admitted of no settled and
defined uniformity. For it means that which easily diffuses itself
over another body; that which is indeterminable and cannot be brought
to a consistency; that which yields easily in every direction; that
which is easily divided and dispersed; that which is easily united and
collected; that which easily flows and is put in motion; that which
easily adheres to, and wets another body; that which is easily reduced
to a liquid state though previously solid. When, therefore, you come
to predicate or impose this name, in one sense flame is moist, in
another air is not moist, in another fine powder is moist, in another
glass is moist; so that it is quite clear that this notion is hastily
abstracted from water only, and common ordinary liquors, without any
due verification of it.
There are, however, different degrees of distortion and mistake
in words. One of the least faulty classes is that of the names of
substances, particularly of the less abstract and more defined species
(those then of chalk and mud are good, of earth bad); words signifying
actions are more faulty, as to generate, to corrupt, to change; but the
most faulty are those denoting qualities (except the immediate objects
of sense), as heavy, light, rare, dense. Yet in all of these there must
be some notions a little better than others, in proportion as a greater
or less number of things come before the senses.

LXI. The idols of the theatre are not innate, nor do they introduce
themselves secretly into the understanding, but they are manifestly
instilled and cherished by the fictions of theories and depraved rules
of demonstration. To attempt, however, or undertake their confutation
would not be consistent with our declarations. For since we neither
agree in our principles nor our demonstrations, all argument is out
of the question. And it is fortunate that the ancients are left in
possession of their honors. We detract nothing from them, seeing our
whole doctrine relates only to the path to be pursued. The lame (as
they say) in the path outstrip the swift who wander from it, and it
is clear that the very skill and swiftness of him who runs not in the
right direction must increase his aberration.

Our method of discovering the sciences is such as to leave little to
the acuteness and strength of wit, and indeed rather to level wit and
intellect. For as in the drawing of a straight line, or accurate circle
by the hand, much depends on its steadiness and practice, but if a
ruler or compass be employed there is little occasion for either; so
it is with our method. Although, however, we enter into no individual
confutations, yet a little must be said, first, of the sects and
general divisions of these species of theories; secondly, something
further to show that there are external signs of their weakness; and,
lastly, we must consider the causes of so great a misfortune, and so
long and general a unanimity in error, that we may thus render the
access to truth less difficult, and that the human understanding may
the more readily be purified, and brought to dismiss its idols.

LXII. The idols of the theatre, or of theories, are numerous, and may,
and perhaps will, be still more so. For unless men’s minds had been now
occupied for many ages in religious and theological considerations, and
civil governments (especially monarchies), had been averse to novelties
of that nature even in theory (so that men must apply to them with some
risk and injury to their own fortunes, and not only without reward,
but subject to contumely and envy), there is no doubt that many other
sects of philosophers and theorists would have been introduced, like
those which formerly flourished in such diversified abundance among the
Greeks. For as many imaginary theories of the heavens can be deduced
from the phenomena of the sky, so it is even more easy to found many
dogmas upon the phenomena of philosophy--and the plot of this our
theatre resembles those of the poetical, where the plots which are
invented for the stage are more consistent, elegant, and pleasurable
than those taken from real history.

In general, men take for the groundwork of their philosophy either
too much from a few topics, or too little from many; in either case
their philosophy is founded on too narrow a basis of experiment and
natural history, and decides on too scanty grounds. For the theoretic
philosopher seizes various common circumstances by experiment, without
reducing them to certainty or examining and frequently considering
them, and relies for the rest upon meditation and the activity of his
wit.

There are other philosophers who have diligently and accurately
attended to a few experiments, and have thence presumed to deduce and
invent systems of philosophy, forming everything to conformity with
them.

A third set, from their faith and religious veneration, introduce
theology and traditions; the absurdity of some among them having
proceeded so far as to seek and derive the sciences from spirits and
genii. There are, therefore, three sources of error and three species
of false philosophy; the sophistic, empiric, and superstitious.

