Pubpols must remain close to the home soil, with an
occasional
junket abroad on "fact-finding" trips.
Lundberg - The-Rich-and-the-Super-Rich-by-Ferdinand-Lundberg
Now and again (paydays) the strap is loosened and he is allowed to swallow a fish.
The bird is a percentage participant in the process, which was established by and for others.
2
It is part of the corporation mystique that the corporation executive is inherently a powerful person--that he freely and autonomously extemporizes. But if such ability
were either extensive or crucial it would be easy to shift top officials out of industries where the average net return on capital was high, such as automobiles, cosmetics or pharmaceuticals, into industries where it was low, such as coal, railroads or steamships. The wizard decision makers would then be able to make decisions that would move the lagging enterprise far above the traditional rate of return for the industry.
This is not done. Executives are not attracted from booming industries to lagging ones, from whaling and pearling to sponge fishing. When an industry hits the skids all the enterprises in it go down, some perhaps faster and further than others. No amount of experienced executive decision making in a single company is able to arrest the process.
There is in fact no consistent relationship between high executive pay and company success. Even in a company on a downhill course, paying no dividends, executives may be paid better than in more profitable companies. Thus for years Bethlehem Steel, although paying no dividends and running at deficits, paid Eugene P. Grace as president up to $800,000 a year, a record as of 1956 in cash emoluments. Somebody, including himself, apparently wanted Mr. Grace in charge of the properties.
That the British take a somewhat jaundiced view of inordinately high executive salaries was shown recently by the case of Wilfred Harvey, sixty-seven-year-old, $750,000-a-year chairman of the British Printing Corporation. Four fellow directors forced his resignation on the ground that his salary scale was "grotesque and ridiculous. " He also had a special expense account. The annual earnings of the company were those of General Motors for a single day. So exercised did the British become that acidulous editorials were written and questions were asked in Parliament. 3
The chief executives of the big companies, in addition to directing internal affairs, also represent the company vis-a-vis the world, government, labor unions and the general public. Their role is, basically, that of politicians and diplomats. As shrewd politicians some, irrespective of the prosperity of the company, are able to make a better deal for themselves than others among the various factors of major owners, small stockholders, government officials, labor leaders, banks and customers. Some are where they are because they are married to a daughter of the chief stockholder or the daughter of the banker that holds the company's notes. They may, indeed, just be a friend of the bank, which is interested only in its notes, not in record earnings.
Henry Ford II, aged twenty-five, was not spirited out of the Navy in 1943 to become vice president of Ford Motor (executive vice president the next year) because he was considered a wizard decision maker. He had failed to graduate with his class of 1940 at Yale, couldn't make the grade. Nor, years before, was his father Edsel at age twenty-six made a vice president because of any then evident great decision-making ability. Henry Ford, when he appointed Edsel, told newspapermen it showed what a remarkable country the United States was that so young a man could achieve such a high post so early. On this score Bourbon France was a far more remarkable country, for Louis XIV became king at age five.
The Power Elite according to Mills
That the top corporation executive is a person of commanding power in his own right is part of the executive mystique and is uncritically incorporated into his theory of the power elite by C. Wright Mills, the American sociologist. As originally argued by the Italian sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, in every branch of human activity people can be given an index number on a scale. To those with the largest accumulated indices of achievements or specific qualities, in whatever category, he gave the name of elite. There is, obviously, an elite for every function and quality: barbers, violinists, scientists, bankers, seductive women, politicians.
People, too, possess powers, from zero to 100, in asserting themselves over large areas of affairs. Those able to assert their wills, thus affecting many others, perhaps even against their wills, are said to have power. And, paraphrasing Pareto, Mills said that those with the most such power are to be regarded as a Power Elite. Where Mills becomes original, or quasi-original, is in his description of what purports to be the more recent American power elite. He constantly uses the words "new" and "today," so that the situation as it stands is evidently something freshly perceived by Mills.
Although the corporate rich or big owners belong to the elite of Mills, be says their role has been reduced in phases--first by big politicians as in the New Deal and more recently by generals, admirals and corporate officials of the Warfare State. 4 The big rich are being phased out or down and are being replaced by executive types, either military or civilian. If Mills is correct, the message of these pages is somewhat passe? .
The inner core of the power elite consists, first, of those who interchange commanding roles at the top of one dominant institutional order with those in another: the admiral who is also a banker and a lawyer and who heads up an important federal commission; the corporation executive whose company was one of the two or three leading war materiel producers who is now Secretary of Defense; the wartime general who dons civilian clothes to sit on the political directorate and then becomes a member of the board of directors of a leading economic corporation. . . .
The inner core of the power elite also includes men of the higher legal and financial type from the great law factories and investment firms, who are almost professional go- betweens of economic, political and military affairs, and who thus act to unify the power elite. The corporation lawyer and the investment banker perform the functions of the "go-between" effectively and powerfully. . . .
The outermost fringes of the power elite--which change more than its core--consist of "'those who count" even though they may not be "in" on given decisions of consequence nor in their career move between the hierarchies. Each member of the power elite need not be a man who personally decides every decision that is to be ascribed to the power elite. Each member, in the decisions he does make, takes the others seriously into account. They not only make decisions in the several major areas of war and peace; they are the men who, in decisions in which they take no direct part, are taken into decisive account by those who are directly in charge.
On the fringes and below them, somewhat to the side of the lower echelons, the power elite fades off into the middle levels of power, into the rank and file of Congress, the pressure groups that are not vested in the power elite itself, as well as a multiplicity of regional and state and local interests. If all the men on the middle levels are not among those who count, they sometimes must be taken into account, handled, cajoled, broken or raised to higher circles. 5
There has in fact been accomplished a Managerial Revolution, Mills implies. Power in the United States has insensibly shifted from the owners to the managers, from property to technical function (Berle-Means, James Burnham, J. K. Galbraith). Here be echoes a long line of modem writers increasingly emboldened in what they assert. 6
According to Mills, within the new managerial grouping, power is in the flux of coalition among managers. It follows that if the Fords, Mellons, Rockefellers, Du Ponts and others still count, they count for much less than they once did. If money once talked, now it only whispers in the halls of power, hushed by the presence of the organization man.
The major new segment in the managerial group, according to Mills, consists of "the warlords," the military. Owing to the emergence of a big cold-war military
establishment and the infusion of corporations with hundreds of retired officers (who were really available because 13. 5 million men were mobilized for World War II), the military establishment has become an independent political segment, Mills contends. War and peace are dictated, not in Wall Street as socialists and populists used to claim, not in Congress and the White House as formal constitutionalists believe, not in the populace as naive democrats believe, but in the Pentagon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, professionals, have the determining voice in this matter and Rockefellers, Mellons, Du Ponts et al. must just tag along.
Although the situation as projected by Mills creates a complicated and dramatic picture, one must object to it on compelling grounds. Mills has raised what are clearly subordinate advisers and technicians into his elite of power. Many of the persons he mentions as power wielders are known, in Wall Street and Washington, as "office boys," "fat boys," court jesters and errand boys. Even by categories they do not rate. Lawyers and bankers, as such, do not rate. The point is: Whose lawyer or banker are they?
Mills's classification was purely subjective, externally applied. Most of the members of his elite are subject to the decisive will of others. They do not have a wide range of power in their own right, as do Communist leaders, but derive it. They are but the representatives of power, held in reserve by others. Yet Mills claims that "the higher agents" of the economic, political and military domains "now often have a noticeable degree of autonomy" and "that only in the often intricate ways of coalition do they make up and carry through the most important decisions. " 7 He asserts in effect that if the Pentagon says "No" to Wall Street and the White House there ensues at least an internal power crisis.
As to this, it can be shown that on "important decisions," such as the discontinuance of manned bombers as well as on other matters, the joint Chiefs have been flatly, pointedly and publicly overruled amid cries of anguish from friends of the bomber program in Congress. The present weakness of manned airpower has been dramatically shown in Vietnam, where American plane losses against a minor foe have been staggering.
A salient fact about any elite is that it is not only a classifiable entity but it really has what it is supposed to have. The elite heavyweight punchers can really outpunch other men. All the orchestral conductors in the world, in meeting duly assembled, could not vote Leonard Bernstein out of the category of elite conductors. This is because Bernstein has all the characteristics stipulated for an elite conductor. One might meaningfully say, "I don't like Bernstein's conducting"; but one could not meaningfully say, "Bernstein is not an elite conductor. "
And this is particularly so of anyone in a power elite. If someone can say of anyone in a supposed power elite, "You no longer have power," and this statement is true, did the object of the remark really have power?
But most of the members in Mills's power elite are readily removable, or may be ignored, by other members. Most of the members of Mills's power elite are indeed no more than advisers and technicians. They were hired and can be fired, hold their positions only during satisfactory conduct. This is not to say that while in office they are not powerful. But their power is derived power, not their own, not autonomous.
All of Mills's military officers, first, are subject to retirement under pre-existing rules. Moreover they can all be retired early. None of them can say, "I don't believe I shall retire just yet. " Furthermore, none of them made the rules.
