A thorough
revision
of contemporary philosophy would be incom- plete without the pages that Dr.
Hegel Was Right_nodrm
Concept 89 2.
Self-Determination 94
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 8
Contents
3. Being
4. Substance
5. On the Method 6. Time
7. Intersubjectivity 8. Causality
9. Natural Law
10. Necessary
96
98
101
105
117
122
129
134
Chapter IV. Infinite and Distinction 139 1. Pseudoinfinite 140 2. Pseudouniversal 145 3. Infinite and Universal 147 4. Imputations 152 5. Distinction 157 6. Individuality 160 7. The Bottom of the Problem 166 8. Philosophy and Faith 172
Chapter V. Logic and Natural Sciences 181 1. Dialectics 181 2. Logic 197 3. Force 201 4. Explanatory Factors 210 5. Probability 222 6. Life 227 7. Conduct 241
Chapter VI . The Man and the State 247 1. Natural Goodness? 248 2. Happiness? 270 3. Ethicity 284 4. State 306 5. Family, Society, State 325 6. Two Issues about Humans 329
Bibliography 341 Hegel's Works 345 Other 345
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Foreword to the first English edition (2011)
The English translation of Porfirio Miranda's Hegel was right is of critical importance for contemporary philosophy as well as for world affairs, since its contribution for the scientific analysis and ethical transformation of present societies is of universal reach.
Miranda's work goes beyond description and commentary of Hegel's thought, by providing a thorough integration into Hegel's propositions of the developments taking place within different disciplines during the last two centuries, and by the systematic reconstruction and ampli- fication of his thesis in the context of XX century philosophy. The result is an illuminating confirmation of the central thesis proposed by Hegel, based on historical events during this period, as well as on Miranda's own arguments.
Following a strict logical and ontological demonstration, which is a necessary condition for all philosophy, Miranda's work provides contemporary arguments for the understanding of the human essence and the State. The importance of revealing the reality of the State is crucial for an objective description, analysis and judgement of the swift transformations of human societies in the XXI century and their corre- sponding public and civil society institutions.
Human beings are the reality and finality of the State, and it has to be distinguished from government. This Hegelian idea is fully demonstrated
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 10 Hegel was right
in its rational and historical content by Miranda, providing a well sup- ported alternative to the limitations of widely accepted theories of so- ciety and culture.
Following Kant and Hegel, Miranda states that human beings are an end in themselves, and should not be considered as means for any- thing, such as power or the accumulation of wealth. The rational dem- onstration of this ethical imperative as an absolute truth, has enormous consequences for the present and future human history, challenging notions of the individual, the subject,the nature of ethics and freedom, accepted by the postmodern, self-centered and materialistic theories of society.
The recognition that ethical rationality develops gradually over the centuries lays the foundation for a critical, yet optimistic view of human existence in history. After the demonstration that self interest defines the natural human tendency, Miranda argues over the impor- tance of raising the level of ethical consciousness in all subjects, in or- der to expand the ethical exercise of individual freedom.
This message is of decisive importance at the present time of world history, when the dominant technological system which is based on the digital convergence, the global scale of production processes and markets, and the unparalleled concentration of wealth and production by large corporations and a handful of individuals, set in motion sig- nificant contradictions within the nation states as the locus of democ- racy and human rights compliance.
According to Miranda, since we are neither good nor human by na- ture, the process of becoming a human being requires the ethical devel- opment of each individual, and the ethical transformation of the social order, as well as of all human beings. The guidance of Miranda for this enormous, yet compelling task, is now open for readers of the English language.
Dr. Alberto Montoya Marti? n del Campo
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Foreword to the third Spanish edition
More than twelve years ago, the Metropolitan Autonomous University (Iztapalapa campus) published for the very first time this work, which goes far beyond a scholarly study of the Hegelian philosophy. Now, after a long time, this work comes again to light, as brilliant and important as always.
Sooner or later, everything that is fundamental becomes a classic, and that is the case of this book, for we can find in it a series of analyses, argumentations and theses which have a significant connection with an entire philosophical tradition of twenty-five centuries that goes back to Plato and that is continued by Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, and is later recovered by Hegel. This tradition stands out for its belief in truth; a belief that is not based on blind recourses or arguments of authority, but rather on demonstration itself. In this text, Dr. Miranda reminds us that there are many things which have been demonstrated for all times, and precisely in that their actuality consists.
It is relevant in many ways that theses which are taken as truths are demonstrated: first, because it makes explicit the departure of irratio- nality, of the primitive magical thought and of the aesthetic mentality: all subjects which have been addressed in this text, taking off from the fact that we come from the animals and that rationality is not natu- ral to us. Second, it becomes manifest that civilization has to do with
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 12 Hegel was right
the progress of rationality in the world, and that would be impossible without truth and the apodictic character of it. Another of its features is the development in philosophy of what has been expressed in Chris- tian theology "Truth shall make you free" (John 8, 31). But, in what sense can a man be free other that in self-knowledge? (Nosce te ipsum) How can we choose without knowing? How can we know without truth? How can we have truth without having proofs?