LXIII. Aristotle affords the most eminent instance of the first; for
he corrupted natural philosophy by logic--thus he formed the world of
categories, assigned to the human soul, the noblest of substances, a
genus determined by words of secondary operation, treated of density
and rarity (by which bodies occupy a greater or lesser space), by the
frigid distinctions of action and power, asserted that there was a
peculiar and proper motion in all bodies, and that if they shared
in any other motion, it was owing to an external moving cause, and
imposed innumerable arbitrary distinctions upon the nature of things;
being everywhere more anxious as to definitions in teaching and the
accuracy of the wording of his propositions, than the internal truth
of things. And this is best shown by a comparison of his philosophy
with the others of greatest repute among the Greeks. For the similar
parts of Anaxagoras, the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus, the heaven
and earth of Parmenides, the discord and concord of Empedocles,[26]
the resolution of bodies into the common nature of fire, and their
condensation according to Heraclitus, exhibit some sprinkling of
natural philosophy, the nature of things, and experiment; while
Aristotle’s physics are mere logical terms, and he remodelled the
same subject in his metaphysics under a more imposing title, and more
as a realist than a nominalist. Nor is much stress to be laid on his
frequent recourse to experiment in his books on animals, his problems,
and other treatises; for he had already decided, without having
properly consulted experience as the basis of his decisions and axioms,
and after having so decided, he drags experiment along as a captive
constrained to accommodate herself to his decisions: so that he is even
more to be blamed than his modern followers (of the scholastic school)
who have deserted her altogether.

LXIV. The empiric school produces dogmas of a more deformed and
monstrous nature than the sophistic or theoretic school; not being
founded in the light of common notions (which, however poor and
superstitious, is yet in a manner universal, and of a general
tendency), but in the confined obscurity of a few experiments. Hence
this species of philosophy appears probable, and almost certain to
those who are daily practiced in such experiments, and have thus
corrupted their imagination, but incredible and futile to others. We
have a strong instance of this in the alchemists and their dogmas; it
would be difficult to find another in this age, unless perhaps in the
philosophy of Gilbert. [27] We could not, however, neglect to caution
others against this school, because we already foresee and augur, that
if men be hereafter induced by our exhortations to apply seriously
to experiments (bidding farewell to the sophistic doctrines), there
will then be imminent danger from empirics, owing to the premature
and forward haste of the understanding, and its jumping or flying to
generalities and the principles of things. We ought, therefore, already
to meet the evil.

LXV. The corruption of philosophy by the mixing of it up with
superstition and theology, is of a much wider extent, and is
most injurious to it both as a whole and in parts. For the human
understanding is no less exposed to the impressions of fancy, than to
those of vulgar notions. The disputatious and sophistic school entraps
the understanding, while the fanciful, bombastic, and, as it were,
poetical school, rather flatters it.

There is a clear example of this among the Greeks, especially in
Pythagoras, where, however, the superstition is coarse and overcharged,
but it is more dangerous and refined in Plato and his school. This
evil is found also in some branches of other systems of philosophy,
where it introduces abstracted forms, final and first causes, omitting
frequently the intermediate and the like. Against it we must use the
greatest caution; for the apotheosis of error is the greatest evil
of all, and when folly is worshipped, it is, as it were, a plague
spot upon the understanding. Yet some of the moderns have indulged
this folly with such consummate inconsiderateness, that they have
endeavored to build a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter
of Genesis, the book of Job, and other parts of Scripture; seeking
thus the dead among the living. [28] And this folly is the more to be
prevented and restrained, because not only fantastical philosophy, but
heretical religion spring from the absurd mixture of matters divine
and human. It is therefore most wise soberly to render unto faith the
things that are faith’s.

LXVI. Having spoken of the vicious authority of the systems founded
either on vulgar notions, or on a few experiments, or on superstition,
we must now consider the faulty subjects for contemplation, especially
in natural philosophy. The human understanding is perverted by
observing the power of mechanical arts, in which bodies are very
materially changed by composition or separation, and is induced to
suppose that something similar takes place in the universal nature
of things. Hence the fiction of elements, and their co-operation in
forming natural bodies. [29] Again, when man reflects upon the entire
liberty of nature, he meets with particular species of things, as
animals, plants, minerals, and is thence easily led to imagine that
there exist in nature certain primary forms which she strives to
produce, and that all variation from them arises from some impediment
or error which she is exposed to in completing her work, or from the
collision or metamorphosis of different species. The first hypothesis
has produced the doctrine of elementary properties, the second that
of occult properties and specific powers; and both lead to trifling
courses of reflection, in which the mind acquiesces, and is thus
diverted from more important subjects. But physicians exercise a much
more useful labor in the consideration of the secondary qualities of
things, and the operations of attraction, repulsion, attenuation,
inspissation, dilatation, astringency, separation, maturation, and the
like; and would do still more if they would not corrupt these proper
observations by the two systems I have alluded to, of elementary
qualities and specific powers, by which they either reduce the
secondary to first qualities, and their subtile and immeasurable
composition, or at any rate neglect to advance by greater and
more diligent observation to the third and fourth qualities, thus
terminating their contemplation prematurely. Nor are these powers (or
the like) to be investigated only among the medicines for the human
body, but also in all changes of other natural bodies.

