No More Learning

We have seen in an earlier chapterhow the Archbishop of
Canterbury, at the end of the year 1164, fled from England, where his
position was imperilled, and took refuge in France. Louis VII, who
was delighted to revenge himself upon his enemy without having recourse
to arms, and was also, no doubt, honestly distressed by the misfortunes
of the prelate, had declared openly for him at the very beginning. He
gave his protection to the exile in spite of the protests of the English
king, who declared that the treaty of 1162 contained a clause to the
effect that neither of the monarchs should receive in his dominions any
rebellious subject of the other. When Henry, in one of his letters of
protest, referred to Becket as the “ex-Archbishop of Canterbury,” the
King of France exclaimed: “What! Ex-Archbishop? Why, the King
of England has no more right than I to depose even the humblest of his
clergy! " Yet for two years the matter dragged on, while every day the
discussion grew less amicable, and a fresh rupture more inevitable. War
broke out in June 1167; but again nothing was effected on either side
save a few skirmishes on the frontier. When each had burnt a village or
two and a few castles, the two kings were ready to come to terms. Henry
could employ his time more profitably than in continuing so fruitless a
struggle, and Louis was even less disposed than usual to take advantage
of his enemy's many difficulties and to conduct the war with spirit. In
August they agreed to lay down their arms until Easter 1168. On the
renewal of hostilities Louis acted with his habitual irresolution and weak-
ness, chiefly confining himself to supporting the rebellions in Aquitaine
and Brittany against Henry. The month of August saw fresh negotia-
tions, which led to new truces and new ruptures. Finally, on 6 January
1169, the two kings again met at Montmirail, near the frontier of Maine,
to arrange a peace, and at the same time to come to some conclusion on
the question of Thomas Becket, which was still unsettled. Louis VII, true
to his character, was content to receive purely nominal satisfaction, such
as the homage of the younger Henry for Normandy, Brittany, Maine,
and Anjou, and that of the English king's second son, Richard, for the
county of Poitou. As for the questions that had caused the war, they
were not considered. The Vexin, which Henry had so unceremoniously
annexed, remained in his possession ; his rights over Brittany, which he
had conquered, received formal recognition; even Thomas Becket was
almost sacrificed as well. It was not till many months had passed, and
many conferences had been held, that an apparent reconciliation was
effected between him and Henry.
Shortly after the tragic end of the Archbishop of Canterbury on
29 December 1170, the opportunity came at last to Louis VII for a
· See supra, Chap. XVII.
CH. XVIII.


## p. 614 (#660) ############################################

614
Further progress by Henry II
striking act of vengeance. Henry II, who pursued his policy of invasion
untiringly, had succeeded in securing the homage of the Count of
Toulouse (January 1173), and his power on the Continent seemed to be
more firmly established than ever, when suddenly his sons broke out
into rebellion. We have already seen how his son Henry, whose disaffec-
tion against his father had been carefully nourished by the King of
France, had (8 March 1173) suddenly fled to the French court, where
his two brothers Richard and Geoffrey soon joined him, at the instiga-
tion of Queen Eleanor. At last Louis seemed determined to take a firm
line; strong in the support of a powerful faction, which included the
Counts of Flanders, Champagne, Boulogne, Blois, Sancerre, Dreux, and
others, he at last shewed a warlike spirit. When the envoys of King
Henry-Rotrou, Archbishop of Rouen, and Arnulf, Bishop of Lisieux-
came to negotiate with Louis, he turned upon them with bitter com-
plaints of his adversary's encroachments. “Why,” he asked, “ has the
King of England, in spite of his solemn pledge, kept Margaret's dowry,
Gisors and the Vexin ? Why does he seek to incite against their rightful
sovereign the people of France, from the mountains of Auvergne to the
Rhone? Why did he receive the liege homage of the Count of Toulouse?
Tell your master that I swear I will never make peace with him without
the express consent of his wife and sons ! ” Not only was Henry the
Younger received at the court of France with every sign of favour, but
Louis VII affected to regard him as the true King of England. He had
a royal seal made for him, and took a solemn pledge to help him in the
winning of the crown. Henry the Younger received the homage of a
great number of barons, who had followed him in his rebellion.
There can be no doubt that a prompt and energetic attack would
have placed Henry II in a peculiarly dangerous position. But Louis
was no more capable than on previous occasions of acting swiftly and
striking with a firm hand. While Henry the Younger, in concert with
the Counts of Flanders and Boulogne, invaded the country round Bray,
to the north of the Seine, the King of France lingered over the siege of
Verneuil; and when, on 9 August, Henry II's army drew near, he im-
mediately decamped and began to parley with the enemy. In the
following year he made a final effort against Rouen ; but again, on the
approach of the King of England, he beat a shameful retreat, burnt
his engines of war himself (14 August 1174), entered into negotia-
tions, and finally deserted the cause of the rebels, whom he forced to
implore pardon of the King of England at Montlouis (30 September
1174).
Thus Louis VII, with his customary indolence, let slip this unexpected
opportunity of driving the English monarch into important concessions.
He allowed Henry II to reduce at his leisure his English and continental
subjects, who had risen at the call of his rebellious sons, and to enlarge
1 See supra, Chap. XVII.