Again, each can be ordered to change his command, his driving will thwarted. In a salient case President Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur of the Far Eastern command. MacArthur did not want to be relieved. But when all the chips were down, he was powerless. The same goes for the Joint Chiefs. In speaking of the autonomous power of the American military, Mills sounds as though he were speaking of the German and French officer corps of an earlier day, when a faction of landed (propertied) army families actually had deputies sitting in the legislature. The General Staff was a legislative force, could unseat ministers. The United States has no such independent politically ensconced officer corps and it is misleading to imply it. In the United States, generals (even loud talkers like Curtis E. Le May and George Patton) can be moved around like pieces on a chessboard.
Corporation officials, similarly, are retired on schedule and are always dismissible at the behest of the large blocks of stock. While they may be powerful, it is not their own power on behalf of which they speak. It is derived power.
In all of Mills's collection of power-elite people, only the big owners (the finpols) and the upper pubpols cannot be dismissed. Here and there, too, some underling is established through the dialectic of intrigue, usually in a limited way. Members of the Supreme Court are ensconced for life, collectively have ultimate power in the area of interpreting the laws; they can void statutes, can precipitate an inner nationwide power crisis (as with the school desegregation and state legislative redistricting decisions). The president has full executive power, but only for a limited term; all appointed national officials are subject to his whim. Congressmen each wield fractional power for formally limited terms. Only a very few of these in the Senate have some national stature based on inner rank or on constituencies they have attracted outside their home states. Those in office for many terms from noncompetitive electoral districts come, on the basis of deals and understandings with each other, to constitute a powerful inner directorate. In combination this directorate can easily frustrate newcomers. They are the "old boys" in the school, know where all the jam pots are hidden. They are the "power elite" in each, house. Collectively, they "run" Congress. State governors, legislators and judges are clearly second-rank figures: they may be secure, but in very limited areas.
The upper hierarchy of the Catholic Church, too, owing to its psychic hold on many voting church members, should be considered pretty much as high-ranking pubpols, between the first and second ranks. It consists of churchpols. This is the end of the power elite as far as pubpolity alone is concerned.
Two people of a type not here included who fit into Mills's conception of the power elite are Secretary of State Dean Rusk and former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, respectively derived from the Rockefeller and Ford stables. These men meet all the Millsian criteria and I wouldn't suggest that they should be regarded as ciphers. It is, however, noteworthy that each significantly changed his tune if not his entire public personality in the transition from service under President John F. Kennedy to service under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Each, indeed, changed from ostensibly reasonable and moderate men to fire-eating hawks, from cosmopolitan men to provincial men. In each case, it is obvious, their public script was supplied by the president, who held the power of dismissal over both. Each, no doubt powerful as a go- between, was powerful only as an underling.
J. William Fulbright, Richard B. Russell, John C. Stennis and others of the Senate Directorate in the interim experienced no such change of attitude. They remained implacably themselves.
There has in fact been no such phased change since 1930 as Mills and others refer to, although there have been changes--mostly in the way of more intense concentration of
wealth with some greater preemption of roles by pubpols. Pubpols and finpols have both enhanced their powers, not with respect to each other but with respect to the public. One of the hundreds of external evidences of this is the shift of the major tax burden to the lower labor force. But these changes have not been basic changes that have altered the structuring of power in the United States.
What is the case is that American society has grown very large and complex and requires a more complex hierarchy of managers and officials with delegated powers. But to ascribe autonomous, initiating power to this hierarchy, as though it or any member of it below the very top could initiate or veto policy, is to befog the picture. The decisive power is at the very top, as was shown by the futile outcry of almost the entire intellectual and academic community against President Johnson's ruinous Vietnam policy. This policy was given the endorsement of leading pubpols and of big owners and corporation officials. And this was, for those with a stomach for it, a demonstration of power.
Let us look at a few recent big decisions of history and ask ourselves what role the Millsian power elite played in them.
In 1940 the facts of atomic theory were put to President Roosevelt. It seemed possible to develop an atomic bomb, Hitler might do it. Beyond scientists (not in Mills's power elite) telling the president of the technical possibilities, what elite led to the decision to go ahead with the Manhattan Project? None, as far as the record shows. If it had proved a costly failure who, besides the president, could have been blamed?
When it came to dropping the bomb on Japan, who was consulted on the pros and cons? Only President Truman figured in the decision to do it. The dropping of the bomb, like its manufacture, came as a surprise even to the corporate press. Similarly, who joined in the decision to oust General MacArthur? Only President Truman. As the saying goes, he wasn't asking anybody, he was telling them. This is, clearly, demonstrated power.
During the Cuban missile crisis many advisory voices counseled President Kennedy: Invade Cuba, bomb it, blockade it, go to the United Nations, consult foreign governments, ignore the whole business, stick to economic blockades. Most suggestions, it is clear, were ignored. One course of action was selected--by President Kennedy.
The Bay of Pigs operation, however, appears to have been a true Millsian power-elite decision (Pentagon and CIA) which the president doubtfully accepted, with a crucial modification (withdrawal of air support) that in effect scuttled the whole thing.
When it came to committing American military power openly in Vietnam in 1965 the whole idea, as far as the record shows, arose in the mind of President Johnson, who appeared to believe he could pull off an easy coup, a grandstand play that would show him a political wizard. As far as the record shows, no combined group such as Mills talks about recommended any such action, and the president in the campaign of 1964 had explicitly opposed militant action as recommended by Barry Goldwater. Key Democrats of the inner Senate Establishment, such as, Richard B. Russell of Georgia and John C. Stennis of Mississippi (elite of the elite as far as inner political power is concerned), were opposed to the procedure. Yet the president, and the president alone, gave the fateful signal that put the United States on the course toward blundering and costly slaughter and the loss of valuable friends all around the world. The operation, indeed, put the United States on all fours with Soviet Russia in its brutal suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, stripped from the United States all pretensions to humane superiority over what is described on every hand as a sinister totalitarian power.
In all of Mills's collection of alleged power elite people only the big owners (what I have called the finpols) and the upper pubpols cannot be questioned, and they never were in question. While the big owners can be proceeded against with much hue and cry, investigated, chivvied, demagogically denounced or even fined, they cannot be knocked out short of revolutionary change; for their position is woven into the very warp and woof of the legal system. The upper pubpols can at most be gradually undermined in a series of electoral defeats. Even in defeat the pubpols often still have much power, like mortally wounded pythons.
This being ineluctably so, the situation is precisely where it was before Mills introduced his dazzling army of underlings. Necessary instruments of it, they are not members of the power elite although in the ruling class; they are its fringes, at most its dispensable advisers. Whatever power they have is by appointment unless they become big owners, which they may do by marriage, or win big elections. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Robert F. Kennedy, Edward Kennedy, W. Averell Harriman and a few others hold elite rank on both counts.
Members of the topmost elite are not answerable to anyone for what they do in the ordinary course of affairs. This condition eliminates the pubpols, who are ultimately answerable to the electorate and to peers. The pubpols, for example, must spend a good part of their time conspicuously entering and leaving churches; the finpols can take the churches or leave them alone, as they usually do. Nelson A. Rockefeller no doubt diminished his standing as a pubpol by his divorce and remarriage; he did not diminish himself a bit as a finpol. Nor did Henry Ford II diminish himself as a finpol by divorce and remarriage. He even weathered automatic excommunication from the Catholic Church, which a pubpol could not have done.
A finpol may be an alcoholic, a drug addict or a homosexual; a pubpol would hardly have those choices. A sybaritic finpol can swing elections; his checks are as good as those written by a puritan. A known sybaritic pubpol could not make it. The finpol, in short, has a surer and more generalized power base: money.
Finpols spend much of their time abroad, often maintain foreign residences--palazzos, ranches, plantations, haciendas, latifundias and even resort hotels.
Pubpols must remain close to the home soil, with an occasional junket abroad on "fact-finding" trips. They can't even be seen at Las Vegas.
Finpols, with no dilution of their essential power, can also lead la dolce vita fully orchestrated, with a full entourage of Corybantic girls. Tendencies in this direction have been moderated of late amid tightening world tensions, as a slight concession to public sensibilities. But jollification continues here and there--in Rome, Marrakech, Monaco, Rio and St. Moritz--behind closed doors.
Best of all, the finpol cannot be toppled by elections. If one party loses out he has many pubpol friends in the other party. As long as the factories are running he is right in the swim. Reforms come and go; trimming in the back committee rooms goes on forever.
As a finpol one obviously has a surer footing.
