Reply to Objection 1: Ezechiel spoke, like Moses to a rough people, and
therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days,
in order that the uncultured people might be able to understand,
although all things were made together according to Augustine (Gen.
therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days,
in order that the uncultured people might be able to understand,
although all things were made together according to Augustine (Gen.
Summa Theologica
In like manner the lower angels
will co-operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual to
whose guardianship they were appointed: so that this voice can be
ascribed either to one or to many angels.
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OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the
end of the world?
(2) Whether that time is hidden?
(3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time?
(4) Whether it will happen suddenly?
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Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the
world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not
to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together.
For there is more conformity between head and members than between one
member and another, as there is more between cause and effect than
between one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head, did not
delay His resurrection until the end of the world, so as to rise again
together with all men. Therefore there is no need for the resurrection
of the early saints to be deferred until the end of the world, so that
they may rise again together with the others.
Objection 2: Further, the resurrection of the Head is the cause of the
resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of certain members
that desire nobility from their being closely connected with the Head
was not delayed till the end of the world, but followed immediately
after Christ's resurrection, as is piously believed concerning the
Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist [*Ep. de Assump. B. V. , cap. ii,
among St. Jerome's works]. Therefore the resurrection of others will be
so much nearer Christ's resurrection, according as they have been more
conformed to Him by grace and merit.
Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament is more perfect,
and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the state of the Old
Testament. Yet some of the fathers of the Old Testament rose again when
Christ rose, according to Mat. 27:52: "Many of the bodies of the
saints, that had slept, arose. " Therefore it would seem that the
resurrection of the Old Testament saints should not be delayed till the
end of the world, so that all may rise together.
Objection 4: Further, there will be no numbering of years after the end
of the world. Yet after the resurrection of the dead, the years are
still reckoned until the resurrection of others, as appears from Apoc.
20:4,5. For it is stated there that "I saw . . . the souls of them that
were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God," and
further on: "And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. "
And "the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were
finished. " Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed until the
end of the world, that all may rise together.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:12): "Man when he is fallen
asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken, he shall not
wake, nor rise out of his sleep," and it is a question of the sleep of
death. Therefore the resurrection of men will be delayed until the end
of the world when the heavens shall be broken.
Further, it is written (Heb. 11:39): "All these being approved by the
testimony of faith received not the promise," i. e. full beatitude of
soul and body, since "God has provided something better for us, lest
they should be consummated," i. e. perfected, "without us---in order
that," as a gloss observes, "through all rejoicing each one might
rejoice the more. " But the resurrection will not precede the
glorification of bodies, because "He will reform the body of our
lowness made like to the body of His glory" (Phil. 3:21), and the
children of the resurrection will be "as the angels . . . in heaven"
(Mat. 22:30). Therefore the resurrection will be delayed till the end
of the world, when all shall rise together.
I answer that, As Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 4) "Divine providence
decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should be ruled in a certain
order by the more subtle and powerful bodies": wherefore the entire
matter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according to the
movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would be contrary to the
order established in things by Divine providence if the matter of lower
bodies were brought to the state of incorruption, so long as there
remains movement in the higher bodies. And since, according to the
teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men to immortal life
conformably to Christ Who "rising again from the dead dieth now no
more" (Rom. 6:9), the resurrection of human bodies will be delayed
until the end of the world when the heavenly movement will cease. For
this reason, too, certain philosophers, who held that the movement of
the heavens will never cease, maintained that human souls will return
to mortal bodies such as we have now---whether, as Empedocles, they
stated that the soul would return to the same body at the end of the
great year, or that it would return to another body; thus Pythagoras
asserted that "any soul will enter any body," as stated in De Anima i,
3.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the head is more conformed to the
members by conformity of proportion (which is requisite in order that
it have influence over the members) than one member is to another, yet
the head has a certain causality over the members which the members
have not; and in this the members differ from the head and agree with
one another. Hence Christ's resurrection is an exemplar of ours, and
through our faith therein there arises in us the hope of our own
resurrection. But the resurrection of one of Christ's members is not
the cause of the resurrection of other members, and consequently
Christ's resurrection had to precede the resurrection of others who
have all to rise again at the consummation of the world.
Reply to Objection 2: Although among the members some rank higher than
others and are more conformed to the Head, they do not attain to the
character of headship so as to be the cause of others. Consequently
greater conformity to Christ does not give them a right to rise again
before others as though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as
we have said in reference to Christ's resurrection: and if it has been
granted to others that their resurrection should not be delayed until
the general resurrection, this has been by special privilege of grace,
and not as due on account of conformity to Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ep. x ad
Paul. et Eustoch. , now recognized as spurious], seems to be doubtful of
this resurrection of the saints with Christ, namely as to whether,
having been witnesses to the resurrection, they died again, so that
theirs was a resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died again)
rather than a resurrection such as will be at the end of the world---or
really rose again to immortal life, to live for ever in the body, and
to ascend bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says on Mat.
27:52. The latter seems more probable, because, as Jerome says, in
order that they might bear true witness to Christ's true resurrection,
it was fitting that they should truly rise again. Nor was their
resurrection hastened for their sake, but for the sake of bearing
witness to Christ's resurrection: and that by bearing witness thereto
they might lay the foundation of the faith of the New Testament:
wherefore it was more fitting that it should be borne by the fathers of
the Old Testament, than by those who died after the foundation of the
New. It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel mentions
their resurrection before Christ's, we must take this statement as made
in anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history. For none
rose again with a true resurrection before Christ, since He is the
"first-fruits of them that sleep" (1 Cor. 15:20), although some were
resuscitated before Christ's resurrection, as in the case of Lazarus.
Reply to Objection 4: On account of these words, as Augustine relates
(De Civ. Dei xx, 7), certain heretics asserted that there will be a
first resurrection of the dead that they may reign with Christ on earth
for a thousand years; whence they were called "chiliasts" or
"millenarians. " Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 7) that these
words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the spiritual
resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their sins to the gift
of grace: while the second resurrection is of bodies. The reign of
Christ denotes the Church wherein not only martyrs but also the other
elect reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in
glory as regards all, special mention being made of the martyrs,
because they especially reign after death who fought for the truth,
even unto death. The number of a thousand years denotes not a fixed
number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign
with Christ, because the number 1,000 designates universality more than
the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a cube
resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for 10 X 10 =
100, and 100 X 10 = 1,000. Again in Ps. 104:8, "The word which He
commanded to a thousand," i. e. all, "generations. "
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Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden?