A greater evil arises from the contemplation and investigation rather
of the stationary principles of things from which, than of the active
by which things themselves are created. For the former only serve for
discussion, the latter for practice. Nor is any value to be set on
those common differences of motion which are observed in the received
system of natural philosophy, as generation, corruption, augmentation,
diminution, alteration, and translation. For this is their meaning:
if a body, unchanged in other respects, is moved from its place, this
is translation; if the place and species be given, but the quantity
changed, it is alteration; but if, from such a change, the mass and
quantity of the body do not continue the same, this is the motion
of augmentation and diminution; if the change be continued so as to
vary the species and substance, and transfuse them to others, this is
generation and corruption. All this is merely popular, and by no means
penetrates into nature; and these are but the measures and bounds of
motion, and not different species of it; they merely suggest how far,
and not how or whence. For they exhibit neither the affections of
bodies nor the process of their parts, but merely establish a division
of that motion, which coarsely exhibits to the senses matter in its
varied form. Even when they wish to point out something relative to
the causes of motion, and to establish a division of them, they most
absurdly introduce natural and violent motion, which is also a popular
notion, since every violent motion is also in fact natural, that is to
say, the external efficient puts nature in action in a different manner
to that which she had previously employed.

But if, neglecting these, any one were, for instance, to observe
that there is in bodies a tendency of adhesion, so as not to suffer
the unity of nature to be completely separated or broken, and a
_vacuum_[30] to be formed, or that they have a tendency to return to
their natural dimensions or tension, so that, if compressed or extended
within or beyond it, they immediately strive to recover themselves, and
resume their former volume and extent; or that they have a tendency to
congregate into masses with similar bodies--the dense, for instance,
toward the circumference of the earth, the thin and rare toward that of
the heavens. These and the like are true physical genera of motions,
but the others are clearly logical and scholastic, as appears plainly
from a comparison of the two.

Another considerable evil is, that men in their systems and
contemplations bestow their labor upon the investigation and discussion
of the principles of things and the extreme limits of nature, although
all utility and means of action consist in the intermediate objects.
Hence men cease not to abstract nature till they arrive at potential
and shapeless matter,[31] and still persist in their dissection, till
they arrive at atoms; and yet were all this true, it would be of little
use to advance man’s estate.

LXVII. The understanding must also be cautioned against the
intemperance of systems, so far as regards its giving or withholding
its assent; for such intemperance appears to fix and perpetuate idols,
so as to leave no means of removing them.

These excesses are of two kinds. The first is seen in those who
decide hastily, and render the sciences positive and dictatorial. The
other in those who have introduced scepticism, and vague unbounded
inquiry. The former subdues, the latter enervates the understanding.
The Aristotelian philosophy, after destroying other systems (as the
Ottomans[32] do their brethren) by its disputatious confutations,
decided upon everything, and Aristotle himself then raises up questions
at will, in order to settle them; so that everything should be certain
and decided, a method now in use among his successors.

The school of Plato introduced scepticism, first, as it were in joke
and irony, from their dislike to Protagoras, Hippias,[33] and others,
who were ashamed of appearing not to doubt upon any subject. But the
new academy dogmatized in their scepticism, and held it as their tenet.
Although this method be more honest than arbitrary decision (for its
followers allege that they by no means confound all inquiry, like
Pyrrho and his disciples, but hold doctrines which they can follow as
probable, though they cannot maintain them to be true), yet when the
human mind has once despaired of discovering truth, everything begins
to languish. Hence men turn aside into pleasant controversies and
discussions, and into a sort of wandering over subjects rather than
sustain any rigorous investigation. But as we observed at first, we
are not to deny the authority of the human senses and understanding,
although weak, but rather to furnish them with assistance.

