No More Learning

_)

Cæsar, ignorant of the exact position where the Belgæ were encamped,
directed his march towards the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. His cavalry
preceded him, but the order of march was different from that which had
been communicated to the Nervii by the deserters; as he approached the
enemy, he had, according to his custom, united six legions, and placed
the baggage in the tail of the column, under the guard of the two
legions recently raised, who closed the march.

The cavalry, slingers, and archers passed the Sambre and engaged the
cavalry of the enemy, who at one moment took refuge in the woods, and at
another resumed the offensive, nor were ever pursued beyond the open
ground. Meanwhile, the six legions debouched. Arrived on the place
chosen for the camp, they began to retrench, and shared the labour among
them. Some proceeded to dig the fosses, while others spread themselves
over the country in search of timber and turf. They had hardly begun
their work, when the Belgæ, perceiving the first portion of the baggage
(which was the moment fixed for the attack), suddenly issue from the
forest with all their forces, in the order of battle they had adopted,
rush upon the cavalry and put it to rout, and run towards the Sambre
with such incredible rapidity that they seem to be everywhere at
once--at the edge of the wood, in the river, and in the midst of the
Roman troops; then, with the same celerity, climbing the hill, they rush
towards the camp, where the soldiers are at work at the retrenchments.
The Roman army is taken off its guard.

Cæsar had to provide against everything at the same time. It was
necessary to raise the purple standard as the signal for hastening to
arms,[262] to sound the trumpets to recall the soldiers employed in the
works, to bring in those who were at a distance, form the lines,
harangue the troops, give the word of order. [263] In this critical
situation, the experience of the soldiers, acquired in so many combats,
and the presence of the lieutenants with each legion, helped to supply
the place of the general, and to enable each to take, by his own
impulse, the dispositions he thought best. The impetuosity of the enemy
is such that the soldiers have time neither to put on the ensigns,[264]
nor to take the covering from their bucklers, nor even to put on their
helmets. Each, abandoning his labours, runs to range himself in the
utmost haste under the first standard which presents itself.

The army, constrained by necessity, was drawn up on the slope of the
hill, much more in obedience to the nature of the ground and the
exigencies of the moment than according to military rules. The legions,
separated from one another by thick hedges, which intercepted their
view, could not lend each other mutual succour; they formed an irregular
and interrupted line: the 9th and 10th legions were placed on the left
of the camp, the 8th and 11th in the centre, the 7th and 12th on the
right. In this general confusion, in which it became as difficult to
carry succour to the points threatened as to obey one single command,
everything was ruled by accident.

Cæsar, after taking the measures most urgent, rushes towards the troops
which chance presents first to him, takes them as he finds them in his
way, harangues them, and, when he comes to the 10th legion, he recalls
to its memory, in a few words, its ancient valour. As the enemy was
already within reach of the missiles, he orders the attack; then,
proceeding towards another point to encourage his troops, he finds them
already engaged.

The soldiers of the 9th and 10th legions throw the _pilum_, and fall,
sword in hand, upon the Atrebates, who, fatigued by their rapid advance,
out of breath, and pierced with wounds, are soon driven back from the
hill they have just climbed. These two legions, led no doubt by
Labienus, drive them into the Sambre, slay a great number, cross the
river at their heels, and pursue them up the slopes of the right bank.
The enemy, then thinking to take advantage of the commanding position,
form again, and renew the combat; but the Romans repulse them anew, and,
continuing their victorious march, take possession of the Gaulish camp.
In the centre, the 8th and 11th legions, attacked by the Veromandui, had
driven them back upon the banks of the Sambre, to the foot of the
heights, where the combat still continued.

While on the left and in the centre victory declared for the Romans, on
the right wing, the 7th and 12th legions were in danger of being
overwhelmed under the efforts of the whole army of the Nervii, composed
of 60,000 men. These intrepid warriors, led by their chief, Boduognatus,
had dashed across the Sambre in face of the escarpments of the left
bank; they had boldly climbed these, and thrown themselves, in close
rank, upon the two legions of the right wing. These legions were placed
in a position the more critical, as the victorious movements of the left
and centre, by stripping almost entirely of troops that part of the
field of battle, had left them without support. The Nervii take
advantage of these circumstances: some move towards the summit of the
heights to seize the camp, others outflank the two legions on the right
wing (_aperto latere_).

As chance would have it, at this same moment, the cavalry and
light-armed foot, who had been repulsed at the first attack, regained
pell-mell the camp; finding themselves unexpectedly in face of the
enemy, they are confounded, and take to flight again in another
direction. The valets of the army, who, from the Decuman gate and the
summit of the hill, had seen the Romans cross the river victoriously,
and had issued forth in hope of plunder, look back; perceiving the
Nervii in the camp, they fly precipitately. The tumult is further
increased by the cries of the baggage-drivers, who rush about in terror.
Among the auxiliaries in the Roman army, there was a body of Treviran
cavalry, who enjoyed among the Gauls a reputation for valour. When they
saw the camp invaded, the legions pressed and almost surrounded, the
valets, the cavalry, the slingers, the Numidians, separated, dispersed,
and flying on all sides, they believed that all was lost, took the road
for their own country, and proclaimed everywhere in their march that the
Roman army was destroyed.

