" Now that a body has the power of
penetrating may happen through two causes.
penetrating may happen through two causes.
Summa Theologica
" It has been
explained in the Article how this is brought about.
Reply to Objection 5: The scars of wounds will not be in the saints,
nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs
of the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake
of justice and faith: so that this will increase their own and others'
joy (Cf. [5075]TP, Q[54], A[4], ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xxii, 19): "We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs
so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their
bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall
see them for this will not make them less comely but more glorious. A
certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not
of the body but of virtue. " Nevertheless those martyrs who have been
maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without those limbs in
the resurrection of the dead, for to them it is said (Lk. 21:18): "A
hair of your head shall not perish. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all will be equally impassible?
Objection 1: It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a
gloss on 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption," says that "all have
equal immunity from suffering. " Now the gift of impassibility consists
in immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible.
Objection 2: Further, negations are not subject to be more or less. Now
impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore it
cannot be greater in one subject than in another.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is more white if it have less admixture
of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the
saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible.
On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of
the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since
impassibility is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in
others.
Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the
latter will not be equal in all, according to 1 Cor. 15:41. Therefore
neither will impassibility be equal in all.
I answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in
itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself,
since it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be
more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. on the other hand,
if we consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in
one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul
over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable
enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfectly,
there is a greater cause of impassibility.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself
and not in relation to its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Although negations and privations considered in
themselves are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to
increase and diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is
said to be more darksome from having more and greater obstacles to
light.
Reply to Objection 3: Some things increase not only by receding from
their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases.
Consequently impassibility also is greater in one subject than in
another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?
Objection 1: It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation
from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
11), "sensation is a kind of passion. " But the glorified bodies will be
impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation.
Objection 2: Further, natural alteration precedes spiritual*
alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. Now
glorified bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will not be subject
to natural alteration. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from
"animus"---the mind. Cf. [5076]FS, Q[50], A[1],3m; [5077]FS, Q[52],
A[1],3m. ] Therefore they will not be subject to spiritual alteration
which is requisite for sensation.
Objection 3: Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new
perception, there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no
new judgment, because "our thoughts will not then be unchangeable," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will be no actual
sensation.
Objection 4: Further, when the act of one of the soul's powers is
intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will be
supremely intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating
God. Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation whatever.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:7): "Every eye shall see Him. "
Therefore there will be actual sensation.
Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) "the animate is
distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement. " Now there will
be actual movement since they "shall run to and fro like sparks among
the reeds" (Wis. 3:7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation.
I answer that, All are agreed that there is some sensation in the
bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the
resurrection would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now
this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible body
is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described
as half-life. [*This is what Aristotle says: "The good and the bad are
in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives
there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy" (Ethic. i,
13)] But there is a difference of opinion as to the mode of sensation.
For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and
consequently "not susceptible to impressions from without" [*Cf. [5078]
Q[74], A[4], On the contrary] and much less so than the heavenly
bodies, because they will have actual sensations, not by receiving
species from sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is
impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain
the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be
a passive power as the Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54).
Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection, were to have sensations
by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a
passive but an active power, and thus it would not be the same
specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power
bestowed on them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive
power never becomes active. Consequently others say that the senses
will be actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external
sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as now the
higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower
powers will then receive from the higher. But this mode of reception
does not result in real sensation, because every passive power,
according to its specific nature, is determined to some special active
principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to
which it is said to be the power. Wherefore since the proper active
principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul
and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if
the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the
imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation.
Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there
is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on
account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real
sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations.
Consequently we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies
will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must,
however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things
outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when
namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing
outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand
is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact
with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when
a sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a
spiritual mode of being, when, namely, the species or the intention of
a quality, and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil
receives the species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white.
Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation, properly
speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but
without matter. that is to say without the material "being" which the
species had outside the soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). This reception
transmutes the nature of the recipient, because in this way the quality
is received according to its material "being. " Consequently this kind
of reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which
of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the nature of the
recipient.
Reply to Objection 1: As already explained, by this passion that takes
place in actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception
of species, the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is
perfected by a spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of
glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Every subject of passion receives the action of
the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that
is naturally adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a
natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the
spiritual alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If
however a thing be naturally adapted to be altered only with a
spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is altered naturally.
For instance the air is not receptive of color, according to its
natural being, but only according to its spiritual being, wherefore in
this way alone is it altered: whereas, on the contrary, inanimate
bodies are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not
spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural
alteration, and consequently there will be only spiritual alteration.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as there will be new reception of species in
the organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common
sense: but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect;
such is the case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying of
Augustine, that "there our thoughts will not be changeable," refers to
the thoughts of the intellectual part: therefore it is not to the
point.
Reply to Objection 4: When one of two things is the type of the other,
the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its
attention to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not
less but more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the
colors of urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the type
of all things that will be done or known by them, their attention to
perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else will
nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say
that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power
is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for
such an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the
principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should
receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect,
one will be able to operate intensely without thereby hindering the
operation of another power even as it was with Christ.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in
act?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the senses are not in act there.
For touch is the first of all the senses (De Anima ii, 2). But the
glorified body will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of
touch becomes actual by the alteration of an animal body by some
external body preponderating in some one of the active or passive
qualities which touch is capable of discerning: and such an alteration
will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act
there.
Objection 2: Further, the sense of taste assists the action of the
nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such
action, as stated above ([5079]Q[81], A[4]). Therefore taste would be
useless there.
Objection 3: Further, nothing will be corrupted after the resurrection
because the whole creature will be invested with a certain virtue of
incorruption. Now the sense of smell cannot have its act without some
corruption having taken place, because smell is not perceived without a
volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the
sense of smell is not there in its act.
Objection 4: Further, "Hearing assists teaching" (De Sensu et Sensato
i). But the blessed, after the resurrection, will require no teaching
by means of sensible objects, since they will be filled with Divine
wisdom by the very vision of God. Therefore hearing will not be there.
Objection 5: Further. seeing results from the pupil receiving the
species of the thing seen. But after the resurrection this will be
impossible in the blessed. Therefore there will be no actual seeing
there, and yet this is the most noble of the senses. The minor is
proved thus: That which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a
visible species; and consequently a mirror placed under the sun's rays
does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil like
the whole body will be endowed with clarity. Therefore it will not
receive the image of a colored body.