LXVIII. We have now treated of each kind of idols, and their qualities,
all of which must be abjured and renounced with firm and solemn
resolution, and the understanding must be completely freed and cleared
of them, so that the access to the kingdom of man, which is founded
on the sciences, may resemble that to the kingdom of heaven, where no
admission is conceded except to children.

LXIX. Vicious demonstrations are the muniments and support of idols,
and those which we possess in logic, merely subject and enslave the
world to human thoughts, and thoughts to words. But demonstrations
are in some manner themselves systems of philosophy and science; for
such as they are, and accordingly as they are regularly or improperly
established, such will be the resulting systems of philosophy and
contemplation. But those which we employ in the whole process leading
from the senses and things to axioms and conclusions, are fallacious
and incompetent. This process is fourfold, and the errors are in equal
number. In the first place the impressions of the senses are erroneous,
for they fail and deceive us. We must supply defects by substitutions,
and fallacies by their correction. Secondly, notions are improperly
abstracted from the senses, and indeterminate and confused when they
ought to be the reverse. Thirdly, the induction that is employed is
improper, for it determines the principles of sciences by simple
enumeration,[34] without adopting exclusions and resolutions, or just
separations of nature. Lastly, the usual method of discovery and proof,
by first establishing the most general propositions, then applying and
proving the intermediate axioms according to them, is the parent of
error and the calamity of every science. But we will treat more fully
of that which we now slightly touch upon, when we come to lay down the
true way of interpreting nature, after having gone through the above
expiatory process and purification of the mind.

LXX. But experience is by far the best demonstration, provided it
adhere to the experiment actually made, for if that experiment be
transferred to other subjects apparently similar, unless with proper
and methodical caution it becomes fallacious. The present method of
experiment is blind and stupid; hence men wandering and roaming without
any determined course, and consulting mere chance, are hurried about
to various points, and advance but little--at one time they are happy,
at another their attention is distracted, and they always find that
they want something further. Men generally make their experiments
carelessly, and as it were in sport, making some little variation
in a known experiment, and then if they fail they become disgusted
and give up the attempt; nay, if they set to work more seriously,
steadily, and assiduously, yet they waste all their time on probing
some solitary matter, as Gilbert on the magnet, and the alchemists on
gold. But such conduct shows their method to be no less unskilful than
mean; for nobody can successfully investigate the nature of any object
by considering that object alone; the inquiry must be more generally
extended.

Even when men build any science and theory upon experiment, yet they
almost always turn with premature and hasty zeal to practice, not
merely on account of the advantage and benefit to be derived from
it, but in order to seize upon some security in a new undertaking of
their not employing the remainder of their labor unprofitably, and by
making themselves conspicuous, to acquire a greater name for their
pursuit. Hence, like Atalanta, they leave the course to pick up the
golden apple, interrupting their speed, and giving up the victory. But
in the true course of experiment, and in extending it to new effects,
we should imitate the Divine foresight and order; for God on the first
day only created light, and assigned a whole day to that work without
creating any material substance thereon. In like manner we must first,
by every kind of experiment, elicit the discovery of causes and true
axioms, and seek for experiments which may afford light rather than
profit. Axioms, when rightly investigated and established, prepare
us not for a limited but abundant practice, and bring in their train
whole troops of effects. But we will treat hereafter of the ways of
experience, which are not less beset and interrupted than those of
judgment; having spoken at present of common experience only as a
bad species of demonstration, the order of our subject now requires
some mention of those external signs of the weakness in practice of
the received systems of philosophy and contemplation[35] which we
referred to above, and of the causes of a circumstance at first sight
so wonderful and incredible. For the knowledge of these external
signs prepares the way for assent, and the explanation of the causes
removes the wonder; and these two circumstances are of material use in
extirpating more easily and gently the idols from the understanding.