The denial of truth, as it has been expressed by superficial skepti- cism, has had on axiological and psychological terms a disastrous effect --one speaks in our time of the Generation X--, for the only thing it has achieved is that lies, mental confusions and contradictions are now surreptitiously considered as absolute truths.
The important thing is that, without truth, no true compromise can exist, and without the latter a fundamental ethical attitude cannot exist either --a fundamental ethical attitude that compels us always to make this world more just and worthy.
Basing himself on his clinical data, post-kleinian psychoanalyst Wil- fred R. Bion wrote that truth is the nourishment of the soul, for only by means of it one can modify and improve the mental, emotional and material quality of life among humans. On the contrary, says Bion, lies are venom. Modern skepticism has taken charge of spreading this widely. Hegel was right is a powerful antidote against that venom.
In our times of economic globalization, it seems imperative that those of us who are impacted by it are capable of a critical revision of such process, and that is only possible if thought itself is not global or economic. In other words: we are only capable of advancing solu- tions and of proceeding accordingly if reason itself can be autonomous from the material and psychical pressures which can be exerted upon human beings.
The work the reader has in his hands offers many important sub- jects: it is impossible to address each of them in this introduction, so I will only mention a few:
1. The difference between science and literature, which consists, namely, in that the former is compelled to demonstrate the truth of its statements, while the latter is not.
2. The lack of synonymy between beauty and truth. It becomes evi- dent hereby that a work or a thesis can be beautiful and pleasant, but there is a great difference between that and something being true.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Foreword to the Second edition 13
3. The synonymy between science, philosophy and the common sub- stance, which consists in defining and demonstrating.
4. The non-empiricity of scientific concepts and, consequently, the participation of the subject in their coinage.
5. The impossibility of obtaining a posteriori the concept of science, which means it is impossible to obtain that by the means of obser- vation and generalization that scientists commonly employ.
6. The refusal of the widespread Rousseaunian story of natural goodness. The argument we find here is that man makes him- self by means of cultural and historical development and not by a purportedly natural determination.
7. Self-determination or freedom which is nothing more than the substance that we call spirit (Geist).
8. The ethicity as a self-reflective and constitutive phenomenon of being.
9. The family, the society and the State.
The sequence of chapters in this work offers a transition from phi- losophy of science and ontology to natural sciences and political philo- sophy. The link between the different chapters is perfectly logical. Thus, Hegel was right is a long and yet rewarding travel that touches not only the writings of Hegel but the most fundamental themes in the history of Western philosophy. One cannot think the way one used to do after reading this book.
The history of Professor Miranda begins in 1924, in the city of Mon- terrey, Nuevo Leo? n, and it is a history full of intellectual and practical braveness. It goes from the powerful critiques of his Hunger and Thirst of Justice to his Marx and the Bible --which made of him a pioneer of the Liberation Theology-- to his demolishing refutation of the positivism of Comte and the Vienna Circle in his Appeal to Reason.
A thorough revision of contemporary philosophy would be incom- plete without the pages that Dr. Jose? Porfirio Miranda has bequeathed us. Thank you for this valuable heritage.
He? ctor Villanueva
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? chapter i
Science and Literature
? ? It has been a clear ruse of escapism to confuse Philosophy with Liter- ature, as well as to think that the scientificity revindicated by Hegel is a strange genre that bears no relation with the so-called scien-
tific disciplines. The fact that Hegel denounces "sleight of hand and garrulity" in Newton's demonstrations (WL I 277) ought to have in- duced commentators and scientists to suspect that something without precedents was taking form there.
In the first part of this chapter, I shall focus on aestheticism and other similar gags that have been put on Philosophy's mouth. This dis- cussion will bring us to one of the most important problems of our times and of all times.
Once all the vetoes, which prevent that scientific requirement is even formulated, have been overcome, our second part will address the core of scientificity's exigencies.
1. Literature and caprice
In the latter decades it has been widely discussed, whether Literature must be put at stake. But deep down, it never is, despite certain appearances. Whoever does not demonstrate the truth of his claims
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 16 Hegel was right
displays them without a true compromise with what he or she says. He displays them because he 'likes' them. Although the case could be that he doesn't.