Objection 1: It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when
we know exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly,
since "all things are measured by a certain period" (De Generat. ii).
Now the beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its end can
also be known exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection
and judgment. Therefore that time is not hidden.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Apoc. 12:6) that "the woman who
represents the Church had a place prepared by God, that there she might
feed [Vulg. : 'they should feed her'] a thousand two hundred sixty
days. " Again (Dan. 12:11), a certain fixed number of days is mentioned,
which apparently signify years, according to Ezech. 4:6: "A day for a
year, yea a day for a year I have appointed to thee. " Therefore the
time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known
exactly from Holy Writ.
Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament was foreshadowed
in the Old Testament. Now we know exactly the time wherein the state of
the Old Testament endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time
wherein the state of the New Testament will endure. But the state of
the New Testament will last to the end of the world, wherefore it is
said (Mat. 28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . to the consummation of
the world. " Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the
resurrection can be known exactly.
On the contrary, That which is unknown to the angels will be much more
unknown to men: because those things to which men attain by natural
reason are much more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their
natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made to men save by
means of the angels as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. iv). Now the
angels have no exact knowledge of that time, as appears from Mat.
24:36: "Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of
heaven. " Therefore that time is hidden from men.
Further, the apostles were more cognizant of God's secrets than others
who followed them, because they had "the first-fruits of the spirit"
(Rom. 8:23)---" before others in point of time and more abundantly," as
a gloss observes. And yet when they questioned our Lord about this very
matter, He answered them (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the
times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power. " Much
more, therefore, is it hidden from others.
I answer that, As Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 58) "as to the last
age of the human race, which begins from our Lord's coming and lasts
until the end of the world, it is uncertain of how many generations it
will consist: even so old age, which is man's last age, has no fixed
time according to the measure of the other ages, since sometimes alone
it lasts as long a time as all the others. " The reason of this is
because the exact length of future time cannot be known except either
by revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection
cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the
end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous as stated above
[5060](A[1]). And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to
happen at a fixed time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible
from the movement of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is
circular, it is for this very reason able by its nature to endure for
ever: and consequently the time between this and the resurrection
cannot be reckoned by natural reason. Again it cannot be known by
revelation, so that all may be on the watch and ready to meet Christ:
and for this reason when the apostles asked Him about this, Christ
answered (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the times or moments
which the Father hath put in His own power," whereby, as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xviii, 53): "He scatters the fingers of all calculators
and bids them be still. " For what He refused to tell the apostles, He
will not reveal to others: wherefore all those who have been misled to
reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to be untruthful; for
some, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53), stated that from our
Lord's Ascension to His last coming 400 years would elapse, others 500,
others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is evident, as will
likewise be the falseness of those who even now cease not to calculate.
Reply to Objection 1: When we know a thing's beginning and also its end
it follows that its measure is known to us: wherefore if we know the
beginning of a thing the duration of which is measured by the movement
of the heaven, we are able to know its end, since the movement of
heaven is known to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly
movement is God's ordinance alone, which is unknown to us. Wherefore
however much we may know its beginning, we are unable to know its end.
Reply to Objection 2: The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in
the Apocalypse (12:6) denote all the time during which the Church
endures, and not any definite number of years. The reason whereof is
because the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted
three years and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of
days as the aforesaid number. Again the number of days appointed by
Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the end of
the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of
Antichrist's preaching and the duration of his persecution.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the state of the New Testament in
general is foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testament it does not
follow that individuals correspond to individuals: especially since all
the figures of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xviii, 52) answers certain persons who wished to
liken the number of persecutions suffered by the Church to the number
of the plagues of Egypt, in these words: "I do not think that the
occurrences in Egypt were in their signification prophetic of these
persecutions, although those who think so have shown nicety and
ingenuity in adapting them severally the one to the other, not indeed
by a prophetic spirit, but by the guess-work of the human mind, which
sometimes reaches the truth and sometimes not. " The same remarks would
seem applicable to the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means of
such conjectures about the future foretold some things that were true,
and in others was deceived.
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Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be at
night-time. For the resurrection will not be "till the heavens be
broken" (Job 14:12). Now when the heavenly movement ceases, which is
signified by its breaking, there will be no time, neither night nor
day. Therefore the resurrection will not be at night-time.
Objection 2: Further, the end of a thing ought to be most perfect. Now
the end of time will be then: wherefore it is said (Apoc. 10:6) that
"time shall be no longer. " Therefore time ought to be then in its most
perfect disposition and consequently it should be the daytime.
Objection 3: Further, the time should be such as to be adapted to what
is done therein: wherefore (Jn. 13:30) the night is mentioned as being
the time when Judas went out from the fellowship of the light. Now, all
things that are hidden at the present time will then be made most
manifest, because when the Lord shall come He "will bring to light the
hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the
hearts" (1 Cor. 4:5). Therefore it ought to be during the day.
On the contrary, Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Now
Christ's resurrection was at night, as Gregory says in a homily for
Easter (xxi in Evang. ). Therefore our resurrection will also be at
night-time.
Further, the coming of our Lord is compared to the coming of a thief
into the house (Lk. 12:39,40). But the thief comes to the house at
night-time. Therefore our Lord will also come in the night. Now, when
He comes the resurrection will take place, as stated above
([5061]Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time.
I answer that, The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will
be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
43). Nevertheless some assert with sufficient probability that it will
be towards the twilight, the moon being in the east and the sun in the
west; because the sun and moon are believed to have been created in
these positions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether
completed by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said that
Christ arose at such an hour.
Reply to Objection 1: When the resurrection occurs, it will not be time
but the end of time; because at the very instant that the heavens will
cease to move the dead will rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be
in the same position as they occupy now at any fixed hour: and
accordingly it is said that the resurrection will be at this or that
hour.