Objection 6: Further, according to the science of perspective, whatever
is seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply to the glorified
bodies. Therefore they will not have actual sense of sight. The minor
is proved thus. Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be
proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen
from a greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that the
angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object. Therefore if
the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things
within a certain distance, and that consequently it does not see a
thing from a greater distance than we see now: and this would seem very
absurd. And thus it would seem that the sense of sight will not be
actual in glorified bodies.
On the contrary, A power conjoined to its act is more perfect than one
not so conjoined. Now human nature in the blessed will be in its
greatest perfection. Therefore all the senses will be actual there.
Further, the sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than the body is.
But the body will be rewarded or punished on account of the merits or
demerits of the soul. Therefore all the senses in the blessed will also
be rewarded and in the wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure
and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that in the glorified bodies there will be all the sensitive powers,
but that only two senses will be in act, namely touch and sight; nor
will this be owing to defective senses, but from lack of medium and
object; and that the senses will not be useless, because they will
conduce to the integrity of human nature and will show forth the wisdom
of their Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the medium in
these senses is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium
is the air, and this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (De
Anima ii, 7). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium in
contact, since taste is a kind of touch (De Anima ii, 9). Smell also
which is the object of the sense of smell will be there, since the
Church sings that the bodies of the saints will be a most sweet smell.
There will also be vocal praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on Ps.
149:6, "The high praises of God shall be in their mouth" that "hearts
and tongues shall not cease to praise God. " The same is had on the
authority of a gloss on 2 Esdra 12:27, "With singing and with cymbals. "
Wherefore, according to others we may say that smelling and hearing
will be in act there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of
being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what we
have said ([5080]Q[81], A[4]): unless perchance we say that there will
be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some neighboring
humor.
Reply to Objection 1: The qualities perceived by the touch are those
which constitute the animal body. Wherefore the body of an animal has,
through its tangible qualities according to the present state of life,
a natural aptitude to be affected with a natural and spiritual
alteration by the object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to
be the most material of the senses, since it has a greater measure of
material alteration connected with it. Yet material alteration is only
accidentally related to the act of sensation which is effected by a
spiritual alteration. Consequently the glorified bodies, which by
reason of their impassibility are immune from natural alteration, will
be subject only to spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it
was with the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, nor
pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such things.
Reply to Objection 2: Taste, in so far as it is the perception of food,
will not be in act; but perhaps it will be possible in so far as it is
cognizant of flavors in the way mentioned above.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have considered smell to be merely a
volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true; which is evident
from the fact that vultures hasten to a corpse on perceiving the odor
from a very great distance, whereas it would be impossible for an
evaporation to travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though
the whole corpse were to be dissolved into vapor. This is confirmed by
the fact that sensible objects at an equal distance exercise their
influence in all directions: so that smell affects the medium
sometimes, and the instrument of sensation with a spiritual alteration,
without any evaporation reaching the organ. That some evaporation
should be necessary is due to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed
with humidity; wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to take place
in order for the smell to be perceived. But in the glorified bodies
odor will be in its ultimate perfection, being nowise hampered by
humidity: wherefore it will affect the organ with a spiritual
alteration, like the odor of a volatile evaporation. Such will be the
sense of smell in the saints, because it will not be hindered by any
humidity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences of
odors, as happens with us now on account of the very great humidity of
the brain, but also of the minutest differences of odors.
Reply to Objection 4: In heaven there will be vocal praise (though
indeed some think otherwise), and in the blessed it will affect the
organ of hearing by a merely spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for
the sake of learning whereby they may acquire knowledge, but for the
sake of the perfection of the sense and for the sake pleasure. How it
is possible for the voice to give sound there, we have already stated
(Sent. ii, D, 2;[5081] Q[2], A[2], ad 5).
Reply to Objection 5: The intensity of light does not hinder the
spiritual reception of the image of color, so long as the pupil retains
its diaphanous nature; thus it is evident that however much the air be
filled with light, it can be the medium of sight, and the more it is
illumined, the more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there
be a fault through defective sight. The fact that the image of an
object placed in opposition to a mirror directly opposite the sun's
rays does not appear therein, is not due to the reception being
hindered, but to the hindering of reflection: because for an image to
appear in a mirror it must needs be thrown back by an opaque body, for
which reason lead is affixed to the glass in a mirror. The sun's ray
dispels this opacity so that no image can appear in the mirror. But the
clarity of a glorified body does not destroy the diaphanous nature of
the pupil, since glory does not destroy nature; and consequently the
greatness of clarity in the pupil renders the sight keen rather than
defective.
Reply to Objection 6: The more perfect the sense the less does it
require to be altered in order to perceive its object. Now the smaller
the angle at which the sight is affected by the visible object, the
less is the organ altered. Hence it is that a stronger sight can see
from a distance more than a weaker sight; because the greater the
distance the smaller the angle at which a thing is seen. And since the
sight of a glorified body will be most perfect it will be able to see
by the very least alteration (of the organ); and consequently at a very
much smaller angle than now, and therefore from a much greater
distance.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under
this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?
(2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with
another not glorified body?
(3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place?
(4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another
glorified body?
(5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to
itself?
(6) Whether a glorified body is palpable?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the
glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of
nature, even as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun,
which is the greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety be a property
of the glorified body, it would seem that the glorified body will be
more subtle than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it will
be "more subtle than the wind and the air," which was condemned by
Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he relates (Moral. xiv, 56).
Objection 2: Further, as heat and cold are simple qualities of bodies,
i. e. of the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and other qualities of
the elements will not be intensified in the glorified bodies any more
than they are now, in fact, they will be more reduced to the mean.
Neither, therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now.
Objection 3: Further, subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity of
matter, wherefore bodies that have less matter within equal dimensions
are said to be more subtle; as fire in comparison with air, and air as
compared with water, and water as compared with earth. But there will
be as much matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will
their dimensions be greater. Therefore they will not be more subtle
then than now.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:44): "It is sown a
corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual," i. e. a spirit-like,
"body. " But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses all bodily subtlety.
Therefore the glorified bodies will be most subtle.
Further, the more subtle a body is the more exalted it is. But the
glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore they will be most
subtle.
I answer that, Subtlety takes its name from the power to penetrate.
Hence it is said in De Gener. ii that "a subtle thing fills all the
parts and the parts of parts.
