for the
enlightenment
thinks god to as the one, the 'highest being' without any determination and qualification.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
for Kant this idea is only a reflexive idea of emerging from the reflec- tion on the activity of measuring.
this non-comparative greatness mani- fests itself concretely in the deregulation of all sensible comparison.
the mathematical experience of the sublime manifests itself in the activity of measuring according to an absolute standard.
our actual measuring and counting can never grasp something absolute great, because it presup- poses not only plurality, but also unity of greatness of as a measure.
every measure presupposes a kind of absolute measure again, that cannot be imagined by the capacity of the sense, the power of imagination.
in the face of the true infinity, this endeavour is deemed to fail.
however, the endeavour itself is not without sense.
it is an expression of the voice of reason that every experience of something given asks for a totality that is infinity and a unity.
nevertheless, this idea is purely ideal, not given in the 'Anschauung', therefore unimaginable.
it puts to the test the limits of imagination.
its conception of nature as a totality prompts in us this idea as an underlying ideality that is infinite and a unity at the same time.
therefore, the sublime is not in an object of nature, but an idea in the mind of a person that contemplates nature and estimates his experiences in the light of the idea.
in nature itself, it is of course especially limitless nature, nature devoid of form, an ocean for example, that causes in us the feeling of the sublime.
4
in an ethical perspective the quality of the feeling of our discontinue relation to the ideal world is called 'Achtung'. 5 the experience of the sub- lime is in line with this feeling. however, sensible-aesthetical experience, the experience of the sublime is essentially related to sensual pleasure ('lust'). nevertheless, it is a mixed pleasure, because this essentially nega- tive experience cannot produce pleasure in the normal, positive sense of the word. therefore, Kant explains that the 'overkill' of the senses by the sublime produces an unpleasant feeling that at the same is enjoyed. it is pleasure mediated by unpleasure. this combination of negative and
4 Kant, Critique of Judgement, pp. 75-76.
5 Cf. John h. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment, Chicago: university of Chicago press 1992, p. 283.
? a religion after christianity? 211
positive feelings is typical for the experience of the 'dynamical sublime, that is of the supersensible idea as overwhelming power.
the dynamical experience of the sublime is the experience of an over- whelming nature that threatens me in my sensible, concrete existence, but at the same time reminds me of my supersensible ethical essence and destiny. it is an aesthetical, contemplative experience, so from a safe dis- tance, not an experience of a real destruction by nature. nevertheless, it is a 'moving' contemplation. the starry heaven above me, the experience of the infinity of the oceans, only limited by the sky horizon, arouses in me a contemplative mood. to contemplate the thundering waterfalls arouses in me feelings of safeness and threat at the same time.
nature in this case is the occasion for the experience of the transcen- dent 'sublime' ideas of god and the immortality of my soul. in this line Kant, following burke, reinterprets the feelings of terror and pain that accompany the feeling of the sublime especially with regard to religion. for burke he sublime is the vast, infinite in nature that arouses a feeling of 'astonishment' that is filled with horror. A feeling familiar to it is 'awe'. 6 'Awe' is the positive feeling of power as the sublime.
with the help of this idea, Kant criticizes the enlightenment think- ers that condemned religion with the words of lucretius, who said that human feelings of pain and terror created the gods. for Kant, this is only true for superstition. true religion transcends that level and discovers in nature the supernatural reality of the sublime.
Confronted with the ideas man feels the insufficiency of his sense and the imagination to grasp this idea of reason. therefore, it is the feeling of something terrifying and attractive at the same time, according to Kant. 7 the sublime invites us therefore to appreciate it insofar is it is against the interest of our senses. therefore, this feeling is related not only to ideas in general, but to the idea of the good in particular.
in this context, he rehabilitates the religious feeling of 'enthusiasm', of being 'inspired'. like the idea of the sublime, this feeling, and 'fanati- cism' too, belongs to the platonic world of feelings related to transcendent ideas. these kind of feelings were condemned in circles of enlightenment
6 edmund burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, edited with an introduction and notes by Adam philips, oxford: oxford univer- sity press 1998, p. 62.
7 one feels the vicinity of Kant to the later philosopher of religion rudolf otto, who described the religious experience of the 'holy' as something 'tremendum et fascinosum', terrifying and attractive at the same time.
? 212 gerrit steunebrink
thinking. According to John locke, enthusiasm is the resource of all trou- ble causing self-made prophets. 8 Voltaire criticized islam as an enthusi- astic rage.
influenced by shaftesbury, Kant gives the notion of 'enthusiasm' a posi- tive turn by means of the idea of the sublime and distinguishes it from the superstitious feeling of 'schwaermerei' or fanaticism. the source of inspiration called enthusiasm is the idea of the good. because the sub- lime transcends all senses, it stimulates us by 'enthusiasm' to transcend our resistance sensible nature is offering and, as morality does, to 'violate' our senses. therefore, the sublime has to do with the power of our heart, inspired by moral laws, to transcend obstacles of our sensuality. that 'emotional' power is enthusiasm. therefore, enthusiasm is ? the idea of the good connected with affect. ? 9 without this affect there is not a thing really done good, as shaftesbury already said. 10 fanaticism for Kant is a delusion that searches for a vision beyond all bounds of sensibility. 11 rousseau, in his E? mile, says of fanaticism what Kant says of enthusiasm and praises it as the courage to risk your life at the service of the most sublime virtues. 12 hegel uses both words together, both participating in the positive and negative aspects of the sublime.
then Kant adds an often-quoted phrase that expresses essentially hegel's understanding of Judaism and islam too:
perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish law than the com- mandment: thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any like- ness of any thing that is in heaven or on earth, or under the earth, etc. this commandment can alone explain the enthusiasm which the Jewish people, in there moral period, felt for their religion when comparing themselves with others, or the pride inspired by mohammedanism. 13
Kant's theory of the sublime and enthusiasm was influential. it lies at the basis of schleiermacher's and rudolf otto's theory of religious experience. it inspired herder to a new view on the relation between a religion and its natural 'habitat', for example the 'formless desert' where mohammad's
8 John locke, An essay concerning human understanding, i, ii, london/new york: everyman's library 1974, ii, pp. 288-296.
9 Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 102.
10 shaftesbury, Letter on Enthousiasm, shaftesbury standard edition, hrsg. gerd hem-
merich und wolfgang benda, stuttgart: fromman-holzboog 1981, p. 372. 11 Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 105.
12 Jean-Jacques rousseau, E? mile, paris: garnier-flammarion 1966, p. 408. 13 Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 104.
? a religion after christianity? 213
imagination received in (contemplative) solitude his visions. 14 it influ- enced herder, goethe and hegel in their positive understanding of the 'stretch' of religious imaginative power (phantasy) that reaches its limits in the sublime and becomes distorted or grotesque. it created a positive view on the imaginary world of primitive and oriental religion. it created, although wrongly, the idea that islam does not know any form of picto- rial art. therefore, the attention, not totally wrongly, turned to poetry as the true vehicle of the sublime. because of the aesthetic background of the reflection on the sublime, religious texts, primitive myths and the old testament were now appreciated as literature.
3. islam in the lectures of philosophy of religion
this idea of the sublime as transcending radically at finite reality, and at the same time tendentionally nullifying it, is the point of departure of hegel's description of Judaism and islam.
