He
concentrated
as many as 50,000 men there in 552.
Cambridge Medieval History - v2 - Rise of the Saracens and Foundation of the Western Empire
It was the same with the Lombards.
In 547 the
Emperor gave them permission to settle in Pannonia and Noricum,
and furnished them with subsidies in return for recruits. They were
rewarded by receiving imperial support against their enemies the
Gepidae; and Greek diplomacy was successful in keeping them
faithful.
On the whole, in spite of certain sacrifices which had been wrung
from the pride of the basileus, Justinian had realised his dream. It was
thanks to his splendid and persistent ambition that the Empire could
now boast the acquisition of Dalmatia, Italy, the whole of eastern
Africa, south-east Spain, the islands of the western basin of the
Mediterranean, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and the Balearic Isles, which
almost doubled its extent. The occupation of Septem carried the
Emperor's authority to the Pillars of Hercules, and with the exception
of those parts of the coast held by the Visigoths in Spain and Septimania
and the Franks in Provence, the Mediterranean was once more a Roman
lake. We have seen by what efforts these triumphs were bought, we
shall see at what cost of suffering they were held. We must however
ch. i. 2—2
## p. 20 (#50) ##############################################
20 Administration in Africa and Italy
maintain that by them Justinian had won for the Empire a great and
incontestable increase of prestige and honour. In some respects it may
have proved a misfortune that he had taken upon him the splendid but
crushing heritage of Roman traditions and memories with the crown of
the Caesars: none the less, none of his contemporaries realised that he
had repudiated the obligations they entailed. His most savage detractors
saw in his vast ambitions the real glory of his reign. Procopius wrote
"The natural course for a high-souled Emperor to pursue, is to seek to
enlarge the Empire, and make it more glorious. "
IV.
Justinian's great object in accomplishing the imperial restoration in
the West was to restore the exact counterpart of the ancient Roman
Empire, by means of the revival of Roman institutions. The aim of the
two great ordinances of April 534 was the restoration in Africa of that
"perfect order" which seemed to the Emperor to be the index of true
civilisation in any State. The Pragmatic Sanction of 554, while it
completed the measures taken in 538 and 540, had the same object in
Italy—to "give back to Rome Rome's privileges," according to the
expression of a contemporary. By what appears at first sight to be a
surprising anomaly, remarkably well illustrating however Justinian's
disinclination to change any condition of the past he endeavoured to
restore, the Emperor did not extend to the West any of the administrative
reforms which he was compassing in the East at the same time.
In Africa, as in Italy, the principle on which the administrative re-
organisation was carried out was that of maintaining the ancient separation
between civil and military authority. At the head of the civil government
of Africa was placed a praetorian praefect, having seven governors below
him, bearing the titles of consvlares or prewsides, who administered the
restored circumscriptions which had been established by the Roman
Empire. The numerous offices in which Justinian, with his usual care
for detail, minutely regulated the details of staff and salaries, helped the
officials and assured the predominance of civil rule in the praefecture of
Africa. It was the same in the reconstructed praefecture of Italy.
From 535 a praetor was at the head of reconquered Sicily, after 538 a
praetorian praefect was appointed in Italy, and the regime of civil
administration was established the day after the capitulation of Ravenna.
The reorganisation was carried out by the Pragmatic of 554. Under the
praefect's high authority, assisted, as formerly, by the two vicarii of
Rome and Italy, the civil officials governed the thirteen provinces into
which the peninsula was still divided. Occasionally in practice political
or military exigencies led to the concentration of all the authority in the
same hands. In Africa Solomon and Germanus combined the functions and
## p. 21 (#51) ##############################################
Administration in Africa and Italy 21
even the titles of praetorian praefect and magister militum. In Italy
Narses was a real viceroy. These, however, were only exceptional
deviations from the established principle, and only concerned the supreme
government of the province. At the same time Justinian introduced
the legislation that he had promulgated into the reconquered West.
The financial administration was co-ordinated with the territorial. The
ancient system of taxation, slightly modified elsewhere by the barbarians,
was completely restored, and the supplies so raised were divided, as had
formerly been the case, between the praefect's area and the coffer of the
largitiones. A comes sacri patrimonii per Italiam was appointed, and
the imperial hgothetae exacted with great harshness arrears of taxation,
dating back to the time of the Gothic kings, from the country already
ruined by warfare.
Thus Justinian meant to efface, with one stroke of the pen, anything
that might recall the barbarian "tyranny. '1 Contracts signed in the
time of Totila, donations made by the barbarian kings, economic
measures passed by them in favour of settlers and slaves, were all
pronounced void, and the Pragmatic restored to the Roman proprietors
all lands that they had held before the time of Totila. However, though
he might shape the future, the Emperor was obliged to accept many
existing facts. The newly-created praefecture of Africa corresponded to
the Vandal kingdom, and included, as the Vandal kingdom had done,
along with Africa, Sardinia and Corsica which the barbarians had torn
from Italy. The Italian praefecture, already reduced by this arrange-
ment, was further diminished by the loss of Dalmatia and Sicily, which
formed a province by themselves. The Italian peninsula alone concerned
the praefect of Italy. \ t^l"\ r t
The military administration was on the siml lints Us the civil, but
very strictly separated from it. Responsible ror J|k* defence of the
country, it was reconstructed on the Roman I modelTaccording to the
minute instructions of the Emperor. Belisarias in Africa and Narses in
Italy organised the frontier defence. Each province formed a great
command, with a magister militum at its head ;\ Africa, Italy and Spain
comprised one each. Under the supreme command of these generals,
who were Commanders-in-Chief of all the troops stationed in the
province, dukes governed the military districts {limites) created along
the whole length of the frontier. In Africa there were originally four,
soon afterwards five (Tripolitana, Byzacena, Numidia and Mauretania),
four also in Italy, along the Alpine frontier. Dukes were also installed
in Sardinia and Sicily. In this group of military districts, troops of a
special nature were stationed, the HmUanei (borderers) formed on the
model formerly invented in the Roman Empire, and partly restored by
Anastasius. Recruited from the provincial population, specially on the
frontier, these soldiers received concessions of land, and pay as well. In
time of peace their duty was to cultivate the land they occupied, and to
"P
## p. 22 (#52) ##############################################
22 Admimstration in Africa
keep a sharp watch on the roads crossing the limes; in time of war they
took up arms either to defend the post specially committed to their
charge, or combined with similar troops to beat back the invader. In
either case they might never leave the limes, as perpetual military service
was the necessary condition of their tenure of land. These tenant-
soldiers were empowered to marry, grouped in regiments commanded by
tribunes, and stationed in the fortified towns and castles on the frontier.
This kind of territorial army, organised by Justinian along all the
borders of the Empire, enabled him to reduce the strength of the troops
of the line, and keep them for big wars. A close-drawn net of fortresses
supported this formation. In Africa, specially, where the Vandals had
razed the fortifications of nearly all the towns, Justinian's lieutenants
had an enormous task before them. No point was left undefended, and
in Byzacena and Numidia several parallel lines of fortresses served to
block all openings, cover all positions of strategic importance, and offer
a refuge to the surrounding population in time of danger. ^ A number
of fortresses were built or restored from Tripolitana to the Pillars of
Hercules, where stood Septem "that the whole world could not take,"
and from the Aures and Hodna to Tell. Even to-day North Africa
abounds in the colossal ruins of Justinian's fortresses, and the hardly
dismantled ramparts of Haidra, Beja, Madaura, Tebessa and Timgad, to
cite no more, bear witness to the great effort by which, in a few years,
Justinian restored the Roman system of defence. Furthermore, in
following the example set by Rome, Justinian tried to incorporate in
the imperial army the barbaric peoples dwelling on the outskirts of the
Empire. These gentiles or J'oederati made a perpetual treaty with the
Emperor, on receiving a promise of an annual subsidy (annorut). They
put their contingents at the disposal of the Roman dukes of the limes,
and their chiefs received from the Emperor's hands a kind of investiture,
as a sign of the Roman sovereignty, when they were given insignia to
denote their command, and titles from the Byzantine hierarchy. Thus
from the Syrtis to Mauretania there stretched a fringe of barbarian client
princes, acknowledging themselves as vassals of the basileus, and called—
Mauri pacifici. According to the expression of the African poet
Corippus, "trembling before the arms and success of Rome, of their own
accord they hastened to place themselves under the Roman yoke and
laws. '"
By carrying out the great work of reorganisation in Africa and Italy,
Justinian flattered himself that he had achieved the double object of
restoring the "complete peace" in the West and " repairing the disasters"
which war had heaped on the unhappy countries. It remains to be seen
how far his optimism was justified, and to reckon the price paid by the
inhabitants for the privilege of entering the Roman Empire once more.
In a celebrated passage of the Secret History Procopius has enumerated
## p. 23 (#53) ##############################################
Misgovernment 23
all the misfortunes which the imperial restoration brought on Africa and
Italy. According to the historian the country was depopulated, the
provinces left undefended and badly governed, ruined further by financial
exactions, religious intolerance, and military insurrections, while five
million human lives were sacrificed in Africa, and still more in Italy.
These were the benefits conferred in the West by the " glorious reign of
Justinian. 1" Although in crediting this account some allowance must be
made for oratorical exaggeration, yet it is certain that Africa and Italy
emerged from the many years of warfare to a great extent ruined, and
that a terrible economic and financial crisis accompanied the imperial
restoration. During many years Africa suffered all the horrors inci-
dent to Berber incursions, military revolts, destruction of the country
by sword and fire, and the murder and flight of the population. The
inevitable consequences of the struggle pressed no less hardly on Italy,
which underwent the horrors of long sieges, famine, massacre, disease,
the passage of the Goths, and the passage of imperialists, added to the
furious devastations of the Alemanni. The largest towns, such as
Naples, Milan, and specially Rome were almost devoid of inhabitants,
the depopulated country was uncultivated, and the large Italian pro-
prietors were repaid for their devotion to Byzantium and their hostility
to Totila by total ruin.
The exactions of the soldiers added yet more wretchedness. By their
greed, insolence and depredations the imperialists made those whom they
declared free regret the barbarian domination. The new administration
added the harshest financial tyranny to the misery caused by the war.
Justinian was obliged to get money at any cost, and therefore the barely
conquered country was given over to the pitiless exactions of the agents
of the fisc. The provinces were not only expected to support unaided
the expense of the very complicated administration imposed on them by
Justinian, but were further obliged to send money to Constantinople for
the general needs of the monarchy. The imperial logothetae applied the
burdensome system of Roman taxes to the ruined countries without
making any allowance for the prevailing distress. They mercilessly
demanded arrears dating from the time of the Goths, falsified the
registers in order to increase the returns, and enriched themselves at the
expense of the taxpayer to such an extent that, according to a
contemporary writer, "nothing remained for the inhabitants but to die,
since they were bereft of all the necessities of life. '"
Desolate, helpless, brought to the lowest straits, the Western
provinces begged the Emperor to help them in their misery if he did
not wish, to quote the official document, "that they should be overcome
by the impossibility of paying their debts. " Justinian heard this appeal.
Measures were taken in Africa to restore cultivation to the fields, the
country districts were repeopled, various works of public utility were
organised in the towns, ports were opened on the coasts, hydraulic
CH. I.
## p. 24 (#54) ##############################################
24 Results of Justinia? is Reign
works were supported or repaired in the interior of the land, and new
cities were founded in the wilds of the high Numidian plateau. Carthage
itself, newly adorned with a palace, churches, splendid baths and
fashionable squares, shewed the interest taken by the prince in his new
provinces. The result of all this was a real prosperity. Similar measures
were taken in Italy, either to tide over the crisis resulting from the mass
of debts and give time to the debtors, or to alleviate in some degree
the crushing burden of the taxes. At the same time the Emperor
busied himself in the restoration of the great aristocracy which had
been broken down by Totila, but to which he looked for the chief
support of the new regime. For a similar reason he protected and
enriched the Church, and set himself as' in Africa by means of the
development of public works to repair the evils of the war. Ravenna
was beautified by such buildings as San Vitale and San Apollinare in
Classe, and became a capital; Milan was raised from her ruins, Rome
was put in possession of privileges likely to lead to an economic revival,
and Naples became a great commercial port.
Unfortunately, in spite of Justinian's good intentions, the financial
burden weighed too heavily upon a depopulated Italy to allow of any
real revival. In the greater number of towns industry and commerce
disappeared; lack of implements hindered the improvement of the land,
and large uncultivated and desert tracts remained in the country. The
middle classes tended more and more to disappear, at the same time
that the aristocracy either became impoverished or left the country.
Justinian exerted himself in vain to restore order and prosperity by
promising to protect his new subjects from the well-known greed of his
officials: the imperial restoration marked, at any rate in Italy, the
beginning of a decadence which long darkened her history.