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Increase of royal power under Louis VII
615
his dominions still further at the expense of the French monarchy by
the acquisition of the county of La Marche (1177). There was even a
time, shortly before his death, when Louis seemed to cherish the illusion
that he had transformed Henry II into a faithful friend of the Capetian
monarchy.
Yet, feeble as this “good” king appeared in his struggle with the
enterprising and active English sovereign, so strong was the force of
circumstances that, in spite of everything, he left the French monarchy
more firmly established than he found it—left it with its prestige defin-
itely restored, and its position in Europe such that it was thenceforward
a power to be reckoned with.
And first, within the limits of his own kingdom we find that Louis VII
pursued, not unsuccessfully, the work of pacification and concentration
that his father had begun with so much energy. In the preamble to
one of his charters we read that “it is the office of the Crown to crush
those who evade justice, and to support the obedient and submissive and
secure to them their rights. ” Louis VII indeed was as ready as Louis VI
to face hardships, and at times to embark upon long expeditions at the
call of the oppressed, in order to make the royal tribunal respected
throughout the country and thereby secure recognition of the king's
supremacy. In 1153, for instance, when Hervé of Donzy complained
that his father Geoffrey of Donzy was trying to deprive him unjustly of
the fief of Gien, Louis proceeded thither without delay, captured the
town, and forced the unnatural father to respect the laws of feudal
heredity. A few years later the king responded to an appeal from Dreu
of Mouchy, whom Névelon of Pierrefonds had driven out of Mouchy.
Louis mustered some troops and obliged the offender by force of arms
to shew a proper regard for justice. On two occasions, in 1163 and
1169, the canons of Clermont and of Brioude appealed to the king as
their natural protector to save them from the violence of the Counts of
Auvergne and their agents ; and Louis unhesitatingly plunged into the
mountains of central France to inflict exemplary punishment upon the
delinquents, whom he even kept for some time imprisoned. In 1166 the
Count of Chalon, too, who had dared to lay his hand on the property
of the great monastery of Cluny, felt the weight of the king's displeasure.
The count, though repeatedly summoned to answer for his misdeeds,
refused to appear; whereupon Louis marched into his territory, took
forcible possession of it, and confiscated it. In 1173 it was the turn of
the Viscount of Polignac, whom the royal troops pursued, captured, and
imprisoned, for molesting the canons of Le Puy.
As time went on the royal court of justice became able to take a
more commanding tone, and to insist that the great vassals of the Crown
should obey its summons. The Count of Nevers, the persecutor of the
monks of Vézelay, for instance, was forced in 1166 after many evasions
I
CH, XVIII.


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616
Appeals of distant vassals to the king
to appear before the king's tribunal in Paris and to abjure his turbulent
ways. Louis VII's words to the injured monks at the beginning of this
long affair were significant: "I have sent my messengers to summon the
count. As to what he will answer or what he will do I know nothing
as yet ; but you may rest assured that if he held as much land as the
King of England in our kingdom I should not allow his violence to go
unpunished. ” It is also noticeable that as a rule this determined language
took effect, and that the nobles brought an ever-increasing number of
cases to be tried before the king's tribunal. Thus in 1153 the Bishop of
Langres and the Duke of Burgundy travelled as far as Moret to lay their
differences before Louis.
From all quarters of France, even the most distant, appeals were
addressed to the king. In 1163 the inhabitants of Toulouse, whom he
had recently defended against Henry II, wrote to express their devotion
and to beg for further support: “Very dear lord, do not take it amiss
that we write to you so often. After God, we appeal to you as to our
good master, our protector, our liberator. Upon your power, next to
the divine power, we fix all our hopes. ” A certain lord of Uzès wrote
to him to complain of the illegal dues levied by the Count of Melgueil,
and to beg for the king's intervention. Again, in 1173 Ermengarde,
Viscountess of Narbonne, entreated him in the most urgent terms to
hasten to the rescue of Languedoc, which was threatened by Henry
Plantagenet. “We are profoundly distressed, my fellow-countrymen
and 1,” she wrote, " to see this country of ours-owing to your absence,
not to say your fault-in danger of being subjected to the authority of
a foreigner who has not the smallest right to rule over us. Do not be
angry, dear lord, at the boldness of my words; it is because I am a
vassal, especially devoted to your crown, that it grieves me to see the
lightest slur cast on your dignity. It is not merely the loss of Toulouse
that we are threatened with, but that of our whole country from the
Garonne to the Rhone, which our enemies are confident of conquering.
I feel that they are even now making all the speed they can, so that,
when they have subjected the members, they may the more easily over-
come the head. I entreat you of your valour to intervene, and appear
among us with a strong army. The audacity of your foes must be
punished, and the hopes of your friends fulfilled. ”
Beyond the frontiers of the kingdom, too, the prestige of the King
of France was steadily growing. From the kingdom of Arles came
numerous promises of fealty, if in return the king would grant his
intervention. Raynald of Bâgé, lord of La Bresse, cried urgently for
his help: “ Come into this country, where your presence is as necessary
to the churches as it is to me. Do not fear the expense;
you all that you spend ; I will do homage to you for all my castles,
which are subject to no suzerain; in a word, all that I possess shall be
at your disposal. ” In Dauphiné, when Louis VII's sister Constance was
I will repay


## p. 617 (#663) ############################################

Louis VII supports Pope Alexander III
617
לל
married to the Dauphin of Viennois, it was considered a matter for
rejoicing that the French influence had gained ground in that direction.
Thus it is not surprising to find Louis VII in 1162 playing his
accustomed part of arbitrator in the great papal schism between
Alexander III and Victor IV, the candidate of the Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa. To tell the truth the king's rôle was not always very brilliant,
nor did it reflect much credit on his perspicacity. In August and Sep-
tember 1162 Frederick, with the connivance of the Count of Champagne,
entangled him in a web of mystification which at one time nearly had
disastrous consequences. It will be well to relate the circumstances, as
we may gain from them some idea of the weaving and unravelling of
intrigues that went on round this “good” king, Louis VII.
When Hadrian IV died in 1159 two Popes had been elected at the same
time: Cardinal Roland under the name of Alexander III, and Cardinal
Octavian under that of Victor IV. Alexander III, who was elected by a
majority of the cardinals, represented the party that was opposed to the
absolute power of the Emperor, the party of Italian independence.
Between him and Frederick Barbarossa there was no possibility of
agreement, whereas naturally an alliance existed between the Emperor
and Victor IV. Alexander III, who had obtained recognition both from
Louis VII and from the King of England immediately after his election,
took refuge in France. But, whether because he had not held the balance
sufficiently equal between Louis and his rival, or because the King of
France was reckoning on the advantage over Henry II that an under-
standing with the Emperor might secure for him, the end of the year
1161 saw the opening of negotiations between Frederick and Louis.
The question of the schism was naturally placed first on the pro-
gramme.
Now, at the court of France there existed a Germanophil party
headed by Louis VII's own brother-in-law Henry the Liberal, Count of
Champagne. He it was whom the king chose to be the principal nego-
tiator; and moreover Louis made the further blunder of giving a
prominent part in the affair to the Bishop of Orleans, Manasse, who
from the first had shewn decided hostility towards Alexander III. So
successfully did these two, Henry of Champagne and Manasse, conduct
the affair in the direction of their wishes, that Louis found himself
involuntarily and almost unconsciously led into far closer relations with
Frederick than he had desired. The bishop, writing in his sovereign's
name to convey final instructions to the Count of Champagne, abused
Louis' confidence so far as to insert, on his own initiative, a phrase that
gave the count full authority to make pledges for the King of France.
Count Henry lost no time in coming to terms. It was agreed that the
two monarchs should meet on a bridge that crossed the Saône at Saint-
Jean-de-Losne on 29 August 1162; that each of them should bring his
Pope with him; and that, then and there, a mixed commission of
CH. XVIII.