Within the discipline of Literature, no author is obliged to demon- strate the truth of his claims, but in Philosophy, everyone is. Otherwise, what we have in our hands is a literary essay:
Those who think that in Philosophy one can do without demonstrating and deducing proof, thereby that they are still away from the most primary no- tion of Philosophy; they can speak about anything, but those who want to speak without concept do not have any right of peeping into Philosophy. (Rph, 141A)
In the worst cases, a poet simply lets himself go and speaks out ar- bitrarily the theses that come to his mind; no one demands that he proves their truth as long as they are beautiful. In extreme instances, the fact that I am a literary writer is a letter of marque, a permit to be irresponsible: since I am a literary writer I can endorse whatever I want; in the end, I do not have to prove it.
In the best cases, the literary writer is convinced of the truth of his theses and would probably like also that others share his conviction. However, he would like to do this not by means of demonstration but by the beauty of them. Even his personal convincement does not de- pend on any prove but on the beauty and transforming capacity of his own theses and conceptions. Nevertheless, Hegel tells us that "beauty is no yet truth". (WG 601)
It would be a great mistake to think that Philosophy wants to become an inquisitor or that it is inclined towards censorship and intolerance. Philosophy does not appeal to authority but to the consciousness of literary writers themselves, and poses for the whole world a decisive question that, undoubtedly, has been neglected: Is promoting rational- ity the same as promoting that man disregards the truth or falseness of the beliefs and conceptions he adopts?
It is neither a particular false claim nor the circulation of it what irritates Philosophy, but the fact itself that, when adopting a worldview, one considers the question of its truth or falseness indifferently. Such indifference is sheer and pure irrationality. To encourage it is to draw man backwards to an animal stage in which he was controlled by emo- tions, impressions and feelings, but not by reason. To adopt a theory
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 17
'because I like it', to be a materialist or a spiritualist, a liberal or a con- servative 'because I like it' is to return to primitive savageness and to be as close as possible to original animality.
By the way, it is not a regression impelled by a recent predomi- nance of an aestheticist criterion: the latter only favors its use, but it does not create the criterion itself. Its cause lays rather in the sponta- neous tendency to go back to nature. Rationality is not given to us by nature. What is new, what is extraordinary, what is news in the strong sense of the word, is that the time of rationality has arrived, the time in which it no longer suffices that a worldview pleases, for one demands its truth.
That and no other is the sense of a famous Hegelian thesis that has shocked artists to a great degree: "the spirit has been left behind art" (PG 492), "the characteristic way of artistic production and of its works does not longer satisfy our highest need" (A? sth I 48), "the beautiful days of the Greek art and the golden period of the late Middle Ages belong to the past" (A? sth I 49).
In order to grasp this thesis we must understand the Hegelian news we just mentioned. First of all, we must realize that there is news and that "our time is a time of birth and a transition to a new period" (PG 15): today we can resist the siege of a genuine artwork by saying that, after all, it is only Art. One must still find out if its message is genuinely compelling due to its truth: "the impression that artworks provoke nowadays is of a more sober kind; what they arouse in us still requires a higher criterion and a different testimony" (A? sth I 48). The moment of scientific exigency has come; that is the teaching of the Phe- nomenology: "It is this coming to be of knowledge or science as such what is described in the Phenomenology of Spirit. " (PG 26)
Because they did not understand this, critics thought that the above mentioned Hegelian thesis of Art foretold the very end of it, at least in the sense that there would not be superior realizations than those of the artists of the Greek Antiquity, the Middle-Ages and the Renaissance. The next paragraph would have sufficed to make them see the truth: "Certainly, we can expect further developments and perfections in the field of arts, but the form of Art is no longer our supreme necessity". (A? sth I 170). Our supreme necessity is truth, and therefore science, for science demonstrates how much truth or falseness there is in some- thing. It has taken entire millenniums of maturing and efforts for humanity to reach a stage of rationality which consists in adopting a
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 18 Hegel was right
conception only if its truth is demonstrated; fortunately enough, we have reached that stage.
Philosophy is not against Art; let us say that loud and clear; the truth of the matter is that the exigency of truth is something much more su- perior and, fortunately again, that it is something we can formulate. There is a possibility that John Hospers may be right:
Art provides the most intense, concentrated, and sharply focused of the experiences available to man. Because of this, art can have an enormous influence on the tenor of a person's life, more influential no doubt than any particular system of morality. (EB 25, 719, 1)
On the other hand, Hospers himself will not deny that today's relativism can stir the foundations of any masterpiece. Even though Jean Valjean perceives the sublime depths of the duty towards his neighbors and fulfills it by sacrificing everything without hesitation, the skeptic would say: "How foolish, honesty is but a prejudice, that conduct is very beautiful but suits Valejan only, each one has his own tastes, one would have to demonstrate that such conduct is better than its contrary and that it is obligatory. " Against relativism the only effective weapon is science, but only science that goes deep down into the depths of truth. On the other hand, due to the intrinsic irratio- nality attached to this conduct, it is unacceptable that one ignores if a worldview is true or false. It is not enough that an intensively beau- tiful conduct overwhelms us; it is not absolute unless it is demonstrat- ed. Hegel says "it is useless; we do not longer kneel before (beauty)" (A? sth I 170)
When there are no reasons, one appeals to feeling. He who proceeds thus must be left speaking alone, since he goes back to the unity of his peculiar- ity, which must remain unaltered. When he appeals to his own feeling, the interrelation with us is broken. On the contrary, with thinking and concepts, we are in the field of universality, rationality, and we have in front the core of the matter; only that can we understand. (PR I 102).