Judaism is first of all called the 'religion of the sublime' but at the end, islam is the true universal religion of the sublime. the common notion of the religions of the sublime is the conception of god as spiritual and as one. As 'one' the god of Judaism transcends the plurality of gods of greek polytheism. in greek polytheism the divine is still submerged in the unity with especially human nature and its virtues, but in the religion of the sublime, the divine withdraws itself from nature, from human nature too and the different spiritual powers are concentrated in 'the one'. not the identity of god with these manifestations, but the difference is the central issue.
the difference is 'thinking' and even 'subject' at the one side, and nature and finiteness at the other. god is a spiritual subjective unity and, therefore, for the first time deserves for us the name of 'god'. we clearly recognize Kant's idea of the sublime. god himself is not so much sublime, but his relation to the material, sensual world makes him sublime, for he manifests him self negatively in the material world, in nature, in finitude. in relation to the divine, the material world shows its radical insufficiency, its finitude, its 'nothingness' in relation to god. the essential characteris- tic of the sublime is 'power'. in this sense, the god of the sublime is not substance anymore, but 'subjective'. it may surprise the reader to find the
14 J. g. herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, frankfurt am main: deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1989, p. 300.
? 214 gerrit steunebrink
word 'subjective' here, for very often in hegel the 'sublime' conception of god as unity belongs to the idea of 'substance', the world of spinoza and of pantheism. we will meet this world in the section about hegel's Aes- thetics. god as subject manifests himself fully in Christianity. however, a first step to this conception is made here in as far god is conceived as power that posited the natural finite world. (l2 27, 670/561) nevertheless, this finite world has no independency at all. it is nothing compared to its creator. therefore, this positing is neither a self-positing of god in his reality, as is the case with the Christian god.
As a subject this 'positing' god is thinking, which means that the content of this absolute power is 'wisdom'. because in god the reason- able determinations of freedom as well as the ethical determinations are united in one goal. therefore, an essential mark of god is 'holiness'. he alone is 'holy'. holiness is a characteristic only of god, not of the gods. Kant is fully present in all those determinations. this god has no sensual outwardness, and therefore images are impossible, for it is a pure thinking subjectivity. this wise thinking, himself determining and judging god is a creator-god. he is the creator of the world as something outside him.
however, in the religion of the sublime the relation between god and the world is an external one. god as the 'one and only' has no plurality in itself, does not dwell in plurality, unless by debasing it to accidental- ity. it is by god's undeserved goodness that creation exists and god's jus- tice shows that creation has no subsistency against god. god is called sublime not as such, but because of his negative relation to the world. the characteristic of sublimity is determined by god's negative relation to the world. here again Kant's influence is clear. Kant's experience of the sublime is ontologized. it is in the negation of the sensual world that the sublime has its own identity. in relation to god, the creation itself is always only a dependent and accidental reality. god makes the creation feel its nothingness. for hegel this means that this creation is not the true self-determination of god. this is only the case in the Christian god who realizes his self-determination as creation in himself, which means the forthcoming of the son. therefore, the Christian god is an internal plural unity, which means a concrete unity.
what is said here about the religion of the sublime is equally true for Judaism and for islam. both are religions of 'the one and only' that has no positive relation to its creation and for whom his creation has no subsis- tency. he is the 'always other' for whom all finitude is 'nothing'.
for the relation to man, this means that man is characterized by 'fear for god' and offering 'servitude' and not by freedom in the full sense of
a religion after christianity? 215
the word. now 'fear of god' is not only negative, it has an aspect of free- dom. hegel stresses this aspect especially in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion of 1824. the 'fear for god' liberates man from his particular interest and makes it possible for him to go for the one and only true goal. therefore, 'fear' is a 'moment' of freedom. therefore, with an aside to schleiermacher, it has nothing to do with a feeling of total dependency. (l2 24, 444/344) he repeats a Kantian formulation by saying that the fear of god liberates man of al his dependencies; that is of being restricted by particular interests. it is the freedom of self-interest. (l2 27, 679/571) this 'fear' resembles very much enthusiasm. however, the good still is done, not so much because it is a commandment of his 'reason', but because it is a commandment of god. that is the element of heteronomy in the reli- gion of the sublime. According to hegel, in Jewish religion and in islam lack of freedom is the basis of the relation with god. in Christianity free- dom is the basis.
however, what is the difference between Judaism and islam? more- over, which role does Christianity play in hegel's determination of that difference? the specific 'national' exclusive relationship between god and the Jewish people is 'denationalized' by islam. (m2, 158/64; l2 24, 437-438/337) to a certain extent, this difference seems to be marginal. islam is just 'denationalized Judaism'. however, this 'denationalization' is a step forward. Judaism misconceived the notion of god as the 'one' by inferring from its uniqueness a relation to only one people. therefore, 'nationalism' is essential for Judaism. hegel mentions indeed the universal perspectives present in the psalms and the prophetic books, but for hegel these are later developments, that do not really change the basic con- ception of the Jewish people as the 'chosen people'. (l2 27, 683-686/557, footnote) however, Christianity, although it can be conceived as a fam- ily and in that sense a nation too, wants that god should be known and honoured everywhere. interestingly, hegel does not describe Christianity as 'denationalized Judaism' as he does with islam. that is because Chris- tianity, distinct from Judaism, is the religion of freedom, while islam, still being Judaism, is the religion of heteronomy and unfreedom. Although denationalized, islam is still Judaism and therefore at the same time the real counterpart of Christianity, for because of its universalism, it is at the same level of Christianity. hegel says very clearly in his lectures of 1824:
here there is no limitation to a particular people; humanity relates itself to the one as purely abstract self-consciousness. this is the characteristic of the islamic religion. in it Christianity finds its antithesis, because it occupies a sphere equivalent to that of the Christian religion. it is a spiritual religion
gerrit steunebrink
like the Jewish, but its god is (available) for self-consciousness only within the abstract knowing spirit. its god is on a par with the Christian god to the extent that no particularity is retained. Anyone, from any people, who fears god, is pleasing to him, and human beings have value only to the extent that they take as their truth the knowledge that this is the one, the essence. the differentiation of subjects according to their station in life or class is sublated; there may be classes, there may be even slaves, but this is merely accidental. (l3 24, 242-243/172)
nevertheless, characteristic for Christianity is the reintegration of fini- tude and plurality within god, by which the gulf between the finite and the infinite is bridged and the finite obtains its own value and concrete reality. the basic expression of the Christian god as this unity of unity and plurality, of the infinite and the finite is for hegel the dogma of the trinity.
so it is in the conception of trinity that Christianity is opposed to islam. the antithesis consists in the fact that in Christianity, spirituality is developed concretely within itself and is known as trinity, as spirit; "and that human history, the relationship to the one, is likewise a concrete his- tory, (. . . ). " (idem) because Christianity has trinity, the history of man is a concrete history. however, islam hates and condemns all concreteness. "its god is the absolute one, in relation to whom human beings retain for themselves no purpose, no private domain, nothing peculiar to them- selves. " (idem) hegel continues to show that this conception of god has specific consequences for the anthropology of islam:
inasmuch as they exist, humans do in any case create a private domain for themselves in their inclinations and interests, and these are all the more savage and unrestrained in this case because they lack reflexion. but cou- pled with this is also the complete opposite, namely, the tendency to let everything take its own course, indifference with respect to every purpose, absolute fatalism, indifference to life; no practical purpose has any essential value. but since human beings are in fact practical and active, their purpose can only be to bring about the veneration of the one in all humanity. thus the religion of islam is essential fanatical. (idem)
hegel wants to say that because of its abstract conception of divine unity, islam cannot cope with concrete unity of unity and plurality in man of his passions either. because no reflexion can bring the passions into unity, there is the extremism of either following the passions wildly or doing nothing, fatalism. next to fatalism comes fanaticism. for man still is a practical being wanting to realize goals. therefore, the only goal of a mus- lim life can be to evoke in all human beings the feeling of the veneration
216
a religion after christianity? 217
of the one. therefore, the islamic religion is essentially fanatic. hegel con- cludes his thoughts with a comparison of islam with enlightenment think- ing of god.