## p. 618 (#664) ############################################

618
The interview at Saint-Jean-de-Losne
arbitrators should be chosen from the clergy and laymen of the two parties
to adjudicate between the two Pontiffs. Both sovereigns were pledged
to abide by this judgment; and in the case of Louis refusing to acquiesce
in these arrangements, or to accept the decision of the arbitrators,
Count Henry took a solemn oath to abjure his fealty to the King of
France and to give his allegiance to the Emperor.
In the meantime Louis, who was still ignorant of the engagements
entered into by the Count of Champagne, had made every effort to
persuade Alexander III to be present at the projected meeting. At an
interview between them at Souvigny in August 1162, the king had in
vain urged the Pope to yield in this matter, expressing surprise, with
more or less sincerity, “that since the Pontiff was conscious of the justice
of his claim he should miss this opportunity of upholding it by a public
statement of his case. ” Alexander was immovable. He agreed to send
four cardinals as delegates, but would do no more; he refused to accom-
pany the King of France. The latter, chagrined, reached Dijon on
28 August, and found there the Count of Champagne, who revealed to
him all the clauses of the treaty and placed him—should Alexander
persist in his refusal—in this dilemma: he must either recognise Victor IV
as Pope, or he must lose the province of Champagne to the Emperor.
“What ! ” exclaimed the king, “ you presumed to take it upon yourself
to make such an engagement for me without my knowledge, without
consulting me! ” Henry quoted the letter that he had received from
Manasse, giving him full powers. The King of France perceived that
he had been tricked. It was too late for him to retire; but what could
be hoped from negotiations that were founded on misunderstandings
such as these?
On 29 August the Emperor Frederick came at dawn of day from
Dôle, accompanied by his Pope, to the bridge of Saint-Jean-de-Losne.
Finding no one there he went away, leaving only a few members of
his suite upon the spot. A little later Louis VII arrived in his turn
from Dijon, and begged Frederick's representatives to consent to a
delay, since it was only on the previous day that he had heard the
terms of the convention. At the same time he promised to secure
the presence of Pope Alexander. On the following morning the Count
of Champagne, who played a dubious part throughout the affair,
came to Louis to remind him that, should he reject the terms of the
treaty, he--Count Henry-was pledged by them to transfer his allegiance
to the Emperor. “However," added this sanctimonious individual, “I
have prevailed on the Emperor to grant a delay of three weeks, on
condition of your promising to be present, with Alexander, at another
meeting at the end of that time, and to accept on that occasion the
arbitrators’ judgment between him and his rival. You must bind your-
self by securities, in case you fail to abide by their award, to give yourself
up as a prisoner into the Emperor's hands at Besançon. ” Louis again


## p. 619 (#665) ############################################

Failure of negotiations with the Emperor
619
naively accepted the terms, and gave as his hostages the Duke of
Burgundy and the Counts of Flanders and Nevers.
He hoped to persuade Alexander to accompany him ; and indeed a
good deal of anxiety was felt at this time by the adherents of the
Pontiff. But a fresh comedy was about to be enacted. Frederick's army,
being short of provisions, had gradually broken up and disappeared ;
and at this moment the King of England, who feared nothing so much
as an alliance between Louis VII and the Emperor, responded to an
appeal from Alexander III by arriving on the scene in full force.
Frederick had but one desire—to withdraw, but to put a good face
upon it. On the morning of the appointed day, 22 September, Louis
again repaired to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, where he found no one but
Rainald of Dassel, the Chancellor of the Empire, who feigned ignorance.
Never, he declared, could it have entered his sovereign's head to submit
the decision on the pontifical election to a commission drawn from
France as well as from the Empire, seeing that none but the Emperor
and the bishops of his dominions were qualified to give judgment in
such a case. Louis then turned to the Count of Champagne, who was
standing beside him, and begged him to repeat the clauses of the con-
vention, “Well, you see ! ” exclaimed the king when this had been
done, “the Emperor, who should be here, has not appeared, and his
representatives have just changed the terms of the treaty in your very
presence! You are witness to it. ”—“That is true," answered the
count. _“I am freed, then, from all my engagements, am I not? ”-
Certainly you are free,” replied Henry. Then the king turned to the
barons and prelates of his suite. “You have all heard and seen,” he
said, “ that I have done everything in my power. Am I still bound by
the convention ? "_“ No,” answered they all, “ you have redeemed your
word. ” Then, wheeling his horse, Louis galloped away upon the road
to Dijon, turning a deaf ear to the Emperor's representatives, who tried
to detain him.
Such was the end of the tragi-comic adventure into which Louis had
so imprudently allowed himself to be drawn. It put an end for ever to
any inclination on his part to come to an understanding with the
supporters of Victor IV, and it was on the morrow of the meeting at
Saint-Jean-de-Losne that he appeared before the world as the protector
of the true Pope. Alexander III was lodged in the royal town of Sens ;
his protector Louis VII carried on a regular and constant correspondence
with him ; and his close alliance with the Capetian monarchy during the
crisis that followed his election contributed not a little to increase the
prestige of that monarchy, and to give it the position in Europe that
was established so firmly in the days of Philip Augustus.
Not only did Louis VI and Louis VII succeed in extending their
supremacy, but they contrived to place the government of their con-
CH. XVIII,