Reply to Objection 2: The most perfect disposition of time is said to
be midday, on account of the light given by the sun. But then the city
of God will need neither sun nor moon, because the glory of God will
enlighten it (Apoc. 22:5). Wherefore in this respect it matters not
whether the resurrection be in the day or in the night.
Reply to Objection 3: That time should be adapted to manifestation as
regards the things that will happen then, and to secrecy as regards the
fixing of the time. Hence either may happen fittingly, namely that the
resurrection be in the day or in the night.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?
Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not happen
suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection of the dead is foretold
(Ezech. 37:7,8) where it is written: "The bones came together . . . and
I saw and behold the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the
skin was stretched out over them, but there was no spirit in them. "
Therefore the restoration of the bodies will precede in time their
reunion with the souls, and thus the resurrection will not be sudden.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not happen suddenly if it require
several actions following one another. Now the resurrection requires
several actions following one another, namely the gathering of the
ashes, the refashioning of the body, the infusion of the soul.
Therefore the resurrection will not be sudden.
Objection 3: Further, all sound is measured by time. Now the sound of
the trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection, as stated above
([5062]Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will take time and will
not happen suddenly.
Objection 4: Further, no local movement can be sudden as stated in De
Sensu et Sensato vii. Now the resurrection requires local movement in
the gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:51,52): "We shall all indeed
rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye. " Therefore
the resurrection will be sudden.
Further, infinite power works suddenly. But the Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iv): "Thou shalt believe in the resurrection to be wrought by the
power of God," and it is evident that this is infinite. Therefore the
resurrection will be sudden.
I answer that, At the resurrection something will be done by the
ministry of the angels, and something immediately by the power of God,
as stated above ([5063]Q[76], A[3]). Accordingly that which is done by
the ministry of the angels, will not be instantaneous, if by instant we
mean an indivisible point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by
instant we mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done
immediately by God's power will happen suddenly, namely at the end of
the time wherein the work of the angels will be done, because the
higher power brings the lower to perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Ezechiel spoke, like Moses to a rough people, and
therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days,
in order that the uncultured people might be able to understand,
although all things were made together according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv), so Ezechiel expressed the various things that will happen in
the resurrection, although they will all happen together in an instant.
Reply to Objection 2: Although these actions follow one another in
nature, they are all together in time: because either they are together
in the same instant, or one is in the instant that terminates the
other.
Objection 3: The same would seem to apply to that sound as to the forms
of the sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect in its
last instant.
Reply to Objection 4: The gathering of the ashes which cannot be
without local movement will be done by the ministry of the angels.
Hence it will be in time though imperceptible on account of the
facility of operation which is competent to the angels.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE TERM "WHEREFROM" OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection; and
under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether death is the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in every
case?
(2) Whether ashes are, or dust?
(3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether death will be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all cases?
Objection 1: It would seem that death will not be the term "wherefrom"
of the resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but shall
be clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord
"will come to judge the living and the dead. " Now this cannot refer to
the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this
distinction must refer to the previous time, and consequently all will
not die before the judgment.
Objection 2: Further, a natural and common desire cannot be empty and
vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle (2
Cor. 5:4) it is a common desire that "we would not be unclothed but
clothed upon. " Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped
of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the
resurrection.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cxv) that the four
last petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present life: and one
of them is: "Forgive us our debts [Douay: 'trespasses']. " Therefore the
Church prays that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the
Church's prayer cannot be void and not granted: "If you ask the Father
anything in My name, He will give it you" (Jn. 16:23). Therefore at
some time of this life the Church will receive the remission of all
debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound by the sin of our
first parent is that we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time
God will grant to the Church that men be born without original sin. But
death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the
world there will be some men who will not die: and so the same
conclusion follows.
Objection 4: Further, the wise man should always choose the shortest
way. Now the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living to
be transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them
to die first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality.
Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who
shall be found living.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:36): "That which thou sowest
is not quickened except it die first," and he is speaking of the
resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.
Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:22): "As in Adam all die, so also in
Christ all shall be made alive. " Now all shall be made alive in Christ.
Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from
death.
I answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may
be seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). However, the safer and more
common opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and
this for three reasons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine
justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent,
that all who by the act of nature derive their origin from him should
contract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors of
death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture
which foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not
predicted properly except of that "which has fallen and perished," as
the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv). Thirdly, because it is more in
harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted
and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar
does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the
juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature has incurred the
defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality save
by means of death. It is also in keeping with the order of nature for
another reason, because, as it is stated in Phys. viii, 1, "the
movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature,"
just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the whole body:
wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to
move, so when the heavenly movement ceases nothing can remain living
with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement.
Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows
that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven comes to a
standstill must depart from this life.
Reply to Objection 1: This distinction of the dead and the living does
not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole
preceding time, since all who are to be judged were living at some
time, and dead at some time: but it applies to that particular time
which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs
of the judgment shall begin to appear.
Reply to Objection 2: The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void;
but nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the
desire whereby we would not be "unclothed," but "clothed upon," namely
if that be possible: and this desire is called by some a "velleity. "
Reply to Objection 3: It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ
is conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived
without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by
Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men [*See
Editor's note which follows TP, Q[26]]. Nor can it be said that they
needed not this redemption, because it was granted to them that they
should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was
vouchsafed---either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be
healed in them (because so long as that sin remained they were unable
to beget without communicating original sin)---or to nature itself
which was healed. Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption
of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot
be delivered from an evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the
debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in
themselves the fruit of the Lord's prayer, unless all were born debtors
and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from
evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from
evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is afterwards
delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it follow, if it can be
asserted without error that some die not, that they are born without
original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because
God can of His mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by a
past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punishment (Jn.
8): and in like manner He can deliver from death those who have
contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And thus it
does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without
original sin.
Reply to Objection 4: The shortest way is not always the one to be
chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the
end. It is not so here, as is clear from what we have said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all will rise again from ashes?
Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For
Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was
not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to Ps.
15:10; Acts 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.
Objection 2: Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing
cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all will
rise again from ashes.
Objection 3: Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes
immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death,
according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found
living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.