Cæsar had repaired from the left wing to the other points of the line.
When he arrived at the right wing, he had found the 7th and 12th legions
hotly engaged, the ensigns of the cohorts of the 12th legion collected
on the same point, the soldiers pressed together and mutually
embarrassing each other, all the centurions of the 4th cohort and the
standard-bearer killed; the standard lost; in the other cohorts most of
the centurions were either killed or wounded, and among the latter was
the primipilus Sextius Baculus, a man of rare bravery, who was destined
soon afterwards to save the legion of Galba in the Valais. The soldiers
who still resisted were exhausted, and those of the last ranks were
quitting the ranks to avoid the missiles; new troops of enemies
continually climbed the hill, some advancing to the front against the
Romans, the others turning them on the two wings. In this extreme
danger, Cæsar judges that he can hope for succour only from himself:
having arrived without buckler, he seizes that of a legionary of the
last ranks and rushes to the first line; there, calling the centurions
by their names and exciting the soldiers, he draws the 12th legion
forward, and causes more interval to be made between the files of the
companies in order to facilitate the handling of their swords. His
example and encouraging words restore hope to the combatants and revive
their courage. Each man, under the eyes of their general, shows new
energy, and this heroic devotedness begins to cool the impetuosity of
the enemy. Not far thence, the 7th legion was pressed by a multitude of
assailants. Cæsar orders the tribunes gradually to bring the two legions
back to back, so that each presented its front to the enemy in opposite
directions. Fearing no longer to be taken in the rear, they resist with
firmness, and fight with new ardour. While Cæsar is thus occupied, the
two legions of the rear-guard, which formed the escort of the baggage
(the 13th and 14th), informed of what was taking place, arrive in haste,
and appear in view of the enemy at the top of the hill. On his part, T.
Labienus, who, at the head of the 9th and 10th legions, had made himself
master of the enemy’s camp on the heights of Haumont, discovers what is
passing in the Roman camp. He judges, by the flight of the cavalry and
servants, the greatness of the danger with which Cæsar is threatened,
and sends the 10th legion to his succour, which, re-passing the Sambre,
and climbing the slopes of Neuf-Mesnil, runs in haste to fall upon the
rear of the Nervii.

On the arrival of these re-enforcements, the whole aspect of things
changes: the wounded raise themselves, and support themselves on their
bucklers in order to take part in the action; the valets, seeing the
terror of the enemy, throw themselves unarmed upon men who are armed;
and the cavalry,[265] to efface the disgrace of their flight, seek to
outdo the legionaries in the combat. Meanwhile the Nervii fight with the
courage of despair. When those of the first ranks fall, the nearest take
their places, and mount upon their bodies; they are slain in their turn;
the dead form heaps; the survivors throw, from the top of this mountain
of corpses, their missiles upon the Romans, and send them back their own
_pila_. “How can we, then, be astonished,” says Cæsar, “that such men
dared to cross a broad river, climb its precipitous banks, and overcome
the difficulties of the ground, since nothing appeared too much for
their courage? ” They met death to the last man, and 60,000 corpses
covered the field of battle so desperately fought, in which the fortune
of Cæsar had narrowly escaped wreck.

After this struggle, in which, according to the “Commentaries,” the race
and name of the Nervii were nearly annihilated, the old men, women, and
children, who had sought refuge in the middle of the marshes, finding no
hopes of safety, surrendered. [266] In dwelling on the misfortune of
their country, they said that, of 600 senators, there remained only
three; and that, of 60,000 combatants, hardly 500 had survived. Cæsar,
to show his clemency towards the unfortunate who implored it, treated
these remains of the Nervii with kindness; he left them their lands and
towns, and enjoined the neighbouring peoples not only not to molest
them, but even to protect them from all outrage and violence. [267]


[Sidenote: Siege of the _Oppidum_ of the Aduatuci. ]

VIII. This victory was gained, no doubt, towards the end of July. Cæsar
detached the 7th legion, under the orders of young P. Crassus, to reduce
the maritime peoples of the shores of the ocean: the Veneti, the Unelli,
the Osismii, the Curiosolitæ, the Essuvii, the Aulerci, and the Redones.
He proceeded in person, with the seven other legions, following the
course of the Sambre, to meet the Aduatuci, who, as we have seen above,
were marching to join the Nervii. They were the descendants of those
Cimbri and Teutones who, in their descent upon the Roman province and
Italy in the year 652, had left on this side the Rhine 6,000 men in
charge of as much of the baggage as was too heavy to be carried with
them. After the defeat of their companions by Marius, and many
vicissitudes, these Germans had established themselves towards the
confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, and had there formed a state.

As soon as the Aduatuci were informed of the disaster of the Nervii,
they returned to their own country, abandoned their towns and forts, and
retired, with all they possessed, into one _oppidum_, remarkably
fortified by nature. Surrounded in every direction by precipitous rocks
of great elevation, it was accessible only on one side by a gentle
slope, at most 100 feet wide, defended by a fosse and double wall of
great height, on which they placed enormous masses of rock and pointed
beams. The mountain on which the citadel of Namur is situated[268]
answers sufficiently to this description. (_See Plate 11. _)

On the arrival of the army, they made at first frequent sorties, and
engaged in battles on a small scale. Later, when the place was
surrounded by a countervallation of twelve feet high in a circuit of
15,000 feet,[269] with numerous redoubts, they kept close in their
_oppidum_. The Romans pushed forward their covered galleries, raised a
terrace under shelter of these galleries, and constructed a tower of
timber, intended to be pushed against the wall. At the sight of these
preparations, the Aduatuci, who, like most of the Gauls, despised the
Romans on account of their small stature, addressed the besiegers
ironically from their walls, not understanding how a great machine,
placed at a great distance, could be put in motion by men so diminutive.
But when they saw this tower move and approach the walls, struck with a
sight so strange and so new to them, they sent to implore peace,
demanding, as the only condition, that they should be left in possession
of their arms. Cæsar refused this condition, but declared that, if they
surrendered before the ram had struck their wall, they should be placed,
like the Nervii, under the protection of the Roman people, and preserved
from all violence. The besieged thereupon threw such a quantity of arms
into the fosses that they filled them almost to the height of the wall
and the terrace; yet, as was afterwards discovered, they had retained
about one-third. They threw open their gates, and that day remained
quiet.