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620
Organisation of the central government
stantly increasing kingdom upon a firm basis. They strengthened their
authority by perfecting the machinery of the administration, and by
replacing the useless and dangerous feudal element at the court by men
whom they could trust, men of humble origin, who were well under
control and of tried wisdom.
At the accession of Louis VI all the administrative authority of the
monarchy was in the hands of the high officials of the Crown. The men
who held the great offices were all, or nearly all, chosen from among the
barons, and had but one idea-to obtain a monopoly of important
posts for their own families, and thus to secure, at the expense of the
sovereign, a position of supreme authority in the kingdom.
At the time with which we are concerned, an ambitious family, to
whom no act of effrontery seemed amiss, the family of Garlande, had
marked down as their own the chief offices at the court. Of these the post
of seneschal was undoubtedly the most important. For the holder of this
office was not only in command of the royal troops, but also exercised
authority over a large part of the king's officials, was the chief ad-
ministrator of the royal demesne, and, finally, played a considerable
part in the dispensing of justice. It has been said, with perfect truth,
,
that his position at this time was that of a “deputy king. ” This was the
office to which the Garlandes first laid siege. In Philip I's reign two of
them, Païen of Garlande and after him his brother Anseau, had already
succeeded in securing it temporarily (1101, 1104) in despite of the lords
of Rochefort-en-Iveline, who were themselves trying to acquire it for
their own family. By 1107 the post of seneschal was again held by
Anseau of Garlande, who succeeded in keeping it until the day of his
glorious death in the king's service at the siege of Le Puiset (1118).
But before that day came two of his brothers, Gilbert and Stephen,
had cast covetous eyes on other great offices. In 1106 Stephen, who was
a clerk in holy orders, obtained the position of chancellor; in 1112
Gilbert secured for himself the post of chief butler; and on the death of
Anseau it was yet another of the Garlande brothers, William, who suc-
ceeded to the seneschalship. It seemed that the ambition of this family
now knew no bounds. When the seneschal, William, died in 1120, his
brother Stephen, although in orders and already chancellor, acquired the
seneschalship for himself rather than allow it to be lost to the family.
Rarely has a man been known to abuse his position with such unconcern.
It seemed indeed as though the State held nothing that did not exist solely
for the enrichment and promotion of this scandalous priest, who deemed
it quite natural that the functions of the king's Grand Chaplain and of
the supreme head of the army should be united in his person. In his
clerical capacity he laid his hands on all the ecclesiastical benefices of
which the king could easily dispose. We find him figuring simultaneously
as Canon of Étampes, Archdeacon of Paris, Dean of the Abbey of
St Geneviève at Paris, Dean of St Samson and of St Avitus at Orleans;


## p. 621 (#667) ############################################

The king frees himself from the Garlande family 621
and one chronicler-rather a slanderous one, it is true-Guibert of
Nogent, declares that when in 1112 Stephen wished to add to all these
benefices the deanery of the cathedral church of Orleans, a bishopric
was hastily bestowed upon the existing dean in order that this desire
might be complied with. On two occasions about this time he even
intrigued to add to his acquisitions the bishopric of Beauvais or that of
Paris; but this was too much, and the king was obliged to submit when
Pope Paschal II formally prohibited the appointment.
This did not prevent Stephen of Garlande from attaining to a degree
of power that excited jealousy on every hand. The clergy raised a chorus
of protest against their unworthy brother, whom Ivo, the austere Bishop
of Chartres, described--probably with a certain amount of exaggeration
-as “an illiterate gambler and libertine," and St Bernard denounced as
a living scandal in the Church. “Who, without surprise and horror," he
cried indignantly, “can see this man serving both God and Mammon-
at one moment clad in armour at the head of armed troops, and at the
next robed in alb and stole, chanting the gospel in a church? ”
It was, however, not so much the unedifying character of his life as
his abuse of power that at last made him unendurable. “The kingdom of
France,” says a contemporary chronicler, “was entirely at his mercy," and
“he seemed not so much to serve the king as to govern him. " The day
came at length when Louis VI awoke to the danger. Urged by his wife,
Adelaide of Maurienne, whom Stephen very foolishly had treated with
disrespect, the king resolved to shake off the yoke with a determined hand.
Stephen, who shewed an increasing tendency to regard the seneschalship
as his own property, was suddenly deprived of office and driven from the
court, together with his brother Gilbert. His fall (1127) was as dramatic
as his rise. He did not yield without a struggle; and for three years
(1128–1130) stoutly fought his master. “Remember your past power,"
wrote one of Stephen's friends to him at this time, “remember your
riches, and what is still more important, the skill with which you handled
the affairs of this world. Of the great officers of state ( palatini) you were
the first; the whole kingdom of France was at the disposal of your caprice.
Like Solomon you desired to undertake great enterprises, to raise towers,
to build superb palaces, to plant vineyards, to gather round you an im-
mense household of male and female serfs. You demanded gold and silver
in heaps; in a word, you had your fill of every delight that is possible to
humanity. But pause a moment, and consider the instability of earthly
things. This king, whose affection seemed to you the strongest support
you could have, at whose side you constantly lived in virtue of your office
and the friendship he bore you, this king now pursues you with his enmity;
you are now forced to defray the expenses of the war with the money you
amassed in time of peace, and to keep a watch over your personal safety
night and day, lest the threats of your enemies should be fulfilled. ” At
last, however, Stephen was obliged to yield and humble himself and give
CH. XVIII.


## p. 622 (#668) ############################################

622
Government by non-feudal officials
up the seneschalship; and indeed he could think himself fortunate in that
he recovered not his influence-for that was gone for ever—but at least
his title of chancellor.
The lesson was a costly one for the Crown, but it was not forgotten.
There were thenceforward no more omnipotent officials before whom the
king himself was obliged to bow. Louis VI left the office of seneschal
vacant for four years, and when at last he filled it gave the appointment
to Count Ralph of Vermandois, a kinsman of his own, on whose fidelity
he could rely; and when Ralph died Louis VII left the office vacant for
two years before giving it to the Count of Blois. These men, it is true,
were important personages, and capable of commanding an army with
brilliant success; but it has been pointed out that, since the new sene-
schals lived on their own lands at a distance from the court, they were as
a rule no longer dangerous. They could no longer domineer at court, and
their functions tended to become merely honorary.
Louis VI and Louis VII followed the same tactics with regard to the
other great officers of state: sometimes leaving their posts vacant, as in
the case of the chancellorship, to which, in Louis VII's time, no one was
appointed for seven years (1172–1179); sometimes contriving to reduce
their powers to privileges of a purely honorary kind. There was an in-
creasing tendency to put all the work into the hands of docile subordinates,
who could be easily dismissed. And sometimes auxiliaries, who had no
official connexion with the government, would be called upon to lend
their aid, men chosen from the clerical rather than the baronial world or
bourgeois who understood the conduct of business affairs.
Of these confidential advisers of the Crown in the twelfth century
some are known to us—as for instance Brother Thierry Galeran, of the
Order of the Temple, who from 1132 was for thirty years or so one
of the most active agents of the King of France; and Bouchard le
Veautre, and Cadurc, and above all the famous Abbot of St Denis,
Suger. Of this last, who was a true statesman, we have already had oc-
casion to speak. For his able government as regent during Louis VII's
absence on the Second Crusade he well deserved the title that his contem-
poraries gave him, the Father of his country.
This is not the place to give a biography of this eminent monk, who,
though of obscure and humble origin, succeeded by sheer strength of
intellect, combined with remarkable tenacity and an orderly, well-balanced
mind such as was rarely met with in his day, in winning his way every-
where without ever resorting to intrigue. Little by little we see his
influence replacing that of Stephen of Garlande with Louis VI, who
called him “his intimate and his faithful counsellor. ” From the year
1130 onwards he was always at the king's side, and always ready with a
wealth of wise and moderate advice. We find him again with Louis VII,
constantly striving-sometimes to excess, as we have seen—to avoid
contention and maintain peace at any price. As regent, during the