LXXI. The sciences we possess have been principally derived from
the Greeks; for the addition of the Roman, Arabic, or more modern
writers, are but few and of small importance, and such as they are,
are founded on the basis of Greek invention. But the wisdom of the
Greeks was professional and disputatious, and thus most adverse to
the investigation of truth. The name, therefore, of sophists, which
the contemptuous spirit of those who deemed themselves philosophers,
rejected and transferred to the rhetoricians--Gorgias,[36]
Protagoras, Hippias, Polus--might well suit the whole tribe, such
as Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, Theophrastus, and their
successors--Chrysippus, Carneades, and the rest. There was only
this difference between them--the former were mercenary vagabonds,
travelling about to different states, making a show of their wisdom,
and requiring pay; the latter more dignified and noble, in possession
of fixed habitations, opening schools, and teaching philosophy
gratuitously. Both, however (though differing in other respects), were
professorial, and reduced every subject to controversy, establishing
and defending certain sects and dogmas of philosophy, so that their
doctrines were nearly (what Dionysius not unaptly objected to Plato)
the talk of idle old men to ignorant youths. But the more ancient
Greeks, as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Parmenides,
Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Philolaus, and the rest[37] (for I omit
Pythagoras as being superstitious), did not (that we are aware) open
schools, but betook themselves to the investigation of truth with
greater silence and with more severity and simplicity, that is, with
less affectation and ostentation. Hence in our opinion they acted
more advisedly, however their works may have been eclipsed in course
of time by those lighter productions which better correspond with
and please the apprehensions and passions of the vulgar; for time,
like a river,[38] bears down to us that which is light and inflated,
and sinks that which is heavy and solid. Nor were even these more
ancient philosophers free from the national defect, but inclined too
much to the ambition and vanity of forming a sect, and captivating
public opinion, and we must despair of any inquiry after truth when it
condescends to such trifles. Nor must we omit the opinion, or rather
prophecy, of an Egyptian priest with regard to the Greeks, that they
would forever remain children, without any antiquity of knowledge or
knowledge of antiquity; for they certainly have this in common with
children, that they are prone to talking, and incapable of generation,
their wisdom being loquacious and unproductive of effects. Hence the
external signs derived from the origin and birthplace of our present
philosophy are not favorable.

LXXII. Nor are those much better which can be deduced from the
character of the time and age, than the former from that of the country
and nation; for in that age the knowledge both of time and of the world
was confined and meagre, which is one of the worst evils for those who
rely entirely on experience--they had not a thousand years of history
worthy of that name, but mere fables and ancient traditions; they were
acquainted with but a small portion of the regions and countries of the
world, for they indiscriminately called all nations situated far toward
the north Scythians, all those to the west Celts; they knew nothing of
Africa but the nearest part of Ethiopia, or of Asia beyond the Ganges,
and had not even heard any sure and clear tradition of the regions of
the New World. Besides, a vast number of climates and zones, in which
innumerable nations live and breathe, were pronounced by them to be
uninhabitable; nay, the travels of Democritus, Plato, and Pythagoras,
which were not extensive, but rather mere excursions from home, were
considered as something vast. But in our times many parts of the New
World, and every extremity of the Old, are well known, and the mass of
experiments has been infinitely increased; wherefore, if external signs
were to be taken from the time of the nativity or procreation (as in
astrology), nothing extraordinary could be predicted of these early
systems of philosophy.

LXXIII. Of all signs there is none more certain or worthy than that
of the fruits produced, for the fruits and effects are the sureties
and vouchers, as it were, for the truth of philosophy. Now, from the
systems of the Greeks, and their subordinate divisions in particular
branches of the sciences during so long a period, scarcely one single
experiment can be culled that has a tendency to elevate or assist
mankind, and can be fairly set down to the speculations and doctrines
of their philosophy. Celsus candidly and wisely confesses as much,
when he observes that experiments were first discovered in medicine,
and that men afterward built their philosophical systems upon them,
and searched for and assigned causes, instead of the inverse method of
discovering and deriving experiments from philosophy and the knowledge
of causes; it is not, therefore, wonderful that the Egyptians (who
bestowed divinity and sacred honors on the authors of new inventions)
should have consecrated more images of brutes than of men, for the
brutes by their natural instinct made many discoveries, while men
derived but few from discussion and the conclusions of reason.