The difference with Mills on the structure of the power elite and other details mentioned earlier does not mean that his book is without merit: Mills wrote as a moralist and a political analyst rather than as a sociologist. As a sociologist he was unable to make contact with readily available data, he did not have the underlying facts. Yet Mills, despite much shuffling with ranks and cadres of underlings, always and despite everything comes around to the paramountcy of money in the situation. He is especially mordant in his final chapter, "The Higher Immorality," where he writes:
Whenever the standards of the moneyed life prevail, the man with money, no matter how he got it, will eventually be respected. A million dollars, it is said, covers a multitude of sins. It is not only that men want money; it is that their very standards are pecuniary. In a society in which the money-maker has had no serious rival for repute and honor, the word "practical" comes to mean useful for private gain, and "common sense," the sense to get ahead financially. The pursuit of the moneyed life is the commanding value, in relation to which the influence of other values has declined, so men easily become morally ruthless in the pursuit of easy money and fast estate- building.
A great deal of American corruption--although not all of it--is simply a part of the old effort to get rich and then become richer. But today the context in which the old drive must operate has changed. When both economic and political institutions were small and scattered--as in the simpler models of classical economics and Jeffersonian democracy--no man had it in his power to bestow or to receive great favors. But when political institutions and economic opportunities are at once concentrated and linked, then public office can be used for private gain. 8
The Big Money
Just as one cannot be sure how much a man is worth by ascertaining how much stock he owns directly, so one can tell little about the true compensation of a top corporation executive by ascertaining what his salary is. It is pointless to mention specific formal salaries. There was a time when a corporation executive kept all of his generous salary. But with the introduction of the graduated income tax, cash income was eroded.
The tax laws seriously undermined the objective of purchasing the loyalty of worry- free essentially pecuniary men, and ways had to be found to make up the difference. Cash bonuses would not do because these required that the corporation expend (as the laws stood up to 1964) $100,000 for every additional $10,000 that found its way into the executive's pocket.
The two thoroughly sound ways that were found to avoid this contre-temps turned out to be cut-rate stock options, a concealed untaxed gift, and lavish expense accounts. These latter have more recently been delicately trimmed, but the stock-option plan is flourishing as never before. 9
The effect of the stock-option plan on executive take-home pay, assuming a doubling in value of the stock spread annually over a decade, was as follows in one company under the law as it stood in 1961: 10
Total Cash
Compensation
$240,000
150,000
95,000
65,000
45,000
30,000
Estimated
after-Tax
Income on
Cash
$72,000
59,000
46,000
37,000
29,000
21,000
Capital Gain
after Taxes
on Options
per Year
$144,000
79,000
43,000
26,000
14,000
5,400
After-Tax Income
Plus Capital Gain
as Percentage
of Cash
Compensation
90
92
93
97
96
85
The effective yearly executive tax in this company ranged, then, from 3 to 15 per cent, or less than the rate applicable to the lowest taxed ordinary income receiver in the country. The pecuniary advantages, direct and sub rosa, of being an upper executive are obvious.
We need not detain ourselves by reviewing untaxed expense account money, applied to some extent to entertainment and diversion and otherwise simply pocketed, or to other perquisites in the way of retirement funds and investment tips handed around among insiders on the top corporate level.
Depending on the extent of the stock-option plan and the nature of the company, this new wrinkle turned out to be the new royal road to riches in some companies. In pioneering General Motors, as we have noticed, it converted a long string of successive top executives into multi-millionaires: Raskob, Sloan, Knudsen, Mott, et al.
Stock options dilute the equities of stockholders--that is, outstanding stock is insensibly reduced in book value as blocks of stock are parceled out at cut rates. Until limitations were imposed outright, stock bonuses were popular, and in these the dilution was more plainly evident. The question now is: Do the stockholders, particularly the large stockholders, know what is taking place?
Leading stockholders always know precisely what is taking place, want to whet the acquisitive appetite of eager-beaver officers. In General Motors the Du Ponts, with a 23 per cent stake, obviously knew what was going on, acquiesced in it and possibly planned it that way. In at least one case some General Motors stockholders objected and terminated a then existing plan in court. In other companies stockholders are not at first aware of what is taking place and, when some do become aware, they may go to court to have the plans struck down, as in the 1930's in American Tobacco and Bethlehem Steel among others. In those cases a largely nonowning management had set up the plans as a way of subtly obtaining enlarged ownership of the company at bargain- counter prices.
Where some of the large hereditary owners, as in IBM among others, are executives and therefore participants in a stock-option plan, they experience less dilution of equity. The equity of the stock they already hold, true enough, is diluted but the dilution is partly or wholly compensated for by the participation in the juicy options.
Executives as Nonpecuniary Men
It is evident from the various schemes of corporate executive compensation that the acquisition of property and more property appears to be the overriding goal. One so concludes upon considering the large formal salaries, stock bonuses, stock-option plans, generous expense accounts and lucrative retirement plans, without considering various fringe benefits: long vacations, medical services, college scholarships and the like. This is all, very plainly, Easy Street in the latter-day corporate era.
And yet it has been seriously suggested that corporation executives are not really interested in money and money-making. We shall come to more items in this black-is- white mythology later, but right here seems a good place to attend to the notion that executives are not interested in making money.
1. The line, echoed in many management utterances, is stated succinctly by Osborn Elliott: ". . . the top men of U. S. industry possess the kind of drive and energy that separate the winners from the also-rans. Yet strangely enough, in a society based on the profit motive, these staunchest defenders of private profits are not themselves primarily motivated by money. Many of them, it is true, quite naturally entertain a healthy regard for the six-digit pay check. For when a man steps into a top job, his pay is likely to accelerate almost to escape velocity. "
There follows a review of some of the opulent salaries, up to Eugene Grace's $800,000 in 1956.
"Yet," Elliott resumes, "the promise of money is not what keeps most top executives coming to the office every day. For one thing, high taxes make a raise almost meaningless. . . . "
We have, though, already seen how that little impediment is bypassed.
"This is certainly the way Crawford Greenewalt [of Du Pont] feels about his own pay as president of du Pont," Elliott continues. "It is a well-known fact that on Greenewalt's wedding day in 1926, his father-in-law Ire? ne? e du Pont gave him 1,000 shares of Christiana Corp. , the holding company that owns gobs of du Pont stock. By 1959, Greenewalt owned 4,096 shares of du Pont common (at $250 a share) and 687 shares of Christiana common (at $17,000), for total holdings worth $13 million. Thus Greenewalt does not exactly depend on his $300,000-odd yearly salary and bonus from du Pont to keep body and soul together.
But Greenewalt's paycheck, Elliott admits, nevertheless has at least emotional meaning to him. He would not like to work for nothing. For, Greenewalt is quoted, "Money is a symbol in the same way that a Nobel Prize is a symbol to the scientists. You can't eat a Nobel Prize. Of course, you can eat the $50,000 that goes with it, but that's not why people want to win one. " 11 So, this strange spectacle of elaborately large pay taken in various tax-skipping forms, does have a rational if recondite explanation. It is, we are assured, purely symbolic, analogous to a Nobel Prize in science. A slight difference is that the Nobel Prize usually comes only once, cannot be solicited and is for a modest $50,000. It carries with it no stock options, gifts or retirement pay that amounts to more in one year than the average worker makes in twenty to forty years.
And the recipients of the pay, we are assured, are akin to scientists, but better paid.
Lest it be thought that I dismiss the strange contention out of hand let us prayerfully consider it together. There may be some subtle point here, as in higher mathematics, which lesser mortals have difficulty in grasping. All this money is a symbolic prize apparently for rare and profound management insight exercised to keep the infinitely complex industrial system going.
Looked at coldly, the contention in the light of all surrounding circumstances is an insult to intelligence. Comparison of year-in-year-out executive pay to the Nobel Prize compounds the insult. If the money were a mere symbol it could be hung on the wall, like a diploma. As it is, it is treasured, carefully invested, locked into the strongest vaults. If a stranger gains access to it without permission, he is liable to be shot out of hand. It is, then, more than a symbol. It is the substance, the ultimate goal.
It is entirely possible, of course, for a man to say honestly that his salary of $300,000 or so means little to him (especially when 70 or 91 per cent of it is taxable) in the light of the fact that he has other large income steadily accruing to him in dividends, undistributed profits, retirement funds, prepaid life insurance and perhaps capital gains from cut-rate stock options. Anyone might feel this way about $300,000 in such circumstances. But that this disproves an interest in money is hardly tenable. Rather could it be interpreted more reasonably as showing an interest in money that has been so well satisfied that $300,000 additional before taxes is a trifle!
Still, Osborn Elliott may be exactly correct in the letter of what he says, although he is certainly errant in rendering the essence. For he said, the close reader will note, that these men are not primarily motivated by the prospect of large gain. What primarily motivates any man might be difficult to say. Most men appear to be primarily motivated by a desire to continue breathing from moment to moment. But somewhere along the way the big money-makers, after primary motivations have been served, appear to be
grasped by a very strong, compulsive, overriding motivation to gather in large sums of money by a variety of devious avenues.