" Now that a body has the power of
penetrating may happen through two causes. First, through smallness of
quantity, especially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of
length, because penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not an
obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of matter, wherefore
rarity is synonymous with subtlety: and since in rare bodies the form
is more predominant over the matter, the term "subtlety" has been
transferred to those bodies which are most perfectly subject to their
form, and are most fully perfected thereby: thus we speak of subtlety
in the sun and moon and like bodies, just as gold and similar things
may be called subtle, when they are most perfectly complete in their
specific being and power. And since incorporeal things lack quantity
and matter, the term "subtlety" is applied to them, not only by reason
of their substance, but also on account of their power. For just as a
subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason that it reaches
to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect said to be subtle
because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic principles and the
hidden natural properties of a thing. In like manner a person is said
to have subtle sight, because he is able to perceive by sight things of
the smallest size: and the same applies to the other senses.
Accordingly people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified
bodies in different ways.
For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xiii, 22),
ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances are said to
be subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be
transformed into a spirit, and that for this reason the Apostle
describes as being "spiritual" the bodies of those who rise again (1
Cor. 15:44). But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body
cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no community of matter
between them: and Boethius proves this (De Duab. Nat. ). Secondly,
because, if this were possible, and one's body were changed into a
spirit, one would not rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of
a soul and body. Thirdly, because if this were the Apostle's meaning,
just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural
[animale] bodies, as being changed into souls [animam]: and this is
clearly false.
Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the
resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means of
rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air
or the wind, as Gregory relates (Moral. xiv, 56). But this again cannot
be maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the
Resurrection, as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must
believe that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover the human body
will rise again with flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord,
according to Lk. 24:39, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see
Me to have," and Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see God," my Saviour:
and the nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid
rarity.
Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified
bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account of the most complete
perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in
relation to the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then
predominant in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all
the fifth essence can nowise enter into the composition of a body, as
we have shown above (Sent. D, 12, qu. 1). Secondly, because granted
that it entered into the composition of the human body, it would be
impossible to account for its having a greater predominance over the
elemental nature then than now, unless---either the amount of the
heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus human bodies would
not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were
decreased, which is inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise
again)---or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties of
the heavenly nature through the latter's dominion over the body, and in
that case a natural power would be the cause of a property of glory,
which seems absurd.
Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which
human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the dominion of the
glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason
of which dominion the glorified body is said to be "spiritual," as
being wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the
body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its participating in
its specific being, in so far as it is subject to the soul as matter to
form; and secondly it is subject to the soul in respect of the other
operations of the soul, in so far as the soul is a principle of
movement. Consequently the first reason for spirituality in the body is
subtlety, and, after that, agility and the other properties of a
glorified body. Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking
of spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xiv,
56) that "the glorified body is said to be subtle as a result of a
spiritual power. "
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections which refer to the
subtlety of rarefaction.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the
same place with another body not glorified?
Objection 1: It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is
able to be in the same place with another body not glorified. For
according to Phil. 3:21, "He will reform the body of our lowness made
like to the body of His glory. " Now the body of Christ was able to be
in the same place with another body, as appears from the fact that
after His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, the doors being
shut (Jn. 20:19, 26). Therefore also the glorified bodies by reason of
their subtlety will be able to be in the same place with other bodies
not glorified.
Objection 2: Further, glorified bodies will be superior to all other
bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority certain bodies, to wit the
solar rays, are able now to occupy the same place together with other
bodies. Much more therefore is this befitting glorified bodies.
Objection 3: Further, a heavenly body cannot be severed, at least as
regards the substance of the spheres: hence it is written (Job 37:18)
that "the heavens . . . are most strong, as if they were of molten
brass. " If then the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to
be in the same place together with another body, it will never be able
to ascend to the empyrean,* and this is erroneous. [*The empyrean was
the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by
Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. [5082]FP, Q[56], A[3]].
Objection 4: Further, a body which is unable to be in the same place
with another body can be hindered in its movement or even surrounded by
others standing in its way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies.
Therefore they will be able to be together in the same place with other
bodies.
Objection 5: Further, as point is to point, so is line to line, surface
to surface, and body to body. Now two points can be coincident, as in
the case of two lines touching one another, and two lines when two
surfaces are in contact with one another, and two surfaces when two
bodies touch one another, because "contiguous things are those whose
boundaries coincide" (Phys. vi, 6). Therefore it is not against the
nature of a body to be in the same place together with another body.
Now whatever excellence is competent to the nature of a body will all
be bestowed on the glorified body. Therefore a glorified body, by
reason of its subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together
with another body.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. i): "Difference of accidents
makes distinction in number. For three men differ not in genus, nor in
species, but in their accidents. If we were to remove absolutely every
accident from them, still each one has a different place; and it is
quite conceivable that they should all occupy the same place. "
Therefore if we suppose two bodies to occupy the same place, there will
be but one body numerically.
I answer that, It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason
of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body,
unless the obstacle to its being now in the same place with another
body be removed by that subtlety. Some say that in the present state
this obstacle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy
a place; and that this grossness is removed by the gift of subtlety.
But there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. First, because
the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect,
for instance an inordinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject
to its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will
rise again in the body, both as regards the matter and as regards the
form. And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by
reason of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of
any defect of nature. For since fulness is opposed to vacancy, that
alone does not fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless
leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the Philosopher
(Phys. iv, 6,7) as being "a place not filled by a sensible body. " And a
body is said to be sensible by reason of its matter, form, and natural
accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also
plain that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as
evidenced by the body of our Lord (Lk. 24:39): nor will it lack matter,
or form, or natural accidents, namely heat, cold, and so forth. Hence
it is evident that the glorified body, the gift of subtlety
notwithstanding, will fill a place: for it would seem madness to say
that the place in which there will be a glorified body will be empty.
Secondly their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the
co-existence of a body in the same place is more than to fill a place.
For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter, those dimensions do
not fill a place. Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum, said
that a vacuum is a place wherein such like dimensions exist apart from
a sensible body; and yet those dimensions hinder another body from
being together with them in the same place. This is made clear by the
Philosopher (Phys. iv, 1,8; Metaph. ii, 2), where he considers it
impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate
dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body.
Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it
from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this
reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the
removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.
Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's being now in
the same place with another body can nowise be removed by the gift of
subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place
together with another body, except something in it that requires a
different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that
which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not
required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place,
not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the
fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the
necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves
(Phys. iv), and as is self-evident. In like manner neither can matter
cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does
not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity. Again neither
does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. It
remains therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a
distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which
a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its
definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying a place.
Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the
necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive quantity alone.