"The antihuman, the animal, consists in remaining with and commu- nicating only by those means" (PG 56). Aristotle had already said it: "If he makes none, it is absurd to seek for an argument against one who has no arguments of his own about anything, in so far as he has
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 19
none; for such a person, in so far as he is such, is really no better than a vegetable" (Metaphysics, IV, 1006a 14).
About the Athenians, which are the esthetical people par excellence, Hegel made two remarks that provide us with great insight, for they precise the attitude of Philosophy towards Art, an attitude embodied by Plato: "that slanting, that Art as such becomes the highest and hence the content loses interest, belongs to the Athenian people. Plato did not banish Art from his Republic: he only prevented that it continued to be god" (WG 639)
It is unacceptable that aesthetics becomes the supreme criterion, for beauty is not a synonym of truth, and to postulate that something is true because of its beauty would lead us to believe in a preestablished harmony which has been proved false by the experience of many cen- turies. For that reason Plato says that "the distinction between Philoso- phy and poetry [ . . . ] is an old quarrel" (Rep 607 B) and his remark becomes even brusquer: according to him, "poems are easy to do for he who does not know reality, for it is phantoms (poiosin), not reali- ties that poets produce" (Rep 599 A). In contrast to the predominant aesthetic criterion of a society, Philosophy acknowledges that every human being is compelled to seek the truth, since rationality is manda- tory to everyone. Probably, to make a genuine poem is not easy, even for him who does not acknowledge the truth, but what matters is the difference clearly expressed by Hegel: "If it was only a matter of stating things, philosophizing would be an easy task" (BS 422). "The philo- sophical method does not allow mere suppositions; what has value in Philosophy must be proved true, that is to say, its necessity has to be displayed" (A? sth I 65).
For that reason, it seems to me that a methodological focus like the following one (which is typical among Hegelian commentators) jeopar- dizes every interpretative pursuit:
The question with which we are faced --and this will be true in all of what follows-- is neither whether Hegel is correct in what he says nor whether his interpreters are justified in what they say of him. Rather the question is one of finding out just what Hegel does say and of determining what impact that can have on our own thinking. (Lauer 1982, 2)
To study a literary work with this method is fine; on the contrary, the only thing that matters in Philosophy is to prove whether the author
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 20 Hegel was right
demonstrates or not, i. e. if he is right or not. The impact a work may have on us, "demands still a higher criterion and a different valida- tion" (A? sth I 48). If we do not ponder the rigorousness of the demon- stration while examining a Hegelian thesis, we cannot understand its meaning. Hegel warns us that "the demonstration remains within the statement" (GP II 398). Thus, if we do not get the demonstration, we are not getting the meaning of the argument. The aesthetical approach is probably the origin of the accusations of obscurity raised against Hegel. Surely the source of great diversity existing of the 'interpretations' of his Philosophy lies therein.
Whoever does not read the Science of Logic as a frontal attack against the deficient scientificity of the disciplines so-called sciences does not make an approach to Hegelian Philosophy as a system that pretends to be true; therefore, one approaches it as an 'opinion', as one of the differ- ent worldviews that are exhibited in the history museum for someone to like them. Such an approach is aesthetical, not philosophical. How is it possible that these people beared hopes to understand a philosophi- cal work if they did not read it as such? "The spirit that gives life in a Philosophy needs, in order to be manifested, to be borne by a similar spirit. " (JS 16) Hegel underlines strongly the following fundamental principle:
"The courage of truth, the faith in the power of the spirit, is the first condition of Philosophy". (EGP 5s).
By saying this we walk deep into a territory planted with mines, for this matter does not only regard aesthetics. The aforesaid museal mentality is nowadays an epidemic among promoters of 'culture', a culture which is vague and without contents: culturalism. Other obsta- cles are the civilizatory relativism and anti-westernism, for how is it possible that a Western man pretends to tell the world what is true and what is not? That goes in hand with indigenism. And we could not miss also the political dimension under the guise of pluralism and of tolerance with declamatory indignation against those who pretend to be the "guardians of truth". We will examine each of this '-isms' and their efforts to shut Philosophy's mouth, until we reach at last the enormous blunder that lies at the bottom of the question.