for the enlightenment thinks god to as the one, the 'highest being' without any determination and qualification. in this respect, islam resembles very much enlightenment reflection. nevertheless, the differ- ence is, that in the enlightenment, that glorifies reflexion, finite human subjective reflexion is the cause of the 'emptiness' of the idea of god, while in islam this emptiness is threatening all human reflexion. indeed hegel looks to the religions from the east from the point of view of spinoza and Kant, two eminent enlightenment thinkers, the first one as a thinker of an undifferentiated, unsubjective substance, the second one as a thinker of the duality of spirit and matter, reason and senses and so on. now those religions reflect him back his own perspective. but coming back to hegel's anthropology of islam, what does fanaticism mean in this context?
4. islam, monotheism and fanaticism in the
Lectures on Philosophy of Religion
for hegel all abstract monotheism is fanatic, which means that not only islam, but also Judaism is fanatic too. the Jews are 'fanatic in 'stubborn- ness', which means that they develop a fanatic mode of defence and stick- ing to their god if they feel attacked in their religion. islam is known by 'fanaticism of conversion', for as a denationalized', universal Judaism, it tries to convert everybody to the faith in the one. hegel's careful exclu- sion of Christianity from fanatic monotheism feeds the suspicion that he is engaged in a controversy not familiar for us about the fanatic character of monotheism in general. indeed david hume developed in his influen- tial The natural History of Religion (1757) the theory that all monotheism is fanatic. Comparing the monotheistic religions Judaism, islam and Chris- tianity with graeco-roman polytheism, he comes to the conclusion that all monotheism is exclusive and does not accept other gods. so therefore, monotheism is fanatic. to the contrary, graeco-roman polytheism has an easy relation to other gods and integrated easily the gods of other peoples in its pantheon. 15 the book was translated into german very early in 1759 and was known by Kant. Kant and hegel certainly read what
15 david hume, 'the natural history of religion' in: david hume, Writings on Religion, ed. Anthony flew, ilinois: open Court publishing Company 1992, pp. 145-148.
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rousseau said about these questions in the chapter about 'civil religion' in his The social contract. he reproaches the Christians for breaking the bond between the laws and the gods in every nation, which the romans respected and integrated in the empire. 16 hegel mentions this behaviour of greeks and romans dealing with the fanaticism of Jews and muslims. (l2 27, 683/575 footnote) however, hegel relates fanaticism exclusively to the religions of the sublime, because they are not capable to think plural- ity in unity. specifically the idea of the trinity shows that the Christian god integrates plurality and therefore Christianity is never called a fanatic religion.
to this, we have to add, as we already said in the paragraph about the sublime, that fanaticism is for hegel not just something negative, because it is related to the positive aspects of the sublime, as well as to the nega- tive. therefore, he does not use the Kantian distinction between 'enthusi- asm' as something positive and 'fanaticism' as something negative. hegel is more in line with rousseau. nothing great is done without it, according to rousseau, and it enables it to risk death for sublime virtues. fanaticism as relating yourself to the sublime, as affectingly striving for the one, is positive insofar man in this relation transcends, finite, particular interests, fear of death and so on, but negative insofar as it nullifies all finite, deter- mined things. this interpretation of fanaticism in islam is dominant in hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History. however, before we go over to that chapter we will first give a short evaluation of hegel's interpreta- tion of islam in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.
5. evaluation: denationalization, monotheism and trinity
to describe islam as 'denationalized Judaism' is adequate to a certain extent. the prophet muhammad considered himself to be a prophet in the tradition of the Jewish prophets and of Christianity. it recognizes Abraham as a common ancestor and, like Judaism and Christianity but different from other religions in the middle east, it repudiated the phenomenon of human sacrifice. on the other hand, Christianity is 'denationalized' or 'universalized' Judaism too. hegel opposes both islam and Christianity as universal religions against Judaism as a nationalistic religion. however, islam is 'universalized Judaism' and Christianity is not. Christianity really
16 Jean-Jacques rousseau, Du contrat social, paris: union ge? ne? rale d'E? ditions 1973, p. 208.
? a religion after christianity? 219
transcends Judaism. nevertheless, Christians from the beginning con- ceived themselves as children of the common ancestor. they consider Christ to be foretold by the prophets, especially the prophets that mani- fest the universalizing tendencies of Judaism. for hegel those universal- izing tendencies were marginal to the idea of the 'chosen people' and to the idea of the given law. however, the Christians did not think so from the beginning! for them it was and is the real and legitimate outcome and fulfilling of the Jewish religion. 17 nevertheless, of course, Christianity is in a different way 'universalized Judaism' as islam is.
Christianity universalized Judaism by abolishing the mosaic law. in a polemic with Judaism, it used the 'Jewish' argument, that the father of Judaism himself, Abraham, living before moses, did not know that law. islam did the other way around. it universalized Judaism by denationaliz- ing and so universalizing the law. the problem here is hegel's interpreta- tion of Judaism. hegel does not like Judaism enough to be able to say that Christianity is 'universalized Judaism'. in some texts, in his Aesthetics for example, hegel even seems to like islam more than Judaism.
not only because of his Christian teleology, but also because of a lack of sources, hegel did not go in debate with the self-conception of islam in relation to Judaism and Christianity. islam considers itself to be the synthesis of Judaism and Christianity. it succeeded to overcome the one- sidedness of both religions. Judaism is a legal religion within the world, while Christianity is a spiritual, mystical religion that leaves the world, as becomes clear in the phenomenon of monasticism. therefore, muslims welcome the reformation, because protestantism abolished monasticism and brought Christianity again in the world. but because the result of this reformation was secularism,18 it becomes clear that Christianity cannot find the right equilibrium between spirituality and law. therefore, islam is the right synthesis of both Judaist innerworldliness and Christian outer- worldliness. especially with regard to the relation between protestantism and secularism and the absence of monasticism, hegel could have had a nice discussion with muslims. because of this discussion, hegel should
17 lustiger, Jean-marie, Le choix de Dieu, Entretiens avec Jean-Louis Missika et Dominique Wolton, paris: edition de fallois 1987 p. 49, 357. see also lustiger, Jean-marie, 'Christliches europa--was bedeutet das? ' in: gu? nther gillessen (ed. ) Zur Problematik von Nation und Konfession, regensburg: pustet 1993, pp. 138-153, p. 142.
18 that was muhammad iqbal's criticism of the reformation, see Annemarie schimmel, Gabriel's Wing, A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, leiden: e. J. brill 1963, p. 268.