## p.
623 (#669) ############################################

Suger, Abbot of St Denis
623
Second Crusade, he shewed especial ability in the administration of the
royal revenue, and was most skilful in his avoidance of all kinds of friction.
“There is nothing more dangerous," he said, “than to change the personnel
of government without due thought. Those who are discharged carry off
with them as much as they can, and those who take their place are so fearful
of receiving the same treatment as their predecessors that they proceed,
without loss of time, to steal a fortune. ” His policy, in a word, was
above all a policy of tact. It had a firm basis of strength, but its aim
was to avoid all direct opposition and to evade obstacles rather than
contend with them. He was a man of affairs, whose ambition was to
govern the State with the same honesty and scrupulousness that he shewed
in the government of his abbey. And in this respect he is one of the most
characteristic representatives of that new class of officials to whom Louis VII,
more and more as time passed, sought to confide the care of the adminis-
tration.
CH. XVIII.


## p. 624 (#670) ############################################

624
CHAPTER XIX.
THE COMMUNAL MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY IN FRANCE.
NEVER was the need for united action more urgent than in the Middle
Ages. The individual counted for very little. A great feudal noble
might stand alone, might build up his own independent power, maintain
his own privileges and rule his own vassals; but in the humbler walks of
life one man alone could do little in the struggle for existence. The
Church encouraged the spirit of association for prayer and service; no
trade could be undertaken on a large scale, save by a commercial gild or
society; rights, privileges, and property were in the hands of groups of
men, who held together for the maintenance of common interests. The
communal movement was one very important aspect of this spirit of as-
sociation. It was a movement not confined to any one country, which
spread almost simultaneously throughout Germany, Italy, England,
Flanders, and France---an international movement, which may to some
extent have been independent of national boundaries, but which each
country worked out on its own lines, according to its own circum-
stances and national characteristics. Similar causes led to the formation
of the German stadt, the Italian city, the English borough, and the
French commune, and certain essential points of resemblance can be
found in all of them, but the actual form which the communal association
took, its nature, its strength, and its duration, varied not only from
country to country but from district to district-even from town to
town.
In no country can this communal movement be better studied than in
France. Perhaps it was there that the spirit of association was most
widespread, and even in Italy the success of the movement was scarcely
more rapid or more marked. On the other hand, it was there also that
the results achieved were least permanent, and that the original aim and
ambitious character of the communal movement were most completely
lost. The southern towns of France were little less strong at one time
than the Lombard communes, but their independence was of much shorter
duration.
The chief period of communal history falls between the dates 1100
and 1400. A few towns acquired self-government as early as the eleventh
century, and a few preserved their independence beyond the fourteenth;
but in France this was the exception. It was in the twelfth century,
however, that the effort to develop by means of union and association was
most successful, and that the urban communes acquired their highest


## p. 625 (#671) ############################################

General definition of Commune
625
powers. The century which followed marked for most of them the begin-
ning of decline, the gradual loss of independence, the substitution of
privileges for rights, the dropping of one ambition after another. In the
fourteenth century the true commune almost entirely disappeared. The
townsmen had not sufficiently stood together. The union had been local
not national. Each separate unit was far too weak to hold its own against
the ever-growing power of the monarchy. Financial difficulties gave the
impulse which led to the downfall of many struggling associations; the
upper classes were not content to share power with the poorer members
of their body, and internal dissensions weakened the commune against
external foes; royal support insidiously paved the way for royal pre-
dominance, and the result was the end of one of the most interesting
attempts at achieving success and progress by means of local union and
communal life.
It is impossible to give any definition of a French commune which
would be universally true. The communal movement may be taken to
mean the general spirit of association which affected the country, parti 1
cularly in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and which gave rise to many
different communal types. It is the purpose of this chapter to consider
as far as possible the causes of this movement, the principal aim which
inspired burgesses in the towns and peasants in the country to form them-
selves into groups for mutual protection and self-government. First,
however, a brief review is necessary of the varying types of association
which resulted from the communal spirit. Only here and there was the
highest stage of development reached and real independence obtained;
but the varying degrees of success all help to illustrate the communal
struggle.
A medieval commune, in the fullest meaning of the word, might be
t
regarded as a collective person: a body which could hold property, exer-
cise rights, possess vassals, and do justice. In the feudal world it took rank
by the side of the great lords of the land; like them it could both perform
and exact homage and hold courts for its tenants, and with them it could
treat on practically equal terms. It was in fact a “seigneurie collective. "
Sometimes a commune could even declare peace
and make treaties
and alliances without the license and control of any overlord. The signs
of its authority were the possession of a belfry, from which could be rung
out the signal for its general assemblies, and a public hall, in which
business could be transacted, meetings held, and justice done; the proof
of its corporate existence was the common seal, which could be affixed
to all its documents and public acts. All communes had their own
officials, elected or nominated, to carry on communal business; and the
two powers most eagerly coveted and most generally secured, though in
varying degree, were the administration of justice and the control of
finance. Both town and country, as has been already said, could and did
acquire some form or other of communal organisation, but the urban
war and
C. MED, H. VOL. V. CH. XIX.
40