## p. 25 (#55) ##############################################
25
CHAPTER II.
JUSTINIAN'S GOVERNMENT IN THE EAST.
I.
At the time when Justinian was only heir-presumptive of the
Empire, probably in the year 520, he met the lady who was to become
the Empress Theodora. Daughter of one of the bear-keepers of the
hippodrome, brought up by an indulgent mother amongst the society
which frequented the purlieus of the circus, this young girl, beautiful,
intelligent and witty—if we may believe the gossip of the Secret History
—soon succeeded in charming and scandalising the capital. At the
theatre where she appeared in tableaux vivants and pantomimes she
ventured on the most audacious representations: in town she became
famous for the follies of her entertainments, the boldness of her manners
and the multitude of her lovers. Next she disappeared, and after a
somewhat unlovely adventure she travelled through the East in a
wretched manner for some time—according to contemporary gossip.
She was seen at Alexandria, where she became known to several of the
leaders of the Monophysite party, and returned—perhaps under their
influence—to a more Christian and purer mode of life. She was again
seen at Antioch, and then returned to Constantinople, matured and wiser.
Then it was that she made a conquest of Justinian. She soon wielded
the strongest influence over her lover: desperately in love, the prince
could refuse nothing that his mistress requested. He heaped riches
upon her, obtained for her the title of patrician, and became the humble
minister of her hatred or her affection. Finally he wished to marry her
legally, and was able to do so in 523, thanks to the complaisance of
Justin". When, in April 527, Justinian was associated in the Empire,
Thcothira shared the elevation and the triumph of her husband. She
ascenden the throne with him in August 527, and for twenty years the
adventuress-Empress exercised a sovereign influence on the course of
politics.
Theodora's name may still be read with that of the Emperor on the
walls of churches and over the doors of castles of that date. Her
picture makes a fellow to that of her imperial husband in the church of
## p. 26 (#56) ##############################################
26 The Empress Theodora [527-548
San Vitale in Ravenna, and also in the mosaics which decorated the
rooms of the Sacred Palace, for it was Justinian's wish to associate her
with the military triumphs and the splendours of the reign. The
grateful people raised statues to her as to Justinian, the officials also
swore fidelity to her, for she was the Emperor's equal throughout her
life, while ambassadors and foreign kings hastened to her to pay their
respects and to gain her good will as well as that of the basUeus. In
deliberating on the most important occasions Justinian always took
council of "the most honoured wife which God had given him," whom
he loved to call "his sweetest charm," and contemporaries agree in
declaring that she did not scruple to use the boundless influence which
she possessed, and that her authority was equal to, if not greater than,
that of her husband. Certainly this ambitious lady possessed many
eminent qualities to justify the supreme authority which she wielded.
She was a woman of unshaken courage, as she proved in the troublous
time of the Nika rising, proud energy, masculine resolution, a determined
and a clear mind, and a strong will by which she frequently overruled the
vacillating Justinian. She undoubtedly combined defects and even vices
with these qualities. She was domineering and harsh, she loved money
and power. To keep the throne to which she had risen she would stoop
to deceit, violence and cruelty; she was implacable in her dislikes, and
inflexible towards those whom she hated. By means of a disgraceful
intrigue she pitilessly destroyed the fortunes of John of Cappadocia, the
all-powerful praetorian praefect, who dared for one moment to dispute
her supremacy (541). She made Belisarius bitterly expiate his rare
lapses into independence, and by the ascendancy which she gained over
Antonina, the patrician's wife, she made him her humble and obedient
servant. As passionate in her loves as in her hates, she advanced
her favourites without scruple. Peter Barsymes was made praetorian
praefect, Narses a general, Vigilius a pope, while she turned the
imperial palace into a hotbed of incessant intrigues. Her influence was
not always good—though the loungers of Constantinople have strangely
lengthened the list of her cruelties and increased the number of her
victims—but it was always powerful. Even when she was forced
temporarily to give way before circumstances, her audacious and supple
wit was always able to devise some startling retaliation. Wily and
ambitious, she always aspired to have the last word—and she got it.
In the twenty years during which Theodora reigned she had a hand
in everything; in politics, and in the Church; in the administration,
she advised the reforms, and filled it with her proteges; in diplomacy,
concerning which the Emperor never decided anything without her
advice. She made and unmade popes and patriarchs, ministers and
generals at her pleasure, not even fearing, when she considered it
necessary, openly to thwart Justinian's wishes. She was the active help-
mate to her husband in all important matters. In the legislative reform
## p. 27 (#57) ##############################################
627-548] The Empress Theodora 27
her feminism inspired the measures which dealt with divorce, adultery,
the sanctity of the marriage-tie, and those meant to assist actresses and
fallen women. In the government of the East her lucid and keen
intelligence discovered-and advised, a policy more suited to the true
interests of the State than that actually pursued, and if it had been
carried out, it might have changed the course of history itself by
making the Byzantine Empire stronger and more durable.
While Justinian, carried away by the grandeur of Roman traditions,
rose to conceptions in turn magnificent and impossible, and dreamed of
restoring the Empire of the Caesars and of inaugurating the reign of
orthodoxy by reunion with Rome, Theodora, by birth an Oriental,
and in other respects more far-seeing and acute than her husband,
immediately turned her attention to the East, She had always
sympathised with the Monophysites; even before she had become
Empress she had willingly received them at the palace, and allowed
them to draw on her credit. She admired their teachers, and loved the
unpolished candour of their monks. She was not actuated by piety
alone, for she had too much political instinct not to realise the im-
portance of religious questions in a Christian State, and the peril
attending indifference to them. But while Justinian, with the mind of
a theologian, occupied himself with religious questions primarily for the
empty pleasure of being able to dogmatise, Theodora, like all the great
Byzantine Emperors, recognised the main features of political problems
under the fleeting form of theological disagreements. ( She realised that
the rich and flourishing provinces of Asia, Syria and Egypt really formed
the mainstay of the Empire; and she felt that the religious differences
by which the Oriental nations manifested their separatist tendencies
threatened danger to the monarchy/ Furthermore ihe saw the necessity
for pacifying the growing discontent by means ofyopportune concessions
and a wide toleration, and she forced the imperial policy to shape itself
to this end; and carried with her the ever worried and vacillating
Justinian, even so far as to brave the Papacy and protect the heretics.
It is only fair to say that she foresaw the future more clearly and
grasped the situation more accurately than did her imperial associate, |,
Before the advent of Justin's dynasty Anastasius' dreams of an ideal
monarchy may have taken this form or something approaching it. He
may have imagined an essentially Oriental Empire, having well-defended
frontiers, a wise administration, sound finances and blessed with religious
unity. To realise this last he would not have hesitated at a breach
with Rome if it had become necessary. In spite of his efforts and good
intentions Anastasius had not succeeded in realising his ideal. But it
was right in principle and, thanks to Theodora, it inspired the policy of
Justinian in the East. In this way the Empress made a great impression
on her husband's government, and as soon as she died a decay set in
which brought the glorious reign to a sad close.
## p. 28 (#58) ##############################################
I
First Persian War [527-531
II.
The imperial policy in the West had been essentially offensive. In
the East, on the other hand, it was generally restricted to a defensive
attitude. Justinian submitted to war or accepted it when offered rather
than sought it, because he was anxious to preserve all his forces for
Africa and Italy. /Thus he maintained the safety of the monarchy in the
East less by a series of great victories than by military arrangements
combined with clever diplomatic action. I
In Asia, Persia had been the perpetual enemy of the Romans for
centuries. There was a ceaseless temptation to strife and a pretext for
warfare in the coincidence of the two frontiers, and the rival influence
which the two States exercised in Armenia in the Caucasus, and among
the Arab tribes of the Syrian desert. The hundred years' peace
concluded in 422 had certainly restored tranquillity for the rest of the
fifth century, but hostilities had broken out afresh in the reign of
Anastasius (502); and it was evident that the peace of 505 would only
prove to be a truce, although Persia was torn by domestic discord, and
had lost her prestige and strength, and her old king Kawad did not yS
seek adventures. In proportion as Justinian profited by the relative "*
weakness of his foes he attempted to bring more peoples into the relation
of clients to Rome. Such were the populations of Lazica (the ancient
Colchis), the tribes of Iberia and Georgia, and even the Sabirian
Huns who occupied the celebrated defiles of the Caspian Gates at
the foot of the Caucasus range on the boundary of the two Empires.
With great skill (Byzantine diplomacy, by spreading Christianity in
those regions, had inclined the peoples to wish for the protection of
the orthodox Emperor, and so had obtained possession of important
strategic and commercial posig for Greek use. This policy of encroach-\
ment was bound to lead to a rupture, which came in 527, during the
last months of Justin's reignA
The war however was neither very long nor disastrous. Neither of
the two adversaries wanted to fight to the death. Kawad, who had
taken up arms, was distracted by domestic difficulties and the task of
assuring the succession of his son. Justinian wanted to disengage himself
as soon as possible in order to have his hands free to deal with affairs in
the West. Under these conditions the imperial army, which was of a
good size, and well commanded by Belisarius, was able to snatch a signal
victory at Dara in 530, the first victory won against Persia for many
years. Another general was able to make considerable progress in
Persian Armenia at the same time, but Justinian did not set himself
seriously to profit by his successes. The next year a Persian invasion of
Syria forced Belisarius to engage in and to lose the disastrous battle of
Callinicum (531). Then, in spite of the fact that the Persians were
## p. 29 (#59) ##############################################
531-544] Second Persian War 29
besieging Martyropolis (581) and that a career of pillage had brought
the Huns under the very walls of Antioch (December 531), the Great
King troubled as little to push his advantages as the Emperor did
to avenge his defeat. Negotiations were as important in this war as
military operations. When therefore in September 531 the death of
Kawiid gave the throne to his son Chosroes I Anoushirvan, the new
sovereign was preoccupied by the endeavour to consolidate his power at
home, and willingly joined in the negotiations which ended in the
conclusion of an "everlasting peace," in September 532. Justinian was
delighted to end the war, and gave way on almost every point. He
agreed to pay once more the annual subsidy which the Romans had
handed over to the Persians to keep up the fortresses which defended
the passes of the Caucasus against the Northern barbarians. This was
a large sum of 110,000 pounds of gold, a thinly veiled form of tribute.
He promised to move the residence of the Duke of Mesopotamia from
Dara, the great fortress built by Anastasius in 507, to Constantina,
which was further from the frontier; and he abandoned the protectorate
over Iberia. In return the country of the Lazi remained within the
sphere of Byzantine influence, and the Persians evacuated the fortresses
in it.
But Chosroes was not the man to rest contented with these first
successes. He was a young prince, ambitious, active and anxious for
conquests. It was not without suspicion that he viewed the progress and
success of the imperial ambition, for he knew that the longing for
universal dominion might well form a menace to the Sassanid monarchy,
as well as to the West. He therefore made use of the years which followed
the peace of 532 to reconstruct his army, and when he saw what seemed
to him a favourable opportunity, he resolutely began the war again (540).
This happened when he discovered that the Roman frontier was stripped
of troops, Armenia and the country of the Lazi discontented under
Byzantine rule, and the Goths at bay after the Vandals were conquered.
At the beginning of hostilities he threw himself on Syria, which he
cruelly ravaged, and seized Antioch, which he completely ruined under
the eyes of the helpless Roman generals. In vain Justinian sent the
best generals against him, first Germanus and then Belisarius, hastily
recalled from Italy at the beginning of 541. Their troops were not
sufficient to defend the country effectively. In 541, Chosroes attacked
Lazica, reduced Iberia and swept away the strong fortress of Petra, which
Justinian had lately built to the south of Phasis. In 542 he ravaged
Commagene; in 543 he made a demonstration on the Armenian frontier;
and in 544 he again appeared in Mesopotamia which he ravaged cruelly,
in spite of the heroic resistance of Edessa. Meanwhile the imperial
troops did nothing: and the generals spent their time in intrigues
instead of in fighting. The military prestige of Belisarius had made
Chosroes give way for a brief space, but the general was absorbed in his
## p. 30 (#60) ##############################################
30 Second Persian War [542-561
domestic troubles, and let slip the time when he should have taken the
offensive with vigour; and by so doing more or less justified the disgrace
which soon overtook him through Theodora's ill-will (542). The only
military enterprise undertaken in 543 by Justinian's army was the invasion
of Persian Armenia, with more than 30,000 men, and it led to a great
disaster. The Emperor was seriously concerned with events in Italy
—Totila had just reconquered nearly the whole peninsula—and he was
very lucky to be able to buy with gold a truce for five years, instead of
a final peace (545). Thanks to the renewal of this convention in 551
and 552 the Asiatic provinces enjoyed tranquillity once more, though
the war continued in Lazica for many years afterwards.