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have written a specific chapter on islam in his philosophy of religion. for this discussion is about which religion is the last and accomplished one. moreover, islam has the advantage of being the last world religion.
hegel's description of the function of the dogma of trinity, as an inte- gration of the plurality of innerworldy presence of god within god self, has still some plausibility for Christians as is shown in the work of the well-known catholic theologian Karl rahner. in his article 'unity and trin- ity of god' that he contributed to a volume with the title The God of Chris- tianity and Islam, rahner says: "the monotheistic religions, and they are not identical with monotheistic metaphysics say: the last most original unity that sustains everything and that is infinite and almighty, does not abode in a solitude, far away and unreachable by men, but can, without splitting up its unicity, as a unity penetrate in the pluralism of the world and it can be given, concretize itself. "19 the hegelian overtones in this formulation are unmistakable.
hegel's attempt to establish a relation between different understand- ings of god as trinitarian or as monistic monotheism at the one side and differences in the self-understanding of man at the other side is perfectly legitimate, but it is difficult to draw conclusions about actual human behaviour with regard to fanaticism. one should not forget that the nega- tive estimation of religious feelings, as expressed in the discussion about enthusiasm, fanaticism and so on, originated in times of the european religious wars. moreover, they were Christian wars.
most important, the description of islam as a religion of the sublime, is not just inadequate. however, we have to postpone this evaluation to that in the chapter about islamic philosophy. there we can explain that hegel, amongst all kind of misinterpretations, hit a mark. this becomes already a little bit clear in the chapters about islam in his philosophy of history. moreover, we have to interpret that chapter first of all. in this chapter, we find an answer to the question why islam entered on the scene after the final and absolute religion of Christianity.
6. islam in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History
in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History hegel speaks about islam not
only in a special chapter about muhammadism, but in a chapter about
19 Karl rahner, 'einzigkeit und dreifaltigkeit gottes' in: Andreas bsteh (ed. ) Der Gott des Christentums und des Islams, mo? dling: Verlag sankt gabriel 1978, pp. 119-137, p. 122 (translation g. s. ).
? a religion after christianity? 221
the Crusades too. both chapters belong to part iV, the part about the 'Christian germanic world', that is the world of western Christianity as it emerges after the fall of the western roman empire. the chapter about muhammadism is, of course, at the beginning of that part, for islam origi- nated in the seventh century. the chapter next to it is about the empire of Charlemagne. the chapter on the Crusades belongs to the section of the middle Ages and the chapter next to it deals with the transition of feudalism to monarchism, within which the development of the nationali- ties is discussed.
in the chapter about islam, hegel first describes the situation of the young, Christianized germanic peoples after the great wandering of peo- ples, following the collapse of the western roman empire. they tried to realize their freedom, but instead of thinking along general rules, laws and principles, they got lost, according to hegel, because of their underdevel- oped nature, in a lot of particularities, dependencies and accidentalities. therefore, the opposite tendency towards generality and integration in a totality had to appear and this happened in the 'revolution of the east'. 20 in fact, this revolution is islam as a religion of the sublime that liberated itself from the particularity of Judaism, stressed unity at the cost of plural- ity and particularity.
it made the adoration of the one to the goal of all subjectivity and it even made subjectivity in its turn merge into the one. At the surface, it seems that hegel refers with this remark to mystical trends in islam, for which it would not be untrue. however, a striking comparison with indian religion shows hegel's true intention. Characteristical for indian religion is according to hegel the monastic immersion in the absolute. however, the islamic way to immerse into the absolute is opposite to this. it is innerworldly activistic. 21 subjectivity in islam is alive, an activity, it enters into the world to negate it and by doing so it mediates the adoration of the one. moreover, indeed, although islam knows mysticism, it does not know monastic life. the essence of this activity is conversion, to bring the whole world to the adoration of the one and only.
then hegel gives a short, and partly because of its shortness, not incor- rect description of some islamic principles, the description he did not give in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. he stresses, like Kant, the
20 g. w. f. hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, transl. J. sibree, london: henry g. bohn 1857, pp. 369-370.
21 hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 369.
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prohibition on images and says correctly that mohammed is a prophet, and, unlike Jesus, still a human being, not elevated above human weaknesses. hegel gives as 'the' characteristic quality of islam: "that in actual exis- tence nothing can become fixed, but that everything is to expand itself
in activity and life in the boundless amplitude of the world, so that the worship of the one remains the only bond by which the whole is capable of uniting. "22 thus is the world of the sublime. nothing is fixed. only the one is important and therefore in the expansion of islam all barriers, all limits, cast distinctions and so on disappear. only man as a believer is important. hegel certainly judges islam in the right way. hegel thinks, like herder who always made a relation between a religion and its nat- ural environment, that this conception of the limitless, unstableness of all things is influenced by the natural 'habitat' of islam, the desert: "here spirit exists in its simplest form, and the sense of the formless has its special abode; for in the desert nothing can be brought into a firm consis- tent shape. "23 for Kant, 'formless' nature, like a wild ocean, is the vehicle for the experience of the sublime and hegel, following herder therefore takes the 'formlessness' of the desert as the source of the islamite experi- ence of the sublime. 24 hegel mentions mohammed's flight from mecca to medina and stresses especially the vast conquests that started already during his lifetime, but were realized under his successors. hegel takes over the accepted prejudice of the western world that the muslims spread their faith by violence, killing everybody that did not want to convert. only later they became more lenient to the conquered. instead of becom- ing muslim, they had to pay a poll tax.
in this context, hegel talks about enthusiasm and fanaticism as essen- tially related to the 'abstract' worship of the one. 'it is the essence of fanaticism to bear only a desolating destructive relation to the concrete, but that of mohametanism was, at the same time, capable of the greatest elevation- an elevation free from all petty interest, and united with all the virtues that appertain to magnanimity and valour. '25 while hegel in his lectures on the philosophy of religion compares the islamic religion of the abstract one with the natural religion of the enlightenment, he now compares islamic fanaticism to the terror of the french revolution.
22 idem, p. 371.
23 idem.
24 J. g. herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, frankfurt am main:
deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1989, p. 300.
25 hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 372.
? a religion after christianity? 223
immediately after the just quoted mixed estimation of islamic fanaticism he adds: 'La religion et la terreur was the principle in this case, as with robespierre, la liberte? et la terreur. '26 Again, like in the lectures on the philosophy of religion hegel tries to make a psychological typology with the help of the concept of fanaticism. it has the psychological affect that, while europeans are involved in a multitude of relations, being a bundle of them, in islam the individual is one passion and that alone. reckless- ness in it positive and negative aspects. it produces, as specifically islam poetry shows, a warmth and fervour, a glow that is the perfect freedom of fancy of every fetter--an absorption in the life of its object and the sentiment it inspires, so that selfishness and egotism are utterly banished. lawrence of Arabia ante dato! in addition, hegel concludes about islam: "never has enthusiasm, as such, performed greater deeds. "27 this is spe- cifically said of muslim enthusiasm, because it is abstract and therefore all-comprehensive, restrained by nothing, without limits and indifferent to all sides.
however, what is or was the place of islam in history? hegel describes the rapid speed of the high development of the arts and the sciences in the Arab empire and the good quality of their government. their decline is caused by the fact that the islamic universality of the sublime does not produce determined forms. "but the great empire of the Caliphs did not last long: for on the basis presented by universality nothing is firm. it fell at the same time as the empire of the franks. After them the ottomans came. At the end was this: fanaticism having cooled down, no moral prin- ciple remained in men's souls. "28
because a new moral principle is not regained, the turn is to the euro- peans, according to hegel. they profited from the islamic developments. hegel describes how european valour idealized itself to a noble chivalry in the struggle with the saracens. how science, especially philosophy came from the Arabs to europe. how the beautiful islamic poetry inspired ger- man literature, especially in goethe's 'west-o? stlicher divan'. however, is that all? what is the philosophical significance of the fact that the values of chivalry, science, philosophy and art came from the islamic world to europe. to discover this significance a glance on a remark about islam in the chapter about the Crusades is revealing.