Careful studies of executive inter-company mobility, based on large numbers of companies, are inconclusive in showing a clear pull of money alone in the attraction of executives. This is in part because the effect of stock options, which became pervasive only after 1950, has not been fully studied and because the effect of hidden perquisites like wide-open expense accounts cannot be measured. But even though pre-1950 data do not clearly show the pull of bigger money 12 it is agreed by observers in the field that either money or greater responsibilities and higher positions invariably associated with money are factors. 13
Business Week in 1953 found that 422 job-changing executives gave the following reasons for moving: bigger job, more responsibility, 29. 9 per cent; greater opportunity for future growth, 21. 6 per cent; increased income, 17. 8 per cent; disagreement with management policies, 16. 1 per cent; discharged, 14. 7 per cent; need for change of activity, 10. 9 per cent; all other reasons combined, 50. 9 per cent.
As Roberts points out, on the executive circuit the first two reasons are usually associated with more money, so that in this group 69. 3 per cent of the reasons given concerned money-making. The total of reasons exceeds 100 per cent because some of the men stated more than one reason. 14 "Many similar surveys have been made and, while they differ in the weight given to individual factors, they point to a complex web of motivations in which money by itself [my emphasis--F. L. ] appears to be relatively unimportant, but in which money contributes to an unknown degree to the attractiveness of non-financial factors. " 15
All that this indicates, after tracing through the fine print, is that a salable executive will not ordinarily stay in a well-paid job if he is seriously humiliated, mistreated or frustrated and will not seek a better-paying job if it doesn't offer him at least as much security of treatment and status. But none of it suggests that executives are not attracted by better money offers. A man paid $100,000 net by Du Pont might not respond to an offer of $200,000 from Podunk Arms but, unless he saw better things in sight for him at Du Pont, he would almost certainly examine carefully an offer of $200,000 net from Allied Chemical or Union Carbide. He would, as everyone recognizes, owe it to his wife, his children, his mother, his pastor, his Alma Mater and the family dog to do at least this much.
If executives were not drawn by better money offers, despite all labored statistical analyses, such offers would not be made (and often accepted) as they commonly are. The fact that all the offers are not accepted shows the weight of the old maxim: Money isn't everything.
Yet the asserted disinterest of the high executive in money, attested to by Greenewalt of Du Pont, has achieved high academic certification, as have many other strange notions relating to wealth in the United States. Professor Daniel Bell, Columbia University sociologist, thus assures us that the new corporate men "were a special breed, often engineers, whose self-conscious task was to build a new economic form, and whose rewards were not primarily [there it is again--F. L. ] money--few accumulated the large fortunes made by a Carnegie, a Rockefeller, a Harriman, or a Ford--but status achievements and, ultimately, some independent power of their own. Thus T. N. Vail, who created American Telephone and Telegraph, Elbert Gary, who became the public relations face of U. S. Steel ('He never saw a blast furnace until he died,' said Ben Stolberg once, bitterly), Alfred P. Sloan, who fashioned the decentralized structure of General Motors, Gerard Swope, who held together General Electric, Walter Teagle,
who rationalized Standard Oil" are representatives of a new social upward mobility. 16 And this last may be true.
The big corporation man here stands forth as a status achiever, not primarily interested in money. (It has never been established, one should notice, that Carnegie, Rockefeller, Harriman, Ford or any of the progenitor moguls were primarily interested in money. For my part, I should say they were not. )
All these men--Vail, Gary, Sloan, Swope and Teagle--were agents. Behind Vail, Gary and Swope stood J. P. Morgan and Company. Behind Sloan was the Du Pont family and behind Teagle were the Rockefellers.
The only one of these to amass a very considerable fortune, thanks to stock options and a preternaturally skyrocketing large industry, was Sloan.
Professor Bell's thesis here is that family capitalism, once dominant, is breaking up, making way for the New Men of power, the new managers, who are very much akin to the members of Mills's power elite, although Bell has many well-taken critical reservations about Mills. Like Mills, he believes in the managerial revolution, in new coalitions of men not primarily interested in money (except as collectors) but interested in status, achievement and play with power. The power of the "ruling class" has been dissolved. Everything is in flux. 17
That the concrete evidence shows this has not happened--at least not yet--the reader is now well aware.
What I suggest is that the big executives, the new men, are interested in money, perhaps not primarily but prominently. I deny that ultimate power either in a company or nationally lies with the executives, unless they are also big owners.
I don't by any means suggest that the big executives are straw men, water boys. They would be of slight use to the powers-that-be if they were. Considering what little is expected of them by their superiors they are perfectly capable. They just do not call the shots, either singly or in coalition. Their role is advisory. If, creatively, they develop large plans, these plans are subject to approval--in politics by the president and the congressional Establishment (with the concurrence of the Supreme Court) and in industry-finance by the big and few stockholders (not by the twenty million shareholders of the Stock Exchanges "People's Capitalism").
To show that what I assert is not so, all anybody has to do is to cite a single case wherein a single executive or coalition of executives, lawyers, military men or others carried out any project whatever in government against the will of the president and Congress, and in industry-finance against the will of the big owners either directly present or always ready to step in. Berle in The Modern Corporation and Private Property shows a string of big companies under management control by one legal device or other, but a few years later the managers, who were often big owners elsewhere in the economy, were knocked out by legislation and most of the companies were also knocked out of existence, especially in public utilities,
All this is so even though, as I am aware, there are cases of big owners who haven't the foggiest notion about anything until they consult the president of their company and their lawyer. They are completely dependent for guidance upon these far more knowledgeable men, who exercise power by proxy. In the circles of power, too, everybody knows for whom they speak. But I see no validity in looking upon such representatives of absentee power as "new men" of power. To me they look like old- fashioned agents, overseers, by no means to be disparaged. At the same time, they should not be enthroned--at least, not until after a coronation.
Social Origins of Executives
The origins and backgrounds of big business leaders have been studied under the most refined academic auspices and their careers statistically traced with fine-caliper methodology. 18 We may profitably take note of some of the findings.
Of the large sample studied for a period of twenty-five years, 52 per cent had fathers in business and 22 per cent had fathers in professions or white-collar work. Only 9 per cent had sires who were farmers, and 15 per cent laborers.
The fathers of 8 per cent were owners of large businesses, of 15 per cent were major executives, of 18 per cent were owners of small businesses, of 8 per cent were minor executives and of 3 per cent were foremen. 19
This finding was widely at variance with the distribution of occupations in the population as of 1920, when 47 per cent of all adult males were classified as laborers. If big business leaders had been 47 per cent the sons of laborers, the mobility rate for laborers would be 100. As it was it was only 16, while that of sons of farmers was only 40. The upward mobility rate for the sons of owners of small business was 360, of sons of professional men 350 and of sons of foremen was 133.
Most significantly, the upward mobility rate of men whose fathers were business executives or owners of large business was 775, nearly eight times the statistical projection. The sons obviously either had friends at court or got proper coaching.
As the University of Chicago sociologist W. Lloyd Warner sees it, the "royal road" to high executive success was higher education. Whereas in 1928 only somewhat more than 30 per cent of big business leaders had a college education, by 1952 the quota was nearly 60 per cent. In 1928 only 15 per cent had some college study but by 1952 20 per cent had at least been to college. 20 Of 505 business leaders as of 1952 as many as 216 went to only 14 different colleges, and these same 14 colleges were mentioned 87 times as the ones attended secondarily, either for graduate work or in transfer. Yale, Harvard, Princeton and Cornell were named most often, with Harvard as the dominant choice for graduate work. 21 Very nearly a third went to Harvard and Yale as undergraduates or graduates.
In no fewer than 62 cases the men went to a second "select" group of 10 colleges, of which Northwestern, Pennsylvania State, Stanford, Wisconsin and Western Reserve were tied for first place. 22
"Education has become the royal road to positions of power and prestige in American business and industry," says Warner. "That this royal road is open to all men is given ample testimony by the large number of educated men from the bottom social layers who appear in our sample. " 23
That this royal road, so optimistically saluted, may not in fact be such is suggested by the continuing merger movement and the steady progress of computer analysis. Decision making, whatever its role in the past, is inevitably being narrowed in scope by the increasing refinement and elaboration of computers; live decision makers, whatever their role in the past, are becoming increasingly dispensable. Furthermore, the merger movement is continually reducing the number of top executive posts. Every merger, while it does not necessarily reduce the total of vice presidents and executive vice presidents, does reduce the number of chairmen and presidents. If all companies were combined into a single company there would be places for only one chairman and one president, and at most twenty-five members of the board.
That education is not the true gateway to the "royal road" is shown by the concentration of elite schools, long the special wards of the propertied. These schools,
eclipsing others, produced most executives because they were most patronized by the upper classes. In view of the fact that sons of members of the business elite, owners or big executives, were disproportionately represented and showed the highest index of upward corporate mobility, it would appear that belonging to the business in-group and the socially related professional group was a more significant factor than level or place of schooling in obtaining big-business position. Sons of owners, executives and professionals as a matter of course are more likely to go on to college, particularly to elite colleges, and after that into the higher executive posts. True, as Warner shows, men of lower social origins can and do make the grade, but in far lesser proportion than the incidence of low social origin in the population. Otherwise put, those who are already in at the beginning are more likely to be in at the final reckoning.