It was an easy matter for the diplomacy of the two Empires to win
allies from amongst the belligerent tribes of the Caucasus, since their
good faith was always an uncertain quantity. While the Lazi, who were
discontented under the Persian tyranny, returned to Justinian in 549,
other peoples who had formerly been within the Byzantine sphere of
influence now attached themselves to Chosroes. Furthermore the war
seemed unending in a country rendered almost impassable by mountains
and forests. A struggle was maintained for several years over Petra.
Taken by the Persians in 541, it was attacked in vain by the Byzantines
in 549, and was only finally regained in 551. Other places were attacked
and defended with equal tenacity. Justinian realised the importance of
possessing a region which would enable him to deprive the Persians of
an outlet on the Black Sea, and therefore he made unheard-of efforts to
keep it.
He concentrated as many as 50,000 men there in 552. Finally
Chosroes saw the uselessness of the interminable strife; and the armistice
of 555 was turned into a definite treaty in 561. Peace was declared
for fifty years, and the Persians agreed to evacuate Lazica, where they
knew that their power could hardly be maintained, since the people were
enthusiastically Christian. But the Emperor's success was dearly bought.
He bound himself to pay an annual tribute of 30,000 aurei, handing
over the sum-total for the first seven years in advance. He promised
for the future to discontinue any religious propaganda in the dominions
of the Great King, in return for the extension of toleration to Christians
in Persia. These concessions dealt a blow at Justinian's pride as an
Emperor and a Christian. However, Lazica remained to him, and it
was a considerable gain in the direction of securing the safety of the
Empire. Still the treaty was intentionally so vague in some points that
it contained the beginnings of many future difficulties.
While Roman Asia was cruelly suffering from these endless wars, the
European provinces were not escaping. Although the shock of the great
barbarian invasions had shaken the East much less than the West, a
succession of barbarian peoples were settled north of the Danube. The
Lombards, Heruls and Gepidae were on the west; Slavs and Bulgars,
Antae and Huns on the lower reaches of the river, while behind them
\
## p. 31 (#61) ##############################################
527-562] The Huns 31
lay the strong nation of Avars, still roving to the north of the Palus
Maeotis but gradually spreading themselves westward. The Empire
proved as attractive to these barbarians as to those who had invaded
the West. They had all one wish and one aim—some day to become
members of the rich and civilised commonwealth, whose towns were
fair, whose fields were fertile, and in which men received great treasures
and honour from the hand of the Emperor. Without doubt these
sentiments were largely inspired by greed of the splendid plunder that
the Roman territory offered to the enterprise of the barbarians, and if
their peaceful offers were declined they did not hesitate to keep their
vows by the use of force. Thus, at the end of the fifth century the
tribes had formed the habit of crossing the Danube periodically, either
in unnoticed driblets, or by sudden invasions, and certain groups were
legally settled on the south side of the river by the beginning of the
sixth century. The movement continued during the whole of Justinian's
reign.
From the beginning of his reign the Huns had appeared in Thrace
and the Antae in Illyricum; but they were repulsed with such energy
that, according to Malalas, "a great terror overcame the barbarian
nations. " Soon however the resistance gave way. As had been the
case in Asia, the frontier was denuded of troops in consequence of the
expeditions to the West, and the boldness of the invaders increased.
In 534 the Slavs and Bulgars crossed the Danube, and the magister
militum of Thrace perished in the attempt to drive them back. In 538
the Huns invaded Scythia and Moesia, in 540 they went further and
ravaged Thrace, Illyricum and Greece as far as the Isthmus of Corinth.
One of their bands even penetrated to the environs of Constantinople,
and spread a terrible panic in the capital. In 546 there was another
Hunnish invasion, in 547 an attack from the Slavs who devastated
Illyricum as far as Dyrrachium, while the imperial generals did not even
dare to face them. In 551 a band of three thousand Slavs pillaged
Thrace and Illyricum and advanced as far as the Aegean Sea. In 552
the Slavs and Antae menaced Thessalonica and settled themselves on
Byzantine land as though they had conquered it. In 558 the Kotrigur
Huns pushed into Thrace, one of their bands reaching Thermopylae,
while another appeared under the walls of Constantinople, which was
only just saved by the courage of the old Belisarius. In 562 the
Huns reappeared. Then the insolent and menacing Avars became
prominent, on the very eve of Justinian's death. It is quite certain that
none of these incursions would have led to the permanent establishment
of a barbarian people within the limits of the Empire, as had happened
in the West, for the imperial generals were always finally successful in
hurling the swarms of invaders back over the Danube. At the same
time the incessant scourge could not fail to produce lamentable
consequences in the provinces which suffered from it. Procopius
## p. 31 (#62) ##############################################
22 Administration in Africa
keep a sharp watch on the roads crossing the lime*; in time of war they
took up arms either to defend the post specially committed to their
charge, or combined with similar troops to beat back the invader. In
either case they might never leave the limes, as perpetual military service
was the necessary condition of their tenure of land. These tenant-
soldiers were empowered to marry, grouped in regiments commanded by
tribunes, and stationed in the fortified towns and castles on the frontier.
This kind of territorial army, organised by Justinian along all the
borders of the Empire, enabled him to reduce the strength of the troops
of the line, and keep them for big wars. A close-drawn net of fortresses
supported this formation. In Africa, specially, where the Vandals had
razed the fortifications of nearly all the towns, Justinian's lieutenants
had an enormous task before them. No point was left undefended, and
in Byzacena and Numidia several parallel lines of fortresses served to
block all openings, cover all positions of strategic importance, and offer
a refuge to the surrounding population in time of dangerA A number
of fortresses were built or restored from Tripolitana to the Pillars of
Hercules, where stood Septem "that the whole world could not take,"
and from the Aures and Hodna to Tell. Even to-day North Africa
abounds in the colossal ruins of Justinian's fortresses, and the hardly
dismantled ramparts of Haidra, Beja, Madaura, Tebessa and Timgad, to
cite no more, bear witness to the great effort by which, in a few years,
Justinian restored the Roman system of defence. Furthermore, in
following the example set by Rome, Justinian tried to incorporate in
the imperial army the barbaric peoples dwelling on the outskirts of the
Empire. These gentiles or J'oederati made a perpetual treaty with the
Emperor, on receiving a promise of an annual subsidy (annona). They
put their contingents at the disposal of the Roman dukes of the limes,
and their chiefs received from the Emperor's hands a kind of investiture,
as a sign of the Roman sovereignty, when they were given insignia to
denote their command, and titles from the Byzantine hierarchy. Thus
from the Syrtis to Mauretania there stretched a fringe of barbarian client
princes, acknowledging themselves as vassals of the basileus, and called—
Mauri pacifici. According to the expression of the African poet
Corippus, "trembling before the arms and success of Rome, of their own
accord they hastened to place themselves under the Roman yoke and
laws. "
By carrying out the great work of reorganisation in Africa and Italy,
Justinian flattered himself that he had achieved the double object of
restoring the "complete peace" in the West and " repairing the disasters n
which war had heaped on the unhappy countries. It remains to be seen
how far his optimism was justified, and to reckon the price paid by the
inhabitants for the privilege of entering the Roman Empire once more.
In a celebrated passage of the Secret History Procopius has enumerated
## p. 31 (#63) ##############################################
Misgovernment 23
all the misfortunes which the imperial restoration brought on Africa and
Italy. According to the historian the country was depopulated, the
provinces left undefended and badly governed, ruined further by financial
exactions, religious intolerance, and military insurrections, while five
million human lives were sacrificed in Africa, and still more in Italy.
These were the benefits conferred in the West by the " glorious reign of
Justinian. '" Although in crediting this account some allowance must be
made for oratorical exaggeration, yet it is certain that Africa and Italy
emerged from the many years of warfare to a great extent ruined, and
that a terrible economic and financial crisis accompanied the imperial
restoration. During many years Africa suffered all the horrors inci-
dent to Berber incursions, military revolts, destruction of the country
by sword and fire, and the murder and flight of the population. The
inevitable consequences of the struggle pressed no less hardly on Italy,
which underwent the horrors of long sieges, famine, massacre, disease,
the passage of the Goths, and the passage of imperialists, added to the
furious devastations of the Alemanni. The largest towns, such as
Naples, Milan, and specially Rome were almost devoid of inhabitants,
the depopulated country was uncultivated, and the large Italian pro-
prietors were repaid for their devotion to Byzantium and their hostility
to Totila by total ruin.
The exactions of the soldiers added yet more wretchedness. By their
greed, insolence and depredations the imperialists made those whom they
declared free regret the barbarian domination. The new administration
added the harshest financial tyranny to the misery caused by the war.
Justinian was obliged to get money at any cost, and therefore the barely
conquered country was given over to the pitiless exactions of the agents
of the fisc. The provinces were not only expected to support unaided
the expense of the very complicated administration imposed on them by
Justinian, but were further obliged to send money to Constantinople for
the general needs of the monarchy. The imperial logoihetae applied the
burdensome system of Roman taxes to the ruined countries without
making any allowance for the prevailing distress. They mercilessly
demanded arrears dating from the time of the Goths, falsified the
registers in order to increase the returns, and enriched themselves at the
expense of the taxpayer to such an extent that, according to a
contemporary writer, "nothing remained for the inhabitants but to die,
since they were bereft of all the necessities of life. '"
Desolate, helpless, brought to the lowest straits, the Western
provinces begged the Emperor to help them in their misery if he did
not wish, to quote the official document, "that they should be overcome
by the impossibility of paying their debts. " Justinian heard this appeal.
Measures were taken in Africa to restore cultivation to the fields, the
country districts were repeopled, various works of public utility were
organised in the towns, ports were opened on the coasts, hydraulic
## p. 32 (#64) ##############################################
32 Justinian's Fortresses
estimates that more than 200,000 people were either slain or led
captive during its course. He also compares the annually ravaged
lands to the "Scythian deserts,1'' and tells how the folk were forced
to flee to the forests and mountains to avoid the outrages and
atrocities which the barbarians would have inflicted upon them.
However, in Asia as in Europe, Justinian had taken wise and
vigorous measures to secure the defence of his provinces, to give them,
as he said, "peace and tranquillity,11 and to remove the "temptation to
invade and ravage the countries where the Emperor's subjects dwelt **
from the barbarians. With this object of efficiency in view he re-
organised the great military commands which were created to guard
the frontier. In Asia one general, the magister militum of the East,
had commanded the enormous district reaching from the Black Sea
to Egypt. This command was too large, and Justinian divided it,
_cjnstiiuting magistri militum for Armenia and Mesopotamia. In
Europe he added a magister militum of Moesia to those of Illyricum
and Thrace. But above all, for the immediate defence of the frontier
he organised all along the limes military districts commanded by
duces and occupied by special troops, the limitanei. We have already
seen how the duties and divisions of this formation were determined
in Africa. The same system was extended to the whole Empire, and
a large strip of military lands round its whole circumference assured
the safety of the interior. Although several of these limites were in
existence before the time of Justinian, he had the merit of organising
and completing the whole system. Three limites were formed in Egypt,
several commands were halved in Syria and on the Euphrates, and duces
were established in Armenia, while others kept watch on the Danube, in
Scythia, in the two Moesias and in Dacia. Thus the barbarians were
again confronted with the opposing wall that used to be called "the
"^monarchy's wrapper" (praetentura imperii).
•i Justinian also busied himself in building a continuous chain of
fortresses along all the frontiers, as he had done in Africa. Rome had
formerly been forced to undertake the immediate defence of the frontiers
of the Empire in order to protect her territories. Justinian did more.
Behind the first line of castella, and attached to them by a succession of
stations, he built a series of large fortresses placed further apart, and
more important. These served to strengthen the frontier castles, made
a second barrier against invasion, and were a place of refuge for the
inhabitants of the country. Thus the whole district was covered with
strong castles. They were of unequal importance and strength, but
they kept a watch on the enemy's territory, occupied points of strategic
importance, barred the defiles, commanded the important routes,
protected the safety of the towns and sheltered the rural population.