The Romans had occupied the town; towards evening, Cæsar ordered them to
leave it, fearing the violences which the soldiers might commit on the
inhabitants during the night. But these, believing that after the
surrender of the place the posts of the countervallation would be
guarded with less care, resume the arms they had concealed, furnish
themselves with bucklers of bark of trees, or wicker, covered hastily
with skins, and, at midnight, attack the part of the works which seems
most easy of access. Fires, prepared by Cæsar, soon announce the attack.
The soldiers rush to the spot from the nearest redoubts; and, though the
enemies fight with the obstinacy of despair, the missiles thrown from
the entrenchments and the towers disperse them, and they are driven back
into the town with a loss of 4,000 men. Next day the gates were broken
in without resistance, and, the town once taken, the inhabitants were
sold publicly to the number of 53,000. [270]


[Sidenote: Subjugation of Armorica by P. Crassus]

IX. Towards the time of the conclusion of this siege (the first days of
September), Cæsar received letters from P. Crassus. This lieutenant
announced that the maritime peoples on the coasts of the ocean, from the
Loire to the Seine, had submitted. On the arrival of this news at Rome,
the Senate decreed fifteen days of thanksgivings. [271]

These successful exploits, and Gaul entirely pacified, gave to the
barbarian peoples so high an opinion of the Roman power, that the
nations beyond the Rhine, particularly the Ubii, sent deputies to Cæsar,
offering hostages and obedience to his orders. Anxious to proceed to
Italy and Illyria, he commanded the deputies to return to him at the
commencement of the following spring, and placed his legions, with the
exception of the 12th, in winter quarters, in the countries of the
Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, neighbouring upon the localities
where Crassus had been making war. [272] They were probably _échelonnés_
in the valley of the Loire, between Orleans and Angers.


[Sidenote: Expedition of Galba into the Valais. ]

X. Before he departed for Italy, Cæsar sent Servius Galba, with a part
of the cavalry and the 12th legion, into the country of the Nantuates,
the Veragri, and the Seduni (_peoples of Chablais and Lower and Upper
Valais_), whose territory extended from the country of the Allobroges,
Lake Léman, and the Rhone, to the summit of the Alps. His object was to
open an easy communication with Italy by way of these mountains, that
is, by the Simplon and the St. Bernard, where travellers were
continually subject to exactions and vexations. Galba, after some
successful battles, by which all these peoples were subdued, obtained
hostages, placed two cohorts among the Nantuates, and the rest of his
legions in a town of the Veragri called Octodurus (_Martigny_). This
town, situated in a little plain at the bottom of a glen surrounded by
high mountains, was divided into two parts by a river (_the Drance_).
Galba left one bank to the Gauls, and established his troops on the
other, which he fortified with a fosse and rampart.

Several day had passed in the greatest tranquillity, when Galba learnt
suddenly that the Gauls had during the night evacuated the part of the
town which they occupied, and that the Veragri and the Seduni were
appearing in great numbers on the surrounding mountains. The situation
was most critical; for not only could Galba reckon on no succour, but he
had not even finished his retrenchments, or gathered in his provisions
in sufficient quantity. He called together a council, in which it was
decided, in spite of the opinions of some chiefs, who proposed to
abandon the baggage and fight their way out, that they should defend the
camp; but the enemies hardly gave the Romans time to make the necessary
dispositions. Suddenly they rush from all sides towards the
retrenchments, and throw a shower of darts and javelins (_gæsa_). Having
to defend themselves against forces which are continually renewed, they
are obliged to fight all at once, and to move incessantly to the point
that are most threatened. The men who are fatigued, and even the
wounded, cannot quit the place. The combat had lasted six hours: the
Romans were exhausted with fatigue. Already they began to be short of
missiles; already the Gauls, with increasing audacity, were filling up
the fosse and tearing down the palisades; already the Romans were
reduced to the last extremity, when the primipilus, P. Sextius Baculus,
the same who had shown so much energy in the battle of the Sambre, and
C. Volusenus, tribune of the soldiers, advise Galba that the only hope
which remained was in a sally. The suggestion is adopted. At the command
of the centurions, the soldiers confine themselves to parrying the
missiles, and take breath; then, when the signal is given, rushing on
all sides to the gates, they fall upon the enemy, put him to rout, and
make an immense slaughter. Of 30,000 Gauls, about 10,000 were slain. [273]
In spite of this, Galba, not believing himself in safety in so difficult
a country, in the midst of hostile populations, brought back the 12th
legion into the country of the Allobroges, where it wintered. [273]




CHAPTER VI.

(Year of Rome 698. )

(BOOK III. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)

WAR OF THE VENETI--VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI--SUBMISSION OF
AQUITAINE--MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII.


[Sidenote: Insurrection of the Maritime Peoples. ]

I. While Cæsar was visiting Illyria and the different towns of the
Cisalpine, such as Ravenna and Lucca, war broke out anew in Gaul. The
cause was this. Young P. Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th
legion among the Andes, near the ocean; as he fell short of wheat, he
sent several prefects and military tribunes to ask for provisions from
the neighbouring peoples. T. Terrasidius was deputed to the Unelli,[274]
M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolitæ, and Quintus Velanius, with T.
Silius, to the Veneti. This last people was the most powerful on the
whole coast through its commerce and its navy. Its numerous ships served
to carry on a traffic with the isle of Britain. Possessed of consummate
skill in the art of navigation, it ruled over this part of the ocean.
The Veneti first seized Silius and Velanius, in the hope of obtaining in
exchange for them the return of the hostages given to Crassus. Their
example was soon followed. The Unelli and the Curiosolitæ seized, with
the same design, Trebius and Terrasidius; they entered into an
engagement with the Veneti, through their chiefs, to run the same
fortune, excited the rest of the neighbouring maritime peoples to
recover their liberty, and all together intimated to Crassus that he
must send back the hostages if he wished his tribunes and prefects to be
restored.

Cæsar, then very far distant from the scene of these events, learnt them
from Crassus. He immediately ordered galleys to be constructed on the
Loire, rowers to be fetched from the coast of the Mediterranean, and
sailors and pilots to be procured. These measures having been promptly
executed, he repaired to the army as soon as the season permitted. At
the news of his approach, the Veneti and their allies, conscious that
they had been guilty of throwing into fetters envoys invested with a
character which is inviolable, made preparations proportionate to the
danger with which they saw they were threatened. Above all, they set to
work making their ships ready for action. Their confidence was great:
they knew that the tides would intercept the roads on the sea-coast;
they reckoned on the difficulty of the navigation in those unknown
latitudes, where the ports are few, and on the want of provisions, which
would not permit the Romans to make a long stay in their country.

