civ in the
appendix of St.
appendix of St.
Summa Theologica
28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed," and then it is added,
"for he hath troubled many that were peace. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than
tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a
backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for such
things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: whereas a
tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil, because
to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is a
graver sin than tale-bearing.
Objection 2: Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name,
deprives him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is
minded to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is
reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip
19:2): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord. "
But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore backbiting
is a graver sin than tale-bearing.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth
[Douay:,'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and
consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting
seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above
(Q[20], A[3]; [2956]FS, Q[73], A[3]). On the other hand the sin of
tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting
is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of
disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and reproach. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[73], A[3]; [2957]FS, Q[73], A[8]),
sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they
inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the greater,
according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all
one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since "no man can
live without friends," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1).
Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be compared to a
faithful friend. " Again, a man's good name whereof backbiting deprives
him, is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship.
Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even
reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is
better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii).
Reply to Objection 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the
end rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its
end, tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the
backbiter says worse things.
Reply to Objection 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and
a bad name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short
of the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to
a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what
conduces directly to enmity.
Reply to Objection 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract
the law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's
neighbor: while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more
directly against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially
against God, because "God is charity" (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this reason
it is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord
hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he
(Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren. "
__________________________________________________________________
OF DERISION [*Or mockery] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins
whereby one's neighbor is injured by words?
(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct
from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the
same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore
derision would seem not to differ from reviling.
Objection 2: Further, no man is derided except for something
reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they
be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if
privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision
is not distinct from the foregoing vices.
Objection 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury
they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by
derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental
to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the
foregoing.
On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as
"making fun. " Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest.
Therefore derision differs from all of them.
I answer that, As stated above ([2958]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should
be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these
sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those
who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the
honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name,
and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends
to shame the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the
others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the
foregoing sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the
end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i. e.
by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the
nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall
laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the
species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs
from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as
Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).
Reply to Objection 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both
respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the
glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is
this, the testimony of our conscience. " Hence, on the other hand, for
doing a reprehensible, i. e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor
and good name in the eyes of others---and for this purpose the reviler
and the backbiter speak of another person---while in his own eyes, he
loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at
reprehensible deeds being imputed to him---and for this purpose the
derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision
agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the
end.
Reply to Objection 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good,
according to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast. "
Wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him
inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of
sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether derision can be a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every
mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary
to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends,
wherefore it is known as "making fun. " Therefore derision cannot be a
mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that
which is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal
sin when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin
to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore
says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has
repented of, is a derider and not a penitent. " It would likewise follow
that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the
horse, i. e. the just man, and his rider, i. e. God. " Therefore derision
is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins
than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest.
But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore
is derision a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg. :
'shall scorn'] the scorners. " But God's derision is eternal punishment
for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth
in heaven shall laugh at them. " Therefore derision is a mortal sin.
I answer that, The object of derision is always some evil or defect.
Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously:
consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the
terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is considered to be
slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first,
in itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone makes game
or fun of another's evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in
itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand
this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the
person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children
and imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn
him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune
troubles us not one whit, but is held as an object of derision. In this
way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is
also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another's evil
seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so would seem the
more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense,
derision is a grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a
greater respect is due to the person derided.
Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the
things of God, according to Is. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached, and
whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy
voice? " and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel. " In the second
place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written (Prov.
30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the
labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick
it out, and the young eagles eat it. " Further, the derision of good
persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against
this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of the just man is
laughed to scorn. " Such like derision does very much harm: because it
turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14),
"Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of
others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous
reviling. "
Reply to Objection 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in
relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something
against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the
jest, on account of contempt, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he
has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly,
in so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that
to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but
only dispositively and imperfectly.
Reply to Objection 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous
than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but
jest. Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling
does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?
(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?
(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
(4) Of its comparison with other sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful
to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according
to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), "Bless and curse not. "
Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.
Objection 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan.
3:82, "O ye sons of men, bless the Lord. " Now the same mouth cannot
both bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James.
Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.
Objection 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him
some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be
a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone,
indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.
Objection 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his
obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it
lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While the
ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul. " Much less
therefore is it lawful to curse a man.
Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God
hath not cursed? " says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a
sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments. " Now one man cannot know
another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no
man may lawfully curse another.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth
not in the words of this law. " Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys
who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).
I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum
dicere]. Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the thing spoken.