## p. 626 (#672) ############################################

626
Communes jurées
communes were as a rule in the vanguard. They were the first to form
themselves into corporate bodies, and the best able to assert communal
authority.
The true urban communes were most numerous in the north and south
of the country; in the centre some towns were privileged but less inde-
pendent. In the north these communes were known as Communes jurées,
in the south, where independence was still more marked, as Consulates.
The term Commune jurée meant that all the members bound themselves
together by a mutual oath of association, which was the essential feature,
the most important bond of unity, and a method of safeguarding their
mutual rights. In these towns the burgesses were often known as jurés
de commun ; and, as the charter of Beauvais says, all men “infra murum
civitatis et in suburbiis commorantes communiam jurabant. ” Besides this
mutual oath which formed the collective body, a commune might be in
the position of a feudal vassal and then an oath had also to be taken to
the overlord. At St Quentin a charter of the eleventh century speaks of
the oath taken by members of the commune, who “jurerent firmement
par sermens a warder et a tenir, sauve la feuté de Dieu et de Saint Quentin,
sauve le droiture de Comte et de Comtesse—ens jurerent ensement ches-
cun quemune ayde a son jure et quemun conseil et quemune detenanche
et quemune deffence. ”
Of these communes of Flanders and northern France some occupied
very independent positions while others exercised comparatively limited
powers; but each one was largely a self-governing body, formed by an
oath of association and able to act as a legal person. A few examples
only can be given. St Quentin was one of the earliest of all towns to gain
municipal organisation. In the eleventh century a charter of Count
Hébert (ob. 1080) recognised and extended the privileges of the town,
granting to it a democratic constitution and almost complete independence
under a mayor and échevins. To this commune all classes took an oath,
not only burgesses but also clergy and knights; a very unusual circum-
stance in the north.
Rouen illustrates another type of commune, for it was a town
possessing the minimum of independence compatible with communal
existence. Rouen had worked its way very gradually into importance,
through the growth of its commerce and consequent increase of wealth,
and in the twelfth century acquired a charter from Geoffrey Plantagenet
(1145), which spoke in general terms of “the commune” and conferred
judicial powers upon it. At the close of the reign of Henry II of Eng-
land, Rouen was governed by a mayor and échevins, assisted by a fortnightly
meeting of cent pairs, to consider all questions of public interest; but the
mayor was chosen by Henry as Duke of Normandy from a list of names
presented by the hundred peers, and it was the duke, not the commune,
who exercised rights of high justice and was able to demand military
service. Even the oath which formed the commune jurée was almost as


## p. 627 (#673) ############################################

Consulates
627
much the oath of a feudal vassal to the duke as the genuine bond of
communal unity. But, despite these limitations, few towns have exercised
greater influence on the spread of communal organisation, and traces of
the établissements de Rouen can be found throughout all those parts of
France which fell at one time or another under the rule of the Angevin
dynasty.
In Amiens, even more than in Rouen, a good example can be found
of communal union resulting from commercial development. No charter
of creation exists for Amiens, but in the twelfth century various docu-
ments confirm the municipal organisation which the town had already
worked out for itself. Here the mayor and échevins exercised seignorial
powers of administration and justice, although the king kept in his own
hands the highest rights of jurisdiction.
In the south of France the consulates occupied a still more advanced
position than that of the communes jurées of the north; in most cases
they had obtained a more complete emancipation from the feudal yoke
and the establishment of almost independent authority under their own
consuls. Nowhere was the communal movement more widespread.
Throughout Roussillon, Provence, Languedoc, parts of Gascony and
Guienne, and as far north as Limousin and La Marche, not only towns
of importance but even tiny villages aimed at acquiring some form of
consular government. The powers which all towns coveted, here as in the
north, were judicial and financial, to which were often added rights of
local legislation and of military control. Besides their almost complete
autonomy, another feature which seems to distinguish the southern com-
munes from those of the north was the greater share taken by the nobles
in their formation. Whereas in the north it is rare to find the upper
classes even admitted as members of the commune, in the south nobles
almost always occupied some of the municipal offices, and the consular
body was frequently composed half of knights and half of burgesses. As
a rule also, an assembly of inhabitants plays a larger part in the southern
communes and appears more frequently than in the northern towns.
Here as elsewhere great variety prevailed as regards powers and inde-
pendence. Marseilles, for a short time, was practically a republic. Pro-
bably municipal officers existed there from very early times; consuls were
certainly in existence at the beginning of the twelfth century. No
distinction was made here between nobles and burgesses; both held office
indifferently. Laws were the same for all, officials were elected by all, and
a great part was played in town government by the grand conseil of
elected representatives and the cent chefs de métiers, artisans chosen by
their colleagues; on special occasions a general assembly of all citizens
was summoned to consider the most important questions. To their
suzerain, the Count of Provence, the townsmen appear to have owed little
but military service, and the statutes of the city were drawn up by the
Marseillais themselves without any seignorial assistance.
CH. XIX.
40-2


## p. 628 (#674) ############################################

628
Villes de bourgeoisie
Another important town, Montpellier, which dates its communal
government from the twelfth century, was recognised as a republic in 1204
by the King of Aragon, whom the burgesses had wanted to choose as
their lord. It had its own elected officials and had erected careful safeguards
against seignorial encroachments; but it was never absolutely independent.
The lord's bailiff attested the acts of the consuls and authority was, at
least nominally, shared between lord and commune.
In Toulouse we have an example of a commercial commune with great
external influence and practical sovereignty throughout the neighbouring
country, but with a less advanced political constitution, since the count
always exercised considerable municipal powers.
To complete this brief summary of the principal types of southern
towns, the cité of Carcassonne may be taken as representing the specially
military commune, and Lézat the almost wholly rural town. In the
latter, the consulate was evidently organised for the benefit of cultivators
and proprietors, both within and without the town walls, and the
authority shared between the abbot and the consuls of the town was
largely concerned with rural matters.
It was not always possible for the efforts of the burgesses to succeed
in establishing so complete a measure of self-government as in the com-
munes described above; and in France a third type of town is found under
the title ville de bourgeoisie or commune surveillée, which possessed certain
communal characteristics without real political power. It formed, in fact,
a privileged community rather than a free commune. Such communities
were scattered throughout all parts of France, but in the centre they
formed the prevailing type and were on the whole both prosperous and
durable; Paris herself, though with certain special characteristics of her
own, belonged to this category. Towns on the king's demesne almost
always took this form in response to the communal tendency. The
townsmen combined to obtain privileges, but royal officials retained full
judicial powers, or at most shared them with the town magistrates. The
same might happen in the case of seignorial towns, where the lords were
induced to make certain concessions but still retained political powers.
In some cases a town might have a municipal body wholly nominated
from without. This was the case at Troyes, where the count chose thir-
teen jurés, who themselves selected one of their number as mayor. In
other cases only the head official might be nominated and his assessors
elected by the town—a method adopted at Orleans, where the king's
bailiff or prévót was ultimately supreme. Some royal towns were rather
more independent than others. At Senlis, Philip Augustus handed over
to the town magistrates all his rights of justice, except in cases of murder,
rape, and homicide (1212); but later the town itself begged to renounce
powers which it could not afford to maintain, and the royal prévót was
again reinstated in his original position of supremacy (1320). At Blois,
the boni viri had no political or judicial functions and divided the