Their determination once taken, they fortified their _oppida_, and
transported to them the wheat from their fields. Persuaded that the
country of the Veneti would be the first attacked, they gathered
together all their ships, no doubt in the vast estuary formed by the
river Auray in the Bay of Quiberon. (_See Plate 12. _) They allied
themselves with the maritime peoples of the coast, from the mouth of the
Loire to that of the Scheldt,[275] and demanded succour from the isle of
Britain. [276]

In spite of the difficulties of this war, Cæsar undertook it without
hesitation. He was influenced by grave motives: the violation of the
right of nations, the rebellion after submission, the coalition of so
many peoples; above all, by the fear that their impunity would be an
encouragement to others. If we believe Strabo, Cæsar, as well as the
Veneti, had other reasons to desire this war: on one side, the latter,
possessed of the commerce of Britain, already suspected the design of
the Roman general to pass into that island, and they sought to deprive
him of the means; and, on the other, Cæsar could not attempt the
dangerous enterprise of a descent on England till after he had destroyed
the fleet of the Veneti, the sole masters of the ocean. [277]


[Sidenote: War against the Veneti. ]

II. Be this as it may, in order to prevent new risings, Cæsar divided
his army so as to occupy the country militarily. The lieutenant T.
Labienus, at the head of a part of the cavalry, was sent to the Treviri,
with the mission to visit the Remi and other peoples of Belgic Gaul, to
maintain them in their duty, and to oppose the passage of the Rhine by
the Germans, who were said to have been invited by the Belgæ. P. Crassus
was ordered, with twelve legionary cohorts, and a numerous body of
cavalry, to repair into Aquitaine, to prevent the inhabitants of that
province from swelling the forces of the insurrection. The lieutenant Q.
Titurius Sabinus was detached with three legions to restrain the Unelli,
the Curiosolitæ, and the Lexovii. The young D. Brutus,[278] who had
arrived from the Mediterranean with the galleys,[279] received the
command of the fleet, which was increased by the Gaulish ships borrowed
from the Pictones, the Santones, and other peoples who had submitted.
His instructions enjoined him to sail as soon as possible for the
country of the Veneti. As to Cæsar, he proceeded thither with the rest
of the land army.

The eight legions of the Roman army were then distributed thus: to the
north of the Loire, three legions; in Aquitaine, with Crassus, a legion
and two cohorts; one legion, no doubt, on the fleet; and two legions and
eight cohorts with the general-in-chief, to undertake the war against
the Veneti. [280]

We may admit that Cæsar started from the neighbourhood of Nantes, and
directed his march to the Roche-Bernard, where he crossed the Vilaine.
Having arrived in the country of the Veneti, he resolved to profit by
the time which must pass before the arrival of his fleet to obtain
possession of the principal _oppida_ where the inhabitants took refuge.
Most of these petty fortresses on the coast of the Veneti were situated
at the extremities of tongues of land or promontories; at high tide they
could not be reached by land, while at low tide the approach was
inaccessible to ships, which remained dry on the flats; a double
obstacle to a siege.

The Romans attacked them in the following manner: they constructed on
the land, at low tide, two parallel dykes, at the same time serving for
terraces (_aggere ac molibus_), and forming approaches towards the
place. During the course of construction, the space comprised between
these two dykes continued to be inundated with water at every high tide;
but as soon as they had succeeded in joining them up to the _oppidum_,
this space, where the sea could no longer penetrate, remained finally
dry, and then presented to the besiegers a sort of place of arms useful
in the attack. [281]

With the aid of these long and laborious works, in which the height of
the dykes finished by equalling that of the walls, the Romans succeeded
in taking several of these _oppida_. But all their labours were thrown
away; for, as soon as the Veneti thought themselves no longer safe, they
evacuated the _oppidum_, embarked with all their goods on board their
numerous vessels, and withdrew to the neighbouring _oppida_, the
situations of which offered the same advantages for a new resistance.

The greater part of the fine season had passed away in this manner.
Cæsar, convinced at length that the assistance of his ships was
indispensable, came to the resolution of suspending these laborious and
fruitless operations until the arrival of his fleet; and, that he might
be near at hand to receive it, he encamped to the south of the Bay of
Quiberon, near the coast, on the heights of Saint-Gildas. (_See Plate
12. _)

The vessels of the fleet, held back by contrary winds, had not yet been
able to assemble at the mouth of the Loire. As the Veneti had foreseen,
they navigated with difficulty on this vast sea, subject to high tides,
and almost entirely unfurnished with ports. The inexperience of the
sailors, and even the form of the ships, added to their difficulties.

The enemy’s ships, on the contrary, were built and rigged in a manner to
enable them to wrestle with all obstacles; flatter than those of the
Romans, they had less to fear from the shallows and low tide. Built of
oak, they supported the most violent shocks; the front and back, very
lofty, were beyond the reach of the strongest missiles. The beams
(_transtra_), made of pieces of timber a foot thick, were fixed with
iron nails, an inch in bigness; and the anchors were held by iron chains
instead of cables; soft skins, made very thin, served for sails, either
because those peoples were nearly or entirely unacquainted with linen,
or because they regarded the ordinary sails as insufficient to support,
with such heavy ships, the impetuosity of the winds of the ocean. The
Roman ships were superior to them only in agility and the impulse of the
oars. In everything else, those of the Veneti were better adapted to the
nature of the localities and to the heavy seas. By the solidity of their
construction they resisted the ships’ beaks, and by their elevation they
were secure from the missiles, and were difficult to seize with the
grappling-irons (_copulæ_). [282]


[Sidenote: Naval Combat against the Veneti. ]

III. The Roman fleet, thanks to a wind from the east or north-east, was
at length enabled to set sail. [283] It quitted the Loire, and directed
its course towards the Bay of Quiberon and Point Saint-Jaques. (_See
Plate 12. _) As soon as the Veneti perceived it, they sent out from the
port formed by the river Auray 220 ships well armed and well equipped,
which advanced to encounter it. During this time, the Roman fleet
reached Point Saint-Jaques, where it formed in order of battle near the
shore. That of the Veneti drew up in front of it. The battle took place
under the very eyes of Cæsar and his troops, who occupied the heights on
the shore.