If we start from the principle that truth is unknowable to the human mind, the possibility of any science is annulled; but a contradiction is simultaneously embraced from the beginning, since this principle is taken as a truth, a known truth. We will get back to this point. But if
? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 8
Contents
3. Being
4. Substance
5. On the Method 6. Time
7. Intersubjectivity 8. Causality
9. Natural Law
10. Necessary
96
98
101
105
117
122
129
134
Chapter IV. Infinite and Distinction 139 1. Pseudoinfinite 140 2. Pseudouniversal 145 3. Infinite and Universal 147 4. Imputations 152 5. Distinction 157 6. Individuality 160 7. The Bottom of the Problem 166 8. Philosophy and Faith 172
Chapter V. Logic and Natural Sciences 181 1. Dialectics 181 2. Logic 197 3. Force 201 4. Explanatory Factors 210 5. Probability 222 6. Life 227 7. Conduct 241
Chapter VI . The Man and the State 247 1. Natural Goodness? 248 2. Happiness? 270 3. Ethicity 284 4. State 306 5. Family, Society, State 325 6. Two Issues about Humans 329
Bibliography 341 Hegel's Works 345 Other 345
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Foreword to the first English edition (2011)
The English translation of Porfirio Miranda's Hegel was right is of critical importance for contemporary philosophy as well as for world affairs, since its contribution for the scientific analysis and ethical transformation of present societies is of universal reach.
Miranda's work goes beyond description and commentary of Hegel's thought, by providing a thorough integration into Hegel's propositions of the developments taking place within different disciplines during the last two centuries, and by the systematic reconstruction and ampli- fication of his thesis in the context of XX century philosophy. The result is an illuminating confirmation of the central thesis proposed by Hegel, based on historical events during this period, as well as on Miranda's own arguments.
Following a strict logical and ontological demonstration, which is a necessary condition for all philosophy, Miranda's work provides contemporary arguments for the understanding of the human essence and the State. The importance of revealing the reality of the State is crucial for an objective description, analysis and judgement of the swift transformations of human societies in the XXI century and their corre- sponding public and civil society institutions.
Human beings are the reality and finality of the State, and it has to be distinguished from government. This Hegelian idea is fully demonstrated
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 10 Hegel was right
in its rational and historical content by Miranda, providing a well sup- ported alternative to the limitations of widely accepted theories of so- ciety and culture.
Following Kant and Hegel, Miranda states that human beings are an end in themselves, and should not be considered as means for any- thing, such as power or the accumulation of wealth. The rational dem- onstration of this ethical imperative as an absolute truth, has enormous consequences for the present and future human history, challenging notions of the individual, the subject,the nature of ethics and freedom, accepted by the postmodern, self-centered and materialistic theories of society.
The recognition that ethical rationality develops gradually over the centuries lays the foundation for a critical, yet optimistic view of human existence in history. After the demonstration that self interest defines the natural human tendency, Miranda argues over the impor- tance of raising the level of ethical consciousness in all subjects, in or- der to expand the ethical exercise of individual freedom.
This message is of decisive importance at the present time of world history, when the dominant technological system which is based on the digital convergence, the global scale of production processes and markets, and the unparalleled concentration of wealth and production by large corporations and a handful of individuals, set in motion sig- nificant contradictions within the nation states as the locus of democ- racy and human rights compliance.
According to Miranda, since we are neither good nor human by na- ture, the process of becoming a human being requires the ethical devel- opment of each individual, and the ethical transformation of the social order, as well as of all human beings. The guidance of Miranda for this enormous, yet compelling task, is now open for readers of the English language.
Dr. Alberto Montoya Marti? n del Campo
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Foreword to the third Spanish edition
More than twelve years ago, the Metropolitan Autonomous University (Iztapalapa campus) published for the very first time this work, which goes far beyond a scholarly study of the Hegelian philosophy. Now, after a long time, this work comes again to light, as brilliant and important as always.
Sooner or later, everything that is fundamental becomes a classic, and that is the case of this book, for we can find in it a series of analyses, argumentations and theses which have a significant connection with an entire philosophical tradition of twenty-five centuries that goes back to Plato and that is continued by Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, and is later recovered by Hegel. This tradition stands out for its belief in truth; a belief that is not based on blind recourses or arguments of authority, but rather on demonstration itself. In this text, Dr. Miranda reminds us that there are many things which have been demonstrated for all times, and precisely in that their actuality consists.
It is relevant in many ways that theses which are taken as truths are demonstrated: first, because it makes explicit the departure of irratio- nality, of the primitive magical thought and of the aesthetic mentality: all subjects which have been addressed in this text, taking off from the fact that we come from the animals and that rationality is not natu- ral to us. Second, it becomes manifest that civilization has to do with
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 12 Hegel was right
the progress of rationality in the world, and that would be impossible without truth and the apodictic character of it. Another of its features is the development in philosophy of what has been expressed in Chris- tian theology "Truth shall make you free" (John 8, 31). But, in what sense can a man be free other that in self-knowledge? (Nosce te ipsum) How can we choose without knowing? How can we know without truth? How can we have truth without having proofs?