The typical business leader of the 1950's was 54 years old, had been with his firm 24 years, achieved his high position 24 years after entering business and had held his job for almost 7 years. Most men began business between age 21 and 22, freely shifted jobs and companies until about 29 years old when they joined their permanent firms.
It is part of the corporation mystique that the corporation executive is inherently a powerful person--that he freely and autonomously extemporizes. But if such ability
were either extensive or crucial it would be easy to shift top officials out of industries where the average net return on capital was high, such as automobiles, cosmetics or pharmaceuticals, into industries where it was low, such as coal, railroads or steamships. The wizard decision makers would then be able to make decisions that would move the lagging enterprise far above the traditional rate of return for the industry.
This is not done. Executives are not attracted from booming industries to lagging ones, from whaling and pearling to sponge fishing. When an industry hits the skids all the enterprises in it go down, some perhaps faster and further than others. No amount of experienced executive decision making in a single company is able to arrest the process.
There is in fact no consistent relationship between high executive pay and company success. Even in a company on a downhill course, paying no dividends, executives may be paid better than in more profitable companies. Thus for years Bethlehem Steel, although paying no dividends and running at deficits, paid Eugene P. Grace as president up to $800,000 a year, a record as of 1956 in cash emoluments. Somebody, including himself, apparently wanted Mr. Grace in charge of the properties.
That the British take a somewhat jaundiced view of inordinately high executive salaries was shown recently by the case of Wilfred Harvey, sixty-seven-year-old, $750,000-a-year chairman of the British Printing Corporation. Four fellow directors forced his resignation on the ground that his salary scale was "grotesque and ridiculous. " He also had a special expense account. The annual earnings of the company were those of General Motors for a single day. So exercised did the British become that acidulous editorials were written and questions were asked in Parliament. 3
The chief executives of the big companies, in addition to directing internal affairs, also represent the company vis-a-vis the world, government, labor unions and the general public. Their role is, basically, that of politicians and diplomats. As shrewd politicians some, irrespective of the prosperity of the company, are able to make a better deal for themselves than others among the various factors of major owners, small stockholders, government officials, labor leaders, banks and customers. Some are where they are because they are married to a daughter of the chief stockholder or the daughter of the banker that holds the company's notes. They may, indeed, just be a friend of the bank, which is interested only in its notes, not in record earnings.
Henry Ford II, aged twenty-five, was not spirited out of the Navy in 1943 to become vice president of Ford Motor (executive vice president the next year) because he was considered a wizard decision maker. He had failed to graduate with his class of 1940 at Yale, couldn't make the grade. Nor, years before, was his father Edsel at age twenty-six made a vice president because of any then evident great decision-making ability. Henry Ford, when he appointed Edsel, told newspapermen it showed what a remarkable country the United States was that so young a man could achieve such a high post so early. On this score Bourbon France was a far more remarkable country, for Louis XIV became king at age five.
The Power Elite according to Mills
That the top corporation executive is a person of commanding power in his own right is part of the executive mystique and is uncritically incorporated into his theory of the power elite by C. Wright Mills, the American sociologist. As originally argued by the Italian sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, in every branch of human activity people can be given an index number on a scale. To those with the largest accumulated indices of achievements or specific qualities, in whatever category, he gave the name of elite. There is, obviously, an elite for every function and quality: barbers, violinists, scientists, bankers, seductive women, politicians.
People, too, possess powers, from zero to 100, in asserting themselves over large areas of affairs. Those able to assert their wills, thus affecting many others, perhaps even against their wills, are said to have power. And, paraphrasing Pareto, Mills said that those with the most such power are to be regarded as a Power Elite. Where Mills becomes original, or quasi-original, is in his description of what purports to be the more recent American power elite. He constantly uses the words "new" and "today," so that the situation as it stands is evidently something freshly perceived by Mills.
Although the corporate rich or big owners belong to the elite of Mills, be says their role has been reduced in phases--first by big politicians as in the New Deal and more recently by generals, admirals and corporate officials of the Warfare State. 4 The big rich are being phased out or down and are being replaced by executive types, either military or civilian. If Mills is correct, the message of these pages is somewhat passe? .
The inner core of the power elite consists, first, of those who interchange commanding roles at the top of one dominant institutional order with those in another: the admiral who is also a banker and a lawyer and who heads up an important federal commission; the corporation executive whose company was one of the two or three leading war materiel producers who is now Secretary of Defense; the wartime general who dons civilian clothes to sit on the political directorate and then becomes a member of the board of directors of a leading economic corporation. . . .
The inner core of the power elite also includes men of the higher legal and financial type from the great law factories and investment firms, who are almost professional go- betweens of economic, political and military affairs, and who thus act to unify the power elite. The corporation lawyer and the investment banker perform the functions of the "go-between" effectively and powerfully. . . .
The outermost fringes of the power elite--which change more than its core--consist of "'those who count" even though they may not be "in" on given decisions of consequence nor in their career move between the hierarchies. Each member of the power elite need not be a man who personally decides every decision that is to be ascribed to the power elite. Each member, in the decisions he does make, takes the others seriously into account. They not only make decisions in the several major areas of war and peace; they are the men who, in decisions in which they take no direct part, are taken into decisive account by those who are directly in charge.
On the fringes and below them, somewhat to the side of the lower echelons, the power elite fades off into the middle levels of power, into the rank and file of Congress, the pressure groups that are not vested in the power elite itself, as well as a multiplicity of regional and state and local interests. If all the men on the middle levels are not among those who count, they sometimes must be taken into account, handled, cajoled, broken or raised to higher circles. 5
There has in fact been accomplished a Managerial Revolution, Mills implies. Power in the United States has insensibly shifted from the owners to the managers, from property to technical function (Berle-Means, James Burnham, J. K. Galbraith). Here be echoes a long line of modem writers increasingly emboldened in what they assert. 6
According to Mills, within the new managerial grouping, power is in the flux of coalition among managers. It follows that if the Fords, Mellons, Rockefellers, Du Ponts and others still count, they count for much less than they once did. If money once talked, now it only whispers in the halls of power, hushed by the presence of the organization man.
The major new segment in the managerial group, according to Mills, consists of "the warlords," the military. Owing to the emergence of a big cold-war military
establishment and the infusion of corporations with hundreds of retired officers (who were really available because 13. 5 million men were mobilized for World War II), the military establishment has become an independent political segment, Mills contends. War and peace are dictated, not in Wall Street as socialists and populists used to claim, not in Congress and the White House as formal constitutionalists believe, not in the populace as naive democrats believe, but in the Pentagon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, professionals, have the determining voice in this matter and Rockefellers, Mellons, Du Ponts et al. must just tag along.
Although the situation as projected by Mills creates a complicated and dramatic picture, one must object to it on compelling grounds. Mills has raised what are clearly subordinate advisers and technicians into his elite of power. Many of the persons he mentions as power wielders are known, in Wall Street and Washington, as "office boys," "fat boys," court jesters and errand boys. Even by categories they do not rate. Lawyers and bankers, as such, do not rate. The point is: Whose lawyer or banker are they?
Mills's classification was purely subjective, externally applied. Most of the members of his elite are subject to the decisive will of others. They do not have a wide range of power in their own right, as do Communist leaders, but derive it. They are but the representatives of power, held in reserve by others. Yet Mills claims that "the higher agents" of the economic, political and military domains "now often have a noticeable degree of autonomy" and "that only in the often intricate ways of coalition do they make up and carry through the most important decisions. " 7 He asserts in effect that if the Pentagon says "No" to Wall Street and the White House there ensues at least an internal power crisis.
As to this, it can be shown that on "important decisions," such as the discontinuance of manned bombers as well as on other matters, the joint Chiefs have been flatly, pointedly and publicly overruled amid cries of anguish from friends of the bomber program in Congress. The present weakness of manned airpower has been dramatically shown in Vietnam, where American plane losses against a minor foe have been staggering.
A salient fact about any elite is that it is not only a classifiable entity but it really has what it is supposed to have. The elite heavyweight punchers can really outpunch other men. All the orchestral conductors in the world, in meeting duly assembled, could not vote Leonard Bernstein out of the category of elite conductors. This is because Bernstein has all the characteristics stipulated for an elite conductor. One might meaningfully say, "I don't like Bernstein's conducting"; but one could not meaningfully say, "Bernstein is not an elite conductor. "
And this is particularly so of anyone in a power elite. If someone can say of anyone in a supposed power elite, "You no longer have power," and this statement is true, did the object of the remark really have power?
But most of the members in Mills's power elite are readily removable, or may be ignored, by other members. Most of the members of Mills's power elite are indeed no more than advisers and technicians. They were hired and can be fired, hold their positions only during satisfactory conduct. This is not to say that while in office they are not powerful. But their power is derived power, not their own, not autonomous.
All of Mills's military officers, first, are subject to retirement under pre-existing rules. Moreover they can all be retired early. None of them can say, "I don't believe I shall retire just yet. " Furthermore, none of them made the rules.