26 idem, p. 372. 27 idem, p. 373. 28 idem, p. 374.
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there hegel says that the Crusades had the same effect as the struggle of the Karolingians with the saracens. the acquaintance with islamic enthusiasm promoted the virtues of chivalry and this spirit was diffused over the whole of europe by the Crusades. it civilized europe: "the ferocity and savage valour that characterized the predatory life of the barbarians (the europeans! ! g. s.
in an ethical perspective the quality of the feeling of our discontinue relation to the ideal world is called 'Achtung'. 5 the experience of the sub- lime is in line with this feeling. however, sensible-aesthetical experience, the experience of the sublime is essentially related to sensual pleasure ('lust'). nevertheless, it is a mixed pleasure, because this essentially nega- tive experience cannot produce pleasure in the normal, positive sense of the word. therefore, Kant explains that the 'overkill' of the senses by the sublime produces an unpleasant feeling that at the same is enjoyed. it is pleasure mediated by unpleasure. this combination of negative and
4 Kant, Critique of Judgement, pp. 75-76.
5 Cf. John h. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment, Chicago: university of Chicago press 1992, p. 283.
? a religion after christianity? 211
positive feelings is typical for the experience of the 'dynamical sublime, that is of the supersensible idea as overwhelming power.
the dynamical experience of the sublime is the experience of an over- whelming nature that threatens me in my sensible, concrete existence, but at the same time reminds me of my supersensible ethical essence and destiny. it is an aesthetical, contemplative experience, so from a safe dis- tance, not an experience of a real destruction by nature. nevertheless, it is a 'moving' contemplation. the starry heaven above me, the experience of the infinity of the oceans, only limited by the sky horizon, arouses in me a contemplative mood. to contemplate the thundering waterfalls arouses in me feelings of safeness and threat at the same time.
nature in this case is the occasion for the experience of the transcen- dent 'sublime' ideas of god and the immortality of my soul. in this line Kant, following burke, reinterprets the feelings of terror and pain that accompany the feeling of the sublime especially with regard to religion. for burke he sublime is the vast, infinite in nature that arouses a feeling of 'astonishment' that is filled with horror. A feeling familiar to it is 'awe'. 6 'Awe' is the positive feeling of power as the sublime.
with the help of this idea, Kant criticizes the enlightenment think- ers that condemned religion with the words of lucretius, who said that human feelings of pain and terror created the gods. for Kant, this is only true for superstition. true religion transcends that level and discovers in nature the supernatural reality of the sublime.
Confronted with the ideas man feels the insufficiency of his sense and the imagination to grasp this idea of reason. therefore, it is the feeling of something terrifying and attractive at the same time, according to Kant. 7 the sublime invites us therefore to appreciate it insofar is it is against the interest of our senses. therefore, this feeling is related not only to ideas in general, but to the idea of the good in particular.
in this context, he rehabilitates the religious feeling of 'enthusiasm', of being 'inspired'. like the idea of the sublime, this feeling, and 'fanati- cism' too, belongs to the platonic world of feelings related to transcendent ideas. these kind of feelings were condemned in circles of enlightenment
6 edmund burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, edited with an introduction and notes by Adam philips, oxford: oxford univer- sity press 1998, p. 62.
7 one feels the vicinity of Kant to the later philosopher of religion rudolf otto, who described the religious experience of the 'holy' as something 'tremendum et fascinosum', terrifying and attractive at the same time.
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thinking. According to John locke, enthusiasm is the resource of all trou- ble causing self-made prophets. 8 Voltaire criticized islam as an enthusi- astic rage.
influenced by shaftesbury, Kant gives the notion of 'enthusiasm' a posi- tive turn by means of the idea of the sublime and distinguishes it from the superstitious feeling of 'schwaermerei' or fanaticism. the source of inspiration called enthusiasm is the idea of the good. because the sub- lime transcends all senses, it stimulates us by 'enthusiasm' to transcend our resistance sensible nature is offering and, as morality does, to 'violate' our senses. therefore, the sublime has to do with the power of our heart, inspired by moral laws, to transcend obstacles of our sensuality. that 'emotional' power is enthusiasm. therefore, enthusiasm is ? the idea of the good connected with affect. ? 9 without this affect there is not a thing really done good, as shaftesbury already said. 10 fanaticism for Kant is a delusion that searches for a vision beyond all bounds of sensibility. 11 rousseau, in his E? mile, says of fanaticism what Kant says of enthusiasm and praises it as the courage to risk your life at the service of the most sublime virtues. 12 hegel uses both words together, both participating in the positive and negative aspects of the sublime.
then Kant adds an often-quoted phrase that expresses essentially hegel's understanding of Judaism and islam too:
perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish law than the com- mandment: thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any like- ness of any thing that is in heaven or on earth, or under the earth, etc. this commandment can alone explain the enthusiasm which the Jewish people, in there moral period, felt for their religion when comparing themselves with others, or the pride inspired by mohammedanism. 13
Kant's theory of the sublime and enthusiasm was influential. it lies at the basis of schleiermacher's and rudolf otto's theory of religious experience. it inspired herder to a new view on the relation between a religion and its natural 'habitat', for example the 'formless desert' where mohammad's
8 John locke, An essay concerning human understanding, i, ii, london/new york: everyman's library 1974, ii, pp. 288-296.
9 Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 102.
10 shaftesbury, Letter on Enthousiasm, shaftesbury standard edition, hrsg. gerd hem-
merich und wolfgang benda, stuttgart: fromman-holzboog 1981, p. 372. 11 Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 105.
12 Jean-Jacques rousseau, E? mile, paris: garnier-flammarion 1966, p. 408. 13 Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 104.
? a religion after christianity? 213
imagination received in (contemplative) solitude his visions. 14 it influ- enced herder, goethe and hegel in their positive understanding of the 'stretch' of religious imaginative power (phantasy) that reaches its limits in the sublime and becomes distorted or grotesque. it created a positive view on the imaginary world of primitive and oriental religion. it created, although wrongly, the idea that islam does not know any form of picto- rial art. therefore, the attention, not totally wrongly, turned to poetry as the true vehicle of the sublime. because of the aesthetic background of the reflection on the sublime, religious texts, primitive myths and the old testament were now appreciated as literature.
3. islam in the lectures of philosophy of religion
this idea of the sublime as transcending radically at finite reality, and at the same time tendentionally nullifying it, is the point of departure of hegel's description of Judaism and islam.
Judaism is first of all called the 'religion of the sublime' but at the end, islam is the true universal religion of the sublime. the common notion of the religions of the sublime is the conception of god as spiritual and as one. As 'one' the god of Judaism transcends the plurality of gods of greek polytheism. in greek polytheism the divine is still submerged in the unity with especially human nature and its virtues, but in the religion of the sublime, the divine withdraws itself from nature, from human nature too and the different spiritual powers are concentrated in 'the one'. not the identity of god with these manifestations, but the difference is the central issue.
the difference is 'thinking' and even 'subject' at the one side, and nature and finiteness at the other. god is a spiritual subjective unity and, therefore, for the first time deserves for us the name of 'god'. we clearly recognize Kant's idea of the sublime. god himself is not so much sublime, but his relation to the material, sensual world makes him sublime, for he manifests him self negatively in the material world, in nature, in finitude. in relation to the divine, the material world shows its radical insufficiency, its finitude, its 'nothingness' in relation to god. the essential characteris- tic of the sublime is 'power'. in this sense, the god of the sublime is not substance anymore, but 'subjective'. it may surprise the reader to find the
14 J. g. herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, frankfurt am main: deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1989, p. 300.