## p. 629 (#675) ############################################

Bastides and Villes-neuves
629
administration with royal officials. At Beauvais the universitas shared
authority with the bishop as well as the king. At Lorris, as Thierry says,
the greatest amount of civil liberty existed without any political rights,
jurisdiction, or even administrative
power.
Many more examples could be given to shew how authority was
shared and to illustrate the nature of the privileges sought for by these
royal and seignorial towns. But the chief point to notice is the very
arbitrary character of the division between these villes de bourgeoisie and
the actual communes. No really hard and fast line can be drawn between
them. A privileged but dependent town is easily distinguished from a
republic such as Arles or Marseilles; but it is not so easy to mark off a
ville de bourgeoisie from a commune of the less advanced description.
Royal officials had almost as much authority at Rouen as at Senlis. Even
some of the southern consulates were not wholly free from seignorial
interference. In Toulouse, the count had a court of justice, and at one
time even exercised the right of choosing consuls. Many communes passed
through this stage of semi-independence (Bayonne in 1173 was a ville de
prévóté) on their way to freedom; only a few towns successfully emerged
with full powers; almost all sank back to this condition after a brief
period of glorious victory. Thus Bordeaux had its mayor nominated by
the English king from 1261 onwards; Marseilles, at about the same date,
was receiving a representative of the Count of Provence and a judge
appointed by him. This was almost always the first step in communal
decline; a commune jurée could very quickly turn into a commune surveillée.
Despite their lack of independence, the villes de bourgeoisie illustrate an
important development of the communal movement, and arise out of that
same spirit of association which under more favourable circumstances led
to the organisation of true communes.
The same may be said of the bastides of the south, and the villes-neuves
of the north-small rural towns actually created by kings or by seigneurs
and endowed from the first with common privileges and common rights,
under the safeguard of a charter granted by the king himself, or by the
immediate lord with the sanction of the sovereign. These small privileged
towns began to spring up as early as the twelfth century under the name of
sauvetés, created by churches and monasteries, either alone or in con-
junction with a lay lord, as new centres of population. In the thirteenth
century a great number were added, known as villes-neuves when they
were more particularly of an economic type, bastides when their military
character predominated. A lord, anxious to increase the number of his
vassals, to attract population, and to win support, was ready to offer in-
ducements to newcomers by promising protection, enfranchisement from
serfdom, and the right of electing their own officials. The bastides of the
south were always strongly fortified and endowed with privileges of a
similar character. In many cases they were little more than walled
villages; but they had distinct communal existence and a measure of
CH. XIX.


## p. 630 (#676) ############################################

630
Rura, communities
self-government, though always under the protection of their suzerain and
dependent upon his will. They became very numerous and very popular.
The kings, both of France and of England, constructed them frequently in
order to win support and strengthen their rival authority. The fixing of
payments and the limitation of dues and labour services which the
inhabitants obtained, readily attracted population and increased their
well-being and industry.
Besides these small rural towns, the result of direct seignorial creation,
there were also rural communities of a somewhat different type. The
peasants from the country, either following town example or impelled by
their own needs, sought to help on their own prosperity by means of
association. Sometimes the inhabitants of a country village would band
together for the maintenance of their rights and would win a charter from
the overlord granting privileges to the whole body. Such were the com-
munities of Rouvres and Talant in Burgundy, Esne in Cambrésis, and
many others. More frequently, however, several villages would combine
to secure communal rights, and the village federations of the north
gained for themselves positions of considerable strength and importance.
One of the best known of these confederations was the commune of
Laonnais, a union of seventeen hamlets formed round Anizi-le-Château,
which bought a charter of privileges from Louis VII in 1177, and tried
to hold its own by force of arms against its ecclesiastical overlord. Round
Soissons also village federations were formed which endeavoured so far as
possible to imitate the organisation of the commune itself; and in Bur-
gundy eighteen villages, with St Seine-l'Abbaye as the centre, purchased
important communal privileges in the fourteenth century. In the moun-
tains natural federations were formed by the character of the country, and
the valley communities of the Pyrenees and the Vosges were often almost
independent bodies, free from all but very nominal subjection to their
feudal overlord.
Many theories have been brought forward to explain this communal
movement and to account for its widespread and apparently spon-
taneous character. Naturally, it is impossible to trace any single line
of development for a movement which itself ran in so many different
channels. Causes are almost as numerous as communes, each of which
was moulded by the circumstances of its history and by the character
of its seigneur. On the other hand, no theory can be completely dis-
regarded. They all illustrate different aspects of the movement.
Nevertheless, in spite of this complexity and variety it may be possible to
find some universal and essential element out of which all the immediate
causes grew, some underlying impulse present in every variety of develop-
ment; and thus to explain why, not only all France, but all Western
Europe was tending to develop in a similar direction at the same time,
to shew how the same spirit of association could affect places of such very