Thus take the example of a separate line, supposing there to be two
such lines, or two parts of one line, they must needs occupy distinct
places, else one line added to another would not make something
greater, and this is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces
and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place, through being
the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed
matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or
two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it
impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without
there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the
principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as
Boethius says (De Trin. ), "we cannot possibly conceive two bodies
occupying one place," so that this distinction of individuals requires
this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the
glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it
the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from another
body. Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to
be in the same place together with another body, but it will be
possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of
the Divine power: even as the body of Peter had the power whereby the
sick were healed at the passing of Peter's shadow (Acts 5:15) not
through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the
upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible
for a glorified body to be in the same place together with another body
for the perfection of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: That Christ's body was able to be together with
another body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but
resulted from the power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as
in His birth [*Cf. [5083]TP, Q[28], A[2], ad 3]. Hence Gregory says
(Hom. xxvi in Evang. ): "The same body went into His disciples the doors
being shut, which to human eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin
at His birth. " Therefore there is no reason why this should be
befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety.
Reply to Objection 2: Light is not a body as we have said above (Sent.
ii, Q[13], A[3]; [5084]FP, Q[67], A[2]): hence the objection proceeds
on a false supposition.
Reply to Objection 3: The glorified body will pass through the heavenly
spheres without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by
the Divine power, which will assist them in all things at will.
Reply to Objection 4: From the fact that God will come to the aid of
the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they
cannot be surrounded or imprisoned.
Reply to Objection 5: As stated in Phys. iv, 5, "a point is not in a
place": hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental,
because the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the
whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the place
corresponds to the term of the body. But it happens that two places
have one term, even as two lines terminate in one point. And
consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet
the same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the two
bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous bodies are
said to coincide.
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Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same
place?
Objection 1: It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible
for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, by
a miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply
that contradictions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two
bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies
are one. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is
proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The
dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place,
or they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the
dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions
that are within the bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they
be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the
dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. "Now
things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same with
one another. " Therefore the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two
bodies cannot have identical dimensions just as they cannot have the
same whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were two.
Therefore they are at the same time one and two.
Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be done miraculously either
against the common principles---for instance that the part be not less
than the whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a
direct contradiction---or contrary to the conclusions of geometry which
are infallible deductions from common principles---for instance that
the three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles.
In like manner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the
definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined
is to make two contradictories true at the same time. Now it is
contrary to common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and
to the definition of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place.
Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as
follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one
another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same
place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a
whole. Again it is contrary to the definition of a line that there be
more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the
case were two bodies in the same place, since between two given points
in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines
corresponding to the two bodies in that place.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem impossible that by a miracle a body
which is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for then it
would have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet
this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore this
cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two
bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as
to every dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater,
and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place;
while it will have no proper place, because no given surface of the
body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore it will
not have a proper place.
Objection 4: Further, place corresponds in proportion to the thing
placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is at
the same time in different places, except by some kind of
transformation, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it can
nowise happen by a miracle that two bodies be together in the same
place.
On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle.
Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be
together in the same place, because the body of her child when coming
forth did not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity.
Therefore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in
the same place.
Further, this may again be proved from the fact that our Lord went in
to His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19, 26).
I answer that, As shown above [5085](A[2]) the reason why two bodies
must needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires
distinction in place. Wherefore we observe that when two bodies merge
into one, each loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being
accrues to the two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is
impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each
retain its distinct being which it had hitherto, in so much as each of
them was a being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this
distinct being depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its
proximate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first
cause can preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done
away, as appears from the first proposition of De Causis, therefore by
God's power and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be
without substance as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the
power of God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain
its distinct being from that of another body, although its matter be
not distinct as to place from the matter of the other body: and thus it
is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be together in the same
place.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is sophistical because it is based
on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the
existence, between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension
proper to the place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put
in occupation of the place would have to be identified: because it
would then follow that the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place
would become one dimension, if each of them were identified with the
dimension of the place. But this supposition is false, because if it
were true whenever a body acquires a new place, it would follow that a
change takes place in the dimensions of the place or of thing placed:
since it is impossible for two things to become one anew, except one of
them be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other
dimensions belong to a place than those of the thing occupying the
place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the
question, because according to this nothing else has been said, but
that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions of
the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are
contained within the bounds of the place, and that the distance between
the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the
bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by
their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two
bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else than that two
bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue.
Reply to Objection 2: Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together
in the same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or
against the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of
geometry. For, as stated above [5086](A[2]), dimensive quantity differs
from all other accidents in that it has a special reason of
individuality and distinction, namely on account of the placing of the
parts, besides the reason of individuality and distinction which is
common to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter
which is its subject. Thus then one line may be understood as being
distinct from another, either because it is in another subject (in
which case we are considering a material line), or because it is placed
at a distance from another (in which case we are considering a
mathematical line, which is understood apart from matter). Accordingly
if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save in
respect of a different placing: and in like manner neither can there be
a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimensions
whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to
another, as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as to place.
But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a
distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and
these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the
distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a difference of
points, and thus different lines described on two bodies that are in
the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for
the point that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the
placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from
a point which is its term. In like manner the two circles described in
two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account
of the difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a
whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while
wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle
described by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other
circle described by the locating body.
Reply to Objection 3: God could make a body not to be in a place; and
yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a
place, because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by
reason of its superficies which is described by contact with the terms
of the lesser body.
Reply to Objection 4: It is impossible for one body to be miraculously
in two places locally (for Christ's body is not locally on the altar),
although it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same
place. Because to be in several places at once is incompatible with the
individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it
would follow that it is divided as to place. on the other hand, to be
in the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual
as distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in
indivision (Metaph. v), whereas distinction from others is a result of
the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several
places at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack
reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a
contradiction, as explained above. Hence the comparison fails.
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Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another
glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same
place together with another glorified body. Because where there is
greater subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is
more subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to
a glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place
with a non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body.
Objection 2: Further, even as a glorified body will be more subtle than
a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle than
another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a
non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same
place with a less subtle glorified body.
Objection 3: Further, the body of heaven is subtle, and will then be
glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in the
same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at
will to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will
be able to occupy the same place.
On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like
spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same
place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated
above (Sent. i, D, 37, Q[3], A[3]; [5087]FP, Q[52], A[3]). Therefore
neither will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place.
Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the
other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection which will be
altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be
impossible for two glorified bodies to be in the same place.
I answer that, The property of a glorified body does not make it able
to be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to be in
the same place with a non-glorified body. But it would be possible by
the Divine power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies
to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified
body. Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in
the same place with another glorified body, both because a becoming
order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because
one glorified body will not be in the way of another.
explained in the Article how this is brought about.
