No More Learning

6 Memorandum of conversation, 19 and 20 July, 1873 (idem, 675).
6 Telegram to the secretary of state, 24 July, 1873 (idem, 482).
6


## p. 411 (#449) ############################################

ARGYLL'S MISMANAGEMENT
411
a
might have proved decisive in the development of the Central Asian
question. Its rejection was as decisive as its adoption might have been.
The Duke of Argyll at the India Office, and a majority of the Council
of India, were convinced adherents of the Lawrence policy. Mr Glad-
stone's first cabinet, then in office, combined a detestation of Russian
government with a curious tolerance of its expansion. It was, therefore,
resolved to reject Northbrook's proposal, on the ground that the amir
had no real cause for alarm, and to limit the governor-general's
assurances to a declaration that “we shall maintain our settled policy
a
in Afghanistan". 1 This decision was well-meant. But its authors
lacked imagination to perceive that it could not appear reassuring to
Sher 'Ali. To him it could mean nothing but a continuation of the
Lawrence policy of helping those who no longer needed assistance.
This criticism which Cranbrook passed in 1878 on his predecessor's
management of the situation seems amply justified. 2
The ill-effects produced by the abortive Simla conference were
emphasised by two other occurrences. The Government of India had
undertaken the thankless task of arbitrating on the boundary claims
of the Persians and Afghans in Seistan. This was a most ill-advised
measure. It may have been desirable that a long-standing subject of
dispute between the two states should be removed. But the more
equitable the decision, the more certain would it be to irritate both
the shah and the amir, for each would feel that his interests had been
neglected. At a moment when the influence of Russia was visibly
waxing, the Government of India would have done well to avoid
needless causes of friction between itself and its Western neighbour.
But the arbitration was held; the decision went in some details against
Afghanistan; and both sides resented British impartiality as a sub-
stantial measure of injustice.
Worse still, Sher 'Ali installed one of his sons, Abdullah Jan, as heir
apparent, in supersession of an elder son, Yakub, who, according to
the Afghan custom, was rebelling against his father. When this
selection was communicated to the Government of India, the answer
was "designedly couched, as nearly as circumstances admit, in the
same language as that in which in 1858 the Punjab Government were
instructed to reply to the letter from Dost Mahomed Khan intimating
the selection of Shere Ali as heir apparent”. 5 Perhaps the government
was wise to desire not to commit itself to the support of a future
claimant who might prove to be incapable. But it blundered in
suggesting to Sher Ali that his favourite son could look for no greater
assistance than he himself had received before imprisonment, death
or exile had freed him from his own rivals.
1 Telegram to Nore: brook, 26 July, 1873 (Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 482). • Idem, 636.
• Cf. Sir F. J. Golasmid, Eastern Persia, 2 vols. 1876; Parl. Papers, 1868–9, XLVI, 483-6.
The original reports are in F. O. 60--392, 393.
• Cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam, s. v. Abdur-rahman.
5 Dispatch to Argyll, 23 January, 1874 (Parl. Papers, 1868–9, XLVI, 491).