The industry of the alchemists has produced some effect, by chance,
however, and casualty, or from varying their experiments (as mechanics
also do), and not from any regular art or theory, the theory they have
imagined rather tending to disturb than to assist experiment. Those,
too, who have occupied themselves with natural magic (as they term it)
have made but few discoveries, and those of small import, and bordering
on imposture; for which reason, in the same manner as we are cautioned
by religion to show our faith by our works, we may very properly apply
the principle to philosophy, and judge of it by its works, accounting
that to be futile which is unproductive, and still more so if, instead
of grapes and olives, it yield but the thistle and thorns of dispute
and contention.

LXXIV. Other signs may be selected from the increase and progress of
particular systems of philosophy and the sciences; for those which are
founded on nature grow and increase, while those which are founded
on opinion change and increase not. If, therefore, the theories we
have mentioned were not like plants, torn up by the roots, but grew
in the womb of nature, and were nourished by her, that which for the
last two thousand years has taken place would never have happened,
namely, that the sciences still continue in their beaten track, and
nearly stationary, without having received any important increase,
nay, having, on the contrary, rather bloomed under the hands of their
first author, and then faded away. But we see that the case is reversed
in the mechanical arts, which are founded on nature and the light
of experience, for they (as long as they are popular) seem full of
life, and uninterruptedly thrive and grow, being at first rude, then
convenient, lastly polished, and perpetually improved.

LXXV. There is yet another sign (if such it may be termed, being
rather an evidence, and one of the strongest nature), namely, the
actual confession of those very authorities whom men now follow; for
even they who decide on things so daringly, yet at times, when they
reflect, betake themselves to complaints about the subtilty of nature,
the obscurity of things, and the weakness of man’s wit. If they would
merely do this, they might perhaps deter those who are of a timid
disposition from further inquiry, but would excite and stimulate those
of a more active and confident turn to further advances. They are
not, however, satisfied with confessing so much of themselves, but
consider everything which has been either unknown or unattempted by
themselves or their teachers, as beyond the limits of possibility,
and thus, with most consummate pride and envy, convert the defects of
their own discoveries into a calumny on nature and a source of despair
to every one else. Hence arose the New Academy, which openly professed
scepticism,[39] and consigned mankind to eternal darkness; hence the
notion that forms, or the true differences of things (which are in
fact the laws of simple action), are beyond man’s reach, and cannot
possibly be discovered; hence those notions in the active and operative
branches, that the heat of the sun and of fire are totally different,
so as to prevent men from supposing that they can elicit or form, by
means of fire, anything similar to the operations of nature; and again,
that composition only is the work of man and mixture of nature, so
as to prevent men from expecting the generation or transformation of
natural bodies by art. Men will, therefore, easily allow themselves to
be persuaded by this sign not to engage their fortunes and labor in
speculations, which are not only desperate, but actually devoted to
desperation.

LXXVI. Nor should we omit the sign afforded by the great dissension
formerly prevalent among philosophers, and the variety of schools,
which sufficiently show that the way was not well prepared that leads
from the senses to the understanding, since the same groundwork of
philosophy (namely, the nature of things), was torn and divided into
such widely differing and multifarious errors. And although in these
days the dissensions and differences of opinions with regard to first
principles and entire systems are nearly extinct,[40] yet there remain
innumerable questions and controversies with regard to particular
branches of philosophy. So that it is manifest that there is nothing
sure or sound either in the systems themselves or in the methods of
demonstration. [41]

LXXVII. With regard to the supposition that there is a general
unanimity as to the philosophy of Aristotle, because the other systems
of the ancients ceased and became obsolete on its promulgation, and
nothing better has been since discovered; whence it appears that it is
so well determined and founded, as to have united the suffrages of both
ages; we will observe--1st. That the notion of other ancient systems
having ceased after the publication of the works of Aristotle is false,
for the works of the ancient philosophers subsisted long after that
event, even to the time of Cicero, and the subsequent ages. But at a
later period, when human learning had, as it were, been wrecked in the
inundation of barbarians into the Roman empire, then the systems of
Aristotle and Plato were preserved in the waves of ages, like planks
of a lighter and less solid nature. 2d. The notion of unanimity, on
a clear inspection, is found to be fallacious. For true unanimity
is that which proceeds from a free judgment, arriving at the same
conclusion, after an investigation of the fact. Now, by far the greater
number of those who have assented to the philosophy of Aristotle,
have bound themselves down to it from prejudice and the authority
of others, so that it is rather obsequiousness and concurrence than
unanimity. But even if it were real and extensive unanimity, so far
from being esteemed a true and solid confirmation, it should even
lead to a violent presumption to the contrary. For there is no worse
augury in intellectual matters than that derived from unanimity, with
the exception of divinity and politics, where suffrages are allowed
to decide. For nothing pleases the multitude, unless it strike the
imagination or bind down the understanding, as we have observed above,
with the shackles of vulgar notions. Hence we may well transfer
Phocion’s remark from morals to the intellect: “That men should
immediately examine what error or fault they have committed, when the
multitude concurs with, and applauds them. ”[42] This then is one of
the most unfavorable signs. All the signs, therefore, of the truth and
soundness of the received systems of philosophy and the sciences are
unpropitious, whether taken from their origin, their fruits, their
progress, the confessions of their authors, or from unanimity.