Objection 4: Further, the term "wherefrom" corresponds to the term
"whereto. " Now the term "whereto" of the resurrection is not the same
in the good as in the wicked: "We shall all indeed rise again, but we
shall not all be changed" (1 Cor. 15:51). Therefore the term
"wherefrom" is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from
ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes.
On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rom. 5:10, "For if when we were
enemies"): "All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence:
Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go. " Now all who shall rise
again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at
their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb.
Therefore all will rise again from ashes.
Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly
belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all
bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.
I answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown [5064](A[1])
that all rise again from death prove also that at the general
resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such
as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain
persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as holy writ
foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of
bodies (Phil. 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the
bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of
all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was
inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of
the body, as appears from Gn. 3:19, "Earth thou art and into earth
shalt thou go [*Vulg. : 'Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt
return']. "
Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the
union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even
as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it
first be dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the
elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven,
and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure
elements.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as
to the term "whereto," but not as to the term "wherefrom. "
Reply to Objection 2: By ashes we mean all the remains that are left
after the dissolution of the body---for two reasons. First, because it
was the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead,
and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the
remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of
dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes [*Cf. [5065]FS, Q[82],
A[3]] whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, in order to
be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved
into its primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by fire it
is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to
those things into which the human body is dissolved.
Reply to Objection 3: The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth
will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will
be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their
prejacent matter.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not take its species from its term
"wherefrom" but from its term "whereto. " Hence the resurrection of the
saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection
of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term
"whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom. " And it often
happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term
"wherefrom" is the same---for instance, a thing may be moved from
blackness to whiteness and to pallor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any
natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ashes from which the human body
will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which
will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the
soul, they would stand in the same relation to that soul as other
ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is
to be united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from
others: and this is false.
Objection 2: Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the
soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still
somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is
retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from
the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 20:11): "His bones shall be
filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in
the dust. " But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still
remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.
On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into the very
elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements
are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since
then in the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural
inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards
the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The
first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine
(Enchiridion lxxxviii): "The human body, although changed into the
substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has
become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will
in an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, making
it a living and growing man. "
Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural
agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid ashes
cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore
there is not in them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.
I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that
the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there
always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which
gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in
contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as
with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries
can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that
these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved
retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this
reason have a
natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical,
since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an
equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that
in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but
only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those
ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those
parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul separated from the body remains in the
same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the
body, and consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: These words of Job do not mean that the vices
actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain
according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are
destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for
the sins committed.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY (THREE
ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise
again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern the good and
wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those
which concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked
in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality:
and we shall inquire (1) about their identity; (2) about their
integrity; (3) about their quality.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same?
(2) Whether it will be the self-same man?
(3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the
same parts in which they were before?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical
body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the
same identical body at the resurrection, for "thou sowest not the body
that shall be, but bare grain" (1 Cor. 15:37). Now the Apostle is there
comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore
the same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the
resurrection.
Objection 2: Further, to every form some matter is adapted according to
its condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now the
body is compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to
agent. Since then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same
condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the
heavenly life to which it adhered while living in the world, or will be
cast down into the life of the brutes if it lived as a brute in this
world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body, but either
a heavenly or a brutish body.
Objection 3: Further, after death, as stated above ([5066]Q[78], A[3]),
the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental
parts into which the human body has been dissolved do not agree with
the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as
any other elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body
were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be
described as identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the
self-same body if it be restored from these parts.
Objection 4: Further, there cannot be numerical identity where there is
numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the mixed
body, which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its
form, cannot be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will
not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which
passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This
is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where there is
distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being,
is differentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now
the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death,
since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities from
which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not
return in identity.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see
God my Saviour [Vulg. : 'my God']," where he is speaking of the vision
after the resurrection, as appears from the preceding words: "In the
last day I shall rise out of the earth. " Therefore the selfsame body
will rise again.
Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 27): "Resurrection is
the second rising of that which has fallen. " But the body which we have
now fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically.
I answer that, on this point the philosophers erred and certain modern
heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated
from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways.
First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to
be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as
to the body to which it was reunited, for they held that this second
union was not with the selfsame body that was laid aside in death, but
with another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species.
Of a different species when the soul while existing in the body had led
a life contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after
death from the body of a man into the body of some other animal to
whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for instance into
the body of a dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on
account of robbery and violence, and so forth---and into a body of the
same species when the soul has led a good life in the body, and having
after death experienced some happiness, after some centuries began to
wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a human body.
This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that
they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form
to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved, [*Cf.
[5067]FP, Q[76], A[1]] or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was
possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being
infused into the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it
is united to various bodies. The second is that they held intellect not
to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to
surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sensitive power is
more acute in him on account of the excellence of his bodily
complexion; and hence it was possible for them to assert that man's
soul passes into the soul of a brute animal, especially when the human
soul has been habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are
refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), and in consequence of
these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.
In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them
fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held
that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle
as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople,
in his exposition of Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc.
Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that
they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by
Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to
the same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same
thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which
after death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And
consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will
not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.
Reply to Objection 1: A comparison does not apply to every particular,
but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain
that is born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition,
since it was first sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the
body will rise again identically the same, but of a different
condition, since it was mortal and will rise in immortality.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul rising again and the soul living in this
world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which
is an accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising
again differs, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference
of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is understood as though it were in
matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when
that which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet
remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Physics
and in De Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things subject to
generation and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions,
by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive
various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of
the substantial form from matter, these dimensions still remain the
same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions,
whatever form it receive, is more identified with that which was
generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any
form whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the
human body will be the same as that body's previous matter.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as a simple quality is not the substantial
form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition
whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a
mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities
reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but
its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is in need
of the form. Now the human body has no substantial form besides this
form of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any
previous substantial form, this would give it substantial being, and
would establish it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be
united to a body already established in the genus of substance, and
thus the soul would be compared to the body as artificial forms are to
their matter, in respect of their being established in the genus of
substance by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body
would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philosophers
refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2 [*Cf. [5068]FP, Q[76],
A[1]]). It would also follow that the human body and each of its parts
would not retain their former names in the same sense, which is
contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). Therefore
since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body
falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental
forms does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame
body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated in
a previous reply (ad 2).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?