Reply to Objection 5: The scars of wounds will not be in the saints,
nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs
of the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake
of justice and faith: so that this will increase their own and others'
joy (Cf. [5075]TP, Q[54], A[4], ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xxii, 19): "We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs
so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their
bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall
see them for this will not make them less comely but more glorious. A
certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not
of the body but of virtue. " Nevertheless those martyrs who have been
maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without those limbs in
the resurrection of the dead, for to them it is said (Lk. 21:18): "A
hair of your head shall not perish. "
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Whether all will be equally impassible?
Objection 1: It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a
gloss on 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption," says that "all have
equal immunity from suffering. " Now the gift of impassibility consists
in immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible.
Objection 2: Further, negations are not subject to be more or less. Now
impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore it
cannot be greater in one subject than in another.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is more white if it have less admixture
of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the
saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible.
On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of
the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since
impassibility is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in
others.
Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the
latter will not be equal in all, according to 1 Cor. 15:41. Therefore
neither will impassibility be equal in all.
I answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in
itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself,
since it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be
more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. on the other hand,
if we consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in
one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul
over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable
enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfectly,
there is a greater cause of impassibility.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself
and not in relation to its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Although negations and privations considered in
themselves are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to
increase and diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is
said to be more darksome from having more and greater obstacles to
light.
Reply to Objection 3: Some things increase not only by receding from
their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases.
Consequently impassibility also is greater in one subject than in
another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?
Objection 1: It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation
from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
11), "sensation is a kind of passion. " But the glorified bodies will be
impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation.
Objection 2: Further, natural alteration precedes spiritual*
alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. Now
glorified bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will not be subject
to natural alteration. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from
"animus"---the mind. Cf. [5076]FS, Q[50], A[1],3m; [5077]FS, Q[52],
A[1],3m. ] Therefore they will not be subject to spiritual alteration
which is requisite for sensation.
Objection 3: Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new
perception, there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no
new judgment, because "our thoughts will not then be unchangeable," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will be no actual
sensation.
Objection 4: Further, when the act of one of the soul's powers is
intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will be
supremely intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating
God. Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation whatever.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:7): "Every eye shall see Him. "
Therefore there will be actual sensation.
Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) "the animate is
distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement. " Now there will
be actual movement since they "shall run to and fro like sparks among
the reeds" (Wis. 3:7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation.
I answer that, All are agreed that there is some sensation in the
bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the
resurrection would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now
this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible body
is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described
as half-life. [*This is what Aristotle says: "The good and the bad are
in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives
there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy" (Ethic. i,
13)] But there is a difference of opinion as to the mode of sensation.
For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and
consequently "not susceptible to impressions from without" [*Cf. [5078]
Q[74], A[4], On the contrary] and much less so than the heavenly
bodies, because they will have actual sensations, not by receiving
species from sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is
impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain
the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be
a passive power as the Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54).
Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection, were to have sensations
by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a
passive but an active power, and thus it would not be the same
specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power
bestowed on them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive
power never becomes active. Consequently others say that the senses
will be actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external
sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as now the
higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower
powers will then receive from the higher. But this mode of reception
does not result in real sensation, because every passive power,
according to its specific nature, is determined to some special active
principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to
which it is said to be the power. Wherefore since the proper active
principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul
and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if
the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the
imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation.
Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there
is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on
account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real
sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations.
Consequently we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies
will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must,
however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things
outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when
namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing
outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand
is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact
with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when
a sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a
spiritual mode of being, when, namely, the species or the intention of
a quality, and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil
receives the species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white.
Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation, properly
speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but
without matter. that is to say without the material "being" which the
species had outside the soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). This reception
transmutes the nature of the recipient, because in this way the quality
is received according to its material "being. " Consequently this kind
of reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which
of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the nature of the
recipient.
Reply to Objection 1: As already explained, by this passion that takes
place in actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception
of species, the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is
perfected by a spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of
glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Every subject of passion receives the action of
the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that
is naturally adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a
natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the
spiritual alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If
however a thing be naturally adapted to be altered only with a
spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is altered naturally.
For instance the air is not receptive of color, according to its
natural being, but only according to its spiritual being, wherefore in
this way alone is it altered: whereas, on the contrary, inanimate
bodies are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not
spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural
alteration, and consequently there will be only spiritual alteration.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as there will be new reception of species in
the organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common
sense: but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect;
such is the case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying of
Augustine, that "there our thoughts will not be changeable," refers to
the thoughts of the intellectual part: therefore it is not to the
point.
Reply to Objection 4: When one of two things is the type of the other,
the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its
attention to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not
less but more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the
colors of urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the type
of all things that will be done or known by them, their attention to
perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else will
nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say
that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power
is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for
such an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the
principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should
receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect,
one will be able to operate intensely without thereby hindering the
operation of another power even as it was with Christ.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in
act?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the senses are not in act there.
For touch is the first of all the senses (De Anima ii, 2). But the
glorified body will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of
touch becomes actual by the alteration of an animal body by some
external body preponderating in some one of the active or passive
qualities which touch is capable of discerning: and such an alteration
will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act
there.
Objection 2: Further, the sense of taste assists the action of the
nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such
action, as stated above ([5079]Q[81], A[4]). Therefore taste would be
useless there.
Objection 3: Further, nothing will be corrupted after the resurrection
because the whole creature will be invested with a certain virtue of
incorruption. Now the sense of smell cannot have its act without some
corruption having taken place, because smell is not perceived without a
volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the
sense of smell is not there in its act.
Objection 4: Further, "Hearing assists teaching" (De Sensu et Sensato
i). But the blessed, after the resurrection, will require no teaching
by means of sensible objects, since they will be filled with Divine
wisdom by the very vision of God. Therefore hearing will not be there.
Objection 5: Further. seeing results from the pupil receiving the
species of the thing seen. But after the resurrection this will be
impossible in the blessed. Therefore there will be no actual seeing
there, and yet this is the most noble of the senses. The minor is
proved thus: That which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a
visible species; and consequently a mirror placed under the sun's rays
does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil like
the whole body will be endowed with clarity. Therefore it will not
receive the image of a colored body.