LXXVIII. We now come to the causes of errors,[43] and of such
perseverance in them for ages. These are sufficiently numerous and
powerful to remove all wonder, that what we now offer should have so
long been concealed from, and have escaped the notice of mankind, and
to render it more worthy of astonishment, that it should even now have
entered any one’s mind, or become the subject of his thoughts; and
that it should have done so, we consider rather the gift of fortune
than of any extraordinary talent, and as the offspring of time rather
than wit. But, in the first place, the number of ages is reduced to
very narrow limits, on a proper consideration of the matter. For out
of twenty-five[44] centuries, with which the memory and learning of
man are conversant, scarcely six can be set apart and selected as
fertile in science and favorable to its progress. For there are deserts
and wastes in times as in countries, and we can only reckon up three
revolutions and epochs of philosophy. 1. The Greek. 2. The Roman.
3. Our own, that is the philosophy of the western nations of Europe:
and scarcely two centuries can with justice be assigned to each. The
intermediate ages of the world were unfortunate both in the quantity
and richness of the sciences produced. Nor need we mention the Arabs,
or the scholastic philosophy, which, in those ages, ground down the
sciences by their numerous treatises, more than they increased their
weight. The first cause, then, of such insignificant progress in the
sciences, is rightly referred to the small proportion of time which has
been favorable thereto.

LXXIX. A second cause offers itself, which is certainly of the greatest
importance; namely, that in those very ages in which men’s wit and
literature flourished considerably, or even moderately, but a small
part of their industry was bestowed on natural philosophy, the great
mother of the sciences. For every art and science torn from this root
may, perhaps, be polished, and put into a serviceable shape, but can
admit of little growth. It is well known, that after the Christian
religion had been acknowledged, and arrived at maturity, by far the
best wits were busied upon theology, where the highest rewards offered
themselves, and every species of assistance was abundantly supplied,
and the study of which was the principal occupation of the western
European nations during the third epoch; the rather because literature
flourished about the very time when controversies concerning religion
first began to bud forth. 2. In the preceding ages, during the second
epoch (that of the Romans), philosophical meditation and labor was
chiefly occupied and wasted in moral philosophy (the theology of
the heathens): besides, the greatest minds in these times applied
themselves to civil affairs, on account of the magnitude of the Roman
empire, which required the labor of many. 3. The age during which
natural philosophy appeared principally to flourish among the Greeks,
was but a short period, since in the more ancient times the seven sages
(with the exception of Thales), applied themselves to moral philosophy
and politics, and at a later period, after Socrates had brought
down philosophy from heaven to earth, moral philosophy became more
prevalent, and diverted men’s attention from natural. Nay, the very
period during which physical inquiries flourished, was corrupted and
rendered useless by contradictions, and the ambition of new opinions.
Since, therefore, during these three epochs, natural philosophy has
been materially neglected or impeded, it is not at all surprising
that men should have made but little progress in it, seeing they were
attending to an entirely different matter.

LXXX. Add to this that natural philosophy, especially of late, has
seldom gained exclusive possession of an individual free from all other
pursuits, even among those who have applied themselves to it, unless
there may be an example or two of some monk studying in his cell, or
some nobleman in his villa. [45] She has rather been made a passage and
bridge to other pursuits.