The denial of truth, as it has been expressed by superficial skepti- cism, has had on axiological and psychological terms a disastrous effect --one speaks in our time of the Generation X--, for the only thing it has achieved is that lies, mental confusions and contradictions are now surreptitiously considered as absolute truths.
The important thing is that, without truth, no true compromise can exist, and without the latter a fundamental ethical attitude cannot exist either --a fundamental ethical attitude that compels us always to make this world more just and worthy.
Basing himself on his clinical data, post-kleinian psychoanalyst Wil- fred R. Bion wrote that truth is the nourishment of the soul, for only by means of it one can modify and improve the mental, emotional and material quality of life among humans. On the contrary, says Bion, lies are venom. Modern skepticism has taken charge of spreading this widely. Hegel was right is a powerful antidote against that venom.
In our times of economic globalization, it seems imperative that those of us who are impacted by it are capable of a critical revision of such process, and that is only possible if thought itself is not global or economic. In other words: we are only capable of advancing solu- tions and of proceeding accordingly if reason itself can be autonomous from the material and psychical pressures which can be exerted upon human beings.
The work the reader has in his hands offers many important sub- jects: it is impossible to address each of them in this introduction, so I will only mention a few:
1. The difference between science and literature, which consists, namely, in that the former is compelled to demonstrate the truth of its statements, while the latter is not.
2. The lack of synonymy between beauty and truth. It becomes evi- dent hereby that a work or a thesis can be beautiful and pleasant, but there is a great difference between that and something being true.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Foreword to the Second edition 13
3. The synonymy between science, philosophy and the common sub- stance, which consists in defining and demonstrating.
4. The non-empiricity of scientific concepts and, consequently, the participation of the subject in their coinage.
5. The impossibility of obtaining a posteriori the concept of science, which means it is impossible to obtain that by the means of obser- vation and generalization that scientists commonly employ.
6. The refusal of the widespread Rousseaunian story of natural goodness. The argument we find here is that man makes him- self by means of cultural and historical development and not by a purportedly natural determination.
7. Self-determination or freedom which is nothing more than the substance that we call spirit (Geist).
8. The ethicity as a self-reflective and constitutive phenomenon of being.
9. The family, the society and the State.
The sequence of chapters in this work offers a transition from phi- losophy of science and ontology to natural sciences and political philo- sophy. The link between the different chapters is perfectly logical. Thus, Hegel was right is a long and yet rewarding travel that touches not only the writings of Hegel but the most fundamental themes in the history of Western philosophy. One cannot think the way one used to do after reading this book.
The history of Professor Miranda begins in 1924, in the city of Mon- terrey, Nuevo Leo? n, and it is a history full of intellectual and practical braveness. It goes from the powerful critiques of his Hunger and Thirst of Justice to his Marx and the Bible --which made of him a pioneer of the Liberation Theology-- to his demolishing refutation of the positivism of Comte and the Vienna Circle in his Appeal to Reason.
A thorough revision of contemporary philosophy would be incom- plete without the pages that Dr. Jose? Porfirio Miranda has bequeathed us. Thank you for this valuable heritage.
He? ctor Villanueva
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? chapter i
Science and Literature
? ? It has been a clear ruse of escapism to confuse Philosophy with Liter- ature, as well as to think that the scientificity revindicated by Hegel is a strange genre that bears no relation with the so-called scien-
tific disciplines. The fact that Hegel denounces "sleight of hand and garrulity" in Newton's demonstrations (WL I 277) ought to have in- duced commentators and scientists to suspect that something without precedents was taking form there.
In the first part of this chapter, I shall focus on aestheticism and other similar gags that have been put on Philosophy's mouth. This dis- cussion will bring us to one of the most important problems of our times and of all times.
Once all the vetoes, which prevent that scientific requirement is even formulated, have been overcome, our second part will address the core of scientificity's exigencies.
1. Literature and caprice
In the latter decades it has been widely discussed, whether Literature must be put at stake. But deep down, it never is, despite certain appearances. Whoever does not demonstrate the truth of his claims
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 16 Hegel was right
displays them without a true compromise with what he or she says. He displays them because he 'likes' them. Although the case could be that he doesn't.
Within the discipline of Literature, no author is obliged to demon- strate the truth of his claims, but in Philosophy, everyone is. Otherwise, what we have in our hands is a literary essay:
Those who think that in Philosophy one can do without demonstrating and deducing proof, thereby that they are still away from the most primary no- tion of Philosophy; they can speak about anything, but those who want to speak without concept do not have any right of peeping into Philosophy. (Rph, 141A)
In the worst cases, a poet simply lets himself go and speaks out ar- bitrarily the theses that come to his mind; no one demands that he proves their truth as long as they are beautiful. In extreme instances, the fact that I am a literary writer is a letter of marque, a permit to be irresponsible: since I am a literary writer I can endorse whatever I want; in the end, I do not have to prove it.