Again, each can be ordered to change his command, his driving will thwarted. In a salient case President Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur of the Far Eastern command. MacArthur did not want to be relieved. But when all the chips were down, he was powerless. The same goes for the Joint Chiefs. In speaking of the autonomous power of the American military, Mills sounds as though he were speaking of the German and French officer corps of an earlier day, when a faction of landed (propertied) army families actually had deputies sitting in the legislature. The General Staff was a legislative force, could unseat ministers. The United States has no such independent politically ensconced officer corps and it is misleading to imply it. In the United States, generals (even loud talkers like Curtis E. Le May and George Patton) can be moved around like pieces on a chessboard.
Corporation officials, similarly, are retired on schedule and are always dismissible at the behest of the large blocks of stock. While they may be powerful, it is not their own power on behalf of which they speak. It is derived power.
In all of Mills's collection of power-elite people, only the big owners (the finpols) and the upper pubpols cannot be dismissed. Here and there, too, some underling is established through the dialectic of intrigue, usually in a limited way. Members of the Supreme Court are ensconced for life, collectively have ultimate power in the area of interpreting the laws; they can void statutes, can precipitate an inner nationwide power crisis (as with the school desegregation and state legislative redistricting decisions). The president has full executive power, but only for a limited term; all appointed national officials are subject to his whim. Congressmen each wield fractional power for formally limited terms. Only a very few of these in the Senate have some national stature based on inner rank or on constituencies they have attracted outside their home states. Those in office for many terms from noncompetitive electoral districts come, on the basis of deals and understandings with each other, to constitute a powerful inner directorate. In combination this directorate can easily frustrate newcomers. They are the "old boys" in the school, know where all the jam pots are hidden. They are the "power elite" in each, house. Collectively, they "run" Congress. State governors, legislators and judges are clearly second-rank figures: they may be secure, but in very limited areas.
The upper hierarchy of the Catholic Church, too, owing to its psychic hold on many voting church members, should be considered pretty much as high-ranking pubpols, between the first and second ranks. It consists of churchpols. This is the end of the power elite as far as pubpolity alone is concerned.
Two people of a type not here included who fit into Mills's conception of the power elite are Secretary of State Dean Rusk and former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, respectively derived from the Rockefeller and Ford stables. These men meet all the Millsian criteria and I wouldn't suggest that they should be regarded as ciphers. It is, however, noteworthy that each significantly changed his tune if not his entire public personality in the transition from service under President John F. Kennedy to service under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Each, indeed, changed from ostensibly reasonable and moderate men to fire-eating hawks, from cosmopolitan men to provincial men. In each case, it is obvious, their public script was supplied by the president, who held the power of dismissal over both. Each, no doubt powerful as a go- between, was powerful only as an underling.
J. William Fulbright, Richard B. Russell, John C. Stennis and others of the Senate Directorate in the interim experienced no such change of attitude. They remained implacably themselves.
There has in fact been no such phased change since 1930 as Mills and others refer to, although there have been changes--mostly in the way of more intense concentration of
wealth with some greater preemption of roles by pubpols. Pubpols and finpols have both enhanced their powers, not with respect to each other but with respect to the public. One of the hundreds of external evidences of this is the shift of the major tax burden to the lower labor force. But these changes have not been basic changes that have altered the structuring of power in the United States.
What is the case is that American society has grown very large and complex and requires a more complex hierarchy of managers and officials with delegated powers. But to ascribe autonomous, initiating power to this hierarchy, as though it or any member of it below the very top could initiate or veto policy, is to befog the picture. The decisive power is at the very top, as was shown by the futile outcry of almost the entire intellectual and academic community against President Johnson's ruinous Vietnam policy. This policy was given the endorsement of leading pubpols and of big owners and corporation officials. And this was, for those with a stomach for it, a demonstration of power.
Let us look at a few recent big decisions of history and ask ourselves what role the Millsian power elite played in them.
In 1940 the facts of atomic theory were put to President Roosevelt. It seemed possible to develop an atomic bomb, Hitler might do it. Beyond scientists (not in Mills's power elite) telling the president of the technical possibilities, what elite led to the decision to go ahead with the Manhattan Project? None, as far as the record shows. If it had proved a costly failure who, besides the president, could have been blamed?
When it came to dropping the bomb on Japan, who was consulted on the pros and cons? Only President Truman figured in the decision to do it. The dropping of the bomb, like its manufacture, came as a surprise even to the corporate press. Similarly, who joined in the decision to oust General MacArthur? Only President Truman. As the saying goes, he wasn't asking anybody, he was telling them. This is, clearly, demonstrated power.
During the Cuban missile crisis many advisory voices counseled President Kennedy: Invade Cuba, bomb it, blockade it, go to the United Nations, consult foreign governments, ignore the whole business, stick to economic blockades. Most suggestions, it is clear, were ignored. One course of action was selected--by President Kennedy.
The Bay of Pigs operation, however, appears to have been a true Millsian power-elite decision (Pentagon and CIA) which the president doubtfully accepted, with a crucial modification (withdrawal of air support) that in effect scuttled the whole thing.
When it came to committing American military power openly in Vietnam in 1965 the whole idea, as far as the record shows, arose in the mind of President Johnson, who appeared to believe he could pull off an easy coup, a grandstand play that would show him a political wizard. As far as the record shows, no combined group such as Mills talks about recommended any such action, and the president in the campaign of 1964 had explicitly opposed militant action as recommended by Barry Goldwater. Key Democrats of the inner Senate Establishment, such as, Richard B. Russell of Georgia and John C. Stennis of Mississippi (elite of the elite as far as inner political power is concerned), were opposed to the procedure. Yet the president, and the president alone, gave the fateful signal that put the United States on the course toward blundering and costly slaughter and the loss of valuable friends all around the world. The operation, indeed, put the United States on all fours with Soviet Russia in its brutal suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, stripped from the United States all pretensions to humane superiority over what is described on every hand as a sinister totalitarian power.
In all of Mills's collection of alleged power elite people only the big owners (what I have called the finpols) and the upper pubpols cannot be questioned, and they never were in question. While the big owners can be proceeded against with much hue and cry, investigated, chivvied, demagogically denounced or even fined, they cannot be knocked out short of revolutionary change; for their position is woven into the very warp and woof of the legal system. The upper pubpols can at most be gradually undermined in a series of electoral defeats. Even in defeat the pubpols often still have much power, like mortally wounded pythons.
This being ineluctably so, the situation is precisely where it was before Mills introduced his dazzling army of underlings. Necessary instruments of it, they are not members of the power elite although in the ruling class; they are its fringes, at most its dispensable advisers. Whatever power they have is by appointment unless they become big owners, which they may do by marriage, or win big elections. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Robert F. Kennedy, Edward Kennedy, W. Averell Harriman and a few others hold elite rank on both counts.
Members of the topmost elite are not answerable to anyone for what they do in the ordinary course of affairs. This condition eliminates the pubpols, who are ultimately answerable to the electorate and to peers. The pubpols, for example, must spend a good part of their time conspicuously entering and leaving churches; the finpols can take the churches or leave them alone, as they usually do. Nelson A. Rockefeller no doubt diminished his standing as a pubpol by his divorce and remarriage; he did not diminish himself a bit as a finpol. Nor did Henry Ford II diminish himself as a finpol by divorce and remarriage. He even weathered automatic excommunication from the Catholic Church, which a pubpol could not have done.
A finpol may be an alcoholic, a drug addict or a homosexual; a pubpol would hardly have those choices. A sybaritic finpol can swing elections; his checks are as good as those written by a puritan. A known sybaritic pubpol could not make it. The finpol, in short, has a surer and more generalized power base: money.
Finpols spend much of their time abroad, often maintain foreign residences--palazzos, ranches, plantations, haciendas, latifundias and even resort hotels.
Pubpols must remain close to the home soil, with an occasional junket abroad on "fact-finding" trips. They can't even be seen at Las Vegas.
Finpols, with no dilution of their essential power, can also lead la dolce vita fully orchestrated, with a full entourage of Corybantic girls. Tendencies in this direction have been moderated of late amid tightening world tensions, as a slight concession to public sensibilities. But jollification continues here and there--in Rome, Marrakech, Monaco, Rio and St. Moritz--behind closed doors.
Best of all, the finpol cannot be toppled by elections. If one party loses out he has many pubpol friends in the other party. As long as the factories are running he is right in the swim. Reforms come and go; trimming in the back committee rooms goes on forever.
As a finpol one obviously has a surer footing.
The difference with Mills on the structure of the power elite and other details mentioned earlier does not mean that his book is without merit: Mills wrote as a moralist and a political analyst rather than as a sociologist. As a sociologist he was unable to make contact with readily available data, he did not have the underlying facts. Yet Mills, despite much shuffling with ranks and cadres of underlings, always and despite everything comes around to the paramountcy of money in the situation. He is especially mordant in his final chapter, "The Higher Immorality," where he writes:
Whenever the standards of the moneyed life prevail, the man with money, no matter how he got it, will eventually be respected. A million dollars, it is said, covers a multitude of sins. It is not only that men want money; it is that their very standards are pecuniary. In a society in which the money-maker has had no serious rival for repute and honor, the word "practical" comes to mean useful for private gain, and "common sense," the sense to get ahead financially. The pursuit of the moneyed life is the commanding value, in relation to which the influence of other values has declined, so men easily become morally ruthless in the pursuit of easy money and fast estate- building.