## p. 412 (#450) ############################################

412
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
Disappointed alike by the complaisance with which the British
Government seemed to regard the Russian advance, by the lack of
special favour shown by the Seistan decision, and by the refusal to
recognise Abdullah Jan as the future amir, Sher 'Ali naturally, if
imprudently, concluded that he must make his own terms with
Russia; and circumstances conspired not only to assist him in doing
so but also to deprive him of Russian help as soon as he had committed
himself to Russia. The Russians met him more than half
way.
Afghanistan might lie outside the sphere of Russian interests; but it
had become a neighbour of the Russian Empire; and intercourse
could easily be explained away as a mere matter of frontier courtesy.
So at first it was. In 1870 Kaufmann, the governor-general of
Russian Turkestan, informed Sher 'Ali that, although his nephew
Abd-ur-rahman had taken refuge in Tashkent, he would receive no
assistance to wage war against his uncle. 3 This letter on its receipt
was forwarded by Sher 'Ali to the Government of India, which in
answer cited “the repeated assurances we have received from the
Russian Government” and suggested that Kaufmann's letters "will
doubtless be, when rightly viewed, a source of satisfaction and an
additional ground of confidence". 4 When Sher 'Ali announced the
nomination of Abdullah Jan, the Russian answered much more tact-
fully than the English governor-general, that "such nominations tend
to the comfort and tranquillity of the kingdom”. 5 From 1875 the
interchange of letters became more frequent. Such as transpired were
letters of compliment. But it was disquieting to watch the coming and
going of the bearers without any real knowledge of what was passing
behind the scenes. 6
Moreover from 1874 these political events were being watched with
greater jealousy and suspicion. In that year Gladstone's cabinet was
succeeded by Disraeli's, Salisbury displaced Argyll at the India Office,
and before long Lytton succeeded Northbrook as governor-general.
The change involved a sharp swing of foreign policy both in Europe
and in Asia. Disraeli was convinced that the late cabinet had lowered
the influence of Great Britain in the world, especially by acquiescing
easily and without due question in the explanations of its Central Asia
policy offered by the Russian Foreign Office. He feared that unless
precautions were taken Great Britain would suddenly find herself in
a position of great political and strategic disadvantage. These views
were fully shared by Salisbury and Lytton. Nor was this surprising.
Of recent years Russian conduct had been most ambiguous. In
January, 1873, for instance, Schuvaloff, who had been sent on a
1 Cf. Lady Betty Balfour, Lytton's Indian Administration, p. 10.
2 Cf. Yakub's statements to Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, il, 247.
3 Kaufmann to Sher 'Ali, 28 March, 1870 (Parl. Papers, 1881, XCVIII, 335).
• Dispatch to Argyll, 24 June, 1870 (Parl. Papers, 1878, LXXX, 633).
5 Parl, Papers, 1881, XCVII, 343.
• Cf. telegram to Salisbury, 16 September, 1876 (Parl. Papers, 1878, LXXX, 533).


## p. 413 (#451) ############################################

RUSSIAN ADVANCES
413
special mission to England, was assuring Granville that he might
safely assure parliament that the emperor had issued positive orders
against the occupation of Khiva. 1 Within a year Granville was com-
plaining that Khiva had become a Russian province under a most
thinly disguised protectorate. His remonstrances 3 produced a de-
claration in March, 1874, that no expeditions were contemplated
against the Tekke Turkomans, and that the emperor had peremptorily
forbidden such a measure. On 10 May following General Lomakin
was appointed military governor of a new southern province and
promptly issued a circular to all the Turkoman tribes in that area
claiming supreme authority over them. The imperial government
asserted that the circular had been misunderstood. 5 Just before
Lytton set out for India the Russian ambassador conveyed to him the
curious suggestion that Great Britain and Russia should unite to
disarm the Muslim states of Central Asia. A little earlier Kaufmann
had been lamenting the hostility of Muslim opinion against Russian
administration.
Meanwhile Kaufmann's correspondence with Sher 'Ali had in-
creased rapidly. Lytton called attention to the fact that whereas the
amir had at first sought the advice of the British Government con-
cerning the replies which should be sent to Kaufmann's letters, he
now had ceased to do so and was reported to be holding secret con-
ferences with the bearers. ? The British Foreign Office therefore sought
from St Petersburg “a written disclaimer of any intention on their
part to negotiate treaties with Sher 'Ali without the consent of Her
Majesty's Government”. 8 St Petersburg declared with great em-
phasis that Kaufmann's letters were merely complimentary. ' But
Salisbury found it difficult to accept these assurances, and asked that
the correspondence might be wholly discontinued. 10 The Russian
Government tacitly refused this request. 11 The Government of India
thus summed up the position:
9
The messages from General Kaufmann have not been despatched. . . only once
or twice a year. During the past year they have been incessant. The bearers of
them are regarded and treated by the amir as agents of the Russian government,
and on one pretext or another some person recognised by the Afghan government
as a Russian agent is now almost constantly at Kabul. We desire to submit to
your Lordship's consideration whether our own conduct would be viewed with
indifference by the cabinet of St Petersburg were the Government of India to
open similarly friendly relations with the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara. 12
i Granville to Loftus, 8 January, 1873 (Parl. Papers, 1873, LXXV, 706).
· Fitzmaurice, op. cil. II, 409, 411.
3 Parl. Papers, 1874, Lxxvi, 176.
• Idem, 1878, Lxxx, 466.
5 Rawlinson, op. cit. p. 338; Parl. Papers, 1878, LXXX, 474, 475.
& Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 33.
: Dispatch to Salisbury, 18 September, 1876 (Parl. Papers, 1878, 'xxx, 537).
8 Derby to Loftus, 2 October, 1876 (idem, 534).
• Loftus to Derby, 15 November, 1876 (idem, 543; cf. 549).
19 Salisbury to Derby, 27 January, 1877 (idem, 553).
11 De Giers to Loftus, 5 March, 1877 (idem, 559).
1: Dispatch to Salisbury, 3 May, 1877 (idem, 565).
7