It was the first time that a Roman fleet appeared on the ocean.
Everything conspired to disconcert Brutus, as well as the tribunes of
the soldiers and the centurions who commanded each vessel: the impotence
of the beaks against the Gaulish ships; the height of the enemy’s poops,
which overlooked even the high towers of the Roman vessels; and lastly,
the inefficiency of the missiles thrown upwards. The military chiefs
were hesitating, and had already experienced some loss,[284] when, to
remedy this disadvantage, they imagined a method having some analogy
with that to which Duillius owed his victory over the Carthaginians in
492: they tried to disable the Gaulish vessels by the aid of hooks
(_falces_) similar to those which were used in attacks on fortresses
(_non absimili forma muralium falcium_). [285] The _falx_ was an iron
with a point and sharpened hook, fixed at the end of long poles, which,
suspended to the masts by ropes, received an impulsion similar to that
of the ram. One or more ships approached a Gaulish vessel, and, as soon
as the crew had succeeded in catching with one of these hooks the ropes
which attached the yards to the masts, the sailors rowed away with all
their strength, so as to break or cut the cords. The yards fell; the
disabled vessel was immediately surrounded by the Romans, who boarded
it; and then all depended on mere valour. This manœuvre was
completely successful. The soldiers of the fleet, knowing that no act of
courage could pass unperceived by Cæsar and the land troops, emulated
one another in zeal, and captured several of the enemy’s vessels. The
Gauls prepared to seek their safety in flight. They had already swerved
their ships to the wind, when suddenly there came on a dead calm. This
unexpected occurrence decided the victory. Left without the possibility
of moving, the heavy Gaulish vessels were captured one after another; a
very small number succeeded in gaining the coast under favour of the
night.

The battle, which began at ten o’clock in the morning, had lasted till
sunset. It terminated the war with the Veneti and the other maritime
peoples of the ocean. They lost in it, at one blow, all their youth, all
their principal citizens, and all their fleet; without refuge, without
the means of defending any longer their _oppida_, they surrendered
themselves, bodies and goods. Cæsar, wishing to compel the Gauls in
future to respect the rights of nations, caused the whole Senate to be
put to death and the rest of the inhabitants to be sold for slaves.
Cæsar has been justly reproached with this cruel chastisement; yet this
great man gave such frequent proofs of his clemency towards the
vanquished, that he must have yielded to very powerful political motives
to order an execution so contrary to his habits and temper. Moreover, it
was a sad effect of the war to expose incessantly the chiefs of the
Gallic states to the resentments of the conquerors and the fury of the
mob. While the Roman general punished the Senate of the Veneti for its
revolt and obstinate resistance, the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii
slaughtered theirs because it laboured to prevent them from joining the
insurrection. [286]


[Sidenote: Victory of Sabinus over the Unelli. ]

IV. While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Q. Titurius
Sabinus gained a decisive victory over the Unelli. At the head of this
nation, and other states in revolt, was Viridovix, who had been joined,
a few days before, by the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii. A
multitude of men of no account, who had joined him from all parts of
Gaul, in the hope of pillage, came to increase the number of his troops.
Sabinus, starting, we believe, from the neighbourhood of Angers with his
three legions, arrived in the country of the Unelli, and chose there for
his camp a position which was advantageous in all respects. He
established himself on a hill belonging to the line of heights which
separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune, where we now
find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier. [287] (_See Plate
13. _) This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north,
the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000
paces (1,500 mètres) to the banks of the Sée. Viridovix came and took a
position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the
heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his
troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up
in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own
soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the
latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in
face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a
lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle,
without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But,
not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he
determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and
cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence of being a
deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following
night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of
Cæsar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the
favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them
escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for
arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with
branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the
retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble
and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But
Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order
to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while
they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality,
the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the
Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pursued by the
cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately
submitted.

Cæsar and Sabinius received intelligence at the same time, one of the
victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against
the Veneti. [288]


[Sidenote: Conquest of Aquitaine by P. Crassus. ]

V. Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached, as we have seen, with
twelve cohorts and a body of cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which,
according to the “Commentaries,” formed the third part of Gaul. [289] He
believed that he could not display too much prudence in a country
where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus had
lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced
a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries,
and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he
led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and
strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during
its march. Their horsemen were at first repulsed and pursued; but,
suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (_in
convalle_), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the
battle re-commenced with fury.

Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour
to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show
what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general
and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans.
Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the _oppidum_ of
the Sotiates (the town of _Sos_), attempted to carry it by assault; but
the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to
covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to
sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they
went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the
Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all
their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers, they
made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the
Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation,
Adiatunnus,[290] supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty
men of the class called _soldures_, attempted a sally from another side
of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and,
after a severe struggle, drove him back into the _oppidum_;
nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.

When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the
countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far
from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an _oppidum_ fortified
by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour
and chiefs of the peoples of Citerior Spain, which joined upon
Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs
enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in
their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had
too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out
detachments on all sides, who intercepted his provisions. At last, as he
saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was
danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council; which was of the
same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.

At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the camp and formed in two
lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited
the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections
of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the
weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the
victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions
they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack
with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained
shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer
battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of
fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans: they demanded with
loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to
their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others
drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the
rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for
action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones
and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the
enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry
brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate,
the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more
easy. [291] He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the
ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take
the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in
the battle, and to lead them by a long circuit to the place reported to
be least defended. While the barbarians are solely occupied with the
principal attack, these cohorts rush into the camp; on hearing the
clamour which arises from this attack, the assailants, led by Crassus,
redouble their efforts. The barbarians, surrounded on all sides, lose
courage, rush out of the retrenchments, and seek their safety in flight.
The cavalry overtook them in the open plain, and of 50,000 Aquitanians
or Cantabrians, hardly one quarter escaped, who only reached the camp
very late in the night.