Objection 1: It would seem that it will not be identically the same man
that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii):
"Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not
repeated identically. " Now such is man's substance in his present
state.
will co-operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual to
whose guardianship they were appointed: so that this voice can be
ascribed either to one or to many angels.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the
end of the world?
(2) Whether that time is hidden?
(3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time?
(4) Whether it will happen suddenly?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the
world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not
to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together.
For there is more conformity between head and members than between one
member and another, as there is more between cause and effect than
between one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head, did not
delay His resurrection until the end of the world, so as to rise again
together with all men. Therefore there is no need for the resurrection
of the early saints to be deferred until the end of the world, so that
they may rise again together with the others.
Objection 2: Further, the resurrection of the Head is the cause of the
resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of certain members
that desire nobility from their being closely connected with the Head
was not delayed till the end of the world, but followed immediately
after Christ's resurrection, as is piously believed concerning the
Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist [*Ep. de Assump. B. V. , cap. ii,
among St. Jerome's works]. Therefore the resurrection of others will be
so much nearer Christ's resurrection, according as they have been more
conformed to Him by grace and merit.
Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament is more perfect,
and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the state of the Old
Testament. Yet some of the fathers of the Old Testament rose again when
Christ rose, according to Mat. 27:52: "Many of the bodies of the
saints, that had slept, arose. " Therefore it would seem that the
resurrection of the Old Testament saints should not be delayed till the
end of the world, so that all may rise together.
Objection 4: Further, there will be no numbering of years after the end
of the world. Yet after the resurrection of the dead, the years are
still reckoned until the resurrection of others, as appears from Apoc.
20:4,5. For it is stated there that "I saw . . . the souls of them that
were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God," and
further on: "And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. "
And "the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were
finished. " Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed until the
end of the world, that all may rise together.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:12): "Man when he is fallen
asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken, he shall not
wake, nor rise out of his sleep," and it is a question of the sleep of
death. Therefore the resurrection of men will be delayed until the end
of the world when the heavens shall be broken.
Further, it is written (Heb. 11:39): "All these being approved by the
testimony of faith received not the promise," i. e. full beatitude of
soul and body, since "God has provided something better for us, lest
they should be consummated," i. e. perfected, "without us---in order
that," as a gloss observes, "through all rejoicing each one might
rejoice the more. " But the resurrection will not precede the
glorification of bodies, because "He will reform the body of our
lowness made like to the body of His glory" (Phil. 3:21), and the
children of the resurrection will be "as the angels . . . in heaven"
(Mat. 22:30). Therefore the resurrection will be delayed till the end
of the world, when all shall rise together.
I answer that, As Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 4) "Divine providence
decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should be ruled in a certain
order by the more subtle and powerful bodies": wherefore the entire
matter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according to the
movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would be contrary to the
order established in things by Divine providence if the matter of lower
bodies were brought to the state of incorruption, so long as there
remains movement in the higher bodies. And since, according to the
teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men to immortal life
conformably to Christ Who "rising again from the dead dieth now no
more" (Rom. 6:9), the resurrection of human bodies will be delayed
until the end of the world when the heavenly movement will cease. For
this reason, too, certain philosophers, who held that the movement of
the heavens will never cease, maintained that human souls will return
to mortal bodies such as we have now---whether, as Empedocles, they
stated that the soul would return to the same body at the end of the
great year, or that it would return to another body; thus Pythagoras
asserted that "any soul will enter any body," as stated in De Anima i,
3.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the head is more conformed to the
members by conformity of proportion (which is requisite in order that
it have influence over the members) than one member is to another, yet
the head has a certain causality over the members which the members
have not; and in this the members differ from the head and agree with
one another. Hence Christ's resurrection is an exemplar of ours, and
through our faith therein there arises in us the hope of our own
resurrection. But the resurrection of one of Christ's members is not
the cause of the resurrection of other members, and consequently
Christ's resurrection had to precede the resurrection of others who
have all to rise again at the consummation of the world.
Reply to Objection 2: Although among the members some rank higher than
others and are more conformed to the Head, they do not attain to the
character of headship so as to be the cause of others. Consequently
greater conformity to Christ does not give them a right to rise again
before others as though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as
we have said in reference to Christ's resurrection: and if it has been
granted to others that their resurrection should not be delayed until
the general resurrection, this has been by special privilege of grace,
and not as due on account of conformity to Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ep. x ad
Paul. et Eustoch. , now recognized as spurious], seems to be doubtful of
this resurrection of the saints with Christ, namely as to whether,
having been witnesses to the resurrection, they died again, so that
theirs was a resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died again)
rather than a resurrection such as will be at the end of the world---or
really rose again to immortal life, to live for ever in the body, and
to ascend bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says on Mat.
27:52. The latter seems more probable, because, as Jerome says, in
order that they might bear true witness to Christ's true resurrection,
it was fitting that they should truly rise again. Nor was their
resurrection hastened for their sake, but for the sake of bearing
witness to Christ's resurrection: and that by bearing witness thereto
they might lay the foundation of the faith of the New Testament:
wherefore it was more fitting that it should be borne by the fathers of
the Old Testament, than by those who died after the foundation of the
New. It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel mentions
their resurrection before Christ's, we must take this statement as made
in anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history. For none
rose again with a true resurrection before Christ, since He is the
"first-fruits of them that sleep" (1 Cor. 15:20), although some were
resuscitated before Christ's resurrection, as in the case of Lazarus.
Reply to Objection 4: On account of these words, as Augustine relates
(De Civ. Dei xx, 7), certain heretics asserted that there will be a
first resurrection of the dead that they may reign with Christ on earth
for a thousand years; whence they were called "chiliasts" or
"millenarians. " Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 7) that these
words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the spiritual
resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their sins to the gift
of grace: while the second resurrection is of bodies. The reign of
Christ denotes the Church wherein not only martyrs but also the other
elect reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in
glory as regards all, special mention being made of the martyrs,
because they especially reign after death who fought for the truth,
even unto death. The number of a thousand years denotes not a fixed
number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign
with Christ, because the number 1,000 designates universality more than
the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a cube
resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for 10 X 10 =
100, and 100 X 10 = 1,000. Again in Ps. 104:8, "The word which He
commanded to a thousand," i. e. all, "generations. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden?