They covered all the provinces with a close-meshed net of fortresses, a
## p. 33 (#65) ##############################################
Justinian's Buildings 33
network through which it seemed impossible for the enemy to slip. It
had taken only a few years for Justinian's resolution to raise or repair
hundreds of fortresses, from the Danube to the Armenian mountains, and
to the banks of the Euphrates. If ancient Roman posts were merely
repaired at some points, while at others it was only necessary to complete
buildings begun by Anastasius, yet the dazed admiration which con-
temporaries seem to have felt for this colossal work was justified, for
Justinian gave unity to the whole system and displayed the greatest
energy in carrying it out. According to Procopius, by it he truly
"saved the monarchy. "
In his De Aedificiis Procopius gives the detailed list of the countless
buildings repaired or built by the Emperor's orders. Here it must
suffice to notice the chief features of the work. On the Danube more
^ than eighty castles were built or restored between the place where the
Save enters that river and the Black Sea. Among them may be men-
tioned Singidunum (Belgrade), Octavum, Viminacium, Novae, further to
the east Ratiaria, Augusta, Securisca, Durostorum (Silistria), Troesmis,
and, on the left bank, the strongly fortified bridge of Lederata. These
were for the most part ancient Roman citadels newly repaired.
Justinian's original work consisted chiefly in the measures which he took
^-* to strengthen the rear. Hundreds of castella sprang up in Dacia,
Dardania, and Moesia, further south in Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace.
Thus there was a second and even a third line of defence. In Dardania
S" alone, Justinian's native country, Procopius enumerates more than one
hundred and fifty castella besides such great posts as Justiniana Prima,
Sardica and Naissus. Fortifications were even constructed on the shore
^ of the Sea of Marmora and the Archipelago. To protect Constantinople
Anastasius had built the Long Wall in 512. It ran from the Sea of
Marmora to Selymbria on . the Black Sea. Similar long walls covered the
Thracian Chersonesus, barred the passes of Thermopylae, and cut across
the Isthmus of Corinth. Fortresses were also raised in Thessaly and
northern Greece. Thus the whole of the Balkan peninsula formed a
vast entrenched camp. On the side of the Euxine long walls protected
the approaches to Cherson, and the strong castle of Petra Justiniana
defended Lazica. Then several lines of fortresses were drawn up from
Trebizond to the Euphrates. In Armenia there was Theodosiopolis
(now Erzeroum), Kitharizon and Martyropolis; in Mesopotamia Amida,
Constantina, Dara, called "the rampart of the Roman Empire," and
another Theodosiopolis; Circesium was on the Euphrates and Zenobia
and Palmyra on the borders of the desert. Added to these there were
the intermediate castella which connected the big fortresses. A little to
the rear, in the second line, were Satala, Coloneia, Nicopolis, Sebaste,
Melitene, "the bulwark of Armenia," Edessa, Carrhae, Callinicum in
Osrhoene, Sura, Hierapolis, Zeugma in the Euphrates district, and
Antioch after the catastrophe of 540. These made a formidable field
C. MED. H. VOL. II. CH. II. 3
## p. 34 (#66) ##############################################
34 Justinian s Diplomacy
for warfare. It is certain that all these buildings do not date from
Justinian's reign, but he must have the credit of combining them all
into a sure and splendid defensive system.
Military methods alone were not employed for the defence of the
Empire in the East. The imperial diplomacy was putting forth all its
powers to that end, and displayed wonderful skill and ingenuity in the
task. The Empire always possessed a great influence over the bar-
barians settled on the Roman frontiers. They were proud when their
services and good faith won for them the approval of the basileus. They
gladly placed their forces at his disposal when they received the annual
subsidy (annona), and became the auxiliaries and vassals of the Empire,
bearing the name of foederati. Their chiefs felt themselves honoured
when they received the splendid insignia of their commands from the
hands of the basileus. They gladly adorned themselves with titles culled
from the hierarchy of the palace, and hastened to declare themselves to be
"Slaves of the imperial Majesty. " Constantinople and the Court dazzled
their simple minds, they flocked there gladly, and it was easy for the
Emperor by the mere splendour of their reception to impress them with
a great idea of the strength of the monarchy. During the whole
of Justinian's reign the Sacred Palace was filled with a never-ending
succession of strange and barbaric sovereigns. Heruls, Huns, Gepidae,
Avars, Saracens, Axumitae, Lazi, Iberians, men of every race and of every
land, with their wives and children and their retinue in picturesque
garments, filled the capital with a babel of all the tongues in the
universe. They were loaded with honours, presents, and magnificent
demonstrations of affection, and returned to their native wilds dazzled
by the spectacle of the imperial majesty. Naturally they felt them-
selves only too happy to be allowed to serve this basileus who gave
so warm a welcome to his faithful servitors, and recompensed them so
generously.
Thus by the clever distribution of favours and money the Emperor
was able to maintain a fringe of barbarian clients on all his frontiers.
At the same time the authorities at Byzantium never forgot that the
fickle and perfidious allies might prove to be dangerous servants because
of their indiscipline, faithlessness and greed. The imperial diplomacy
watched them with an eagle eye, skilfully treating them with a mixture
of sternness and leniency; and endeavouring tfi render them harmless by
the policy of setting them against each other, and fostering rivalry and
hatred amongst them^XJustinian maintained a possible rival to every
barbarian king, he had always a hostile people waiting his word to
descend on every other people. The Lombards menaced the Gepidae,
the Utigurs the Kotrigurs, the Avars the Huns. Thus, as Agathias
wrote, " so long as the barbarians destroyed each other, the Emperor was
always victor without drawing his sword, no matter what was the end of
## p. 35 (#67) ##############################################
Justinian's Diplomacy 35
the struggle. " Formerly Rome had found the same methods necessary
to govern the barbarians. Byzantium was able to add to the Roman
traditions the influence which she wielded because of her propagation of
Christianity. \Her missionaries worked for the consolidation of the
imperial power as effectively as her diplomatists. They opened a road
for politicians, and prepared new territories for Byzantine influence and
civilisation. Thanks to them conversions increased everywhere, from
the plains of southern Russia to the Abyssinian plateau, and from the
Caucasus Mountains to the oases of the Sahara.
By means of Christianity Byzantine influence spread beyond the
boundaries of the Empire in Justinian's reign, and many were the peoples
affected by it; Huns from the Cimmerian Bosphorus, Souanians, Abasgi,
Apsilians from the Caucasus district, Alans, and Sabirian Huns, Tzani
from the upper Euphrates, Arabs from Syria, Himyarites from Yemen,
Nobadae and Blemmyes from the upper Nile, Berbers from the oases of
the Sahara, and Heruls from Moesia.
By these means Justinian was able to checkmate his enemies. In the
East he sought amongst the Sabirian Huns for allies against the Sassanid
monarchy, because they could rush upon the Persian realm from the
north. He also went to the Arabs of the Syrian desert because they
might make useful diversions from the south, and he formed them into
a unique State, under the phylarchiw Harith the Ghassanid(531). Not
content with this, he went yet further and made friends among the Arabs
on the Yemen and in the Ethiopian kingdom of Axum. In the West
he skilfully managed to sow discord amongst the tribes who crowded on
the Danube frontier, checking the Bulgars by the Huns, the Huns by the
Antae, and the Antae and Utigurs by the Avars. He scattered money
and lands liberally amongst them all, loading their ambassadors with
silken robes and golden chains, in return for which he only asked them
to supply Byzantium with soldiers. In this way he settled the Lombards
in Pan noma, the Heruls in Dacia, and the Kotrigur Huns in Thrace.
He offered the Avars lands suitable for settlement on the Save, and
similarly managed to procure a number of vassals on all the frontiers of
the Empire. On the Danube there were the Heruls, Gepidae, Lombards,
Huns and Antae; on the borders of Armenia, the Lazi and Tzani; on
the Syrian frontier the crowd of Arab tribes; in Africa the Berber
inhabitants of Byzacena, Numidia and Mauritania.
Thus with wonderful skill Justinian exercised the difficult art of
ruling barbarians, and he did it from the depth of his palace and capital.
Contemporaries waxed eloquent in praise of the prudence, the fairness
and delicacy displayed by the Emperor in carrying out this policy, and
in celebrating that evfiovXLa by which, according to Menander, "he
would have destroyed the barbarians without fighting if he had lived
long enough. 11 However this policy was not without its dangers. UJy
displaying the riches of the Empire to the barbarians, and by lavishly
ch. ii. 3—2
t^
## p. 36 (#68) ##############################################
36 Defects of Justinian's Diplomacy
distributing money and lands amongst them, their demands were
naturally increased enormously, and their invasions provoked\ Procopius
very wisely observed that " once they had tasted Byzantine"wealth it was
impossible to keep them from it, or to make them forget the road to it. "
The obvious antidote for the dangers of this course of diplomacy was a
strong military organisation. Procopius again wrote "there is no other
way of compelling the barbarians to keep faith with Rome except by the
fear of the imperial armies. " Justinian understood this quite well.
Unfortunately, in proportion as the West again absorbed the resources
and attention of the Empire, lack of money led to the disorganisation
of those military institutions which had been formed to protect the East.
Corps of limitanei were disbanded, the fighting force of the troops of the
line in Syria was diminished, strong positions were left undefended,
often bereft of garrisons altogether, and Justinian's excellent network of
fortresses no longer sufficed to keep out the barbarians. The Emperor
seemed to prefer diplomatic action by itself to the practical military
precautions that he had applied so actively at the beginning of his reign.
He thought it more clever to buy off the invaders than to beat them by
force of arms, he considered it cheaper to subsidise the barbarians than
to maintain a large army on a war footing; he found it more agreeable
to direct a subtle diplomacy than great military operations, and he never
realised that the first result of his policy was to encourage the barbarians
in rr>t,iirn\ .
This was the fundamental defect of Justinian's foreign policy in the
East. It rested on a skilful combination of military force and diplomacy.
As long as the balance was maintained between these two elements
equilibrium was secured, the end aimed at was attained, and the Empire
was well defended and comparatively safe. But when this balance was
upset, everything went wrong at once. The Slavs appeared at Hadrianople,
the Huns under the walls of Constantinople, while the Avars assumed a
threatening attitude and regions of the Balkans were terribly ravaged.
Procopius was justified when he reproached Justinian with having "wasted
the riches of the Empire in extravagant gifts to. the barbarians," and in
his assertion that the Emperor's rash generosity only incited them to
return perpetually "to sell the peace for which they were always well
paid. " The historian goes on to explain that "after them came others,
who made a double profit, from the rapine in which they indulged and
from the money with which the liberality of the prince always furnished
them. Thus the evil continued with no abatement, and there was no
escape from the vicious circle. "
This mistaken policy cost the Empire dear. Nevertheless, it was
founded on a right principle, and some of the results which it
produced were not to be despised, in connexion with the defence of
territory, the development of commerce, or the spread of civilisation.
Justinian's mistake—specially during the last years of his reign—lay in
## p. 37 (#69) ##############################################
Domestic Government 37
the fact that he carried the system to excess. When he allowed the
army to become disorganised and fortresses to fall into ruin he bereft
his diplomacy of the force that was necessary to support his plans.
When he ceased to awe the barbarians he found himself at their mercy.
III.
The domestic government of the East took up as much of Justinian's
attention as the defence of the territory. /The urgent need for adminis-
trative reform in the, midst of a serious religious crisis provided ample
food for his anxiety,
In Byzantium lie salej)fjpublic offices was an ancient custom, and
this venality led to deplorable results. The governors expected to recoup
themselves from the province for the expenses which they incurred in
obtaining their posts, and to enrich themselves to as great an extent as
possible while they held them. The other agents in so corrupt an
administration only followed the governor's example, when they pillaged
and crushed the district to their heart's content. The__financial system
was oppressive and exacting; justice was sold or partially administered,
and deep misery and general insecurity was the natural result. The
people left the country, the towns were emptied, the fields deserted, and
agriculture abandoned. While those who were strong or rich enough to
defend themselves managed to escape the exactions of the tax-collector,
the great proprietors maintained troops of armed men in their pay, and
ravaged the country, attacked people and seized land, sure of immunity
from the magistrates. Everywhere murder, brigandage, agitation and
risings abounded, and last and most serious result of all the disorders,
thej-eturnsj>f thejaxfis-from the exhausted provinces were but scanty.
Justinian calculated that only one-third of the taxes imposed really
reached the treasury, and the misery of the subjects destroyed the source
of the public wealth. It will be easy to understand why the Emperor felt
so much concern at affairs in the East, if we add that the laws abounded
in contradictions, obscurities and useless prolixity, which gave rise to
very long law-suits, and furnished an opportunity for the j udges to give
arbitrary decisions, or to decide matters to suit their own convenience.
Justinian, as we know, had the qualities that go to make a good
administrator. He loved order, he had a sincere wish to do good work,
and a real care for the well-being of his subjects. With an authoritative
disposition and absolutist tendencies, he combined a taste for adminis-
trative centralisation. But above all, his vast projects left him incessantly
in need of large sums of money. He saw that the best way to ensure
the regularity of the returns was to protect those who paid from the
functionaries who ruined them; and thus in furthering the well-being
and quiet of his subjects the Emperor was also serving the best interests
## p. 38 (#70) ##############################################
38 Justinians Legislation [533-636
of the fisc.