Objection 6: Further, according to the science of perspective, whatever
is seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply to the glorified
bodies. Therefore they will not have actual sense of sight. The minor
is proved thus. Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be
proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen
from a greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that the
angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object. Therefore if
the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things
within a certain distance, and that consequently it does not see a
thing from a greater distance than we see now: and this would seem very
absurd. And thus it would seem that the sense of sight will not be
actual in glorified bodies.
On the contrary, A power conjoined to its act is more perfect than one
not so conjoined. Now human nature in the blessed will be in its
greatest perfection. Therefore all the senses will be actual there.
Further, the sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than the body is.
But the body will be rewarded or punished on account of the merits or
demerits of the soul. Therefore all the senses in the blessed will also
be rewarded and in the wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure
and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that in the glorified bodies there will be all the sensitive powers,
but that only two senses will be in act, namely touch and sight; nor
will this be owing to defective senses, but from lack of medium and
object; and that the senses will not be useless, because they will
conduce to the integrity of human nature and will show forth the wisdom
of their Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the medium in
these senses is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium
is the air, and this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (De
Anima ii, 7). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium in
contact, since taste is a kind of touch (De Anima ii, 9). Smell also
which is the object of the sense of smell will be there, since the
Church sings that the bodies of the saints will be a most sweet smell.
There will also be vocal praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on Ps.
149:6, "The high praises of God shall be in their mouth" that "hearts
and tongues shall not cease to praise God. " The same is had on the
authority of a gloss on 2 Esdra 12:27, "With singing and with cymbals. "
Wherefore, according to others we may say that smelling and hearing
will be in act there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of
being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what we
have said ([5080]Q[81], A[4]): unless perchance we say that there will
be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some neighboring
humor.
Reply to Objection 1: The qualities perceived by the touch are those
which constitute the animal body. Wherefore the body of an animal has,
through its tangible qualities according to the present state of life,
a natural aptitude to be affected with a natural and spiritual
alteration by the object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to
be the most material of the senses, since it has a greater measure of
material alteration connected with it. Yet material alteration is only
accidentally related to the act of sensation which is effected by a
spiritual alteration. Consequently the glorified bodies, which by
reason of their impassibility are immune from natural alteration, will
be subject only to spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it
was with the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, nor
pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such things.
Reply to Objection 2: Taste, in so far as it is the perception of food,
will not be in act; but perhaps it will be possible in so far as it is
cognizant of flavors in the way mentioned above.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have considered smell to be merely a
volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true; which is evident
from the fact that vultures hasten to a corpse on perceiving the odor
from a very great distance, whereas it would be impossible for an
evaporation to travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though
the whole corpse were to be dissolved into vapor. This is confirmed by
the fact that sensible objects at an equal distance exercise their
influence in all directions: so that smell affects the medium
sometimes, and the instrument of sensation with a spiritual alteration,
without any evaporation reaching the organ. That some evaporation
should be necessary is due to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed
with humidity; wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to take place
in order for the smell to be perceived. But in the glorified bodies
odor will be in its ultimate perfection, being nowise hampered by
humidity: wherefore it will affect the organ with a spiritual
alteration, like the odor of a volatile evaporation. Such will be the
sense of smell in the saints, because it will not be hindered by any
humidity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences of
odors, as happens with us now on account of the very great humidity of
the brain, but also of the minutest differences of odors.
Reply to Objection 4: In heaven there will be vocal praise (though
indeed some think otherwise), and in the blessed it will affect the
organ of hearing by a merely spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for
the sake of learning whereby they may acquire knowledge, but for the
sake of the perfection of the sense and for the sake pleasure. How it
is possible for the voice to give sound there, we have already stated
(Sent. ii, D, 2;[5081] Q[2], A[2], ad 5).
Reply to Objection 5: The intensity of light does not hinder the
spiritual reception of the image of color, so long as the pupil retains
its diaphanous nature; thus it is evident that however much the air be
filled with light, it can be the medium of sight, and the more it is
illumined, the more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there
be a fault through defective sight. The fact that the image of an
object placed in opposition to a mirror directly opposite the sun's
rays does not appear therein, is not due to the reception being
hindered, but to the hindering of reflection: because for an image to
appear in a mirror it must needs be thrown back by an opaque body, for
which reason lead is affixed to the glass in a mirror. The sun's ray
dispels this opacity so that no image can appear in the mirror. But the
clarity of a glorified body does not destroy the diaphanous nature of
the pupil, since glory does not destroy nature; and consequently the
greatness of clarity in the pupil renders the sight keen rather than
defective.
Reply to Objection 6: The more perfect the sense the less does it
require to be altered in order to perceive its object. Now the smaller
the angle at which the sight is affected by the visible object, the
less is the organ altered. Hence it is that a stronger sight can see
from a distance more than a weaker sight; because the greater the
distance the smaller the angle at which a thing is seen. And since the
sight of a glorified body will be most perfect it will be able to see
by the very least alteration (of the organ); and consequently at a very
much smaller angle than now, and therefore from a much greater
distance.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under
this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?
(2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with
another not glorified body?
(3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place?
(4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another
glorified body?
(5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to
itself?
(6) Whether a glorified body is palpable?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the
glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of
nature, even as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun,
which is the greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety be a property
of the glorified body, it would seem that the glorified body will be
more subtle than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it will
be "more subtle than the wind and the air," which was condemned by
Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he relates (Moral. xiv, 56).
Objection 2: Further, as heat and cold are simple qualities of bodies,
i. e. of the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and other qualities of
the elements will not be intensified in the glorified bodies any more
than they are now, in fact, they will be more reduced to the mean.
Neither, therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now.
Objection 3: Further, subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity of
matter, wherefore bodies that have less matter within equal dimensions
are said to be more subtle; as fire in comparison with air, and air as
compared with water, and water as compared with earth. But there will
be as much matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will
their dimensions be greater. Therefore they will not be more subtle
then than now.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:44): "It is sown a
corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual," i. e. a spirit-like,
"body. " But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses all bodily subtlety.
Therefore the glorified bodies will be most subtle.
Further, the more subtle a body is the more exalted it is. But the
glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore they will be most
subtle.
I answer that, Subtlety takes its name from the power to penetrate.
Hence it is said in De Gener. ii that "a subtle thing fills all the
parts and the parts of parts.