## p. 631 (#677) ############################################

Roman influence
631
different character, spreading as it did through royal boroughs, seignorial
estates, active commercial centres, rural districts, and obscure hamlets.
The earlier writers on communal history advocated the theory of
Roman influence and the continuity of the old municipal organisation.
They urged the importance of the old Roman cities, the respect of the
barbarians for the civic institutions, and the very early existence of com-
munal union long before the grant of charters, which as a rule confirmed
rather than created rights of self-government. St Quentin, Metz, Rouen,
Bourges, Rheims, and in the south of France almost all the important
towns without exception, were cited by these historians as Roman muni-
cipalities, whose liberties either survived or were sufficiently remembered
to be considered an influential factor in the growth of later communal
rule. This theory has, however, been rejected by the majority of later
writers, who have shewn how completely Roman municipal institutions
had decayed at the time of the fall of the Empire, how the inroads of
Saracens and Northmen in the ninth century completed the work of
destruction in the towns, and how the communes of feudal times had to
be constructed anew, on their own lines and to meet their own individual
difficulties. The complete absence of documentary evidence to connect the
Roman towns with the later communes, the weakness of analogy as an
argument, and the certainty in most cases of municipal ruin and recon-
struction, have led to the almost complete abandonment of the Roman
theory. For the northern towns it can now find no serious supporters. In
the south there is much to be said against it. Certain important Roman
centres can be proved to have lost all their old rights and to have built
up a wholly new communal government in later days. Bordeaux, though
it preserved some degree of municipal organisation under Visigoths and
Franks, entirely lost its early civilisation with the attacks of the North-
men; and when after three centuries its history can once more be continued,
all traces of municipal institutions have disappeared. A similar fate seems
to have befallen Bayonne; while Lyons, Toulouse, Perpignan, and many
other old Roman towns, can be shewn to have built up their communal
powers as a new thing and on feudal lines. Even though it is often true
that communal government and elected officials were in existence long
before their formal recognition by charter, and apparently independent
of any seignorial grant, it is unnecessary to connect these self-won liberties
with the long-past Roman organisation. At the same time, there is no
doubt that in the south Rome had more permanent influence than in the
north; not so much by direct survival, as by traces of Roman law and
perhaps some vague remembrance of earlier independence. It has indeed
been pointed out that in south-eastern France the Northmen's invasions
had less influence than elsewhere, that feudal oppression was slight, and
that the Crusades found the communal movement already far advanced.
But at least it can be maintained that no direct survival of Roman
CH. XIX.


## p. 632 (#678) ############################################

632
Germanic influence
institutions need be considered, and that the medieval commune can be
studied quite apart from the Roman town.
Another theory, almost as extreme in the opposite direction, was that
which suggested a direct Germanic origin for the commune, and connected
the urban community with the rural mark. Its supporters pointed to the
development of the rural communes through the possession of common
property and the acquisition of common rights. This was specially
urged for German towns, but French and Italian development was also
ascribed to similar causes. However, the Mark Theory has been aban-
doned for lack of evidence, and it is impossible to maintain that the
communal movement originated in rural communities rather than in
urban centres. A material town—the houses and the population-may
have grown from a thickly populated village, but the village community
in fact constantly copied the town community in its organisation, and
petitioned for urban privileges when it sought for a charter of incor-
poration. Scarcely any rural communes obtained formal recognition
before the thirteenth century, although natural communities existed
in a primitive form long before. But while realising the insufficiency of
this second suggestion as to communal origin, the truth underlying it can
be recognised in the undoubtedly important part played by common
property as a bond of connexion, and in the fact that a great deal of
early advance was along the lines of economic and agricultural develop-
ment.
The échevinage Theory, as it may be called, is almost a corollary to
this Germanic theory, since it suggests a connexion between the town
échevins and the Carolingian scabini, judicial officers of the Frankish
hundred or centena, the subdivision of the county, who were generally
chosen by the count with the consent and sanction of the people. Scholars,
writing of northern Gaul, have pointed out the existence of a body of
judicial échevins in the towns, previous to the formally recognised com-
munal government, and have suggested that this may have been a stepping-
stone between the old organisation of the hundred and the later and more
independent jurisdiction of the commune. At Verdun the échevinat du
palais seems to have been a sort of dependent municipality in the eleventh
century, whereas the town only became an imperial commune in 1195.
Bruges had local magistrates, called échevins, in 1036. Dinant had a
body of échevins, nominated by the Bishops of Liège before the jurés
elected by the community; the Archbishop of Rheims abolished the
échevinage of the town in 1167, but it was restored with elected officials
in 1182. In St Quentin and a few other towns a curious double govern-
ment existed for a time. The early échevinage, instead of merging as
usual into the communal government, continued, and the tribunal of the
échevins represented the justice of the sovereign, distinct from the justice
of the town in the hands of the mayor and jurés, who had a considerable
police jurisdiction and the power to punish offences against their own body.


## p. 633 (#679) ############################################

Royal influence
633
In 1320 the king, after a dispute ending in the suspension of the commune,
allowed the échevinage to continue: "qui noster est, et totaliter a com-
munio separatus. ” But despite evidence of the existence of these early
échevins, it is impossible to prove any certain connexion between them
and the Frankish scabini, and between the town and the centena. An
attempt has been made to prove that early towns were actually small
hundreds; and in England we know that the old burhgemot coincided
very closely in power with the hundred moot, and that for the collection
of geld a borough originally was roughly valued at half a hundred; but
that only proves influence, not direct connexion. Pirenne entirely repudi-
ates the idea, and urges that the centena hardly ever coincided with the town,
and that an urban court was a new creation, necessary when the burgesses
came to claim trial within their own walls. In any case, however, what-
ever may be the exact origin of the early échevinage, it is at least
interesting as a preliminary step to fuller communal rights
. It is one of
many proofs that liberties nearly always existed before charters, and that
the towns were painfully working out their own independence step by step.
We are on firmer ground in a later group of theories concerning com-
munal growth; theories which all contain part of the truth and supple-
ment one another by accounting for different aspects of the development.
In connexion with the royal theory, it has been suggested that the
kings themselves formed the communes, that they were particularly the
work of Louis the Fat, and that his successors continued his policy and
allied themselves with the towns against their over-mighty feudal vassals.
It is easy to refute a claim that the kings were true friends to communal
independence. The monarchy was a determined enemy to local unions,
which would inevitably place obstacles in the path of centralisation, and
organisations pledged by their very character to oppose arbitrary power.
It was the growing power of the Crown which eventually caused the de-
struction of the communal movement, and it was the pretended support
of the king which turned many an independent commune into a royal
prévôté. On the other hand, it is quite true that the kings for many
reasons found it to their interest to grant charters and to confirm customs.
They might be in immediate need of money or support, and the sale of
concessions was their easiest way of obtaining both. The privileges granted
to villes de bourgeoisie, the formation of villes-neuves, even the recognition
of the more limited communes, such as those which the English kings
favoured in all their dominions, were repeatedly the work of the monarchs.
But their friendliness or the reverse depended entirely on the circum-
stances of the moment, and their influence was always fatal in the end.
They did not favour real municipal independence, and that commune was
doomed which sought for royal protection or once admitted royal officials
to interfere in its administration.
There are plenty of examples to shew the real policy of the kings, their
desire to undermine independent power, their grant of charters only when
at
CH. XIX.


## p. 634 (#680) ############################################

634
Ecclesiastical influence
something could be gained thereby, their universal interpretation of pro-
tection as interference.