In the best cases, the literary writer is convinced of the truth of his theses and would probably like also that others share his conviction. However, he would like to do this not by means of demonstration but by the beauty of them. Even his personal convincement does not de- pend on any prove but on the beauty and transforming capacity of his own theses and conceptions. Nevertheless, Hegel tells us that "beauty is no yet truth". (WG 601)
It would be a great mistake to think that Philosophy wants to become an inquisitor or that it is inclined towards censorship and intolerance. Philosophy does not appeal to authority but to the consciousness of literary writers themselves, and poses for the whole world a decisive question that, undoubtedly, has been neglected: Is promoting rational- ity the same as promoting that man disregards the truth or falseness of the beliefs and conceptions he adopts?
It is neither a particular false claim nor the circulation of it what irritates Philosophy, but the fact itself that, when adopting a worldview, one considers the question of its truth or falseness indifferently. Such indifference is sheer and pure irrationality. To encourage it is to draw man backwards to an animal stage in which he was controlled by emo- tions, impressions and feelings, but not by reason. To adopt a theory
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'because I like it', to be a materialist or a spiritualist, a liberal or a con- servative 'because I like it' is to return to primitive savageness and to be as close as possible to original animality.
By the way, it is not a regression impelled by a recent predomi- nance of an aestheticist criterion: the latter only favors its use, but it does not create the criterion itself. Its cause lays rather in the sponta- neous tendency to go back to nature. Rationality is not given to us by nature. What is new, what is extraordinary, what is news in the strong sense of the word, is that the time of rationality has arrived, the time in which it no longer suffices that a worldview pleases, for one demands its truth.
That and no other is the sense of a famous Hegelian thesis that has shocked artists to a great degree: "the spirit has been left behind art" (PG 492), "the characteristic way of artistic production and of its works does not longer satisfy our highest need" (A? sth I 48), "the beautiful days of the Greek art and the golden period of the late Middle Ages belong to the past" (A? sth I 49).
In order to grasp this thesis we must understand the Hegelian news we just mentioned. First of all, we must realize that there is news and that "our time is a time of birth and a transition to a new period" (PG 15): today we can resist the siege of a genuine artwork by saying that, after all, it is only Art. One must still find out if its message is genuinely compelling due to its truth: "the impression that artworks provoke nowadays is of a more sober kind; what they arouse in us still requires a higher criterion and a different testimony" (A? sth I 48). The moment of scientific exigency has come; that is the teaching of the Phe- nomenology: "It is this coming to be of knowledge or science as such what is described in the Phenomenology of Spirit. " (PG 26)
Because they did not understand this, critics thought that the above mentioned Hegelian thesis of Art foretold the very end of it, at least in the sense that there would not be superior realizations than those of the artists of the Greek Antiquity, the Middle-Ages and the Renaissance. The next paragraph would have sufficed to make them see the truth: "Certainly, we can expect further developments and perfections in the field of arts, but the form of Art is no longer our supreme necessity". (A? sth I 170). Our supreme necessity is truth, and therefore science, for science demonstrates how much truth or falseness there is in some- thing. It has taken entire millenniums of maturing and efforts for humanity to reach a stage of rationality which consists in adopting a
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conception only if its truth is demonstrated; fortunately enough, we have reached that stage.
Philosophy is not against Art; let us say that loud and clear; the truth of the matter is that the exigency of truth is something much more su- perior and, fortunately again, that it is something we can formulate. There is a possibility that John Hospers may be right:
Art provides the most intense, concentrated, and sharply focused of the experiences available to man. Because of this, art can have an enormous influence on the tenor of a person's life, more influential no doubt than any particular system of morality. (EB 25, 719, 1)
On the other hand, Hospers himself will not deny that today's relativism can stir the foundations of any masterpiece. Even though Jean Valjean perceives the sublime depths of the duty towards his neighbors and fulfills it by sacrificing everything without hesitation, the skeptic would say: "How foolish, honesty is but a prejudice, that conduct is very beautiful but suits Valejan only, each one has his own tastes, one would have to demonstrate that such conduct is better than its contrary and that it is obligatory. " Against relativism the only effective weapon is science, but only science that goes deep down into the depths of truth. On the other hand, due to the intrinsic irratio- nality attached to this conduct, it is unacceptable that one ignores if a worldview is true or false. It is not enough that an intensively beau- tiful conduct overwhelms us; it is not absolute unless it is demonstrat- ed. Hegel says "it is useless; we do not longer kneel before (beauty)" (A? sth I 170)
When there are no reasons, one appeals to feeling. He who proceeds thus must be left speaking alone, since he goes back to the unity of his peculiar- ity, which must remain unaltered. When he appeals to his own feeling, the interrelation with us is broken. On the contrary, with thinking and concepts, we are in the field of universality, rationality, and we have in front the core of the matter; only that can we understand. (PR I 102).