? 214 gerrit steunebrink
word 'subjective' here, for very often in hegel the 'sublime' conception of god as unity belongs to the idea of 'substance', the world of spinoza and of pantheism. we will meet this world in the section about hegel's Aes- thetics. god as subject manifests himself fully in Christianity. however, a first step to this conception is made here in as far god is conceived as power that posited the natural finite world. (l2 27, 670/561) nevertheless, this finite world has no independency at all. it is nothing compared to its creator. therefore, this positing is neither a self-positing of god in his reality, as is the case with the Christian god.
As a subject this 'positing' god is thinking, which means that the content of this absolute power is 'wisdom'. because in god the reason- able determinations of freedom as well as the ethical determinations are united in one goal. therefore, an essential mark of god is 'holiness'. he alone is 'holy'. holiness is a characteristic only of god, not of the gods. Kant is fully present in all those determinations. this god has no sensual outwardness, and therefore images are impossible, for it is a pure thinking subjectivity. this wise thinking, himself determining and judging god is a creator-god. he is the creator of the world as something outside him.
however, in the religion of the sublime the relation between god and the world is an external one. god as the 'one and only' has no plurality in itself, does not dwell in plurality, unless by debasing it to accidental- ity. it is by god's undeserved goodness that creation exists and god's jus- tice shows that creation has no subsistency against god. god is called sublime not as such, but because of his negative relation to the world. the characteristic of sublimity is determined by god's negative relation to the world. here again Kant's influence is clear. Kant's experience of the sublime is ontologized. it is in the negation of the sensual world that the sublime has its own identity. in relation to god, the creation itself is always only a dependent and accidental reality. god makes the creation feel its nothingness. for hegel this means that this creation is not the true self-determination of god. this is only the case in the Christian god who realizes his self-determination as creation in himself, which means the forthcoming of the son. therefore, the Christian god is an internal plural unity, which means a concrete unity.
what is said here about the religion of the sublime is equally true for Judaism and for islam. both are religions of 'the one and only' that has no positive relation to its creation and for whom his creation has no subsis- tency. he is the 'always other' for whom all finitude is 'nothing'.
for the relation to man, this means that man is characterized by 'fear for god' and offering 'servitude' and not by freedom in the full sense of
a religion after christianity? 215
the word. now 'fear of god' is not only negative, it has an aspect of free- dom. hegel stresses this aspect especially in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion of 1824. the 'fear for god' liberates man from his particular interest and makes it possible for him to go for the one and only true goal. therefore, 'fear' is a 'moment' of freedom. therefore, with an aside to schleiermacher, it has nothing to do with a feeling of total dependency. (l2 24, 444/344) he repeats a Kantian formulation by saying that the fear of god liberates man of al his dependencies; that is of being restricted by particular interests. it is the freedom of self-interest. (l2 27, 679/571) this 'fear' resembles very much enthusiasm. however, the good still is done, not so much because it is a commandment of his 'reason', but because it is a commandment of god. that is the element of heteronomy in the reli- gion of the sublime. According to hegel, in Jewish religion and in islam lack of freedom is the basis of the relation with god. in Christianity free- dom is the basis.
however, what is the difference between Judaism and islam? more- over, which role does Christianity play in hegel's determination of that difference? the specific 'national' exclusive relationship between god and the Jewish people is 'denationalized' by islam. (m2, 158/64; l2 24, 437-438/337) to a certain extent, this difference seems to be marginal. islam is just 'denationalized Judaism'. however, this 'denationalization' is a step forward. Judaism misconceived the notion of god as the 'one' by inferring from its uniqueness a relation to only one people. therefore, 'nationalism' is essential for Judaism. hegel mentions indeed the universal perspectives present in the psalms and the prophetic books, but for hegel these are later developments, that do not really change the basic con- ception of the Jewish people as the 'chosen people'. (l2 27, 683-686/557, footnote) however, Christianity, although it can be conceived as a fam- ily and in that sense a nation too, wants that god should be known and honoured everywhere. interestingly, hegel does not describe Christianity as 'denationalized Judaism' as he does with islam. that is because Chris- tianity, distinct from Judaism, is the religion of freedom, while islam, still being Judaism, is the religion of heteronomy and unfreedom. Although denationalized, islam is still Judaism and therefore at the same time the real counterpart of Christianity, for because of its universalism, it is at the same level of Christianity. hegel says very clearly in his lectures of 1824:
here there is no limitation to a particular people; humanity relates itself to the one as purely abstract self-consciousness. this is the characteristic of the islamic religion. in it Christianity finds its antithesis, because it occupies a sphere equivalent to that of the Christian religion. it is a spiritual religion
gerrit steunebrink
like the Jewish, but its god is (available) for self-consciousness only within the abstract knowing spirit. its god is on a par with the Christian god to the extent that no particularity is retained. Anyone, from any people, who fears god, is pleasing to him, and human beings have value only to the extent that they take as their truth the knowledge that this is the one, the essence. the differentiation of subjects according to their station in life or class is sublated; there may be classes, there may be even slaves, but this is merely accidental. (l3 24, 242-243/172)
nevertheless, characteristic for Christianity is the reintegration of fini- tude and plurality within god, by which the gulf between the finite and the infinite is bridged and the finite obtains its own value and concrete reality. the basic expression of the Christian god as this unity of unity and plurality, of the infinite and the finite is for hegel the dogma of the trinity.
so it is in the conception of trinity that Christianity is opposed to islam. the antithesis consists in the fact that in Christianity, spirituality is developed concretely within itself and is known as trinity, as spirit; "and that human history, the relationship to the one, is likewise a concrete his- tory, (. . . ). " (idem) because Christianity has trinity, the history of man is a concrete history. however, islam hates and condemns all concreteness. "its god is the absolute one, in relation to whom human beings retain for themselves no purpose, no private domain, nothing peculiar to them- selves. " (idem) hegel continues to show that this conception of god has specific consequences for the anthropology of islam:
inasmuch as they exist, humans do in any case create a private domain for themselves in their inclinations and interests, and these are all the more savage and unrestrained in this case because they lack reflexion. but cou- pled with this is also the complete opposite, namely, the tendency to let everything take its own course, indifference with respect to every purpose, absolute fatalism, indifference to life; no practical purpose has any essential value. but since human beings are in fact practical and active, their purpose can only be to bring about the veneration of the one in all humanity. thus the religion of islam is essential fanatical. (idem)
hegel wants to say that because of its abstract conception of divine unity, islam cannot cope with concrete unity of unity and plurality in man of his passions either. because no reflexion can bring the passions into unity, there is the extremism of either following the passions wildly or doing nothing, fatalism. next to fatalism comes fanaticism. for man still is a practical being wanting to realize goals. therefore, the only goal of a mus- lim life can be to evoke in all human beings the feeling of the veneration
216
a religion after christianity? 217
of the one. therefore, the islamic religion is essentially fanatic. hegel con- cludes his thoughts with a comparison of islam with enlightenment think- ing of god.
for the enlightenment thinks god to as the one, the 'highest being' without any determination and qualification. in this respect, islam resembles very much enlightenment reflection. nevertheless, the differ- ence is, that in the enlightenment, that glorifies reflexion, finite human subjective reflexion is the cause of the 'emptiness' of the idea of god, while in islam this emptiness is threatening all human reflexion. indeed hegel looks to the religions from the east from the point of view of spinoza and Kant, two eminent enlightenment thinkers, the first one as a thinker of an undifferentiated, unsubjective substance, the second one as a thinker of the duality of spirit and matter, reason and senses and so on. now those religions reflect him back his own perspective. but coming back to hegel's anthropology of islam, what does fanaticism mean in this context?