At the news of this victory, the greater part of the peoples of
Aquitaine[292] submitted to Crassus, and sent spontaneously him
hostages; some, nevertheless, who were more distant, and reckoned on the
advanced period of the season, refused to make their submission. [293]


[Sidenote: March against the Morini and the Menapii. ]

VI. Towards the same time, Cæsar, in spite of the near approach of the
end of the fine season, marched against the Morini and the Menapii, who
alone, after the entire pacification of Gaul, remained in arms, and had
not sent him deputies. These peoples had no towns: they dwelt in
caverns[294] or under the tent. [295] Taught by the example of their
neighbours, they avoided engaging in pitched battles, and withdrew into
the recesses of woods and marshes. Cæsar, when he arrived in their
country, was attacked by surprise at the moment he was beginning to
fortify his camp. He drove them back into the woods, but not without
experiencing some loss; then, to open himself a wider road in the forest
which had become their asylum, he caused the trees between him and the
enemy to be cut down, and, heaping them up to the right and the left, he
formed two ramparts, which secured him from attacks on the flank. This
work was executed in a few days over a great space with incredible
celerity. Cæsar had already reached the place of refuge of the Morini
and the Menapii, who retired further and further into the thickness of
the forests; already he had captured their herds and baggage, which they
were obliged to leave behind, when rain falling in torrents, no longer
permitting the soldiers to remain under tents, compelled him to
retire. [296] He ravaged the country, burnt the habitations, and withdrew
his army, which he placed in winter quarters (between the Seine and the
Loire), among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the other peoples recently
vanquished. [297]


[Sidenote: Observations. ]

VII. The war of 698, directed almost exclusively against the peoples on
the shores of the ocean, shows clearly that Cæsar already, at that time,
entertained the design of making an expedition into the isle of Britain,
for he not only destroys the only important fleet that could be brought
against him, that of the Veneti, but he subjugates, either in person or
by his lieutenants, all the countries which extend from Bayonne to the
mouth of the Scheldt.

It is worthy of remark how much the Romans were superior to the
barbarians, by discipline, tactics, and the art of sieges; with what
facility they raised terraces, made dykes, or promptly cut down a forest
to clear themselves a passage through it. Truly, it is to the genius of
Cæsar that the glory of all these brilliant successes belongs; but we
must also acknowledge that he had under his orders the best army in the
world, and the men most experienced in the military profession. Among
these were the chiefs placed over the machines and siege operations,
named _præfecti fabrorum_. They rendered him the most signal services.
Mention is made of L. Cornelius Balbus,[298] who prepared the material
of his army during his consulate, and Mamurra,[299] who, in spite of the
bad character Catullus gives him in his satires, gave proof of his
genius during the wars in Gaul.




CHAPTER VII.

(Year of Rome 699. )

(BOOK IV OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)

INCURSIONS OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI--FIRST PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--FIRST DESCENT IN BRITAIN--CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND THE
MENAPII.


[Sidenote: Cæsar’s March against the Usipetes and the Tencteri. ]

I. The Usipetes and the Tencteri, German peoples driven out of their
place by the Suevi, had wandered during three years in different
countries of Germany, when, during the winter of 698 to 699, they
resolved to pass the Rhine. They invaded the territory of the Menapii
(established on the two banks), surprised them, massacred them, crossed
the river not far from its mouth (towards Cleves[300] and Xanten) (_see
Plate 14_), and, after taking possession of the whole country, lived
the rest of the winter on the provisions they found there.

Cæsar saw the necessity of being on his guard against the impression
which this invasion would produce on the minds of the Gauls. It was to
be feared they would be tempted to revolt, with the assistance of the
Germans who had just crossed the Rhine.

To meet this danger, Cæsar crossed the mountains earlier than usual
(_maturius quam consuerat_), and joined the army in the countries of the
Aulerci and the Lexovii, between the Loire and the Seine, where it had
wintered. His apprehensions were but too well founded. Several peoples
of Gaul had invited the Germans to leave the banks of the Rhine and
penetrate farther into the interior. Eager to respond to this appeal,
the latter soon spread themselves far over the country, and already some
of them had arrived at the countries of the Eburones and the Condrusi,
the latter clients of the Treviri. On receiving news of this, Cæsar
called together the Gaulish chiefs who had invited the Germans, feigned
ignorance of their conduct, addressed kind words to them, obtained
cavalry from them, and, after securing his provisions, began his march
against this new irruption of barbarians. He foresaw a formidable war,
for the number of the Tencteri and Usipetes amounted to no less than
430,000 individuals--men, women, and children. If we admit that among
these peoples the proportion of the number of men capable of bearing
arms was the same as in the emigration of the Helvetii, that is,
one-fourth of the total population, we see that the Romans had to
combat more than 100,000 enemies. [301]

Without knowing exactly the road taken by Cæsar, we may suppose that he
promptly concentrated his army on the lower Seine to carry it towards
the north, at Amiens, where he had convoked the Gaulish chiefs who had
sought the support of the Germans. He followed, from Amiens, the road
which passes by Cambrai, Bavay, Charleroy, Tongres, and Maestricht,
where he crossed the Meuse. (_See Plate 14. _) He was only a few days’
march from the Germans, when deputies came to propose, in rather haughty
language, an arrangement:--“Driven from their country, they have not
taken the initiative in the war; but they will not seek to avoid it.
The Germans have learnt from their ancestors, whoever may be the
aggressor, to have recourse to arms, and never to prayers. They may be
useful allies to the Romans, if lands are given to them, or if they are
allowed to retain those they have conquered. Moreover, with the
exception of the Suevi, to whom the gods themselves are not equal, they
know no people capable of resisting them. ” Cæsar imposed upon them, as a
first condition, to quit Gaul; observing, “Those who have not been able
to defend their own lands, have no right to claim the lands of others;”
and he offered them a settlement among the Ubii, who were imploring his
support against the Suevi. The deputies promised to bring an answer to
this proposal in three days; meanwhile, they begged him to suspend his
march. Cæsar considered that this demand was only a subterfuge to gain
time to recall the cavalry, which had been sent a few days before to
collect plunder and provisions among the Ambivariti,[302] beyond the
Meuse. He rejected their proposal, and continued his advance.