Emperor gave them permission to settle in Pannonia and Noricum,
and furnished them with subsidies in return for recruits. They were
rewarded by receiving imperial support against their enemies the
Gepidae; and Greek diplomacy was successful in keeping them
faithful.
On the whole, in spite of certain sacrifices which had been wrung
from the pride of the basileus, Justinian had realised his dream. It was
thanks to his splendid and persistent ambition that the Empire could
now boast the acquisition of Dalmatia, Italy, the whole of eastern
Africa, south-east Spain, the islands of the western basin of the
Mediterranean, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and the Balearic Isles, which
almost doubled its extent. The occupation of Septem carried the
Emperor's authority to the Pillars of Hercules, and with the exception
of those parts of the coast held by the Visigoths in Spain and Septimania
and the Franks in Provence, the Mediterranean was once more a Roman
lake. We have seen by what efforts these triumphs were bought, we
shall see at what cost of suffering they were held. We must however
ch. i. 2—2
## p. 20 (#50) ##############################################
20 Administration in Africa and Italy
maintain that by them Justinian had won for the Empire a great and
incontestable increase of prestige and honour. In some respects it may
have proved a misfortune that he had taken upon him the splendid but
crushing heritage of Roman traditions and memories with the crown of
the Caesars: none the less, none of his contemporaries realised that he
had repudiated the obligations they entailed. His most savage detractors
saw in his vast ambitions the real glory of his reign. Procopius wrote
"The natural course for a high-souled Emperor to pursue, is to seek to
enlarge the Empire, and make it more glorious. "
IV.
Justinian's great object in accomplishing the imperial restoration in
the West was to restore the exact counterpart of the ancient Roman
Empire, by means of the revival of Roman institutions. The aim of the
two great ordinances of April 534 was the restoration in Africa of that
"perfect order" which seemed to the Emperor to be the index of true
civilisation in any State. The Pragmatic Sanction of 554, while it
completed the measures taken in 538 and 540, had the same object in
Italy—to "give back to Rome Rome's privileges," according to the
expression of a contemporary. By what appears at first sight to be a
surprising anomaly, remarkably well illustrating however Justinian's
disinclination to change any condition of the past he endeavoured to
restore, the Emperor did not extend to the West any of the administrative
reforms which he was compassing in the East at the same time.
In Africa, as in Italy, the principle on which the administrative re-
organisation was carried out was that of maintaining the ancient separation
between civil and military authority. At the head of the civil government
of Africa was placed a praetorian praefect, having seven governors below
him, bearing the titles of consvlares or prewsides, who administered the
restored circumscriptions which had been established by the Roman
Empire. The numerous offices in which Justinian, with his usual care
for detail, minutely regulated the details of staff and salaries, helped the
officials and assured the predominance of civil rule in the praefecture of
Africa. It was the same in the reconstructed praefecture of Italy.
From 535 a praetor was at the head of reconquered Sicily, after 538 a
praetorian praefect was appointed in Italy, and the regime of civil
administration was established the day after the capitulation of Ravenna.
The reorganisation was carried out by the Pragmatic of 554. Under the
praefect's high authority, assisted, as formerly, by the two vicarii of
Rome and Italy, the civil officials governed the thirteen provinces into
which the peninsula was still divided. Occasionally in practice political
or military exigencies led to the concentration of all the authority in the
same hands. In Africa Solomon and Germanus combined the functions and
## p. 21 (#51) ##############################################
Administration in Africa and Italy 21
even the titles of praetorian praefect and magister militum. In Italy
Narses was a real viceroy. These, however, were only exceptional
deviations from the established principle, and only concerned the supreme
government of the province. At the same time Justinian introduced
the legislation that he had promulgated into the reconquered West.
The financial administration was co-ordinated with the territorial. The
ancient system of taxation, slightly modified elsewhere by the barbarians,
was completely restored, and the supplies so raised were divided, as had
formerly been the case, between the praefect's area and the coffer of the
largitiones. A comes sacri patrimonii per Italiam was appointed, and
the imperial hgothetae exacted with great harshness arrears of taxation,
dating back to the time of the Gothic kings, from the country already
ruined by warfare.
Thus Justinian meant to efface, with one stroke of the pen, anything
that might recall the barbarian "tyranny. '1 Contracts signed in the
time of Totila, donations made by the barbarian kings, economic
measures passed by them in favour of settlers and slaves, were all
pronounced void, and the Pragmatic restored to the Roman proprietors
all lands that they had held before the time of Totila. However, though
he might shape the future, the Emperor was obliged to accept many
existing facts. The newly-created praefecture of Africa corresponded to
the Vandal kingdom, and included, as the Vandal kingdom had done,
along with Africa, Sardinia and Corsica which the barbarians had torn
from Italy. The Italian praefecture, already reduced by this arrange-
ment, was further diminished by the loss of Dalmatia and Sicily, which
formed a province by themselves. The Italian peninsula alone concerned
the praefect of Italy. \ t^l"\ r t
The military administration was on the siml lints Us the civil, but
very strictly separated from it. Responsible ror J|k* defence of the
country, it was reconstructed on the Roman I modelTaccording to the
minute instructions of the Emperor. Belisarias in Africa and Narses in
Italy organised the frontier defence. Each province formed a great
command, with a magister militum at its head ;\ Africa, Italy and Spain
comprised one each. Under the supreme command of these generals,
who were Commanders-in-Chief of all the troops stationed in the
province, dukes governed the military districts {limites) created along
the whole length of the frontier. In Africa there were originally four,
soon afterwards five (Tripolitana, Byzacena, Numidia and Mauretania),
four also in Italy, along the Alpine frontier. Dukes were also installed
in Sardinia and Sicily. In this group of military districts, troops of a
special nature were stationed, the HmUanei (borderers) formed on the
model formerly invented in the Roman Empire, and partly restored by
Anastasius. Recruited from the provincial population, specially on the
frontier, these soldiers received concessions of land, and pay as well. In
time of peace their duty was to cultivate the land they occupied, and to
"P
## p. 22 (#52) ##############################################
22 Admimstration in Africa
keep a sharp watch on the roads crossing the limes; in time of war they
took up arms either to defend the post specially committed to their
charge, or combined with similar troops to beat back the invader. In
either case they might never leave the limes, as perpetual military service
was the necessary condition of their tenure of land. These tenant-
soldiers were empowered to marry, grouped in regiments commanded by
tribunes, and stationed in the fortified towns and castles on the frontier.
This kind of territorial army, organised by Justinian along all the
borders of the Empire, enabled him to reduce the strength of the troops
of the line, and keep them for big wars. A close-drawn net of fortresses
supported this formation. In Africa, specially, where the Vandals had
razed the fortifications of nearly all the towns, Justinian's lieutenants
had an enormous task before them. No point was left undefended, and
in Byzacena and Numidia several parallel lines of fortresses served to
block all openings, cover all positions of strategic importance, and offer
a refuge to the surrounding population in time of danger. ^ A number
of fortresses were built or restored from Tripolitana to the Pillars of
Hercules, where stood Septem "that the whole world could not take,"
and from the Aures and Hodna to Tell. Even to-day North Africa
abounds in the colossal ruins of Justinian's fortresses, and the hardly
dismantled ramparts of Haidra, Beja, Madaura, Tebessa and Timgad, to
cite no more, bear witness to the great effort by which, in a few years,
Justinian restored the Roman system of defence. Furthermore, in
following the example set by Rome, Justinian tried to incorporate in
the imperial army the barbaric peoples dwelling on the outskirts of the
Empire. These gentiles or J'oederati made a perpetual treaty with the
Emperor, on receiving a promise of an annual subsidy (annorut). They
put their contingents at the disposal of the Roman dukes of the limes,
and their chiefs received from the Emperor's hands a kind of investiture,
as a sign of the Roman sovereignty, when they were given insignia to
denote their command, and titles from the Byzantine hierarchy. Thus
from the Syrtis to Mauretania there stretched a fringe of barbarian client
princes, acknowledging themselves as vassals of the basileus, and called—
Mauri pacifici. According to the expression of the African poet
Corippus, "trembling before the arms and success of Rome, of their own
accord they hastened to place themselves under the Roman yoke and
laws. '"
By carrying out the great work of reorganisation in Africa and Italy,
Justinian flattered himself that he had achieved the double object of
restoring the "complete peace" in the West and " repairing the disasters"
which war had heaped on the unhappy countries. It remains to be seen
how far his optimism was justified, and to reckon the price paid by the
inhabitants for the privilege of entering the Roman Empire once more.
In a celebrated passage of the Secret History Procopius has enumerated
## p. 23 (#53) ##############################################
Misgovernment 23
all the misfortunes which the imperial restoration brought on Africa and
Italy. According to the historian the country was depopulated, the
provinces left undefended and badly governed, ruined further by financial
exactions, religious intolerance, and military insurrections, while five
million human lives were sacrificed in Africa, and still more in Italy.
These were the benefits conferred in the West by the " glorious reign of
Justinian. 1" Although in crediting this account some allowance must be
made for oratorical exaggeration, yet it is certain that Africa and Italy
emerged from the many years of warfare to a great extent ruined, and
that a terrible economic and financial crisis accompanied the imperial
restoration. During many years Africa suffered all the horrors inci-
dent to Berber incursions, military revolts, destruction of the country
by sword and fire, and the murder and flight of the population. The
inevitable consequences of the struggle pressed no less hardly on Italy,
which underwent the horrors of long sieges, famine, massacre, disease,
the passage of the Goths, and the passage of imperialists, added to the
furious devastations of the Alemanni. The largest towns, such as
Naples, Milan, and specially Rome were almost devoid of inhabitants,
the depopulated country was uncultivated, and the large Italian pro-
prietors were repaid for their devotion to Byzantium and their hostility
to Totila by total ruin.
The exactions of the soldiers added yet more wretchedness. By their
greed, insolence and depredations the imperialists made those whom they
declared free regret the barbarian domination. The new administration
added the harshest financial tyranny to the misery caused by the war.
Justinian was obliged to get money at any cost, and therefore the barely
conquered country was given over to the pitiless exactions of the agents
of the fisc. The provinces were not only expected to support unaided
the expense of the very complicated administration imposed on them by
Justinian, but were further obliged to send money to Constantinople for
the general needs of the monarchy. The imperial logothetae applied the
burdensome system of Roman taxes to the ruined countries without
making any allowance for the prevailing distress. They mercilessly
demanded arrears dating from the time of the Goths, falsified the
registers in order to increase the returns, and enriched themselves at the
expense of the taxpayer to such an extent that, according to a
contemporary writer, "nothing remained for the inhabitants but to die,
since they were bereft of all the necessities of life. '"
Desolate, helpless, brought to the lowest straits, the Western
provinces begged the Emperor to help them in their misery if he did
not wish, to quote the official document, "that they should be overcome
by the impossibility of paying their debts. " Justinian heard this appeal.
Measures were taken in Africa to restore cultivation to the fields, the
country districts were repeopled, various works of public utility were
organised in the towns, ports were opened on the coasts, hydraulic
CH. I.
## p. 24 (#54) ##############################################
24 Results of Justinia? is Reign
works were supported or repaired in the interior of the land, and new
cities were founded in the wilds of the high Numidian plateau. Carthage
itself, newly adorned with a palace, churches, splendid baths and
fashionable squares, shewed the interest taken by the prince in his new
provinces. The result of all this was a real prosperity. Similar measures
were taken in Italy, either to tide over the crisis resulting from the mass
of debts and give time to the debtors, or to alleviate in some degree
the crushing burden of the taxes. At the same time the Emperor
busied himself in the restoration of the great aristocracy which had
been broken down by Totila, but to which he looked for the chief
support of the new regime. For a similar reason he protected and
enriched the Church, and set himself as' in Africa by means of the
development of public works to repair the evils of the war. Ravenna
was beautified by such buildings as San Vitale and San Apollinare in
Classe, and became a capital; Milan was raised from her ruins, Rome
was put in possession of privileges likely to lead to an economic revival,
and Naples became a great commercial port.
Unfortunately, in spite of Justinian's good intentions, the financial
burden weighed too heavily upon a depopulated Italy to allow of any
real revival. In the greater number of towns industry and commerce
disappeared; lack of implements hindered the improvement of the land,
and large uncultivated and desert tracts remained in the country. The
middle classes tended more and more to disappear, at the same time
that the aristocracy either became impoverished or left the country.
Justinian exerted himself in vain to restore order and prosperity by
promising to protect his new subjects from the well-known greed of his
officials: the imperial restoration marked, at any rate in Italy, the
beginning of a decadence which long darkened her history.