First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the
indicative mood: in this way "maledicere" signifies simply to tell
someone of another's evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore
tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly,
speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this
belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His
word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and they were made"; while
secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and
thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ
verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, "speaking" is related to the
thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which
is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the
optative mood.
Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way
of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. And here
we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on
one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above
([2959]FS, Q[20], A[3]). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by
way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of
lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another's
evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will
be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the
other hand if a man commands or desires another's evil under the aspect
of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly
speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker
is directed not to evil but to good.
Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect
of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge
lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the
Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in
the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though
conforming their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation
may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the
aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or
hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least
that he may cease from harming others.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called
with an evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second
Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of
good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good
simply, in fact rather is it in conformity therewith.
Reply to Objection 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be
considered. His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful
to curse it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed,
according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day. " Yet when a
sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he
judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to
curse his own soul.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be
perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest
sin, which has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to
know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to
know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational
creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to
punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either
of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.
Objection 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but
the nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the
devil, as stated above [2960](A[1]). Therefore it is nowise lawful to
curse an irrational creature.
Objection 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as
bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral.
iv, 2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to
curse what exists. " Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an
irrational creature.
On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Mat.
21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.
I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard
things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: while
good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to
the rational creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related to
the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in
so far as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man. In this
sense the Lord said to man (Gn. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy
work," so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also
David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding
(Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature is related to the
rational creature by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the
fig tree in signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is
related to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by
way of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on
account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on
account of the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may
understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in
2 Kings 1:21, namely on account of the people slaughtered there.
But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a
sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is idle
and vain and consequently unlawful.
From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For
Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm.
civ in the
appendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins.
But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a
venial Sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the
mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing
sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil
deeds are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom
of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, according to 1
Cor. 6:10, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor extortioners shall
possess the kingdom of God. " Therefore cursing is a mortal sin.
I answer that, The evil words of which we are speaking now are those
whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire.
Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil by
commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we
love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mortal
sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the person whom
we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect. Hence it is
written (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let
him die. "
It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin
either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing
him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the
curse; because he may say such words through some slight movement, or
in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed
chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention, as stated above
([2961]Q[72], A[2]).
From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?
Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than
backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied in
the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that "when
Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended about the
body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy
[Douay: 'railing speech']," where blasphemy stands for cursing,
according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than backbiting.
Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting.
Objection 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as
stated above ([2962]Q[73], A[3]). But cursing is on a par with the sin
of murder; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth. ): "When thou
sayest: 'Curse him down with his house, away with everything,' you are
no better than a murderer. " Therefore cursing is graver than
backbiting.
Objection 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But
the curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely
signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more
grievously than the backbiter.
On the contrary, It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas
cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what has
been said [2963](A[1]). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing.
I answer that, As stated in the [2964]FP, Q[48], A[5], evil is twofold,
evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil of fault is
the worse ([2965]FP, Q[48], A[6]). Hence to speak evil of fault is
worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of speaking
be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer,
the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas it
belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to speak evil of
punishment, and not evil of fault except under the aspect of
punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for in the case
of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is spoken by way of
assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken,
either by causing it in the form of a command, or by wishing it. Now
the utterance itself of a person's fault is a sin, in as much as it
inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, and it is more grievous to
inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other things being
equal.
Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin than
the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing which is
expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a cause, will
be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it inflicts an
injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's good name.
Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices considered in
their essential aspects: for other accidental points might be taken
into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid
vices.
Reply to Objection 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God,
and thus accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one
curse a creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to
backbiting.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [2966](A[3]), cursing, in one
way, includes the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil
of another's violent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a
murderer, but he differs from him in so far as the external act adds
something to the act of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers cursing by way of
command.
__________________________________________________________________
(D) BY SINS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (Q[77])
OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations.
First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed in buying and
selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which occurs in loans. In
connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin
is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is lawful
to sell a thing for more than its worth?
(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;
(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?
(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price
than was paid for it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more
than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws determine
that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just for buyer
and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend.
8,15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than its
worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than its worth. Therefore
it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be
natural and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a
certain jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to
sell at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is
naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, then
he will boast. " Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than
its worth.