At the appointed time, Cæsar, having passed the locality where Venloo
now stands, was no longer more than twelve miles from the enemy; and the
deputies returned as they had promised. They met the army in march, and
earnestly entreated it should go no farther. When they found they could
not prevail, they begged at least that the cavalry, which formed the
vanguard, should not engage in action, and that they should be allowed a
delay of three days, in order to send deputies to the Ubii; if the
latter bound themselves by oath to receive them, they would accept
Cæsar’s conditions. The latter was not the dupe of this new stratagem,
yet he promised them to advance that day no more than four miles, for
the purpose of finding water. He invited them, further, to send a more
numerous deputation next day. His cavalry received the order not to
provoke a combat, but to confine itself in case of being attacked, to
remaining firm, and await the arrival of the legions.

When they learnt that Cæsar was approaching the Meuse and the Rhine, the
Usipetes and Tencteri had concentrated their forces towards the
confluence of those two rivers, in the most remote part of the country
of the Menapii, and had established themselves on the river Niers, in
the plains of Goch. Cæsar, on his side, after leaving Venloo, had borne
to the right to march to the encounter of the enemy. Since, to the north
of the Roer, there exists, between the Rhine and the Meuse, no other
water-course but the Niers, he was evidently obliged to advance to that
river to find water: he was four miles from it when he met, at Straelen,
the German deputation.

The vanguard, consisting of 5,000 cavalry, marched without distrust,
reckoning on the truce which had been concluded. Suddenly, 800 horsemen
(all at the disposal of the Germans, since the greater part of their
cavalry had passed the Meuse) appeared bearing down upon Cæsar’s cavalry
from the greatest distance at which they could be seen. In an instant
the ranks of the latter are thrown into disorder. They have succeeded in
forming again, when the German horsemen, according to their custom,
spring to the ground, stab the horses in the bellies, and overthrow
their riders, who fly in terror till they come in sight of the legions.
Seventy-four of the cavalry perished, among whom was the Aquitanian
Piso, a man of high birth and great courage, whose grandfather had
wielded the sovereign power in his country, and had obtained from the
Senate the title of “Friend. ” His brother, in the attempt to save him,
shared his fate.

This attack was a flagrant violation of the truce, and Cæsar resolved to
enter into no further negotiation with so faithless an enemy. Struck
with the impression produced by this single combat on the fickle minds
of the Gauls, he was unwilling to leave them time for reflection, but
decided on delaying battle no longer; besides, it would have been folly
to give the Germans leisure to wait the return of their cavalry. Next
morning their chiefs came to the camp in great numbers, to offer their
justification for the previous day’s attack in defiance of the
convention, but their real object was to obtain by deception a
prolongation of the truce. Cæsar, satisfied at seeing them deliver
themselves into his power of their own accord, judged right to make use
of reprisals, and ordered them to be arrested. The Roman army, then
encamped on the Niers, was only eight miles distant from the
Germans. [303]


[Sidenote: Rout of the Usipetes and the Tencteri. ]

II. Cæsar drew all the troops out of his camp, formed the infantry in
three lines,[304] and placed the cavalry, still intimidated by the late
combat, in the rear guard. After marching rapidly over the short
distance which separated him from the Germans, he came upon them totally
unexpected. Struck with terror at the sudden appearance of the army, and
disconcerted by the absence of their chiefs, they had the time neither
to deliberate nor to take their arms, and hesitated for a moment between
flight and resistance. [305] While their cries and disorder announce
their terror, the Romans, provoked by their perfidious conduct on the
previous day, rush upon the camp. As many of the Germans as are quick
enough to gain their arms attempt to defend themselves, and combat among
the baggage and wagons. But the women and children fly on every side.
Cæsar sends the cavalry to pursue them. As soon as the barbarians, who
still resisted, hear behind them the cries of the fugitives, and see the
massacre of their companions, they throw down their arms, abandon their
ensigns, and rush headlong out of the camp. They only cease their flight
when they reach the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, where some
are massacred and others are swallowed up in the river. [306] This
victory, which did not cost the Romans a single man, delivered them
from a formidable war. Cæsar restored their liberty to the chiefs he had
retained; but they, fearing the vengeance of the Gauls, whose lands they
had ravaged, preferred remaining with him. [307]


[Sidenote: First Passage of the Rhine. ]

III. After so brilliant a success, Cæsar, to secure the results,
considered it a measure of importance to cross the Rhine, and so seek
the Germans in their homes. For this purpose, he must choose the point
of passage where the right bank was inhabited by a friendly people, the
Ubii. The study of this and the following campaigns leads us to believe
that this was Bonn. [308] From the field of battle, then, he proceeded
up the valley of the Rhine; he followed a direction indicated by the
following localities: Gueldres, Crefeld, Neuss, Cologne, and Bonn. (_See
Plate 14. _) Above all, it was Cæsar’s intention to put a stop to the
rage of the Germans for invading Gaul, to inspire them with fears for
their own safety, and to prove to them that the Roman army dared and
could cross a great river. He had, moreover, a plausible motive for
penetrating into Germany--the refusal of the Sicambri to deliver up to
him the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had taken refuge among
them after the battle. The Sicambri had replied to his demand, that the
empire of the Roman people ended with the Rhine, and that beyond it
Cæsar had no further claims. At the same time, the Ubii, who alone of
the peoples beyond the Rhine had sought his alliance, claimed his
protection against the Suevi, who were threatening them more seriously
than ever. It would be a sufficient guarantee for their safety, they
said, to show himself on the right bank of the Rhine, so great was the
renown of the Roman army among even the most remote of the German
nations, since the defeat of Ariovistus and the recent victory; and they
offered him boats for passing the river. Cæsar declined this offer. It
did not appear to him worthy of the dignity of himself or of the Roman
people to have recourse to barbarians, and he judged it unsafe to
transport the army in boats. Therefore, in spite of the obstacles
presented by a wide, deep, and rapid river, he decided on throwing a
bridge across it.