## p. 25 (#55) ##############################################
25
CHAPTER II.
JUSTINIAN'S GOVERNMENT IN THE EAST.
I.
At the time when Justinian was only heir-presumptive of the
Empire, probably in the year 520, he met the lady who was to become
the Empress Theodora. Daughter of one of the bear-keepers of the
hippodrome, brought up by an indulgent mother amongst the society
which frequented the purlieus of the circus, this young girl, beautiful,
intelligent and witty—if we may believe the gossip of the Secret History
—soon succeeded in charming and scandalising the capital. At the
theatre where she appeared in tableaux vivants and pantomimes she
ventured on the most audacious representations: in town she became
famous for the follies of her entertainments, the boldness of her manners
and the multitude of her lovers. Next she disappeared, and after a
somewhat unlovely adventure she travelled through the East in a
wretched manner for some time—according to contemporary gossip.
She was seen at Alexandria, where she became known to several of the
leaders of the Monophysite party, and returned—perhaps under their
influence—to a more Christian and purer mode of life. She was again
seen at Antioch, and then returned to Constantinople, matured and wiser.
Then it was that she made a conquest of Justinian. She soon wielded
the strongest influence over her lover: desperately in love, the prince
could refuse nothing that his mistress requested. He heaped riches
upon her, obtained for her the title of patrician, and became the humble
minister of her hatred or her affection. Finally he wished to marry her
legally, and was able to do so in 523, thanks to the complaisance of
Justin". When, in April 527, Justinian was associated in the Empire,
Thcothira shared the elevation and the triumph of her husband. She
ascenden the throne with him in August 527, and for twenty years the
adventuress-Empress exercised a sovereign influence on the course of
politics.
Theodora's name may still be read with that of the Emperor on the
walls of churches and over the doors of castles of that date. Her
picture makes a fellow to that of her imperial husband in the church of
## p. 26 (#56) ##############################################
26 The Empress Theodora [527-548
San Vitale in Ravenna, and also in the mosaics which decorated the
rooms of the Sacred Palace, for it was Justinian's wish to associate her
with the military triumphs and the splendours of the reign. The
grateful people raised statues to her as to Justinian, the officials also
swore fidelity to her, for she was the Emperor's equal throughout her
life, while ambassadors and foreign kings hastened to her to pay their
respects and to gain her good will as well as that of the basUeus. In
deliberating on the most important occasions Justinian always took
council of "the most honoured wife which God had given him," whom
he loved to call "his sweetest charm," and contemporaries agree in
declaring that she did not scruple to use the boundless influence which
she possessed, and that her authority was equal to, if not greater than,
that of her husband. Certainly this ambitious lady possessed many
eminent qualities to justify the supreme authority which she wielded.
She was a woman of unshaken courage, as she proved in the troublous
time of the Nika rising, proud energy, masculine resolution, a determined
and a clear mind, and a strong will by which she frequently overruled the
vacillating Justinian. She undoubtedly combined defects and even vices
with these qualities. She was domineering and harsh, she loved money
and power. To keep the throne to which she had risen she would stoop
to deceit, violence and cruelty; she was implacable in her dislikes, and
inflexible towards those whom she hated. By means of a disgraceful
intrigue she pitilessly destroyed the fortunes of John of Cappadocia, the
all-powerful praetorian praefect, who dared for one moment to dispute
her supremacy (541). She made Belisarius bitterly expiate his rare
lapses into independence, and by the ascendancy which she gained over
Antonina, the patrician's wife, she made him her humble and obedient
servant. As passionate in her loves as in her hates, she advanced
her favourites without scruple. Peter Barsymes was made praetorian
praefect, Narses a general, Vigilius a pope, while she turned the
imperial palace into a hotbed of incessant intrigues. Her influence was
not always good—though the loungers of Constantinople have strangely
lengthened the list of her cruelties and increased the number of her
victims—but it was always powerful. Even when she was forced
temporarily to give way before circumstances, her audacious and supple
wit was always able to devise some startling retaliation. Wily and
ambitious, she always aspired to have the last word—and she got it.
In the twenty years during which Theodora reigned she had a hand
in everything; in politics, and in the Church; in the administration,
she advised the reforms, and filled it with her proteges; in diplomacy,
concerning which the Emperor never decided anything without her
advice. She made and unmade popes and patriarchs, ministers and
generals at her pleasure, not even fearing, when she considered it
necessary, openly to thwart Justinian's wishes. She was the active help-
mate to her husband in all important matters. In the legislative reform
## p. 27 (#57) ##############################################
627-548] The Empress Theodora 27
her feminism inspired the measures which dealt with divorce, adultery,
the sanctity of the marriage-tie, and those meant to assist actresses and
fallen women. In the government of the East her lucid and keen
intelligence discovered-and advised, a policy more suited to the true
interests of the State than that actually pursued, and if it had been
carried out, it might have changed the course of history itself by
making the Byzantine Empire stronger and more durable.
While Justinian, carried away by the grandeur of Roman traditions,
rose to conceptions in turn magnificent and impossible, and dreamed of
restoring the Empire of the Caesars and of inaugurating the reign of
orthodoxy by reunion with Rome, Theodora, by birth an Oriental,
and in other respects more far-seeing and acute than her husband,
immediately turned her attention to the East, She had always
sympathised with the Monophysites; even before she had become
Empress she had willingly received them at the palace, and allowed
them to draw on her credit. She admired their teachers, and loved the
unpolished candour of their monks. She was not actuated by piety
alone, for she had too much political instinct not to realise the im-
portance of religious questions in a Christian State, and the peril
attending indifference to them. But while Justinian, with the mind of
a theologian, occupied himself with religious questions primarily for the
empty pleasure of being able to dogmatise, Theodora, like all the great
Byzantine Emperors, recognised the main features of political problems
under the fleeting form of theological disagreements. ( She realised that
the rich and flourishing provinces of Asia, Syria and Egypt really formed
the mainstay of the Empire; and she felt that the religious differences
by which the Oriental nations manifested their separatist tendencies
threatened danger to the monarchy/ Furthermore ihe saw the necessity
for pacifying the growing discontent by means ofyopportune concessions
and a wide toleration, and she forced the imperial policy to shape itself
to this end; and carried with her the ever worried and vacillating
Justinian, even so far as to brave the Papacy and protect the heretics.
It is only fair to say that she foresaw the future more clearly and
grasped the situation more accurately than did her imperial associate, |,
Before the advent of Justin's dynasty Anastasius' dreams of an ideal
monarchy may have taken this form or something approaching it. He
may have imagined an essentially Oriental Empire, having well-defended
frontiers, a wise administration, sound finances and blessed with religious
unity. To realise this last he would not have hesitated at a breach
with Rome if it had become necessary. In spite of his efforts and good
intentions Anastasius had not succeeded in realising his ideal. But it
was right in principle and, thanks to Theodora, it inspired the policy of
Justinian in the East. In this way the Empress made a great impression
on her husband's government, and as soon as she died a decay set in
which brought the glorious reign to a sad close.
## p. 28 (#58) ##############################################
I
First Persian War [527-531
II.
The imperial policy in the West had been essentially offensive. In
the East, on the other hand, it was generally restricted to a defensive
attitude. Justinian submitted to war or accepted it when offered rather
than sought it, because he was anxious to preserve all his forces for
Africa and Italy. /Thus he maintained the safety of the monarchy in the
East less by a series of great victories than by military arrangements
combined with clever diplomatic action. I
In Asia, Persia had been the perpetual enemy of the Romans for
centuries. There was a ceaseless temptation to strife and a pretext for
warfare in the coincidence of the two frontiers, and the rival influence
which the two States exercised in Armenia in the Caucasus, and among
the Arab tribes of the Syrian desert. The hundred years' peace
concluded in 422 had certainly restored tranquillity for the rest of the
fifth century, but hostilities had broken out afresh in the reign of
Anastasius (502); and it was evident that the peace of 505 would only
prove to be a truce, although Persia was torn by domestic discord, and
had lost her prestige and strength, and her old king Kawad did not yS
seek adventures. In proportion as Justinian profited by the relative "*
weakness of his foes he attempted to bring more peoples into the relation
of clients to Rome. Such were the populations of Lazica (the ancient
Colchis), the tribes of Iberia and Georgia, and even the Sabirian
Huns who occupied the celebrated defiles of the Caspian Gates at
the foot of the Caucasus range on the boundary of the two Empires.
With great skill (Byzantine diplomacy, by spreading Christianity in
those regions, had inclined the peoples to wish for the protection of
the orthodox Emperor, and so had obtained possession of important
strategic and commercial posig for Greek use. This policy of encroach-\
ment was bound to lead to a rupture, which came in 527, during the
last months of Justin's reignA
The war however was neither very long nor disastrous. Neither of
the two adversaries wanted to fight to the death. Kawad, who had
taken up arms, was distracted by domestic difficulties and the task of
assuring the succession of his son. Justinian wanted to disengage himself
as soon as possible in order to have his hands free to deal with affairs in
the West. Under these conditions the imperial army, which was of a
good size, and well commanded by Belisarius, was able to snatch a signal
victory at Dara in 530, the first victory won against Persia for many
years. Another general was able to make considerable progress in
Persian Armenia at the same time, but Justinian did not set himself
seriously to profit by his successes. The next year a Persian invasion of
Syria forced Belisarius to engage in and to lose the disastrous battle of
Callinicum (531). Then, in spite of the fact that the Persians were
## p. 29 (#59) ##############################################
531-544] Second Persian War 29
besieging Martyropolis (581) and that a career of pillage had brought
the Huns under the very walls of Antioch (December 531), the Great
King troubled as little to push his advantages as the Emperor did
to avenge his defeat. Negotiations were as important in this war as
military operations. When therefore in September 531 the death of
Kawiid gave the throne to his son Chosroes I Anoushirvan, the new
sovereign was preoccupied by the endeavour to consolidate his power at
home, and willingly joined in the negotiations which ended in the
conclusion of an "everlasting peace," in September 532. Justinian was
delighted to end the war, and gave way on almost every point. He
agreed to pay once more the annual subsidy which the Romans had
handed over to the Persians to keep up the fortresses which defended
the passes of the Caucasus against the Northern barbarians. This was
a large sum of 110,000 pounds of gold, a thinly veiled form of tribute.
He promised to move the residence of the Duke of Mesopotamia from
Dara, the great fortress built by Anastasius in 507, to Constantina,
which was further from the frontier; and he abandoned the protectorate
over Iberia. In return the country of the Lazi remained within the
sphere of Byzantine influence, and the Persians evacuated the fortresses
in it.
But Chosroes was not the man to rest contented with these first
successes. He was a young prince, ambitious, active and anxious for
conquests. It was not without suspicion that he viewed the progress and
success of the imperial ambition, for he knew that the longing for
universal dominion might well form a menace to the Sassanid monarchy,
as well as to the West. He therefore made use of the years which followed
the peace of 532 to reconstruct his army, and when he saw what seemed
to him a favourable opportunity, he resolutely began the war again (540).
This happened when he discovered that the Roman frontier was stripped
of troops, Armenia and the country of the Lazi discontented under
Byzantine rule, and the Goths at bay after the Vandals were conquered.
At the beginning of hostilities he threw himself on Syria, which he
cruelly ravaged, and seized Antioch, which he completely ruined under
the eyes of the helpless Roman generals. In vain Justinian sent the
best generals against him, first Germanus and then Belisarius, hastily
recalled from Italy at the beginning of 541. Their troops were not
sufficient to defend the country effectively. In 541, Chosroes attacked
Lazica, reduced Iberia and swept away the strong fortress of Petra, which
Justinian had lately built to the south of Phasis. In 542 he ravaged
Commagene; in 543 he made a demonstration on the Armenian frontier;
and in 544 he again appeared in Mesopotamia which he ravaged cruelly,
in spite of the heroic resistance of Edessa. Meanwhile the imperial
troops did nothing: and the generals spent their time in intrigues
instead of in fighting. The military prestige of Belisarius had made
Chosroes give way for a brief space, but the general was absorbed in his
## p. 30 (#60) ##############################################
30 Second Persian War [542-561
domestic troubles, and let slip the time when he should have taken the
offensive with vigour; and by so doing more or less justified the disgrace
which soon overtook him through Theodora's ill-will (542). The only
military enterprise undertaken in 543 by Justinian's army was the invasion
of Persian Armenia, with more than 30,000 men, and it led to a great
disaster. The Emperor was seriously concerned with events in Italy
—Totila had just reconquered nearly the whole peninsula—and he was
very lucky to be able to buy with gold a truce for five years, instead of
a final peace (545). Thanks to the renewal of this convention in 551
and 552 the Asiatic provinces enjoyed tranquillity once more, though
the war continued in Lazica for many years afterwards.