4. islam, monotheism and fanaticism in the
Lectures on Philosophy of Religion
for hegel all abstract monotheism is fanatic, which means that not only islam, but also Judaism is fanatic too. the Jews are 'fanatic in 'stubborn- ness', which means that they develop a fanatic mode of defence and stick- ing to their god if they feel attacked in their religion. islam is known by 'fanaticism of conversion', for as a denationalized', universal Judaism, it tries to convert everybody to the faith in the one. hegel's careful exclu- sion of Christianity from fanatic monotheism feeds the suspicion that he is engaged in a controversy not familiar for us about the fanatic character of monotheism in general. indeed david hume developed in his influen- tial The natural History of Religion (1757) the theory that all monotheism is fanatic. Comparing the monotheistic religions Judaism, islam and Chris- tianity with graeco-roman polytheism, he comes to the conclusion that all monotheism is exclusive and does not accept other gods. so therefore, monotheism is fanatic. to the contrary, graeco-roman polytheism has an easy relation to other gods and integrated easily the gods of other peoples in its pantheon. 15 the book was translated into german very early in 1759 and was known by Kant. Kant and hegel certainly read what
15 david hume, 'the natural history of religion' in: david hume, Writings on Religion, ed. Anthony flew, ilinois: open Court publishing Company 1992, pp. 145-148.
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rousseau said about these questions in the chapter about 'civil religion' in his The social contract. he reproaches the Christians for breaking the bond between the laws and the gods in every nation, which the romans respected and integrated in the empire. 16 hegel mentions this behaviour of greeks and romans dealing with the fanaticism of Jews and muslims. (l2 27, 683/575 footnote) however, hegel relates fanaticism exclusively to the religions of the sublime, because they are not capable to think plural- ity in unity. specifically the idea of the trinity shows that the Christian god integrates plurality and therefore Christianity is never called a fanatic religion.
to this, we have to add, as we already said in the paragraph about the sublime, that fanaticism is for hegel not just something negative, because it is related to the positive aspects of the sublime, as well as to the nega- tive. therefore, he does not use the Kantian distinction between 'enthusi- asm' as something positive and 'fanaticism' as something negative. hegel is more in line with rousseau. nothing great is done without it, according to rousseau, and it enables it to risk death for sublime virtues. fanaticism as relating yourself to the sublime, as affectingly striving for the one, is positive insofar man in this relation transcends, finite, particular interests, fear of death and so on, but negative insofar as it nullifies all finite, deter- mined things. this interpretation of fanaticism in islam is dominant in hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History. however, before we go over to that chapter we will first give a short evaluation of hegel's interpreta- tion of islam in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.
5. evaluation: denationalization, monotheism and trinity
to describe islam as 'denationalized Judaism' is adequate to a certain extent. the prophet muhammad considered himself to be a prophet in the tradition of the Jewish prophets and of Christianity. it recognizes Abraham as a common ancestor and, like Judaism and Christianity but different from other religions in the middle east, it repudiated the phenomenon of human sacrifice. on the other hand, Christianity is 'denationalized' or 'universalized' Judaism too. hegel opposes both islam and Christianity as universal religions against Judaism as a nationalistic religion. however, islam is 'universalized Judaism' and Christianity is not. Christianity really
16 Jean-Jacques rousseau, Du contrat social, paris: union ge? ne? rale d'E? ditions 1973, p. 208.
? a religion after christianity? 219
transcends Judaism. nevertheless, Christians from the beginning con- ceived themselves as children of the common ancestor. they consider Christ to be foretold by the prophets, especially the prophets that mani- fest the universalizing tendencies of Judaism. for hegel those universal- izing tendencies were marginal to the idea of the 'chosen people' and to the idea of the given law. however, the Christians did not think so from the beginning! for them it was and is the real and legitimate outcome and fulfilling of the Jewish religion. 17 nevertheless, of course, Christianity is in a different way 'universalized Judaism' as islam is.
Christianity universalized Judaism by abolishing the mosaic law. in a polemic with Judaism, it used the 'Jewish' argument, that the father of Judaism himself, Abraham, living before moses, did not know that law. islam did the other way around. it universalized Judaism by denationaliz- ing and so universalizing the law. the problem here is hegel's interpreta- tion of Judaism. hegel does not like Judaism enough to be able to say that Christianity is 'universalized Judaism'. in some texts, in his Aesthetics for example, hegel even seems to like islam more than Judaism.
not only because of his Christian teleology, but also because of a lack of sources, hegel did not go in debate with the self-conception of islam in relation to Judaism and Christianity. islam considers itself to be the synthesis of Judaism and Christianity. it succeeded to overcome the one- sidedness of both religions. Judaism is a legal religion within the world, while Christianity is a spiritual, mystical religion that leaves the world, as becomes clear in the phenomenon of monasticism. therefore, muslims welcome the reformation, because protestantism abolished monasticism and brought Christianity again in the world. but because the result of this reformation was secularism,18 it becomes clear that Christianity cannot find the right equilibrium between spirituality and law. therefore, islam is the right synthesis of both Judaist innerworldliness and Christian outer- worldliness. especially with regard to the relation between protestantism and secularism and the absence of monasticism, hegel could have had a nice discussion with muslims. because of this discussion, hegel should
17 lustiger, Jean-marie, Le choix de Dieu, Entretiens avec Jean-Louis Missika et Dominique Wolton, paris: edition de fallois 1987 p. 49, 357. see also lustiger, Jean-marie, 'Christliches europa--was bedeutet das? ' in: gu? nther gillessen (ed. ) Zur Problematik von Nation und Konfession, regensburg: pustet 1993, pp. 138-153, p. 142.
18 that was muhammad iqbal's criticism of the reformation, see Annemarie schimmel, Gabriel's Wing, A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, leiden: e. J. brill 1963, p. 268.
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have written a specific chapter on islam in his philosophy of religion. for this discussion is about which religion is the last and accomplished one. moreover, islam has the advantage of being the last world religion.
hegel's description of the function of the dogma of trinity, as an inte- gration of the plurality of innerworldy presence of god within god self, has still some plausibility for Christians as is shown in the work of the well-known catholic theologian Karl rahner. in his article 'unity and trin- ity of god' that he contributed to a volume with the title The God of Chris- tianity and Islam, rahner says: "the monotheistic religions, and they are not identical with monotheistic metaphysics say: the last most original unity that sustains everything and that is infinite and almighty, does not abode in a solitude, far away and unreachable by men, but can, without splitting up its unicity, as a unity penetrate in the pluralism of the world and it can be given, concretize itself. "19 the hegelian overtones in this formulation are unmistakable.
hegel's attempt to establish a relation between different understand- ings of god as trinitarian or as monistic monotheism at the one side and differences in the self-understanding of man at the other side is perfectly legitimate, but it is difficult to draw conclusions about actual human behaviour with regard to fanaticism. one should not forget that the nega- tive estimation of religious feelings, as expressed in the discussion about enthusiasm, fanaticism and so on, originated in times of the european religious wars. moreover, they were Christian wars.
most important, the description of islam as a religion of the sublime, is not just inadequate. however, we have to postpone this evaluation to that in the chapter about islamic philosophy. there we can explain that hegel, amongst all kind of misinterpretations, hit a mark. this becomes already a little bit clear in the chapters about islam in his philosophy of history. moreover, we have to interpret that chapter first of all. in this chapter, we find an answer to the question why islam entered on the scene after the final and absolute religion of Christianity.