" Now that a body has the power of
penetrating may happen through two causes. First, through smallness of
quantity, especially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of
length, because penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not an
obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of matter, wherefore
rarity is synonymous with subtlety: and since in rare bodies the form
is more predominant over the matter, the term "subtlety" has been
transferred to those bodies which are most perfectly subject to their
form, and are most fully perfected thereby: thus we speak of subtlety
in the sun and moon and like bodies, just as gold and similar things
may be called subtle, when they are most perfectly complete in their
specific being and power. And since incorporeal things lack quantity
and matter, the term "subtlety" is applied to them, not only by reason
of their substance, but also on account of their power. For just as a
subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason that it reaches
to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect said to be subtle
because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic principles and the
hidden natural properties of a thing. In like manner a person is said
to have subtle sight, because he is able to perceive by sight things of
the smallest size: and the same applies to the other senses.
Accordingly people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified
bodies in different ways.
For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xiii, 22),
ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances are said to
be subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be
transformed into a spirit, and that for this reason the Apostle
describes as being "spiritual" the bodies of those who rise again (1
Cor. 15:44). But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body
cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no community of matter
between them: and Boethius proves this (De Duab. Nat. ). Secondly,
because, if this were possible, and one's body were changed into a
spirit, one would not rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of
a soul and body. Thirdly, because if this were the Apostle's meaning,
just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural
[animale] bodies, as being changed into souls [animam]: and this is
clearly false.
Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the
resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means of
rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air
or the wind, as Gregory relates (Moral. xiv, 56). But this again cannot
be maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the
Resurrection, as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must
believe that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover the human body
will rise again with flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord,
according to Lk. 24:39, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see
Me to have," and Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see God," my Saviour:
and the nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid
rarity.
Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified
bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account of the most complete
perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in
relation to the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then
predominant in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all
the fifth essence can nowise enter into the composition of a body, as
we have shown above (Sent. D, 12, qu. 1). Secondly, because granted
that it entered into the composition of the human body, it would be
impossible to account for its having a greater predominance over the
elemental nature then than now, unless---either the amount of the
heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus human bodies would
not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were
decreased, which is inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise
again)---or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties of
the heavenly nature through the latter's dominion over the body, and in
that case a natural power would be the cause of a property of glory,
which seems absurd.
Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which
human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the dominion of the
glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason
of which dominion the glorified body is said to be "spiritual," as
being wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the
body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its participating in
its specific being, in so far as it is subject to the soul as matter to
form; and secondly it is subject to the soul in respect of the other
operations of the soul, in so far as the soul is a principle of
movement. Consequently the first reason for spirituality in the body is
subtlety, and, after that, agility and the other properties of a
glorified body. Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking
of spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xiv,
56) that "the glorified body is said to be subtle as a result of a
spiritual power. "
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections which refer to the
subtlety of rarefaction.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the
same place with another body not glorified?
Objection 1: It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is
able to be in the same place with another body not glorified. For
according to Phil. 3:21, "He will reform the body of our lowness made
like to the body of His glory. " Now the body of Christ was able to be
in the same place with another body, as appears from the fact that
after His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, the doors being
shut (Jn. 20:19, 26). Therefore also the glorified bodies by reason of
their subtlety will be able to be in the same place with other bodies
not glorified.
Objection 2: Further, glorified bodies will be superior to all other
bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority certain bodies, to wit the
solar rays, are able now to occupy the same place together with other
bodies. Much more therefore is this befitting glorified bodies.
Objection 3: Further, a heavenly body cannot be severed, at least as
regards the substance of the spheres: hence it is written (Job 37:18)
that "the heavens . . . are most strong, as if they were of molten
brass. " If then the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to
be in the same place together with another body, it will never be able
to ascend to the empyrean,* and this is erroneous. [*The empyrean was
the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by
Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. [5082]FP, Q[56], A[3]].
Objection 4: Further, a body which is unable to be in the same place
with another body can be hindered in its movement or even surrounded by
others standing in its way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies.
Therefore they will be able to be together in the same place with other
bodies.
Objection 5: Further, as point is to point, so is line to line, surface
to surface, and body to body. Now two points can be coincident, as in
the case of two lines touching one another, and two lines when two
surfaces are in contact with one another, and two surfaces when two
bodies touch one another, because "contiguous things are those whose
boundaries coincide" (Phys. vi, 6). Therefore it is not against the
nature of a body to be in the same place together with another body.
Now whatever excellence is competent to the nature of a body will all
be bestowed on the glorified body. Therefore a glorified body, by
reason of its subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together
with another body.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. i): "Difference of accidents
makes distinction in number. For three men differ not in genus, nor in
species, but in their accidents. If we were to remove absolutely every
accident from them, still each one has a different place; and it is
quite conceivable that they should all occupy the same place. "
Therefore if we suppose two bodies to occupy the same place, there will
be but one body numerically.
I answer that, It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason
of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body,
unless the obstacle to its being now in the same place with another
body be removed by that subtlety. Some say that in the present state
this obstacle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy
a place; and that this grossness is removed by the gift of subtlety.
But there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. First, because
the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect,
for instance an inordinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject
to its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will
rise again in the body, both as regards the matter and as regards the
form. And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by
reason of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of
any defect of nature. For since fulness is opposed to vacancy, that
alone does not fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless
leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the Philosopher
(Phys. iv, 6,7) as being "a place not filled by a sensible body. " And a
body is said to be sensible by reason of its matter, form, and natural
accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also
plain that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as
evidenced by the body of our Lord (Lk. 24:39): nor will it lack matter,
or form, or natural accidents, namely heat, cold, and so forth. Hence
it is evident that the glorified body, the gift of subtlety
notwithstanding, will fill a place: for it would seem madness to say
that the place in which there will be a glorified body will be empty.
Secondly their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the
co-existence of a body in the same place is more than to fill a place.
For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter, those dimensions do
not fill a place. Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum, said
that a vacuum is a place wherein such like dimensions exist apart from
a sensible body; and yet those dimensions hinder another body from
being together with them in the same place. This is made clear by the
Philosopher (Phys. iv, 1,8; Metaph. ii, 2), where he considers it
impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate
dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body.
Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it
from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this
reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the
removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.
Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's being now in
the same place with another body can nowise be removed by the gift of
subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place
together with another body, except something in it that requires a
different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that
which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not
required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place,
not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the
fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the
necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves
(Phys. iv), and as is self-evident. In like manner neither can matter
cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does
not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity. Again neither
does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. It
remains therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a
distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which
a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its
definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying a place.
Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the
necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive quantity alone.