## p. 414 (#452) ############################################

414
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
1
>
1
>
Considerations of this kind, then, occasioned a reversal of the policy
hitherto followed by the British Government towards the amir. Till
1874 that policy had been one of general inaction, of subsidies, smooth
words, and an amiable acceptance of Russian assurances. The amir
had wanted a definite agreement. Not getting it, he had inclined
towards Russia, and listened, or at all events seemed to listen, to
Russian overtures, either with a serious purpose of seeking external
support from Tashkent or in the hope of alarming the Government of
India into conceding what he wanted, or perhaps in the hope of being
able to balance himself between the two greai states-a policy de-
manding greater dexterity and more accurate information than the
amir could command. But the new cabinet at London with dis-
concerting abruptness resolved upon action. It took the view which
Lord Dufferin expressed so pointedly a few years later. “It would be
manifestly futile”, he wrote, “to base the safety of the North-Western
Frontier of India upon any understanding, stipulation, convention
or treaty with the imperial government. For this view Dufferin
assigned a specific reason.
"I do not mean to imply”, he continued, “that the emperor and his ministers
would wilfully violate their engagements; but the authority of the Russian execu-
tive is so slight, the control it exercises over its distant agents and military chiefs
is so unsteady, and its policy is so designedly tentative, while the forces which
stimulate the aggressive instincts of the nation are so constant, that little reliance
could be ultimately placed upon mere verbal guarantees. ”
Salisbury resolved to seek additional security in two directions-
by occupying a more commanding position on the Afghan frontier
itself, and by inducing the amir to accept British agents within his
territories. The first measure had been eagerly advocated and bitterly
opposed for a long time. Jacob, Rawlinson, Green and Frere had all
urged the need of occupying Quetta, in order to establish a post on
the further side of the hills, control the road to Kandahar, and threaten
the flank of any invader seeking to move through the Khyber or
Kurram Passes. Against these opinions was all the weight of
Lawrence's influence, still strong on the council of the governor-
general and the Council of India. But times had changed and
Lawrence's arguments had come to seem far less unanswerable than
before the advance of Russia. Despite the prolonged visits of elderly
gentlemen who “positively stamped about the room”,? Salisbury
approved the occupation of Quetta under the treaty signed with the
Khan of Kalat at the close of 1876. 3 These negotiations with Kalat
had two objects, the first was military, as indicated above. The second
was political. If the amir altogether refused to accept English agents,
the Kalat mission might be “the father of the Central Asian Mission
1 Dufferin to Salisbury, 16 March, 1880 (F. 0. 65-1099).
Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Salisbury, 11, 159.
3 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 96 599.