It was an easy matter for the diplomacy of the two Empires to win
allies from amongst the belligerent tribes of the Caucasus, since their
good faith was always an uncertain quantity. While the Lazi, who were
discontented under the Persian tyranny, returned to Justinian in 549,
other peoples who had formerly been within the Byzantine sphere of
influence now attached themselves to Chosroes. Furthermore the war
seemed unending in a country rendered almost impassable by mountains
and forests. A struggle was maintained for several years over Petra.
Taken by the Persians in 541, it was attacked in vain by the Byzantines
in 549, and was only finally regained in 551. Other places were attacked
and defended with equal tenacity. Justinian realised the importance of
possessing a region which would enable him to deprive the Persians of
an outlet on the Black Sea, and therefore he made unheard-of efforts to
keep it.
He concentrated as many as 50,000 men there in 552. Finally
Chosroes saw the uselessness of the interminable strife; and the armistice
of 555 was turned into a definite treaty in 561. Peace was declared
for fifty years, and the Persians agreed to evacuate Lazica, where they
knew that their power could hardly be maintained, since the people were
enthusiastically Christian. But the Emperor's success was dearly bought.
He bound himself to pay an annual tribute of 30,000 aurei, handing
over the sum-total for the first seven years in advance. He promised
for the future to discontinue any religious propaganda in the dominions
of the Great King, in return for the extension of toleration to Christians
in Persia. These concessions dealt a blow at Justinian's pride as an
Emperor and a Christian. However, Lazica remained to him, and it
was a considerable gain in the direction of securing the safety of the
Empire. Still the treaty was intentionally so vague in some points that
it contained the beginnings of many future difficulties.
While Roman Asia was cruelly suffering from these endless wars, the
European provinces were not escaping. Although the shock of the great
barbarian invasions had shaken the East much less than the West, a
succession of barbarian peoples were settled north of the Danube. The
Lombards, Heruls and Gepidae were on the west; Slavs and Bulgars,
Antae and Huns on the lower reaches of the river, while behind them
\
## p. 31 (#61) ##############################################
527-562] The Huns 31
lay the strong nation of Avars, still roving to the north of the Palus
Maeotis but gradually spreading themselves westward. The Empire
proved as attractive to these barbarians as to those who had invaded
the West. They had all one wish and one aim—some day to become
members of the rich and civilised commonwealth, whose towns were
fair, whose fields were fertile, and in which men received great treasures
and honour from the hand of the Emperor. Without doubt these
sentiments were largely inspired by greed of the splendid plunder that
the Roman territory offered to the enterprise of the barbarians, and if
their peaceful offers were declined they did not hesitate to keep their
vows by the use of force. Thus, at the end of the fifth century the
tribes had formed the habit of crossing the Danube periodically, either
in unnoticed driblets, or by sudden invasions, and certain groups were
legally settled on the south side of the river by the beginning of the
sixth century. The movement continued during the whole of Justinian's
reign.
From the beginning of his reign the Huns had appeared in Thrace
and the Antae in Illyricum; but they were repulsed with such energy
that, according to Malalas, "a great terror overcame the barbarian
nations. " Soon however the resistance gave way. As had been the
case in Asia, the frontier was denuded of troops in consequence of the
expeditions to the West, and the boldness of the invaders increased.
In 534 the Slavs and Bulgars crossed the Danube, and the magister
militum of Thrace perished in the attempt to drive them back. In 538
the Huns invaded Scythia and Moesia, in 540 they went further and
ravaged Thrace, Illyricum and Greece as far as the Isthmus of Corinth.
One of their bands even penetrated to the environs of Constantinople,
and spread a terrible panic in the capital. In 546 there was another
Hunnish invasion, in 547 an attack from the Slavs who devastated
Illyricum as far as Dyrrachium, while the imperial generals did not even
dare to face them. In 551 a band of three thousand Slavs pillaged
Thrace and Illyricum and advanced as far as the Aegean Sea. In 552
the Slavs and Antae menaced Thessalonica and settled themselves on
Byzantine land as though they had conquered it. In 558 the Kotrigur
Huns pushed into Thrace, one of their bands reaching Thermopylae,
while another appeared under the walls of Constantinople, which was
only just saved by the courage of the old Belisarius. In 562 the
Huns reappeared. Then the insolent and menacing Avars became
prominent, on the very eve of Justinian's death. It is quite certain that
none of these incursions would have led to the permanent establishment
of a barbarian people within the limits of the Empire, as had happened
in the West, for the imperial generals were always finally successful in
hurling the swarms of invaders back over the Danube. At the same
time the incessant scourge could not fail to produce lamentable
consequences in the provinces which suffered from it. Procopius
## p. 31 (#62) ##############################################
22 Administration in Africa
keep a sharp watch on the roads crossing the lime*; in time of war they
took up arms either to defend the post specially committed to their
charge, or combined with similar troops to beat back the invader. In
either case they might never leave the limes, as perpetual military service
was the necessary condition of their tenure of land. These tenant-
soldiers were empowered to marry, grouped in regiments commanded by
tribunes, and stationed in the fortified towns and castles on the frontier.
This kind of territorial army, organised by Justinian along all the
borders of the Empire, enabled him to reduce the strength of the troops
of the line, and keep them for big wars. A close-drawn net of fortresses
supported this formation. In Africa, specially, where the Vandals had
razed the fortifications of nearly all the towns, Justinian's lieutenants
had an enormous task before them. No point was left undefended, and
in Byzacena and Numidia several parallel lines of fortresses served to
block all openings, cover all positions of strategic importance, and offer
a refuge to the surrounding population in time of dangerA A number
of fortresses were built or restored from Tripolitana to the Pillars of
Hercules, where stood Septem "that the whole world could not take,"
and from the Aures and Hodna to Tell. Even to-day North Africa
abounds in the colossal ruins of Justinian's fortresses, and the hardly
dismantled ramparts of Haidra, Beja, Madaura, Tebessa and Timgad, to
cite no more, bear witness to the great effort by which, in a few years,
Justinian restored the Roman system of defence. Furthermore, in
following the example set by Rome, Justinian tried to incorporate in
the imperial army the barbaric peoples dwelling on the outskirts of the
Empire. These gentiles or J'oederati made a perpetual treaty with the
Emperor, on receiving a promise of an annual subsidy (annona). They
put their contingents at the disposal of the Roman dukes of the limes,
and their chiefs received from the Emperor's hands a kind of investiture,
as a sign of the Roman sovereignty, when they were given insignia to
denote their command, and titles from the Byzantine hierarchy. Thus
from the Syrtis to Mauretania there stretched a fringe of barbarian client
princes, acknowledging themselves as vassals of the basileus, and called—
Mauri pacifici. According to the expression of the African poet
Corippus, "trembling before the arms and success of Rome, of their own
accord they hastened to place themselves under the Roman yoke and
laws. "
By carrying out the great work of reorganisation in Africa and Italy,
Justinian flattered himself that he had achieved the double object of
restoring the "complete peace" in the West and " repairing the disasters n
which war had heaped on the unhappy countries. It remains to be seen
how far his optimism was justified, and to reckon the price paid by the
inhabitants for the privilege of entering the Roman Empire once more.
In a celebrated passage of the Secret History Procopius has enumerated
## p. 31 (#63) ##############################################
Misgovernment 23
all the misfortunes which the imperial restoration brought on Africa and
Italy. According to the historian the country was depopulated, the
provinces left undefended and badly governed, ruined further by financial
exactions, religious intolerance, and military insurrections, while five
million human lives were sacrificed in Africa, and still more in Italy.
These were the benefits conferred in the West by the " glorious reign of
Justinian. '" Although in crediting this account some allowance must be
made for oratorical exaggeration, yet it is certain that Africa and Italy
emerged from the many years of warfare to a great extent ruined, and
that a terrible economic and financial crisis accompanied the imperial
restoration. During many years Africa suffered all the horrors inci-
dent to Berber incursions, military revolts, destruction of the country
by sword and fire, and the murder and flight of the population. The
inevitable consequences of the struggle pressed no less hardly on Italy,
which underwent the horrors of long sieges, famine, massacre, disease,
the passage of the Goths, and the passage of imperialists, added to the
furious devastations of the Alemanni. The largest towns, such as
Naples, Milan, and specially Rome were almost devoid of inhabitants,
the depopulated country was uncultivated, and the large Italian pro-
prietors were repaid for their devotion to Byzantium and their hostility
to Totila by total ruin.
The exactions of the soldiers added yet more wretchedness. By their
greed, insolence and depredations the imperialists made those whom they
declared free regret the barbarian domination. The new administration
added the harshest financial tyranny to the misery caused by the war.
Justinian was obliged to get money at any cost, and therefore the barely
conquered country was given over to the pitiless exactions of the agents
of the fisc. The provinces were not only expected to support unaided
the expense of the very complicated administration imposed on them by
Justinian, but were further obliged to send money to Constantinople for
the general needs of the monarchy. The imperial logoihetae applied the
burdensome system of Roman taxes to the ruined countries without
making any allowance for the prevailing distress. They mercilessly
demanded arrears dating from the time of the Goths, falsified the
registers in order to increase the returns, and enriched themselves at the
expense of the taxpayer to such an extent that, according to a
contemporary writer, "nothing remained for the inhabitants but to die,
since they were bereft of all the necessities of life. '"
Desolate, helpless, brought to the lowest straits, the Western
provinces begged the Emperor to help them in their misery if he did
not wish, to quote the official document, "that they should be overcome
by the impossibility of paying their debts. " Justinian heard this appeal.
Measures were taken in Africa to restore cultivation to the fields, the
country districts were repeopled, various works of public utility were
organised in the towns, ports were opened on the coasts, hydraulic
## p. 32 (#64) ##############################################
32 Justinian's Fortresses
estimates that more than 200,000 people were either slain or led
captive during its course. He also compares the annually ravaged
lands to the "Scythian deserts,1'' and tells how the folk were forced
to flee to the forests and mountains to avoid the outrages and
atrocities which the barbarians would have inflicted upon them.
However, in Asia as in Europe, Justinian had taken wise and
vigorous measures to secure the defence of his provinces, to give them,
as he said, "peace and tranquillity,11 and to remove the "temptation to
invade and ravage the countries where the Emperor's subjects dwelt **
from the barbarians. With this object of efficiency in view he re-
organised the great military commands which were created to guard
the frontier. In Asia one general, the magister militum of the East,
had commanded the enormous district reaching from the Black Sea
to Egypt. This command was too large, and Justinian divided it,
_cjnstiiuting magistri militum for Armenia and Mesopotamia. In
Europe he added a magister militum of Moesia to those of Illyricum
and Thrace. But above all, for the immediate defence of the frontier
he organised all along the limes military districts commanded by
duces and occupied by special troops, the limitanei. We have already
seen how the duties and divisions of this formation were determined
in Africa. The same system was extended to the whole Empire, and
a large strip of military lands round its whole circumference assured
the safety of the interior. Although several of these limites were in
existence before the time of Justinian, he had the merit of organising
and completing the whole system. Three limites were formed in Egypt,
several commands were halved in Syria and on the Euphrates, and duces
were established in Armenia, while others kept watch on the Danube, in
Scythia, in the two Moesias and in Dacia. Thus the barbarians were
again confronted with the opposing wall that used to be called "the
"^monarchy's wrapper" (praetentura imperii).
•i Justinian also busied himself in building a continuous chain of
fortresses along all the frontiers, as he had done in Africa. Rome had
formerly been forced to undertake the immediate defence of the frontiers
of the Empire in order to protect her territories. Justinian did more.
Behind the first line of castella, and attached to them by a succession of
stations, he built a series of large fortresses placed further apart, and
more important. These served to strengthen the frontier castles, made
a second barrier against invasion, and were a place of refuge for the
inhabitants of the country. Thus the whole district was covered with
strong castles. They were of unequal importance and strength, but
they kept a watch on the enemy's territory, occupied points of strategic
importance, barred the defiles, commanded the important routes,
protected the safety of the towns and sheltered the rural population.
They covered all the provinces with a close-meshed net of fortresses, a
## p. 33 (#65) ##############################################
Justinian's Buildings 33
network through which it seemed impossible for the enemy to slip. It
had taken only a few years for Justinian's resolution to raise or repair
hundreds of fortresses, from the Danube to the Armenian mountains, and
to the banks of the Euphrates. If ancient Roman posts were merely
repaired at some points, while at others it was only necessary to complete
buildings begun by Anastasius, yet the dazed admiration which con-
temporaries seem to have felt for this colossal work was justified, for
Justinian gave unity to the whole system and displayed the greatest
energy in carrying it out. According to Procopius, by it he truly
"saved the monarchy. "
In his De Aedificiis Procopius gives the detailed list of the countless
buildings repaired or built by the Emperor's orders. Here it must
suffice to notice the chief features of the work. On the Danube more
^ than eighty castles were built or restored between the place where the
Save enters that river and the Black Sea. Among them may be men-
tioned Singidunum (Belgrade), Octavum, Viminacium, Novae, further to
the east Ratiaria, Augusta, Securisca, Durostorum (Silistria), Troesmis,
and, on the left bank, the strongly fortified bridge of Lederata. These
were for the most part ancient Roman citadels newly repaired.