Thus take the example of a separate line, supposing there to be two
such lines, or two parts of one line, they must needs occupy distinct
places, else one line added to another would not make something
greater, and this is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces
and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place, through being
the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed
matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or
two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it
impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without
there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the
principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as
Boethius says (De Trin. ), "we cannot possibly conceive two bodies
occupying one place," so that this distinction of individuals requires
this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the
glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it
the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from another
body. Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to
be in the same place together with another body, but it will be
possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of
the Divine power: even as the body of Peter had the power whereby the
sick were healed at the passing of Peter's shadow (Acts 5:15) not
through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the
upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible
for a glorified body to be in the same place together with another body
for the perfection of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: That Christ's body was able to be together with
another body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but
resulted from the power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as
in His birth [*Cf. [5083]TP, Q[28], A[2], ad 3]. Hence Gregory says
(Hom. xxvi in Evang. ): "The same body went into His disciples the doors
being shut, which to human eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin
at His birth. " Therefore there is no reason why this should be
befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety.
Reply to Objection 2: Light is not a body as we have said above (Sent.
ii, Q[13], A[3]; [5084]FP, Q[67], A[2]): hence the objection proceeds
on a false supposition.
Reply to Objection 3: The glorified body will pass through the heavenly
spheres without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by
the Divine power, which will assist them in all things at will.
Reply to Objection 4: From the fact that God will come to the aid of
the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they
cannot be surrounded or imprisoned.
Reply to Objection 5: As stated in Phys. iv, 5, "a point is not in a
place": hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental,
because the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the
whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the place
corresponds to the term of the body. But it happens that two places
have one term, even as two lines terminate in one point. And
consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet
the same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the two
bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous bodies are
said to coincide.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same
place?
Objection 1: It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible
for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, by
a miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply
that contradictions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two
bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies
are one. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is
proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The
dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place,
or they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the
dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions
that are within the bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they
be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the
dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. "Now
things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same with
one another. " Therefore the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two
bodies cannot have identical dimensions just as they cannot have the
same whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were two.
Therefore they are at the same time one and two.
Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be done miraculously either
against the common principles---for instance that the part be not less
than the whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a
direct contradiction---or contrary to the conclusions of geometry which
are infallible deductions from common principles---for instance that
the three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles.
In like manner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the
definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined
is to make two contradictories true at the same time. Now it is
contrary to common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and
to the definition of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place.
Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as
follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one
another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same
place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a
whole. Again it is contrary to the definition of a line that there be
more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the
case were two bodies in the same place, since between two given points
in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines
corresponding to the two bodies in that place.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem impossible that by a miracle a body
which is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for then it
would have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet
this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore this
cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two
bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as
to every dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater,
and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place;
while it will have no proper place, because no given surface of the
body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore it will
not have a proper place.
Objection 4: Further, place corresponds in proportion to the thing
placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is at
the same time in different places, except by some kind of
transformation, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it can
nowise happen by a miracle that two bodies be together in the same
place.
On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle.
Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be
together in the same place, because the body of her child when coming
forth did not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity.
Therefore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in
the same place.
Further, this may again be proved from the fact that our Lord went in
to His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19, 26).
I answer that, As shown above [5085](A[2]) the reason why two bodies
must needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires
distinction in place. Wherefore we observe that when two bodies merge
into one, each loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being
accrues to the two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is
impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each
retain its distinct being which it had hitherto, in so much as each of
them was a being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this
distinct being depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its
proximate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first
cause can preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done
away, as appears from the first proposition of De Causis, therefore by
God's power and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be
without substance as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the
power of God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain
its distinct being from that of another body, although its matter be
not distinct as to place from the matter of the other body: and thus it
is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be together in the same
place.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is sophistical because it is based
on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the
existence, between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension
proper to the place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put
in occupation of the place would have to be identified: because it
would then follow that the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place
would become one dimension, if each of them were identified with the
dimension of the place. But this supposition is false, because if it
were true whenever a body acquires a new place, it would follow that a
change takes place in the dimensions of the place or of thing placed:
since it is impossible for two things to become one anew, except one of
them be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other
dimensions belong to a place than those of the thing occupying the
place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the
question, because according to this nothing else has been said, but
that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions of
the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are
contained within the bounds of the place, and that the distance between
the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the
bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by
their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two
bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else than that two
bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue.
Reply to Objection 2: Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together
in the same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or
against the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of
geometry. For, as stated above [5086](A[2]), dimensive quantity differs
from all other accidents in that it has a special reason of
individuality and distinction, namely on account of the placing of the
parts, besides the reason of individuality and distinction which is
common to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter
which is its subject. Thus then one line may be understood as being
distinct from another, either because it is in another subject (in
which case we are considering a material line), or because it is placed
at a distance from another (in which case we are considering a
mathematical line, which is understood apart from matter). Accordingly
if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save in
respect of a different placing: and in like manner neither can there be
a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimensions
whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to
another, as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as to place.
But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a
distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and
these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the
distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a difference of
points, and thus different lines described on two bodies that are in
the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for
the point that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the
placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from
a point which is its term. In like manner the two circles described in
two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account
of the difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a
whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while
wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle
described by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other
circle described by the locating body.
Reply to Objection 3: God could make a body not to be in a place; and
yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a
place, because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by
reason of its superficies which is described by contact with the terms
of the lesser body.
Reply to Objection 4: It is impossible for one body to be miraculously
in two places locally (for Christ's body is not locally on the altar),
although it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same
place. Because to be in several places at once is incompatible with the
individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it
would follow that it is divided as to place. on the other hand, to be
in the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual
as distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in
indivision (Metaph. v), whereas distinction from others is a result of
the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several
places at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack
reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a
contradiction, as explained above. Hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another
glorified body?
Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same
place together with another glorified body. Because where there is
greater subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is
more subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to
a glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place
with a non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body.
Objection 2: Further, even as a glorified body will be more subtle than
a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle than
another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a
non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same
place with a less subtle glorified body.
Objection 3: Further, the body of heaven is subtle, and will then be
glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in the
same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at
will to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will
be able to occupy the same place.
On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like
spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same
place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated
above (Sent. i, D, 37, Q[3], A[3]; [5087]FP, Q[52], A[3]). Therefore
neither will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place.
Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the
other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection which will be
altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be
impossible for two glorified bodies to be in the same place.
I answer that, The property of a glorified body does not make it able
to be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to be in
the same place with a non-glorified body. But it would be possible by
the Divine power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies
to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified
body. Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in
the same place with another glorified body, both because a becoming
order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because
one glorified body will not be in the way of another.