Thus has this great mother of the sciences been degraded most
unworthily to the situation of a handmaid, and made to wait upon
medicine or mathematical operations, and to wash the immature minds
of youth, and imbue them with a first dye, that they may afterward be
more ready to receive and retain another. In the meantime, let no one
expect any great progress in the sciences (especially their operative
part), unless natural philosophy be applied to particular sciences,
and particular sciences again referred back to natural philosophy. For
want of this, astronomy, optics, music, many mechanical arts, medicine
itself, and (what perhaps is more wonderful), moral and political
philosophy, and the logical sciences have no depth, but only glide over
the surface and variety of things; because these sciences, when they
have been once partitioned out and established, are no longer nourished
by natural philosophy, which would have imparted fresh vigor and
growth to them from the sources and genuine contemplation of motion,
rays, sounds, texture, and conformation of bodies, and the affections
and capacity of the understanding. But we can little wonder that the
sciences grow not when separated from their roots.

LXXXI. There is another powerful and great cause of the little
advancement of the sciences, which is this; it is impossible to advance
properly in the course when the goal is not properly fixed. But the
real and legitimate goal of the sciences is the endowment of human
life with new inventions and riches. The great crowd of teachers know
nothing of this, but consist of dictatorial hirelings; unless it so
happen that some artisan of an acute genius, and ambitious of fame,
gives up his time to a new discovery, which is generally attended with
a loss of property. The majority, so far from proposing to themselves
the augmentation of the mass of arts and sciences, make no other use
of an inquiry into the mass already before them, than is afforded by
the conversion of it to some use in their lectures, or to gain, or
to the acquirement of a name, and the like. But if one out of the
multitude be found, who courts science from real zeal, and on his own
account, even he will be seen rather to follow contemplation, and the
variety of theories, than a severe and strict investigation of truth.
Again, if there even be an unusually strict investigator of truth, yet
will he propose to himself, as the test of truth, the satisfaction
of his mind and understanding, as to the causes of things long since
known, and not such a test as to lead to some new earnest of effects,
and a new light in axioms. If, therefore, no one have laid down the
real end of science, we cannot wonder that there should be error in
points subordinate to that end.

LXXXII. But, in like manner, as the end and goal of science is
ill defined, so, even were the case otherwise, men have chosen an
erroneous and impassable direction. For it is sufficient to astonish
any reflecting mind, that nobody should have cared or wished to open
and complete a way for the understanding, setting off from the senses,
and regular, well-conducted experiment; but that everything has been
abandoned either to the mists of tradition, the whirl and confusion of
argument, or the waves and mazes of chance, and desultory, ill-combined
experiment. Now, let any one but consider soberly and diligently
the nature of the path men have been accustomed to pursue in the
investigation and discovery of any matter, and he will doubtless first
observe the rude and inartificial manner of discovery most familiar to
mankind: which is no other than this. When any one prepares himself for
discovery, he first inquires and obtains a full account of all that
has been said on the subject by others, then adds his own reflections,
and stirs up and, as it were, invokes his own spirit, after much
mental labor, to disclose its oracles. All which is a method without
foundation, and merely turns on opinion.

Another, perhaps, calls in logic to assist him in discovery, which
bears only a nominal relation to his purpose. For the discoveries of
logic are not discoveries of principles and leading axioms, but only
of what appears to accord with them. [46] And when men become curious
and importunate, and give trouble, interrupting her about her proofs,
and the discovery of principles or first axioms, she puts them off with
her usual answer, referring them to faith, and ordering them to swear
allegiance to each art in its own department.

There remains but mere experience, which, when it offers itself, is
called chance; when it is sought after, experiment. [47] But this kind
of experience is nothing but a loose fagot; and mere groping in the
dark, as men at night try all means of discovering the right road,
while it would be better and more prudent either to wait for day, or
procure a light, and then proceed. On the contrary, the real order of
experience begins by setting up a light, and then shows the road by it,
commencing with a regulated and digested, not a misplaced and vague
course of experiment, and thence deducing axioms, and from those axioms
new experiments: for not even the Divine Word proceeded to operate on
the general mass of things without due order.

Let men, therefore, cease to wonder if the whole course of science be
not run, when all have wandered from the path; quitting it entirely,
and deserting experience, or involving themselves in its mazes, and
wandering about, while a regularly combined system would lead them in
a sure track through its wilds to the open day of axioms.