Objection 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty
demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on utility, the
amount of the recompense for a favor received should depend on the
utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility sometimes is worth
more than the thing given, for instance if the receiver be in great
need of that thing, whether for the purpose of avoiding a danger, or of
deriving some particular benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and
selling, it is lawful to give a thing in return for more than its
worth.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 7:12): "All things . . .
whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. "
But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore no
man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.
I answer that, It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit in
order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this is to
deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says (De Offic.
iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from double-dealing: the
seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one that
bids against him. "
But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two ways.
First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of view, buying
and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both
parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and vice
versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now whatever is
established for the common advantage, should not be more of a burden to
one party than to another, and consequently all contracts between them
should observe equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a
thing that comes into human use is measured by the price given for it,
for which purpose money was invented, as stated in Ethic. v, 5.
Therefore if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing's worth,
or, conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the
equality of justice: and consequently, to sell a thing for more than
its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust
and unlawful.
Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as accidentally
tending to the advantage of one party, and to the disadvantage of the
other: for instance, when a man has great need of a certain thing,
while an other man will suffer if he be without it. In such a case the
just price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the loss
which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be lawful to sell
a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though the price paid be
not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive a
great advantage by becoming possessed of the other man's property, and
the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing, the
latter ought not to raise the price, because the advantage accruing to
the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a circumstance affecting
the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not his, though he may charge
for the loss he suffers.
On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from
something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller
something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2967]FS, Q[96], A[2]) human law
is given to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it
is not given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to
forbid all that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to
prohibit whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats
other matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but
by not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the
seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer
obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as
licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be
too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be made,
for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half the
amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend.
2,8].
On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is
contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is reckoned
unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and
selling: and he who has received more than he ought must make
compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be
considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things is
not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of
estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to
destroy the equality of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking
into himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are
inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in
reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that
justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination. " And then
he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book to a
man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is evident
that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it
is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real
equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we consider
equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend on the
usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing
bought.
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Whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and
unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should be
taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its
substance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered
unlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man sell
instead of the real metal, silver or gold produced by some chemical
process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which silver and
gold are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels and the like.
Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the thing be
defective in other ways.
Objection 2: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity,
would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in equality.
Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures of things
that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places are greater,
in others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7). Therefore just
as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of the thing sold, it
seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through the thing sold being
defective.
Objection 3: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a
fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much
knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a sale
is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): "It is manifestly a
rule of justice that a good man should not depart from the truth, nor
inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any connection with
fraud. "
I answer that, A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the thing
which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if the
seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is guilty of
a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful. Hence we find
it written against certain people (Is. 1:22), "Thy silver is turned
into dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because that which is
mixed is defective in its substance.
Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being
measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure in
selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it is
written (Dt. 25:13,14): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag,
a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a greater
bushel and a less," and further on (Dt. 25:16): "For the Lord . . .
abhorreth him that doth these things, and He hateth all injustice. "
A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man
sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do this
knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in
consequence, is illicit.
In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale, but
he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing defects be
in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the seller does not
sin, because he does that which is unjust materially, nor is his deed
unjust, as shown above ([2968]Q[59], A[2]). Nevertheless he is bound to
compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his knowledge. Moreover
what has been said of the seller applies equally to the buyer. For
sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his goods to be
specifically of lower value, as when a man sells gold instead of
copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and
is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a defect in quantity
as to a defect in quality.
Reply to Objection 1: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of
the usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but
also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance. Hence
if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true specific
nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent and unjust,
especially as real gold and silver can produce certain results by their
natural action, which the counterfeit gold and silver of alchemists
cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the property of making people
joyful, and is helpful medicinally against certain maladies. Moreover
real gold can be employed more frequently, and lasts longer in its
condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If however real gold were to
be produced by alchemy, it would not be unlawful to sell it for the
genuine article, for nothing prevents art from employing certain
natural causes for the production of natural and true effects, as
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things produced by the art of the
demons.
Reply to Objection 2: The measures of salable commodities must needs be
different in different places, on account of the difference of supply:
because where there is greater abundance, the measures are wont to be
larger. However in each place those who govern the state must determine
the just measures of things salable, with due consideration for the
conditions of place and time. Hence it is not lawful to disregard such
measures as are established by public authority or custom.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price
of things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at
times a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on
their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or
buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but
only of such as render the thing adapted to man's use, for instance,
that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the
seller and buyer can easily discover.
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Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?
Objection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the
defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer to
buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods offered for
sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to
the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the seller if
the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be hurried into buying a
thing without carefully inquiring into its condition.