6. islam in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History
in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History hegel speaks about islam not
only in a special chapter about muhammadism, but in a chapter about
19 Karl rahner, 'einzigkeit und dreifaltigkeit gottes' in: Andreas bsteh (ed. ) Der Gott des Christentums und des Islams, mo? dling: Verlag sankt gabriel 1978, pp. 119-137, p. 122 (translation g. s. ).
? a religion after christianity? 221
the Crusades too. both chapters belong to part iV, the part about the 'Christian germanic world', that is the world of western Christianity as it emerges after the fall of the western roman empire. the chapter about muhammadism is, of course, at the beginning of that part, for islam origi- nated in the seventh century. the chapter next to it is about the empire of Charlemagne. the chapter on the Crusades belongs to the section of the middle Ages and the chapter next to it deals with the transition of feudalism to monarchism, within which the development of the nationali- ties is discussed.
in the chapter about islam, hegel first describes the situation of the young, Christianized germanic peoples after the great wandering of peo- ples, following the collapse of the western roman empire. they tried to realize their freedom, but instead of thinking along general rules, laws and principles, they got lost, according to hegel, because of their underdevel- oped nature, in a lot of particularities, dependencies and accidentalities. therefore, the opposite tendency towards generality and integration in a totality had to appear and this happened in the 'revolution of the east'. 20 in fact, this revolution is islam as a religion of the sublime that liberated itself from the particularity of Judaism, stressed unity at the cost of plural- ity and particularity.
it made the adoration of the one to the goal of all subjectivity and it even made subjectivity in its turn merge into the one. At the surface, it seems that hegel refers with this remark to mystical trends in islam, for which it would not be untrue. however, a striking comparison with indian religion shows hegel's true intention. Characteristical for indian religion is according to hegel the monastic immersion in the absolute. however, the islamic way to immerse into the absolute is opposite to this. it is innerworldly activistic. 21 subjectivity in islam is alive, an activity, it enters into the world to negate it and by doing so it mediates the adoration of the one. moreover, indeed, although islam knows mysticism, it does not know monastic life. the essence of this activity is conversion, to bring the whole world to the adoration of the one and only.
then hegel gives a short, and partly because of its shortness, not incor- rect description of some islamic principles, the description he did not give in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. he stresses, like Kant, the
20 g. w. f. hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, transl. J. sibree, london: henry g. bohn 1857, pp. 369-370.
21 hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 369.
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prohibition on images and says correctly that mohammed is a prophet, and, unlike Jesus, still a human being, not elevated above human weaknesses. hegel gives as 'the' characteristic quality of islam: "that in actual exis- tence nothing can become fixed, but that everything is to expand itself
in activity and life in the boundless amplitude of the world, so that the worship of the one remains the only bond by which the whole is capable of uniting. "22 thus is the world of the sublime. nothing is fixed. only the one is important and therefore in the expansion of islam all barriers, all limits, cast distinctions and so on disappear. only man as a believer is important. hegel certainly judges islam in the right way. hegel thinks, like herder who always made a relation between a religion and its nat- ural environment, that this conception of the limitless, unstableness of all things is influenced by the natural 'habitat' of islam, the desert: "here spirit exists in its simplest form, and the sense of the formless has its special abode; for in the desert nothing can be brought into a firm consis- tent shape. "23 for Kant, 'formless' nature, like a wild ocean, is the vehicle for the experience of the sublime and hegel, following herder therefore takes the 'formlessness' of the desert as the source of the islamite experi- ence of the sublime. 24 hegel mentions mohammed's flight from mecca to medina and stresses especially the vast conquests that started already during his lifetime, but were realized under his successors. hegel takes over the accepted prejudice of the western world that the muslims spread their faith by violence, killing everybody that did not want to convert. only later they became more lenient to the conquered. instead of becom- ing muslim, they had to pay a poll tax.
in this context, hegel talks about enthusiasm and fanaticism as essen- tially related to the 'abstract' worship of the one. 'it is the essence of fanaticism to bear only a desolating destructive relation to the concrete, but that of mohametanism was, at the same time, capable of the greatest elevation- an elevation free from all petty interest, and united with all the virtues that appertain to magnanimity and valour. '25 while hegel in his lectures on the philosophy of religion compares the islamic religion of the abstract one with the natural religion of the enlightenment, he now compares islamic fanaticism to the terror of the french revolution.
22 idem, p. 371.
23 idem.
24 J. g. herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, frankfurt am main:
deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1989, p. 300.
25 hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 372.
? a religion after christianity? 223
immediately after the just quoted mixed estimation of islamic fanaticism he adds: 'La religion et la terreur was the principle in this case, as with robespierre, la liberte? et la terreur. '26 Again, like in the lectures on the philosophy of religion hegel tries to make a psychological typology with the help of the concept of fanaticism. it has the psychological affect that, while europeans are involved in a multitude of relations, being a bundle of them, in islam the individual is one passion and that alone. reckless- ness in it positive and negative aspects. it produces, as specifically islam poetry shows, a warmth and fervour, a glow that is the perfect freedom of fancy of every fetter--an absorption in the life of its object and the sentiment it inspires, so that selfishness and egotism are utterly banished. lawrence of Arabia ante dato! in addition, hegel concludes about islam: "never has enthusiasm, as such, performed greater deeds. "27 this is spe- cifically said of muslim enthusiasm, because it is abstract and therefore all-comprehensive, restrained by nothing, without limits and indifferent to all sides.
however, what is or was the place of islam in history? hegel describes the rapid speed of the high development of the arts and the sciences in the Arab empire and the good quality of their government. their decline is caused by the fact that the islamic universality of the sublime does not produce determined forms. "but the great empire of the Caliphs did not last long: for on the basis presented by universality nothing is firm. it fell at the same time as the empire of the franks. After them the ottomans came. At the end was this: fanaticism having cooled down, no moral prin- ciple remained in men's souls. "28
because a new moral principle is not regained, the turn is to the euro- peans, according to hegel. they profited from the islamic developments. hegel describes how european valour idealized itself to a noble chivalry in the struggle with the saracens. how science, especially philosophy came from the Arabs to europe. how the beautiful islamic poetry inspired ger- man literature, especially in goethe's 'west-o? stlicher divan'. however, is that all? what is the philosophical significance of the fact that the values of chivalry, science, philosophy and art came from the islamic world to europe. to discover this significance a glance on a remark about islam in the chapter about the Crusades is revealing.
26 idem, p. 372. 27 idem, p. 373. 28 idem, p. 374.
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there hegel says that the Crusades had the same effect as the struggle of the Karolingians with the saracens. the acquaintance with islamic enthusiasm promoted the virtues of chivalry and this spirit was diffused over the whole of europe by the Crusades. it civilized europe: "the ferocity and savage valour that characterized the predatory life of the barbarians (the europeans! ! g. s.