Objection 1: It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when
we know exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly,
since "all things are measured by a certain period" (De Generat. ii).
Now the beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its end can
also be known exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection
and judgment. Therefore that time is not hidden.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Apoc. 12:6) that "the woman who
represents the Church had a place prepared by God, that there she might
feed [Vulg. : 'they should feed her'] a thousand two hundred sixty
days. " Again (Dan. 12:11), a certain fixed number of days is mentioned,
which apparently signify years, according to Ezech. 4:6: "A day for a
year, yea a day for a year I have appointed to thee. " Therefore the
time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known
exactly from Holy Writ.
Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament was foreshadowed
in the Old Testament. Now we know exactly the time wherein the state of
the Old Testament endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time
wherein the state of the New Testament will endure. But the state of
the New Testament will last to the end of the world, wherefore it is
said (Mat. 28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . to the consummation of
the world. " Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the
resurrection can be known exactly.
On the contrary, That which is unknown to the angels will be much more
unknown to men: because those things to which men attain by natural
reason are much more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their
natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made to men save by
means of the angels as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. iv). Now the
angels have no exact knowledge of that time, as appears from Mat.
24:36: "Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of
heaven. " Therefore that time is hidden from men.
Further, the apostles were more cognizant of God's secrets than others
who followed them, because they had "the first-fruits of the spirit"
(Rom. 8:23)---" before others in point of time and more abundantly," as
a gloss observes. And yet when they questioned our Lord about this very
matter, He answered them (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the
times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power. " Much
more, therefore, is it hidden from others.
I answer that, As Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 58) "as to the last
age of the human race, which begins from our Lord's coming and lasts
until the end of the world, it is uncertain of how many generations it
will consist: even so old age, which is man's last age, has no fixed
time according to the measure of the other ages, since sometimes alone
it lasts as long a time as all the others. " The reason of this is
because the exact length of future time cannot be known except either
by revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection
cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the
end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous as stated above
[5060](A[1]). And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to
happen at a fixed time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible
from the movement of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is
circular, it is for this very reason able by its nature to endure for
ever: and consequently the time between this and the resurrection
cannot be reckoned by natural reason. Again it cannot be known by
revelation, so that all may be on the watch and ready to meet Christ:
and for this reason when the apostles asked Him about this, Christ
answered (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the times or moments
which the Father hath put in His own power," whereby, as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xviii, 53): "He scatters the fingers of all calculators
and bids them be still. " For what He refused to tell the apostles, He
will not reveal to others: wherefore all those who have been misled to
reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to be untruthful; for
some, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53), stated that from our
Lord's Ascension to His last coming 400 years would elapse, others 500,
others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is evident, as will
likewise be the falseness of those who even now cease not to calculate.
Reply to Objection 1: When we know a thing's beginning and also its end
it follows that its measure is known to us: wherefore if we know the
beginning of a thing the duration of which is measured by the movement
of the heaven, we are able to know its end, since the movement of
heaven is known to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly
movement is God's ordinance alone, which is unknown to us. Wherefore
however much we may know its beginning, we are unable to know its end.
Reply to Objection 2: The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in
the Apocalypse (12:6) denote all the time during which the Church
endures, and not any definite number of years. The reason whereof is
because the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted
three years and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of
days as the aforesaid number. Again the number of days appointed by
Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the end of
the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of
Antichrist's preaching and the duration of his persecution.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the state of the New Testament in
general is foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testament it does not
follow that individuals correspond to individuals: especially since all
the figures of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xviii, 52) answers certain persons who wished to
liken the number of persecutions suffered by the Church to the number
of the plagues of Egypt, in these words: "I do not think that the
occurrences in Egypt were in their signification prophetic of these
persecutions, although those who think so have shown nicety and
ingenuity in adapting them severally the one to the other, not indeed
by a prophetic spirit, but by the guess-work of the human mind, which
sometimes reaches the truth and sometimes not. " The same remarks would
seem applicable to the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means of
such conjectures about the future foretold some things that were true,
and in others was deceived.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be at
night-time. For the resurrection will not be "till the heavens be
broken" (Job 14:12). Now when the heavenly movement ceases, which is
signified by its breaking, there will be no time, neither night nor
day. Therefore the resurrection will not be at night-time.
Objection 2: Further, the end of a thing ought to be most perfect. Now
the end of time will be then: wherefore it is said (Apoc. 10:6) that
"time shall be no longer. " Therefore time ought to be then in its most
perfect disposition and consequently it should be the daytime.
Objection 3: Further, the time should be such as to be adapted to what
is done therein: wherefore (Jn. 13:30) the night is mentioned as being
the time when Judas went out from the fellowship of the light. Now, all
things that are hidden at the present time will then be made most
manifest, because when the Lord shall come He "will bring to light the
hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the
hearts" (1 Cor. 4:5). Therefore it ought to be during the day.
On the contrary, Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Now
Christ's resurrection was at night, as Gregory says in a homily for
Easter (xxi in Evang. ). Therefore our resurrection will also be at
night-time.
Further, the coming of our Lord is compared to the coming of a thief
into the house (Lk. 12:39,40). But the thief comes to the house at
night-time. Therefore our Lord will also come in the night. Now, when
He comes the resurrection will take place, as stated above
([5061]Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time.
I answer that, The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will
be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
43). Nevertheless some assert with sufficient probability that it will
be towards the twilight, the moon being in the east and the sun in the
west; because the sun and moon are believed to have been created in
these positions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether
completed by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said that
Christ arose at such an hour.
Reply to Objection 1: When the resurrection occurs, it will not be time
but the end of time; because at the very instant that the heavens will
cease to move the dead will rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be
in the same position as they occupy now at any fixed hour: and
accordingly it is said that the resurrection will be at this or that
hour.
Reply to Objection 2: The most perfect disposition of time is said to
be midday, on account of the light given by the sun. But then the city
of God will need neither sun nor moon, because the glory of God will
enlighten it (Apoc. 22:5). Wherefore in this respect it matters not
whether the resurrection be in the day or in the night.