Objection 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents
him carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods
he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic.
iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: "Could anything be more absurd than
for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer this
unhealthy horse for sale? '" Therefore the seller is not bound to state
the defects of the thing sold.
Objection 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to
know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to
offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters pertaining
to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is false. Much less
therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for
sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.
Objection 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one
offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now
sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without any
defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat to a
place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will come
after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they would
give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the buyer
this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him
the faults of the goods he is selling.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): "In all contracts
the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and unless the
seller make them known, although the buyer has already acquired a right
to them, the contract is voided on account of the fraudulent action. "
I answer that, It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of
danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help or
counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in
certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or
when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers
goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the
very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may
occasion loss or danger to the buyer---loss, if, by reason of this
defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the price
on that account---danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the
goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a lame for a
fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or poisonous food
for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be hidden, and the seller
does not make them known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and
the seller will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred.
On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse
have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be
useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought
from the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods, since
perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to allow a
greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to his own
indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is
manifest: for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if
the defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them
is not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made
known to him. The case would be different if the defects were manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the
public crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because
if he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be
frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might
render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated
to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to
compare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad:
for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being
useful in many others.
Reply to Objection 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to
tell everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is
so bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would
endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this case.
Reply to Objection 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now
than it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to
be of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other
merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the seller,
since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not
seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is going to
happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his price, it
would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does not seem to
be bound to do this as a debt of justice.
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Whether, in trading, it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than
what was paid for it?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell a
thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom.
xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom] says on Mat. 21:12: "He that buys a thing in order that he
may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who is
cast out of God's temple. " Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his
commentary on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not known learning, or
trading" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "What is
trade," says he, "but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of
retailing at a higher price? " and he adds: "Such were the tradesmen
whom Our Lord cast out of the temple. " Now no man is cast out of the
temple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful.
Objection 2: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a
higher price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their
value, as shown above [2969](A[1]). Now if you sell a thing for a
higher price than you paid for it, you must either have bought it for
less than its value, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this
cannot be done without sin.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Shun, as you
would the plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or
who, from being a nobody has become a celebrity. " Now trading would net
seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness.
Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell at
a higher price.
'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed," and then it is added,
"for he hath troubled many that were peace. "
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Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than
tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a
backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for such
things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: whereas a
tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil, because
to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is a
graver sin than tale-bearing.
Objection 2: Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name,
deprives him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is
minded to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is
reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip
19:2): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord. "
But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore backbiting
is a graver sin than tale-bearing.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth
[Douay:,'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and
consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting
seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above
(Q[20], A[3]; [2956]FS, Q[73], A[3]). On the other hand the sin of
tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting
is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of
disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and reproach. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[73], A[3]; [2957]FS, Q[73], A[8]),
sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they
inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the greater,
according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all
one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since "no man can
live without friends," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1).
Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be compared to a
faithful friend. " Again, a man's good name whereof backbiting deprives
him, is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship.
Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even
reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is
better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii).
Reply to Objection 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the
end rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its
end, tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the
backbiter says worse things.
Reply to Objection 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and
a bad name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short
of the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to
a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what
conduces directly to enmity.
Reply to Objection 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract
the law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's
neighbor: while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more
directly against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially
against God, because "God is charity" (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this reason
it is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord
hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he
(Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren. "
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OF DERISION [*Or mockery] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins
whereby one's neighbor is injured by words?
(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?
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Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct
from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the
same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore
derision would seem not to differ from reviling.
Objection 2: Further, no man is derided except for something
reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they
be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if
privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision
is not distinct from the foregoing vices.
Objection 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury
they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by
derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental
to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the
foregoing.
On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as
"making fun. " Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest.
Therefore derision differs from all of them.
I answer that, As stated above ([2958]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should
be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these
sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those
who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the
honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name,
and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends
to shame the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the
others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the
foregoing sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the
end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i. e.
by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the
nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall
laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the
species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs
from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as
Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).
Reply to Objection 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both
respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the
glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is
this, the testimony of our conscience. " Hence, on the other hand, for
doing a reprehensible, i. e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor
and good name in the eyes of others---and for this purpose the reviler
and the backbiter speak of another person---while in his own eyes, he
loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at
reprehensible deeds being imputed to him---and for this purpose the
derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision
agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the
end.