Justinian's original work consisted chiefly in the measures which he took
^-* to strengthen the rear. Hundreds of castella sprang up in Dacia,
Dardania, and Moesia, further south in Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace.
Thus there was a second and even a third line of defence. In Dardania
S" alone, Justinian's native country, Procopius enumerates more than one
hundred and fifty castella besides such great posts as Justiniana Prima,
Sardica and Naissus. Fortifications were even constructed on the shore
^ of the Sea of Marmora and the Archipelago. To protect Constantinople
Anastasius had built the Long Wall in 512. It ran from the Sea of
Marmora to Selymbria on . the Black Sea. Similar long walls covered the
Thracian Chersonesus, barred the passes of Thermopylae, and cut across
the Isthmus of Corinth. Fortresses were also raised in Thessaly and
northern Greece. Thus the whole of the Balkan peninsula formed a
vast entrenched camp. On the side of the Euxine long walls protected
the approaches to Cherson, and the strong castle of Petra Justiniana
defended Lazica. Then several lines of fortresses were drawn up from
Trebizond to the Euphrates. In Armenia there was Theodosiopolis
(now Erzeroum), Kitharizon and Martyropolis; in Mesopotamia Amida,
Constantina, Dara, called "the rampart of the Roman Empire," and
another Theodosiopolis; Circesium was on the Euphrates and Zenobia
and Palmyra on the borders of the desert. Added to these there were
the intermediate castella which connected the big fortresses. A little to
the rear, in the second line, were Satala, Coloneia, Nicopolis, Sebaste,
Melitene, "the bulwark of Armenia," Edessa, Carrhae, Callinicum in
Osrhoene, Sura, Hierapolis, Zeugma in the Euphrates district, and
Antioch after the catastrophe of 540. These made a formidable field
C. MED. H. VOL. II. CH. II. 3
## p. 34 (#66) ##############################################
34 Justinian s Diplomacy
for warfare. It is certain that all these buildings do not date from
Justinian's reign, but he must have the credit of combining them all
into a sure and splendid defensive system.
Military methods alone were not employed for the defence of the
Empire in the East. The imperial diplomacy was putting forth all its
powers to that end, and displayed wonderful skill and ingenuity in the
task. The Empire always possessed a great influence over the bar-
barians settled on the Roman frontiers. They were proud when their
services and good faith won for them the approval of the basileus. They
gladly placed their forces at his disposal when they received the annual
subsidy (annona), and became the auxiliaries and vassals of the Empire,
bearing the name of foederati. Their chiefs felt themselves honoured
when they received the splendid insignia of their commands from the
hands of the basileus. They gladly adorned themselves with titles culled
from the hierarchy of the palace, and hastened to declare themselves to be
"Slaves of the imperial Majesty. " Constantinople and the Court dazzled
their simple minds, they flocked there gladly, and it was easy for the
Emperor by the mere splendour of their reception to impress them with
a great idea of the strength of the monarchy. During the whole
of Justinian's reign the Sacred Palace was filled with a never-ending
succession of strange and barbaric sovereigns. Heruls, Huns, Gepidae,
Avars, Saracens, Axumitae, Lazi, Iberians, men of every race and of every
land, with their wives and children and their retinue in picturesque
garments, filled the capital with a babel of all the tongues in the
universe. They were loaded with honours, presents, and magnificent
demonstrations of affection, and returned to their native wilds dazzled
by the spectacle of the imperial majesty. Naturally they felt them-
selves only too happy to be allowed to serve this basileus who gave
so warm a welcome to his faithful servitors, and recompensed them so
generously.
Thus by the clever distribution of favours and money the Emperor
was able to maintain a fringe of barbarian clients on all his frontiers.
At the same time the authorities at Byzantium never forgot that the
fickle and perfidious allies might prove to be dangerous servants because
of their indiscipline, faithlessness and greed. The imperial diplomacy
watched them with an eagle eye, skilfully treating them with a mixture
of sternness and leniency; and endeavouring tfi render them harmless by
the policy of setting them against each other, and fostering rivalry and
hatred amongst them^XJustinian maintained a possible rival to every
barbarian king, he had always a hostile people waiting his word to
descend on every other people. The Lombards menaced the Gepidae,
the Utigurs the Kotrigurs, the Avars the Huns. Thus, as Agathias
wrote, " so long as the barbarians destroyed each other, the Emperor was
always victor without drawing his sword, no matter what was the end of
## p. 35 (#67) ##############################################
Justinian's Diplomacy 35
the struggle. " Formerly Rome had found the same methods necessary
to govern the barbarians. Byzantium was able to add to the Roman
traditions the influence which she wielded because of her propagation of
Christianity. \Her missionaries worked for the consolidation of the
imperial power as effectively as her diplomatists. They opened a road
for politicians, and prepared new territories for Byzantine influence and
civilisation. Thanks to them conversions increased everywhere, from
the plains of southern Russia to the Abyssinian plateau, and from the
Caucasus Mountains to the oases of the Sahara.
By means of Christianity Byzantine influence spread beyond the
boundaries of the Empire in Justinian's reign, and many were the peoples
affected by it; Huns from the Cimmerian Bosphorus, Souanians, Abasgi,
Apsilians from the Caucasus district, Alans, and Sabirian Huns, Tzani
from the upper Euphrates, Arabs from Syria, Himyarites from Yemen,
Nobadae and Blemmyes from the upper Nile, Berbers from the oases of
the Sahara, and Heruls from Moesia.
By these means Justinian was able to checkmate his enemies. In the
East he sought amongst the Sabirian Huns for allies against the Sassanid
monarchy, because they could rush upon the Persian realm from the
north. He also went to the Arabs of the Syrian desert because they
might make useful diversions from the south, and he formed them into
a unique State, under the phylarchiw Harith the Ghassanid(531). Not
content with this, he went yet further and made friends among the Arabs
on the Yemen and in the Ethiopian kingdom of Axum. In the West
he skilfully managed to sow discord amongst the tribes who crowded on
the Danube frontier, checking the Bulgars by the Huns, the Huns by the
Antae, and the Antae and Utigurs by the Avars. He scattered money
and lands liberally amongst them all, loading their ambassadors with
silken robes and golden chains, in return for which he only asked them
to supply Byzantium with soldiers. In this way he settled the Lombards
in Pan noma, the Heruls in Dacia, and the Kotrigur Huns in Thrace.
He offered the Avars lands suitable for settlement on the Save, and
similarly managed to procure a number of vassals on all the frontiers of
the Empire. On the Danube there were the Heruls, Gepidae, Lombards,
Huns and Antae; on the borders of Armenia, the Lazi and Tzani; on
the Syrian frontier the crowd of Arab tribes; in Africa the Berber
inhabitants of Byzacena, Numidia and Mauritania.
Thus with wonderful skill Justinian exercised the difficult art of
ruling barbarians, and he did it from the depth of his palace and capital.
Contemporaries waxed eloquent in praise of the prudence, the fairness
and delicacy displayed by the Emperor in carrying out this policy, and
in celebrating that evfiovXLa by which, according to Menander, "he
would have destroyed the barbarians without fighting if he had lived
long enough. 11 However this policy was not without its dangers. UJy
displaying the riches of the Empire to the barbarians, and by lavishly
ch. ii. 3—2
t^
## p. 36 (#68) ##############################################
36 Defects of Justinian's Diplomacy
distributing money and lands amongst them, their demands were
naturally increased enormously, and their invasions provoked\ Procopius
very wisely observed that " once they had tasted Byzantine"wealth it was
impossible to keep them from it, or to make them forget the road to it. "
The obvious antidote for the dangers of this course of diplomacy was a
strong military organisation. Procopius again wrote "there is no other
way of compelling the barbarians to keep faith with Rome except by the
fear of the imperial armies. " Justinian understood this quite well.
Unfortunately, in proportion as the West again absorbed the resources
and attention of the Empire, lack of money led to the disorganisation
of those military institutions which had been formed to protect the East.
Corps of limitanei were disbanded, the fighting force of the troops of the
line in Syria was diminished, strong positions were left undefended,
often bereft of garrisons altogether, and Justinian's excellent network of
fortresses no longer sufficed to keep out the barbarians. The Emperor
seemed to prefer diplomatic action by itself to the practical military
precautions that he had applied so actively at the beginning of his reign.
He thought it more clever to buy off the invaders than to beat them by
force of arms, he considered it cheaper to subsidise the barbarians than
to maintain a large army on a war footing; he found it more agreeable
to direct a subtle diplomacy than great military operations, and he never
realised that the first result of his policy was to encourage the barbarians
in rr>t,iirn\ .
This was the fundamental defect of Justinian's foreign policy in the
East. It rested on a skilful combination of military force and diplomacy.
As long as the balance was maintained between these two elements
equilibrium was secured, the end aimed at was attained, and the Empire
was well defended and comparatively safe. But when this balance was
upset, everything went wrong at once. The Slavs appeared at Hadrianople,
the Huns under the walls of Constantinople, while the Avars assumed a
threatening attitude and regions of the Balkans were terribly ravaged.
Procopius was justified when he reproached Justinian with having "wasted
the riches of the Empire in extravagant gifts to. the barbarians," and in
his assertion that the Emperor's rash generosity only incited them to
return perpetually "to sell the peace for which they were always well
paid. " The historian goes on to explain that "after them came others,
who made a double profit, from the rapine in which they indulged and
from the money with which the liberality of the prince always furnished
them. Thus the evil continued with no abatement, and there was no
escape from the vicious circle. "
This mistaken policy cost the Empire dear. Nevertheless, it was
founded on a right principle, and some of the results which it
produced were not to be despised, in connexion with the defence of
territory, the development of commerce, or the spread of civilisation.
Justinian's mistake—specially during the last years of his reign—lay in
## p. 37 (#69) ##############################################
Domestic Government 37
the fact that he carried the system to excess. When he allowed the
army to become disorganised and fortresses to fall into ruin he bereft
his diplomacy of the force that was necessary to support his plans.
When he ceased to awe the barbarians he found himself at their mercy.
III.
The domestic government of the East took up as much of Justinian's
attention as the defence of the territory. /The urgent need for adminis-
trative reform in the, midst of a serious religious crisis provided ample
food for his anxiety,
In Byzantium lie salej)fjpublic offices was an ancient custom, and
this venality led to deplorable results. The governors expected to recoup
themselves from the province for the expenses which they incurred in
obtaining their posts, and to enrich themselves to as great an extent as
possible while they held them. The other agents in so corrupt an
administration only followed the governor's example, when they pillaged
and crushed the district to their heart's content. The__financial system
was oppressive and exacting; justice was sold or partially administered,
and deep misery and general insecurity was the natural result. The
people left the country, the towns were emptied, the fields deserted, and
agriculture abandoned. While those who were strong or rich enough to
defend themselves managed to escape the exactions of the tax-collector,
the great proprietors maintained troops of armed men in their pay, and
ravaged the country, attacked people and seized land, sure of immunity
from the magistrates. Everywhere murder, brigandage, agitation and
risings abounded, and last and most serious result of all the disorders,
thej-eturnsj>f thejaxfis-from the exhausted provinces were but scanty.
Justinian calculated that only one-third of the taxes imposed really
reached the treasury, and the misery of the subjects destroyed the source
of the public wealth. It will be easy to understand why the Emperor felt
so much concern at affairs in the East, if we add that the laws abounded
in contradictions, obscurities and useless prolixity, which gave rise to
very long law-suits, and furnished an opportunity for the j udges to give
arbitrary decisions, or to decide matters to suit their own convenience.
Justinian, as we know, had the qualities that go to make a good
administrator. He loved order, he had a sincere wish to do good work,
and a real care for the well-being of his subjects. With an authoritative
disposition and absolutist tendencies, he combined a taste for adminis-
trative centralisation. But above all, his vast projects left him incessantly
in need of large sums of money. He saw that the best way to ensure
the regularity of the returns was to protect those who paid from the
functionaries who ruined them; and thus in furthering the well-being
and quiet of his subjects the Emperor was also serving the best interests
## p. 38 (#70) ##############################################
38 Justinians Legislation [533-636
of the fisc.