Reply to Objection 3: That time should be adapted to manifestation as
regards the things that will happen then, and to secrecy as regards the
fixing of the time. Hence either may happen fittingly, namely that the
resurrection be in the day or in the night.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?
Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not happen
suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection of the dead is foretold
(Ezech. 37:7,8) where it is written: "The bones came together . . . and
I saw and behold the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the
skin was stretched out over them, but there was no spirit in them. "
Therefore the restoration of the bodies will precede in time their
reunion with the souls, and thus the resurrection will not be sudden.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not happen suddenly if it require
several actions following one another. Now the resurrection requires
several actions following one another, namely the gathering of the
ashes, the refashioning of the body, the infusion of the soul.
Therefore the resurrection will not be sudden.
Objection 3: Further, all sound is measured by time. Now the sound of
the trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection, as stated above
([5062]Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will take time and will
not happen suddenly.
Objection 4: Further, no local movement can be sudden as stated in De
Sensu et Sensato vii. Now the resurrection requires local movement in
the gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:51,52): "We shall all indeed
rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye. " Therefore
the resurrection will be sudden.
Further, infinite power works suddenly. But the Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iv): "Thou shalt believe in the resurrection to be wrought by the
power of God," and it is evident that this is infinite. Therefore the
resurrection will be sudden.
I answer that, At the resurrection something will be done by the
ministry of the angels, and something immediately by the power of God,
as stated above ([5063]Q[76], A[3]). Accordingly that which is done by
the ministry of the angels, will not be instantaneous, if by instant we
mean an indivisible point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by
instant we mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done
immediately by God's power will happen suddenly, namely at the end of
the time wherein the work of the angels will be done, because the
higher power brings the lower to perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Ezechiel spoke, like Moses to a rough people, and
therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days,
in order that the uncultured people might be able to understand,
although all things were made together according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv), so Ezechiel expressed the various things that will happen in
the resurrection, although they will all happen together in an instant.
Reply to Objection 2: Although these actions follow one another in
nature, they are all together in time: because either they are together
in the same instant, or one is in the instant that terminates the
other.
Objection 3: The same would seem to apply to that sound as to the forms
of the sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect in its
last instant.
Reply to Objection 4: The gathering of the ashes which cannot be
without local movement will be done by the ministry of the angels.
Hence it will be in time though imperceptible on account of the
facility of operation which is competent to the angels.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE TERM "WHEREFROM" OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection; and
under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether death is the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in every
case?
(2) Whether ashes are, or dust?
(3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether death will be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all cases?
Objection 1: It would seem that death will not be the term "wherefrom"
of the resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but shall
be clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord
"will come to judge the living and the dead. " Now this cannot refer to
the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this
distinction must refer to the previous time, and consequently all will
not die before the judgment.
Objection 2: Further, a natural and common desire cannot be empty and
vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle (2
Cor. 5:4) it is a common desire that "we would not be unclothed but
clothed upon. " Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped
of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the
resurrection.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cxv) that the four
last petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present life: and one
of them is: "Forgive us our debts [Douay: 'trespasses']. " Therefore the
Church prays that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the
Church's prayer cannot be void and not granted: "If you ask the Father
anything in My name, He will give it you" (Jn. 16:23). Therefore at
some time of this life the Church will receive the remission of all
debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound by the sin of our
first parent is that we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time
God will grant to the Church that men be born without original sin. But
death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the
world there will be some men who will not die: and so the same
conclusion follows.
Objection 4: Further, the wise man should always choose the shortest
way. Now the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living to
be transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them
to die first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality.
Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who
shall be found living.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:36): "That which thou sowest
is not quickened except it die first," and he is speaking of the
resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.
Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:22): "As in Adam all die, so also in
Christ all shall be made alive. " Now all shall be made alive in Christ.
Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from
death.
I answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may
be seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). However, the safer and more
common opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and
this for three reasons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine
justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent,
that all who by the act of nature derive their origin from him should
contract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors of
death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture
which foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not
predicted properly except of that "which has fallen and perished," as
the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv). Thirdly, because it is more in
harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted
and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar
does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the
juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature has incurred the
defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality save
by means of death. It is also in keeping with the order of nature for
another reason, because, as it is stated in Phys. viii, 1, "the
movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature,"
just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the whole body:
wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to
move, so when the heavenly movement ceases nothing can remain living
with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement.
Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows
that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven comes to a
standstill must depart from this life.
Reply to Objection 1: This distinction of the dead and the living does
not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole
preceding time, since all who are to be judged were living at some
time, and dead at some time: but it applies to that particular time
which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs
of the judgment shall begin to appear.
Reply to Objection 2: The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void;
but nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the
desire whereby we would not be "unclothed," but "clothed upon," namely
if that be possible: and this desire is called by some a "velleity. "
Reply to Objection 3: It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ
is conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived
without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by
Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men [*See
Editor's note which follows TP, Q[26]]. Nor can it be said that they
needed not this redemption, because it was granted to them that they
should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was
vouchsafed---either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be
healed in them (because so long as that sin remained they were unable
to beget without communicating original sin)---or to nature itself
which was healed. Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption
of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot
be delivered from an evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the
debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in
themselves the fruit of the Lord's prayer, unless all were born debtors
and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from
evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from
evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is afterwards
delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it follow, if it can be
asserted without error that some die not, that they are born without
original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because
God can of His mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by a
past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punishment (Jn.
8): and in like manner He can deliver from death those who have
contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And thus it
does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without
original sin.
Reply to Objection 4: The shortest way is not always the one to be
chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the
end. It is not so here, as is clear from what we have said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all will rise again from ashes?
Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For
Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was
not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to Ps.
15:10; Acts 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.
Objection 2: Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing
cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all will
rise again from ashes.
Objection 3: Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes
immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death,
according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found
living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.
Objection 4: Further, the term "wherefrom" corresponds to the term
"whereto. " Now the term "whereto" of the resurrection is not the same
in the good as in the wicked: "We shall all indeed rise again, but we
shall not all be changed" (1 Cor. 15:51). Therefore the term
"wherefrom" is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from
ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes.