Reply to Objection 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good,
according to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast. "
Wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him
inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of
sin.
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Whether derision can be a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every
mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary
to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends,
wherefore it is known as "making fun. " Therefore derision cannot be a
mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that
which is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal
sin when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin
to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore
says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has
repented of, is a derider and not a penitent. " It would likewise follow
that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the
horse, i. e. the just man, and his rider, i. e. God. " Therefore derision
is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins
than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest.
But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore
is derision a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg. :
'shall scorn'] the scorners. " But God's derision is eternal punishment
for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth
in heaven shall laugh at them. " Therefore derision is a mortal sin.
I answer that, The object of derision is always some evil or defect.
Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously:
consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the
terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is considered to be
slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first,
in itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone makes game
or fun of another's evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in
itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand
this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the
person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children
and imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn
him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune
troubles us not one whit, but is held as an object of derision. In this
way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is
also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another's evil
seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so would seem the
more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense,
derision is a grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a
greater respect is due to the person derided.
Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the
things of God, according to Is. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached, and
whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy
voice? " and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel. " In the second
place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written (Prov.
30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the
labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick
it out, and the young eagles eat it. " Further, the derision of good
persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against
this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of the just man is
laughed to scorn. " Such like derision does very much harm: because it
turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14),
"Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of
others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous
reviling. "
Reply to Objection 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in
relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something
against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the
jest, on account of contempt, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he
has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly,
in so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that
to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but
only dispositively and imperfectly.
Reply to Objection 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous
than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but
jest. Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling
does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin.
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OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?
(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?
(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
(4) Of its comparison with other sins.
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Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful
to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according
to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), "Bless and curse not. "
Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.
Objection 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan.
3:82, "O ye sons of men, bless the Lord. " Now the same mouth cannot
both bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James.
Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.
Objection 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him
some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be
a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone,
indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.
Objection 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his
obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it
lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While the
ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul. " Much less
therefore is it lawful to curse a man.
Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God
hath not cursed? " says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a
sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments. " Now one man cannot know
another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no
man may lawfully curse another.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth
not in the words of this law. " Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys
who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).
I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum
dicere]. Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the thing spoken.
First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the
indicative mood: in this way "maledicere" signifies simply to tell
someone of another's evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore
tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly,
speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this
belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His
word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and they were made"; while
secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and
thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ
verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, "speaking" is related to the
thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which
is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the
optative mood.
Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way
of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. And here
we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on
one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above
([2959]FS, Q[20], A[3]). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by
way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of
lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another's
evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will
be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the
other hand if a man commands or desires another's evil under the aspect
of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly
speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker
is directed not to evil but to good.
Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect
of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge
lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the
Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in
the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though
conforming their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation
may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the
aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or
hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least
that he may cease from harming others.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called
with an evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second
Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of
good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good
simply, in fact rather is it in conformity therewith.
Reply to Objection 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be
considered. His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful
to curse it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed,
according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day. " Yet when a
sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he
judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to
curse his own soul.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be
perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest
sin, which has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to
know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to
know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.
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Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational
creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to
punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either
of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.
Objection 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but
the nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the
devil, as stated above [2960](A[1]). Therefore it is nowise lawful to
curse an irrational creature.
Objection 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as
bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral.
iv, 2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to
curse what exists. " Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an
irrational creature.
On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Mat.
21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.
I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard
things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: while
good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to
the rational creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related to
the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in
so far as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man. In this
sense the Lord said to man (Gn. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy
work," so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also
David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding
(Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature is related to the
rational creature by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the
fig tree in signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is
related to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by
way of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on
account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on
account of the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may
understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in
2 Kings 1:21, namely on account of the people slaughtered there.
But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a
sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is idle
and vain and consequently unlawful.
From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.
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Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For
Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm.
civ in the
appendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins.
But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a
venial Sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the
mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing
sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil
deeds are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom
of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, according to 1
Cor. 6:10, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor extortioners shall
possess the kingdom of God. " Therefore cursing is a mortal sin.
I answer that, The evil words of which we are speaking now are those
whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire.
Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil by
commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we
love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mortal
sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the person whom
we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect. Hence it is
written (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let
him die. "
It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin
either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing
him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the
curse; because he may say such words through some slight movement, or
in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed
chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention, as stated above
([2961]Q[72], A[2]).
From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.
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Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?
Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than
backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied in
the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that "when
Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended about the
body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy
[Douay: 'railing speech']," where blasphemy stands for cursing,
according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than backbiting.
Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting.
Objection 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as
stated above ([2962]Q[73], A[3]). But cursing is on a par with the sin
of murder; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth. ): "When thou
sayest: 'Curse him down with his house, away with everything,' you are
no better than a murderer. " Therefore cursing is graver than
backbiting.
Objection 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But
the curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely
signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more
grievously than the backbiter.
On the contrary, It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas
cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what has
been said [2963](A[1]). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing.
I answer that, As stated in the [2964]FP, Q[48], A[5], evil is twofold,
evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil of fault is
the worse ([2965]FP, Q[48], A[6]). Hence to speak evil of fault is
worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of speaking
be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer,
the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas it
belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to speak evil of
punishment, and not evil of fault except under the aspect of
punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for in the case
of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is spoken by way of
assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken,
either by causing it in the form of a command, or by wishing it. Now
the utterance itself of a person's fault is a sin, in as much as it
inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, and it is more grievous to
inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other things being
equal.
Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin than
the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing which is
expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a cause, will
be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it inflicts an
injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's good name.
Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices considered in
their essential aspects: for other accidental points might be taken
into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid
vices.
Reply to Objection 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God,
and thus accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one
curse a creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to
backbiting.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [2966](A[3]), cursing, in one
way, includes the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil
of another's violent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a
murderer, but he differs from him in so far as the external act adds
something to the act of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers cursing by way of
command.
__________________________________________________________________
(D) BY SINS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (Q[77])
OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations.
First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed in buying and
selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which occurs in loans. In
connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin
is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is lawful
to sell a thing for more than its worth?
(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;
(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?
(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price
than was paid for it?
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Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more
than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws determine
that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just for buyer
and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend.
8,15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than its
worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than its worth. Therefore
it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be
natural and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a
certain jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to
sell at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is
naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, then
he will boast. " Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than
its worth.
Objection 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty
demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on utility, the
amount of the recompense for a favor received should depend on the
utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility sometimes is worth
more than the thing given, for instance if the receiver be in great
need of that thing, whether for the purpose of avoiding a danger, or of
deriving some particular benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and
selling, it is lawful to give a thing in return for more than its
worth.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 7:12): "All things . . .
whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. "
But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore no
man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.
I answer that, It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit in
order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this is to
deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says (De Offic.
iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from double-dealing: the
seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one that
bids against him. "
But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two ways.
First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of view, buying
and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both
parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and vice
versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now whatever is
established for the common advantage, should not be more of a burden to
one party than to another, and consequently all contracts between them
should observe equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a
thing that comes into human use is measured by the price given for it,
for which purpose money was invented, as stated in Ethic. v, 5.
Therefore if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing's worth,
or, conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the
equality of justice: and consequently, to sell a thing for more than
its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust
and unlawful.
Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as accidentally
tending to the advantage of one party, and to the disadvantage of the
other: for instance, when a man has great need of a certain thing,
while an other man will suffer if he be without it. In such a case the
just price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the loss
which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be lawful to sell
a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though the price paid be
not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive a
great advantage by becoming possessed of the other man's property, and
the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing, the
latter ought not to raise the price, because the advantage accruing to
the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a circumstance affecting
the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not his, though he may charge
for the loss he suffers.
On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from
something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller
something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2967]FS, Q[96], A[2]) human law
is given to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it
is not given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to
forbid all that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to
prohibit whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats
other matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but
by not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the
seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer
obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as
licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be
too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be made,
for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half the
amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend.
2,8].
On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is
contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is reckoned
unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and
selling: and he who has received more than he ought must make
compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be
considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things is
not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of
estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to
destroy the equality of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking
into himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are
inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in
reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that
justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination. " And then
he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book to a
man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is evident
that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it
is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real
equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we consider
equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend on the
usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing
bought.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and
unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should be
taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its
substance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered
unlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man sell
instead of the real metal, silver or gold produced by some chemical
process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which silver and
gold are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels and the like.
Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the thing be
defective in other ways.
Objection 2: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity,
would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in equality.
Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures of things
that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places are greater,
in others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7). Therefore just
as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of the thing sold, it
seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through the thing sold being
defective.