A great deal of American corruption--although not all of it--is simply a part of the old effort to get rich and then become richer. But today the context in which the old drive must operate has changed. When both economic and political institutions were small and scattered--as in the simpler models of classical economics and Jeffersonian democracy--no man had it in his power to bestow or to receive great favors. But when political institutions and economic opportunities are at once concentrated and linked, then public office can be used for private gain. 8
The Big Money
Just as one cannot be sure how much a man is worth by ascertaining how much stock he owns directly, so one can tell little about the true compensation of a top corporation executive by ascertaining what his salary is. It is pointless to mention specific formal salaries. There was a time when a corporation executive kept all of his generous salary. But with the introduction of the graduated income tax, cash income was eroded.
The tax laws seriously undermined the objective of purchasing the loyalty of worry- free essentially pecuniary men, and ways had to be found to make up the difference. Cash bonuses would not do because these required that the corporation expend (as the laws stood up to 1964) $100,000 for every additional $10,000 that found its way into the executive's pocket.
The two thoroughly sound ways that were found to avoid this contre-temps turned out to be cut-rate stock options, a concealed untaxed gift, and lavish expense accounts. These latter have more recently been delicately trimmed, but the stock-option plan is flourishing as never before. 9
The effect of the stock-option plan on executive take-home pay, assuming a doubling in value of the stock spread annually over a decade, was as follows in one company under the law as it stood in 1961: 10
Total Cash
Compensation
$240,000
150,000
95,000
65,000
45,000
30,000
Estimated
after-Tax
Income on
Cash
$72,000
59,000
46,000
37,000
29,000
21,000
Capital Gain
after Taxes
on Options
per Year
$144,000
79,000
43,000
26,000
14,000
5,400
After-Tax Income
Plus Capital Gain
as Percentage
of Cash
Compensation
90
92
93
97
96
85
The effective yearly executive tax in this company ranged, then, from 3 to 15 per cent, or less than the rate applicable to the lowest taxed ordinary income receiver in the country. The pecuniary advantages, direct and sub rosa, of being an upper executive are obvious.
We need not detain ourselves by reviewing untaxed expense account money, applied to some extent to entertainment and diversion and otherwise simply pocketed, or to other perquisites in the way of retirement funds and investment tips handed around among insiders on the top corporate level.
Depending on the extent of the stock-option plan and the nature of the company, this new wrinkle turned out to be the new royal road to riches in some companies. In pioneering General Motors, as we have noticed, it converted a long string of successive top executives into multi-millionaires: Raskob, Sloan, Knudsen, Mott, et al.
Stock options dilute the equities of stockholders--that is, outstanding stock is insensibly reduced in book value as blocks of stock are parceled out at cut rates. Until limitations were imposed outright, stock bonuses were popular, and in these the dilution was more plainly evident. The question now is: Do the stockholders, particularly the large stockholders, know what is taking place?
Leading stockholders always know precisely what is taking place, want to whet the acquisitive appetite of eager-beaver officers. In General Motors the Du Ponts, with a 23 per cent stake, obviously knew what was going on, acquiesced in it and possibly planned it that way. In at least one case some General Motors stockholders objected and terminated a then existing plan in court. In other companies stockholders are not at first aware of what is taking place and, when some do become aware, they may go to court to have the plans struck down, as in the 1930's in American Tobacco and Bethlehem Steel among others. In those cases a largely nonowning management had set up the plans as a way of subtly obtaining enlarged ownership of the company at bargain- counter prices.
Where some of the large hereditary owners, as in IBM among others, are executives and therefore participants in a stock-option plan, they experience less dilution of equity. The equity of the stock they already hold, true enough, is diluted but the dilution is partly or wholly compensated for by the participation in the juicy options.
Executives as Nonpecuniary Men
It is evident from the various schemes of corporate executive compensation that the acquisition of property and more property appears to be the overriding goal. One so concludes upon considering the large formal salaries, stock bonuses, stock-option plans, generous expense accounts and lucrative retirement plans, without considering various fringe benefits: long vacations, medical services, college scholarships and the like. This is all, very plainly, Easy Street in the latter-day corporate era.
And yet it has been seriously suggested that corporation executives are not really interested in money and money-making. We shall come to more items in this black-is- white mythology later, but right here seems a good place to attend to the notion that executives are not interested in making money.
1. The line, echoed in many management utterances, is stated succinctly by Osborn Elliott: ". . . the top men of U. S. industry possess the kind of drive and energy that separate the winners from the also-rans. Yet strangely enough, in a society based on the profit motive, these staunchest defenders of private profits are not themselves primarily motivated by money. Many of them, it is true, quite naturally entertain a healthy regard for the six-digit pay check. For when a man steps into a top job, his pay is likely to accelerate almost to escape velocity. "
There follows a review of some of the opulent salaries, up to Eugene Grace's $800,000 in 1956.
"Yet," Elliott resumes, "the promise of money is not what keeps most top executives coming to the office every day. For one thing, high taxes make a raise almost meaningless. . . . "
We have, though, already seen how that little impediment is bypassed.
"This is certainly the way Crawford Greenewalt [of Du Pont] feels about his own pay as president of du Pont," Elliott continues. "It is a well-known fact that on Greenewalt's wedding day in 1926, his father-in-law Ire? ne? e du Pont gave him 1,000 shares of Christiana Corp. , the holding company that owns gobs of du Pont stock. By 1959, Greenewalt owned 4,096 shares of du Pont common (at $250 a share) and 687 shares of Christiana common (at $17,000), for total holdings worth $13 million. Thus Greenewalt does not exactly depend on his $300,000-odd yearly salary and bonus from du Pont to keep body and soul together.
But Greenewalt's paycheck, Elliott admits, nevertheless has at least emotional meaning to him. He would not like to work for nothing. For, Greenewalt is quoted, "Money is a symbol in the same way that a Nobel Prize is a symbol to the scientists. You can't eat a Nobel Prize. Of course, you can eat the $50,000 that goes with it, but that's not why people want to win one. " 11 So, this strange spectacle of elaborately large pay taken in various tax-skipping forms, does have a rational if recondite explanation. It is, we are assured, purely symbolic, analogous to a Nobel Prize in science. A slight difference is that the Nobel Prize usually comes only once, cannot be solicited and is for a modest $50,000. It carries with it no stock options, gifts or retirement pay that amounts to more in one year than the average worker makes in twenty to forty years.
And the recipients of the pay, we are assured, are akin to scientists, but better paid.
Lest it be thought that I dismiss the strange contention out of hand let us prayerfully consider it together. There may be some subtle point here, as in higher mathematics, which lesser mortals have difficulty in grasping. All this money is a symbolic prize apparently for rare and profound management insight exercised to keep the infinitely complex industrial system going.
Looked at coldly, the contention in the light of all surrounding circumstances is an insult to intelligence. Comparison of year-in-year-out executive pay to the Nobel Prize compounds the insult. If the money were a mere symbol it could be hung on the wall, like a diploma. As it is, it is treasured, carefully invested, locked into the strongest vaults. If a stranger gains access to it without permission, he is liable to be shot out of hand. It is, then, more than a symbol. It is the substance, the ultimate goal.
It is entirely possible, of course, for a man to say honestly that his salary of $300,000 or so means little to him (especially when 70 or 91 per cent of it is taxable) in the light of the fact that he has other large income steadily accruing to him in dividends, undistributed profits, retirement funds, prepaid life insurance and perhaps capital gains from cut-rate stock options. Anyone might feel this way about $300,000 in such circumstances. But that this disproves an interest in money is hardly tenable. Rather could it be interpreted more reasonably as showing an interest in money that has been so well satisfied that $300,000 additional before taxes is a trifle!
Still, Osborn Elliott may be exactly correct in the letter of what he says, although he is certainly errant in rendering the essence. For he said, the close reader will note, that these men are not primarily motivated by the prospect of large gain. What primarily motivates any man might be difficult to say. Most men appear to be primarily motivated by a desire to continue breathing from moment to moment. But somewhere along the way the big money-makers, after primary motivations have been served, appear to be
grasped by a very strong, compulsive, overriding motivation to gather in large sums of money by a variety of devious avenues.
Careful studies of executive inter-company mobility, based on large numbers of companies, are inconclusive in showing a clear pull of money alone in the attraction of executives. This is in part because the effect of stock options, which became pervasive only after 1950, has not been fully studied and because the effect of hidden perquisites like wide-open expense accounts cannot be measured. But even though pre-1950 data do not clearly show the pull of bigger money 12 it is agreed by observers in the field that either money or greater responsibilities and higher positions invariably associated with money are factors. 13
Business Week in 1953 found that 422 job-changing executives gave the following reasons for moving: bigger job, more responsibility, 29. 9 per cent; greater opportunity for future growth, 21. 6 per cent; increased income, 17. 8 per cent; disagreement with management policies, 16. 1 per cent; discharged, 14. 7 per cent; need for change of activity, 10. 9 per cent; all other reasons combined, 50. 9 per cent.