## p. 415 (#453) ############################################

THE PROPOSED MISSION
415
>
a
of the future. The agent would reside. . . chiefly at Quetta. . . . He
would have leisure for collecting information from Candahar-Herat
-Cabul—and Balkh. . . . English rupees would try conclusions with
Russian roubles in the zenana and the divan". 1
In Salisbury's mind this political object was certainly the more
immediate matter. In Afghanistan the Government of India was
represented only by a Muslim agent who wrote (Salisbury thought)
exactly what the amir tells him”, and whose reports did not tally
with other reports received. ? The consequent uncertainty was much
more than a formal disadvantage. Early in 1875 the secretary of state
wrote to the governor-general, Northbrook, “It has the effect of
placing upon our frontier a thick covert, behind which any amount of
hostile intrigue and conspiracy may be masked. I agree with you in
thinking that a Russian advance upon India is a chimaera. But I am
by no means sure that an attempt to throw the Afghans upon us is so
improbable”. : He therefore directed measures to obtain the estab-
lishment of a British agent at Herat, where the amir had already
expressed his readiness to receive one.
This decision was at once criticised on the ground that Sher 'Ali
had never given any formal promise to this effect. But Salisbury did
not assert that he had, and Northbrook himself had to admit that the
amir had “appeared to consent" on condition of the agreement which
had been refused him at Simla. However, he pleaded that the
measure was needless, the time inopportune, and the probable con-
sequence war. ? Salisbury replied in a long and closely reasoned
dispatch. The undoubted conflict between the declared policy of the
Russian Government and the actual conduct of its frontier officials
made absolute the need of speedy and accurate information. “The
case is quite conceivable in which Her Majesty's Government may
be able, by early diplomatic action, to arrest proceedings on the
frontier which a few weeks, or even days later, will have passed beyond
the power even of the government of St Petersburg to control. ” His
orders were therefore to be carried into effect. 8 Northbrook resigned
rather than obey, and Lytton was then appointed governor-general.
He carried with him instructions to send a mission to the amir by way
of Quetta and Kandahar to obtain Sher 'Ali's assent to the establish-
ment of a permanent mission. In return the amir might be conceded
the terms which he had asked for in 1873. 8
After overcoming opposition within his council,10 Lytton broached
· Salisbury to Lytton, 22 August, 1876 (Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 74).
• Salisbury to Disraeli, 2 January, 1875 (idem, 11, 71).
• Salisbury to Northbrook, 19 February, 1875 (idem).
• Same to same, 22 January, 1875 (Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 502).
• Northbrook to Salisbury, 20 May, 1875 (Mallet, Northbrook, pp. 101 599. ).
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 503.
? Mallet, op. cit. p. 105.
& Dispatch to Government of India, 19 November, 1875 (Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 521).
• Dispatch to the governor-general, 28 February, 1876, and encl. (idem, 530).
10 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 64 599.
.


## p. 416 (#454) ############################################

416
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
the reception of the special temporary mission to the amir. This was
declined, but an Afghan envoy was sent to discuss matters with the
British authorities at Peshawar. The negotiations, protracted by re-
ferences to Kabul, lasted from October, 1876, till March, 1877, and
ended in complete failure. " It has been usual to lay the blame for this
upon the policy of Salisbury, and no doubt Salisbury's policy was
foredoomed to failure. What Sher 'Ali would have conceded in 1873
he would not grant in 1876. But unless it is argued that British
influence in Afghanistan was worthless, greater blame attaches to
Argyll for throwing away the golden opportunity of 1873 than to
Salisbury for seeking to retrieve his predecessor's error. European
affairs were moving to a crisis. A continuation of the policy of
quiescence would permit Russia to strengthen her growing influence
over the amir and thereby greatly to increase her power of hampering
British foreign policy. European conditions required that Sher 'Ali
should make an open choice between British and Russian friendship,
for, if he was not a friend to Great Britain, he was a dangerous
potential enemy. “A tool in the hands of Russia”, Lytton said, “I will
never allow him to become. Such a tool it would be my duty to break
before it could be used. "'2
In Europe the Balkan troubles had given rise to a situation of
exceptional anxicty and strain. In 1875 a rebellion had broken out
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading in 1877 to the Russo-Turkish
War. These events intensified the antagonism of Anglo-Russian rela-
tions. For a year and more after the outbreak of the war a conflict
between the two great powers was by many thought inevitable. Both
sought every means within their reach to limit and control the action
of the other. On the one side the British occupied Quetta in 1877,
and on the other, as British hostility developed to the treaty of San
Stefano, and when Indian troops were dispatched to Malta, the
governor-general of Turkestan sought a specific alliance with the amir
of Afghanistan and initiated a military movement in the direction of
India. In the circumstances of the time nothing less could have been
expected. But the episode also indicated clearly what had been the
underlying motive of Russian policy in Central Asia for the previous
quarter of a century.
The Peshawar discussions had led nowhere. The main reason which
Sher 'Ali had alleged for refusing to receive an English mission had
been that acceptance would prevent his refusing to accept a Russian
mission. His argument proves how much ground had been lost by
1876, for it shows that he had come to regard the Russians and the
British as on an equal footing. He had not done so in 1873. Nor even
now did his answer expose the whole situation that had developed.
For the moment the British proposal was dropped. But relations with
Dispatch to Salisbury, 10 May, 1877 (Parl. Papers, 1878–9, LVI, 534).
Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 30.
a