Objection 3: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a
fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much
knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a sale
is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): "It is manifestly a
rule of justice that a good man should not depart from the truth, nor
inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any connection with
fraud. "
I answer that, A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the thing
which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if the
seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is guilty of
a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful. Hence we find
it written against certain people (Is. 1:22), "Thy silver is turned
into dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because that which is
mixed is defective in its substance.
Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being
measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure in
selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it is
written (Dt. 25:13,14): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag,
a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a greater
bushel and a less," and further on (Dt. 25:16): "For the Lord . . .
abhorreth him that doth these things, and He hateth all injustice. "
A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man
sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do this
knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in
consequence, is illicit.
In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale, but
he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing defects be
in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the seller does not
sin, because he does that which is unjust materially, nor is his deed
unjust, as shown above ([2968]Q[59], A[2]). Nevertheless he is bound to
compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his knowledge. Moreover
what has been said of the seller applies equally to the buyer. For
sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his goods to be
specifically of lower value, as when a man sells gold instead of
copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and
is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a defect in quantity
as to a defect in quality.
Reply to Objection 1: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of
the usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but
also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance. Hence
if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true specific
nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent and unjust,
especially as real gold and silver can produce certain results by their
natural action, which the counterfeit gold and silver of alchemists
cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the property of making people
joyful, and is helpful medicinally against certain maladies. Moreover
real gold can be employed more frequently, and lasts longer in its
condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If however real gold were to
be produced by alchemy, it would not be unlawful to sell it for the
genuine article, for nothing prevents art from employing certain
natural causes for the production of natural and true effects, as
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things produced by the art of the
demons.
Reply to Objection 2: The measures of salable commodities must needs be
different in different places, on account of the difference of supply:
because where there is greater abundance, the measures are wont to be
larger. However in each place those who govern the state must determine
the just measures of things salable, with due consideration for the
conditions of place and time. Hence it is not lawful to disregard such
measures as are established by public authority or custom.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price
of things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at
times a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on
their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or
buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but
only of such as render the thing adapted to man's use, for instance,
that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the
seller and buyer can easily discover.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?
Objection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the
defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer to
buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods offered for
sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to
the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the seller if
the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be hurried into buying a
thing without carefully inquiring into its condition.
Objection 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents
him carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods
he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic.
iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: "Could anything be more absurd than
for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer this
unhealthy horse for sale? '" Therefore the seller is not bound to state
the defects of the thing sold.
Objection 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to
know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to
offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters pertaining
to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is false. Much less
therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for
sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.
Objection 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one
offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now
sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without any
defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat to a
place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will come
after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they would
give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the buyer
this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him
the faults of the goods he is selling.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): "In all contracts
the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and unless the
seller make them known, although the buyer has already acquired a right
to them, the contract is voided on account of the fraudulent action. "
I answer that, It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of
danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help or
counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in
certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or
when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers
goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the
very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may
occasion loss or danger to the buyer---loss, if, by reason of this
defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the price
on that account---danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the
goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a lame for a
fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or poisonous food
for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be hidden, and the seller
does not make them known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and
the seller will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred.
On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse
have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be
useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought
from the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods, since
perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to allow a
greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to his own
indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is
manifest: for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if
the defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them
is not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made
known to him. The case would be different if the defects were manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the
public crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because
if he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be
frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might
render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated
to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to
compare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad:
for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being
useful in many others.
Reply to Objection 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to
tell everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is
so bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would
endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this case.
Reply to Objection 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now
than it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to
be of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other
merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the seller,
since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not
seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is going to
happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his price, it
would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does not seem to
be bound to do this as a debt of justice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, in trading, it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than
what was paid for it?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell a
thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom.
xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom] says on Mat. 21:12: "He that buys a thing in order that he
may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who is
cast out of God's temple. " Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his
commentary on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not known learning, or
trading" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "What is
trade," says he, "but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of
retailing at a higher price? " and he adds: "Such were the tradesmen
whom Our Lord cast out of the temple. " Now no man is cast out of the
temple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful.
Objection 2: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a
higher price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their
value, as shown above [2969](A[1]). Now if you sell a thing for a
higher price than you paid for it, you must either have bought it for
less than its value, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this
cannot be done without sin.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Shun, as you
would the plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or
who, from being a nobody has become a celebrity. " Now trading would net
seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness.
Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell at
a higher price.