On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rom. 5:10, "For if when we were
enemies"): "All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence:
Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go. " Now all who shall rise
again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at
their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb.
Therefore all will rise again from ashes.
Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly
belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all
bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.
I answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown [5064](A[1])
that all rise again from death prove also that at the general
resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such
as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain
persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as holy writ
foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of
bodies (Phil. 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the
bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of
all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was
inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of
the body, as appears from Gn. 3:19, "Earth thou art and into earth
shalt thou go [*Vulg. : 'Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt
return']. "
Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the
union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even
as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it
first be dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the
elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven,
and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure
elements.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as
to the term "whereto," but not as to the term "wherefrom. "
Reply to Objection 2: By ashes we mean all the remains that are left
after the dissolution of the body---for two reasons. First, because it
was the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead,
and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the
remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of
dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes [*Cf. [5065]FS, Q[82],
A[3]] whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, in order to
be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved
into its primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by fire it
is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to
those things into which the human body is dissolved.
Reply to Objection 3: The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth
will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will
be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their
prejacent matter.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not take its species from its term
"wherefrom" but from its term "whereto. " Hence the resurrection of the
saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection
of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term
"whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom. " And it often
happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term
"wherefrom" is the same---for instance, a thing may be moved from
blackness to whiteness and to pallor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any
natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ashes from which the human body
will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which
will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the
soul, they would stand in the same relation to that soul as other
ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is
to be united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from
others: and this is false.
Objection 2: Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the
soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still
somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is
retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from
the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 20:11): "His bones shall be
filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in
the dust. " But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still
remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.
On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into the very
elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements
are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since
then in the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural
inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards
the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The
first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine
(Enchiridion lxxxviii): "The human body, although changed into the
substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has
become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will
in an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, making
it a living and growing man. "
Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural
agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid ashes
cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore
there is not in them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.
I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that
the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there
always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which
gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in
contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as
with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries
can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that
these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved
retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this
reason have a
natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical,
since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an
equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that
in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but
only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those
ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those
parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul separated from the body remains in the
same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the
body, and consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: These words of Job do not mean that the vices
actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain
according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are
destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for
the sins committed.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY (THREE
ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise
again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern the good and
wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those
which concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked
in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality:
and we shall inquire (1) about their identity; (2) about their
integrity; (3) about their quality.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same?
(2) Whether it will be the self-same man?
(3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the
same parts in which they were before?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical
body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the
same identical body at the resurrection, for "thou sowest not the body
that shall be, but bare grain" (1 Cor. 15:37). Now the Apostle is there
comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore
the same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the
resurrection.
Objection 2: Further, to every form some matter is adapted according to
its condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now the
body is compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to
agent. Since then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same
condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the
heavenly life to which it adhered while living in the world, or will be
cast down into the life of the brutes if it lived as a brute in this
world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body, but either
a heavenly or a brutish body.
Objection 3: Further, after death, as stated above ([5066]Q[78], A[3]),
the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental
parts into which the human body has been dissolved do not agree with
the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as
any other elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body
were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be
described as identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the
self-same body if it be restored from these parts.
Objection 4: Further, there cannot be numerical identity where there is
numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the mixed
body, which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its
form, cannot be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will
not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which
passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This
is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where there is
distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being,
is differentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now
the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death,
since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities from
which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not
return in identity.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see
God my Saviour [Vulg. : 'my God']," where he is speaking of the vision
after the resurrection, as appears from the preceding words: "In the
last day I shall rise out of the earth. " Therefore the selfsame body
will rise again.
Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 27): "Resurrection is
the second rising of that which has fallen. " But the body which we have
now fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically.
I answer that, on this point the philosophers erred and certain modern
heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated
from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways.
First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to
be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as
to the body to which it was reunited, for they held that this second
union was not with the selfsame body that was laid aside in death, but
with another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species.
Of a different species when the soul while existing in the body had led
a life contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after
death from the body of a man into the body of some other animal to
whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for instance into
the body of a dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on
account of robbery and violence, and so forth---and into a body of the
same species when the soul has led a good life in the body, and having
after death experienced some happiness, after some centuries began to
wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a human body.
This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that
they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form
to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved, [*Cf.
[5067]FP, Q[76], A[1]] or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was
possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being
infused into the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it
is united to various bodies. The second is that they held intellect not
to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to
surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sensitive power is
more acute in him on account of the excellence of his bodily
complexion; and hence it was possible for them to assert that man's
soul passes into the soul of a brute animal, especially when the human
soul has been habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are
refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), and in consequence of
these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.
In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them
fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held
that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle
as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople,
in his exposition of Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc.
Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that
they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by
Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to
the same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same
thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which
after death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And
consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will
not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.
Reply to Objection 1: A comparison does not apply to every particular,
but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain
that is born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition,
since it was first sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the
body will rise again identically the same, but of a different
condition, since it was mortal and will rise in immortality.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul rising again and the soul living in this
world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which
is an accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising
again differs, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference
of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is understood as though it were in
matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when
that which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet
remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Physics
and in De Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things subject to
generation and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions,
by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive
various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of
the substantial form from matter, these dimensions still remain the
same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions,
whatever form it receive, is more identified with that which was
generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any
form whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the
human body will be the same as that body's previous matter.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as a simple quality is not the substantial
form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition
whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a
mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities
reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but
its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is in need
of the form. Now the human body has no substantial form besides this
form of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any
previous substantial form, this would give it substantial being, and
would establish it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be
united to a body already established in the genus of substance, and
thus the soul would be compared to the body as artificial forms are to
their matter, in respect of their being established in the genus of
substance by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body
would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philosophers
refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2 [*Cf. [5068]FP, Q[76],
A[1]]). It would also follow that the human body and each of its parts
would not retain their former names in the same sense, which is
contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). Therefore
since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body
falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental
forms does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame
body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated in
a previous reply (ad 2).
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Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?
Objection 1: It would seem that it will not be identically the same man
that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii):
"Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not
repeated identically. " Now such is man's substance in his present
state.