"The antihuman, the animal, consists in remaining with and commu- nicating only by those means" (PG 56). Aristotle had already said it: "If he makes none, it is absurd to seek for an argument against one who has no arguments of his own about anything, in so far as he has
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none; for such a person, in so far as he is such, is really no better than a vegetable" (Metaphysics, IV, 1006a 14).
About the Athenians, which are the esthetical people par excellence, Hegel made two remarks that provide us with great insight, for they precise the attitude of Philosophy towards Art, an attitude embodied by Plato: "that slanting, that Art as such becomes the highest and hence the content loses interest, belongs to the Athenian people. Plato did not banish Art from his Republic: he only prevented that it continued to be god" (WG 639)
It is unacceptable that aesthetics becomes the supreme criterion, for beauty is not a synonym of truth, and to postulate that something is true because of its beauty would lead us to believe in a preestablished harmony which has been proved false by the experience of many cen- turies. For that reason Plato says that "the distinction between Philoso- phy and poetry [ . . . ] is an old quarrel" (Rep 607 B) and his remark becomes even brusquer: according to him, "poems are easy to do for he who does not know reality, for it is phantoms (poiosin), not reali- ties that poets produce" (Rep 599 A). In contrast to the predominant aesthetic criterion of a society, Philosophy acknowledges that every human being is compelled to seek the truth, since rationality is manda- tory to everyone. Probably, to make a genuine poem is not easy, even for him who does not acknowledge the truth, but what matters is the difference clearly expressed by Hegel: "If it was only a matter of stating things, philosophizing would be an easy task" (BS 422). "The philo- sophical method does not allow mere suppositions; what has value in Philosophy must be proved true, that is to say, its necessity has to be displayed" (A? sth I 65).
For that reason, it seems to me that a methodological focus like the following one (which is typical among Hegelian commentators) jeopar- dizes every interpretative pursuit:
The question with which we are faced --and this will be true in all of what follows-- is neither whether Hegel is correct in what he says nor whether his interpreters are justified in what they say of him. Rather the question is one of finding out just what Hegel does say and of determining what impact that can have on our own thinking. (Lauer 1982, 2)
To study a literary work with this method is fine; on the contrary, the only thing that matters in Philosophy is to prove whether the author
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demonstrates or not, i. e. if he is right or not. The impact a work may have on us, "demands still a higher criterion and a different valida- tion" (A? sth I 48). If we do not ponder the rigorousness of the demon- stration while examining a Hegelian thesis, we cannot understand its meaning. Hegel warns us that "the demonstration remains within the statement" (GP II 398). Thus, if we do not get the demonstration, we are not getting the meaning of the argument. The aesthetical approach is probably the origin of the accusations of obscurity raised against Hegel. Surely the source of great diversity existing of the 'interpretations' of his Philosophy lies therein.
Whoever does not read the Science of Logic as a frontal attack against the deficient scientificity of the disciplines so-called sciences does not make an approach to Hegelian Philosophy as a system that pretends to be true; therefore, one approaches it as an 'opinion', as one of the differ- ent worldviews that are exhibited in the history museum for someone to like them. Such an approach is aesthetical, not philosophical. How is it possible that these people beared hopes to understand a philosophi- cal work if they did not read it as such? "The spirit that gives life in a Philosophy needs, in order to be manifested, to be borne by a similar spirit. " (JS 16) Hegel underlines strongly the following fundamental principle:
"The courage of truth, the faith in the power of the spirit, is the first condition of Philosophy". (EGP 5s).
By saying this we walk deep into a territory planted with mines, for this matter does not only regard aesthetics. The aforesaid museal mentality is nowadays an epidemic among promoters of 'culture', a culture which is vague and without contents: culturalism. Other obsta- cles are the civilizatory relativism and anti-westernism, for how is it possible that a Western man pretends to tell the world what is true and what is not? That goes in hand with indigenism. And we could not miss also the political dimension under the guise of pluralism and of tolerance with declamatory indignation against those who pretend to be the "guardians of truth". We will examine each of this '-isms' and their efforts to shut Philosophy's mouth, until we reach at last the enormous blunder that lies at the bottom of the question.
If we start from the principle that truth is unknowable to the human mind, the possibility of any science is annulled; but a contradiction is simultaneously embraced from the beginning, since this principle is taken as a truth, a known truth. We will get back to this point. But if
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