## p. 417 (#455) ############################################

STOLIETOFF'S MISSION
417
a
Kaufmann grew ever closer. In June, 1878, they culminated in a
letter written by the Russian governor-general to the amir, informing
him that the external relations of Afghanistan required “deep con-
sideration”, and that he was sending a Russian officer-Stolietoff-
“to inform you of all that is hidden in my mind". 1 The envoy carried
”
with him a draft treaty offering terms very similar to those Lytton
had offered at Peshawar-recognition of the heir apparent and
assistance against any external enemy. In case these proposals
should be declined, Kaufmann entered into tentative discussions with
Abd-ur-rahn:an, Sher 'Ali's fugitive nephew. At the same time three
-
columns of troops marched from Tashkent in the direction of the
Afghan frontiers. The Government of India was well served by its
agents. On 9 June it had heard of Stolietoff's intended dispatch; on
the 24th it believed that he had set out. He had in fact left Tashkent
on 13 June—the day on which the Berlin Congress met. His approach
tested the sincerity of Sher 'Ali's excuses to Lytton. Instead of meeting
with any firm refusal, the mission found at the frontier half-hearted,
probably mere ostensible orders not to enter thu country. It ignored
them and arrived at Kabul on 22 July without a shadow of resistance.
On the 21st Stolietoff is said to have received a dispatch from Kauf-
mann, informing him of the settlement reached at Berlin and warning
him not to make any positive promises to the amir. The marching
columns had of course been recalled. .
The envoy's arrival and reception at Kabul raised in an acute form
the question of British relations with the amir. The case anticipated
by Dalhousie had arisen. ? Lytton sought and obtained the home
government's approval for his insisting on Sher 'Ali's acceptance of
an English mission. 8 The letter announcing that an envoy would be
sent arrived at Kabul on 17 August. Abdullah Jan, Sher 'Ali's heir
apparent, died the same day. This event offered a convenient pretext
for deferring an answer. But the letter was read in durbar; Stolietoff
urged the amir to delay matters and if necessary prevent the English
mission from reaching Kabul while he travelled to Tashkent to inform
Kaufmann, who would inform the emperor and thus compel Great
Britain to desist from her demands. ' On the 23rd Sher 'Ali wrote his
reply to Kaufmann, saying that Stolietoff had “reduced to writing
the verbal representations, the object of which was to strengthen the
friendly relations between the illustrious government of His Imperial
Majesty the Emperor and the God-granted government of Afghani-
stan”, and would soon return with the writer's replies. 10 On 21 Sep-
1 Kaufmann to Sher 'Ali, June, 1878 (Parl. Papers, 1881, xcvm, 350).
2 Idem, 351; cf. Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, 11, 248.
3 Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. 1, 149.
* Parl. Papers, 1878, LXXXI, 584, 591.
5 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 247. 6 Roberts, op. cit. II, 110.
? Vide p. 405, supra:
& Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 603.
• Roberts's report based on Yakub's information (Roberts, op. cit. 11, 469).
10 Parl. Papers, 1881, XCVIII, 350.
27
CHIVI


## p. 418 (#456) ############################################

418
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
» 2
3
tember Neville Chamberlain, the envoy whom Lytton had chosen, was
prevented by threats of violence from passing Ali Masjid. 1 Sher 'Ali
had accepted Stolietoff's advice and resolved to defy the Government
of India.
"The amir's policy”, Lytton wrote, “was to make fools of us in the sight of all
Central Asia and all India without affording us any pretext for active resentment,
My policy was naturally to force the amir either to change his policy or to reveal
it in such a manner as must make the public a partner with the government in the
duty of counteracting it. ” ?
Lytton has generally been represented as taking an over-serious
view of the situation. But the problem was twofold. It was not
merely that of a possible invasion of India. It also included the results
of a widespread belief in its likelihood. Salisbury might scout the
possibility, advise the use of large-scale maps, and point to the essential
weakness of Russia, but an invasion of India was “a common topic
of conversation in every assemblage of chiefs between Tabriz and
Peshawur”. 4 The fundamental weakness of past policy had been that
it had left Russia free to advance so that the day was visibly threatening
when the spheres of interest of the two empires would meet, not at a
convenient distance from, but actually on the Indian frontier. “It
may be very convenient", wrote Frere with great truth, “to say we
will be guided by circumstances; but that is not the sort of policy
which wins friends and deters enemies. "
In the dispatch of the mission Lytton had overrun the wishes of
Beaconsfield and Salisbury. Both were extremely anxious to see the
Russian forces withdrawn from Turkish territory, and feared lest a
sudden flare-up of Afghan difficulties might endanger the execution
of the Treaty of Berlin. They would have preferred to see the Afghan
trouble smoothed over or at all events put off for a twelvemonth; but
Beaconsfield's language and views seem to have varied from day to
day, with the result that the instructions sent to Lytton by the India
Office were not so clear and specific as was expected. It had been
desired that the mission to the amir should proceed not by the Khyber
Pass, where it was expected and likely to be stopped, but by way of
the Bolan and Kandahar where opposition would have been more
difficult and unlikely. ” But the choice of routes seems to have been
left to Lytton, who chose the more provocative. On 25 and 30 October
stormy meetings of the cabinet took place. Salisbury and the Lord
Chancellor severely attacked Lytton's conduct and urged the ex-
pediency of curbing his future proceedings. Cranbrook, the secretary
of state for India, strongly defended the governor-general. In the
interests of cabinet unity Beaconsfield proposed that Lytton should
• Forrest, Life of Sir Neville Chamberlain, pp. 479. 999;
: Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 285.
Cf. Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 128, 142.
• Frere, Letter to Durand, p. 44.
• Martineau, op. cit. 1, 239.
• Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, vi, 380 599.
' Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 341.