It was the first time that a regular army attempted to cross the Rhine.
The bridge was constructed in the following manner. (_See Plate 15. _)
Two trees (probably in their rough state), a foot and a half in
thickness, cut to a point at one of their extremities, and of a length
proportionate to the depth of the river, were bound together with
cross-beams at intervals of two feet from each other; let down into the
water, and stuck into the ground by means of machines placed in boats
coupled together, they were driven in by blows of a rammer, not
vertically, like ordinary piles, but obliquely, giving them an
inclination in the direction of the current. Opposite them, and at a
distance of forty feet below, another couple of piles were placed,
arranged in the same manner, but inclined in a contrary direction, in
order to resist the violence of the river. In the interval left between
the two piles of each couple, a great beam was lodged, called the
_head-piece_, of two feet square; these two couples (_hæc utraque_) were
bound together on each side, beginning from the upper extremity, by two
wooden ties (_fibulæ_), so that they could neither draw from nor towards
each other, and presented, according to the “Commentaries,” a whole of a
solidity so great, that the force of the water, so far from injuring it,
bound all its parts tighter together. [309] This system formed one row of
piles of the bridge; and as many of them were established as were
required by the breadth of the river. The Rhine at Bonn being about 430
mètres wide, the bridge must have been composed of fifty-six arches,
supposing each of these to have been twenty-six Roman feet in length
(7·70 mètres). Consequently, there were fifty-four rows of piles. The
floor was formed of planks reaching from one head-piece to the other, on
which were placed transversely smaller planks, which were covered with
hurdles. Besides this, they drove in obliquely, below each row of piles,
a pile which, placed in form of a buttress (_quæ pro ariete subjectæ_),
and bound in with it, increased the resistance to the current. Other
piles were similarly driven in at a little distance above the rows of
piles, so as to form stockades, intended to stop trunks of trees and
boats which the barbarians might have thrown down in order to break the
bridge.

These works were completed in ten days, including the time employed for
the transport of the materials. Cæsar crossed the river with his army,
left a strong guard at each extremity of the bridge, and marched towards
the territory of the Sicambri, proceeding, no doubt, up the valley of
the Sieg and the Agger, (_See Plate 14. _) During his march, deputies
from different peoples came to solicit his alliance. He gave them a
friendly reception, and exacted hostages. As to the Sicambri, at the
beginning of the erection of the bridge, they had fled to the deserts
and forests, terrified by the reports of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who
had taken refuge among them.

Cæsar remained only eighteen days beyond the Rhine. During this time he
ravaged the territory of the Sicambri, returned to that of the Ubii, and
promised them succour if they were attacked by the Suevi. The latter
having withdrawn to the centre of their country, he renounced the
prospect of combating them, and considered that he had thus accomplished
his design.

It is evident, from what precedes, that Cæsar’s aim was not to make the
conquest of Germany, but to strike a great blow which should disgust the
barbarians with their frequent excursions across the Rhine. No doubt he
hoped to meet with the Suevi, and give them battle; but learning that
they had assembled at a great distance from the Rhine, he thought it
more prudent not to venture into an unknown country covered with
forests, but returned into Gaul, and caused the bridge to be broken.

It was not enough for Cæsar to have intimidated the Germans; he formed a
still bolder project, that of crossing the sea, to go and demand a
reckoning of the Britons for the succour which, in almost all his wars,
and particularly in that of the Veneti, they had sent to the Gauls. [310]


[Sidenote: Description of Britain in the time of Cæsar. ]

IV. The Romans had but imperfect information relating to Britain, which
they owed to certain Greek writers, such as Pytheas of Marseilles, who
had visited the Northern Sea in the fourth century before our era, and
Timæus of Tauromenium. The Gauls who visited Britain for the sake of
traffic, knew hardly more than the southern and south-eastern coasts.
Nevertheless, a short time before the arrival of the Romans, one of the
populations of Belgic Gaul, the Suessiones, then governed by Divitiacus,
had extended their domination into this island. [311]

It was only after having landed in Britain that Cæsar was able to form a
tolerably exact idea of its form and extent. “Britain,” he says, “has
the form of a triangle, the base of which, about 500 miles in extent,
faces Gaul. The side which faces Spain, that is, the west, presents a
length of about 700 miles. In this direction the island is separated
from Hibernia (_Ireland_) by an arm of the sea, the breadth of which is
apparently the same as the arm of the sea which separates Britain from
Gaul;” and he adds that “the surface of Hibernia represents about one
half the surface of Britain. The third part of the triangle formed by
this latter island is eastward turned to the north, and 800 miles long;
it faces no land; only one of the angles of this side looks towards
Germany. ”[312] These imperfect estimates, which were to give place in
the following century to others less inaccurate,[313] led the great
captain to ascribe to the whole of Britain twenty times 100,000 paces in
circuit. He further gathered some information still more vague on the
small islands in the vicinity of Britain. “One of them,” he writes, “is
called Mona (_the Isle of Man_), and is situated in the middle of the
strait which separates Britain from Hibernia. ” The Hebrides, the
Shetland islands (_Acmodæ_ of the ancients), and the Orcades, which were
only known to the Romans at the commencement of our era,[314] were
confounded, in the minds of Cæsar and his contemporaries, with the
archipelago of the Feroe isles and Scandinavia. Caledonia (_Scotland_)
appeared only in an obscure distance.

Cæsar represents the climate of Britain as less cold and more temperate
than that of Gaul. With the exception of the beech (_fagus_) and the fir
(_abies_), the same timbers were found in the forests of this island as
on the neighbouring continent. [315] They grew wheat there, and bred
numerous herds of cattle.