As Roberts points out, on the executive circuit the first two reasons are usually associated with more money, so that in this group 69. 3 per cent of the reasons given concerned money-making. The total of reasons exceeds 100 per cent because some of the men stated more than one reason. 14 "Many similar surveys have been made and, while they differ in the weight given to individual factors, they point to a complex web of motivations in which money by itself [my emphasis--F. L. ] appears to be relatively unimportant, but in which money contributes to an unknown degree to the attractiveness of non-financial factors. " 15
All that this indicates, after tracing through the fine print, is that a salable executive will not ordinarily stay in a well-paid job if he is seriously humiliated, mistreated or frustrated and will not seek a better-paying job if it doesn't offer him at least as much security of treatment and status. But none of it suggests that executives are not attracted by better money offers. A man paid $100,000 net by Du Pont might not respond to an offer of $200,000 from Podunk Arms but, unless he saw better things in sight for him at Du Pont, he would almost certainly examine carefully an offer of $200,000 net from Allied Chemical or Union Carbide. He would, as everyone recognizes, owe it to his wife, his children, his mother, his pastor, his Alma Mater and the family dog to do at least this much.
If executives were not drawn by better money offers, despite all labored statistical analyses, such offers would not be made (and often accepted) as they commonly are. The fact that all the offers are not accepted shows the weight of the old maxim: Money isn't everything.
Yet the asserted disinterest of the high executive in money, attested to by Greenewalt of Du Pont, has achieved high academic certification, as have many other strange notions relating to wealth in the United States. Professor Daniel Bell, Columbia University sociologist, thus assures us that the new corporate men "were a special breed, often engineers, whose self-conscious task was to build a new economic form, and whose rewards were not primarily [there it is again--F. L. ] money--few accumulated the large fortunes made by a Carnegie, a Rockefeller, a Harriman, or a Ford--but status achievements and, ultimately, some independent power of their own. Thus T. N. Vail, who created American Telephone and Telegraph, Elbert Gary, who became the public relations face of U. S. Steel ('He never saw a blast furnace until he died,' said Ben Stolberg once, bitterly), Alfred P. Sloan, who fashioned the decentralized structure of General Motors, Gerard Swope, who held together General Electric, Walter Teagle,
who rationalized Standard Oil" are representatives of a new social upward mobility. 16 And this last may be true.
The big corporation man here stands forth as a status achiever, not primarily interested in money. (It has never been established, one should notice, that Carnegie, Rockefeller, Harriman, Ford or any of the progenitor moguls were primarily interested in money. For my part, I should say they were not. )
All these men--Vail, Gary, Sloan, Swope and Teagle--were agents. Behind Vail, Gary and Swope stood J. P. Morgan and Company. Behind Sloan was the Du Pont family and behind Teagle were the Rockefellers.
The only one of these to amass a very considerable fortune, thanks to stock options and a preternaturally skyrocketing large industry, was Sloan.
Professor Bell's thesis here is that family capitalism, once dominant, is breaking up, making way for the New Men of power, the new managers, who are very much akin to the members of Mills's power elite, although Bell has many well-taken critical reservations about Mills. Like Mills, he believes in the managerial revolution, in new coalitions of men not primarily interested in money (except as collectors) but interested in status, achievement and play with power. The power of the "ruling class" has been dissolved. Everything is in flux. 17
That the concrete evidence shows this has not happened--at least not yet--the reader is now well aware.
What I suggest is that the big executives, the new men, are interested in money, perhaps not primarily but prominently. I deny that ultimate power either in a company or nationally lies with the executives, unless they are also big owners.
I don't by any means suggest that the big executives are straw men, water boys. They would be of slight use to the powers-that-be if they were. Considering what little is expected of them by their superiors they are perfectly capable. They just do not call the shots, either singly or in coalition. Their role is advisory. If, creatively, they develop large plans, these plans are subject to approval--in politics by the president and the congressional Establishment (with the concurrence of the Supreme Court) and in industry-finance by the big and few stockholders (not by the twenty million shareholders of the Stock Exchanges "People's Capitalism").
To show that what I assert is not so, all anybody has to do is to cite a single case wherein a single executive or coalition of executives, lawyers, military men or others carried out any project whatever in government against the will of the president and Congress, and in industry-finance against the will of the big owners either directly present or always ready to step in. Berle in The Modern Corporation and Private Property shows a string of big companies under management control by one legal device or other, but a few years later the managers, who were often big owners elsewhere in the economy, were knocked out by legislation and most of the companies were also knocked out of existence, especially in public utilities,
All this is so even though, as I am aware, there are cases of big owners who haven't the foggiest notion about anything until they consult the president of their company and their lawyer. They are completely dependent for guidance upon these far more knowledgeable men, who exercise power by proxy. In the circles of power, too, everybody knows for whom they speak. But I see no validity in looking upon such representatives of absentee power as "new men" of power. To me they look like old- fashioned agents, overseers, by no means to be disparaged. At the same time, they should not be enthroned--at least, not until after a coronation.
Social Origins of Executives
The origins and backgrounds of big business leaders have been studied under the most refined academic auspices and their careers statistically traced with fine-caliper methodology. 18 We may profitably take note of some of the findings.
Of the large sample studied for a period of twenty-five years, 52 per cent had fathers in business and 22 per cent had fathers in professions or white-collar work. Only 9 per cent had sires who were farmers, and 15 per cent laborers.
The fathers of 8 per cent were owners of large businesses, of 15 per cent were major executives, of 18 per cent were owners of small businesses, of 8 per cent were minor executives and of 3 per cent were foremen. 19
This finding was widely at variance with the distribution of occupations in the population as of 1920, when 47 per cent of all adult males were classified as laborers. If big business leaders had been 47 per cent the sons of laborers, the mobility rate for laborers would be 100. As it was it was only 16, while that of sons of farmers was only 40. The upward mobility rate for the sons of owners of small business was 360, of sons of professional men 350 and of sons of foremen was 133.
Most significantly, the upward mobility rate of men whose fathers were business executives or owners of large business was 775, nearly eight times the statistical projection. The sons obviously either had friends at court or got proper coaching.
As the University of Chicago sociologist W. Lloyd Warner sees it, the "royal road" to high executive success was higher education. Whereas in 1928 only somewhat more than 30 per cent of big business leaders had a college education, by 1952 the quota was nearly 60 per cent. In 1928 only 15 per cent had some college study but by 1952 20 per cent had at least been to college. 20 Of 505 business leaders as of 1952 as many as 216 went to only 14 different colleges, and these same 14 colleges were mentioned 87 times as the ones attended secondarily, either for graduate work or in transfer. Yale, Harvard, Princeton and Cornell were named most often, with Harvard as the dominant choice for graduate work. 21 Very nearly a third went to Harvard and Yale as undergraduates or graduates.
In no fewer than 62 cases the men went to a second "select" group of 10 colleges, of which Northwestern, Pennsylvania State, Stanford, Wisconsin and Western Reserve were tied for first place. 22
"Education has become the royal road to positions of power and prestige in American business and industry," says Warner. "That this royal road is open to all men is given ample testimony by the large number of educated men from the bottom social layers who appear in our sample. " 23
That this royal road, so optimistically saluted, may not in fact be such is suggested by the continuing merger movement and the steady progress of computer analysis. Decision making, whatever its role in the past, is inevitably being narrowed in scope by the increasing refinement and elaboration of computers; live decision makers, whatever their role in the past, are becoming increasingly dispensable. Furthermore, the merger movement is continually reducing the number of top executive posts. Every merger, while it does not necessarily reduce the total of vice presidents and executive vice presidents, does reduce the number of chairmen and presidents. If all companies were combined into a single company there would be places for only one chairman and one president, and at most twenty-five members of the board.
That education is not the true gateway to the "royal road" is shown by the concentration of elite schools, long the special wards of the propertied. These schools,
eclipsing others, produced most executives because they were most patronized by the upper classes. In view of the fact that sons of members of the business elite, owners or big executives, were disproportionately represented and showed the highest index of upward corporate mobility, it would appear that belonging to the business in-group and the socially related professional group was a more significant factor than level or place of schooling in obtaining big-business position. Sons of owners, executives and professionals as a matter of course are more likely to go on to college, particularly to elite colleges, and after that into the higher executive posts. True, as Warner shows, men of lower social origins can and do make the grade, but in far lesser proportion than the incidence of low social origin in the population. Otherwise put, those who are already in at the beginning are more likely to be in at the final reckoning.
The typical business leader of the 1950's was 54 years old, had been with his firm 24 years, achieved his high position 24 years after entering business and had held his job for almost 7 years. Most men began business between age 21 and 22, freely shifted jobs and companies until about 29 years old when they joined their permanent firms.