## p. 419 (#457) ############################################

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR
419
2
be authorised to occupy the Kurram valley, not as an act of war
but as the taking of a "material guarantee” for the granting of the
English demands. But when it seemed likely that this would be
adopted, Cranbrook refused to have anything to do with so half-
hearted a measure. At last Lytton's and Cranbrook's views prevailed. 1
On 2 November an ultimatum, expiring on the 20th, was dispatched
to Sher 'Ali. The amir had already applied to Kaufmann for assistance
in view of the threatening English attitude, which he rightly ascribed
to the arrival of the Russian mission. 2 Kaufmann advised Sher 'Ali
to make peace if he could. In fact the Russian agents had fallen into
the pit which they had dug for others. Reckoning too hopefully on
the approach of an Anglo-Russian war, they had led Sher 'Ali into
relying on their support, at the moment when they found themselves
unable to accord it. Lytton and Cranbrook were right in seizing this
precise moment to re-establish British ascendancy at Kabul, when
Sher 'Ali's hostility was manifest, when Russian intervention would
have involved tearing up the agreement reached so lately at Berlin,
and when Russian resources, financial and military, were depleted
by the recent war.
The campaign which began with the invasion of Afghan territory
on 20 November was skilfully conducted and speedily successful. *
Two columns advanced by the Kurram and the Khyber passes. On
22 December Sher 'Ali issued a farman in which, after recounting his
numerous triumphs over the invaders, he announced his retirement
into Russian territory. " He died early in 1879, and negotiations were
opened with his son' Yakub leading to the Treaty of Gandammak,
signed 26 May, 1879, before the British forces had entered Kabul.
By this agreement the new amir assigned the districts of Kurram,
Pishin and Sibi to the British Government; he agreed to conduct his
relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice of the
governor-general; and he agreed to accept a permanent British re-
presentative, who was to be stationed at Kabul. s Every object which
had been sought thus seemed to have been secured.
The doubtful point was whether Amir Yakub would succeed in
maintaining his position. Cavagnari, the political agent who had
conducted the negotiations, had not been much impressed by his
talent and character, reporting him as the best of his family, but fickle
of purpose, ignorant of business, and weak of mind. ' The estimate
was not unjust. Roberts noted his shifty eye, retreating forehead, and
lack of vigour. 10 His weakness had already been displayed. Lytton
Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit. VI, 386; Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 342.
: Parl. Papers, 1881, XCVII, 353.
• The best account is probably to be found in Roberts, op. cit. chaps. xlv 599.
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 702.
• Idem, 355.
• Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 313.
' Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 691.
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 691; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 326 sqq.
• Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 322.
10 Roberts, op. cit. 11, 202.
.
27-2


## p. 420 (#458) ############################################

420
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
3
had strongly desired the establishment of a British mission, but had
contemplated its residence at Herat, not at Kabul. Yakub, however,
had himself proposed Kabul, willing to run any risk provided he
could secure the support of the British army. The proposal was
accepted with some misgivings. Cavagnari, resolute and forceful,
was named resident-an admirable man in a crisis, but less suited for
a position of delicacy. He reached Kabul on 24 July. He was well
received with an Afghan rendering of God save the Queen. On
3 September he was murdered in the course of a real or pretended
mutiny of unpaid troops.